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THE

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JANUARY, 1862.

ARTICLE I.

CHRIST PREACHING TO THE SPIRITS IN PRISON.[1]

BY REV. JAMES B. MILES, CHARLESTOWN, MASS.

This passage translated in the English authorized version stands: "For Christ also hath once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God, being put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the spirit; by which also he went and preached unto the spirits in prison."

Before entering upon a criticism on this text of scripture, we are constrained to remark that among obscure passages we think this may be set down as *locus vexativissimus*, or the place of all most difficult of satisfactory interpretation. In regard to it, pertinent are the remarks of Camerarius, a devout and learned man, and friend of Melanchthon: "Est hic unus ex iis locis sacrarum literarum, de quibus pietas religiosa quaerere amplius et dubitare quid dicatur, sine reprehensione: et de quibus diversae etiam sententiae admitti posse videantur, dummodo non detorqueatur *κανὼν τοῦ τὸ* αὐτὸ φρονεῖν, id est religiosa de fide consensio, neque aberretur ἀπὸ τῆς ἀναλογίας τῆς πίστεως." This is, indeed, one of those places of the sacred scriptures concerning which it is devout piety to prosecute investigation, and to be in doubt what to say without blame, and concerning which even different opinions seem to be admissible, provided the canon of being like minded, that is, religious agreement in the faith, is not wrested, and we do not deviate from the analogy of the faith. It is hardly to be thought strange that the fiery Luther, baffled by the difficulties of this text, breaks out: "By this penalty, so terrible, the apostle Peter seems also moved that, not otherwise than as a fanatic, he speaks such words as not even at this day are able to be understood by us." Of this passage the learned Dr. Brown of Edinburgh cogently says: "The observation of the apostle Peter respecting his beloved brother Paul is applicable to himself. In his Epistles there are some things hard to be understood, which the unlearned and the unstable wrest to their own destruction, and this is one of them. Few passages have received a greater variety of interpretation; and he would prove more satisfactorily his self-confidence than his wisdom, who should assert that *his* interpretation was undoubtedly the true one." But our task has not been simplified, but rendered tenfold more perplexing by this very variety of interpretation. The remark of that profound biblical scholar and holy man, Archbishop Leighton, seems to us quite just. "This place is somewhat obscure in itself, but as it usually happens, made more so by the various fancies and contests of interpreters, aiming or pretending to clear it. These I like never to make a noise of." (Leighton's Comment. First Epist. Pet.) We have not the presumption to expect, from our present investigation, to reach conclusions respecting the meaning of this vexed passage which will be entirely satisfactory to all. And yet, the fact that many eminent scholars have failed in their attempts at an explanation should not deter even the humblest from an additional endeavor to ascertain its meaning. For the same inspired apostle who has left us this obscure text assures us that "No prophecy of the scripture is of any private interpretation." And we shall not soon forget a favorite expression of a beloved theological teacher, who now no longer sees "through a glass darkly," and who was himself a giant. He was wont to say: "A dwarf is not so tall as a giant. But then a dwarf standing upon a giant's shoulders can see farther than the giant himself." In harmony with this utterance is the memorable remark of Lord Bacon: "I have been laboring to render myself useless." The deep wisdom of these words time has proved. Truths which in Bacon's time must be defended by labored argumentation, in the march of intelligence have become axiomatic. In no department has progress been more marked than in that of sacred hermeneutics. What with the tomes that have been written in verification of the inspired text, in defence of the sacred canon, and in explanation of its words and phrases, the shelves of our theological libraries fairly groan. The battle in respect to the genuineness of the text *seems* to have been nearly fought through. Scholars, in all lands, and of all shades of religious belief, seem nearly agreed on this point. And interpreters, in successive centuries, availing themselves of the results attained by their predecessors, have been finding the key to the meaning of one and another obscure text, so that now few passages, comparatively, remain inexplicable; these few, let it be gratefully acknowledged, pertain not to the essential facts and doctrines of the gospel. Often has the Word of God been tried, and from each trial it has emerged with heightened lustre. All real advance in knowledge of the sacred languages, biblical criticism and antiquities, topography, oriental manners and customs, sheds light upon some dark places of scripture. We can have no doubt the day is coming in which the meaning of the passage we have under consideration, will become luminous. If our present effort shall direct to this scripture such attention and elicit such discussion as will in any degree remove its obscurity, our expectations will have been met.

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[1] An Exposition of 1 Peter, iii. 18, 19.

Our first enquiry naturally is: What precisely are the inspired words that compose the passage whose meaning we wish to ascertain? In the Greek texts most worthy of confidence, like those of Scholz, Lachmann, Griesbach, Tischendorf, and Alford, they are as follows: *Ὅτι καὶ Χριστὸς ἅπαξ περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν ἔπαϑε, δίκαιος ὑπὲρ ἀδίκων, ἵνα ἡμᾶς προσαγάγῃ τῷ ϑεῷ, ϑανατωϑεὶς μὲν σαρκί, ζωοποιηϑεὶς δὲ πνεύματι, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τοῖς ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύμασι πορευϑεὶς ἐκήρυξεν.* Stephens, Beza, and the Elzevir edition insert the article *τῷ* before *πνεύματι*, but the best critics pronounce this reading void of authority. Have, now, our translators, not in one jot or tittle, changed the sense expressed by the Greek? We ask this question with feelings bordering upon reverence, for we believe our version, with comparatively few exceptions, faithfully renders the original. But this passage is one of the exceptions. The last clause of the eighteenth verse in the Greek reads *ϑανατωϑεὶς μὲν σαρκί, ζωοποιηϑεὶς δὲ πνεύματι.* It will be observed there are no prepositions in the original and that the two members of the clause are antithetical. This is clearly one of the cases denominated, by Bishop Lowth, *antithetical parallels.* *ζωοποιηϑεὶς δὲ πνεύματι* is set over against *ϑανατωϑεὶς μὲν σαρκί*; *ζωοποιηϑείς* being contrasted with *ϑανατωϑείς*, and *πνεύματι* with *σαρκί.* The conjunctive particles, *μέν* in one member of the clause, and *δέ* in the other member, establish the antithesis. Now the laws of the Greek language, in such cases, require us to give the same construction to the two Datives *πνεύματι* and *σαρκί.* We violate no principle of grammar in using either *in* or *by*, or, in fact, any one of a large number of prepositions, with these Datives. For in Greek the Dative is very comprehensive, representing all that in Latin is denoted by the Dative and Ablative, and holding a relation to the tenor of the sentence not so close or essential as that of the Accusative or Genitive. (See Winer, Gram. of N. T., Vol. I. Sect. 31, where the subject of the Dative is treated exhaustively.) But wide as is the range of construction in respect to the Dative in the present instance, whatever preposition we use in one member of the clause, we must employ the same, or an equivalent preposition, in the other member. If we translate *ϑανατωϑεὶς μὲν σαρκί,* "put to death *in* the flesh," we must also render ζωοποιηϑεὶς δὲ πνεύματι, quickened *in* the Spirit," and *vice versâ*. The rendering "quickened *by* the Spirit" requires "put to death *by* the flesh." Utterly void of authority, and in violation of the laws of New Test. Greek is the translation which we have: "*put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the Spirit.*" Now the objections to the translation of ϑανατωϑεὶς μὲν σαρκί by the words "being put to death *by* the flesh," are, in the first place, the omission in the Greek of the article before σαρκί; and, in the second place, the phrase is unintelligible. For in this case we must understand by σαρκί, "flesh," either Christ's *material body*, or else, *man*, *mankind*, *the race*. Give to σαρκί the former sense, and the reading will be *Christ was put to death by his body*. But if this assertion has any meaning, it must assert a falsehood. Nor can σαρκί be taken to mean *mankind*, the *race*. For although the assertion then being "Christ was put to death by men" expresses an important fact, yet the *usus loquendi* forbids this translation of σαρκί. Except in the Hebraism πᾶσα σάρξ which is a literal translation of the Hebrew כָּל־בָּשָׂר by two terms, which in the one language as well as the other, signify "all flesh" and mean "all mankind at large," σάρξ in the sense of *men* is not used by the Greek writers. Sometimes the Hebraism is strengthened by the addition of a negative particle. In Hebrew לֹא כָּל־בָּשָׂר, *not all flesh* is equivalent to *no flesh*, and in the same sense οὐ πᾶσα σάρξ is used in the New Testament, Matt. xxiv. 22; 1 Cor. i. 29. (Winer Gram. N. T., Vol. I. Sect. 26; Fairbairn's Herm. Man. Sect. 2.) The correct translation, then, is as follows: "*For Christ, also, hath once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God, being put to death, indeed, in flesh, but quickened in spirit, in which he going preached even to the spirits in prison.*" In favor of the essential correctness of this translation we have the authority of many ancient versions. The Vulgate of Jerome, which among these holds the first place as an authority, reads: "Mortuus est autem corpore, et vixit spiritu," died in body, and lived in spirit. The Peschito Syriac, the oldest of all versions, renders the passage, according to Dr. Murdock's translation: "He died in body and lived in spirit." Wiclif (1380): "Maad deede sotheli in flesch, forsothe maad quike in spirit. Tyndale (1534): "Was killed as pertaynynge to the flesshe, but was quyckened in the sprete." Coverdale (1535): "Was slayne after the flesh, but quyckened after the spirit." The Geneva version (1557) agrees with Tyndale's. Rheim's (1582) reads: "Mortified certes in flesh, but quickened in spirit." Luther: "Und ist getödtet nach dem fleische, aber lebendig gemacht nach dem geiste."

What now is the interpretation of this language? In answering this inquiry it may be of service to advert briefly to some of the important explanations which the passage has received, or to some of the important dogmas it has been supposed to support.

1. From this text that ancient and remarkable symbol, the Apostles' creed, has derived the article "He [Christ] descended into hell." There is no evidence, however, that this article formed a part of the original Apostles' creed. On the contrary, Bishop Pearson in his celebrated Exposition of the Creed says: "This article of the *descent into hell*, hath not been so anciently in the creed or so universally as the rest. The first place we find it used in, was the Church of Aquileia; and the time we are sure it was used in the creed of that church was less than 400 years after Christ. After that it came into the *Roman creed* and others, and hath been acknowledged as a part of the *Apostles'* creed ever since." That by many, at least, who accept the Apostles' creed as their formulary of doctrine, the article "he descended into hell" is thought to express the sense of the passage under consideration is evident from the following statement of Pearson: "The Church of England at the Reformation, as it received the *three creeds*, in *two* of which this article is contained, so did it also make this one of the articles of religion, to which all who are admitted to any benefice, or received into holy orders, are obliged to subscribe. And at the first reception it was propounded with a certain explication, and thus delivered in the fourth year of King

Edward the Sixth, with reference to an express place of scripture interpreted of this *descent*. That the body of Christ lay in the grave until his resurrection; but his spirit, which he gave up, was with the spirits which were detained in prison, or in hell (in carcere sive in inferno), and preached to them, as the place in St. Peter (1 Ep. iii. 19) testifieth." And again: "This text did our church first deliver as the proof and illustration of the descent, and the ancient Fathers did apply the same in the like manner to the proof of this article." "This place was also made use of in the exposition of the creed contained in the catechism set forth by the authority of King Edward, in the seventh year of his reign." Now we are aware the question may be asked with some pertinency: How does this statement of the creed exhibit what was thought to be the sense of this text; for has not this article of the creed received an almost endless diversity of exposition? Thus, is not the comment, as not seldom happens, more unintelligible than the text? The interpretations of the article are, indeed, well-nigh legion. But the most of them *explain away*, rather than *explain* it. A careful consideration of the circumstances that led to its introduction, and a critical examination of the language used in reference to it in subsequent times, prove that a vast majority of the adherents of the creed have understood this article, and hence also the scripture upon which the article is founded, to imply the dogma of an "Intermediate State;" in other words, that the souls of men at death do not enter immediately upon their reward or into their punishment, but descend to the lower regions, to some subterranean caverns, where the righteous experience, for a time, until the resurrection, comparative happiness, and the wicked comparative misery; and that Christ passed the three days between his death and resurrection in this nether world, preaching to the disembodied spirits there.

This dogma appears at different times and places variously modified, but in its fundamental idea essentially the same. Some maintain that Christ's mission to souls in the intermediate state was undertaken for the benefit of the spirits of the righteous only; others, that it had exclusive reference to the spirits of the wicked; and others still, that it embraced both the righteous and the wicked. That we have given the prominent and prevailing interpretation of the article, "He descended into hell," appears evident, in the first place, from the fact that this exposition accords with the general belief of the times in which the article originated. By the word "hell," as used in the creed, we are not to understand the place of the future torments of the wicked, described in the New Testament, as is clear from the ancient manuscripts, which read *Descendit in inferna*, or *ad inferna*, or *ad inferas*, which Dr. Pearson explains as follows. "As *manes* is not only put for the souls below, but also for the place, as in the poet: "Manesque profundi," and "Haec manes veniat mihi fama sub imas;" so *inferi* is most frequently used for the place under ground where the souls departed are, and the *inferna* must then be those regions in which they take up their habitations. The Greek equivalent for the Latin "inferi" and "inferna" is "hades," and, like them, it denoted originally the common receptacle of the departed, which was divided into two distinct spheres or compartments, one for the good, termed elysium, the other for the wicked, called tartarus. "Now the word 'infernus,' in Latin, comprehends the receptacle of all the dead, and contains both *elysium*, the place of the blessed, and *tartarus*, the abode of the miserable. The term '*inferi*,' comprehends all the inhabitants, good and bad, happy and wretched. The Latin words 'infernus' and 'inferi' bear evident traces of the notion that the repository of the souls of the departed is under ground. This appears also to have been the opinion of both Greeks and Hebrews, and indeed of all antiquity" (Campbell Prelim. Diss. on the Gospels). That the Hebrew theory in respect to the destination of disembodied spirits was fundamentally the same with that contained in the poetry and mythology of Greece and Rome, can be conclusively shown by an examination of the Old Testament. "In regard to the situation of hades," says Dr. Campbell, "it seems always to have been conceived, by both Jews and pagans, as in the lower parts of the earth, near its centre, as we should term it, or its foundation (according to the notions of the Hebrews, who knew nothing of its spherical figure), and answering in depth to the visible heavens in height; both which are, on this account, oftener than once, contrasted in sacred writ." And again: "Of the coincidence of the Hebrew notions and the pagan, in regard to the situation of the place of departed spirits, if it were necessary to add anything to what has been observed above, those beautiful lines of Virgil might suffice" (Aen. 8 B). Dr. Fairbairn, the learned professor of Divinity in the College of Glasgow, remarks: "The sheol of the Hebrews bore so much of a common resemblance to the hades of the Greeks, that, in the Septuagint, hades is the word commonly employed as an equivalent, and in the latter periods of the Jewish commonwealth the two words were viewed as of substantially like import. According also to the Hebrew mode of contemplation, there was a common receptacle for the spirits of the departed; and a receptacle which was conceived of as occupying, in relations to this world, a lower sphere — under ground. Hence they spoke of *going down* to sheol, or of being *brought up* again from it. Josephus, when describing in this respect the belief of the Pharisees, which was undoubtedly the common belief of his countrymen, says: 'They believe that souls have an immortal vigor in them, and that under the earth there will be rewards or punishments, according as they have lived virtuously or viciously in this life; that the latter are to be detained in an everlasting prison, but that the former shall have power to revive and live again' (Ant. 18, 1. 3). The language of earlier times perfectly accords with these views, so far as it refers to points embraced in them. For example, Gen. xlii. 38; Ps. cxxxix. 8; Ps. xxx. Isa. xiv. Beyond doubt, therefore, sheol, like hades, was regarded as the abode, after death, alike of the good and the bad. And the conception of its low, deep, subterranean position is not only implied in the general style of thought and expression on the subject, but is sometimes very forcibly exhibited. For example, Deut. xxxii. 22; Job.

xi. 7–9; Amos ix. 2. The sheol of the Hebrews much more nearly coincides with the hades of the Greeks, than with either our hell (in its now universally received acceptation) or the grave." "Along, however, with these points of obvious agreement between the sheol of the Hebrews and the hades of the Greeks, there were points, two inparticular, of actual diversity. One was that sheol was not, in the estimation of the Hebrews, a final, but only an intermediate state. It was the soul's place of rest, and it might be, for aught they knew, of absolute quiescence during its state of separation from the body, but from which it was again to emerge, when the time should come for the resurrection of the dead. Closely connected with this was the other, that sheol was not viewed as a separate realm, like hades, withdrawn from the primal fountain of life. With the heathen, the Lord of the lower regions was the rival of the King of the earth and heaven. But with the more enlightened Hebrew there was no real separation between the two." Such, then, were the views respecting the destination of the departed prevailing in the early ages of the church. "At the Christian Era, popular phraseology would have made little distinction between the fact of a man's death and the idea of his descent to the lower regions. The latter was regarded as implied in the former." (Huidekoper, Christ's Mission to the Underworld.) Says Tertullian: "To us the nether world (inferi) is not an exposed cavity, nor any open receptacle for the bilge water of the world; but a vast region extending upward and downward in the earth, a profundity hid away in its very bowels. For we read that Christ passed the three days of his death in the heart of the earth, that is, in an internal recess, hidden in the earth itself, and hollowed out within it, and based upon yet lower abysses" (De Anima, c. 55). The language of Irenaeus, as translated by Prof. Huidekoper, is: "Therefore the Lord descended to the regions under the earth, preaching to them also his advent, the sins of such as believed on him being remitted." In a controversy with Celsus, Origen uses this language: "With a soul divested of its body, Christ discoursed to souls divested of their bodies." In short, scarcely any dogma stands out more conspicuously upon the pages of patristic theology than this. Our limits do not allow us to quote the passages of the Old Testament that were regarded as predictions of Christ's mission to souls in their intermediate state. Says Bishop Pearson: "Many have been the interepretations of the opinion of the Fathers made of late; and their differences are made to appear so great, as if they agreed in nothing which concerns this point; whereas there is nothing which they agree in more than this, which I have already affirmed, the real descent of the soul of Christ unto the habitation of the souls departed. The persons to whom, and end for which he descended, they differ in; but as to a local descent into the infernal parts, they all agree."

Such, then, was the interpretation given to this text by the church, regarded as a whole, at the time the fifth article was introduced into the creed. Indeed, we may say this interpretation, in all its essential features, has been generally maintained down to the present time. Dr. Bloomfield says: "the opinion that Christ went down and preached (i. e. proclaimed his Gospel) to the antediluvians in hades, is the *common* one, supported by the ancient and many of the ablest modern expositors." Bishop Horsley, in a sermon upon this text, maintains the same view, and asserts that "prison," as here used, is the "hell of the Apostles' creed." So, also, Dr. Christopher Wordsworth, in his very learned and discriminating commentary upon this passage, founds his exposition upon the same idea. His language is: "Christ after death went in his disembodied spirit to the nether world. Death opened to him a new sphere of missionary enterprise. He went and preached to the spirits in prison. He made *two journeys*, one downward, in his human spirit, to the nether world of disembodied spirits, and another upward, in his risen body reunited to his spirit, to the heavenly world, and to the right hand of God. Christ, who before had preached on earth to man in bodily presence, now, after his removal from them by death, preached *also*, or *even*, to human spirits in the region under the earth." De Wette, also, finds in this text the same fundamental idea. According to him, the passage teaches that Christ, in his spiritual personality (die geistige persönlichkeit), went not to the entire under-world, but to that department assigned to unbelievers. "Was den *Ort* betrifft, wohin Christus ging, so ist es nicht die ganze Unterwelt, sondern der verwahrungsort der im Unglauben abgeschiedenen Geister in derselben."

But this interpretation, which, with all its modifications, retains the notion of the local descent of Christ's spirit to a common depository or receptacle of departed spirits, we cannot accept as the true one. For if we do receive it, it must be for one or the other of the two following reasons. (1.) In the first place, either that it accords with the general drift and scope of the teachings of Christianity on the subject; or (2.), in the second place, that the apostle Peter uses this language by *accommodation*, or "*ex vulgari opinione*." In other words, that the apostle conforms his language to the erroneous opinions and narrow prejudices of the people of his time. But this theory of an "intermediate state," and Christ's mission to souls in it, is not in harmony with the general tenor of the New Testament. It savors too much of paganism. That the notion of a common subterranean mansion for the spirits of the departed should have been entertained before the Sun of Righteousness arose upon the world, is not strange. Such a notion would seem to be the natural result of the practice of burying the body, and the soul's native presentiment of its own continued existence. It ought to excite no surprise to find this notion upon almost every page of the poetry and mythology of Greece and Rome. Nor, indeed, is it wonderful that the Hebrews, anterior to the advent of Christ, held the same opinion. For we must remember they had received no distinct revelation of the future state. The Law and the Prophets contained only "slight hints," "faint dawnings," of a scheme which was to bring "life and immortality to light." "As for a future state of retribution in another world, Moses said nothing to the Israelites about that. Whatever may at any time have been revealed to himself, and to some other highly-favored individuals, on that subject, it does not appear that he was commissioned to deliver to the people any revelation at all concerning a future state. This was reserved for a *greater* than Moses, and for a more glorious dispensation than his law. For, as we read in the Epistle to the Hebrews, "the law *made nothing perfect;* but the *bringing in of a better hope* did (Heb. 10); namely, the promises given through Jesus Christ, who brought life and immortality to light, *through the gospel.*" (See Whately, Encyc. Britan., Vol. I. Dis. 3.) This idea of an intermediate state holds one relation to an age in which the future state was a dim and uncertain prospect, but quite another to the time when the future state is a clear and shining revelation. One of the great and distinctive characteristics of the gospel is, that it brings life and immortality *to light.* Christ takes this momentous doctrine of the destination of the soul after death out of the sphere of uncertainty, conjecture, and shadow, and places it in the realm of *actual knowledge.* This is just what might be inferred from the relation of the Jewish religion to Christianity. On this point Dr. Barrow forcibly remarks: "As God did not by the Jewish religion speak his mind to all, so did he not therein speak out all his mind. As rivers run into the sea, as shadows flee before the sun, so these small and shallow, these dusky and faint revelations, would discharge themselves into, would vanish before, a complete and universal one." (Bar. Disc. Auth. of Chris.)

Does, then, the New Testament countenance the notion of a common receptacle of the spirits of the departed, — such as is denoted by the hades of the pagans and the sheol of the Hebrews? The word *hades* occurs only eleven times in the New Testament. It is found in only three of the recorded sayings of our Saviour. But are we to conclude *à priori* that hades in the New Testament has the same meaning as the same word in pagan literature, or as sheol as used by the Hebrews? Words are but representatives of ideas, and in different eras the same words represent essentially different ideas. In the progress of knowledge the contents of words are increased, or diminished, or changed. This fact is strikingly illustrated in the passage from the old to the new dispensation. Christ did not coin new words so much as he, so to speak, recast old ones, refining them of the dross of human errors, and enhancing their richness by incorporating into them new conceptions. A striking example is the name of the Deity. From what misconceptions did Christ free it, and what volumes of new meaning did he crowd into it! The same may be said of the word *love*. How much broader and deeper the Christian than the Jewish sense of this word! So much so that Christ says: "A NEW commandment I give unto you, that ye love one another." The word *freedom* receives a like expansion of meaning in the transition from the old to the new dispensation. On one occasion the Jews indignantly reply to Christ: "We be Abraham's seed, and were never in bondage to any man. How sayest thou then, Ye shall be made free?" To whom Christ responds: "If the Son shall make you free ye shall be free indeed." As though he had said, Freedom has heights you have not yet scaled, and depths you have not yet sounded, and lengths and breadths you have not yet measured. There are more things in freedom than are dreamed of in your philosophy. Now the future state is in a very important sense a doctrine of Christianity. If Christ and his apostles in describing it use words employed by pagans or Jews, must we take it for granted they attach to those words essentially the pagan or Jewish sense? Because they employ the word *hades*, are we to assume they denote by it a common subterranean depository of the souls of the departed? By no means. We are to remember Christ came as *the light of the world*, as *the truth;* and in ascertaining the meaning of his language in respect to any doctrine we are to be guided by the connection in which the words stand, and by other words which he has uttered in regard to that same doctrine. Our Saviour's first use of the word *hades* is in the expression

"And thou Capernaum which art exalted unto heaven shalt be brought down unto hades" (Matt. xi. 23). But hades here cannot mean the common receptacle of the departed, the place of the good as well as of the bad. Even Olshausen, who is himself inclined to the belief in an intermediate state, says: "The casting down into hades here signifies the dissolution of individual evil into its primeval element. The simple and true fundamental idea of heaven and hades is this, that good and evil, which are already separated internally, even on the earth, although they here appear externally to stand on an equality with one another, will be ultimately separated likewise externally." Heaven and hades are contrasted. As one denotes the highest exaltation, the other signifies the deepest debasement. We next find our Lord using this word in his memorable address to Peter. "And on this rock will I build my church, and the gates of hades shall not prevail against it" (Matt. xvi. 18). Does hades here necessarily mean the repository of the good and the bad spirits? Indeed, does not the connection absolutely forbid such a reference? By "gates of hades" does not Christ evidently mean the prison of devils and wicked spirits, those who might be supposed to be fired with the intensest desires to overturn his church? The remaining instance of our Saviour's use of this word *hades* is in the parable of the rich man and Lazarus. Of the rich man he says: "In hades he lifted up his eyes, being in torments." Impossible is it to make the word in this connection denote the common receptacle of the departed. Dean Trench, although intimating that hades here does not mean strictly hell, inasmuch as this term, in his view, applies to the state of the wicked only after the general judgment, yet says, hades is a state which will issue in hell, and in depicting its sufferings uses the following terrific language: "It is the place of painful restraint, where the souls of the wicked are reserved to the judgment of the great day; it is 'the deep' whither the devils prayed that they might not be sent to be tormented before their time. Dives, being there, is '*in torments*,' stripped of all wherein his soul delighted and found its satisfaction; his purple robe has become a garment of fire; as he himself describes it, he is 'tormented in this flame.'" If this state is not hell, has it not all the essential elements and horrors of hell? Is there not great force in the comment of Dr. Fairbairn: "It cannot but be regarded as a noticeable circumstance that in the solitary example wherein hades is mentioned by our Lord explicitly as a receptacle for the departed, it is in connection with the wicked, and as a place of torment"? Our Saviour's use of the word *hades*, then, is such as to show beyond a doubt that he did in no case denote by it a common underground depository of the departed, the place of the temporary sojourn of himself and his people between death and the resurrection. We next inquire: Do the apostles attach to this word a sense essentially different from that of Christ? We first find the word in Acts ii. 27–31. This is the passage in which Peter, arguing for the Messiahship of Christ, quotes a part of the sixteenth Psalm containing the expression, "Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell, neither wilt thou suffer thine Holy One to see corruption," and adds, David, being a prophet, "spake of the resurrection of Christ that his soul was not left in hades, neither his flesh did see corruption." In respect to this passage Prof. Huidekoper remarks: "That Peter believed his Master to have been in the under-world would seem an unavoidable inference from his argument in Acts ii. 22–31. And when Peter quotes from the Psalms in evidence that God would not leave Christ in the under-world, he makes no effort to prove that Christ had ever gone there. This was an inference which his hearers would probably have regarded as necessarily involved in his death. It needed no proof." In this text Peter is thought to teach decisively that Christ went to sheol at his death, and the passage which is the subject of our present criticism is regarded as the statement of the object of his mission to the departed. But we cannot unhesitatingly accept such conclusions. We are mindful that Peter quotes this passage from the Old Testament, and that it would be entirely inconsistent with the mode in which citations are made from the Old Testament by the New, to make Peter inculcate exactly the Jewish notions contained in the passage without modification. We are mindful that Peter was one of the favored three who enjoyed the most familiar intercourse with the Saviour, and hence had the best opportunities for clear and full instructions upon a subject which of all others must have engaged his interest. We can but ask: Is it at all probable Peter did not know Christ's doctrine in regard to the future state; that he carefully distinguished between hades and the realm which was to receive his own and his people's disembodied spirits? Besides, the original Hebrew of Ps. xvi. 10, — "Lo tayatsāv naphsā lo Sheōl," — does not necessarily imply that Christ's soul DWELT in sheol. According to Gesenius, the verb "Yatsāv" in this place means, "to leave at the disposal of, or to give up to the pleasure of sheōl." Prof. Hengstenberg translates the passage, "Thou wilt not leave my soul to hell," and remarks: "The exposition of Luther and many others, — Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell, has both usage and the parallelism against it, according to which the pious is not even to see the grave, and consequently his soul could not be in hell (sheol). Peter, for the sake of whom this exposition has been adopted, has not followed it. He renders, in Acts ii. 29, Thou wilt not leave my soul to hell, 'eis hadou,' as also the Septuagint." The meaning of which Dr. Robinson thus states: "To leave or abandon *to* the grave or sheol; not strictly to leave *in* it." The natural and obvious import of the language is that hades should not hold dominion over Christ's soul. Where is the proof that Peter believed his Master to have been in the under-world? In only five other instances is hades used in the New Testament. In one of these (1 Cor. xv. 55) the most critical editions of the Greek substitute ϑάνατε for ᾅδῃ. The four remaining cases are found in the Revelation, and are translated *hell*, and do not require a specific notice, as none of them can be properly interpreted to favor the dogma of a common underground receptacle of the dead. But by more positive and decisive evidence still is the notion of such an intermediate state refuted in the New Testament. We refer, in the first place, to our Saviour's explicit words to the penitent robber: "To-day shalt thou be with me in paradise" (Luke xxiii. 43). We give that collocation of the words of this declaration which we believe to be fully substantiated. Christ emphasizes the word *to-day*, to fix attention upon the immediate destination of their spirits after the death of their bodies. That place he calls *paradise*. Does paradise mean a region of shadow and gloom, some nether world or subterranean cavern? Such an interpretation is entirely abhorrent to the *usus loquendi* of the Old and New Testaments, and of the early Christians. In reference to the origin of the word *paradise* Gesenius says: "It seems, however, to originate neither with the Greeks nor the Hebrews, but in the languages of eastern Asia," and denotes "*a region of surpassing beauty*," "pleasure-gardens and parks with wild animals around the residence of Persian monarchs." The distinctive etymological notion contained in the word is that of *consummate happiness*, *bliss*, and in the Septuagint the word is employed as the equivalent of the garden of Eden, which, in the Hebrew conception combined all the elements of felicity. That according to the New Testament usage it represents the highest conceivable blessedness is proved by the context of the three passages in which alone the word occurs in the New Testament. In 2 Cor. xii. 4, paradise is used interchangeably with the "third heaven," which means, "*the highest heaven*, the abode of God and angels and glorified spirits" (Rob. Lex.). In the Apocalypse (ii. 7) the word stands in this connection: "To him that overcometh will I give to eat of the tree of life which is in the midst of the paradise of God." Can the paradise of God be other than heaven itself? What constitutes the very essence of heaven's bliss if not the presence of God? Where this is, must be the place of the very "fulness of joy." The same necessarily seems to be the meaning of the word in the expression of Christ to the dying thief. It is our Saviour's object to fill the soul of this man with consolations and hopes that will cause him to triumph over death and the grave. Would the assurance, "To-day shalt thou be with me in the under-world" have produced this effect?

The early Christians also understood by paradise the region of perfect bliss. Tertullian held to the doctrine of an intermediate state, and yet he maintains that the martyrs, by reason of their preëminent piety, at death are taken at once to the *abode of the blessed*, which he calls *paradise*, and says that in this particular point they enjoyed an advantage over other Christians. (Hag. His. Doc. V. 1. S. 77.) Says Huidekoper: "That paradise was never located by the early Christians in the under-world, I should deem too obvious for argument, were not the contrary advanced in such a work as the doctrinal history of Crucius and Hase." The Assembly's Catechism quotes this passage, "To-day shalt thou be with me in paradise," in proof that the righteous shall at death "immediately pass into glory." Moreover, this dogma of an intermediate state, retaining the essential idea of a common receptacle for the souls of the departed, cannot be made to harmonize with numerous other declarations of the New Testament respecting the destination of the souls of the righteous and wicked at death. We refer especially to such passages as the following: "We are confident, I say, and willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord" (2 Cor. v. 8). "For me to live is Christ, and to die is gain. For I am in a strait betwixt two, having a desire to depart, and to be with Christ, which is far better" (Phil. i. 21, 23). "Blessed are the dead which die in the Lord *from henceforth*" (Rev. xiv. 13). From henceforth, *ἀπάρτι, from now on*, from the *present instant*. Now we submit it: Is it not the natural and almost irresistible sense of this language, that the moment of death, with the righteous, is the moment of his introduction into heaven? Do not such declarations sustain the conclusion: "At death the souls of the righteous, being made perfect in holiness, are received into the highest heavens, where they behold the face of God, in light and glory, waiting for the full redemption of their bodies." So, also, we believe the doctrine of the New Testament to be, that at death "the souls of unbelievers are cast into hell, where they remain in torment and utter darkness, reserved to the judgment of the last day." This seems to us the unavoidable inference from such scriptures as the parable of the rich man and Lazarus (Luke xvi.), and the passage in Jude v. 6, 7. Now, whatever may be our theory respecting the time when the soul is to be clothed with its resurrection body, although we may think that, in the case of a large majority of our race, it will not be until a period long after death, yet we have no reason to suppose the reception of the body will change the place of the departed, or essentially change their state. The scriptures, indeed, do not necessarily imply that the glorified body will not be the instrument of enhancing the bliss of the righteous. No more do we understand them to teach that the moment of the resurrection, whenever it may be, will mark the cessation of the saints' progress in knowledge and joy. The inspiring and, as we believe, the scriptural view is, that the saint, at death, enters upon an *endless* career of development and attainment; that his course is *from strength to strength, from glory to glory, forever;* that the child of God, in the circling ages of eternity, may, in knowledge and blessedness, pass the limit at which Gabriel has now arrived, ever approximating, but never reaching, the Infinite. We are prompted to ask, why call the interval between death and the resurrection, whatever that interval may be, an intermediate place or state, any more than the interval between the resurrection and the point at which Gabriel now stands? We might adduce still other arguments in favor of the belief that the place and state of the good and bad, immediately after death, will be essentially the same as their ultimate place and state. But we trust we have established our point, that to interpret this passage in favor of the dogma of an intermediate state, — a common repository of the dead, — is to oppose the general drift and scope of the teachings of the New Testament. Nor, again, can we believe the Apostle uses this language by *accommodation,*—that he panders to the mistaken notions of those whom he addresses; for the moment we do this, we transfer the standard of truth and error from the pages of revelation to our own minds; we bend the Bible to our own opinions and judgments, when we should conform our opinions to the Bible. Indeed, we become, to all intents and purposes, infidels, and open the door to an entirely unrestrained liberty with the Divine Word. Sad havoc are the abettors of this theory of accommodation making of the most important truths of scripture. "The doctrines of the Trinity, of the divine Sonship of the Messiah, of the Atonement, of the personality of the Holy Spirit, of a corporeal resurrection, and of a final judgment, have all been swept away by them, and even the idea of Christianity being, in any peculiar sense, a revelation from heaven, has been sometimes represented merely as a mode of speech suited to the time of its appearance." (Fair. Her. Man.) We are to remember Peter was an *inspired* teacher. It was not his mission *to please* men, and fall in with and confirm their *false* opinions and beliefs, but rather to *instruct* them, and guide them into the *truth.* Can we believe, then, Peter would have contributed to uphold and confirm in the minds of men so great an error as the dogma of a common underground repository of the dead? The words of Dean Trench, although originally applied to another point, are of exact appropriateness here: "For this error, if it was an error, was so little an innocuous one, that might have been safely left to drop naturally away, was, on the contrary, one which reached so far in its consequences, entwined its roots so deeply among the very ground truths of religion, that it could never have been suffered to remain at the hazard of all the misgrowths which it must needs have occasioned." We cannot, therefore, think this text favors the idea of the local descent of Christ's spirit to a subterranean realm, the temporary abode of the departed. In addition to the scriptural objections to this theory, we might, did our limits allow, refer to the metaphysical one, arising from a consideration of the relation of spirit to space. The fundamental idea of the theory looks like a relic of heathenism, which, through ignorance or sectarian bias, as is the case with many other heathenish notions, has been foisted into the scriptures.

The great prevalence of this dogma, and the fact that, at the present time, it seems to be gaining new adherents, especially from the advocates of a probationary state after death, have compelled us to go into such an extended discussion of it as leaves us little space for other interpretations. The gist only of one or two more prominent interpretations will we give.

(2.) One of these is that which regards "the spirits in prison" as sinful men righteously condemned, the slaves and captives of satan, shackled with the fetters of sin, and cites in justification Isa. xlii. 6, 7: "I the Lord have called thee ..... to open the blind eyes, to bring out the prisoners from the prison, and them that sit in darkness out of the prison-house." Christ's being "quickened in spirit" is taken to mean, that in consequence of his penal, vicarious, and expiatory sufferings denoted by "put to death in flesh," he became spiritually alive and powerful, in a sense and to a degree in which he was not previously, and in which but for these sufferings he never could have become, full of life to communicate to dead souls, "mighty to save." Or as others express the same idea, Christ was quickened in reference to his great work, the salvation of mankind; quickened as to that efficacious agency by which this work was to be carried forward; an agency by which Christ made himself to be felt among men in his power to save; an agency which diffused new and mighty life through his body, the church, and, by means of his church thus vitalized, throughout the world. In the spirit, thus understood, he was straitened before his death, according to his own complaint (Luke xii. 50). After his death he was quickened; life flowed from him, filling his church with vitality, agreeably to his own forcible illustration (Jno. xii. 24): "Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die it abideth alone; but if it die it bringeth forth much fruit"; agreeably also to his prediction (Jno. xii. 32): "And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me." The going and preaching of Christ, according to this scheme, describe not what our Lord did *bodily* (σαρκικῶς or σωματικῶς), but what he did *spiritually* (πνευματικῶς), not what he did personally, but what he did by the instrumentality of others. The preaching of Paul and the Apostles and of all their successors, all preaching addressed to sinners is the preaching of Christ to spirits in prison. Whatever Christ's disciples do in the discharge of their great commission, it is not they, but Christ by them. This interpretation is, for substance, adopted by Bishop Leighton, and many other expositors, and is advocated by Professor Brown of Edinburgh, in an Article of the Bib. Sac. for Nov. 1847. Of this scheme we remark: It is in many respects plausible, and it displays much ingenuity. Indeed, it is ingenious to a fault. So far as it relates to the phrase, "*quickened in spirit*," we adopt it as the true explanation, fully sustained by other passages of Scripture. But to make τοῖς πνεύμασι ἐν φυλακῇ (*the spirits in prison*), mean *sinful men*, seems to us unnatural, and by no means justified by the texts cited in its support, or by any texts which can be cited. That "prison" and "prisoners" in the passage of Isaiah referred to have a metaphorical sense, meaning *spiritual captivity, and spiritually captive men*, we have no doubt. But this is rather the *usus loquendi* of the Old than the New Testament. Sinners in the New Testament are called with great force *servants*, *slaves*, *bondmen*, but not *prisoners*. Their condition is described as *servitude* rather than *imprisonment*. Besides, we are not aware that the word πνεύμασι (*spirits*) can be employed to designate men in the *body*. The result of our investigations is that this term invariably denotes disembodied spirits, or the spirit in distinction from the body. Nor, again, will the context allow us to understand by "spirits in prison," sinners of a time subsequent to the Christian Era. In the Greek a simple comma separates the 19th and 20th verses, and we should read: "In which spirit, he going, preached unto the spirits in prison, which spirits in prison were disobedient *then, when* (ποτε, ὅτε) the long suffering of God was waiting in the days of Noah." The correlative particles (ποτε, ὅτε) mark definitely the time when these disobedient spirits disobeyed. That time was in the days of Noah. The scheme under consideration attempts to escape from this difficulty by alleging that "spirits in prison" is a phrase characteristic of men in all ages, and then reading "Jesus Christ came and preached to spiritually captive men who in former times, and especially in the days of Noah, had been hard to convince." In justification of this reading the only expression given is "God sent the Gospel to the Britons, who in the days of Caesar were painted savages." But these expressions are very remotely analogous, if there is any analogy between them. And, again, this idiom is not found in the scriptures, to say the least of it. And, still again, "spirits in prison," instead of being a phrase characteristic of men in all ages, is, as we have already shown, characteristic of men *in the body* in no age.

(3.) Still another prevalent interpretation of this text is that which, like the one last stated, makes "quickened in spirit" signify that our Saviour was filled with the spirit above measure as a consequence of his penal sufferings, which spirit he poured out from on high, baptizing his church with it and diffusing, through his church, a heavenly life among the nations. This theory, also, like the one last named, makes the preaching of Christ here spoken of instrumental. But instead of considering the Apostles and men of the present dispensation the instruments by whom our Lord preached, it regards Noah as the sole instrument. By "spirits in prison" it understands lost spirits now in hell, — the spirits of those antediluvians to whom Noah preached righteousness without effect. The sense of the passage, according to this theory is expressed by the following paraphrase. "Christ exerted himself by the spirit, through the ministrations of Noah, when the deluge was at hand. He then preached, by his faithful prophet, to the disobedient persons of that generation, whose disobedient spirits are now in the prison of hell, bearing the just punishment of their incorrigible impenitence." This exposition is advocated in the Biblical Repository for April 1843, in an Article by Rev. T. H. Skinner, D.D., of New York. This theory, too, all must admit has whatever merit there is in ingenuity; and, while it is not open to some of the objections which the last-named theory encounters, it is encumbered by others from which that is free. But not to notice minor points, we find at least two insuperable objections to it. The first is, it unwarrantably changes the collocation of the words of the passage. From the Greek as it stands in any approved edition, and in fact from any natural translation, no unsophisticated, indeed no quite studious, reader, would gather the meaning indicated. The theory requires the transposition of two entire clauses, for which there is no apparent reason. The structure of the various sentences of this passage, in the original, is neither abrupt nor incoherent, but remarkably regular. Moreover, this interpretation is liable to the objection of being far-fetched and forced. It is *non congruens sermo*, not at all suggested by or in harmony with the context, in which there is not the remotest allusion to the pre-existence of Christ. The introduction of that important doctrine just in this place is exceedingly abrupt and unnatural.

Having noticed some of the prominent interpretations of this difficult passage with a brief statement of the reasons that compel us to reject them, we would be glad now, were we able, in a few words, to give the true sense of it. In this endeavor we are by no means confident of success. The best that we can do is to state that interpretation which at the present stage of our investigations most commends itself to us, holding the mind open to conviction by any additional light to be received in the future. In the discussion of this subject it is much easier to deny than to affirm, to demolish than to build. In our affirmations we propose to advance cautiously and step by step.

(1.) One thing is clear. The passage implies that the spirit of Christ at the moment of the death of his body passed into the spirit world. The construction of the Greek inevitably makes πνεύματι (*spirit*) refer to the spiritual part of Christ, his soul, as σαρκί (*flesh*) refers to his body. Dr. Wordsworth says, "spirit" here is that higher and nobler part of human nature by which we are akin to God and recipients of his spirit; "flesh" represents that side of our nature by which we appertain to earth. This is the meaning assigned to the word *spirit* here by ancient expositors who cited this text in refutation of the Apollinarian heresy, which denied the reality of the Lord's human spirit. Thus, Athanasius says: "If the soul is only carnal why does it not die with the body, and why does Peter call the souls detained in prison *spirits*." De Wette, whose definition seems to us the most perfect, says: "πνεύματι (*spirit*) means Christ's *spiritual personality*." Now the apostle in plain terms says: Christ, in this soul or spiritual personality, going (πορευθείς) preached. We naturally enquire, whither did he go? And Christ's own words to the dying robber, "To-day shalt thou be with me in paradise," compel us to answer: He went *immediately* to paradise. So much we deem to be certain. Our Saviour's real, personal spirit, or spiritual personality, quickened, invigorated, exalted, passed at once to the realm called the "paradise of God," the "third heaven," which we take to be equivalent to the *presence of God*, where there is *fulness of joy*, the place where the spirits of all the righteous that had died before his crucifixion were congregated. Dr. Fairbairn considers Christ's words to Mary (Jno. xx. 17), "Touch me not, for I am not ascended to my Father," conclusive proof that Christ's soul, at his crucifixion, did not ascend to the proper heaven of glory. Now, without attempting an exposition of this enigmatical passage, we cannot see that it militates at all against the idea that Christ's *soul* ascended to the proper heaven of glory at the moment of his crucifixion. Our Saviour's words seem to have prominent reference to his risen *body*, that part of himself which could be *touched*. He says: "Touch me not, for I have not ascended;" i. e. I, in the form in which you see me, clothed with this body, have not ascended. We do not see that this text opposes any objection to the belief that

Christ's *soul*, at the instant he expired on the cross, ascended to, or, more properly, *was in*, the proper heaven of glory.

(2.) We next enquire: What did our Saviour's newly energized and vitalized spirit do in this realm, paradise? Can we for a moment think it was inactive? This supposition seems to us contrary to the nature of spirit, especially of a spirit in which *dwelt the fulness of God.* More especially is this supposition forbidden by the antecedent statement that the spirit of Christ received a new influx of life and vigor at the instant of its departure to paradise. What, then, was Christ's spiritual personality doing in paradise during the three days that his earthly body was lying in Joseph's tomb? Although he was active, he was not engaged in consummating the work of atonement. That was completed on the cross. Christ's words, "It is finished," denote the *final act* of his atoning work. Then the battle was fought through and the victory won. Of this time, the Saviour teaches us explicitly, it is the hour "that the Son of man should be glorified" (Jno. xii. 23), when he is to be glorified with the Father's own self, with the glory which he had with him before the world was (Jno. xvii. 5). Does not this language imply that Christ's spirit, the instant after his crucifixion, was in the proper heaven of glory? We are, then, shut up to the conclusion that Christ, during the interval between his crucifixion and the resurrection of his body, was active in essentially the same mode in which he is now exerting himself, pouring forth from his own exhaustless fulness of life abundant streams of life and joy into the souls of saints already with him in glory, and, by the agency of the Holy Spirit, carrying forward this work of regenerating and sanctifying men on the earth. Now, in accordance with these facts, must be explained the words, "He preached to the spirits in prison." But the "spirits in prison" cannot mean the souls in paradise, for φυλακῇ (*prison*), both by derivation and usage, is proved to mean the place of confinement for the wicked. The Peshito Syriac translates it, according to Dr. Murdock, "hades," and hades, as we have already seen, in the New Testament, denotes the place of torment. Nor can "spirits in prison," as we have before proved, refer to any class of men on the earth, either of antediluvian or postdiluvian times. "Spirits in prison" must mean the spirits of wicked men who lived on the earth in the time of Noah, and who had been consigned to the world of despair,—to hell. De Wette renders φυλακῇ by *gefangnisse*, and explains, "Am Orte wo die Shuldigen fur das Gericht aufbewort werden,"—*prison, the place where the guilty are reserved for judgment.*

(3.) It only remains to enquire: *In what sense did Christ preach* to these wicked spirits in the prison of despair? The analogy of faith does not allow us to think he preached to them as he now preaches to sinners on the earth, through messengers, or that in any way he offered to them hope and life. Nor does the word here translated *preached* (κηρύσσω) denote any such mode of preaching; in fact, it has quite a different significance from that which we attach to the word *preach.* Says Dr. Campbell: "The verb κηρύσσω occurs in the New Testament about five-and-twenty times, always in nearly the same sense, *I proclaim, praedico, palam annuncio;* for so far is it from being necessary that the κήρυγμα should be a discourse, that it may be only a single sentence, and a very short sentence too. Nay, to such brief notifications we shall find the term most frequently applied. Besides, the words κηρύσσω and κήρυγμα were adopted, with equal propriety, whether the subject were sacred or civil. Again, though the verb κηρύσσω always implied public notice of some event, either accomplished or about to be accomplished, it never denoted either a comment on, or explanation of, any doctrine, critical observations on, or illustrations of, any subject, or a chain of reasoning, in proof of a particular sentiment; and, if so, to pronounce publicly such a discourse as with us is denominated sermon, homily, lecture, or preaching, would by no means come within the meaning of the word κηρύσσω, in its first and common acceptation" (Prel. Diss. Part 5). The only mode of preaching which the case admits of, and which the terms employed necessarily denote, is the natural effect which the completion of Christ's atoning work and his entrance into glory would have upon the lost spirits shut up in the prison-house of doom. We have good reason to suppose "the spirits in prison" were cognizant of this stupendous event, the consummation of which even inanimate nature, by the most striking phenomena, acknowledged. And would not such an event *make proclamation* to the lost spirits? What tormenting memories it must have awakened in their minds; what bitter regrets; what painful anticipations. Is not Christ now *preaching* to the lost spirits, and will he not forever be preaching or proclaiming to the lost spirits, as imagination shall forever hold before their eyes that lowly, rejected Saviour, and faithful memory shall forever cause to sound in their ears his gracious, but forever rejected messages? Says not the psalmist: "Whither shall I go from thy Spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence? If I make my bed in sheol, thou art there." Even so may the sinner exclaim: Whither shall I go from the Saviour? If I take up my abode with the spirits in prison, behold thou art there, and thy presence and preaching there shall be the instruments of my keenest anguish. In arriving at this interpretation, we have been guided much by the remarks of Dr. Fairbairn.

In favor of this exposition we can say: (1.) It ascribes a legitimate and common sense to the verb *κηρύσσω*, "he preached;" a sense justified by the usage of all languages, and which in our language is denoted by the proverb "Actions speak louder than words," which is referred to by the poet when he says our life

> "Finds tongues in trees, books in the running brooks,
> Sermons in stones, and good in everything;"

and by the orator, when pointing to the granite shaft that uprears its majestic form upon Bunker Hill, he declares to assembled thousands: "That plain shaft is the orator of this occasion;" and by Joshua of old, when, after setting up a great stone, he says to the people of Israel: "Behold, this stone shall be a witness unto us, for it hath heard all the words of the Lord which he spake unto us" (Josh. xxiv. 27).

(2.) This interpretation is in harmony with the context. Scarcely could the design of the apostle be better expressed than by the following comment: "He is endeavoring to fortify Christians against discouragement from the sufferings to which they were exposed for the sake of the gospel. Christians should seek to avoid suffering by maintaining a good conscience; but if they should still, and perhaps on this very account, be called to suffer, it was greatly better to do so for well-doing than for ill-doing. Then, in confirmation of this complex truth, he points to a twofold illustration. In the first instance, he fixes attention on *Christ* as having suffered, indeed, the just for the unjust; suffered as the Righteous One, but only *once* suffered, and on that "*ἅπαξ ἔπαϑεν*" the especial stress is to be laid. It was, so to speak, but a momentary infliction of evil, however awful in its nature while it lasted; still but once borne, and never to be repeated. Not only so, but it carried along with it infinite recompenses of good for sinful men, bringing them to God, and for Christ himself, limiting the reign of death to a short-lived dominion over the body, while the soul, lightened and relieved, inspired with the energy of immortal life, went into the invisible regions, and, with buoyant freedom, moved among the spirits of the departed. How widely different from that mighty class of sufferers; the most striking examples in the world's history of the reverse of what appeared in Christ, the last race of the antediluvians, who suffered not for *well*-doing, but for *ill*-doing; and suffered not *once* merely in the flood that swept them away from their earthly habitations, but even now, after so long a time, when the work on the cross was finished, still pent up as in a prison-house of doom, where they could be haunted by memories of past crimes, and with forebodings of eternal retribution. What a contrast! How should the thought of it persuade us to suffering for well-doing rather than for evil doing! And for those lost ones themselves Christ's spirit, now released from sufferings, fresh with the dew of its dawning immortality preached, — preached by its very entrance into the paradise of glory" (Fair. Her. Man.).

(3.) As a final argument in favor of this interpretation we may say, while it gives to all the words and clauses of the passage their natural meaning and construction, it also perfectly accords with the analogy of faith. It is in harmony with the general tenor and scope of the teachings of the New Testament in respect to Christ and departed spirits. It is free from all taint of the pagan notions of a common underground depository of spirits. It gives no countenance to the Romish dogma of purgatory. Nor does it lend the slightest sanction to the opinion that probation will be extended for a longer or shorter time after death; that an opportunity for securing salvation will be granted to sinners beyond the grave. This opinion seems to be gaining new adherents at the present time. Of the "Essays and Reviews" by eminent English churchmen, that by Wilson upon the "National Church" concludes as follows: "The Roman Church has imagined a '*limbus infantium*,' we must rather entertain a hope that there shall be found after the great adjudication receptacles suitable for those who shall be infants, not as to years of terrestrial life, but as to spiritual development; nurseries, as it were, and seed-grounds, where the undeveloped may grow up under new conditions, the stunted may become strong, and *the perverted be restored.* And when the Christian church, in all its branches, shall have fulfilled its sublunary office, and its founder shall have surrendered his kingdom to the Great Father, all, both small and great, shall find a refuge in the bosom of the universal parent, to repose, or be quickened into higher life, in the ages to come, according to his will."

The fatal tendency of such a belief we can readily understand. Men in love with sin will continue in sin up to the very instant of death; will make no provision for eternity until they are plunged into it. Now, adopting the exposition we have given to this text, it can by no means be made to countenance the idea of a probation after death. And if such an opinion is not countenanced by this text, then it finds no support in the Bible. The great and obvious doctrine of the Bible is that *now*, in the present life, is the accepted time; that now is the day of salvation, and that this life is the *only* day of salvation.

ARTICLE II.

SAALSCHÜTZ ON HEBREW SERVITUDE.

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AN exhibition of the subject of Hebrew servitude from the Jewish point of view has long seemed to us eminently desirable. For this purpose we had selected the 101st chapter of Prof. Saalschütz's Treatise on the Mosaic Law, entitled "*Dienende*." Before we had found leisure to complete the translation of this chapter, our design was in part anticipated by the appearance in the American Theological Review[1] of Prof. H. B. Smith's translation of Dr. M. Mielziner's work on "Slavery among the ancient Hebrews, from biblical and Rabbinic sources." By this translation Prof. Smith has rendered to the Christian public an important service. We proceed, nevertheless, to carry out our original plan, and that for two reasons. First, because Saalschütz differs in some important points from the common Rabbinic view, to which Mielziner in general adheres; so that by a comparison of the two the reader will have the matter more fully before him in its various aspects. Secondly, because we propose in a series of consecutive articles to discuss the whole subject of slavery, in its relations to the Bible, the State, and the Church; and to such a series the subject of Hebrew servitude constitutes the most suitable introduction.

In Saalschütz's Treatise on the Mosaic Law[2] the numerous foot-notes are numbered consecutively from the beginning to the end of the work. In the translation of the present chapter it was important to retain this numbering for various reasons, especially for convenience of reference to the notes appended to other chapters. The few brief notes of the translator are always indicated by brackets. To the translation are appended some general remarks, to which the reader's attention is respectfully called.

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[1] In the April and July numbers for 1861.

[2] Das Mosaische Recht, nebst den vervöllstandigenden thalmudisch-rabbinischen Bestimmungen. Für Bibelforscher, Juristen und Staatsmänner. Von Dr. G. L. Saalschütz. Berlin. 1853.

TRANSLATION.

§ 1. The Mosaic law knows nothing of *slavery* in the sense of considering *freeman* and *slave* as beings holding an opposite relation to each other in respect to their dignity as men, and on a scale of civil and social rights. The Hebrew language has no word for stigmatizing by a degrading appellation one part of those who owe service, and distinguishing them from the rest as "slaves," but only *one* term for all who are under obligation to render service to others. For males this is *Ebed*,[897] *servant*, *man-servant;* properly *laborer;*[898] for females, *Shifchah*, *Ama*,[899] *maid-servant*, *maid.* Among a people who occupied themselves with agriculture; whose lawgiver, Moses, and whose kings, Saul and David, went immediately from the herd and from the plough to their high vocation, there could be nothing degrading in an appellation taken from "labor." "Servant of God" is also applied to Moses and the pious as a title of honor. The laws, moreover, respecting servants protect in every regard their dignity as men, and their feelings, as will be manifest from what follows. They by no means surrender these to the arbitrary will of the masters, as in other ancient and modern states in which slavery and thraldom have prevailed.

§ 2. The body of servants consisted in general of the following classes: 1, debtors who were obliged to render service to the creditor; 2, Hebrew men-servants and maid-servants bought with money; 3, heathen men-servants and maid-servants; 4, children of both sexes brought up in the master's house, that had been either taken in war, or were the offspring of men-servants or maid-servants; 5, such as were hired for wages.[900]

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[897] עֶבֶד.

[898] The verb *abad* (עָבַד) signifies *to labor* in general, as may be plainly seen from its use in the law of the Sabbath, Ex. xx 9: "Six days mayest thou *labor.*"

[899] שִׁפְחָה, אָמָה; see § 9, note 911.

§ 3. (I. *a*) The laws relating to *Hebrew servants* are as follows:

If any one buys a "Hebrew servant" (עֶבֶד עִבְרִי, *Ebed Ibri*) he shall serve six years, but in the seventh he shall go out free for nothing. If he came in single he goes out single. If he is the husband of a wife she goes out with him. Ex. xxi. 2, 3.

If his master has given him a wife,[901] and she has borne him sons or daughters, the wife and her children remain to the master, and the servant goes out by himself. If the servant says: I love my master, my wife, and my children: I will not go out free; then his master shall bring him before the judges, and fetch him to a door or a door-post, and bore his ear through with an awl, and he shall serve him forever, vs. 4–6.

In Deut. xv. 16, 17, where this symbolic indication of permanent servitude is once more prescribed, it is stated still more definitely that the ear is to be fastened by the awl to the door. The manifest dishonor which lies in this symbolic act agrees perfectly with the whole spirit of the law; for this seeks to protect personal freedom in every way, and always to re-establish it; and cannot therefore approve of one's giving himself over to perpetual servitude. It is true that in the case before us he had, in his love for his family, an apparently good reason for the act. But who bade him at the outset to enter into these relations, and take for his wife a maid in the ownership of her master?

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[900] At a later day the *Nethinim* constituted a peculiar class. § 16.

[901] From the specifications that follow it appears that she is a *heathen* maid-servant, who has not the right of going out at the end of six years. — *Bertheau, Sieben Gruppen Mos. Gesetze.* S. 22., as also before him, *Salvador, Institutions de Moïse*, L. VII. ch. V., assume that she is a Hebrew maid, whose six years of service do not end at the same time with those of her husband. But this seems to be altogether excluded from the law, which could not, in the case supposed, have said in general terms that the maid and her children *belong to the master* (according to the law for heathen maids, Lev. xxv. 44–46. See § 12), and that the servant, in order to be with them, must remain *forever* in servitude.

There has been, moreover, a difference of opinion respecting the meaning of the words: "he shall serve him forever," Ex. xxi. 5; or, as it reads, Deut. xv. 17, "he shall remain thy servant forever." The question is, whether they actually signify an unlimited period of time, or only one that lasts till the year of jubilee. The latter opinion has, as a general rule, prevailed. But we do not believe it to be the original meaning. For, in the first place, there is no ground why we should here take "forever" in this sense. Then, again, this word is plainly used, Lev. xxv. 46, of a servitude not limited by the year of jubilee. (See below, § 12.) Still further, in Lev. xxv. 40–42, no degradation is attached to a service that ends with the year of jubilee. That only which lasts beyond this limit is characterized as an actual bond-service. Finally, it does not appear how the year of jubilee, without a single intimation of the lawgiver on the subject, should give the servant the right previously renounced by him of taking with himself his wife and her children, when she is a maid-servant in the ownership of her master. But without this the departure must then also be distasteful to him. Without controversy, then, the words: "he shall serve forever," mean, he and his remain the property of his master (perhaps his hereditary property. Compare Lev. xxv. 46).[902] Possibly this will help us, further on, in the solution of greater difficulties connected with the passages pertaining to the law in question.

In Deut. xv. 12–18, the same law is repeated with some additional particulars:

(I. *b.*) The "Hebrew brother" who goes out free on the seventh year shall not be sent away empty; but is to be furnished from the flock, the threshing-floor, and the winepress. Deut. xv. 13, 14.

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[902] According to the law of the Mishnah, the Hebrew servant who has been appropriated by the ceremony of boring his ear becomes free at the year of jubilee, or upon the death of his master, without being obligated to render further service to his son, as he certainly is obligated when the master dies within the *six* years of service. But this duty, again, holds good only in respect to the son, not to the daughter or other heirs. — *Qiddushin.* 1, 2.

In Ex. xxi. 2, it is simply directed that the servant shall go out for nothing; that is, without being obliged in any way to indemnify his master. According to the passage of the law just quoted, he is also required to present him with a gift, in thankful remembrance, as is added v. 15, of the redemption from Egyptian bondage wrought by God for Israel. In v. 18 of the same passage, it is further added, in respect to his release: "Let it not seem hard to thee, when thou sendest him away free from thee, *because double the wages of an hireling*, he hath served thee six years; and Jehovah thy God shall bless thee in all that thou doest." In rendering the words in italics, we have sought to preserve the ambiguity of the original, which leaves it doubtful whether the lawgiver meant to say: Let it not grieve thee to release him, *since* he has rendered to thee double the service of a hireling, inasmuch as he has been wholly in thy house, and thou hast had him more at thy disposal; or, Let it not grieve thee, *although* he has served thee for double the wages of a hireling; that is, although, from thy having been obliged to purchase and maintain him, he has cost thee twice as much as a hireling who is paid in proportion to his labor. We prefer the latter explanation, since the literal meaning must plainly be, "for double the wages of a hireling.(a)

According to this law, the servants (and also the maid-servants, of whom more hereafter) are to be released in the *seventh* year; whence it follows, as already remarked, chap. 14. § 1, that we are here to understand not the general sabbatical year, but the seventh year from the beginning of the service, which might not coincide with the sabbatical year; for it says expressly that *he shall serve six years.*

(a) [The words of the original are: כִּי מִשְׁנֶה שְׂכַר שָׂכִיר עֲבָדְךָ שֵׁשׁ שָׁנִים, which our author has endeavored to render with verbal literalness: *da das Zwiefache vom Lohne des Miethlings* er dir sechs Jahre gedient hat. The ambiguity lies in the particle כִּי, which may either *assign the reason* why the master should not be grieved, — "*for* he hath served thee," etc., — or may *specify the thing* in view of which he might be in danger of being grieved — "*that* he hath served thee; i. e. in view of the fact that he hath served thee, etc. In the former case, מִשְׁנֵה שְׂכַר־ שָׂכִיר will mean, *double the worth of the wages of an hireling;* in the latter, *for double the wages of an hireling.* The author prefers the second interpretation. We should prefer the first, as in our version: "for he hath been worth a double hired servant to thee."] — Tr.

§ 4. A third enactment of the law brings those who owe service into connection with the year of jubilee. It is as follows:

(II. *a*) "If thy brother, dwelling by thee, become poor, and be sold to thee, thou shalt not lay upon him the service of a servant. As a hired servant, as a sojourner, shall he be with thee. Till the year of jubilee shall he serve with thee. Then shall he go out from thee, he and his children with him, and shall return unto his own family, and to the possession of his fathers. For they are my servants whom I have brought forth out of the land of Egypt; they shall not be sold according to the sale of a servant. Thou shalt not rule over him with rigor, but shalt fear thy God." Lev. xxv. 39–43.

By "the sale of a servant" is plainly meant that for continual, hereditary service, and for rougher sorts of labor; for he immediately proceeds to speak of this kind of service in connection with heathen servants. We also have for the coarser and finer kinds of work different servants. Now a man who had himself once been a landed proprietor, and retained, moreover, this character since the year of jubilee restored to him the patrimony which he had sold, certainly had a claim to indulgent treatment in this unusual relation. He was then to be regarded as the hired servant, who was bound to no master, and was not to be subjected to any severe treatment.

§ 5. When he who buys the servant is a foreigner, another turn is given to the specifications of this law.

(II. *b.*) If a stranger in the land has become rich, and "thy brother" who lives by him has become poor, and shall be sold to him,(a) or to a foreign family settled in the land,[903] he shall have, after he has been sold, the right of redemption, whether he find the means to redeem himself, or one of his relations redeem him (compare chap. 107), Lev. xxv. 47–49. In redeeming him, the sum for which he has been sold is to be divided by the number of years intervening between the sale and the year of jubilee, and thus the price for a single year computed. Then, according as "more years," or fewer, remain till the year of jubilee, the sum which the purchaser receives back is to be larger or smaller, chap. xxv. 50–52.

(a) [The Hebrew is וְנִמְכַּר, which our version renders "*and sell himself.*" So also Gesenius and De Wette. See below, under § 8. Tr.]

[903] See the grammatical note to § 100. [The Hebrew is לְעֵקֶר מִשְׁפַּחַת גֵּר, which our version renders, "*to the stock of a stranger's family,*" apparently mean-

It is, then, as if he received wages from his master, year by year, as a hired servant, and so he is to be dealt with. His brethren are to see that he is not subjected to harsh treatment, after the custom of heathen masters, vs. 50, 53. If he is not redeemed in the manner just stated, he goes out free, with his children, in the year of jubilee, v. 54. It is then added once more: "For unto me the children of Israel are servants, whom I brought forth out of the land of Egypt, v. 55. Notice has already been taken, chap. 14, of the circumstance that the right of being redeemed is allowed in the case of a heathen master, but is not mentioned when the master is an Israelite.(a)

§ The law now under consideration in its twofold form (II. *a. b.*) compared with the two passages quoted under the preceding head (I. *a. b.*) Ex. xxi. 2–6, Deut. xv. 12–18, has always offered difficulties which have not yet been satisfactorily solved; difficulties, namely, growing out of the entire difference in respect to the time of service. For while, according to I. *a. b.* the servant is to go out free in

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ing, as the Sept. (ἐκ γενετῆς προσηλύτῳ) and the Vulgate (*cuiquam de stirpe ejus* [peregrini]), a *descendant* of a foreign family. The author, for reasons which he has stated in the note to chap. 100, understands either a family whose ancestors of foreign origin have long since settled in the land, or a family of the heathen, occupying the land before the coming of the Israelites.] — TR.

(a) [In the chapter referred to, the author, assuming that the redeemed Hebrew owed service to him who had redeemed him, suggests that it might have been more painful for him to serve a relative than an Israelite who stood in no specific relation to him; while redemption from a heathen master would be always a gain.] — TR.

the seventh year, according to II. *a. b.* he serves till the year of jubilee; that is, either fewer than six years, when the jubilee fell at an earlier time, or, if he should happen to have been bought immediately after it, well-nigh forty-three years longer. This contradiction Michaelis seeks to remove by the assumption that the lawgiver had in view precisely the first case, that of the arrival of the year of jubilee before the seventh year.(a) But this is getting over the difficulty in a very superficial way. It is impossible that a law should have been given containing such a perilous ambiguity. Moreover, in the law that immediately follows respecting the Israelite who sells himself to a stranger, Lev. xxv. 47, seq., the possibility is assumed that there may yet remain "many years" to the jubilee, v. 51; a period, therefore, which we cannot conceive of as lying within the compass of six years. Others, again, have wished to refer to this law the case of the servant who *chose* not to go out free in the seventh year. But we have already endeavored to show that then he probably remained in the service of his master, not till the year of jubilee, but forever. This case, moreover, constitutes an exception to which the general language of the law in question cannot well be restricted. Michaelis supposes there may have been other cases in which the servant did not become free till the fiftieth year; for example, when one had been sold for debt or theft. But the lawgiver does not say for what causes he might be sold who was to go out free *the seventh year;* and that in (II. *a.*) Lev. xxv. 39, seq., he does not have theft in view is manifest, since he expressly speaks of the brother that has been brought low (reduced to poverty).

Perhaps, now, by a more particular examination of the words of the law, we may succeed in removing the contradiction after another manner. It would seem, in the first place, that, in interpreting these two classes of laws, men have entirely overlooked the pretty clear intimations contained in them, that they treat of entirely *different classes of persons.* In Lev. xxv. 39, where the law speaks of being sold to an Israelite (II. *a.*), and just so in v. 47, where the sale is to a foreigner (II. *b.*), the subject of the sale is introduced with the words: " If thy brother by thee be brought low," and, " If thy brother by him (the foreigner) be brought low." He is then (as also appears with special clearness from the added clause, v. 42, " for they are my servants, whom I have brought out of the land of Egypt ") an *impoverished Israelite*, who has sold his patrimony till the year of jubilee, Lev. xxv. 41. This man is in no way called " servant." On the contrary, the very thing forbidden is that he should be treated as a servant, and put to servile labors. On the other hand, in Ex. xxi. 2 (I. *a.*) the law runs thus: " If thou buyest a Hebrew *servant.*" It is scarcely credible that this law and the other just adduced refer to persons identical with each other. *To buy for one's self a servant* is an expression that hardly applies to the acquisition of one who up to this moment has been no servant, but a possessor of landed property, and in respect to whom it is expressly said, Lev. xxv. 42 (II. *a.*), that the sale of a servant is unsuitable. The law, then (I. *a.*), Ex. xxi. 2, seq. relates to an *actual* Hebrew *servant*, who has been *already* held to service as such; and the different relations of the two classes of persons are the ground of the difference in the two sets of laws. In order to make this perfectly clear, a few additional remarks are needed.

(a) [Michaelis gives the view entertained by the Rabbins generally. (See below, note 917.) It is also maintained by Mielziner, see Am. Theol. Review for April 1861, pp. 243, 244. — Tr.]

§ 7. In the first law relating to the purchase and sale of a servant, Ex. xxi. 2, seq., compared with Deut. xv. 12–18 (I. *a. b.*), we are not at liberty to understand the re-sale of the man spoken of in Lev. xxv. 39, seq. (II. *a. b.*); for this is flatly contradicted by the treatment prescribed in his case. This leads to the idea that by the term " Hebrew " servants, an altogether peculiar class of servants is designated, not belonging to heathendom, and yet not to be regarded as proper Israelites; but *born in a state of servitude*, and constituting a middle class between the impoverished *Israelites*, that appear in the second law (II.), and proper servants bought of *heathen.* To this class might belong, first of all those descended from a maid-servant given in marriage by the master to his servant, to which allusion is made, Ex. xxi. 5 (I. *a*), since, according to the express direction of the lawgiver, these remained with the mother in servitude when the servant went out in the seventh year. Once more, according to Ex. xii. 44, the servant bought with money was permitted, if he desired it, to become fully incorporated with the household by circumcision, and to obtain naturalization, at least so far as was compatible with his relations. That many must have found this to be for their advantage, can hardly be doubted.[904] These persons, and certainly their children, and those of other heathen servants born in the house, as also the servants taken in war who had grown up in the house, — these all could not possibly be regarded any longer as gentiles, but rather as those who had been introduced into the universal national fellowship,[905] with the right of participating in all the ritual services. But since now the lawgiver does not intimate by a single word that this grade of naturalization had of itself the effect to make them immediately free,[906] we can hardly make any other assumption than that they remained in their former relation of servitude to the master's house, where they belonged in a certain measure to the household. This servitude, in itself light, was now made lighter, especially for those born in the house, or that had entered it when very young. Here, then, we should have a great multitude of "Hebrew servants," for whom the law in question must have been a kindness; that is, when we refer it to the case of their *leaving* their *first* master's house. If their original master did not manumit them (which, however, may have happened in the majority of cases), but sold them, then what might originally have been regarded as a hardship became also the road to their freedom, since their second master had no longer the right which the first enjoyed over them, but, according to the law provided in the case (I. *a.*), was obliged to let them go free in the seventh year, and that, too, without being permitted to demand of them any redemption-money. More than this, he was required also to furnish them with a present to help them on in life, perhaps to assist them in procuring a small flock of their own.

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[904] That the circumcision of servants was a rule enjoined as of universal obligation, as Michaelis assumes, in accordance with Gen. xvii. 13, 27, is incorrect. In the passage referred to it is to be regarded only as a special obligation imposed upon Abraham, which, according to the Mosaic law, is of no further obligation. On the contrary, from Ex. xii. 44 it expressly follows that the circumcision of servants was left optional. According to the later Rabbinical view, the servant bought of Gentiles was by all means to be induced through the influence of persuasion to receive baptism and circumcision; or, if he refused these, to be again resold into a foreign land. Nevertheless, one can have in his house as a resident proselyte (גֵר תּוֹשָׁב, *proselytus inquilinus*), [more commonly called *proselyte of the gate*, who was subjected to neither baptism nor circumcision, but simply obligated himself to avoid idolatry, and to keep the so-called seven precepts of Noah. — Tr.], a servant whom he has bought under the express condition of non-circumcision. — *Jebammoth*, 48. *b.:* Maimonides, Tract. *Issure Biah*, Chap. XIV. § 9; comp. XIII. §§ 11, 12.

[905] For this view no mean voucher is found, as it would seem, in the fact that in Deut. xxix. 11, among those who are present or are represented in the general congregation, the *hewers of wood* and *drawers of water* are also introduced, who can hardly have been Israelites, especially at so early a period, but must rather have been the servants brought with them from Egypt, Ex. xii. 44, who were originally of heathen origin.

It might seem strange, according to this explanation, that the person sold should be designated as "thy brother, a Hebrew man, or a Hebrew woman," Deut. xv. 12 (I. *b.*). But in Lev. xxv. 35, the term "brother" is expressly used of a stranger also. On the other hand, the expression "Hebrew man and Hebrew woman," which is used in both statements of this law (I. *a. b.*), but *not at all* in the other law (II.), Lev. xxv. 39, seq., instead of which we have "children of Israel," v. 55, — this expression, we say, intimates that the subject spoken of [in the former class of passages, Tr.] is no original *Israelite*, but one received only in a general way, by naturalization, into *the Hebrew commonwealth*, and belonging, accordingly, to an altogether peculiar class of servants. For elsewhere the term *Hebrew* is *never* used in laws, and in the Pentateuch the constant usage is to employ it *only where* foreigners speak of Israelites, or Israelites to foreigners.[907] Peculiar is the exhortation (I. *b.*), Deut. xv. 15: "Remember that thou wast a bondman in the land of Egypt, and the Lord thy God redeemed thee: therefore I command thee this day to do this." Exactly the same form of exhortation appears, Deut. v. 15, after the command that the *heathen* man-servant and maid-servant be allowed to rest on the sabbath-day. Elsewhere, also, it is customary to mention the Egyptian bondage for the purpose of inculcating clemency towards the *stranger;* for example, that he shall not be oppressed, Ex. xxiii. 9; that he shall be loved, Lev. xix. 34; that he shall receive loans without usury, Lev. xxv. 35, 38. On the other hand, in both statements of the law now under consideration (I. *a. b.*), we miss the reference to the fact that they who have been redeemed from Egypt are God's servants; which, nevertheless, appears twice in the other law, Lev. xxv. 39, seq. (II. *a. b.*), and likewise indicates that only in the latter case (II.) does the lawgiver speak of Israelites actually such by original descent, but not in the former case (I). There is a further consideration that deserves attention. In Ex. xxi. 4, seq., it is presupposed that the servant came into the service of his master unmarried, and formed a connection there with a bond-maid belonging to the household, though he knew that upon his departure he could not take her with him, and that, as the final result, he requested his master to retain him in his service. From this, also, we may perhaps infer that he was a descendant of heathen ancestors, who, on the ground of their being more accustomed to the relations of servitude, found it not so hard to bear, especially when mildly treated, and who, when they left their master's house, could not so easily maintain themselves as could the Israelite, who must sooner or later return to his patrimony, who found shelter among his kindred, who probably, also, was previously married, and, therefore, could hardly have come into his master's service without a family. All these latter particulars the law in Lev. xxv. 39, seq. (II.) presupposes in respect to the impoverished Israelite who enters into servitude. Finally, we may adduce the fact that in neither statement of the law concerning *servants* (I), is any mention made of redemption by kinsmen, not even in the case where the servant decides to remain for ever in the service of his master; though there may well have been relatives in circumstances to redeem with him the wife and children also to whom he cleaved, rather than suffer their brother to go into a condition of slavery. *This circumstance*, which must always excite surprise, is certainly explained upon the supposition that the man was by descent a foreigner and had no Israelitish kinsmen.

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[906] According to Rabbinic law this certainly did not take place. The servants who are received by circumcision and the baptismal bath, pass in this way out of the domain of heathendom, without being, however, fully introduced into the commonwealth of Israel. This does not happen, except by full manumission. Until then, free Israelites of both sexes are forbidden to enter into marriage with them. But a servant [that is, an Israelitish servant, — TR.] *sold under process of law* (see below in note 917) may do this, even if he have been a priest, if his master gives him a Canaanitish maid. *Sanhedrim*, 58. 6. Maimonides, Tract. *Issure Biah*, Chap. XII § 11. comp. Tract. *Abadim*, Chap. III. § 3, 4.

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[907] Michaelis also has felt the singularity of the expression "Hebrew" in this place, a term elsewhere not used; and he is almost inclined to understand under the term "Hebrews" all people who had originally the same habitations, "the other side of the Euphrates," as did the forefathers of the Israelites. This, however, is not to be thought of. Rather did the word "Hebrew" indicate always rather the general political relation; the word "Israelite," the religious and religious-patriarchal relation; so that, when one wished to speak of a person not connected by descent with the patriarchal commonwealth, but who had nevertheless been fully introduced into it by naturalization, in the manner above described, the term "Hebrew" offered itself as more suitable than "Israelite."

§ 8. Altogether different are the relations touched upon in the law (II.), Lev. xxv. 39, seq. It follows in the train of the general laws relating to the sabbatical year and year of jubilee, and refers back to what has been already indicated, v. 10, that the fiftieth year is to be hallowed, liberty is to be proclaimed in the land, and every one to return to his inheritance and his family. This law, therefore, is closely connected with the general ordinances made by the lawgiver for that part of the population which was free and possessed landed estate. The question immediately arises here, In what way did the man who was designated as one "impoverished" come into the relation of servitude? The word *nimkar*,[908] vs. 39, 47, 48, has been translated, *he sells himself*, instead of the rendering adopted by us, *he is sold.* If this were correct, it could be understood as meaning that, on account of his poverty, he engages himself to service.(a) But how should he then receive in advance the wages for the whole period of service, which must yet be liable to interruption, as, for example, by his death? What is the object of the directions for his redemption, especially since he is to be treated as a yearly hired servant (see above)? The rendering of נִמְכַּר, *he sells himself*, is, moreover, not so well established as the other, *he is sold.*[909] There remains, then, only the assumption that the impoverished Israelite has fallen into debt, and thus come into the power of his creditor. This seems to be hinted in the words, "if thy brother have been brought low by him"(b) (the stranger), where there is also indicated a close relation between the two, which can be here no other than that of debtor and creditor. The seller is then the law, and the civil tribunal acting in its name. For to this there must plainly be a final resort, unless the debtor, by his own voluntary action, anticipate such a procedure. The word "sell," then, is to be here understood not altogether in a proper sense; but the debtor is delivered over to the creditor, to serve out the amount of the debt. Compare 2 Kings iv. 1; Isa. l. 1; Neh. v. 5.

It agrees now well with this relation that the time of service should be extended to the longest limit; since in the case of a loan which amounted perhaps to a considerable sum, the creditor could not well be required to content himself with six years of service. Such a rule in its final result would also have been very unpleasant to the poor man who wished to effect a loan. For, at the end of every six years, he would have incurred continually new debts and come into the hands of new creditors, while there would have been no relief for him except the return of his hereditary patrimony in the year of jubilee.[910] In the case of the purchase of a *servant*, on the contrary, his master knew beforehand that he must release him at the end of six years, and governed himself accordingly in respect to the price.

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[908] נִמְכַּר.

(a) [That is, for a pecuniary consideration (Dienste nehme). — Tr.]

[909] As an example of the certain use of נִמְכַּר in this sense, take the law concerning the thief, Ex. xxii. 2 (Eng. Vers. xxii. 3), "If he have nothing (to pay), he shall be sold for his theft," where it cannot possibly mean he shall sell himself.

(b) [וּמָךְ אָחִיךָ עִמּוֹ. The word עִמּוֹ does not necessarily indicate any other than the general relation of proximity — "by him." So our English version: "and thy brother *that dwelleth* by him wax poor." — Tr.]

To us it appears manifest throughout that these two sets of laws refer to different classes of persons, — the second (II.) to the *free* landholder who had been reduced to poverty and would be without means till the year of jubilee, the first (I.) to the servant who had been already in a state of servitude, — and that thus the difficulties and contradictions above referred to find their solution.

§ 9. The law in respect to "Hebrew maid-servants"[911] is in a certain manner interpolated into the ordinances for Hebrew servants, Deut. xv. 12–17, of which the introductory words are as follows: "If thy brother, a Hebrew man or a Hebrew woman, be sold unto thee, six years shall he serve thee, and in the seventh year thou shalt let him go free." Hence it appears that the Hebrew maid-servant also was to serve only six years, and go out free on the seventh. After the further direction that the servant upon his departure shall receive a present; but that, if he prefer to remain, his ear shall be bored; then follow, v. 17, these words: "And also unto thy maid-servant thou shalt do likewise. These words certainly do not mean to affirm that her ear shall be in like manner bored,[912] since here the proceedings are based on wholly different relations. They rather refer immediately to the preceding direction respecting the presents that are to be given in connection with the departure. It is, however, possible that she also might prefer to remain in service. In this case the words just quoted might include also what has been said in the clause immediately preceding them: "And he shall be a servant to thee for ever;" so that she also would lose, like the man-servant, the right of any further release. If, now, in this law, Deut. xv. 12–17 (I. *b.*) compared with Ex. xxi. 2–6 (I. *a.*), the reference is to one who was already a man-servant, and possibly of gentile origin, the same must also be assumed respecting this maid-servant.

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[910] The year of jubilee might, however, have been specified here only as the longest period to which the service could extend, without its being the intention of the law to say that the poor man *must* remain so long in service; since we must certainly assume that he might leave the Israelitish master also at an earlier period, if he was redeemed, or was in a condition to redeem himself.

[911] These, as already remarked above, are called *Shifchah* (שִׁפְחָה) and *Amah* (אָמָה). Wherein the distinction between the two terms lies is the more difficult to investigate, because the etymology and proper signification are wholly uncertain. One might, perhaps, say that *Shifchah* is a maid who has not yet entered into a state of marriage, but that this has happened in the case of the *Amah*. Compare Gen. xvi. 1 with xxi. 10. Yet it must be admitted that the usage is not altogether consistent with itself, although in laws it is especially customary to speak of the son of the *Amah*, and the word, moreover, is certainly connected with *em* (אֵם), *mother*.

[Mielziner dissents from this view. He thinks that *Amah* "probably means bond-women *in general*;" while *Shifchah* "probably designates a class of bond-women who performed the most menial service, and were under the special orders of the mistress." See Am. Theol. Review for April; note to p. 238. — Tr.]

§ 10. Immediately following the law above quoted in respect to men-servants, Ex. xxi. 2–6 (I. *a.*), though not standing in any other connection with it, we find another law respecting maid-servants, which, as compared with that above stated, has been another source of difficulties.

"If a man sell his daughter for a maid-servant, she shall not go out as the men-servants do. If she be not pleasing in the eyes of her master, who hath espoused her to him-[self],[913] he shall cause her to be redeemed. To sell her unto a foreign people he shall not have power, seeing he hath dealt deceitfully with her. And if he betroth her to his son, he shall deal with her after the manner of daughters. If he take him another [wife], her aliment, her raiment, and her duty of marriage he shall not withdraw. And if he do not these three unto her, then shall she go out free without money." Ex. xxi. 7–11.

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[912] According to Rabbinic law also, this does not take place. Maimonides, Tract. *Abadim*, chap. III. § 13.

[913] The particle here rendered "*to him*[*self*]" has in the original two different readings, לֹא, *lo, not*, and לוֹ, *lo, to him*, or *to himself*. The reading לֹא, *not*, stands in the text; but the old marginal gloss indicates in its stead לוֹ, *to him*[*self*]. Many decide in favor of the first reading. It makes no great difference in the meaning, since, in the former case, we must render: "If she be displeasing in the eyes of her master, *so that he does not* betroth her (to himself, as we naturally understand, cannot decide to enter into the relation of marriage with her). No one, however, can fail to see the forced character of this construction. We prefer, therefore, the latter explanation, according to which the words of v. 8,

The three things mentioned in the last verse are apparently these (compare § 11): that he should — (1), take her to himself as a wife; or (2), should give her to his son; and (3), that when he (or his son also) afterwards takes another wife, she shall experience no neglect. For the first case, that of aversion to her, the readiest expedient is that he cause her to be redeemed. Precisely how he is to accomplish this is not said; but we may apparently regard it as a thing understood of itself, that he must either induce the father to take her back, upon the condition, perhaps, of his refunding a part of the sum received for her, or find another to whom she is not displeasing, and who is ready to marry her. The direction that he shall not sell her to *a foreign people*,[914] consequently only to an Israelite or (naturalized) foreigner in the land, seems to indicate this, that the father has not the right to insist in the matter, that the present master himself retains her as his own, while at the same time he is at liberty to release himself from her by finding another suitable marriage for her to an Israelite, or also to a naturalized foreigner. If, now, he does not concern himself about the matter of her redemption, or is not able to accomplish it; if he does not give her to his son, or

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"he betroths her to him[self], and of v. 9, he betroths her to his son, agree well with each other.

[914] This expression, which plainly is intended to exclude individuals of foreign nationality, has seemed strange to expositors of former days. The Rabbins connect with it the rule that in general, nothing further can be said of the sale of the aforesaid maiden, whether on the side of her master or of her father; which latter, indeed, had originally the power of giving her only to one who was not hindered (as, for example, by consanguinity) from taking her as his wife. See Rashi on the passage; Maimonides, Tract. *Abadim*, Chap. IV. § 10, 11; *Qiddushin*, 18. a. 20. a. On the expression itself compare Geiger in his *Zeitschrift für Jud. Theol.* IV. I. § 22 ff.

if another is preferred before her and she is neglected, she has, in all these three cases, the right to go out free, without the repayment of the price paid for her.

It is manifest, now, that this law is most palpably inconsistent with that before adduced, Deut. xv. 12–17. *There* the maid-servant is placed in the same category with the man-servant. *Here*, in this latter law, it is expressly said: "She shall not go out as the men-servants do."[915] *There* it is precisely the case of a *maid-servant* who has no further claims beyond the reception of a present upon her departure; *here* she is not at all destined for *service*, but instead of this, to enter into a matrimonial relation with the master, or with his son; in which latter case his father is to provide for her as for a daughter. Nothing is or can be said, consistently with this relation, concerning her going out in the seventh year. On the contrary, she has, in specified circumstances, the right to go out immediately, and this on the ground that the conduct of the master in deceiving her with respect to these three particulars is to be considered as an act of "deceitful dealing." There is, then, a radical difference in the two laws. They cannot be brought into agreement with each other; nor can one say, with Michaelis, II. § 88, that the law in Deut. xv. 12–27, as compared with that in Ex. xxi. 7–11, exhibits a progress towards clemency. The very opposite is true. After the lawgiver had in the earlier law directed that the master should provide for her as for a daughter, and one who could claim the fulfilment of all matrimonial obligations, to have then treated her in the latter law, as a mere maid-servant who might be sent away from the house without ceremony, would have been a hard proceeding.

§ 11. We hesitate not, therefore, to pursue a course here similar to that which has been followed in reference to men-servants, and to assume that here also, as there, we have to do with different relations and classes of persons. In the law, Deut. xv. 12 – 17, the subject is in fact an actual maidservant, who has also been previously such, and whom her owner sells to another. If, now, she was of gentile descent (see our remarks above, on the term "Hebrew woman," applied to her), there accrues to her, from this transaction, the high advantage that, after six years service with the *second* master, she obtains her perfect freedom, and can in all cases return to her kindred. In the law, Ex. xxi. 7 – 11, she of whom it speaks has manifestly never been a maidservant, but has dwelt only in her father's house. He is probably a poor man, who, by the so-called sale of his daughter, gains something, but who, nevertheless, surrenders her only to enter into relations suitable for her, and in which he has a guarantee for her future condition. We have then again in the *former* case, Deut. xv. 12 – 27, a *maid-servant;* in the *latter*, Ex. xxi. 7 – 11, a *free* woman. Whether her father is an Israelite, or a foreigner, the text does not say; and it is, moreover, well-nigh a matter of indifference, since in the case of women this distinction was not so very important. It is, perhaps, more natural to think of the latter,[916] if our conjecture is right that, in the law *immediately preceding*, the "Hebrew" servant is not of Israelitish descent. Perhaps, moreover, we ought not to leave altogether out of account the fact that the law in respect to captive *heathen women* contains provisions in certain respects similar; those, namely, which direct that, if the master treat with neglect a woman of this class in her matrimonial relation to him, he must let her go free, and neither sell her for money, nor compel her to perform bond-service. Deut. xxi. 14. See chap. 98, § 5.

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[915] The Rabbins, it is true, explain: "As *Canaanitish* men-servants," who become free on account of a bodily injury [see Ex. xxi. 26, 27. — Tr.]; which, as they allege, does not set the Hebrew man-servant or maid-servant free, but is to be punished in accordance with the general laws for bodily damages. See Maimonides, Tract. *Abadim*, chap. IV. § 6.

It is further a weighty consideration, as well perhaps with reference to the case just adduced as in a general point of view, that we have here a relation altogether different from that of a regular marriage; inasmuch as the woman whom the master takes to himself is called, not wife, but maid-servant, is dismissed without a bill of divorce, and receives no marriage dower. The difference is, then, somewhat of the same kind that appears in other books of the scriptures, between wives and concubines. To this latter relation the lawgiver is not, as it would seem, favorably inclined. See chap. 103, § 3. Hence, perhaps, the solicitude which he manifests, Ex. xxi. 9, 10, to secure for this maid-servant the rights of actual marriage. Accordingly, one might better refer the tenth verse also to the son alone, and understand the whole passage in the following manner: The master originally intended this maid for himself. With him — perhaps a man already advanced in years — she claims only the place of a concubine. As such he must, first, take her to himself; or, secondly, provide for her redemption; or, thirdly, he can give her to his son, although this was not the original stipulation. In this last case, however, she is not obliged to be connected with him in the relation of concubine, with the expectation of being thrust into the background by the subsequent introduction of a regular housewife; but the master must treat her as a *daughter* (in-law), not as a maid-servant, and give her to his son as an actual wife, so that, should he take another wife, she may not be disparaged. If the *original purchaser* did not do in her behalf one of these three things above specified, she went out free immediately and returned to her father. But the son of the father [if he had taken her] could not send her away without ceremony, but only on the condition of giving her, as in the case of other regular wives, a writing of divorce, when he was, moreover, bound to assign a reason.[917]

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[916] According to this view, therefore, the lawgiver would rest here, not proceeding at all to the further assumption that an Israelite could surrender his daughter after this manner.

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[917] After the exposition of our views respecting the possibly different reference of the different laws concerning Israelitish and "Hebrew" servants, we must not omit stating that the views of the Rabbins know nothing of such a difference. With them the Hebrew servant is an Israelite whom the judicial tribunal has sold against his will, or who has sold himself, — the former case only on account of theft, Ex. xxii. 2, the latter from absolute poverty. A Hebrew maid-servant is a girl yet in her minority, who has been given away on account

§ 12. In connection with the law relating to the impoverished Israelite who enters into service, the manner of acquiring *heathen men-servants and maid-servants* is also indicated, as well as the relation which they hold to the Israelites. The impoverished Israelite is not to be sold as a perpetual servant, nor to be employed in (the rougher kinds of) bond-service, but to be treated as a hireling. But from the people who live round about, men-servants and maid-servants can be bought. So also from the children of resident foreigners, and from their descendants and families born in the land These may be put to (bond) service, treated as a perpetual possession, and also transmitted as an inheritance to children. Lev. xxv. 44–46. Compare vs. 39, 42.

Here then we have to a certain extent a condition of slavery,[918] which however merits this name only in the mild-

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of pressing poverty (see on this subject the note to chap. 108). The obligation to serve till the year of jubilee is assumed as possible only in those cases where it arrives before the close of the six years, or where the servant prefers to remain. See Maimonides, Tract. *Abadim*, chaps. I.–IV. What difficulties lie in the way of this view have been indicated above. It may be, however, that the relations of a later day hardly permitted any longer the appearance of a special class of "Hebrew" servants in the sense above given. Against our attempted explanation, as applicable to the times of Jeremiah, the alternate use by him of the terms *Hebrew* and *Jew* might also deserve consideration, Jer. xxxiv. 9.

In the case of a Hebrew servant, the right of master is gained [according to the Rabbins, — Tr.] by purchase or document [שטר, which Buxtorf defines to be, *scriptum obligationis vel contractus, instrumentum literarum vel contractus.* — Tr.], and he becomes free again by the expiration of the six years, or still earlier by the arrival of the year of jubilee, or by the reimbursement of that part of the purchase money which has not yet been paid off by service. The Hebrew maid-servant becomes, moreover, free by the appearance of the signs of puberty (since then the right of the father over her ceases, comp. *Kethuboth*, IV. 4). The servant whose ear has been bored with an awl becomes free in the year of jubilee, and upon the death of the master. *Qiddushin*, 1, 2; Maimonides on the same.

[918] Michaelis introduces into his discussion respecting servants an unprofitable misapprehension, when he gives not only to this particular section, but to the whole the title of "Slavery," although he labors to show how strongly the lawgiver has expressed his disapprobation of the slavery prevailing among other people, and how carefully he has mitigated it. With what right can a man-servant who becomes free the seventh year, or even he who goes out in the year of jubilee, or a maid-servant when her master, upon his failure to perform certain obligations to her, is required immediately to send away free, — with what right can all these be called *slaves?* [*Leibeigne* = the Latin term *mancipia.* — Tr.]

est sense. For all the powers which we are accustomed to connect with this word, in ancient and modern times, — the absolute surrender of the slaves to the arbitrary will of the master, his right to chastise them without limit, to employ them in unremitting toil, and even to kill them with impunity, — all these are set aside by the Mosaic law, inasmuch as this class of servants is carefully protected by the law,[919] and is in no way left without rights. In addition to this they were at liberty, as remarked above, to become naturalized, a step which must sooner or later have resulted in their independence and complete fusion with the nation. No prejudice, such as existed, and still exists, among other nations, according to which slaves are regarded as a sort of inferior beings, — no such prejudice opposed itself among the Hebrews, even to a family connection with servants. An example in point may be found in 1 Chron. ii. 34, 35, (see chap. 109), where an Israelite gives his daughter to an Egyptian servant, whereby he becomes heir to his master. In the same manner Abraham has no scruples about installing his servant Eliezer as heir to his great possessions and his dignity as an emir, Gen. xv. 2, 3. These regulations could not but be followed by the most salutary results. By their means those who, under the title of "slaves," constitute in other nations a class distinct from the rest of the population, extremely dangerous, and capable of being kept in order only by the most severe, sometimes the most barbarous, laws, were among the Israelites received more intimately into the patriarchal family-circle; the feeling of distance and hostility which they naturally brought with them was, as it were, gradually dried up; and the general free spirit of the Mosaic institutions operated continually to soften down the contrast, otherwise so odious, between the condition of master and that of servant.[920] Hence, as Michaelis has already remaked, in the history of the Hebrew state during its existence of fifteen centuries, we hear nothing respecting servile wars, as in the Roman empire, or any other dissatisfaction on the part of the servants. In these circumstances no better fortune could befall one destined to slavery than that he should be sold into Palestine, where the mildest lot awaited him, and where also, by means of a special law, Deut. xxiii. 16, 17, forbidding the surrender of the servant who had escaped from his master and permitting him to settle at pleasure in the land, he found, as now in England (to which also *Michaelis* and *Wallon, droit d'Asyle*, refer) a protecting asylum the moment he set his foot on the soil of Palestine.

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[919] Precisely the same view is taken by the law of the Mishnah; although in some particulars this has apparently not kept itself entirely free from the influence of that feature of the Roman jurisprudence which regards the slave as chattel property.

[920] One of the earliest and most touching memorials of the manner in which

In the passage of the law now under consideration, purchase is named as the manner in which gentile men-servants and maid-servants were acquired, just as in the case of Hebrew servants.[921] Elsewhere also, as for example, Ex. xii. 44, the servant is designated as "one bought for money (מִקְנַת כֶּסֶף, *miqnath keseph*). In addition to these were those born in the house" (*yelide bayith*[922]), Gen. xvii. 23. These are the children of the men-servants and maid-servants who have come into the master's possession, as also (§3) the children of the maid-servant married to a Hebrew servant who remained with her master. These we find also designated by another term, "the son of thy handmaid," Ex. xxiii. 12.[923]

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servants were treated in the Hebrew family offers itself in the circumstance that the oak under which Rachael's handmaid was buried received the name of *the oak of weeping*. Gen. xxxv. 8.

[921] The average price of a servant or handmaid appears from Ex. xxi. 32, (see chap. 73 §1) to have been thirty shekels. Compare the valuation of persons, Lev. xxvii. 2, seq., chap. 43. § 4.

[922] יְלִידֵי בָיִת.

[923] According to the law of the Mishnah the right of master over a Canaanitish servant is acquired (just as in the case of immovable estate) by purchase, by document, or by actual appropriation (having one's self served by him). [The words of the Mishnah are: עבד כנעני נקנה בכסף ובשטר ובחזקה; *a Canaanitish servant* is acquired by money, by document, and by possession. The latter mode of acquisition is thus explained by Maimonides as quoted by Surenhusius, Mishna, *Qiddushin*, I. 3; "If he has taken off or put on his master's shoes, or carried his garments after him to the bath; undressed, washed, anointed, rubbed, dressed, raised him up; or if the master has raised up the servant, he

Respecting servants and handmaids acquired in war (chap. 98) the lawgiver in these regulations makes no declarations. It is natural to suppose that those acquired in this way came under the same rules. A special law, indeed, Deut. xxi. 10–14, makes mention of the female captive. But in her case it is presupposed that her master takes her to wife (chap. 98, § 5). And in general the female captives on whose virginity a special stress is laid, Numb. xxxi. 18, had undoubtedly the same destination.

§ 13. We come now to the particular laws relating to servants, in which we notice in general a tendency to secure for them a mild condition of servitude.

On the sabbath the servants and handmaids are not to labor, Ex. xx. 10. This law given on Sinai is once more mentioned, Ex. xxiii. 12: "On the seventh day thou shalt rest, that the son of thy handmaid and the stranger may be refreshed." When the decalogue is repeated, Deut. v. 14, 15, the law of the sabbath in respect to servants and handmaids is as follows: "In it thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, nor thy man-servant, nor thy maid-servant, ... nor thy stranger that is in thy gates; that thy man-servant and thy maid-servant may rest as well as thou.[924] For remember that thou wast a servant in Egypt, and God has set thee free; therefore he commandeth thee to keep the sabbath." In the freedom, then, which God had conferred upon them they were to recognize a demand that they should treat others with mildness, compare Ex. xxiii. 9.

The general national festivals were also holidays for the servants; and it is repeatedly enjoined that they share in

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has gained possession of him." — Tr.] The servant, on the other side, becomes free by redemption or by a certificate of freedom. *Qiddushin* I. 3. Maimonides, Tract. *Abadim*, chap. 5.

The servant whom his master sells to one not an Israelite, or into a foreign country, thereby passes in the view of the law, out of the condition of servitude. If then he escapes from his new master, the former has no disposal of him. Nay more, the government may compel the seller himself to redeem him, in order to set him free. *Gittin*, IV. 6. Maimonides, Tract. *Abadim*, chap. viii.

[924] The thought that servants and handmaids hold to the master the relation of children of the same God, and can therefore lay claim to receive perfect justice, is prominently set forth in Job, chap. xxxi. 13, 14.

these feasts. The standing form of expression in reference to this is: "rejoice before thy God in thy feast, thou, thy son and thy daughter, *thy man-servant and thy maid-servant*, etc., Deut. xvi. 11, 12, 14, compare xii. 18.

The master had no power over the body and life of his servant and handmaid. The infliction upon them of mild chastisement was unquestionably permitted, as it is now also, even in those countries where the servants are completely free. For those who had grown up in the house, this was as necessary as for the master's own children, Prov. xxix. 19, 21, compare xiii. 24. But if the master smote them so as to injure them in respect to any one of their members, for example, if he smote out one of their teeth, he was required immediately to set them free. If the servant dies on the spot from an unfortunate blow, the master is to be punished for this.[925] For the particulars see chap. 72, § 2; chap. 76, § 3. For the protection which the Mosaic law extends to captives taken in war, see chap. 98, § 5.

It is a characteristic mark that in all these cases the first thing kept in view is the freedom of the inferior, in preference to any other punishments imposed on the master, as if it were the endeavor of the lawgiver, first of all, to attain this end for all servants, and by all the means in his power.

If one had seduced a maid-servant who was already espoused to a man,[926] but had not yet obtained her freedom, neither of the two was to be punished with death, as was otherwise appointed for both in the case of the seduction of a free woman. Instead of this they were only to be chastized, Lev. xix. 20. This, again, is in a certain sense a demand that those who have the privilege should rather enter into matrimony as free than in a state of servitude.[927]

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[926] It is strange that De Wette, who is elsewhere so cautious, should say in reference to Hebrew "slaves:" *Archaeology*, § 160: "Corporal chastisement to the extent of death was *allowed* to be inflicted upon them, provided only that it was not instantaneous." Where does the lawgiver say this? For maltreatment he appoints penalties, but in no case approves of it.

[926] According to the Talmud, *Kerithuth*, II. 5; comp. *Gem*. II. *a*., she is a maid-servant betrothed to a man-servant; whether a Hebrew or Canaanitish maid-servant to a Hebrew man-servant, or the former to a Canaanitish man-servant, is a question respecting which the different opinions are propounded and considered. The decision arrived at is that she is a half-free woman, betrothed to a Hebrew servant. Maimonides Tract. *Issure Biah*, chap. III. § 13.

No law forbids the servants to hold property in their own name, provided they had brought it with them, or received it as a gift, or had the opportunity to acquire it in any other way. But Michaelis is wrong in drawing this general inference from Lev. xxv. 49, where the person under consideration is the impoverished Israelite, who is no proper servant, and who has the perpetual right of redemption. There might be outstanding debts due him, or he might receive by inheritance enough to redeem himself for the remaining time of service. With more show of reason does Michaelis adduce the fact that Zibah, the servant of Saul, and then of Mephibosheth, was himself the master of twenty servants, 2 Sam. ix. 2, 9, 10.[928] We may, perhaps, adduce from more ancient time the fact that the relation of servitude in which Jacob stood did not prevent his possessing herds of his own and a numerous train of servants, Gen. xxxii. 17.

One is surprised to see in Michaelis, appended immedidiately to the laws relating to servants, a section entitled "Peculiar right of oxen," that, namely, of being left unmuzzled while threshing out the corn (chap. 17. § 5). Michaelis thinks that this law contains, likewise, an intimation that the servant should not be forbidden to partake of the eatable or drinkable substance upon which he is bestowing toil. The law does indeed authorize an *inference* of the kind, if one looks to the spirit of the legislator. But what he wished to say concerning laborers, he would have uttered directly, had he found it necessary to do so. But this, as it would seem, he did not. Every passer-by was furthermore permitted to partake of the fruits of the field and of the grape-clusters (chap. 16. § 3). The obligation rested upon the master, and certainly he had the intention, of giving his servants and handmaids a regular maintenance. It could hardly then be supposed that at the wine-press and fruit harvest he would prohibit his laborers from partaking of the fruits,[929] especially when we consider the abundant produce of the soil at that day.[930] But in the case of beasts, especially of oxen employed in threshing out grain, of which in the course of days they might consume no inconsiderable part, it was possible that one of a severer temper should conceive the idea of hindering them from eating.

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[927] The Rabbins notice (*Kerithuth*, II. 4, compared with 5) how the penalty applied in this case to the maid-servant differs from the directions elsewhere in force; and they state, as a prominent point, that the chastisement was to be suffered only by *her*, the trespass-offering to be brought only by the man. But it does not appear how this can be inferred from the the text. See chap. 81. § 3.

[928] According to *the law of the Mishna*, *Canaanitish* servants and handmaids have no right to anything found by them, but Hebrew servants have. *These*, therefore, have an actual right to possess property. *Baba metsiah*, I. 5. Compare Maimonides, *Tract. Mattanah*, chap. III. § 12, seq.

§ 14. In Lev. xix. 20, it is said of the maid-servant betrothed to a husband: "if she has not been redeemed, *or her right of freedom* has not been given her." The word *chuphshah*,[931] here employed in the original text, Gesenius translates simply by the word "freedom." But it can just as well signify a document, or a formal declaration, to be made, for example, before the judges, by which the manumission of this maid-servant is announced. In fact, the text seems to require the assumption of such a formal procedure, which could indeed have been hardly dispensed with where, as in the case of this maid, grave legal decisions were concerned. See § 13. We might in like manner assume something of the same sort in the case of men-servants, especially when their master of his own accord manumitted them. For this there is the more ground, when we consider that for the case of the servant who prefers to remain beyond his time in the house of his master, a definite form is prescribed.[932]

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[929] Although in Job, chap. xxiv. 10, 11, such conduct as this is certainly charged upon evil-doers.

[930] That according to Mosaic law, laborers have in general the right to partake of those fruits upon which they are bestowing labor, is stated *Baba metsiah*, VII. 2–7. No limitation is to be set to this right; yet the laborer's own interest requires that he avoid using it to excess, lest he should close against himself the doors (to employment). From chap. VII. it follows that the laborers were in fact accustomed to stipulate for themselves an indemnification for the renunciation of that right. The *keepers* of fruits (already gathered) have a right to partake of them when such is the custom of the place, VII. 8.

[931] חֻפְשָׁה.

§ 15. The *hirelings*, or hired servants, to which class, as it would seem from Ex. xii. 45, the lawgiver reckons foreigners, would naturally undertake service where it would be most for their advantage. They had also the privilege of determining the kind and degree of work in view of the wages to be demanded. They are accordingly mentioned, Lev. xxv. 45, as an example of those who receive special good treatment. In Lev. xix. 13; Deut. xxiv. 14, 15, it is directed that their wages be paid them before the going down of the sun; which may be naturally limited to mean, so far as they need them and demand them. From this precept it seems also to follow that they were hired by the day, or for the performance of a definite work. On the other hand, it appears from Lev. xxv. 53 (see above) that they were sometimes hired by the year. In this case they probably made their home altogether in the master's house.[933]

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[932] The ordinances, according to the law of the Mishna, see above, notes 927 and 923. The Rabbins require, in the case of the manumission of those who have been already received by (circumcision and) baptism (see note 888), a subsequent bath, whereby they become altogether like other Israelites, *Jebammoth*, 47. 6, Maimonides, *Issure Biah*, chap. XIII. § 11. The servant purchased from gentiles, if he come before his master and declare, upon the occasion of his (first) baptism, that he receives it in order to become a proselyte, thereby obtains his freedom. *Jebammoth* 45. b.; 46. a.; Maimonides, as quoted above, § 11. If one makes over in writing his whole property to his slave, the latter thereby obtains his freedom forthwith. *Peah*, III. 8. The daughters of manumitted servants are altogether in the same condition as those of other proselytes, so that, provided their mother was an Israelitish woman, even priests are permitted to marry them, and the children are competent to the priestly dignity. *Bikkurim*, I. 5.

When bills of manumission are to be given, the same thing is in general to be observed in respect to their form as in the case of bills of divorce. *Gittin*, I. 4. Compare the remarks on this subject in chap. 106. The substance of a bill of manumission lies in the words, "Henceforth be a free woman (or a free man);" or, "Henceforth be thine own." *Gittin*, IX. 3. When one has executed a bill of manumission, and given a commission to put it into the hands of his servant, he can no longer recall it, even though the servant have not yet received the document, as can certainly be done in the case of a divorce. The ground of this difference is, that it is lawful in one's absence to ordain something to his advantage, but not to his detriment. *Gittin*, I. 6.

The Rabbins suppose the case to be possible that one may be half-servant and half-free; for example, when he has belonged at the same time to several masters, and has been manumitted by one of them. He is then in an evil plight, as being unable to contract any marriage; not with a maid-servant, in his character as freeman, nor with a free woman, in his character as servant. Rabbinic law decides that in this case the remaining owner or owners can be compelled to manumit him, on condition of receiving a bond for his half (or respective proportion) of the servant's value. *Gittin*, IV. 5; *Edayoth*, I. 13. Comp. Maim. Tract. *Abadim*, chap. VII. § 4. In the case of maid-servants, also, a like relation of half-freedom may exist. *Kerithuth*, II. 5.

§ 16. Michaelis speaks also of the servants of the sanctuary, and quotes in connection with these Lev. xxvii. 1–8. But in that passage it is more than probable that not the person himself is devoted by a vow to the sanctuary, but his value according to the estimation given,[934] see chap 43, § 4. But in the case of the ban-vow [*Banngelübde*, answering to the Hebrew חֵרֶם, by which a thing was irrevocably devoted according to the tenor of the vow, — Tr.] the meaning certainly is that one may irrevocably devote anything belonging to him, servants included, as a gift to the sanctuary, see chap. 44, p. 372, [where the author discusses at large the question whether *private persons* could devote human beings to death, and rightly decides the question in the negative, — Tr]. Why the Midiantish women given to the priests and Levites, Numb. xxxi. 47, should not have belonged to them, but to the sanctuary, as Michaelis thinks, II. § 125, does not appear. But in later time there were certainly men-servants and also maid-servants, 1 Sam. ii. 22, belonging to the sanctuary. It is well known that under Joshua the Gibeonites were devoted to the service of the sanctuary Josh. ix. 3, seq.; 26, 27.[935] Altogether different, however, was the relation of those who were consecrated to the sanctuary after the manner of Samuel (who, however, was also a Levite); and who seems to have participated immediately in the functions of divine service. That Eli, on account of his fondness for Samuel, made him his own personal servant, as Michaelis expresses himself, is nowhere said. On the contrary it is declared, 1 Sam. iii. 1, that "the child Samuel ministered to Jehovah (that is, performed the service of the sanctuary) before Eli." But in the Mosaic law, which does not favor votive dedications, we find no very exact specifications respecting any of these relations.

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[933] According to the law of the Mishnah, the proper time for demanding wages is, for the day-laborer (according to Lev. xix. 13) the whole of the night; for the night-laborer, (according to Deut. xxiv. 15) the whole of the day following the termination of his labor, even when he has been hired for longer periods of time. During that period he is to be permitted to make oath in case of any dispute in regard to the demand; and so also after its expiration, provided only that witnesses testify to his having addressed the demand at the right time to the master of the house. In all other cases the presumption of the court is rather in favor of the alleged employer, so that he is admitted to an oath by which he repels the demand. *Baba metsiah*, IX. 11, 12; compare *Shebuoth*, VII. 1; see note 795 [a long note appended to § 89, which treats of the oath. — Tr].

The general Mosaic regulations are applied to the hire of beasts and vessels. *Baba metsiah*, IX. 12.

In respect to the hours of labor and the board of the day-laborer, the custom of the place is to be law. Here the employer may do nothing arbitrary, nor can the employee demand anything beyond such usage. *Baba metsiah*, VII. 1.

[934] The idea of a *valuation of persons* without any thought of the relations of servitude appears further in the Mosaic law in the redemption of the first-born (chap. 8 § 5). It appears also in modern times, as for example, in the custom (unfortunately, still occasionally prevalent) of purchasing exemption from service, and substituting another man, in respect to military obligation.

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[935] These are distinguished from other servants partly by their exclusive destination [to be "hewers of wood and drawers of water for the congregation and for the altar of the Lord," Josh. ix. 23, 27. — Tr.]; partly also by the circumstance that here the whole of a little community was devoted to hereditary servitude. This may, in a certain manner, remind us of the Spartan Helots, although the condition of the Gibeonites seems to have been in no respect an oppressive one, compare 2 Sam. xxi. 3, seq. We can hardly doubt that the *Nethinim*, that is, *given* (*to the sanctuary*), who appear 1 Chron. ix. 2; Ezra ii. 43, 58, 70; vii. 7; viii. 20; Neh. iii. 26; vii. 46, 60, 73; x. 29; xi. 3, 21, were descendants of those Gibeonites, according to the well-known assumption of the Rabbins (see note 889); and that this designation, which is first applied to the Levites, as *hereditarily given* to the sanctuary, Numb. iii. 9, afterwards remained as the exclusive title of the Gibeonites, who in like manner belonged by inheritance to the sanctuary. For this reason the proper *Nethinim* are expressly distinguished from other persons assigned to the hereditary service of the sanctuary; as, for example, "the servants of Solomon," Ezra ii. 58; Neh. vii. 60; xi. 3 (see Winer, *Handwörterbuch*, II. § 175). The former, as appears from Ezra ii. 43, seq.; Neh. vii. 46, seq., were divided into several families; but, after the return from the captivity, were not very numerous, inasmuch as their number, along with that of "the servants of Solomon," amounted only to 392. The *Nethinim* dwelt in quarters of their own, Neh. iii. 31; xi. 21, and had their own overseers, Neh. xi. 21, who (if one may venture to draw a conclusion from the Nethinim name *Zika*, Ezra ii. 43; Neh. vii. 46) were chosen out of their own number.

GENERAL REMARKS ON THE ABOVE.

In the foot-notes Saalschütz has everywhere indicated the view of the Rabbins on the topics discussed by him. The most important points in which he differs from them relate to the circumcision of servants, and the manner of reconciling what is said of the purchase of Hebrew men-servants and maid-servants, Ex. xxi. 2–11; Deut. xv. 12–18, with the directions respecting the poor Israelite who has been sold to his brother or to a resident foreigner, Lev. xxv. 39–43, 47–55.

1. In regard to *circumcision* Saalschütz maintains, note 904, that the direction given to Abraham for the circumcision of all the male servants in his household "is to be regarded only as a special obligation imposed upon Abraham;" and he infers from the words of Moses, Ex. xii. 44, "Every man's servant that is bought for money, when thou hast circumcised him, then shall he eat thereof;" namely, of the paschal lamb,—that the circumcision of servants was left optional. To this view Mielziner very pertinently objects that the words "every man-child in your generations," Gen. xvii. 12, and "my covenant shall be in your flesh for an everlasting covenant," v. 13, clearly imply that the command imposed upon Abraham was intended to be of perpetual obligation. In regard to the words of Moses, Ex. xii. 44, nothing further can be inferred from them than that some delay might occur in the circumcision of the servant "bought for money," during which the passover might possibly be celebrated. The natural inference from them certainly is that the lawgiver considered the circumcision of all such servants as a thing that must follow of course.[1] In regard to the original intent of the precept

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[1] The Hebrew of Ex. xii. 44 runs thus: וְכָל־עֶבֶד אִישׁ מִקְנַת כָּסֶף וּמַלְתָּה אֹתוֹ אָז יֹאכַל בּוֹ; which may be rendered literally: And as to every servant,—a man bought with money, thou shalt circumcise him; then shall he eat thereof. So Rosenmüller well: Ceterum, verba illa וְכָל־עֶבֶד וגו absolute sunt posita, et *πρότασιν* faciunt, Latine sic exprimenda: *quod attinet servum emptitium,* וּמַלְתָּה אֹתוֹ, *circumcides eum,* ו *ἀποδόσιν* indicat, ut alias saepissime." In this he agrees with the ancient versions. *The Septuagint* is: Καὶ πάντα οἰκέτην

given to Abraham, Mielziner, in maintaining the common view, has clearly the right on his side. But in respect to the *later Rabbinic usage* he and Saalschütz are perfectly agreed. "That the Rabbins," says the former, "did not countenance anything like coercion of conscience, is evident from their declaration that a purchased slave could not be forced even to the circumcision enjoined by the law. In case of his refusal, the master was to forbear with him for a year, and try to bring him to a better mood by mild persuasion. If his efforts were unsuccessful, he must sell him again to a heathen. If the slave, however, entered into service on the condition that circumcision was to be omitted, the master might retain him forever uncircumcised. A slave once delivered from heathendom by circumcision could not be sold again to a heathen, nor into foreign lands, because he might in that case be easily enticed back into heathenism. If the master thus sold him, he could under certain circumstances be forced to buy him back again; but then he could no longer hold him in his service, but must let him go free."[1] This view of the Rabbins grew very naturally out of the development of the idea of the freedom and spirituality of religion. In the case of infants born in the house, circumcision was wholly the act of the parent or

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η ἀργυρώνητον (as if he had read a conjunction *or* between the words עֶבֶד and אִישׁ) *περιτεμεῖς αὐτόν· καὶ τότε φάγεται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ.* The *Vulgate* reads: Omnis autem servus emptitius circumcidetur, et sic comedet. The *Targum of Onkelos* follows the Hebrew literally. The Targum of Pseudo-Jonathan, besides other departures from the Hebrew text, enjoins *baptism* also: And as to every foreigner who has been sold as a servant to an Israelite being the purchase of money — thou shalt circumcise him and baptize him, then he shall eat thereof.

With the view of the ancient translators agrees that of the moderns generally. *Luther:* Aber wer ein erkaufter knecht ist, den beschneide man, und dann esse er davon; but whoever is a servant bought with money, let him be circumcised, and then let him eat thereof. *De Wette:* Und jeglichen knecht, der mit geld erkauft ist, sollst du beschneiden, dann mag er davon essen; And every servant bought with money shalt thou circumcise; then may he eat thereof. So the *French Version:* Mais tout esclave qu'on aura acheté par argent sera circoncis, et alors il en mangera; But every slave who has been bought with money shall be circumcised, and then he shall eat thereof.

[1] In Am. Theol. Review, pp. 430, 431. Compare above, Saalschütz, note 904.

master. But when heathen servants arrived at years of discretion were introduced into the household, it was felt that the imposition upon them by force of the rite of circumcision could have to them no spiritual significance, and must have the effect of confirming them in their rejection of the true religion.

2. Far more important is Saalschütz's dissent from the common view in respect to the *two classes of passages; first*, Ex. xxi. 2–6; Deut. xv. 12–18, which he designates as I. *a* and *b; secondly*, Lev. xxv. 39–43, and verses 47–55 of the same chapter, which he numbers II. *a* and *b*. The common view is, that both these classes of passages refer to *the same persons*. To remove the difficulties growing out of the total disagreement in respect to the time of service,—till the seventh year in one case, till the year of jubilee in the other,—different hypotheses have been proposed, which are stated by Saalschütz. That adopted by Mielziner (and long ago given by Michaelis) is the following: "Ordinarily the man-servant became free after six years of service, that is, at the beginning of the seventh year; but if he had been sold into servitude a few years before the year of jubilee, he was not to wait for the seventh year, but he regained his freedom in the year of jubilee." He adds in a note that "the Rabbins confirm this view, but only in relation to the person who sold himself on account of poverty; one who was sold as a judgment for theft, they say, could only be sold for six years, not for a shorter time;" and, further, that the prevailing view of the Rabbinical commentators is that the regulations spoken of Ex. xxi. 2–6, and Deut. xv. 12 seq., applied only to persons sold as a judgment for theft, while the provisions defined in Lev. xxv. 40 were applicable only to those who sold themselves on account of poverty; while Rabbi Eliezer, in opposition to this common view, maintains that the man who sold himself was in every respect subject to the same conditions as the one sold under a judicial sentence; a point in respect to which Mielziner himself agrees with Eliezer.[1]

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[1] Am. Theol. Review for April, 1861, pp. 243, 244.

In respect to the harmonizing of the two classes of passages now under consideration, Saalschütz, while he fairly states the common view, maintains at length that the first class of passages, Ex. xxi. 2 – 6, and Deut. xv. 12 – 18, refers to a peculiar class of servants, not belonging to the heathen, and yet not to be regarded as proper Israelites, but constituting a middle class between slaves purchased of heathen and the impoverished Israelites that appear in the *second* class of passages, Lev. xxv. 39 – 43, and vs. 47 – 55. See his enumeration in § 7 above. As this is an important point, we give in full Mielziner's criticism on Saalschütz's view.

"Prof. Saalschütz, in his Mos. Recht, 702, attempts an explanation of this same difficulty. He agrees with Rabbi Eliezer (in opposition to the Rabbins), that wholly different persons are intended in Leviticus and Exodus. The passage in Lev. xxv. 40, he says, refers only to the case of an Israelite reduced to poverty, who had sold his possessions until the year of jubilee, and who was therefore allowed to sell his services for more than six years, that is, till the year of jubilee. The other passages (in Ex. and Deut.) refer, not, as the Rabbins allege, to one sold for theft, but to a special class of servants, who, without being heathen, were not considered as proper Israelites, but formed *a middle class, born in slavery*, between the impoverished Israelites and the slaves purchased of heathen. Under this category come, first of all, those born in the house of an Israelite from the marriage of slaves; also, slaves purchased who had become incorporated with the family by circumcision, and thus attained a kind of naturalization. This class was known under the name of 'Hebrew slaves,' and to them applies the ordinance that, when sold by their first master the second owner has no longer the same rights over them with the first, but must release them in the seventh year. Saalschütz finds himself compelled to take this view, from the difficulty which he sees in the words of Ex. xxi. 2: 'If thou buy an Hebrew servant.' As this could not be said of one who, up to that time, had *not* been a Hebrew servant, but a holder of property. But the difficulty in the passsage is less than that in the interpretation. Why does the phrase 'to buy a servant,' presuppose that he was already a servant, any more than the phrases 'to make a king' (Judg. ix. 8), or 'to take a wife' (creare regem, ducere uxorem), presuppose that the former was already a king, and the latter already a wife? And opposed to the interpretation of Saalschütz is the fact that, in the repetition of the law (Deut. xv. 12) about emancipation after six years service, the *ebed* [servant] is not named. And, in fine, we do not see why the whole special legislation in Exodus should be introduced with provisions about this peculiar class of servants, even before the enactments as to the freedom of the Hebrews themselves, to which, according to the usual interpretation, this passage refers."[1]

To us Mielziner does not seem, in the note just quoted, to have fully met the argument of Saalschütz, §§ 6–8. The assumption of the Rabbins, to which he gives his adherence, that the release at the year of jubilee had respect only to the Hebrew servant who had been sold into servitude a few years, — less than six before the year of jubilee, — who "was not to wait for the seventh year, but regained his freedom in the year of jubilee," seems to us very forced and unnatural, and we cannot but say with Saalschütz: "This is getting over the difficulty in a very superficial way. It is impossible that a law should have been given containing such a perilous ambiguity." His position, also, in respect to the formula, "If thou buy a Hebrew servant," does not appear to be conclusive. Undoubtedly the phrases, "to make a king," "to take a wife," presuppose, from their very nature, that neither the king nor the wife existed before. Otherwise the former could not have been made, nor the latter taken. So, also, with the phrase, "to buy a wife," which means to take a wife by purchase. But, on the other hand, to depose a king, and to divorce a wife, presuppose the previous existence of both. We must, then, judge of each expression from its own character. Now the phrase, "to buy a Hebrew servant," is most obviously and naturally understood as meaning, to buy a Hebrew who is already a servant. It might, perhaps, apply to the Hebrew who was sold into servitude for theft, but not, as Mielziner contends, to the case of the poor Israelite who sold himself for poverty. When we consider how carefully worded is the ordinance respecting the latter, Lev. xxv. 39–43, 47–55, and how widely the language differs, in every respect, from that in Ex. xxi. 2–6, Deut. xv. 12–18, it is hard to believe that both classes of regulations relate to the same persons.

It is not, however, our purpose to advocate the position of Saalschütz against the common Rabbinic view. Our readers have both before them, and we leave to them the decision between the two. Only this we would remark, that the view of Saalschütz is peculiarly favorable to all servants of foreign descent who had been incorporated by circumcision into the Hebrew commonwealth. For it gave to each of them, upon every change of masters, the privilege of freedom after six years of service; while, according to the common view, as well stated by Mielziner, "Besides the case of serious injuries inflicted upon the slave by the master (Ex. xxi. 26, 27), the Mosaic law has no ordinance about the manumission of slaves from foreign nations."[1]

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[1] Am. Theol. Review for April, pp. 244, 245.

It has been maintained by some writers that the words of Moses in reference to the year of jubilee: "And ye shall hallow the fiftieth year, and proclaim liberty throughout all the land unto all the inhabitants thereof," apply, by fair interpretation, to the servants of foreign origin also, as being a part of "the inhabitants of the land." This view is ably advocated by Rev. Albert Barnes, who says: "To one who should read this law, if there were no other to conflict with it, or that made it necessary to seek a different interpretation, the plain meaning of the statute would appear to be, that *all* who resided in the land from whatever motive, or whatever were their relations or employments, were from that moment to be regarded as freemen."[2] Undoubtedly such would be the view of the statute taken absolutely by itself. But in interpreting it, we are to consider the limitations imposed on it by the context, as well as by other laws. Now, if we examine the context, we find that the ordinance of the year of jubilee provides not simply for liberty, but for liberty in connection with the return of the people to their hereditary possessions, which had been temporarily alienated through the pressure of poverty. The entire verse, Lev. xxv. 10, reads thus; "And ye shall hallow the fiftieth year, and proclaim liberty throughout all the land unto all the inhabitants thereof; it shall be a jubilee unto you; *and ye shall return every man unto his possession, and ye shall return every man*

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[1] In Am. Theol. Review for July, p. 436.

[2] Barnes on Slavery, chap. V. § 2, p. 146.

unto his family." *The same words are repeated*, v. 13: "In the year of this jubilee ye shall return every man unto his possession." Then follow extended regulations having for their basis the fundamental law that all landed estate is to return at the year of jubilee to its hereditary owners, so that there shall be no perpetual alienation of it. After these follow, in the remainder of the chapter, provisions for the release at the year of jubilee of the impoverished Israelite who has sold himself (or been sold) to one of his countrymen or to a gentile. Now all this certainly looks as if these provisions referred throughout to one and the same class of persons,—impoverished Israelites. One who reads the chapter through with no preconceived theory, naturally infers that the provisions, vs. 39–43, and 47–55, are intended to specify how the ordinance of v. 10, "Ye shall return every man unto his possession, and ye shall return every man unto his family," is to be carried out. Such has ever been the view of Jewish commentators. They have held that all Hebrew servants, though their ear had been bored with the awl, were released at the year of jubilee; but they have not extended this rule to gentile servants.

This view is further confirmed by the fact, that between the two passages relating to the release at the year of jubilee of an Israelite held in servitude, *first*, by one of his own countrymen, vs. 39–43; *secondly*, by a foreigner, vs. 47–55, there occur the following remarkable words:

> "Both thy bond-men and thy bond-maids, which thou shalt have, shall be of the heathen that are round about you; of them shall ye buy bond-men and bond-maids. Moreover of the children of the strangers that do sojourn among you, of them shall ye buy, and of their families that are with you, which they begat in your land; and they shall be your possession, and ye shall take them as an inheritance for your children after you, to inherit them for a possession, they shall be your bond-men forever: but over your brethren, the children of Israel, ye shall not rule one over another with rigor." vs. 44–46.

Mr. Barnes explains the clause: "They shall be your bond-men forever," as meaning that "the *permanent* provision for servants was *not* that they were to enslave or employ their brethren, the Hebrews, but that they were to employ foreigners; or, as he immediately afterwards expresses it: "it would be a *permanent arrangement* that they might be purchased and introduced among the Hebrews."[1] In other words, he refers the words "for ever," not to *the persons bought and their children*, but to the *ordinance*. But, *first*, this is not the natural interpretation of the passage grammatically considered. Had Moses intended such a sense, he would probably have said, as often elsewhere, "It shall be to you an ordinance forever;" *secondly*, the context is against such an interpretation. He has just been prohibiting the permanent servitude of an Israelite (and of course his posterity) to one of his brethren; and he immediately proceeds to make the same prohibition in respect to a heathen master. We seem, therefore, necessitated to understand him as here allowing such servitude in the case of heathen servants, and them only.

If, now, the view of Saalschütz as to the class of persons called "Hebrew servants" is tenable, then, since incorporation into the Hebrew commonwealth by circumcision was at least free to all of gentile origin who desired it, a way was opened for the gradual fusion of gentile servants in the Hebrew commonwealth, and the termination of their state of servitude. Otherwise we must say that, in respect to them, the custom already existing was tolerated, just as in the case of polygamy and divorce, and the evils incident to it mitigated by humane restrictions and regulations.

But we entirely agree with Mr. Barnes that the passage in question furnishes no warrant for the system of slavery as it exists in our southern states. Here we might draw a contrast between the mild laws of the Hebrews, even in respect to "the heathen round about them," and the barbarous code of American slavery. The Hebrew laws recognized the rights of the slave as a man. If his master smote out his eye or his tooth, he was to let him go free for his eye's or his tooth's sake. But the southern slave codes begin by converting slaves into chattels personal. And, lest any one should suppose the expression to be only a figure of speech, they take care to tell us that it is to be understood literally in the strictest sense. "Slaves shall be deemed, taken, reputed, and adjudged to be chattels personal in the hands of their masters and possessors, to all intents and purposes whatsoever."[1] "A slave is one who is in the power of a master, to whom he belongs. The master may sell him, dispose of his person, his industry, his labor; he can do nothing, possess nothing, nor acquire anything but which must belong to his master."[2] Thus they strip him at the outset of all rights whatever. According to these laws the slave has no more right to use his intellectual than his bodily powers in the pursuit of his own welfare. If the acquisition of knowledge diminishes his value as a "chattel personal," his owner must place beyond his reach all the means of knowledge. Accordingly, in most of the slave states, it is made a high crime and misdemeanor to teach the slave to read or write, or give him any book or pamphlet, though it be the word of God. That these "chattels personal" may not learn their rights as men, and thus become dangerous or unsafe property, they are by law shut up in ignorance. The master may give them by verbal teaching just so much knowledge of God's holy word as he judges convenient and proper; but they may not learn to read for themselves the words of Christ and his apostles. Why? Because the intelligence which this implies would diminish their value as chattels personal! Such is the supremely mean and selfish spirit of the system. If any man treats his slaves in a Christian manner (as doubtless many do), it is in spite of the slave-code, not by its direction. Contrast now with all this the Hebrew laws, which left the way open to all servants of gentile origin to be incorporated by circumcision into the Hebrew commonwealth, and expressly admitted them to all the religious privileges which their masters enjoyed.

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[1] Barnes on Slavery, ubi supra, p. 155.

But on this we will not at present insist. We prefer to meet those who defend American slavery on the ground of the Mosaic code in another way. We wish them to show, in the light of the New Testament, if they can, who are now their "*brethren*," over whom they may not rule with rigor, and who are the "*heathen round about*" them, whom they may take as "an inheritance for their children after them"? They will hardly make the distinction to be that between their own citizens and foreign nations, for that would allow them, if they had the power, to enslave the people of Britain, France, Spain, and Mexico; and we may add (if they can succeed in establishing their so-called "Southern Confederacy") the "greasy mechanics" of the northern states. Nor will they venture to make the distinction one of religious faith, for then the Persians, Turks, and Arabs would be candidates, along with the Africans, for the horrors of the slave-ship. It can be no other than that of *race*, — a distinction unknown to the Mosaic institutions. The high preëminence conferred by these upon the Israelites over all foreigners rested, not on any distinction of race, but upon covenant privileges. By his own sovereign act Jehovah took them into a special relation to himself. "Now, therefore, if ye will obey my voice, indeed, and keep my covenant, then ye shall be a peculiar treasure unto me above all people; for all the earth is mine. And ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests, and an holy nation."[1] In accordance with this sovereign choice he gave them the land of Canaan, and drove out the heathen before them. In all the civil regulations of the Mosaic code their preëminence over the surrounding heathen nations was carefully maintained. They were the depositaries of God's truth, the only people to whom he had directly revealed himself. From them the light of religion was to go forth to the rest of the world. It was of the highest importance that in all their institutions their special dignity as the peculiar people of Jehovah should manifest itself. Hence we find appended to the laws enjoining the gentle treatment of Israelitish servants, and their release at the year of jubilee the significant clause: "For they are my servants which I brought forth out of the land of Egypt; they shall not be sold as bondmen."[1]

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[1] South Carolina code.

[2] Louisiana code.

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[1] Ex. xix. 5, 6.

But in the New Testament we are expressly taught that Christ has abolished the distinction between Jews and Gentiles. "He is our peace who hath made both one," — it is of gentiles that he is speaking in contrast with God's ancient covenant people, — "and hath broken down the middle wall of partition between us;"[1] so that now "we both" — Jews and Gentiles — "have access by one spirit unto the Father." "Now therefore," adds the apostle, "ye are no more strangers and foreigners, but fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the household of God."[3] The slave-holder, then, who argues from the Mosaic code, must, if he understands the first principles of the gospel, acknowledge that *now under the New Testament* his slaves stand to him in the relation of brethren belonging to the same household of faith with himself, and that the law for their treatment is that for the impoverished Israelite, not for "the heathen round about." Let him do this, and we will be content.

But instead of this he sets up the odious and unscriptural distinction of *race*. Starting from the acknowledged fact that some races are more vigorous than others, and that "in the course of human events" the weaker races will naturally come into a subordinate relation to the stronger, he draws from this the monstrous inference that the natural condition of the former is to be "chattels personal" to the latter; as if there were no distinction between being in a state of political inferiority, such, for example, as that of India to England, or our own aboriginal tribes to the United States, and being converted into "chattels personal," stripped of all the rights of manhood, and bought and sold, like cattle, in the market."[1]

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[1] Lev. xxv. 42, 55.

[2] Ephes. i. 14.

[3] Ephes. i. 18, 19.

[4] In "Ross on Slavery" we may see an abundance of this sort of reasoning. He either does not apprehend or will not acknowledge the radical difference

Such is the logic of the argument from races; and its injustice is answerable to it. When by subjection to the power of slavery the manhood of the negro slave has been as far as possible crushed out of him, and the free negro placed under the overshadowing influence of *the caste of color*, and thus doomed to a condition of civil and social inferiority, from which, so long as he remains in this country, no amount of virtue or talent can possibly raise him,— when thus the colored race has been placed in the most unauspicious circumstances for the development of true manhood, its degradation is pleaded as an argument to show that servitude is its normal and healthful condition! A glance at the present condition of Liberia is sufficient to refute this plea. There it has been proved that, if the negro race can but have a tolerably fair chance, it is abundantly capable of self-government, and progress in all the arts of civilization.

In bringing this Article to a close we wish to say a word respecting another argument which has sometimes been insisted on. It is, to use the words of Dr. Ross, that "Ham was cursed to render service forever, to Shem and Japheth."[1] Were this a true statement of the words of scripture, it would prove nothing to the purpose. The Assyrian was ordained of God to chastise his offending covenant people: "O Assyrian, the rod of mine anger, and the staff in their hand is mine indignation. I will send him against an hypocritical nation, and against the people of my wrath will I give him a charge,"[2] &c. But this did not clear him from the guilt and punishment of oppressing the Jews, as the verses immediately following show. Moses and the prophets predicted the dispersion and oppression of the Jews as a punishment for their sins: "Thou shalt be only oppressed and crushed always;"[3] "My God will cast them away, because they did not hearken unto him: and they shall be wanderers

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between the natural subordination of one class to another, as the woman to the man, the child to the parent, and the conversion of men and women into articles of merchandize, which is the very essence of American slavery.

[1] Ross on Slavery, p. 50.

[2] Isa. x. 5, 6.

[3] Deut. xxviii. 33.

among the nations."[1] But who will venture to plead these awful threatenings as an excuse for maltreating and spoiling them?

But the word of God says no such thing as Dr. Ross represents. The blessings of Noah were bestowed on Shem and Japheth; but the curse was restricted to Canaan.[2] If any one ask why, we are not bound to furnish an answer. Perhaps it was for the same reason that, in the third commandment and elsewhere, God promises that he will show mercy unto thousands of generations to them that love him and keep his commandments; but will visit the iniquity of the fathers upon the children only to the third and fourth generation of them that hate him, — because, namely, he is "the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth."[3] When God mercifully restricts the curse to one of Ham's sons, what right has Dr. Ross to extend it to Ham himself; "He cursed him" [Ham], says Dr. Ross, "*because he left him unblessed.*"[4] To be left unblessed was doubtless a great calamity, but *it was not the same thing as receiving the special curse of servitude.* That fell on Canaan alone. "Cursed be Canaan," says Noah; "a servant of servants shall he be to his brethen. "The *special* curse on Canaan," says Dr. Ross, "made the general curse on Ham conspicuous, historic, and explanatory, simply because his descendants were to be brought under the control of God's peculiar people."[5] If these words mean anything to his purpose, it is that the curse of servitude *specially pronounced* on Canaan made the same curse of servitude, *falling generally* on Ham "conspicuous, historic, and explanatory." But this is a baseless assumption, which we meet by a simple denial. The curse of servitude was pronounced on Canaan alone, and the history of his posterity, — the Sidonians, Hittites, Jebusites, Amorites, Girgasites, Hivites, Arkites, Sinites, Arvadites, Zemarites, and Hamathites,[6] — in their relation to God's covenant people made the curse *for them alone* "conspicuous, historic, and explanatory." Now it is well known that none of Canaan's posterity settled in Africa. "The border of the Canaanites was from Sidon, as thou comest to Gerar, unto Gaza; as thou goest unto Sodom and Gomorrah, Admah and Zeboim, even unto Lasha."[1] None, then, of the Africans come under the curse pronounced by Noah on Canaan.

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[1] Hosea ix. 17.
[2] Gen. ix. 25–27.
[3] Ex. xx. 5, 6; xxxiv. 6, 7.
[4] Ross on Slavery, ubi supra.
[5] Ib.
[6] Gen. x.; xv. 18.

ARTICLE III.

THE TÜBINGEN HISTORICAL SCHOOL.[2]

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"The Tübingen School" is, strictly speaking, a historical rather than a theological school. Its representatives, Baur, Strauss, Keller, Schwegler, Köstlin, and Hilgenfeld, are indeed theologians, and have pursued such investigations as are usually left to theologians. Their peculiarity, however, consists in their dealing with their materials, not from a theological, but from a purely historical point of view. While not refusing the title of theologians, and claiming for themselves a place within the broad realm of Protestant theology, they boast that they alone exhibit the genuine Protestant spirit by their independent search for historical truth. They propose to carry on their inquiries, unbiassed by any peculiar doctrinal views; they found their dogmatic system on their scientific convictions, and refuse to interpret history according to any settled system of doctrine. They claim to have sought historical truth like any other kind of truth, and to have applied the modern principles of historical science to the investigation of the history of the Christian church; especially to the study of its earliest history, its origin, its primitive character, and development, and to the examination of its oldest documents, our New Testament scriptures.

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[1] Gen. x. 19.

[2] This Article is a reproduction, in an English form and dress, rather than a close translation, of an anonymous Article under the same title in Von Sybel's Historische Zeitschrift, Vol. 4, 1860. It leans very decidedly towards the views of the school whose principles it proposes to exhibit; it will not, however, on that account be less interesting to American readers desirous of learning the views of this class of critics. The Article has been considerably shortened by omissions and condensations. — Tr.

The origin of the Tübingen school belongs to the history of theology in Germany. It is the successsor of that school of rationalism which followed the dead and formal orthodoxy of the century after the Reformation. It was the aim of rationalism to harmonize the biblical history, and especially that contained in the gospels, with the decisions of human reason and the dictates of universal experience; in fact, by explaining away the supernatural element in it, to reduce it to the level of ordinary history. But it is an article of the faith of the church that the biblical narrative is not only genuine history, but a supernatural or miraculous history, recording events, many of which occurred out of the ordinary course of nature. Without seeking to invalidate the genuineness of the biblical narrative, rationalism, therefore, attempted to show that a true conception of it would find in the miracles only natural and perfectly intelligible events. To do this required no small skill, for the scriptures unquestionably ascribe them to supernatural agencies. The rationalistic interpreter, however, found ample resources for his purpose in the store-house of verbal interpretation. Neglect of the peculiar diction of the Old and the New Testament, unfamiliarity with oriental figures, it was asserted, alone leads men to accept the scripture narratives as records of supernatural events. "Why," it was asked, "when in the Old Testament God is said to have spoken, need we suppose that there was an actual vocal utterance? May not the prophets have represented their own lofty and enthusiastic declarations as those of God? When in the biblical narrative the serpent is said to have spoken to Eve, or the ass to Balaam, would it not be more natural to refer this discourse to the minds of the persons addressed, and to interpret these accounts as the scriptural method of representing the thoughts which these creatures awakened in them?" Through a similar process of interpretation, the narrative of our Lord's temptation becomes an account of his reflections before entering on his public ministry; the descent of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost, a great increase of religious enthusiasm on the part of the apostles. Again, it was asserted by the rationalist that all men, and especially the orientals, are disposed to refer natural phenomena to the direct agency of the Deity. When, therefore, the sacred writers ascribe an event to the divine agency, they do not mean thus to exclude natural causes. The account of Jehovah's descent in fire upon Mount Sinai is only an oriental method of representing the occurrence of a storm; the fiery tongues of Pentecost were electric sparks; Paul and Silas were released from their fetters at Philippi by an earthquake. Saul was blinded on the road to Damascus by a flash of lightning, and restored to sight by the touch of the cold hands of the old man Ananias. Still further, when the narrative contains no indication of the working of material causes, the narrator may have overlooked them, or have been ignorant of their mode of operation. The rational interpreter, it was maintained, should supply the missing links in the history. His scientific culture will teach him that the miraculous cures of the gospels are not essentially unlike those daily wrought by modern physicians; the restoration of the dead to life, and even the resurrection of Christ himself were but the awakening of persons in a swoon; the impossible feeding of the multitude was but the effect of Christ's generous surrender of his own store of food, followed by similar generosity on the part of his disciples. Once more, the refinements of verbal interpretation show that Christ's walking upon the sea was but a walking on the shore, the finding of the tribute-money in the mouth of the fish was but the purchase of the fish for the sum named.

The ingenuity which thus transformed a miracle into a natural event was able to reduce the discourses of Christ and the apostles to perfect harmony with human reason.

By wisely discriminating, it was said, between the literal and the figurative, and by bearing in mind that our Lord and his followers often conformed to the popular method of speaking and to existing opinions, such unintelligible and unreasonable representations as that of the enthronement of God in heaven, or those of the preëxistence, the atoning death, the resurrection, the future advent of Christ, or the doctrines of original sin, of angels, of the devil, may be so interpreted that the most enlightened rationalist need not be ashamed to believe them. By such a method, it may be seen, the authenticity and the authority of the scriptures was left intact, though their contents were sadly distorted from the truth.

The supernaturalistic opponents of this scheme of interpretation did not find it difficult to point out its sophistry, to expose its violation of good taste, and its arbitrary torturing of the meaning of the Word. But they did not succeed in driving rationalism from the field. According to the representations of the Tübingen school, their failure may be accounted for by the timidity and the imperfection of their methods. Their faith in miracles, which they refused to abandon, was inconsistent with true historic consciousness, and their doctrine of inspiration forbade any radical criticism of the sacred writings. Moreover, they adopted some of the principles of rationalism itself. The older theology, with its faith in miracles, had unhesitatingly received the statements of the scriptures as literal truth; the new found it expedient to soften the sharp outline of some of the more striking miracles, to introduce the agency of natural causes, and to conceal the true meaning of the scripture narrative beneath indefinite expressions, e. g. to disguise the agency of an angel beneath the phrase, "the leadings of Providence." Examples of this sort are frequent in the writings of Neander and others. The first third of the present century thus presents to us in this department of theological inquiry the spectacle of a rationalism hesitating to deal with the biblical narrative after a rigid historical method, and a supernaturalism clinging with similar hesitancy to its belief in revelation and its faith in miracles. The principles of modern historical criticism, which had been applied with so much success to profane history, and which, in their application to the Old Testament, had opened to interpreters a new and safer path, were rarely and very unwillingly admitted in reference to the New. Even Schleiermacher and Hegel, who have exerted so great an influence on the theological development of Germany, effected at first but slight changes in this department. For Schleiermacher, though a rationalistic critic and interpreter, by his admission of the fontal miracle of an "original Christ," opened the door for the admission of any miracle. Most of his pupils gradually, though not without many concessions to the spirit of the age, found their way into the ranks of supernaturalism, where they concealed their faith in miracles beneath such obscure phrases as "the harmony of the spiritual and the physical," "natural processes," etc. Hegel, in like manner, at first stood opposed to positive religion with a sort of rationalism, traces of which he never entirely lost. Afterwards, when the reconciliation of faith and knowledge became the watchword of his system, he explained the historical element in faith as a matter of indifference, since we are therein concerned only with the ideal. In fact he expressed himself so undecidedly on this point, that he might have been with equal justice claimed by both parties. His followers were so self-satisfied, and so happy in their fancied speculative orthodoxy, they were wont to look down with such especial contempt upon the untenable position of rationalistic criticism, that so radical an attack on the traditions of the church as soon followed was the last thing to have been expected from this party.

Such was the relation of theological parties in Germany, when, some five-and-twenty years since, Strauss published his "Life of Jesus."[1] Its remorseless attacks upon both the natural method of interpretation adopted by the rationalists, and the apologetic defences of the supernaturalists awakened anger and consternation. The moderate and the indifferent of all parties found themselves obliged to define their position in reference to important questions whose difficulty they had hitherto happily avoided. Strauss was regarded as a disturber of the peace of the church; and the greatest anxiety was felt concerning the desolations wrought by so audacious a criticism in the realm of faith, of piety, and of morality. The professed aim of this celebrated work was simply this: to treat the gospel narratives precisely as we treat any other tradition, to exhibit a method of critical inquiry hampered by no prescribed results, and to claim for criticism, especially biblical criticism, independence of all foregone conclusions. The chief element of such an independence Strauss considered to be disbelief in miracles. He thought that faith in miracles rested upon an insecure foundation. He claimed that the law which inseparably connects natural causes with natural results in other departments, holds equally good in the realm of scripture history; and that what in all other cases is regarded as evidences of unhistoric character cannot in this be a sign of higher historic truth. He asserted that our frequent experience of the imperfection of human observation, of the falsity of tradition, of the untrustworthiness of narratives through designed or undesigned invention, render it much less probable that a miracle occurred than that the historian has to deal in the gospel history with a fictitious narrative. A large part of the evangelical story must then be treated as unhistorical. Not only the accounts of the infancy and the ascension of Jesus, but all the miracles which cannot be accounted for by natural causes. Many of his discourses, — almost all contained in the fourth gospel, — together with the resurrection of the crucified one, must be consigned to the region of tradition. Not a few who could not deny his general critical principles shrank from the results to which they led. The "Life of Jesus" provoked a multitude of replies, many of which successfully combatted and dispelled one and another of the suspicions and doubts which Strauss had brought upon the gospel narrative.

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[1] Das Leben Jesu, kritisch bearbeitet. Tübingen: 1835. 2 Bde.

Some German scholars, however, felt that his objections had not been scientifically met, while at the same time they recognized that his views, like those of the older rationalists, were imperfect. They censured them as too exclusively negative. Granted that so large a portion of the gospels is unhistorical, how is this unhistorical element to be explained and accounted for? If so many narratives and discourses in them are not to be referred to the recollections of the historians, to what shall they be referred for their origin? To this inquiry Strauss answers that they are mythical; he proposes to substitute the mythical for the rationalistic and the supernaturalistic explanations of the evangelical narrative. A myth, he says, is not a history but a fiction, the work not of one but of many, a popular legend framed, not designedly or consciously, but involuntarily, yet serving for the expression of certain practical ideas, the embodiment of certain dogmatic interests. In the case of the gospel myths these ideas and interests were religious. Two of them are prominent; the desire of the early church to glorify its founder, and the need of seeing in him the fulfilment in part of the prophecies of the Old Testament, in part the realization of the Jewish idea of the Messiah. According to Strauss, the latter motive exerted the stronger influence. In obedience to it the manifold contributions of individuals — innumerable little rills — flowed together to form the stream of Christian tradition, which bore onward a picture of the Christ which in its main features was symmetrical. What the Messiah was to be, what he would accomplish, how he would show himself to the world, through what miracles he would be glorified, were matters already so well settled in the Jewish theology, that from the popular expectation on the one hand, and from the recollection of the personal history of Jesus on the other, a tradition might easily spring up in the Christian community which should exhibit in its particular features no greater discrepancies than actually appear in our gospels.

Comprehensive and satisfactory as was this explanation to many minds, it had some serious defects, which have since been recognized by its author. It must be admitted that the whole of the gospel narrative cannot be explained in the manner proposed by Strauss. His assumption of a Christian legendary tradition — a popular myth — accounts for only the common traits of the evangelical history, for only such discrepancies between the several accounts as are plainly accidental and involuntary, and indicate no individuality or characteristic spirit and tendency on the part of their supposed authors. When, however, we find certain peculiar features throughout an entire gospel, we cannot account for them by the common motives to Christian legendary composition, we must refer them to the peculiar views and interests of the author of the narrative, or of the circle which he represents. When, furthermore, the entire narrative seems planned so as to exhibit these characteristics; when this individuality appears in the arrangement of the materials, in the chronology, in the representation of accessory circumstances; when it is shared by long discourses or conversations, such as are not usually perpetuated in legends, such, for instance, as occur in the fourth gospel, and to a certain extent in the third, — we must be convinced that we have to do, not with a popular legend, but with an artistic literary composition. We are, then, prompted to examine the peculiar motives, the leading thoughts and the general plan of the several narratives, to determine the relation of the individual account to the common Christian tradition, and to explain it on historical grounds, which must ultimately be found in the divine conceptions of Christianity, existing in the early church, and in the different parties of which that body was composed. Such a procedure would add a positive element to the negative criticism of the "Life of Jesus." Strauss aimed rather to remove from the gospel narratives all unhistoric matter, than to present a true historical picture of the Author of Christianity. He shows us what he was not; but if we ask what he was, he gives us nothing but a few indeterminate hypotheses respecting the germs from which the Christian legend was developed. We, however, may demand more than this. Although it should be admitted that no more can be gained from the gospels than what Strauss admits — that Jesus, the son of Joseph and Mary, proclaimed the approach of the kingdom of God, announced himself as the Messiah, its founder; that his character and his discourses won for him a party of enthusiastic adherents; that some of his deeds appeared miraculous to his contemporaries; that he boldly attacked the dominant pharisaic party, provoked their bitter hatred, and at their instance was crucified; that finally, sooner or later after his death, a belief in his resurrection and ascension to heaven became general among his followers, — it were still worth while to inquire whether we cannot in some other way gain a more satisfactory conception of the Author of Christianity and of his work. If our gospels are not purely historical narratives, if religious interests and doctrinal convictions had a share in their composition, they are, on that very account, trustworthy witnesses to the spirit, the views, the tendencies of the early Christian church. On these points, say the later representatives of the Tübingen school, we have other and even older and more direct testimony in the remaining books of the New Testament, in the annals of ecclesiastical authors, and in the uncanonical remains of the oldest Christian literature. By the aid of these historical sources, they propose to gain a conception as complete as possible, both of the Christianity and of the Christian church of the first century, and of the dissensions and parties which influenced its early development. They aim thus not only to advance beyond the limits of Strauss's criticism, but to add to its predominant negative results positive historical knowledge, to gain further information concerning the Founder of Christianity, not, indeed, concerning the particulars of his life, but concerning the spirit of his teaching and his works. They even expect to gain for the criticism of the gospels a more secure defensive position, by more fully determining the character of the original sources of our knowledge of the evangelical histories, the time of their composition, and their connection with the parties in the primitive church.

Investigations of this sort had been prosecuted by Baur,[1] at Tübingen, before the appearance of the "Life of Jesus;" they were, however, greatly facilitated and furthered by the unflinching criticism of Strauss. The latter assailed the gospel narrative on the philosopical side, the former on the historical. Both aimed alike to set aside all untenable hypotheses, to shun the unintelligible views of the supernaturalists and the arbitrary theories of the rationalists, and to gain a satisfactory conception of the origin and earliest development of Christianity. But this can be done only by the aid of tradition; and this tradition is subjected to the tests proposed by Strauss, before it is employed by Baur in his construction of the evangelical history. Baur's views are thus conditioned by those of Strauss. This difference exists between the methods of the two men: to the one the critical attack upon tradition is only a means for the restoration of the facts of history; to the other, his positive view of history is but the result, and the almost inseparable product, of his critical analysis.

The mutual relation of the two is strikingly displayed in their respective courses. Strauss directly attacks those parts of the scriptures in which the miraculous and improbable most disturb his critical taste, partly because this element is there most abundant, and partly because he is there concerned with the central topic of Christianity, — the person and history of Christ. Baur, seeking a tenable position for new historical combinations, addresses himself, from preference, to those books of the New Testament which are best adapted to his purpose, the original and oldest documents of the primitive Christian period, — the genuine Pauline epistles. It was from the study of them that he first arrived at the conviction that a false idea of the apostolic age is generally entertained; that it could not have been the period of undisturbed harmony which it is usually considered. He thought that he could discover in the words of Paul himself traces of profound opposition and earnest conflicts waged with the Jewish party in the church, and even with the other apostles. Connecting herewith information gained from later sources respecting this party, its duration and its influence, he recognized in the so-called Ebionites the same Judaizing spirit with which Paul had to contend, and employed in illustrating the earlier period the pseudo-Clementine Ebionistic writings of a subsequent age. Thus, before the publication of Strauss's views, he had laid the foundations upon which he afterwards built his comprehensive historical combinations. On the same grounds he had already begun to suspect the authenticity of the Acts of the Apostles. Besides the miraculous narratives therein contained, he detected a conciliatory purpose in their unhistorical portrayal of the activity of the apostle to the gentiles, which he deemed irreconcilable with his own declarations, and designed to veil his opposition to pseudo-Christianity. At the same time, in his work on the Pastoral Epistles, and his discussion of the Epistle to the Romans, he first attempted to discriminate between what he considered the genuine and what he regarded as the unauthentic Pauline Epistles, finally recognizing as genuine only the Epistle to the Romans, the Epistles to the Corinthians, and the Epistle to the Galatians. But at the time of the publication of the "Life of Jesus," he had not extended his critical inquiries to the gospel history. In 1843 the fourth Gospel, and in 1846 the third Gospel, were examined by him; and in 1847, a corresponding discussion of the first and the second was added to a revised edition of the foregoing discussions in his "Critical Inquiries into the Canonical Gospels." At the same time, in his work on Paul, published in 1845, he brought to a close his criticism of the Pauline Epistles and of the Acts.

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[1] Ferdinand Christian Baur, born 1792, died 1860; Professor of Theology at the University of Tübingen.

Several of his pupils shared in these labors of their master. Edward Zeller, in 1842, established the "Theological Annals," (Theolog. Jahrbücher) which, edited by him, either alone or in conjunction with Baur, was principally devoted to New Testament criticism. Albert Schwegler, an accomplished adherent of the school of Baur, in his "Post-Apostolic Age" (Das Nachapostolische Zeitalter Tüb. 1846. 2 Bde.), while either anticipating his master or completing what he had left unfinished, united their views in a comprehensive and spirited historical picture of that important period. These scholars, together with Köstlin, Planck, Hilgenfeld, and Volkmar, though disagreeing with Baur in many of the results at which they individually arrive, have nevertheless pursued the historical method proposed by him.

The first demand of this school is freedom from all prejudice. Baur insists that the same laws and principles of investigation shall be applied to the study of the scriptures as apply to other writings. "Christianity," he says, "is a historical phenomenon, and as such must be historically examined." When charged by his opponents with putting Christianity in a position in which its supernatural and miraculous elements shall disappear, he replies: "Such must necessarily be the tendency of historical inquiry. Its office is to investigate events in connection with their causes and their results. A miracle, however, destroys this natural connection. It assumes a position in which, not from the want of adequate information, but from the very necessity of the case, it is impossible to consider one thing as the natural consequence of another. But how can such a position be defended? Only by historical methods. But in a historical point of view, it were a mere begging the question to assume the occurrence of an event at variance with the common analogy of historical intuition. The question of the origin of Christianity thus ceases to be a purely historical question, and becomes the purely dogmatic one: 'Is it an absolute demand of the religious consciousness, in opposition to all historical analogy, that certain events shall be regarded as simple miracles?'" A miracle and a purely historical method exclude each other. Strauss and Baur alike acknowledge that he who admits the existence of the former refuses to employ the latter.

Assuming, with Strauss, that our New Testament historical books narrate much which either did not happen, or did not happen in such a way that our account of it can be regarded as presenting a true picture of the origin and early development of Christianity, Baur seeks by another method to gain such a picture from them, when studied in connection with other books of the New Testament, and with uncanonical ecclesiastical authorities. These writings he thinks, so far as they are narrative, contain, together with much that is improbable and incredible, an important germ of historical tradition, which can be separated so soon as we can discover its determinate purpose. They may, also, without exception, though only partially applicable, and needing to be used with care, be employed as original documents in obtaining a knowledge of the time to which they owe their origin. Even the narratives of this collection are not simply historical books; they have a definite religious aim; they propose to teach, to edify, to influence the Christian community. In the epistles of the New Testament and the Apocalypse of John this design is manifest. In these writings, therefore, mirror themselves the religious position of the author and of the circle to which they belong, their relation to the parties and the practical and dogmatic questions of their time, their wishes for the future, their view of the aims to which Christianity must, with varying definiteness, be led, the circumstances of the age whence these writings sprung, and the relations of the communities which they were designed to influence. These indications Baur attempts to follow out. He would learn from the doctrinal character and tendency of the writings of the New Testament, not only what age produced them, but what was the religious character, and what were the ecclesiastical relations of that age. In the same manner would he deal with all the remaining early writings of the church, down to the end of the second century; for he regards them as occupying the same position as historical sources, and accounts for the exclusion of some of them from our canon by the fact that they were, though of equal value, yet less in harmony with the sentiments of the subsequent age than those which find a place there. This testimony of different times and parties respecting themselves, Baur considers the safest criterion for the critical examination of the reports concerning the state of the early church, contained either in the canonical or the uncanonical books. By joining the traditions thus tested with this immediate witness, he expects, by a comprehensive combination, to restore the obscured and distorted picture of the early church — of its development and of its founder — to at least the general outlines of its original condition.

The best starting-point for this inquiry he finds in that historical fact, with the discovery of which his critical course began, and of which he subsequently became more and more firmly convinced, the opposition among the apostles and, in the apostolic age, between the Jewish and the Pauline form of Christianity. This opposition gradually diminished, until at last, after many conflicts and many concessions on either side, it ended in the second half of the second century, in the establishment of the Catholic church and the settlement of its doctrinal system. From that deeply seated opposition, says Baur, the church received an impulse which for a century controlled its development. It determined the dogmatic position of individuals and of parties. The memorials of the conflict, and of the concessions which ended it, we have in the canonical writings of the New Testament and the uncanonical writings of the early church. Each stage of her progress is indicated by works, a part of which, rightly honored with apostolic or non-apostolic names, were finally appended to the sacred books of the Jews. This later development of the church throws the fullest light on the character of the founder of Christianity. That conception only of him can be the true one which explains the circumstances and the relations of the society which he established. The important historical question respecting the person and the doctrine of Jesus is: What was he, and how must he have appeared, in order to render possible at once the narrow views of his

Judaizing disciples and the susceptibility of endless development, — the world-moving power which characterizes his work?

The adherents of the Tübingen school pay no heed to the charge that their style of criticism is irreconcilable with proper reverence for the Holy Scriptures, and utterly at variance with the views which for centuries have been entertained respecting them by the church. They simply affirm that no limits should be assigned to historical enquiry, but such as thoroughly scientific principles recognize. In like manner, they attach no value to the declarations in support of the authenticity of the scriptures made by the universal Christian consciousness. The question of the truth or the falsehood of the books of the New Testament, they contend, is not to be settled by any feeling of their harmony with our necessities, our inclinations, or our convictions, but only by adequate historical proofs. To substitute for such external testimony or internal indications, satisfactorily tested by scientific criticism, those immediate convictions, — those irresistible feelings once called the witness of the Holy Ghost, and now the evidence of inward personal experience, — is, they say, absurd and impossible.

They do, however, condescend to justify and defend a critical method which rejects the long-cherished opinions respecting the authorship of many of the books of the New Testament; transfers to the middle of the second century writings which until lately were considered apostolic; imputes to the sacred authors the invention of facts and discourses and the false assumption of the names of the apostles and their immediate disciples; admits that the church permitted the interpolation of many passages into the sacred books, and circulated and believed these falsified and corrupt productions; charges the apostles with divisions and dissensions respecting the most important topics of Christianity, and the church with the adoption of narrow Judaizing views; denies the genuineness and historical authority of John's Gospel, and recognizes in the Apocalypse a genuine work of this apostle, the most trustworthy document of ante-Pauline Christianity, the only extant work of a personal disciple of Jesus.

Tradition gains no increased authority in the view of Baur and his disciples from its mere antiquity. We are more certain, say they, of an event which happened thirty years since than of one which happened three thousand years ago. The authorship of any writing, if proved by external testimony, can be established by only contemporary witnesses, or by such as were their immediate successors. The lapse of time weakens rather than strengthens such evidence. Witnesses who lived in the seventy years which followed the apostolic age, are of more importance than all who have lived in the last seventeen hundred years. We have, they affirm, no express and immediate testimony respecting the authorship of the New Testament writings, and very little that is mediate and indirect in the early age. We have no authoritative testimony concerning Matthew's Gospel before Justin Martyr, about 140, A. D. Papias, a disciple of the apostle John, refers indeed to a compilation made by Matthew, and a narrative dictated to Mark by the apostle Peter; but his description of them does not correspond with our gospels, and the latter seems to have been unknown to Justin. He and the heretic Marcion used a Gospel by Luke, but of its age we are ignorant. The first traces of the Acts appear about 170, A. D. We have no testimony concerning John's Gospel and the Epistles earlier than this period. Justin mentions the Apocalypse, the time of whose composition, 69 A. D., can be determined from internal evidence. Marcion, 140 – 150, A. D., bears the first direct witness to the Pauline Epistles, though quotations and allusions imply that they were known to the authors of the Epistle to the Hebrews, the Epistle of James, the Petrine Epistles, and the writings of Barnabas and Clement of Rome. The Tübingen school claim that there is, therefore, no evidence which invalidates their opinion respecting these or the other writings of the New Testament.

The tradition on which the faith of the church rests has not, they say, therefore, the completeness, the directness, the originality which alone should entitle it to confidence. An interval of from forty to one hundred years between the time of a supposed author and the first direct testimony to his authorship, affords ample opportunity for deception, especially when printing is unknown. We have no proof that these earliest witnesses did not follow an uncertain hypothesis respecting the origin of these works, or that they did not accept without inquiry the names connected with the titles of the copies in their possession. The titles of works circulated in an age unskilled in literary criticism are very unsafe guides respecting their authors. They may not be genuine. It is easy, when books exist only in MS., for an author to ascribe his own book to another, or for any owner of a copy, on the merest supposition, to prefix another name to the book, or for an author, without changing the original title or removing the writer's name, to remodel, enlarge, and enrich a work, so that without losing its original designation, it shall be completely transformed.

Such destructive hypotheses, however, seem to be forbidden by the supposed good faith of the early church, and the voice of ecclesiastical tradition. But, say the Tübingen school, the church did not at first unanimously adopt our New Testament writings. Several apocryphal gospels, differing essentially from the canonical ones, circulated, especially among the Judaizing Christians. Others were popular with the Gnostic sects. Not until the second half of the second century did our four canonical gospels become universally recognized. Even in the fourth century several of our New Testament books were rejected by some portions of the church, and other books, e. g. the Shepherd of Hermas, the Epistle of Barnabas, and the Apocalypse of Peter, were admitted into the canon, but have since been excluded. In fact, our collection of sacred writings was slowly formed; and general agreement respecting its contents was not reached for centuries.

This final agreement is not to be accounted for by the supposition that fuller information on the point had in the mean time been gained; it was rather the result of the prejudices and religious interests of the church. For what are men more ready to believe and less disposed critically to examine than that which harmonizes with their personal or their party views and inclinations, necessities and prejudices? What is more readily rejected than what opposes them? Just in the proportion that any political, moral, religious, or doctrinal interest is associated with the adoption or the rejection of a tradition, is the certainty of its independent, unprejudiced, critical examination imperilled. The profound interest which all parties, both orthodox and heretic, felt in the New Testament writings naturally hindered that critical examination of them, that cool historical inquiry into their supposed apostolic origin which true science demands. Rather was it to be expected that their decision would be determined by dogmatic prejudices; that each party would adopt as apostolic, writings which agreed best with its own tendencies and conclusions, and reject those opposed to them; and that finally the majority, constituting the catholic church, would accept as apostolic such writings only as corresponded to the religious consciousness of a later age. This later religious consciousness might, however, be quite unlike that of an earlier period, so that many views familiar to the church during its infancy might be strange and unfamiliar to it in a subsequent age, and many views entertained in the later age would not be represented in the primitive faith. It is, then, say the Tübingen critics, not only an arbitrary but an impossible hypothesis, that the church critically investigated the origin of the New Testament writings, and consequently received as genuine nothing that was false. Moreover, the fact is not to be overlooked, that the church teachers who determined public opinion had not the means, furnished in modern times by general critical culture, for ascertaining with certainty the origin of an uncertain composition. Their circumstances, too, were unfavorable to such investigations. Intercourse between different portions of the church was not so close or so frequent that events occurring in one region were immediately known in another. There were then no journals, no catalogues of books, none of the bibliographical aids that we possess. Who could assure himself that a work circulating in Rome had been written eighty years before by an apostle in the remote East, or that when an epistle appeared in Alexandria it had been originally addressed by an apostle to Crete or to Asia Minor? Such matters could be settled only by personal inquiries pursued in the communities in question, and in nine cases out of ten would not then lead to any satisfactory result. Should an interval of ten years separate the inquirer from the reputed author, the work would in the mean time have been quite extensively circulated in its original neighborhood, and ambition and pride would not suffer the possessors of the supposed apostolic composition to surrender willingly the prestige it conferred. Most frequently such investigations would be set on foot so late as to fail of their intended object. Everything favored literary deception. There was in that early age a striking and to us almost inexplicable want of critical acuteness. In both the pagan and the Christian literature, works were universally received as authentic which at the first glance we see to be fabrications. With a boldness equalled only by the credulity with which the deception was received, not only were the names of well-known authors prefixed to works which they could not have written, but the names of authors were invented, works were inserted into the series of a writer's productions, books were ante-dated, and well-known philosophers were credited with views utterly at variance with those which they had elsewhere expressed. The exposure of such falsehoods was the exception, not the rule, in the ages just before and after the beginning of the Christian era. With an easy faith the Fathers of the church did not scruple to accept a work as authentic if it but furthered their personal or their party interests. The Tübingen school cite a multitude of instances in which works were imputed to different writers on insufficient grounds, and then assume that the books of the New Testament were received with equal credulity, and are not more worthy of being regarded as the genuine and venerable productions which the church believes them to be.

In reply to the obvious objections of Christian interpreters, that it is inconceivable that the sacred writers should have lent themselves to such a course of deception, and that these hypotheses and assumptions represent the Christian religion as resting on the grossest falsehood, and its first teachers as either knaves or fools, the disciples of Baur beg us to make some distinctions. They profess to admit that the New Testament has a foundation in truth; they even acknowledge that many of the writings whose genuineness they question are not ante-dated, and are not pure fabrications, in the strict sense of that term. There are several ways, say they, of accounting for their origin. An author may ascribe to another a work which he has written; this they suppose to have been done in the case of the unauthentic apostolic epistles. Without having compared the original work, he may have rewrought it, and have allowed the name of the true author to remain prefixed to it; thus they imagine that Matthew's Gospel, as we possess it, is the result of several successive reconstructions of materials which that apostle collected; Mark's the product of a combination of our first and third Gospels with another ascribed to that evangelist; the Acts of the Apostles, a revised form of a personal narrative by the evangelist Luke. Again, an anonymous production may have been ascribed by individual judgment to one or another author; thus, they affirm, have the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Epistle of Barnabas been dealt with. Finally, a book may assign its materials, but not its actual composition, to a person who is ultimately regarded as its author, and later ages may fail to make the same distinction. This appears to have been the case, say these critics, with the fourth Gospel. The author of it would unquestionably have the matter of his book regarded as John's, but he nowhere says that he is the apostle John, but, on the contrary, speaks of him in the third person. It is in this way that we must account for the title, The Gospel *according* to John, *according* to Matthew, etc. A work might lawfully be thus designated, though it contained narratives quite different from those previously recorded by those apostles; it might still claim to be the genuine apostolic tradition.

Furthermore, say these critics, the refusal to receive a portion of the New Testament as genuine, is not equivalent to an admission that Christianity and the Christian church rest on a foundation of falsehood and deceit. The Christian faith and the Christian community are not the product of these writings; rather are these writings a memorial of the faith cherished at the time of their composition by the Christian church; and they continue to be such, though a few decades, or even a century, may have been required for their composition, and though the names of their authors be doubtful or unknown. Lessing, say they, triumphantly proved that the letter is not the spirit, and the Bible is not religion. For one hundred years Christianity was propagated more by oral tradition than by writings. The Christian religion and its founder remain the same, whatever may be our historical knowledge of it, and however we may regard the books to which we owe our knowledge of it.

The disciples of Baur contend that the judgment to be passed on the conduct which they impute to the early Christian writers and to the church, must be governed by the ideas and customs of the period in question. The name of an author was in that age of secondary importance; whatever weight it had, came from the worth of the matter with which it was connected. A man, therefore, who had written anything which he considered true and edifying, would not hesitate to ascribe it to another. He does the latter no wrong by surrendering to him something to which he has himself a right. As little does he wrong the reader, who is concerned to know what has been written, not who wrote it. The distinction between invention and history, and even that between justifiable and unjustifiable invention is but faintly drawn in the popular mind. The title of the individual to intellectual property is but imperfectly recognized. It were indeed wrong to ascribe to an honored name anything unworthy of it, but to attribute to it what is excellent is not only lawful, but meritorious. By such considerations, and by references to the manner in which the ancient profane historians and authors of dialogues impute speeches and conversations to their personages, the Tübingen school sustain their assumption that unknown Christian authors attributed their conception of the doctrine of Peter and of Paul to these apostles, and then our notion of Christianity to its founder. It was of no consequence in that age whether an apostle actually had spoken thus; according to the author's view, he might, or even must, have spoken thus; — the spirit of the age demanded no greater historical accuracy. To transfer to that period our standard of the rights of intellectual property, would be as wrong as it would be to apply the clauses of an act against theft to the members of Plato's Republic, or to the inhabitants of Sparta.

Baur and his adherents account for the presence of a large amount of unhistorical matter in the New Testament by the long-continued prevalence of *oral* tradition in the early church, and the high esteem in which it was held. In proof of this, they refer to the many narratives respecting the life and discourses of Jesus, current even in the second century, many of which were gathered up by travellers who deemed them superior to the written accounts. Christianity, say they, was first diffused by preaching, not by books. It is unlikely that an unrecorded history, thus transmitted, should not undergo great changes, and be much corrupted, in a very short time. A few days, even a few hours, are long enough entirely to transform the account of something which has just happened into an extravagant legend. How much more probable is such a result when a long period is embraced in the story, when the later narrators are far removed from the time and the place of the occurrence, when the age is destitute of critical skill, and when the shape, and even the substance, of the narrative is closely connected with popular or personal religious interests. Unless, then, it can be proved by external testimony that the authors of our sacred books were eye witnesses of the facts related, that we have their original and actual compositions, and that they had access to unquestionable sources of information, the Tübingen school feel themselves justified in assuming the possible intrusion of legendary matter into our New Testament narratives.

Just as undeniable, say these critics, was the controlling influence of religious and dogmatic interests in the formation of these legends. The age, destitute of a keen historical and critical perception, was favorable to the construction of a myth. The church was a new community, which had just undergone the profoundest revolution that ever stirred the life of man. It was filled with the bitterest feelings of opposition to the surrounding world, rent by party strife, and engaged in a mortal struggle with its foes. It was mainly composed of persons without scientific culture, — women, artisans, slaves, — incapable of observing carefully, proving critically, and judging coolly; employing the feelings and the fancy rather than the reflecting understanding, cherishing the strongest faith in miracles, and taught to expect the greatest of miracles, — the sudden destruction of the world. It was natural that such a community should transfer to their conception of the past their present expectations, feelings, and wishes, the doctrines and the tendencies which entered into their daily experience, and then seek therein the type and the justification of their own aspirations, and thus transform that history into such a shape as should meet their own ideal dogmatic views.

The future character and deeds of the Messiah were points firmly settled in the Jewish faith before the birth of Jesus. From prophetic declarations, from Old Testament types, and from private expectations, had been formed a fully developed conception of his person and his work. A Messianic system of doctrine had been sketched, which it was expected would be realized in the history of the manifested Messiah. What is more natural, say our critics, than that the gospel history should gradually conform itself to this expectation, that its gaps should be filled up with materials from the prevailing Messianic notion, and that facts inconsistent with this idea should be harmonized by interpolations of suitable passages? Were certain determinate features thus once introduced into the history of Christ, it is to be expected that they would soon be more fully portrayed. Thus a dogmatic conviction transforms itself into a narrative or myth. A man thinks he knows what should occur in the history of the Messiah, and then is convinced that it must have occurred. It is only a confounding of the needful with the actual. The deception consists only in regarding as an objective necessity what one is himself convinced of, and thus imperceptibly transforming subjective notions into real history. The process is one from which science itself has been unable to protect itself, and we need not be surprised that a credulous church, finding everything probable which is edifying, should have received, as genuine history, narratives which afford numerous illustrations of both unconscious popular invention and the conscious activity of skilful authorship.

Christianity itself, the origin and the corruption of whose earliest documents are accounted for by the above hypotheses, Baur regards as a universal form of the religious consciousness corresponding to the spirit of its age, and a natural result of the previous historical development of the nations of the world. The conquests of Alexander and the subsequent establishment of the Roman empire prepared the way for its extension by mitigating or annihilating the opposition and prejudices of separate nationalities, while the universal dominion of an earthly kingdom rendered familiar the conception of a universal kingdom of God. At the same time, while on the one hand the heathen religions grew weak through the increase of unbelief and of superstition, and on the other, Judaism shut itself up in hard, proud exclusiveness, and a lifeless legalism, the foundation was laid for a new mode of viewing the world. Among the Greeks, philosophy introduced a freer, more profound and liberal form of religious life, grounding itself on the self-consciousness of man as an inward revelation of the Godhead. Monotheism thus developed itself out of polytheism; the sensuous, cheerful, Greek view of life, delighting itself in the present, was forced out into a wider range by an idealistic dualism, and a vista was opened into a future world, to which the present served as a preparation. Judaism, transformed into the Alexandrian theology, lost much of its national form; an allegorical style of interpretation made the Old Testament scriptures present the ideas of the Greek philosophers; and for the legal ritual was substituted an inward piety, consisting largely of a regard for the poor and an all-embracing love for mankind. Christianity, according to this view, contains nothing new; it needs no miracle to account for its origin or its extension; it is but the result of rational thought, a necessity of the human heart, a demand of the moral consciousness.

The doctrine inculcated by the founder of Christianity, Baur finds very simple. Leaving out of view John's Gospel, which is not to be connected with the other three, and confining himself to that gospel which he considers most authentic, — that of Matthew, — he sees nothing in the teaching of Jesus which has not a purely moral tendency, and which does not aim to restore man to his own moral and religious consciousness. Poverty of spirit uttering its convictions of the transitoriness of everything earthly, perfect righteousness consisting in the inward purpose rather than in the outward act, self-abandonment displayed in loving others as ourselves, simplicity of heart and humility ascribing all glory to God alone, sincerity and unconditional submission expressed in the habitual address to God as our Father, are the prominent elements of the teachings of Jesus. By such a deepening and purifying of the moral and religious consciousness, he overstepped in principle the limits of the Mosaic legalism, and spiritualized the theocracy of the Old Testament into a moral kingdom of God. But neither did he absolutely break with Judaism, nor introduce a peculiar and more developed system of doctrine. Later Christian teachers formulized the truths of sin and grace; he simply addresses himself to man's free-will, and assumes that man can, if he chooses, fulfil the law of God. According to the accounts of the first three Gospels, he does not present himself as a supernatural being. He but appropriates the national Messianic idea, feels and announces himself to be the Messiah, and as such accepts the inevitable conflict with the dominant party of the Pharisees. Only in this concrete form can the teachings of Jesus be said to have founded a new religion, a world-conquering church. In his hands the Messianic idea accomplished more than in others, only because it was embodied in a personality which by its moral greatness and purity, by the strength and depth of its religious life, exhibited as present and actual what his teaching demanded. Like Socrates, Jesus of Nazareth was a religious reformer because he *was* what he taught; he was fitted and called to establish in humanity, by his own personality, a new moral and religious life.

These facts were but gradually recognized by his adherents, and but imperfectly understood by his disciples. Deep and overpowering as must have been their impression of his personality, if their faith in him was to survive his death, and triumph after his resurrection, strong as was the hold upon them of what was new and peculiar in the teachings of Jesus, yet were they, as appears from the Pauline Epistles, none the less unconscious of the position they had assumed in respect to Judaism. Their new faith seemed to them only the complement, not a virtual abandonment, of the old. They wished to abide in the Jewish communion, and to retain within its limits the Christians who were born in it, or were admitted to it by circumcision. They were hampered by the restrictions of the Mosaic law; they saw in Jesus only the Messiah of the Jews, not the founder of a new world-religion embracing alike both Jews and Gentiles, and effacing their distinctive peculiarities. The first step in the right direction was taken by the Hellenist Stephen; and the final independence of Judaism on the part of Christianity was established by the great Apostle to the Gentiles. In him the Christian consciousness thoroughly and definitively broke with Judaism. The principle that Christianity, and not Judaism, alone can put man in the proper relation to God, occupied, after his conversion, the central position in his system; and from this principle, as Baur attempts to show in detail, the entire Pauline doctrine develops itself.

The more fully Paul followed out this view, the more marked became his opposition, not only to the older believers and to his contemporaries, but also to the older apostles and the churches founded by them. Thus are explained the distrust with which he was met by the more moderate Judeo-Christians, and the intense hatred which he awakened in the more extreme. According to his own account, which is less conciliatory than that in the Acts, the apostolic council resulted only in a consent, forced from the Palestinian Christians by the facts in the case, to his independent administration of his own department. How little either party had abandoned its former position appears from the subsequent collision between Peter and Paul at Antioch. Each party still pursued its own path. Even in churches founded by Paul, attacks on his personal character and work were repeatedly made by his opponents, or by persons encouraged and recommended by them. Such attacks called forth the Epistle to the Galatians and one of the Epistles to the Corinthians. The Epistle to the Romans, containing the fullest exposition of Paul's views, and addressed to the church of the imperial city, founded by other than apostolic agency, and strongly tinged with Judaism, seeks to win their adherence, and to disarm their prejudices against Gentile Christianity, the successful rival of the Jewish faith and its theocratic prerogatives. It was for the reconciliation of the adverse parties that Paul urged on the collection for the saints at Jerusalem, and bore it, with such unhappy results to himself, to its destination. His conciliatory efforts, however, failed in their chief points.

In the age after his death the two parties still stood bitterly opposed to each other; and it was not until after the lapse of several generations that their gradual approximation and their final coalescence were effected.

The traces of these conflicts, and of this gradual reconciliation, Baur finds both within and without our books of the New Testament. The purest and weightiest document on the Pauline side, next to the epistles of the apostle, is, according to him, the Gospel according to Luke, which presents the evangelical history from the position of Pauline liberality, or freedom from Jewish exclusiveness. On the Judaizing side, the oldest work that we have is, in his opinion, the Apocalypse of John, probably written by the apostle whose name it bears, in the year before the destruction of Jerusalem. By a profound application of the facts of history, it expresses the anticipations of a religious party, respecting the immediate future, and endeavors to unite and to strengthen that party for the endurance of coming trials. The first Christians expected daily the end of the world, and the miraculous advent of the Messiah and the establishment of his kingdom. The apostolic and the post-apostolic age — the entire New Testament, its latest books only excepted — are full of such anticipations. The nearness of the Messiah's advent was the secret of the self-sacrificing surrender of the Christian church in its conflict with its pagan and its Jewish foes. When, in the Neronian persecution, the heathen kingdom of this world first showed its extreme hatred of the church; when, in the Jewish war, the destiny of the people who had rejected the Messiah seemed about to be accomplished, and when, after Nero's death, a bloody civil war raged around the imperial throne, the probationary period of the world seemed to the Christians drawing to a close. The idea then gained credence that Nero, either escaped from his murderers or raised from the dead, would return with a mighty host from the East to Rome, and wreak upon it a fearful vengeance. The Christians beheld in him the Antichrist who, with the aid of demons, would achieve his work, destroy all true confessors of Christ, and then fall before the returning Messiah. In such circumstances, and under such influences, was the Apocalypse written. Under the guidance of the prevailing Jewish, Messianic anticipation, it aims to encourage the church to a steadfast profession and faithful maintenance of its belief, and to prepare it for a coming martyrdom, by painting, in the familiar form of prophecy, the issue of the approaching conflict, and the rich reward of the unfaltering combatants. For its own age it was, then, a work of the profoundest import, and it was tortured, doubted, and even rejected by the following age, because later centuries did not find themselves sustained by it in their views of the past, and in anticipations which had been long before shown to be groundless by the facts of history. Still more significant is the fact that this early book ascribes to the devil's doctrine of Balaam things which Paul had defended and permitted,—that one of the chief apostles of the Jewish party here admits the Gentile Christians to communion with Jewish Christians in the Messianic church only in a sort of plebeian relation; that among the twelve apostles whose names are graven on the foundation stones of the New Jerusalem, no place is found for that of the great apostle of the gentiles, and that the Ephesian church, in which he labored so long, is praised that she had tried and found false those who would make themselves apostles. These things, Baur thinks, indicate differences from whose reconciliation alone could spring the catholic church. But it was not in the nature of things that different portions of the church, united by a common faith, should long preserve these oppositions and enmities. The points in dispute gradually lost their sharpness; common views were more prominently brought forward; the mutually hostile parties, approaching each other, borrowed much from each other, and gradually reconciled their differences, so that at last there emerged a common doctrine and a common church. A decided step had been taken in this direction when the baptism of gentile Christians was substituted for their circumcision. A still further step was taken when Christianity, opposed in its Pauline form, was received in a Petrine, when, as in the Clementine Epistles, Peter was set forth as the only apostle to the gentiles; and, with a still surviving opposition to the person and work of Paul, his fundamental principle of catholicity is fully recognized. The Epistle of James testifies to the influence which the Pauline conception of Christianity won over such as still, in principle, strove against it. On the other hand, the epistles proceeding from a Pauline point of view—Hebrews, Ephesians, Colossians, Philippians, as well as the Pastoral Epistles, aimed against the heretical Gnosis—indicate different forms and degrees of that reconciling purpose, which, in a more thoroughly conciliatory spirit, and by means of a freer enlargement and transformation of historical materials, accomplished its aim in the Acts of the Apostles. Similar confirmations of the fact of such differences and of their reconciliation are found outside of the New Testament, in the writings transmitted to us under the names of Barnabas, Ignatius, Clemens, Polycarp, and Hermas, and in the works of Justin Martyr. In the second half of the second century, the differences of opinion, which had so deeply moved the apostolic and the post-apostolic age, had disappeared; Peter and Paul appear as reconciled; and, as if to leave no doubt on this point, they are equally revered as the founders of the Church of Rome, where this fusion of ecclesiastical parties seems to have been first achieved; and in the imperial city, which it is probable that Peter never visited, the graves of the two apostles are shown as memorials of their common martyrdom. Both the Epistles of Peter, written, according to this school of critics, at Rome in the second century, reveal the same tendency.

The final step in this conciliatory movement appears in the fourth Gospel, written, as Baur thinks, in the middle of the second century, and not long afterwards universally recognized as a work of the Apostle John. From the position occupied by this Gospel, Judaism appears as a distant phenomenon of a former age; Christianity is established as the only and universal way of salvation; all the barriers of Jewish exclusiveness are removed; in Christianity a new and absolute principle, the world-creating Word of God, has revealed itself; and the obligation rests upon every man, hampered by no bonds of any narrow form of the religious life, to surrender himself entirely to this divine being, to unite himself in love with the Son of God, and through him with God himself. This ideal representation is no longer disturbed by any of the conflicts through which Christianity had to work its earlier way. As the founder of Christianity is here raised to divinity, so is Christianity here presented as endowed with an endless life. Christian consciousness has at last reached a resting-place, and left behind the clouds which at a lower point had veiled its field of vision.[1]

In prosecuting the inquiries and reaching the results above stated and illustrated, the critics of the Tübingen school claim to have exercised the strictest historic impartiality towards the Christian church and Christianity, and to have aimed to gain a picture of its origin and development, as true as possible, corresponding with actual facts, and in harmony with historical possibilities and probabilities. In doing this, they must assume the position of critics, attack many almost universal assumptions, and do violence to many fondly cherished convictions. Their final aim is, they assert, the purely positive one of the acquirement of accurate historical knowledge; and however much opinions may differ in respect to the individual results reached by them, it cannot be denied, they say, that their leading principles are the same which, in another field than that of theology, have controlled all historical studies since the inquiries of Niebuhr and of Ranke.

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[1] Our limits will not permit us to present the reviewer's further development of Baur's views respecting the later history of the church. He shows that in the presence of Gnosticism, which rejected a large portion of the sacred volume, and of Montanism, which substituted for its teachings the revelations of a prophetic ecstasy, it sought to give greater weight to its traditions by exalting the authority of its teachers, and strengthened itself by preparing and promulgating precise statements of its faith. Thus arose Episcopacy, and, in due time, the Papacy, and thus, too, was the catholicity of the church firmly and finally established.

ARTICLE IV.

THE LIFE OF ERASMUS.[1]

BY REV. ENOCH POND, D.D., PROFESSOR, IN BANGOR THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

SEVERAL memoirs of Erasmus were written within a century after his death, as those of Rhenanus, Merula, Mercier, Birardiere, Bayle, in his Dictionary, and Du Pin, in the fifth volume of his Ecclesiastical History. At later periods, his life has been written by Knight, Beaurigny, Le Clerc, Jortin, Hess, and Adolph Müller. The memoir by Le Clerc is prefixed to his complete edition of the works of Erasmus, and of this the volumes of Jortin are little more than a translation. They are written in the form of annals, showing where Erasmus was, and what he did, and what befel him from year to year. Large portions of them consist of extracts from his letters, interspersed with explanatory and critical remarks. The memoir proper is followed by a copious appendix, and by an extended review of Erasmus's character and works. The work of Jortin is called by Johnson "a dull book," but we have not found it so. To be sure, it is not written in an easy, flowing style, — the plan of the author forbade it; but it is agreeable, instructive, full of anecdote and interest, touching upon the characters and works of the friends and correspondents of Erasmus, who were the most distinguished men of his age. It can hardly be called, however, a *life* of Erasmus. It is rather *remarks* upon his life, than a continuous biography. In the following sketch, we shall be guided chiefly by the volumes of Jortin, assisted occasionally by other writers, and especially by a very instructive monograph in the London Quarterly Review for July 1859.

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[1] The Life of Erasmus. By the late Rev. John Jortin, D.D., Archdeacon of London, etc. Three vols. 8vo. London. 1808.

Erasmus lived at a most exciting and critical period of the world's history. He preceded the Reformation by almost half a century, and was one of those learned, gifted, laborious men who, without knowing exactly what they were doing, prepared the way for it. It was continually in the mouths of the monks, while the Reformation was in progress, "Erasmus laid the egg, and Luther hatched it." To this Erasmus, who did not quite like the compliment, replied: "I laid a hen's egg, but Luther hatched some other kind of brood."

Not only did Erasmus prepare the way for the Reformation, he lived through the most tumultuous and critical period of it. The Reformation may be said to have commenced in the year 1517, when Luther published his theses against indulgences; Erasmus died almost twenty years later, in 1536.

The circumstances of Erasmus's birth and early education, and indeed we may say of his whole life, were against him, and yet, to his credit it should be said, he so grappled with them and rose above them as to be justly regarded the most distinguished literary character of his age, and perhaps of any age. His favor was courted by popes and prelates, emperors and kings. He corresponded familiarly with all the distinguished men, both of church and state, at the period in which he lived; and his letters, which were all in Latin, fill one of the folios of his works.

The year of Erasmus's birth is not certainly known. He did not know it himself, and his biographers are not agreed respecting it. It is quite certain, however, that he was born at Rotterdam, on the twenty-eighth day of October, in the year 1465 or 1467.

His father, whose name was Gerard, resided in Torgau, and made proposals of marriage to Margaret, the daughter of a physician of Sevenbergen. The relatives of Gerard, who intended him for a priest, were so violently opposed to the connection, that the young couple concluded to marry themselves. They solemnly plighted their faith to each other, and lived together for some years as husband and wife. The result of their union was two sons, the youngest of whom was the personage of whom we write. He took the name of his father Gerard, which in Dutch signifies *desirable*, *amiable*. In Latin, this is equivalent to *Desiderius*, and in Greek to *Erasmus*. Hence, in subsequent life he chose to be called *Desiderius Erasmus*.

After the birth of the youngest son, the father was sent away by his relatives to Rome, where he employed himself in transcribing ancient authors. Ere long they informed him that Margaret was dead, which so deeply affected him, that he concluded to take orders and become a priest. Upon his return to Holland he found that he had been imposed upon, and that his beloved Margaret was yet alive. Still, he dared not violate his vow of celibacy, nor could Margaret think of marrying any other person. Henceforth they lived separate, and devoted themselves to the care of their children.

Little Gerard was sent to school when only four years of age, and soon after became a singer in the cathedral church of Utrecht. At the age of nine he went to Daventer, where he had for a school-fellow Adrianus Florentius, afterwards Pope Adrian VI. Here his progress in knowledge was surprising. He went rapidly through the whole course of scholastic training, — logic, physics, metaphysics, morals, as taught at that period, seeming to apprehend almost intuitively whatever was taught him; and so remarkable was his memory that he could repeat verbatim the greater part of Terence and Horace. Zinthius, one of the masters of the school, is said to have predicted at this time that Gerard would one day become the envy and the wonder of Germany.

At Daventer Gerard boarded in the same house with his mother, who followed him there that she might be near him. After about four or five years, she died suddenly of the plague, and he who should have been her husband was so much affected by her death, that he soon followed her to the grave; leaving his son and his property to the care of three executors, by whom the boy was hardly used.

Erasmus was now of an age to be sent to the university; but to this his guardians would not consent. Their plan was to thrust him into a convent, and share his patrimony among themselves. They first placed him in a convent school at Balduk in Brabant, where he passed, or as he says, lost, three years of his life. As he utterly refused to renounce his liberty, and take upon himself the vows of the order, he was removed by his guardians to another religious house near Delft; and afterwards to a third at Stein, near Torgau.

It may help to illustrate the spirit and practices of the age, to show how much solicitude was manifested, and what artifices were resorted to, to induce young men, and even boys, to commit themselves to conventual life. Even at Daventer, says Erasmus, "the master of the school used every endeavor to induce me to become a monk. Though of a pious disposition, I was wise enough to plead my youth, and the anger of my parents if I should do anything without their knowledge. When the good man saw that nothing else would prevail, he brought forth a crucifix, and, while I burst into tears, he said with the look of one inspired: 'Do you not acknowledge that Christ suffered for you?' I told him that I did most fervently acknowledge it. 'By him, then, I adjure you that you suffer him not to have died for you in vain. Obey my counsels, and seek the good of your soul, lest in the world to come you perish everlastingly.'"

The same course of measures, and even severer ones, were pursued at Balduk. The slightest breach of discipline was threatened with, and often followed by, a cruel punishment. The young Erasmus was once flogged for an offence of which he was not guilty, which threw him into a fever, and permanently injured his health. The most frightful stories were told him of the wickedness of the world, and the lamentable fate of young men who had withstood the admonitions of pious monks, and left the safe seclusion of the cloister. One had sat down on what seemed to be the root of a tree, but proved to be a huge serpent, which swallowed him up. Another had no sooner left the walls of the monastery than he was devoured by a raging lion.

At Stein a false friend achieved that for Erasmus, which the importunity of his guardians and the terrors and persuasions of monks and friars had urged in vain. Cornelius Verder, whom he had known and loved at Daventer, was at Stein before him. He described the convent school as a quiet paradise for a man of letters. His time was his own, books in abundance were at his command, accomplished teachers would encourage and assist his studies, all was pure, sober enjoyment, — a pious, intellectual luxury. Erasmus listened, and, after some hesitation, entered on his probation. All passed along pleasantly for the time. He had much opportunity for study; the discipline was made easy to him; he enjoyed the society of his friends; they were even indulged in occasional pastimes, in which the good elder brothers of the convent condescended to mingle. But as the fatal day of profession approached, the courage of Erasmus began to fail him. He sent for his guardians and begged to be released. His health, he said, was feeble, and required a generous diet. He had no taste for monastic exercises. His whole heart was upon letters, according to the new light which was now dawning upon the world. But his entreaties and arguments availed nothing. All around him were hard, inexorable, and cunning. He was coaxed, flattered, threatened, compelled. St. Augustine (for they were Augustinian friars) would avenge himself on the renegade from his order. God himself would punish him who had put his hand to the plough, and turned back. Verder, too, was there with his bland and seemingly friendly influence, unwilling to lose his companion and his victim.

Erasmus could no longer resist. He took the desperate, fatal plunge. He made the vow. But his eyes were soon opened. He began to realize the consequences of the step he had taken. The quiet, the indulgence, the unbroken leisure were gone. He must submit to a harsh, capricious discipline; to rigid but not religious rules; to companion-ship no longer genial or edifying. He was in the midst of a set of coarse, vulgar, profligate, unscrupulous men; zealots, and at the same time debauchees; idle, and tainted with all the vices which usually follow in the train of idleness. Erasmus confesses that his morals did not altogether escape the general corruption; though his feeble health, his lack of animal spirits, or his better principles, kept him back from the more shameless practices. His greatest consolation was in his books. He pursued his studies with less freedom indeed than formerly, but yet with industry and success. He here wrote a little work on "Contempt of the World," in which he denounces not only the wickedness of the world, but much more severely the ignorance, the indolence, and profligacy of the cloister. This work was published at a later period. He read with much admiration the writings of Laurentius Valla, an Italian critic, who had exposed most successfully the forgeries and impositions of Rome.

In the convent at Stein Erasmus remained about five years, dissatisfied with the greater part of his associates, and they as much dissatisfied with him. He was one among them, but not of them. He did not enjoy their society, nor they his.

At length the happy moment arrived when he was to be released. Henry à Bergis, bishop of Cambray, was projecting a visit to Rome in the hope of obtaining a cardinal's hat, and he wished some one to accompany him who could speak and write Latin easily and well. He had heard of the learning of Erasmus, and he applied both to the bishop of Utrecht and to the prior of the convent, to let him go. They gave their consent, and Erasmus went with the bishop to Cambray. But the bishop's prospects in Italy vanished, and the plan of going there was abandoned; so Erasmus remained with the bishop at Cambray, where he entered into holy orders.

During a residence here of about five years, Erasmus pursued his studies with diligence and profit. Still he was not satisfied with his situation. He longed for admittance to some one of the great universities of Europe; and, at length, that at Paris seemed to open its gates to him. The bishop not only consented to his going, but promised him a pension for his support, — a promise which he was too poor, or too parsimonious, to fulfil. The eager student obtained what may be called a *bursary* in Montague College, but this proved altogether inadequate to his support. He had no money to pay fees for lectures, or to purchase books, — nothing but food and lodging, and these of the most miserable kind. "Our sleeping rooms," he says, "were on the ground floor, with mouldy plastered walls, full of vermin, and in close proximity to filthy and pestilential latrinae. In the depth of winter, we had only dry bread, to be washed down by fetid and unwholesome water. I saw there many youths of high hopes and promise, some of whom actually died, and others were doomed for life to madness or leprosy."

But though in deep poverty, forsaken of friends, and suffering from harsh and unworthy treatment, the light of Erasmus could not be hid. He was gradually forcing his way to celebrity and usefulness. Even in Paris, the young scholar began to be known, and he was able to replenish his scanty resources by the instruction of private pupils. Some of these were from England, the sons of noble and wealthy parents. Among them was William Blunt, Lord Mountjoy, who removed his teacher from the pestilential precincts of the college to a purer air and better accommodations, and afterwards bestowed on him an annual pension of a hundred crowns. He continued to be his friend and patron as long as he lived.

While at Paris, Erasmus had the offer of a more noble pupil, the son of James Stanley, Earl of Derby, and son-in-law to the king's mother. The young man was soon to be made a bishop; and Erasmus was applied to, to instruct him and prepare him for his bishopric. For this service he was to receive a hundred crowns, with the promise of a benefice, and the loan of three hundred crowns until the living was bestowed. But from a love of independence, or thinking, perhaps, that he might employ his time better than in teaching an unpromising pupil, Erasmus declined the flattering offer. He would not, he says, for all the wealth in the world, be so hindered in prosecuting his studies.

In the year 1497, Erasmus left Paris, on account of the plague, and visited the Low Countries. He here made the acquaintance of a noble lady, the Marchioness of Veré, who settled a pension upon him, and more than once assisted him in his necessities. In return, he instructed her son, Adolphus de Veré, and wrote for him the little treatise, "De Arte Scribendi Epistolas."

In the following year, at the request of Mountjoy, Erasmus made his first visit to England. He was at once an object of general respect and esteem, and was welcomed by some of the highest and most gifted in the land. He commenced, almost immediately, his life-long acquaintance with Sir Thomas More, with Colet, afterwards Dean of St. Paul's, and with Grocyn and Linacer, professors of Greek at Oxford. His first impressions of England were flattering in a high degree. "You ask me," he writes to Piscator, alias Fisher, "how I am pleased with England. If you will believe me, dear Robert, nothing ever delighted me so much. I have found the climate most agreeable and healthful; and then there is so much civility and learning, and that not trite and trivial, but profound and accurate, so much familiarity with the ancient writers, Latin and Greek, that, but for the sake of seeing it, I should hardly care to visit Italy. When listening to Colet, I seem to hear Plato. And then who would not admire Grocyn's vast range of knowledge? What can be more subtle, more deep, more fine, than the judgment of Linacer? Did nature ever form a disposition more gentle, more sweet, more happy, than that of Thomas More?"

Of his host, Mountjoy, Erasmus speaks in the highest terms, and Mountjoy was equally attached to him. He was never easy, it is said, unless he was in his company. Even after his marriage, this noble lord would leave his family, and go to Oxford, that he might pursue his studies under the direction of Erasmus.

And yet during his first visit to England Erasmus was rather a pupil than a teacher. He was already a perfect master of Latin, but not of Greek. In Oxford he found that instruction in the Greek Language which, if Paris could have furnished, he had been too poor to buy. Under Grocyn he made rapid progress, and soon became sufficiently acquainted with the language to commence his translations from ancient authors. It was by his continued translations that he perfected himself in the knowledge of Greek.

During his stay in England, Erasmus went, with Sir Thomas More, to Eltham, on a visit to the royal family. He saw here all the children of King Henry VII., with the exception of Prince Arthur, the eldest. He had much pleasant intercourse with them, more especially with Henry, afterwards Henry VIII., and left with them, at parting, a Latin ode.

Before the end of the year 1498, Erasmus returned from England to France. The next seven or eight years he spent chiefly in France and in the Low Countries, pursuing his studies with great diligence, and publishing several important works. One of those was his *Adagia*, a collection of miscellanies, of proverbs, of wise and witty sayings, of remarkable incidents, displaying an amount of research and learning at which the literary world was astonished. Another of his publications at this period was his "Enchiridion Militis Christiani," which he wrote, he tells us, "not for the sake of showing his eloquence, but to correct the error of those who make religion to consist in rites and ceremonies, to the neglect of piety and true virtue." Such a work, in those days, was "New Divinity," which exposed its author to the censure of the monks.

During this interval Erasmus was oppressed with deep poverty, as, indeed, he was through the greater part of his life. He was continually making literary presents to his wealthy friends, and soliciting aid from them, which came always in stinted measure, and frequently not at all. He supported himself, in part, by teaching in a private way; and what money he received he expended, first, as he tells us, "in the purchase of Greek books, and afterwards of clothes." His health, too, was precarious and low. For several years he had an annual attack of fever, from which he was relieved through the intercession of St. Genevieve, though not without the aid of a skilful physician.

Erasmus's second visit to England, in the year 1506, was short. He was introduced to Warham, Archbishop of Canterbury, to whom he presented, with a Dedicatory Epistle, his translation of the Hecuba of Euripides. The archbishop received him with great kindness, made him a small present, and continued to be his friend and patron so long as he lived.

The following year Erasmus visited Italy, having under his care and instruction two young men. He had expected to find Italy the pleasant and peaceful sanctuary of arts, letters, and religion; but instead of this, he found the whole country convulsed and desolated with war. Julius II. now occupied the pontifical throne, whose whole ambition was to lead an army, and extend his dominions by conquest and blood. Erasmus first stopped at Turin, where he remained several months, and where he received a doctor's degree. He passed on to Bologna, but had scarcely arrived there, when the city was besieged by the pontiff's soldiers, with Julius himself at their head. He retired to Florence, but returned to Bologna just in time to witness the triumphant entrance of the pope into the captured city. From Bologna he made an excursion to Rome, where he again witnessed a gorgeous ovation of the martial pontiff. The effect of all this on the mind of Erasmus was anything but agreeable. He could not help contrasting it with what he knew to be the peaceful spirit of the gospel; and he poured forth his feelings in a dissertation, which was published in the next edition of his Adagia.

While Erasmus was at Bologna, the plague broke out here, and the physicians and those who nursed the infected persons were required to wear a white cloth over their shoulders, that they might be known and avoided. This white cloth looked very much like the white scapular which Erasmus still wore, as the badge of his monastic order. In repeated instances he was mistaken for an infected person, and, as he came among the people, was mobbed and stoned. To prevent such occurrences in future, he got permission from the pope to change his friar's habit for that of a common priest.

From Bologna, Erasmus removed to Venice, where he superintended the publication of several of his works. We next hear of him at Padua, where he found a natural son of James IV., of Scotland, a youth not yet twenty years old, but already Archbishop of St. Andrews. Erasmus took him under his charge, and instructed him in rhetoric, Greek, law, divinity, and music. He is represented as a youth of singular beauty, and of a sweet disposition. He afterwards fell, at his father's side, in the battle of Flodden Field.

Erasmus now went to Rome a second time, where he was received with open arms by the literati of the city, among whom were the Cardinal St. George, the Cardinal of Viterbo, and the Cardinal de Medici, afterwards Pope Leo X. He describes, in one of his letters, his interview with the Cardinal Grimani, who displayed not only the courtesy of a high-born and accomplished churchman, but a respect, amounting to deference, for the poor, adventurous scholar. "He received me," says Erasmus, "with the utmost courtesy, as if I had been a cardinal, conversed with me two hours upon literary subjects, and would not suffer me, all the while, to uncover my head; and upon my offering to rise when his nephew, an archbishop, came in, he ordered me to keep my seat, saying that it was but decent that the scholar should stand in presence of his master. In the course of our conversation, he earnestly entreated me not to think of leaving Rome, and offered to make me partaker of his house and fortunes. At length, he showed me his library, which was full of books, in all languages, and is esteemed the best in Italy, except the Vatican. If I had known Grimani sooner, I certainly should not have left Rome; but I was under engagements to return to England, which I could not break."

Even Pope Julius II. condescended to notice Erasmus at this time, and offered him the rank, the office, and emoluments of one of his penitentiaries. The Pope, who was just entering upon a war against the Venetians, also put the scholar upon a singular test. He commanded him to declaim one day against the Venetian war, and the next day in its favor. Erasmus complied with the injunction, and although, as he tells us, he argued much more strongly against the war than for it, still the conflict went on.

In April, 1509, Henry VIII. ascended the throne of England. In the previous year, he had written to Erasmus, expressing an earnest desire to see him. Mountjoy, also, wrote him from the court at Greenwich, urging him to return to England, holding out the certain favor of the king, and promising him the patronage of Archbishop Warham, who sent him five pounds towards the expense of his journey. Erasmus commenced his journey without delay, crossing the Rhoetian Alps, and passing down the Rhine into the Low Countries, from whence, after a short respite at Louvain, he went over to England. On his way to London, he was shown all the treasures of the church of Canterbury. He mentions — not without a covert sneer — the amount of relics collected there, — "the bones, skulls, chins, teeth, hands, fingers, arms," etc., — all which he was permitted to handle and to kiss. But he was frightened at the profaneness of one of his companions, who, instead of kissing the holy relic, made "a most unseemly noise at it with his lips."

In London, Erasmus took up his lodgings in the Augustinian convent, where his expenses were paid by his friend Mountjoy. His promises of promotion and patronage by the young king were not fulfilled. His promises, too, from Cardinal Woolsey were no better than the wind. They were large in words, but in fulfilment they came to nothing.

He found a more reliable friend in Fisher, Bishop of Rochester, and Chancellor of the University at Cambridge. Fisher was an open advocate of the new learning, and was resolutely determined to emancipate Cambridge from the scholastic trammels in which it had been so long confined. Through his influence Erasmus was called to the university, and constituted professor of Greek. He had his lodgings in Queen's College, where his rooms were long after shown, and where a walk is still called by his name.

At first, his scholars were but few, and his income small, and his friends were under the necessity of soliciting aid for him from other sources. But after two or three years, his prospects brightened, and he became more reconciled to his situation. Archbishop Warham's liberality was free and unremitting, and the gratitude of Erasmus was in due proportion. Warham gave him the living of Adlington, near Ashford, in Kent, to which he was collated in March, 1511. He resigned it, however, before the end of the year, and from motives which did him honor: "I cannot pretend to feed a flock of whose language I know nothing."

Erasmus had no love for modern languages, and neglected them almost entirely. He never learned English or Italian. The French, notwithstanding his long residence at Paris, he spoke but imperfectly, and the same may be said of the Dutch, his mother tongue. He thought, spoke, and wrote in Latin, caring to associate only with the literati of different countries, to whom this language was familiar.

During his sojourn in England, of about four years, Erasmus became exceedingly attached to a few select friends, such as More and Warham, Colet and Mountjoy. It was at the house of More that he wrote his "Encomium Moriae," or "Praise of Folly," in which he lashed the fooleries and superstitions of the monks in a manner which they could never forgive or forget. He did great service to Colet's school at St. Paul's, in composing hymns and prayers for the pupils, and preparing for their use a grammatical work, "De Copia Verborum."

Still, it is doubtful whether Erasmus was ever thoroughly pleased with England. In several of his letters, he speaks rather severely of the English character and habits. Thus, in writing to his friend Ammonius, he instructs him how to make his fortune in England: "First of all," says he, "be impudent. Thrust yourself into all affairs; elbow those who stand in your way; neither love nor hate any one in good earnest, but consult your own advantage; give away nothing without a sure prospect of gaining by it; and be of the opinion of every one with whom you have to do." Erasmus was too frank and honest to descend to such courses as these, and hence he had little prospect of becoming a great man in England.

Erasmus complains also of the filthy habits of the English people, to which he ascribes the frequent prevalence among them of the plague, the sweating sickness, and other mortal disorders. "The streets," he says, "are filthy, and the floors of their houses, which are commonly of clay, are strewed over with rushes, under which lies, unmolested, any quantity of slopped beer, grease, fragments, bones, spittle, excrements of dogs and cats, and everything else which is odious and intolerable." Let us be thankful for the improvements which have taken place in the new world, upon the modes of living among our English ancestors of the fifteenth century.

Induced by what he conceived to be more flattering prospects, Erasmus left England, in the year 1514, and returned to the continent. Charles of Austria (afterwards the Emperor Charles V.) had appointed him an honorary counsellor, with a pension of two hundred florins. The Cardinal de Medici, who had showed him so much kindness at Rome, and who he hoped would now increase his favors, had been elected pontiff, with the title of Leo X. A bishopric in Sicily was also held out to him, which, however, he failed to receive. In addition to all the rest, his old convent of Stein, wishing to share in the fame of the great scholar who had been permitted to leave its walls, urged upon him a request to return. The answer of Erasmus to this request sets forth, in the strongest terms, his objections to monastic life. "What," he exclaims, "can be more corrupt and wicked than these relaxed religious houses? Consider even those which are in the best repute, and you will find in them nothing which resembles Christianity, but only cold, Judaical observances. Upon these the religious orders value themselves, and by them they judge and despise others. Would it not be better, according to the doctrine of our Saviour, to look upon all Christendom as one house, one family, one monastery, and upon all Christians as one brotherhood? Would it not be better to regard the sacrament of baptism as the most sacred of all vows, and never trouble ourselves where we live, if we only live well?"

For the next six or seven years Erasmus seems not to have cared much where he lived. We find him in Flanders, at Basle, at Brussels, and in several other places, always busy, always poor, and ever complaining of feeble health. He wrote many letters, made many valuable acquaintances, and published some of the more important of his works, particularly his New Testament, in Greek and Latin, and his valuable edition of the works of Jerome. These were printed at Basle, by Frobenius, who was ever afterward the friend of Erasmus, and aided him in most of his publications.

In the year 1515, Martin Dorpius published strictures upon Erasmus's "Encomium Moriae," or "Praise of Folly." He is said to have been the first who ever wrote against him. But from this time onward his adversaries multiplied thick and fast, and too much of his time was taken up in replying to them.

We have now pursued the history of Erasmus to the opening of the Reformation from Popery. A poor, friendless boy at the first,—a wanderer, for most of the time, from one country to another, and dependent entirely on his own efforts and on the charity of friends,—he now stood before the world as one of the first scholars and theologians in Europe. Reuchlin, alias Caprio, was his superior in Hebrew and Oriental learning, to which Erasmus made no pretensions; Budaeus was thought to excel him in Greek; the Ciceronians of Italy might surpass him in the purity and elegance of their Latin; but he was more than their equal in the command of a free, vigorous, idiomatic style. In wit and satire he had no rivals, unless it were in the author of the "Epistolae Obscurorum Virorum," which were persistently, though falsely, ascribed to him.[1]

Nothing can more clearly show the position of Erasmus at this time, than the earnest desire of the great potentates of Europe, civil and ecclesiastical, for the honor of his residence in their dominions. Charles V., both before and after his advancement to the empire, had shown him distinguished honor. Francis I. had repeatedly urged him to take up his abode in France, and become connected with the University of Paris. Henry VIII. had with reluctance allowed him to depart from England, and would have welcomed him back on almost any terms. The Archduke Ferdinand of Austria had paid him the highest court. The Elector of Bavaria made him splendid offers to undertake the Presidency of his University of Ingolstadt.

There may be ostentation in some of the epistles of Erasmus, in which he recounts the letters, the invitations, and the magnificent presents which he had received from different prelates and potentates. "From the Emperor Charles V.," says he, "I have many letters, written with so much affection and esteem, that I prize them even more than his kindness to me; to which I owe a great part of my fortune. From King Ferdinand I have as many not less friendly, and always accompanied by some honorary gift. How often, too, have I been invited, and on the most liberal terms, by the king of France? The king of England, by frequent letters and unsolicited presents, is always declaring his singular good will. His Queen Catharine, the best of women in this age, vies with her husband in this respect. Sigismund, the king of Poland, sent me a letter with a royal gift. The Duke of Saxony often addresses letters to me, and never without a valuable present."

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[1] These once celebrated Letters purport to have been written by monks, in which they discourse together, in their barbarous Latin, of the affairs of the times, and of religious subjects. They address to one Eratius, their correspondent at Cologne, the most trivial and senseless questions. They discover, with the utmost simplicity, their gross ignorance, credulity, and superstition; their low and vulgar spirit; and at the same time their pride, and their fanatical and persecuting zeal. They relate to him many of their low adventures and debaucheries, and the scandalous conduct of some of their leaders. These Letters are so much to the life, that many of the monks were completely duped by them. They thought them to have been written in the interest and for the defence of their order. A prior of Brabant is said to have bought a large number of copies, to be distributed among the Dominicans.

In his paroxysms of laughter over these letters, Erasmus is said to have broken a painful abscess on his face, which the physicians were about to open.

Leo X. was among the correspondents and patrons of Erasmus, and accepted the dedication of his New Testament. Adrian VI., who had been his school-fellow at Daventer, offered him a deanery, which he thought proper to decline. Clement VII. sent him a present of two hundred florins, and made him still greater promises, which were not fulfilled. Near the close of his life, Paul III. offered him the provostship of Daventer, worth six hundred florins a year, and had serious thoughts of making him a cardinal. We might proceed, and fill a page with distinguished names, cardinals, bishops, and men of letters, all of whom had correspondence with Erasmus, and deemed it an honor to be reckoned among his friends.

It may be inquired here: How had Erasmus, the poor, friendless scholar, achieved so lofty a position? What had he done to attract the notice and admiration of Christendom, and make kings and princes, popes and prelates, so anxious to be near him, and to enjoy his friendship? The answer to these questions must be sought in the circumstances of the times, and in the indefatigable and highly successful labors of Erasmus for their development. The darkness of the Middle Ages was now passing away; the light of sound learning was beginning to shine; and those who labored successfully for its diffusion were greater celebrities at that period than they could have been at almost any other. Besides, the distinguished men of that age felt their indebtedness to Erasmus; they felt under obligations to him for what he had done; and this sense of obligation they were led to manifest in ways such as have been mentioned.

In the first place, Erasmus had been the chief promoter of *polite literature* and of *classical learning*, in central and western Europe. By his translations of the Greek, and his improved editions of the Latin classics, — to say nothing of his own merely literary publications, — he had awakened an interest in subjects of this nature, and opened a new world to the gaze and the admiration of future explorers.

Then he was the declared enemy of the dominant scholasticism, monkery, and other superstitions of the Middle Ages, of which the world was becoming weary — which were "waxing old, and ready to vanish away." He knew what monkery was, for he had been forced into it in early life; and he lost no opportunity to avenge himself of it in maturer years. And the more his works on this subject were opposed, the more they circulated. Of his "Praise of Folly," twenty-seven editions were published during the lifetime of the author. His "Colloquies" were in every library, and in almost every school. Not less than twenty thousand copies were sold by a single publisher.

Erasmus may also be regarded as the father of true *Biblical criticism;* which was another reason for his extended fame. By his publication of the New Testament, and by his Notes and Paraphrases on the sacred writings, he introduced a new era in sacred learning, and gave the Bible to western Europe. It is said that there was never a Greek Testament in northern and western Europe until that of Erasmus was published. The Latin Vulgate was the standard in the whole Romish church, as it is to this day.

Still another reason for the extended fame of Erasmus grew out of his new and corrected editions of the early Fathers. Among these were the works of Jerome, his first and favorite author, of Cyprian, of the pseudo-Arnobius, of Hilary, of Irenaeus, of Ambrose, Augustine, and Lactantius. He published parts of the works of Athanasius, of Basil, and of Chrysostom, and at the time of his death had advanced far in preparing for the press the entire works of Origen. When we think that these works were in many folios, and closely printed, we are amazed at the industry of the compiler and commentator, and do not wonder at the eminence to which he attained. It was by means of these volumes, in great measure, that he supplanted the scholasticism of the previous ages, and brought back the world to the purer and more practical theology of primitive times.

At the period to which we have now arrived, we behold Erasmus at the summit of his glory and influence. Had he died at this time, it might have been happier for himself and his reputation. The world would have lost some of his valuable publications, but it would have been spared others which certainly add nothing to his fame.

A new era was now beginning to open. A new character was coming upon the stage, whose name had already filled the whole Western horizon. From the proceedings and discussions of Luther at Wittemberg, from the embers of the papal bull which he had openly burned there, arose the Reformation. That Erasmus had done much to prepare the way for it was undeniable. Shall he now welcome it, cast in his lot with it, and labor shoulder to shoulder with the brave men who are straining every nerve to push it forward; or shall he cling to the church in which he has always lived, to which all his noble, royal friends and patrons are attached, and where all his interests seem to lie; or shall he attempt to maintain a stately neutrality, approve each party so far as it is right, condemn it where it seems to be wrong, and endeavor to bring about a reconciliation? These were hard questions for Erasmus in that trying day; questions which he knew not how to solve; and which neither party would allow him to solve according to his unbiassed judgment. For each was using every means in its power to compass the invaluable proselyte, and bring him over to its own side.

Erasmus had been chiefly a man of letters, and was constitutionally a man of peace. He desired a reformation, and had labored to accomplish it, but he hoped to bring it about in a peaceful way. He had hoped that the progress of learning would soften and enlighten the general mind; that by the diffusion of knowledge the prevailing superstitions would be overthrown; that biblical studies would of themselves promote a truer and purer religion; that perhaps Leo X., the patron of arts and of letters, might become the great reformer of the church. That such were the anticipations of Erasmus at this critical period, there can be little doubt, and that they were entirely futile and fallacious, is equally clear. He understood not the nature of the questions at issue, nor the magnitude of the interests which were depending on either side, nor the strength with which the advocates of the old religion would cling to their favorite superstitions, nor the deadly strife which would be necessary in order to tear them away. The times that were coming were emphatically such as to try men's souls; and the event proved that the soul of Erasmus was not equal to the trial.

In the early part of the Reformation, Erasmus contrived to stand pretty well with both parties. The monks, indeed, and the inferior catholic clergy hated and denounced him, but the pontiff, the cardinals, and the more distinguished prelates treated him with honor and respect.

Of Luther, at this period, Erasmus was accustomed to speak with reserve, but not in terms of hostility or reproach. Thus, in a letter to Melanchthon, in 1519, he says: "All the world is agreed in commending the moral character of Luther; but as touching his writings, there are various opinions. I have not as yet read his works. He hath given us good advice on certain points. God grant that his success may be equal to the liberty he hath undertaken."

The same year, Luther sent a very courteous and civil letter to Erasmus. He took it for granted that Erasmus was on his side, because he had declared himself so strongly against the monks. Erasmus replied, calling Luther "his dearest brother in Christ," and informing him of the excitement which his works had occasioned at Louvain. "As to myself," says he, "I told the divines of the university that it would be better for them to publish a solid answer to your works, than to rail at you before the populace, especially as no objections could be raised against your moral character. I have read portions of your Commentary on the Psalms, and like it much, and hope it may do great good." Erasmus goes on to tell Luther that many persons in England and in the Low Countries approved of his writings. He exhorts him to moderation in his language, and to content himself with attacking, not the persons of popes and kings, but rather those evil counsellors who imposed upon them, and made a bad use of their authority.

But, notwithstanding all these kind and civil expressions, Erasmus was not prepared to go all lengths with Luther, or to commit himself to the support of his cause. He hated strife; he hated controversy, and preferred rather to surrender some portion of the truth, than, in maintaining it, to disturb the peace of the world. Besides, he had not the courage or the spirit of a martyr. He confesses as much as this in a letter to the Dean of St. Paul's, written in 1521. "Wherein could I have assisted Luther," says he, "if I had declared myself for him, and shared the danger along with him? Only thus far, that, instead of one man, two would have perished. It is true that he has given us many a wholesome doctrine, and many a good counsel; and I wish that he had not defeated the good effects of them by his insufferable faults. But if he had written everything in the most unexceptionable manner, *I had no inclination to die for the sake of the truth. Every man has not the courage to be a martyr, and I am afraid if I were put to the trial of Peter, that I should imitate him in his fall.*"

It was well that the world, at that period, had men of sterner stuff than this; men who dared to stand up on God's behalf; who counted not their lives dear unto themselves, that so they might finish their course with joy. Still, "we must not judge too severely those timid spirits who are not endowed with this sublimer virtue." Erasmus desired a reformation, while he unwittingly shrunk from the only method in which, as things then were, a reformation could be accomplished. He still pleased himself with the hope of a tranquil reformation, carried on and consummated by princes and prelates, popes and kings. As one well expresses it, "he dreamed that the clergy of that day, corrupt as most of them were to the very core, could be persuaded to forego all those accumulated superstitions on which their power and influence rested, and become mild, holy, self-denying pastors; that sovereigns like Charles V., and Francis I., and Henry VIII., each a bigot in his way, might forget their feuds, and conspire for the reëstablishment of a pure and apostolical church; that popes like the voluptuous Leo X., or the cold and narrow Adrian, or the worldly and intriguing Clement VII., should become the apostles of a simple, evangelical creed; that the edifice of sacerdotal power and authority, which had been growing up for centuries, would crumble away before the genial influence of learning and persuasion. Erasmus, we repeat, may have dreamed of such a thing, and for a time directed his course accordingly; but, as might have been expected, the progress of events soon spoiled the dream, and dissipated the delusion.

Erasmus's controversy with Hutten was a disgrace to both parties. Hutten had undertaken to drive Erasmus from his position of neutrality, and compel him to take sides with Luther. For this purpose he had, in his letters, expostulated with him, had entreated him, reproached and warned him: "Will they who have condemned Luther be induced to spare you? No; fly while you can, and preserve yourself for us. Fly to some place of refuge, where the vengeance of *your* enemies, and of *ours*, cannot overtake you."

From this time, Erasmus did reside chiefly in the Protestant city of Basle; not, however, as *he* would allow, from a regard to his personal safety, but for the more convenient publishing of his works. Here Hutten came to make him a visit, but Erasmus refused to see him. On retiring from Basle, Hutten sent back what he called his "*Expostulatio,*" which, "in fury of invective, in bitterness of satire, and in the mastery of vituperative Latin," is said to have exceeded everything which that age of violence had before produced. In none of these properties, however, did it exceed the reply of Erasmus, which, under the title of "The Sponge," he immediately hurled back. Luther had often been censured for intemperance of language in his controversial papers, but he had never descended to the style of either of these wretched publications. He is said to have "stood aghast at them," and to have expressed his grave and sober condemnation of them both.

It was too late, after this, for Erasmus to think of acting as mediator between the two contending parties. He had forfeited his position of neutrality, and turned away from the side of the reformers. And subsequent events soon drove him still further away. The peasant war broke out in 1525, desolating southern Germany with atrocities which were surpassed only by the atrocities resorted to to support it. And this was soon followed by the uprising and extravagances of the Anabaptists. Although Luther denounces these proceedings with all the vehemence of which he was capable, inculcating an absolute submission in things temporal, to the higher powers, still his enemies laid hold of them, and endeavored to turn them against the Reformation. "See what your agitation and opposition to the established order of things has resulted in! We told you in season towards what your efforts were tending, but you would not hear. Nought remains, but you must now eat the fruit of your own way, and take the consequences of your folly."

Erasmus was shocked with these new commotions, and was more than ever disposed to stand aloof from the reformers. He was half persuaded to listen to the entreaties of his Catholic friends, and take up his pen in their defence. At this juncture, Luther wrote him a long and friendly letter, the principal object of which was, not to induce him to espouse his cause, but to hold him back from open opposition. "I never wished," says he, "that, forsaking or neglecting your own measure of grace, you should enter our camp. You might, indeed, have aided us much by your wit and your eloquence; but, since you have not the disposition and the courage for this, we would have you serve God in your own way. Only we feared, lest our adversaries should entice you to write against us, and that necessity should compel us to oppose you to your face. If you cannot, dear Erasmus, assert *our opinions*, be persuaded to let them alone, and treat of subjects more suited to your taste."

Erasmus must have been moved by this friendly and gentle entreaty; and yet he was too deeply committed, or too far advanced in his work, to be deterred from the fatal step. A book must be written against the Lutherans; and on what subject shall he write? He selects a subject quite remote from the great controversy in hand, one which long had been, and still was, debated in the Romish church,—the question respecting what had been called by Augustine, and was called by Luther, *the bondage of the will.* This question did not relate, as some have supposed, to *the free, responsible agency of man.* Luther believed in free agency as fully as Erasmus. But the question turned rather on *the natural and entire depravity of man*,—on what Paul calls "*the bondage of corruption*,"—by which the human will is enslaved. It belonged rather to the Pelagian controversy, than to the great struggle of the Reformation.

And yet Erasmus did not so conceive of it. He did not correctly understand it. He wrote a long and wordy "Diatribe *de Libero Arbitrio*," elegant in style, but lacking in point and substance, which neither convinced the Lutherans, nor satisfied those of the other party. In his reply to the "Diatribe," Luther admits that the composition is very elegant, but insists that the matter is contemptible, comparing it to "an excrement in a golden dish." Erasmus rejoined, in a work entitled "Hyperaspistes;" but the controversy gained him little favor with the Catholics, and added nothing to his fame.

From this time, Erasmus became, in his sympathies, more and more a Papist, though he never regained the confidence of the high papal party. At Paris, his books were burned, and, what is worse, his friend Berquin was burned for translating and circulating them. Still, Erasmus clung to the persecuting church, and even framed an apology for it in the case of Berquin. "It is better to err in this way," says he, "than to permit the unbridled license which prevails in some parts of Germany, where the pope is antichrist, the cardinals the creatures of antichrist, the bishops monsters, the clergy swine, the monasteries conventicles of satan, and the princes tyrants.[1]

The revolution which took place in England, in the year 1533, also had an effect to prejudice Erasmus the more against the Reformation. The king divorced his wife Catharine, renounced the pope, and constituted himself the head of the English church. And not only so, he commenced persecuting, with fire and sword, all who would not admit his supremacy and sanction his violent proceedings. Among the sufferers were two of Erasmus's most valued English friends, Fisher, Bishop of Rochester, and Sir Thomas More. More, like Erasmus, had been growing more papistical with advancing years. In his later writings, he had showed himself the determined apologist of all the abuses of the old system, — pilgrimages, image-worship, purgatory, monkery, — things at which he had laughed, with Erasmus, twenty years before. He had learned even to connive at palpable persecution; and now the measure which he was prepared to mete to others was meted out to him. For denying the king's supremacy, he was beheaded on Tower Hill, July 5, 1535.

The last dozen years of Erasmus's life were spent almost wholly at Basle. He had many invitations to visit Rome, and other Catholic cities and countries, but he always excused himself on the ground of ill health. The probability is, that, Catholic as he was, he dared not trust himself among bigoted Catholics.

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[1] Erasmus came, at last, to advocate deadly persecution in certain cases. In his tract against the Evangelicals he maintains that some heretics may lawfully be put to death, as rioters and blasphemers.

He had long suffered from a disease of the kidneys, inducing gravel, or the stone, but his last sickness was dysentery. He was sensible that he was going, several weeks before his death, and spoke of his departure with entire composure. He died in a Protestant city, July 12, 1536, without craving or receiving any of those rites which Romanists think so important at the last. He was buried in the cathedral church at Basle, where his tomb, with a Latin inscription, remains to this day.

In person, Erasmus is represented as small in stature, but well shaped, of a fair complexion, with light hair, blue eyes, a cheerful countenance, and very neat in his apparel. He had a feeble constitution, a prodigious memory, and an ease and fluency of expression which rendered him a most agreeable companion. He was remarkable for his wit, of which his earlier writings furnish many examples. Some of his sarcastic and witty expressions have been often quoted, and will be long remembered. Thus, when inquired of by the Elector of Saxony in regard to Luther and the Reformation, with an affected gravity, he replied: "Luther has committed two unpardonable offences. He has touched the pope's crown and the monks' bellies."

When informed, at a later period, of Luther's marriage, he exclaimed: "This is just as I expected. The tragedy has ended, like a comedy, with a wedding."

In his note to Archbishop Warham, who had sent him a horse, Erasmus says: "I have received your horse,—a good creature, free from all the mortal sins, except gluttony and laziness. He has some of the qualities, too, of a holy father confessor, being modest, humble, chaste, peaceable, and never bites or kicks."

During the greater part of his life, as we have seen, Erasmus was poor and dependant. At some periods, he seems to have been a persistent beggar. But in his last years, owing to diminished expenses, or to a larger income from his works, he was enabled to lay by a comfortable estate. He left property to the amount of more than seven thousand ducats, the most of which he ordered to be distributed, to relieve the poor and the sick, to furnish marriage dowers to deserving young women, and to assist young men of good character in entering upon the business of life.

The first edition of the works of Erasmus was published at Basle, by Frobenius, in 1540, in nine folio volumes. A second and more complete edition was published at Leyden, in 1706, in ten volumes folio, under the care and inspection of Le Clerc.

As to the character of Erasmus, it is needless to offer much additional remark. He was early enlightened as to the spiritual nature of religion, and the futility and danger of most of the popish ceremonies and superstitions. He opposed and ridiculed them as heartily as Luther. He loved the Bible, and spent much of his time and labor in the study of it, and in making it accessible to others. Still, he could not separate himself entirely from the church of Rome. There were ties binding him to it which he could not sever. And when he was charged with cowardice, with treachery to his own convictions, and with the vain attempt to steer between truth and falsehood, right and wrong, he indignantly repelled the charge. "I am not trying," he said, "to steer between truth and falsehood, right and wrong, but rather between Sylla and Charybdis."

We do not say that Erasmus was not a Christian, even in the best sense of the term. We hope and trust that he was. But he had many infirmities, which require to be overlooked, —*faults*, even, for which we search in vain for a sufficient apology. He is chiefly to be respected as a man of *letters*, who, in the great period of dawning intellect, stood first among the foremost, tearing away the rubbish of the Middle Ages, and preparing for the triumphs which were soon to follow. If not directly connected with the Reformation, he was the *forerunner* of it, commissioned, like the Nazarite of old, to prepare the way of the Lord.

ARTICLE V.

CLOSE COMMUNION.

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It is our purpose in the present Article to state the chief reasons which have led the Baptists of America, with few exceptions,[1] to invite only Christians of their own faith and order to the Lord's table; believing that such a statement will tend to promote Christian fellowship between them and others. Should this discussion seem to be tinged in any degree with a partisan or uncharitable spirit, we beg leave to disclaim such a spirit, and to refer the evil to its proper source, inaccuracy of language. Without expecting that the following argument will be deemed conclusive throughout by the majority of our readers, we certainly anticipate their assent to a large part of it, and we bespeak for the whole a candid perusal. It will be necessary for us to mention, at the outset, a few doctrinal principles which underlie the argument for "close communion." These principles are held to be true and fundamental by nearly all the members of Baptist churches in our land. We shall state them as briefly as comports with the design of this Article, not attempting an extended vindication of their truth.

One of these principles is, that the New Testament is our ultimate authority in respect to church order and action. Accepting without reserve the doctrine of the plenary inspiration of the Old Testament scriptures, and believing that to the end of time they will be exceedingly precious and useful to the Christian, we are nevertheless unable to discover in them any proper model or account of a Christian church. Their laws, and histories, and songs of praise bear the impress of Judaism. Even their predictions of the Messiah and his reign are expressed in language determined by the peculiarities of that dispensation. And surely it will be admitted that the Mosaic economy differed greatly from the Christian. The former had a national organization, a national temple, a national atonement; the latter has none of these. The former had an extensive and burdensome ritual, — sacrifices, oblations, purifications, to be made by those who served unto the shadow of heavenly things; the latter has almost no ritual at all. No ordinance of the earlier economy is preserved without change in the later. No rule as to meats and drinks, divers washings and carnal ordinances, imposed until the time of reformation, is taken up by the new economy and laid on the necks of believers for all time. The handwriting of ordinances, that was against us, has been blotted out. The Jewish nation may indeed have been typical of the spiritual Israel or kingdom of Christ, just as the Jewish sacrifices were typical of Christ, the Lamb of God; but it would be as unsafe to infer the organization of a Christian church from the national organization of the Israelites as it would have been to infer the manner of Christ's death from the manner of slaying a lamb by the Jewish high-priest. Bearing in mind, then, the difference between the two economies and the natural dependence of language in every age upon previous or existing usages and institutions, we are not surprised that the Old Testament fails to describe beforehand with literal accuracy the polity and working of a Christian church; much less are we surprised at the impossibility of deriving the rites of the new dispensation from those of the old. Evidently, so far as the Bible is concerned, we are remitted to Christ and his apostles for light on all questions of church order and action. And as to extra scriptural teaching, we shall hardly be expected to go far in search of it while the Word of God is intelligible, and the language of Chillingworth is remembered: "The Bible, the Bible only, is the religion of Protestants."

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[1] It is proper to say that we refer to regular, or Calvinistic, Baptists only. In this country the Free-will Baptists practise open communion, while those of England practise what is called close communion.

Another of these principles is, that the constitution and work of Christian churches are definitely fixed by the New Testament. It is not true, we think, that the writings of the apostles authorize us to look upon the constitution of a Christian church as elastic, variable, discretionary, capable of being adjusted by the wisdom of officers or members to the ever-changing tastes and conditions of society. Christianity has indeed a spirit and a form, a soul and a body, but they are perfectly and divinely fitted to each other. If one of them suffers, the other suffers also. If the spirit degenerate, the form will be perverted; if the form be injured, the spirit will languish. Their mutual sympathy and dependence may not always be manifest, but they surely exist, and will in due time appear. The records of Christianity in every age prove this. And we are satisfied that the New Testament nowhere authorizes Christians to adapt their ecclesiastical polity and action to the institutions, the prejudices, or the genius of any people or epoch. It rather makes it their duty to offer the world the same Christianity, both in spirit and form, which they find delineated by apostolic men. To found the church was the work of Christ and his inspired followers. The former prescribed the qualifications for membership, and laid down the rule of discipline for private offences; the latter organized numerous churches, administered the ordinances, attended to the appointment of suitable officers, and gave important directions as to the discipline of public offenders.[1] And thus, by inspired example and teaching was the proper constitution of Christian churches determined for all time. On this point the writings of Paul are very instructive. He took care to ordain elders in every church which he planted; he insisted upon the maintenance of faithful discipline in the churches; he evinced by his conduct great respect for church action and authority; he proclaimed the value of unity, order, coöperation, in every church; he exhorted Christians to remember, obey, and support their pastors; he exalted the custom of all the churches to the position of a moral law for believers; he affirmed his own directions in respect to order and decorum among the brethren to be commandments of the Lord; and he declared that his teaching, not only of doctrine but also of duty, was the same in all the churches.[1] Hence it is manifest that Paul attached no little importance to the proper organization and action of the churches. Nothing was left to accident or the caprice of uninspired men. The body was fitly framed together; and it is only necessary to examine with care the words of this one apostle in order to ascertain the normal constitution and functions of a Christian church.

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[1] Matt. xvi. 18, sq.; xviii. 18; Jno. xx. 20; Eph. ii. 20; Rev. xxi. 14.—Matt. x. 32, sq.; Luke xiv. 26, sq.; Matt. xxviii. 19: Mark xvi. 16; Jno. iii. 3, sq.—Acts xiv. 23; xviii. 8; Tit. i. 5; 1 Cor. v. 1, sq.

Another of these principles is, that churches observing the Lord's supper must determine what are the scriptural qualifications for admission to it. The ordinance is placed in their hands with instructions, and it is practically impossible for them to observe it without interpreting those instructions. They spread the table for their Master, and they must also invite the guests. They may say: 'The New Testament authorizes us to welcome to this feast all men, or all believers in Christ, or all members of Christian churches;' but, having prepared the supper, they cannot well say: 'Our responsibility now ends; certain terms of admission to this table are laid down, we believe, in the New Testament, but it is a delicate point, and we forbear to indicate them;—let every man do what is right in his own eyes, freely partaking, if he thinks himself entitled to do so.' This would be saying: There is instruction in the New Testament which the churches of Christ may pass over in silence; they are indeed "the pillar and ground of the truth," and should proclaim the terms of baptism, of membership in the church, of admission into heaven, but it is not their duty to explain the terms of communion at the table of the Lord; this portion of the revealed will of God they may forbear to teach, although it is often misunderstood. Such a position is wholly untenable. No man would assume it except by necessity. But if churches observing the Lord's supper must determine what are the scriptural qualifications for this ordinance, manifestly they can only invite those to partake of it who are believed to possess these qualifications. If the scriptures in their judgment make true faith in Christ a term of admission to the Lord's table, they cannot invite those who give them no satisfactory evidence of having such faith. If baptism is made another term by the same authority, they cannot invite those who are believed to be yet unbaptized. In all cases the invitation must express the views of doctrine and duty held by those who give it. For they have no right to make the opinions of others their standard of action. They have no right to place honest error on the same level with truth, overlooking the sacredness of the divine law, and regarding only the sincerity of the human subject. Wrong does not become right, nor falsehood truth, because it is believed to be so. Christians should not, therefore, treat any man as if he had obeyed a command of the Saviour when they believe he has not obeyed it, for by so doing they disparage the objective divine rule; nor should any man wish to receive from them such treatment, for it is wishing them to honor his profession at the expense of Christ's command.

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[1] Acts xiv. 23; Tit. i. 5.—1 Cor. v. 1, sq.; 2 Thess. iii. 6.—Acts xiv. 26, 27; xv. 2, 3.—1 Cor. xii. 12, sq.—Heb. xiii. 7, 17; Gal. vi. 6.—1 Cor. xi. 16.—xiv. 37.—iv. 17.

Another of these principles is, that Baptists ought to follow out their doctrine of baptism, if correct, to its legitimate results. If they are right in holding that nothing but the immersion of a believer into the name of the Trinity is Christian baptism, they may fearlessly accept all the consequences of this belief. Loyalty to Christ will bring with it no real unkindness to his friends. Obedience to one of his directions will not be found to violate any other. All his commands are harmonious, and no possible conditions of society can make them discordant. To believe them harmonious, when Christianity is in a normal and healthy state, as in the apostolic age, is not enough; they are equally so, it must be admitted, when the people of God are in a partly disorganized state. For true charity does not consist in assenting to every opinion, and endorsing every act of a fellow Christian, but in thinking no ill of his purposes, and seeking to rectify his errors. "Faithful are the wounds of a friend, but the kisses of an enemy are deceitful." Paul was not uncharitable when he "withstood Peter to the face, because he was to be blamed." The very plainness and boldness of his reproof betokened large confidence in the radical integrity of his brother apostle. So, likewise, a strict obedience to the law of baptism, with all it involves, although it may separate a part of Christ's disciples from the rest, at certain points, and may give birth to discussion and admonition, is yet entirely consistent with fervent charity between those who differ. It may not, indeed, be so easy for Christians to obey all the laws of their Master, when some of them have mistaken the path of duty, and discord seems to reign, as it would be if all were of one mind, walking visibly in the same path; but, nevertheless, it is possible, and therefore no servant of Jesus can plead his desire to obey one command as a valid excuse for not obeying another. If, then, Baptists are correct in their views of baptism, they ought not to hesitate in accepting and justifying the consequences; but if wrong in their views of baptism, they are doubtless wrong in the consequences also. The latter error, however, grows out of the former, and must be corrected through it, if at all. We claim, then, that the following argument establishes the duty of "close communion" on the part of Baptists, provided the immersion of believers, in the name of the Trinity, and nothing else, is Christian baptism. This is believed to be true by all consistent members of the Baptist denomination. It is plainly the logical and, if true, the scriptural basis of their practice of restricted communion. Having stated these principles, we have reached the main question, and shall proceed to consider, from a Baptist point of view, what are the scriptural prerequisites to communion at the Lord's table.

Faith in Christ is the first prerequisite. Only true Christians are entitled to partake of the supper, and only those who give credible evidence of piety should be invited to partake. In support of this position, we appeal: (1.) To the import of the ordinance itself. It is partly commemorative. "This do in remembrance of me." "As often as ye eat this bread, and drink this cup, ye do show the Lord's death till he come." It is a memorial of the dying Redeemer, the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world. The breaking of the bread and the pouring out of the wine carry the heart back to Calvary, and bring before it the spotless victim in his passion. But those who have no spiritual connection and affinity with Christ, no trust in him as their atoning sacrifice, or love to him as the Holy One, cannot feel any proper interest in the sacred mementoes of his passion. They are at heart self-righteous. They do, in fact, reject his proffered aid, and repudiate his atonement. Whatever admiration they may feel for him as a man or a teacher, they feel no gratitude to him as a Saviour. How, then, can they heartily commemorate his death, or be entitled to celebrate that event in company with his friends?

To put the question is to answer it. Again, it is partly symbolical. "Take, eat; this is my body, which is broken for you." "Drink ye all of it; for this is my blood of the new testament, which is shed for many for the remission of sins." It will be observed that the act of eating and drinking the consecrated elements is made very prominent. And with reason; for by partaking of the bread and wine, the communicants signify most clearly their reception of Christ by faith as the support of their spiritual life. They profess to be united with him, as the branch is united with the vine, and to draw from him, as their Sacrifice and Redeemer, present supplies of grace. If not, if the sole object of the supper is to commemorate the dying Saviour, without symbolizing any special relation of the communicant to him, why does the former partake of the elements at all? Why is it not enough to break the bread and pour out the wine in sight of all the people? The act of eating and drinking is altogether unmeaning and superfluous. But if this act signifies the reception of Christ by faith and a vital union with him, then it is most significant and essential. An omission of it would rob the ordinance of more than half its meaning. Hence we say that the Lord's supper was intended to symbolize and express the believer's relation to Christ. How, then, can any person who rejects the Saviour wish or dare to approach his table? Or how can one who gives no satisfactory evidence of faith in Christ be invited to this table? It is also partly typical. "I will not drink henceforth of the fruit of the vine, until I drink it new with you in my Father's kingdom." "Many shall come from the east and west, and shall sit down [at table] with Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob in the kingdom of heaven." "Blessed are they which are called unto the marriage supper of the Lamb." From these and similar expressions of the Word of God, it appears that the Lord's supper was meant to foreshadow the blessed fellowship of heaven. With what propriety, then, can those who lack the one indispensable qualification for that fellowship be welcomed to the communion? It is evident, therefore, from the import of this ordinance, that faith in Christ is the first prerequisite to it.

In support of this position we appeal: (2.) To the example of Christian churches in the apostolic age. So far as the point in question is concerned, their practice seems to have been uniform. The sacred emblems were never offered to unbelievers. All notices of this ordinance in the New Testament favor the opinion that those, and those only, who gave credible evidence of piety were admitted to the supper. Some have referred to the case of Judas as an exception, but without sufficient reason. For it is probable, if not certain, that he went out to accomplish the betrayal of Christ before the supper was instituted; but if he remained with the rest, and partook of the eucharist, it was in the character of a true disciple, the omniscient Saviour alone perceiving his hypocrisy. Is, then, the example of churches under apostolic guidance of any weight in the present case? We believe it is. When Paul declares with reference to a practice far less closely connected with the gospel than this, "We have no such *custom*, neither the churches of God," he appears to regard this fact as a final *ne plus ultra* argument against it. Yet, in the case to which he refers, it is impossible to determine whether the custom of the churches rested on special instruction from the apostles, or on their own sense of propriety and modesty. But the practise now in question must have been established by the apostles. They received the ordinance from Christ, and they caused it to be observed in the primitive churches. Whatever may be urged in favor of the opinion that they suffered certain prevalent evils to exist for a time in the churches, trusting to the general principles of Christianity and the spirit of love which it created for their ultimate removal, it cannot surely be supposed that by their own positive agency they established any but right customs. Hence the fact that believers only, according to the records of the New Testament, were welcomed to the Lord's supper in the apostolic age, is ample proof that such only should now be invited. As faith in Christ was then prerequisite to communion, it must still be prerequisite.

In support of this position we appeal: (3.) To the caution which Paul gave to the Corinthians. "Let a man examine himself, and so let him eat of the bread and drink of the cup," — words which imply the necessity of personal preparation for the ordinance. In what this preparation consisted may be learned from the context. Paul had just spoken of the supper as a memorial of Christ and a proclamation of his vicarious death, adding that "whoever shall eat the bread or drink the cup of the Lord unworthily, shall be guilty of the body and the blood of the Lord"; and soon after, as a reason for self-examination, "he that eateth and drinketh unworthily eateth and drinketh judgment to himself, not discerning the Lord's body." That is to say: Whoever does not appreciate the sacrifice of Christ, and feel his need of it as an atonement for sin, whoever does not receive Christ with love and trust as the source of spiritual life in his soul, is unprepared for the Lord's supper; if he partake, it will be unworthily, not discerning the Lord's body; he will eat and drink judgment to himself. It is not to be supposed that such language as this was uttered by an apostle who deemed it proper for unbelievers to partake of the Lord's supper. Had the Corinthians been taught by Paul, when he was with them, to invite or admit to the communion any persons who were held to be unregenerate and incapable of spiritual discernment, they would have been astonished at the words cited above, and compelled to look upon his teaching by letter as irreconcilable with his teaching by voice.

For these reasons, in brief, we maintain that faith in Christ is prerequisite to communion with him at his table. It would not be difficult to strengthen our argument for this view, but we deem it unnecessary. The treatise of Jonathan Edwards on "The Qualifications for Full Communion," and his "Reply to Mr. Williams," render an elaborate discussion of the point superfluous.[1]

But if churches observing the Lord's supper may invite to this ordinance only those who give to them satisfactory evidence of piety, it is plain that Baptists cannot welcome the members of Episcopal, Lutheran, Unitarian, or Universalist churches, as such, to the communion. For it is well known that persons are freely received into churches of all these denominations who do not profess to have experienced a change of heart. It is known that persons christened in infancy are presumed by many Episcopalians and Lutherans to have been regenerated thereby, and are therefore, at a suitable age, admitted by confirmation to full membership in the church. It is known that views of depravity and regeneration are entertained by Unitarians and Universalists quite unlike those of evangelical Christians, and accordingly that many are received into their fellowship who cannot in the judgment of charity be esteemed pious. Hence Christians who believe in the new birth and reject the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, are unable to regard membership in any of these churches as suitable evidence of piety. They are ready to acknowledge that large numbers of true believers may be found in the four denominations just mentioned,[1] but they cannot look upon the terms of admission to church fellowship in either of them as being suitable tests of piety, nor can they presume that men are real Christians merely because they have borne such tests. The consequences are obvious. It is impossible for Baptists, with their present views of faith in Christ as prerequisite to the Lord's supper, and of the proper fruits and evidences of faith, to invite members of the denominations named above to this ordinance. To do so would be to trample on their firmest convictions of duty, and pay respect to the opinions of men at the sacrifice of loyalty to Christ. They are not, of course, expected or desired by any thoughtful Christian to do this.

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[1] The Works of President Edwards, Vol. I. p. 81, sq. New York: Leavitt and Allen. 1856.

Baptism is the second prerequisite. Only baptized believers are entitled to a place at the Lord's table, and such only can properly be invited to partake. To justify this statement we shall consider: (1.) The relation of the two ordinances to each other as symbols. It is generally admitted, we suppose, that baptism symbolizes the beginning of the new life, and the Lord's supper its furtherance. The former speaks of change from one spiritual condition to another, from moral pollution to moral purity, — putting off the old, putting on the new, — while the latter speaks of growth, progress, power, in a present condition. The one represents a single event, a sudden transition, a consecration of its subject to a new service and master, while the other represents an ever-recurring duty, refreshment, and joy. "For as many of you as have been baptized into Christ have put on Christ;" "*As often* as ye eat this bread and drink this cup, ye do show the Lord's death till he come." The life of faith must be originated before it can be nourished; and an ordinance which represents the inception of this life must naturally precede one which represents its existence and support. In baptism a sinner publicly renounces the service of satan and declares his allegiance to Christ; at the Lord's table he takes his place among the acknowledged friends of Jesus and receives from him the tokens of love and favor. Can there be any doubt as to the order in which these sacred rites should be observed? Shall a rebel appear at the king's table and recline in his bosom before he has solemnly abjured his wickedness and avowed his future loyalty? Shall he be formally recognized as a citizen before he is formally qualified for citizenship? It is plain to us that the import of baptism makes it prerequisite to the communion, that one who neglects or refuses to observe the initiatory ordinance has no right to observe the subsequent ordinance. Salvation, indeed, depends upon neither of them; *fides integra secura est de salute;*[1] yet an orderly observance of these rites is a solemn duty, and a neglect of them grievous disobedience.

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[1] We shall not, of course, be understood as placing these four denominations on a level, either as to the correctness of their theological opinions, or as to the power and purity of their Christian influence.

To justify our statement we may consider: (2.) The practice of Christian churches in the apostolic age. Beginning with the inspired record at the day of Pentecost, and tracing the history of Christians until that record closes, we find no hint of the presence of unbaptized persons at the Lord's table, no intimation that they were ever invited to commune. But we do find that baptism is treated as the first great duty to be performed after exercising faith in Christ, and that the eucharist, if noticed at all, is assigned to a later period. When the multitude cried out on the day of Pentecost: "Men and brethren, what shall we do?" Peter replied: "Repent and be baptized, every one of you"; and "they that gladly received his word were baptized." After this "they continued steadfast in the apostle's doctrine and in fellowship, in breaking of bread and in prayers."

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[1] Tertullian, De Baptismo.

So, too, the people of Samaria, "when they believed Philip, preaching the things concerning the kingdom of God and the name of Jesus Christ, were baptized, both men and women." With equal promptness were the eunuch, and Saul, and Cornelius, Lydia and her household, the jailor and all his, baptized when they had believed. It is said also that "many of the Corinthians, hearing, believed and were baptized."[1] If, then, the history of apostolic labor given in the Acts puts any one point beyond the reach of controversy, it is this: that baptism followed the exercise of faith as its primary and authorized expression. In no case is the Lord's supper put before baptism; in no case does the narrative recognize any interval between faith and baptism to be filled by the Lord's supper; in no case are believers brought into the church and afterwards baptized. The order appears to have been one and the same in every instance, and baptism always preceded the communion. On this point the testimony of the scriptures is univocal; and, if apostolic precedent can be relied upon as a guide to duty, we may be sure that baptism is prerequisite to communion at the Lord's table.

But to this it has been objected that some of the eleven who were present at the institution of the supper, had never been baptized at all; that none of them had received Christian baptism, and hence that Christ, whose example has more authority than the practice of any number of apostolic churches, did not make baptism a term of admission to his table. It will be necessary for us to examine the several points of this objection. And, in the first place, is it reasonable to conclude from the tenor of the gospel narratives that some of the twelve were never baptized? We think not. Two of them at least, and possibly all, had been disciples of John the Baptist prior to their connection with Jesus. When it is remembered that large numbers of the Jews resorted to John for baptism, that he admitted to this privilege those who bore the fruits of repentance, and that he directed their thoughts to a greater one about to appear, even "the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world," it is natural to infer that the most truly religious of the people became his disciples, and that from this class the Saviour chose his personal attendants. And the probability of this inference is strengthened by the promptness with which the latter forsook all and followed Christ. It may, indeed, be supposed that they were drawn to Jesus by a special divine power, which acted without regard to any spiritual preparation in them; but this hypothesis is hardly plausible. John was sent expressly to prepare the way of the Lord; and it may be presumed, in default of any evidence to the contrary, that individuals whose hearts had been prepared by his preaching were selected by our Saviour to be his personal attendants. Again, it appears from the fourth Gospel, that Jesus, by the hands of the twelve, baptized those who became his disciples.[1] And if it was his custom to have his disciples baptized, it may be taken for granted that he did not make the case of his most eminent followers an exception. Those who believe that he did should have positive evidence for their opinion. "Order is heaven's first law"; and surely it must have pervaded the action of him who came down from heaven. If, then, any of the twelve were not baptized by the harbinger of Christ, they doubtless submitted to this rite when they left all to follow Jesus. It may also be worthy of remark, that those first called by him were disciples of John;[2] as such they had been baptized already, and were therefore qualified to administer the ordinance in a regular way to others. The words of Peter, too, when the disciples were about to fill the place made vacant by the death of Judas, may have a bearing on the question before us. "Wherefore, of these men which have companied with us all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out among us, *beginning from the baptism of John* unto that same day that he was taken up from us, must one be ordained to be a witness with us of his resurrection." It is further to be remembered that Christ himself was baptized in order "to fulfil all righteousness." This last expression may have a far deeper sense than some have supposed, but it certainly *includes* a fulfilment of all the rites and duties of religion. And such was the relation of baptism to Christ's work and his people, that it was necessary for him to receive it. But if he himself and his disciples generally were baptized, we must conclude that the twelve also were baptized, previous to the institution of the holy supper. The indexes all point in the same direction, and there are no real grounds on which to rest a different conclusion. If moral evidence is ever satisfactory, it should be in such a case as this.

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[1] Acts ii. 38, sq.; viii. 12, 36, sq.; ix. 18; x. 46, sq.; xviii. 8.

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[1] Jno. iii. 26; iv. 12.

[2] Jno. i. 35, sq.; Luke v. 1, sq.; Mark i. 16, sq.; Matt. iv. 18, sq.

But, in the second place, was John's baptism virtually Christian baptism? This is denied by the objection before us. Christian baptism is supposed to have been first authorized by the Great Commission, and to have been first administered on the day of Pentecost. Hence none of those who were present at the institution of the Lord's supper had received it. We are aware that many distinguished scholars approve this view, but the following reasons constrain us to reject it: The ritual act of baptism was the same before and after the death of Christ, — expressed by the same word, and performed in like circumstances. It is safe, therefore, to conclude that its symbolical import was the same. If it represented the new birth, or purification of soul, when administered by Paul, it probably signified the same when administered by John the Baptist. If the ordinance, as used by John, had not been understood to symbolize an inward change, — the beginning of a new spiritual life, — it could hardly have been adopted by Christ to represent such a change. But we are not left to inference on this point. The qualifications for baptism suggest its meaning as a symbol, and these qualifications were virtually the same before and after the ascension of Christ. "John did baptize in the wilderness and preach the baptism of repentance for the remission of sins." His language was: "Repent ye, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand."

"Bring forth, therefore, fruits meet for repentance." "I indeed baptize you with water unto repentance." And the words of Peter to those who "were pricked in their heart," were: "Repent and be baptized, every one of you, in the name of Jesus Christ, for the remission of sins." Moreover, the Lord himself had said to his disciples: "Thus it is written, and thus it behooved Christ to suffer, and to rise from the dead the third day, and that repentance and remission of sins should be preached, in his name, among all nations." Did the word "repentance" mean one thing in the mouth of John, and another thing in the mouth of Peter? Can any but genuine repentance secure the remission of sins? Or can there be genuine repentance without a radical change of heart, without the new birth, in which the soul begins a life of spiritual obedience? We are conconfident that John insisted upon that "repentance which is unto life, and which needeth not to be repented of," as prerequisite to baptism. Hence, he repulsed the Pharisees and Sadducees, saying: "O generation of vipers, who hath warned you to flee from the wrath to come? Bring forth, therefore, fruits meet for repentance." But this radical change of the moral state, or disposition of the soul, which was required alike and equally by John the Baptist, by Christ himself, and by his chosen apostles, involves every spiritual grace. It can no more exist without faith than memory can exist without thought. Indeed, the virtues of the new life are not simply bound together by strong affinities; they are vitally and inseparably united. Contrition, faith, and love interpenetrate, pervade, and qualify each other. The presence of one is the presence of all, and the absence of one is the absence of all. They are fruits and evidences of regeneration, always in a cluster. But "repentance" is a comprehensive term, signifying, properly, conversion as a spiritual change, and including all the principles of the new life. It is faith, love, contrition, taking the place of unbelief, hatred of God, and hardness of heart. It gives, in one word, the essential condition of baptism. And it is just this renovation of heart which baptism, as a ritual act, symbolizes, — in what way we are not required by our present theme to show. But is not baptism a sacrament, an oath of allegiance and service, and hence the *formula* an important part of the ordinance? How, then, could it signify the same, or virtually the same, when it was simply "unto repentance," and when it was "into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost?" Far be it from us to undervalue the full light of the gospel. We do not claim for those who had true repentance before the day of Pentecost as much knowledge of Christ as was possessed by Christians afterwards. But we do claim that the difference between the former and the latter was a difference of knowledge, and not of spiritual state; that both were accepted servants of God, and believers in the Messiah, and that both were alike *in* the kingdom of God. For the Saviour himself declared: "The law and the prophets were until John; since that time the kingdom of God is preached, and every man presseth into it."[1] The faith of the former class was more general, but not less real, than that of the latter; they were looking and waiting for the Messiah, ready to receive him in all his offices, and they were baptized, not without distinct reference to faith in him when revealed. John verily baptized with the baptism of repentance, saying unto the people, that they should believe on him which should come after him, that is, on Christ Jesus. It is also worthy of note that John taught them to expect, with the Messiah, extraordinary operations of the Spirit: "He shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost." Three topics, then, were the staple of his preaching; namely, repentance toward God, faith in the coming Messiah, and the miraculous agency of the Spirit. How much light he was able to shed on these Christian themes it is not for us to say, but more, certainly, than any earlier prophet. We know, however, that he demanded evidence of a change of heart, — which change prepared the subjects of it to receive the full doctrine of Christ and the Holy Spirit, — as prerequisite to baptism, and that he intimated very distinctly the peculiar office of each. "Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world," and "He shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost." Hence we infer that those disciples whom Paul found at Ephesus had neither been taught nor baptized by John himself, but by some rash follower of his; and especially, as the reason for their re-baptism seems to have been their ignorance of Christ and of the Holy Spirit. Whatever, then, may have been the formula made use of by John in administering baptism, we believe that the ordinance was essentially Christian, and that, as a general rule, those who had received it from him, as well as those who had received it from the disciples of Christ, were admitted, as properly baptized, to Christian churches on and after the day of Pentecost. Many of the "three thousand" were perhaps thus added to the company of avowed Christians in Jerusalem.[1] The wonders of the Pentecost, and the words of Peter, may have fully opened their eyes, for the first time, to the fact that Jesus was indeed the Messiah, and that he was now baptizing his disciples with the Holy Ghost. It may be remarked, further, that Christ himself was baptized by John. Yet he observed the ordinances of the new economy, as well as those of the old, "leaving us an example that we should follow his steps." Says Turretin: "The baptism of Christ should be no other than the baptism of believers, because he is the Head, and believers are the members; because it was proper for him to sanctify the use and sacrament of our baptism by his own; because baptism is a symbol of the unity of believers in one mystical body (Eph. iv. 5), not only with one another, but also with Christ, the Head (1 Cor. xii. 13; Gal. iii. 27); and because his circumcision was identical with the circumcision of the Jews." Locus XIX., Quaestio XVI. But if it were probable, as it is not, that some of the eleven who were present with Christ at the institution of the supper, had never been baptized, we should nevertheless look to subsequent example for light concerning the duties of believers generally. The calling and position of the apostles were extraordinary, and what they were permitted to do in such a case cannot safely be urged as a precedent against what they taught others to do. The uniform practice of believers under their instruction must be held conclusive of their judgment as inspired men upon the question in debate; and this uniform practice, as we have seen, puts baptism before communion at the Lord's table.

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[1] Luke xvi. 16, cf. Matt. xi. 13; Mark i. 1, sq.

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[1] Acts ii. 41. The writer entertains this opinion himself, but is not sure that any of his brethren approve it.

It is to be considered, (3.) That Christians of every name, from the apostolic age to the present, with hardly a dissentient voice, have declared baptism to be a prerequisite to the eucharist. It would be easy to produce ample proof of this statement, but we deem it unnecessary. The only protest worthy of note has been made by a portion of the English Baptists. Moved by a desire to receive all whom Christ has received, they have overlooked the marks of distinction between visible churches on earth and "the general assembly and church of the first-born, which are written in heaven," and have assumed that all who belong to the latter should be welcomed to the highest privileges of the former. Forgetting that Christ has nowhere identified the terms of admission to his favor with the terms of admission to a local church, they have closed their eyes to the example of apostolic believers, and have marred the order and symmetry of the Lord's house. However noble their spirit and purpose, they have placed themselves in a solitary and false position, a position which we think they will ere long abandon, to resume their place with the great body of believers, who maintain that baptism is prerequisite to the Lord's supper.

Our second statement, then, is justified by the symbolical meaning of the two ordinances, by the uniform example of the primitive churches, and by the common judgment of Christendom. But if it is correct, the duty of Baptist churches is obvious. They must welcome to the Lord's table only those whom they suppose to have been baptized.

For if it is evident that no man should expect to be saved at last, unless he believes that he has complied with the terms of salvation, and that no church should endorse and encourage his expectation, unless it shares his belief, or, in other words, is satisfied of his compliance with those terms; it is equally evident that no Christian should deem himself entitled to the communion until he believes that he has complied with the scriptural terms of admission to this ordinance, and that no church should invite him to commune unless it shares his belief, or is satisfied that he has complied with those terms. Hence Baptist churches can invite those only who have been immersed in water on profession of their faith, to partake of the eucharist. Should they welcome to this sacred rite those who were sprinkled on profession of their faith, or those who were merely christened in infancy, they would deliberately trample on what they hold to be the law of Christ; for, while they look upon such persons as still unbaptized, they believe baptism a prerequisite to communion. But it is well known that all other evangelical churches not only make use of sprinkling or pouring instead of immersion, but also administer the rite to infants; it is therefore impossible for Baptists to invite the members of these churches, as such, to the Lord's table. However heartily they may accord to them faith in Christ, the first qualification for communion, — and most heartily, we are confident, they do this, — they are compelled to pronounce them destitute of the second, which is baptism; and, therefore, mindful of the paramount claims of Christ, they refuse to modify or disturb the order of his house. Such is their true position; and the readers of this Article will doubtless recognize it as identical in principle with their own. Yet an opinion prevails to some extent among those who have not duly considered the point, that the act of partaking together of the Lord's supper is a proper sign and test of Christian fellowship, so that the piety of one who is not invited to partake is called in question. This act would indeed be such a test, if piety were recognized as the sole qualification for communion; but not otherwise. If baptism is understood to be also prerequisite, then obviously uniting at the Lord's table is a sign of fellowship in the matter of baptism as well as of piety. The ritual qualification is endorsed no less distinctly than the spiritual. Hence members of the denomination for which we now speak, honor the piety of multitudes whom they cannot invite to the eucharist, and utterly disclaim the use of this ordinance as a sign or test of simply Christian fellowship. Might not this fact be more distinctly acknowledged than it is by some of their assailants? But to proceed:

An orderly church walk is the last prerequisite. None but members of some Christian church, whose "conversation becometh the gospel of Christ" and who "strive together for the faith of the gospel," should be invited to the communion.

In support of this position we remark: (1.) That becoming connected with a Christian church naturally precedes partaking of the eucharist. It has already been shown that baptism is properly the first public act of consecration to God and his service. By submitting to this rite one solemnly avows his faith in the triune God and his purpose to obey him in all things. He takes his place under the banner of Christ, and pledges himself to have no other master. And what next? The great army is made up of companies, one here and another there, and he can have no regular connection with it unless he joins one of these companies, unless he enters a particular church. Uniting with a local church is therefore the immediate sequence and, as it were, the natural counterpart of the baptismal vow. Hence the latter is often called "the door into the church," and membership is supposed to follow it as a matter of course. There are, to be sure, exceptional cases; persons are sometimes converted and baptized when there is no church and when they are unable for a time to become members of one. This was true, we suppose, of the eunuch whom Philip baptized. But such instances do not affect the general rule. It is still true that in all ordinary circumstances church membership follows directly after baptism; certainly it precedes admission to the Lord's table. Besides, it must be borne in mind that partaking of the holy supper is an act to be repeated until the close of life, while uniting with a Christian church is an act to be performed but once, unless a repetition is made necessary by local changes. At what point of time, then, shall the church relation be established? Surely not at the close of one's Christian life and service nor in the middle of that service, but obviously at the beginning of it. No good reason appears for assigning it any other place.

In support of our position we remark: (2.) That the Lord's supper is a church ordinance. It was meant to be observed and administered, not by individual Christians at will, nor by irresponsible companies of believers, but by the churches of Christ as such. This statement is justified by the language of Paul to the Corinthians. "The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ? The bread which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ? Because it is one bread, we, the many, are one body; for we all partake of the one bread." ..... "When ye come together in church, I hear there are schisms among you; and I partly believe it. ..... When, therefore, ye come together in one place, it is not to eat the Lord's supper; for in eating each one takes before another his own supper." ..... "Have ye not houses to eat and to drink in? Or despise ye the church of God, and put to shame them that have not?" ..... "So then, my brethren, when ye come together to eat, wait for one another. If any man is hungry, let him eat at home, that ye come not together to judgment."[1] Several points of great interest are fixed by these words of the apostle:

In the first place, the Corinthian Christians were evidently accustomed to "meet together" in order to observe the Lord's supper. No less than four times within the space of a few verses does Paul connect their coming together in one place with the celebration of the eucharist. This was their custom; there is no hint of any irregularity; it was their uniform practice. Whether they commemorated the death of Christ daily or weekly or monthly, we are not told, but the language cited above makes it certain that they always met together for this service. Indeed, it seems to have been the proper and avowed object of their assembling. Although the way in which some of them partook of the love-feast before the eucharist betokened little respect for the latter, they met professedly, without doubt, to eat not their *own* but the *Lord's* supper. No other view explains the repeated and emphatic manner in which their "coming together" is connected with this ordinance.

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[1] 1 Cor. x. 16, 17; xi. 18, 20, 21, 22, 33, 34.

In the second place, they could not properly observe it without coming together. This is not said, but implied. Many things could be done by Christians separately. "Have ye not houses to eat and to drink in?" "If any man is hungry, let him eat at home." But it does not seem to have entered the apostle's mind that the *Lord's* supper could be eaten at home. No word of his letter intimates the propriety of such an act. There were parties, factions, rivalries, in the church at Corinth. Some were for Paul, some for Apollos, some for Cephas. Selfish and contentious men fomented discord in presence of the speaking emblems. The rich slighted the poor and the poor envied the rich. Their solemn feast had become a grief and a scandal. Was there no group of lowly disciples who met in some upper room to receive with reverent and thankful hearts the memorials of their dying Lord? No church within the church bound together by ties of holy fellowship to observe apart the precious ordinance? Has not Paul, who was so careful to "praise" the Corinthians for their good conduct, spoken of at least one such faithful group? Not a syllable does he breathe of such a company or service. Instead of this, his language firmly points to the whole body of Corinthian believers as presenting themselves at the Lord's table. Fixing his mind on the members of this body, he says: When ye come together in one place, it is not to eat the *Lord's* supper,— your professed, as it should be your real, object,— but, as your conduct shows, it is for each one to eat his *own* supper, which might have been taken at home. Again, being present with them in spirit, he explains in one respect the import of communion: Since the consecrated loaf is one bread, we, the many, are one body; for all of us — *οἱ πάντες* — partake of the one bread. By signifying thus our union with Christ and dependence on him for spiritual life, we signify our union with one another, and the church of many members is represented as one body. According to these passages, the eucharist was observed by the collected church, and no abuses which might attend such an observance of it could justify individuals or families in celebrating it at home.

In the third place, the Christians at Corinth came together "in church" to observe the holy supper. When Paul wrote his first letter to the Corinthians, the word *ἐκκλησία* had already become the appropriate designation for an organized body of Christians. It was either applied to the whole company of believers in every age, or to a local church, as that of Antioch. In the passage before us it must be used in the latter sense; a sense which it generally has in this Epistle. Hence the words *ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ* signify in church form or capacity, and give evidence that the Corinthian believers celebrated the eucharist as a church. This view of their meaning is confirmed by a clause in the context. Rebuking some of his readers for their conduct when together, he says: "Have ye not houses to eat and to drink in? or despise ye the church of God?" In other words: There are two possible explanations of your conduct; either you have no houses in which to take your daily food, or, if you have them and yet feast yourselves in church, you certainly despise *the church of God.* The apostle, be it observed, does not say, "the Christian brethren;" to despise them were indeed a grave offence, but he says, "the church of God," a very different expression; and by it he means "the church of God at Corinth," — an organized, responsible body, entrusted with the duty of exercising discipline, and preserving in their purity the ordinances and worship of Christ's house.[1] It would have been no small sin for the Corinthian Christians to treat each other with disrespect as individuals, but it was a far greater crime for them to despise the order, authority, and good name of the church, — a divine institution and society, responsible under Christ for the conservation and diffusion of his truth until the end of time.

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[1] See 1 Cor. i. 2; vi. 4; x. 32; xi. 16; 2 Cor. i. 1; viii. 1, 18, 19, 23, 24; xi. 8, 28; xii. 13. Also, 1 Cor. v. 4, 5, 11, 12, 13; ii. 6, sq.

Plainly, then, the Lord's supper was observed by the saints in Corinth as a church, and any disorderly or selfish conduct attending it was not only a grief to individuals, but an act of contempt to the church, as such. This appears to be the obvious meaning of Paul's language. Bearing in mind, then, the repeated statement that the Corinthian disciples "came together" to observe the Lord's supper, the clear intimation that they could not observe it properly without coming together, and the plain testimony that they met in "church" to observe it, we feel ourselves authorized to say that they broke bread as a church, and treated the eucharist in all respects as a church ordinance. It is therefore needless to examine further the apostle's words on this point. But it is important to remark that, in no other instance, has an inspired writer spoken at length of the manner of celebrating the eucharist in the primitive churches. If the New Testament anywhere indicates, with special clearness, the practice of those churches planted and trained by the apostles, it is in this passage. Every other reference to their practice is comparatively brief and indistinct. Yet every other reference serves to confirm the view which has been taken of this. One of them reads thus: "And on the first day of the week, when we were assembled to break bread, Paul preached to them, — about to depart on the morrow, — and continued his speech until midnight."[1] To whom did Paul thus preach at Troas? To the members of the Christian church in that city, we reply; and for such reasons as follow: They were deeply interested in the apostle's discourse, listening quietly until midnight. No opposition was raised, no disturbance created; a young man fell asleep during the service. We read of no conversions, no first fruits of the gospel in Troas, as the result of this protracted address. Moreover, the meeting was on the first day of the week, and Paul seems to have tarried seven days, that he might be present. It may, therefore, be presumed that they were accustomed to meet on that day for worship and the breaking of bread. Indeed, every line of the narrative reminds us of an assembly of Christians. Besides, Troas had been visited twice before by the apostle, once on his way, for the first time, to Europe, and again in the period which elapsed between the writing of his first and second letters to the Corinthians. Both these visits were brief, yet not, perhaps, without fruit. Of the first, nothing is said which either warrants or forbids the hypothesis of his making known the gospel to some in that place. Luke appears to have joined him there. Of the second, he thus writes: "When I came to Troas for the gospel of Christ, and a door was opened unto me in the Lord, I had no rest for my spirit, because I found not Titus, my brother; but, taking leave of them, I went forth into Macedonia."[1] Now if there were not previously a church in Troas, this language implies that he preached there long enough, at least, to learn the state of the city, and the attitude of its inhabitants towards the gospel. Some were doubtless converted, and, according to the uniform practice of the apostle, were presently brought together in a church. From these disciples he separated himself with great reluctance, impelled by his anxiety to see Titus, and learn the condition of the church at Corinth. With such hints on record, all conspiring to show that there was a goodly company of the faithful in Troas, we have ample grounds for believing them to have been associated in church order and fellowship, maintaining Christian worship on the Lord's day, and observing the ordinances of the gospel. If they had not been thus united, would Paul have tarried there a full week, and then left them again, without setting in order the things that were wanting, and ordaining elders in that city?[1] It is evident, then, that the apostle broke bread with a Christian church in Troas, and that the narrative of this event by Luke strengthens our argument from the language of Paul in his first letter to the Corinthians. Turning back, now, to the beginning of apostolic labor at Jerusalem, we have another record of similar bearing. With a few words inserted, to bring out the sense more distinctly, it reads thus: "On that day there were added" to the company of Christian disciples "about three thousand souls; and they applied themselves constantly to the teaching of the apostles and the communication" of alms, "the breaking of the" sacramental "bread, and the" social "prayers."[2] These Christians were baptized; they were under the guidance and teaching of the apostles; they met together almost daily for social worship; they provided for their poor with great liberality, and they were living in the same city. Were they not, then, to all intents and purposes, a Christian church, a distinct, organized, responsible body, prepared to act in concert upon all matters of discipline and common interest? If not, when did they become such a body? A community of baptized believers, under common instruction, and united in worship, — what is it but a church of Christ? Indeed, it is expressly called by this name, only a few verses further on. "And the Lord added to to the *church*[3] daily such as should be saved." And after this record of their breaking bread together, they are habitually spoken of as "the church," "the church at Jerusalem."[4] But the Christians at Jerusalem, it may be replied, did not meet together and observe the Lord's supper as a church; for they are described as "breaking bread from house to house." This objection is more plausible than conclusive. For whether the words *κατ᾽ οἶκον* signify "from house to house," or rather "at home," "in private houses," instead of in the temple, no evidence can be gleaned from this expression that the Lord's supper was intended for the use of Christian families, or social circles, as such. The circumstances of the church at Jerusalem were peculiar. Although believers in Christ were suffered to meet with others in the temple for worship, it would have been manifestly improper, if not impossible, for them to celebrate the eucharist there. By so doing they would have been sure to inflame the wrath of the Jews, and make the courts of the Lord's house a theatre of strife and blasphemy. It may be taken for granted, that they could use neither temple nor synagogue for any service distinctly and visibly Christian. Hence, if they wished to act as a separate community, they had to meet in some place of their own. *Meyer* thinks they had a common meeting-house from the first, which is referred to by the words *κατ᾽ οἶκον.* This certainly may have been the case. But if it was not, if they had no one place large enough to receive them all, and therefore met in several places to break bread, — one or two of the apostles presiding over each assembly, — this provisional arrangement might not have caused the holy supper to be esteemed a family or a social rite; it might have existed without violating the principles which were to be plainly expressed by the regular working of the church. The essential points were guarded. Only those who had been baptized, and were walking together in the faith of the gospel, partook of the supper. The emblems were not carried out of the church. They were not used at pleasure by families or groups of brethren. There was oversight, order, harmony, coöperation. In short, we conclude, from the narrative of Luke, that the Lord's supper was observed by the saints in Jerusalem as members of the church.

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[1] Acts xx. 7.

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[1] 2 Cor. ii. 12, 13.

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[1] Acts xiv. 23; Tit. i. 5.

[2] Acts ii. 41, 42. See Professor Hackett's note on this passage.

[3] The words τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ are probably genuine, though wanting in a few of the best manuscripts.

[4] The Scriptural Terms of Admission to the Lord's Supper. By Rev. A. N. Arnold, D.D. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. We take pleasure in referring to the work of Dr. Arnold as an almost perfect statement of the grounds of restricted communion, as practised by the Baptists.

Finally, we come to the institution of the supper by our Saviour himself. Many were the persons in Judea, Galilee,

the day of Pentecost, we find them soon after joining in the celebration of the Lord's supper."[1] And in all these instances of "breaking bread," there are good reasons for supposing the presence and action of a Christian church. It may also be remarked that this ordinance appears to have been restricted uniformly by the early Christians to church members. "This food," says Justin Martyr, "is called among us *εὐχαριστία*; of which no one is allowed to partake who does not believe that what we teach is true, and has not been bathed in the bath (*λουσαμένῳ τὸ . . . . λουτρόν*) for the remission of sins and unto regeneration, and does not live as Christ has enjoined."[2] Three prerequisites are here laid down; namely, faith, baptism, and an orderly walk; and, with few exceptions, Christians of every name, from the apostolic age to the present, have agreed in this matter with the contemporaries of Justin. It seems to us, therefore, unnecessary to say more in support of our third position. In view of the qualification last named, an orderly church walk, the Baptists of this country do not for the most part feel themselves at liberty to invite to the Lord's table those members of other churches whom they look upon as unbaptized. As the eucharist is a church ordinance, they hold that none but members of the church observing it are strictly entitled to partake, and that none can properly be invited to join with them in the service, who could not be welcomed, without change of views, to full membership. They also hold that those who are giving, and pledged to give, the weight of their influence against what is believed by a church to be essential in doctrine and practice, cannot properly be received into its fellowship. If admitted, they would sow the seeds of dissension and thus prove themselves "heretics" in the primitive sense of the term. By receiving them the church would pull down with one hand what it is holding up with the other. Thus those members of Pedo-baptist churches to whom we now refer, do steadily affirm and teach by their ecclesiastical position that infant sprinkling is in effect Christian baptism, or else that baptism is not prerequisite to full membership and an orderly walk in a Christian church. In either case they throw the whole weight of their example against the doctrine of believer's baptism, a doctrine which in the judgment of Baptists is essential to Christian obedience as well as to the perfect organization and highest purity of the church. How, then, can their church walk be endorsed by the latter as orderly? Is it believed to be so? Were the members of any Baptist church to act as decisively in some other way, against this doctrine, would they not be esteemed by their brethren subverters of the truth and originators of division? And, the church being right in its doctrine, ought it not to withdraw its fellowship from them as walking disorderly and not after the gospel? "Now I beseech you, brethren," says Paul to the Romans, "mark them which cause divisions and offences contrary to the doctrine which ye have learned, and avoid them."[1] But if a Baptist church ought to withdraw the hand of fellowship from those who set themselves firmly against the duty of obeying what it deems a plain command of Christ, has it a right to offer this hand to the same persons as soon as they are united with another church, or to any persons who assail persistently the duty in question? But one reply is possible. If communion at the Lord's table were a sign of Christian fellowship merely, the case would be entirely different; Baptists would then gladly invite all who give evidence of piety to partake with them. But such a sign it can never be while, besides faith, baptism and an orderly church walk are the scriptural terms of admission to the Lord's supper.

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[1] Dr. Arnold, Terms of Admission, etc., p. 39.

[2] Apol. I. c. 66.

Before closing this discussion it is proper to remark that several Baptist ministers and churches in this country do not insist upon the third qualification named by us. Believing that faith and baptism are the only prerequisites to communion laid down in the New Testament, they feel themselves at liberty to invite all baptized believers to partake with them of the sacred emblems. Our reasons for rejecting their view and practice have been already given; for the brethren themselves, however, we cherish the highest esteem.

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[1] Rom. xvi. 17. Comp. Tit. iii. 10; Gal. v. 12; 1 Cor. i. 10.

From what has been said it appears that the principles which require Baptist churches to limit their invitation to the Lord's supper to Christians of their own faith and order, are identical with those which determine the action of other evangelical churches in this matter. Hence we cannot perceive the fitness of calling their practice "close communion." In principle it is as open as that of most orthodox churches; as open as the New Testament allows them to make it. We freely admit that it is "restricted"; and so it must continue to be while the example of apostolic Christians and the authority of inspired men retain their hold on the conscience; but we see no good reason for pronouncing it "close."

In reality, the great question between other denominations and the one for which we have endeavored to speak, relates to the subjects and the rite of baptism. A more careful examination of this question may, perhaps, in time, by the blessing of God, bring together those who now differ; and if it does, whether by a change of belief on the part of Baptists or by a change on the part of Pedo-baptists, the former will be relieved of a duty, the performance of which occasions them far more sorrow than it does others,—the duty of restricting their invitation to the eucharist to members of Baptist churches. Such a "consummation is devoutly to be wished." May God hasten it by revealing his truth to all who love our Lord Jesus Christ! Then shall we rejoice, not only in Christian fellowship, but also in sacramental fellowship.

ARTICLE VI.

THE IMPRECATORY PSALMS, VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE SOUTHERN REBELLION.

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Those scriptures have been called imprecatory which contain a request, or intimate a wish or even willingness that moral agents be chastised or punished; and also those which express gratitude for the past afflictive event, or even submission to it.[1] Many an amiable Christian reads some of these scriptures with a half-closed eye. The Imprecatory Psalms, in a special manner, are thought to be ill suited for modern times. They may have had their use as a war-trumpet in the shock of an ancient battle, when the soldiers of Israel were not ripe for gentler words; but it is imagined that we are to look upon them now as we gaze at the helmets and coats of mail which are hung up in the museum of antiquities. There are crises in life, however, which bring out the hidden uses of such parts of the Bible as had seemed to be antiquated. Since the commencement of the present rebellion, the Imprecatory Psalms have gained a new meaning in the view of men who had been wont to regard them as unchristian. Now the red planet Mars, which had been unnoticed in our horizon, has reappeared. The lost hymns have been found again. It is a new proof of the inspiration of the Bible, that so many of its forgotten teachings have been commended to our regard by the martial scenes of the day. The present occasion, therefore, appears to be a suitable one for considering the Imprecatory Psalms. And the design of the present Essay is to examine, first, some of the reasons why these Psalms are often condemned as adverse to the spirit of Christianity; and, secondly, some of the ethical principles which these Psalms illustrate.

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[1] Even such passages as the following have been classed under the general name of Imprecatory: Psalm iii. 7; ix. 2-4; xviii. 37-43; xxi. 7-11; xxxvii. 12-15; lii. 5-7; lxiii. 9-11; lxiv. 7-9; cxxxv. 8-12.

On the first topic I remark, in the first place, that we are often inclined to condemn the Imprecatory Psalms, because we overlook the benevolent temper which characterized the writers of the Old Testament, and which was eminently conspicuous in David, the author of the sternest songs. Far too frequently do we fail to recognize that kindly spirit which pervades the Hebrew scriptures, and in harmony with which we ought to interpret the imprecations. When we inquire into the design of some appalling threat, we must keep in view that symbol of a humane temper which is found in the Levitical prescription: "If a bird's nest chance to be before thee in the way in any tree, or on the ground, whether they be young ones, or eggs, and the dam sitting upon the young, or upon the eggs, thou shalt not take the dam with the young: But thou shalt in any wise let the dam go, and take the young to thee; that it may be well with thee, and that thou mayest prolong thy days."[1] If men have an enemy, and they behold one of his cattle going astray, or lying down under a too heavy weight, the Mosaic law forbids them to take advantage of him, although he be their enemy, and it commands them to drive back to him his straying ox, and to help the animal that is overburdened.[2] The Christian scriptures quote some of their most touching rules of benevolence from the Levitical code. It prescribes: "Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thine heart; thou shalt not avenge, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, *but thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.*"[3] The Proverbs of the Jewish nation declare: "Rejoice not when thine enemy falleth, lest the Lord see it, and it displease him."[4] "Say not, I will do so to him as he hath done to me."[5]

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[1] Deut. xxii. 6, 7.
[2] Ex. xxiii. 4, 5.
[3] Lev. xix. 17, 18.
[4] Prov. xxiv. 17, 18.
[5] Prov. xxiv. 29. See also, Prov. xxv. 21; xxvi. 21, 22; Job xxxi. 29

As we ought to associate the Imprecatory Psalms with the humane spirit of the school from which they emanated, so we ought to interpret them in harmony with the generous temper of David, to whom we ascribe some, and the severest, of them. If his character had been savage, we should be less clearly authorized than now in ascribing a benevolent spirit to his words. By no means do we deny that he committed many grievous offences against the rules of charity; but his lamentation over his bitter foe is of itself a touching proof that in his general character he was clement beyond his times.[1] "Thou art more righteous than I," was the confession made to him by Saul, "for thou hast rewarded me good, whereas I have rewarded thee evil."[2] It may have been in allusion to his forgiving spirit towards this malicious king and his courtiers, that David sung:

> "Yet my prayer also shall be in their evil doings:
> When their judges were set free in rocky places
> They heard my words; *for they were sweet.*"
>
> "They rewarded me evil for good,
> My soul is orphaned.
> But as for me,
> When they were sick my clothing was sackcloth:
> I afflicted my soul with fasting;
> And my prayer returned into mine own bosom.
> [i. e. I fell on my knees and inclined my head to the ground, as in 1 Kings xviii. 42.]
> I behaved myself as though he had been my friend or brother.
> I bowed down heavily as though he had been my mother."[3]

Commentators have noticed the contrast between Prov. xx. 22, "Say not thou, I will recompense evil," etc., and Psalm xli. 10, "Raise me up, that I may requite them," my enemies. But the general spirit of kindness pervading the Old Testament may allow us to interpret the seemingly harsh phrase by the obviously benevolent one. See note on Psalm xli. 10, under the second head of the second division of this Essay.

[1] See 2 Sam. i. 19–27. See also 1 Sam. xxiv. 5; 2 Sam. xvi. 10.

[2] 1 Sam. xxiv. 2–22.

[3] Psalm cxli. 5, 6; xxxv. 12–14. See also Psalm xxxviii. 20; cix. 4, 5. Throughout this Essay the rhythmical quotations of the Psalms are generally taken from Mombert's Translation of Tholuck's Commentary.

But why need we expatiate on the kindly temper of the Old Testament, when its entire system of sacrifices for sin was a symbol of atoning love, and one of the clearest expositors of those sacrificial offerings was the poet, warrior, and monarch who has been most frequently censured for the severe songs?

In the second place, we are apt to condemn the Imprecatory Psalms, because we often fail to recognize the sentiments of justice which are breathed forth by the New Testament writers, and particularly by Christ himself. The old covenant would not have been so often denounced, if it had been seen to be harmonious with the new. The gospel is thought to be a synonyme for mere gentleness. "Thy money perish with thee," said Peter to the sorcerer.[1] "God shall smite thee, thou whited wall," said the chief of the apostles to the high-priest.[2] And if this expression be deemed a hasty one, he said at his leisure: "Beware of dogs, beware of evil workers, beware of the concision;"[3] and again: "I would they were even cut off which trouble you;"[4] and still again, in a style like that of the condemned Psalms: "Alexander the coppersmith did me much evil; the Lord reward him according to his works."[5] We shall have repeated occasion in the progress of this Essay, to quote similar imprecatory words from the apostle John. He even portrays the martyrs as crying "with a loud voice, and saying: "How long, O Lord, holy and true, dost thou not judge and avenge our blood on them that dwell on the earth!"[6] Indeed, the general spirit of the New Testament overawes us by its references to God as a "consuming fire,"[7] into whose hands "it is dreadful to fall,"[8] for "He that despised Moses's law died without mercy under two or three witnesses: of how much sorer punishment suppose ye shall he be thought worthy who hath trodden under foot the Son of God?"[1]

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[1] Acts viii. 20.

[2] Acts xxiii. 3.

[3] Phillip. iii. 2.

[4] Gal. v. 12.

[5] 2 Tim. iv. 14. See also Gal. i. 8, 9, "Let him be accursed."

[6] Rev. vi. 10. See also Rev. xviii. 20–24; xix. 1–8.

[7] Heb. xii. 29.

[8] Heb x. 31.

As the ancestor of Christ is sometimes thought to have been devoid of kindly feelings, so the Son of David is sometimes thought to have been destitute of sternness. He has been regarded as the antipode, rather than the antitype of the Psalmist. But we are told that in the synagogue on the Sabbath, he "looked round about on them [the Pharisees] with anger."[2] "Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites;" "ye blind guides;" "ye fools and blind;" "fill ye up, then, the measure of your fathers;" "ye serpents, ye generation of vipers, how can ye escape the damnation of hell?"[3] — such words as these betray a spirit as rigorous against evil as can be found in the Hebrew scriptures. The New Testament quotes in different forms, and in six different instances, one of the most terrific appeals of the Old Testament: "Hear ye indeed, but understand not. Make the heart of this people fat, and make their ears heavy, lest they convert and be healed." In two of these instances the New Testament represents these words as quoted by the Saviour himself, and John declares: "These things said Esaias when he saw *his* [the Saviour's] glory, and spake of *him*."[4] It also deserves a special consideration that the sixty-ninth Psalm, one of the most terrific of all the Imprecatory Songs, is frequently connected in the New Testament with the history of Christ. Compare the ninth verse with John ii. 17; the twenty-fifth verse with Matthew xxiii. 38, also with Acts i. 20; the twenty-second and twenty-third verses with Romans xi. 9, 10; and especially the twenty-first verse with Matthew xxvii. 34, 48; Mark xv. 23, 36; Luke xxiii. 36; John xix. 29, 30. Perhaps there can be no better justification of the spirit pervading the Imprecatory

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[1] Heb. x. 27, 28, 29; also xii. 25. See likewise, Matt. xxi. 41; xxii. 7; xxiv. 51; Rom. ii. 5; James v. 3, et al.

[2] Matt. iii. 5.

[3] Matt. xxiii. 13, 16, 19, 32, 33. See also Matt. xi. 20–24.

[4] See Isa. vi. 9, 10; Matt. xiii. 13–15; Mark iv. 12; Luke viii. 10; John xii 40; Acts xxviii. 26, 27; Rom. xi. 8.

Psalms, than is found in the *immediate collocation* of a verse which we at once refer to our Saviour, with other verses which he and his apostles quote, and thus endorse, although they are among the sternest in the Bible:

> "*They give me also gall for my meat;*
> *And in my thirst they give me vinegar to drink.*
> Let their table become a snare before them:
> And when they think themselves in peace, let it become a trap:
> Let their eyes be darkened that they see not,
> And make their loins continually to shake.
> Pour out thine indignation upon them,
> And let thy wrathful anger take hold of them."[1]

But why need we enlarge on the fact that the gospels and epistles are pervaded by the spirit of justice, since the entire doctrine of the atonement is an expression of the divine purpose to punish sin? When, therefore, it is objected that the Old Testament is rigorous, we reply: It is essentially no more rigorous than the New. When it is objected that David was stern, we reply: The Son of David was stern. When it is objected that both the Jewish and the Christian scriptures are clouded over with imprecations, we reply: These clouds are irradiated with a bow of promise. The severity of Jehovah is explained by his mercy, as this is revealed by Moses and the prophets not less really than by Christ and the apostles.

In the third place, we are apt to condemn the Imprecatory Psalms because we are inclined to overlook the peculiar genius of their authors. More or less clandestinely we are wont to interpret an ancient and an oriental poet, as we would interpret a modern and occidental essayist. The eastern minstrel employs intense words for saying what the western logician would say in tame language. The fervid oriental would turn from our modifying phrases in sickness of heart. We shudder at the lofty flights which captivate him. But he and we mean to express the same idea. The occidental philosopher has a definite thought when he affirms, that God exercises benevolence toward good men. Isaiah has essentially the same thought when he cries out: "As the bridegroom rejoiceth over the bride, so shall thy God rejoice over thee."[1] The terms of endearment which the old Hebrews ascribe to Jehovah, appear undignified to men like David Hume. Biblical figures, when introduced into our songs of Zion, are condemned by some critics as too amatory. But our less erotic phrases would have been despised as ungrateful and unfeeling, by the ardent Hebrews.

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[1] Psalm lxix. 22, sq. De Wette says (Com. ü. Ps. s. 400), that the *Jewish* religion could not inspire different sentiments from these, and that the *Christian* religion was the *first* which cultivated a love toward all men. Is it not singular, then, that the New Testament so often cites, and never censures, the sixty-ninth Psalm?

Now why should we not remember that as the affectionate words of the Old Testament are more intense than an American philosopher would adopt, so the denunciatory words are more unqualified than he would select? Why should we forget that the sensitive orientals would feel chilled by the calculating, reserved style in which we indicate our abhorrence of vice? If the lion were the painter, how should we be portrayed? On the other hand, we are not prepared by temperament or by education for the rank luxuriance of their style in reprimanding vice. Yet they and we mean to express essentially the same idea. We are roused by their unmodified figures to reconsider and to feel anew the *force* of our idea. The western philosophers clothe an exact thought in the precise words: "Good men will rejoice when they see virtue triumphant, even if its prosperity be attended with the just and needed sufferings of the vicious." The Hebrew poet is inflamed with this thought, and he sings:

"The righteous shall rejoice when he seeth the vengeance:
He shall wash his feet in the blood of the wicked."

"The Lord said: I will bring again from Bashan,
I will bring my people again from the depths of the sea,

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[1] Isa. lxii. 5.

> That thy foot may be dipped in the blood of thine enemies,
> And the tongue of thy dogs in the same."[1]

This is a bright painting. It is to be criticised as such. The divine justice is the principal figure. The bathing of the foot, the tongue of the dog, belong to the drapery around the figure. If we ascribe these fringes of the drapery to malice in the painter, we must ascribe Isaiah's rapturous expressions of the divine love to amativeness in the prophet. But such a criticism is against the artistic rules. They allow us to use bold coloring, but not to prolong our gaze upon it. They require us to move quickly from the signs which are seen, to the truth which is not seen. If we stay our thoughts upon the covering, we lose the substance which is covered up. In Raphael's fresco paintings of the night we find the lizard, and the bat, and the snail, and the hedge-hog, but these only set off the main figures, and help to produce the main impression, which is one of serenity and repose. In all the oriental poems, which are pictures, we must be guided by the same principle of criticism. Here and there a symbol may be terrific. We are to look at once from the sign to the thing signified. That thing inspires us with awe. A coiled snake represents eternity. Our danger is that we linger on the snake, that we dissect it, count its fangs, analyze its venom. If our minds would rapidly dart from the image to the idea indicated by it, we should not be repelled by the outward form so much as edified by the inward sentiment. It is, for example, a fact as obvious in modern as it was in ancient days, that the effects of a crime extend to all the relatives of the criminal. This injurious influence results from a law of our mental, moral, social constitution. The western logicians will state it cautiously, guarding it against misconstruction, marking out its metes and bounds, modifying, adjusting, defending it. The inspired poet will not seem to recognize its liability to be misunderstood. Innocent himself, he will not appear to suspect others of guilt. All the cruelties of battle he will look straight through, in order to fasten his gaze upon the law of God expressed in Exodus xx. 5. He will paint in bold colors the barbarous usages of his day, without endorsing anything but the providence of God in tolerating them. He will not explain or qualify his word, but let it stand and let it strike. Of the Edomites he sings:

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[1] Psalm lviii. 10; lxviii. 22, 23.

> "Their infants shall be dashed in pieces before their eyes:
> Their houses shall be plundered, and their wives ravished."[1]

It is the justice of God, it is not the ruthlessness of men; it is the grand intent of the Lawgiver, his final, benevolent aim, it is not the petty annoyances of the executioners whom he appoints; it is the predominant right, it is not the incidental wrong to which the prophet looks. He is courageous, resolute, rapid in portraying the divine justice, and is not called at that moment to describe also the divine mercy. This mercy is too well known to need a representation just here. A mother has been heard to express even joy in the fact that her child was suffering an acute pain. Her joy, however, was in the phenomenon not as *pain*, but as a *sign* of the child's cure from an alarming malady. She made no distinction in her language between pain as an *evil*, and pain as *a premonitory symptom* of good.

A fourth reason, partly involved in the preceding, yet claiming an independent notice, why the Imprecatory Psalms are often condemned, is that we are apt to regard *them* as *teaching* some proposition which *we infer* from them; and the incidental fact which we think to be involved in them we exalt above the grand aim which they obviously propose for themselves. The fervid expressions of feeling which relate to a single idea, may seem to imply several truths or several errors; but the impassioned orator, when he gave vent to those expressions, did not mean to include the several truths or errors. He meant to utter one idea; his mind was absorbed with the one idea, and all the other suggestions ascribed to him by ourselves were merely intended by him to set off that one idea, or perhaps were not intended for anything at all, were not even thought of, either as true or false. On the eve of a sanguinary battle we may pray for the discomfiture of rebels who are warring in an evil cause. But we do not pray for their eternal ruin. "Do you believe that if they are discomfited they will be punished forever"? When this question is proposed to us we are startled. We had not thought of it. We do, perhaps, believe or fear that some of our adversaries will receive an everlasting punishment; still this was not the object of our prayer. "But ought you not to have thought of it"? We need not have thought of it *as an event to be prayed for.* "Still, ought you not to have thought of it as an object to be prayed against"? Perhaps not. Perhaps we could not. Perhaps the idea of the present duty in time must have excluded the idea of the retributions in eternity. Besides, ought or ought not, as a matter of fact we did not think of it, and our prayer should not be interpreted as if we did. We must look at facts as they *are*, not as they *might be.*

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[1] Isa. xiii. 16, Henderson's Translation. This is a prediction of the same evil mentioned by the writer of Psalm cxxxvii. 8, 9; see pp. 198, 9 of this Essay. For other instances of the same practice in war, see 2 Kings viii. 12; Hos. x. 14; Zech. xiv. 2; Joel xiii. 16; Nah. iii. 10.

Now the language of the Bible must be explained according to the laws of ordinary speech. When the fervid Psalmist is entreating for the overthrow of his enemies, he is sometimes represented as interceding for their eternal pain. We need not here discuss the question, whether any of his prayers have any kind of reference to the unending ruin of his foes. It is enough to say now that, so far as his *entreaties* are concerned, they may be explained as having reference to the temporal discomfiture of men who were nuisances to society. The disappointment of intriguers who would lay waste the heritage of God, — this was the burden of his supplications. "The zeal of thy house hath eaten me up," he might have exclaimed in regard to some of his phrases. Absorbed with the hope of defeating in this world the plan of his own and of God's enemies, he does pray:

> "Give them according to their deeds,
> And according to the wickedness of their endeavors:
> Give them after the work of their hands;
> Render to them their desert."[1]

If these words had been represented as uttered at the day of judgment, they would point to the eternal retributions then to be awarded. But the context proves that the author of these words is not meditating, like an observer of the comprehensive and complete moral government of God, upon the everlasting penalty which God sees to be needful for the honor of his government through all worlds; but the Psalmist is meditating, like an injured member of society, on the civil chastisements which are needed for the support of the Jewish civil and ecclesiastical law. He is aiming his *desires* at those remedial measures which may benefit himself, and his nation, and his church. His *words* may seem to fly beyond this mark, and to be aimed at those eternal retributions by which the Most High secures the eternal welfare of angels and other orders of intelligences. We are not to interpret the Psalmist's words, however, according to the power which they may have *possibly*, but according to the spirit which is breathed by their author *generally*. We read in our version:[2] "Of thy mercy *cut off* mine enemies, and *destroy* all them that afflict my soul." We read in the Syriac version of the same passage: "Of thy mercy *put to silence* them that hate me, and *destroy* the enemies of my soul." This parallelism indicates that the Psalmist is praying for the discomfiture of his adversaries so far forth as they are *injurious*, not so far forth as they are ill-deserving in the view of Him who judges the hidden and intrinsic wickedness of the heart. We read in our version:[3] "In the name of the Lord *I will destroy* them" [all nations]. We read in the Syriac version of the same passage: "In the name of the Lord *have I destroyed them*." Such words prove that the Psalmist is speaking of *combinations* formed by wicked men, and annihilated by himself; of *leagues* entered into by the ungodly, and utterly extinguished by himself. He is not speaking of the individual soul which *he* has consigned to the punishment deserved for its inward, secret transgressions. He prays that his enemies may be "destroyed," *so that he may be delivered out of great trouble;* not so that God's justice may be satisfied in their everlasting remorse.[1] He does, indeed, ask that the foe may be "troubled *forever;*"[2] but we must bear in mind that he also says: "I will dwell in the house of the Lord *forever;*"[3] and "Holiness becometh thine house *forever.*"[4] When a band of rebels has been defeated utterly, it may be said to endure an *everlasting* discomfiture. The foe is ruined forever, when his schemes are frustrated so that they will never be revived. "Destroy thou them, O God;" this was the supplication. But the suppliant was thinking of the natural and spiritual good to be attained in this world, and not of the governmental advantage to be attained in other worlds by this chastisement; for he adds: "Let all those that put their trust in thee rejoice, *because thou protectest them.*"[5] "Consume them in wrath, consume them that they may not be;" this is the prayer, and, viewed by itself, it seems to portend the utmost extremity of punishment; but immediately before it we read: "*Slay them not,*" and immediately after it we read: "Let them know that God ruleth in Jacob; *and at evening let them return,*" etc.[6]

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[1] Psalm xxviii. 4.

[2] Psalm cxliii. 12. See Oliver's Translation of the Syriac Psalter.

[3] Psalm cxvii. 10, 11, 12.

If we ascribe such verses to a desire in their author that his foes be punished without end, we may bring a similar charge against all those philanthropists who pray for the detection of a murderer, and for the infliction of that *conclusive* penalty upon him which will save the State from his malign influence. The fact that such a penalty may result in his unending woe, does not prevent the peace-loving citizens from offering their prayer. The fact that Professor Webster deserved a punishment in another world, should not have prevented the magistrates from inflicting on him the penalty which he deserved in this world. As the agony of the patient is not the end for which the physician applies to him the moxa, so the eternal punishment of the criminal is not the end for which the philanthropists desire his capital punishment.

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[1] Psalm cxliv. 6, 7.

[2] Psalm lxxxiii. 17, compared with v. 16: "*that they may seek thy name.*"

[3] Psalm xxiii. 6.

[4] Psalm xciii. 5.

[5] Psalm v. 10.

[6] Psalm lix. 11–14.

In the fifth place, the Imprecatory Psalms are often condemned because their inspiration is overlooked. When it is *revealed* to men that a particular sinner has been abandoned by Jehovah, they have a right to adopt such a mode of speech with regard to the reprobated one, as we have no right to *originate* in reference to a sinner whom we may simply *conjecture* to have been thus abandoned. We may not devise for ourselves a peculiarity of style, which may yet be fitly prescribed by heavenly wisdom for other penmen. In our present relations it would be inappropriate for us to invent a method of threatening, which men who "spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost," employed in relations unlike our own. If we are not inspired to know that our enemies have been judicially given up of God, and if we are not inspired to offer a prayer in opposition to the forsaken ones, then we are in circumstances so dissimilar to those of David that, if we should originate *words* like his, the *meaning* of them would be different from his. The simple fact that he speaks as a supernatural representative of the All-wise Judge, interprets his phrases as phrases cannot be interpreted which are devised by an uninspired man.

It is often asked: Why did not the Psalmist pray that his enemies may be *converted*, rather than "be confounded and put to shame," "turned back and brought to confusion"?[1] We answer: In some instances, it may have been revealed to him that his foes were not to be converted. But why did he not express his sympathy for them? We reply: It may have been revealed to him, that indignation was more appropriate than compassion, *at that time.* It is right to be indignant. It is right to be sympathetic. It is right to praise the justice of God. It is right to praise his mercy. If he inspire his friends to express his indignation in a day when his general atonement is not fully revealed, we are not warranted by that fact to invent a similar style of expressing his indignation, when Christ has thrown open for the Gentile as well as the Jew a wide door of promise. The truth expressed in the Imprecatory Psalms is eternal. The sentiment which they breathe was holiness once. It is holiness now. It will be holiness forever. But a holy sentiment is one thing. A sentiment appropriate to peculiar circumstances is a different thing. The style in which that sentiment may be expressed is different still. To condemn inspired men because they wrote in a method not in all respects conformed to the method of uninspired men, is as idle as it would be to arraign Jehovah because he governs his universe in a mode not exactly conformed to our mode of governing a small household.[1]

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[1] Psalm xxxv. 4.

In the sixth place, the Imprecatory Psalms are often condemned because it is imagined that all of them must be explained on one and the same principle. It is forgotten that there may be different grounds on which different songs and *different parts of the same song* are justifiable; and a statement which will prove some one verse of a Psalm to be correct, will not apply to some other. One of the prophets, giving a pictorial view of Jehovah's wrath against Idumaea, reconciles us to it by intermingling a sketch of Jehovah's compassion for the innocent who suffer with the guilty:

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[1] Calvin, on Psalm cix. 6, remarks: "I know a lady in France who hired a parcel of these [Franciscan] friars to curse her own and only son in these words. But I return to David, who, free from all inordinate passion, breathed forth his prayers under the influence of the Holy Spirit." On verse 12 Calvin says: "David is not rashly excited by any personal anguish to speak in this manner; but it is as God's messenger he declares the punishment which was impending over the ungodly." On verse 20 Calvin adds: "David did not rashly or unadvisedly utter curses against his enemies, but strictly adhered to what the Spirit dictated."

> "Leave thy orphans, I will preserve them,
> And let thy widows confide in me."[1]

But it is very certain that this particular development of mercy amid chastisements, is not given in those scriptures which represent the influence of sin as moving upward to parents, downward to children, and laterally to other relatives. This verse of Jeremiah would seem to contradict several verses of other prophets,[2] if they all had reference to the same chastisement, *viewed in the same relation.*

While some parts of the Psalms may be explained on the hypothesis that their authors had received a revelation of the judicial abandonment of their enemy, other parts may be explained on the hypothesis that their threatenings were uttered with a tacit condition. It is not the way of poets to stop their song and stipulate express conditions. Sometimes they do so, however; and often where the condition is not formally laid down, it may be silently understood. Woes may be imprecated on the transgressor, *if he remain obdurate;* and the spirit of the following verses may be supposed to breathe through various Psalms which do not give vent to it in words:

> "Oh, let the wickedness of the wicked come to an end! —
> God is angry with the wicked every day.
> *If he* [the enemy] *turn not*, he [God] will whet his sword.
> He hath bent his bow and made it ready."[3]

Some of the Psalms imprecate evil on the Jews themselves, for whom an atonement had been revealed. These Psalms cannot be explained in the same way with those which imprecate evil on the Gentiles,[1] for whom the general atonement had not been distinctly made known. The feelings of the Psalmist in regard to them may have resembled our feelings in regard to the lost spirits. But why was it not clearly disclosed that the atonement was to be made for Gentiles as well as Jews? This query is often proposed, and is like another as often suggested: Why did not the Old Testament distinctly recommend all the humanizing usages of modern warfare, and all the refining influences of Christian civilization? These inquiries belong to the same genus with the following: Why did not Christ appear on the earth centuries before he deemed it wise to appear? Why was not the world created ages before God saw fit to call it into being? Why did Jehovah admit any evil into his universe?

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[1] Jer. xlix. 11, Henderson's Translation.

[2] See the citations on page 173.

[3] Psalm vii. 9, 11, 12. The twelfth and thirteenth verses are probably an indirect quotation from Deut. xxxii. 41, 42. Other imprecatory passages in the Psalms are quotations from the Prophets. This fact qualifies their severity.

Other reasons may be assigned for the complaints against the Imprecatory Psalms, but let us proceed, in the second place, to consider some of the ethical principles which are illustrated by these Psalms.

First, the Imprecatory Songs throw light on the fact that there are times when a man, as a single individual, and for his own personal advantage, should not resist his enemies, and still may resist them as he is identified with the public and in union with God. No benefit may flow to the community from the redress of our private grievances, as such. Other men appear to gain as much as we lose; and if we attempt to rectify the wrong, others must part with what we acquire, and the sum total of suffering is not lessened. At such times we may "take joyfully the spoiling of our goods." But there are emergencies when we are sure that if one member of the body politic suffer unredressed, all the members will receive more harm than good; and what a man should not do to recover his rights as he is a mere individual, he should do to recover them as he is interlocked with the community. He is a single link in the chain. As one link, containing so many ounces of metal, he is of inferior worth; but as "a tenth or ten-thousandth" part of the chain, he is essential to its integrity. One wheel or one band in a complicated apparatus may be of little value, when viewed as so much iron or so much leather; but if the wheel be broken or the band cut, the entire machinery must lie idle. An injured citizen may shrink from the annoyance of a law-suit. It will cost him time and trouble, and bring him neither fame nor money. But it may be needful for the future quiet and safety of the town; therefore he plunges into the public trial with a clear view of the vexation coming from it to himself, and the ultimate security coming from it to the neighborhood.

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[1] De Wette often reasons (see Com. ü. Ps. s. 400) as if *all* the imprecations were directed against the *heathen*.

He who promotes the welfare of other men, advances also the glory of God. He who wrongs other men, wrongs their Maker. They are images of their author, and God is dishonored when his likeness is tarnished. To resist our foes, then, not because they are injurious to ourselves alone, but also because they are injurious to the public, is to resist them because they are enemies to Jehovah. God opposes them as malefactors to society; we should oppose them as he does. If he prefers to pardon his enemies, he has a wise reason for his preference; we should entertain a choice the image of his. And on the same principle, if he prefers to afflict his enemies, the circumstance that they happen to be *our* enemies also should not prevent our entertaining a choice the image of his. He has a solid ground for all that he intends in causing pain or pleasure; we must either have a feeling in the likeness of his benevolence when he afflicts men, or at war with it, or neutral. Man a neutral, when the contest is between a loving father on the one hand, and mischievous children on the other! Man a neutral, when the strife is between an unbounded benevolence and a narrow selfishness! The inspired Psalmist would scorn such a neutrality. He looks above the details of the combat, and seizes on the great principle of it. "For," he sings:[1]

> "For lo, *Thine* enemies make a tumult;
> And they that hate *Thee* have lifted up the head.
> They have taken crafty counsel against *Thy* people,
> And consulted against *Thy* hidden ones.
> They have said: 'Come, and let us cut them off from being a nation;
> That the name of Israel may be no more in remembrance.'
> For they have consulted together with one consent;
> They are confederate against *Thee*."

Therefore,

> "O my God, make them like a wheel (or whirlwind):
> As the stubble before the wind.
> As the fire burneth a wood,
> And as the flame setteth the mountains on fire,
> So persecute them with thy tempest,
> And make them afraid with thy storm.
> Fill their faces with shame,
> *That they may seek thy name, O Lord.*
> Let them be confounded and troubled forever;
> Yea, let them be put to shame, and perish.
> *That men may know that Thou*, whose name alone is Jehovah,
> *Art the Most High* over all the earth."

That one phrase, "*confederate against Thee*," has suggested to many American Christians the crime of those States which are now "confederate" against our Union. *If we have the temper of the old Jewish songs* we go forth to battle against these States, not in order to secure our personal welfare or any sectional emolument; not in order to preserve our Union as a mere secular empire; but to preserve it as an asylum for the oppressed throughout the world; as the model of a republic to be imitated in other lands; as the embodiment of liberal principles that make the intellect more energetic, the conscience more exact, the affections more generous, the will more resolute. We believe that our national Constitution is fitted to quicken the growth of a real manhood, to enlarge the compass of a pure church, to discipline the virtuous citizen for an ampler reward in heaven than he would reach if he were not trained to think for himself, to govern himself, to develop his own powers, to worship his Maker according to his own conscience. Therefore we station our blockading squadrons at every sea-port, and the mouth of every river; our cavalry and infantry at every highway and railway, where we can prevent the transit of food which may strengthen our foes for their battles. In laying this embargo upon the commerce of the rebels we are not vindictive, *provided that we have the temper of the Psalmist in his imprecations;* for he unfolds the reason for his prayers, thus:

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[1] Psalm lxxxiii. 2–5, 12–18.

> "Deliver me from the *workers of iniquity,*
> And save me *from bloody* men. —
> They run and prepare themselves *without my fault.* —
> *Let them know that God ruleth in Jacob* —
> *Let them wander up and down for meat,*
> *Though they be not satisfied, and will stay all night.*"[1]

Men who are now sending armed regiments to intercept the supplies of food to the Southern rebels, blame the king of Israel for requesting God to do, or submitting to God when he does, substantially the same thing which these objectors are doing themselves. They overlook the emphasis which consists in repetition, and by which the Psalmist makes it evident and prominent, that he has one amiable reason, and only one general reason, for all his imprecations. That reason is:

> "That the heathen may know themselves to be but men:[2]

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[1] Psalm lix. 2, 4, 13, 15. "They had to wander about when evening came, having lost the prey, and, hungry, wake through the night." — Tholuck. In the same way, we are eager to deprive our enemies of the armor which they use against us, and yet are ready to censure David for entreating that his foes may be deprived of the weapons which they used against the righteous. We forget that, as he compares his adversaries to *lions*, rhetorical propriety requires him to represent them as using the deadly instruments of lions; and, in consistency with this oriental figure, he prays, "O God, break their teeth in their mouth; the tusks of *the young lions* break in pieces, O Lord." Should the Psalmist have prayed that the *young lions* be deprived of their *arrows* and *swords?* See Hengstenberg on Psalm lviii. 6. See also the third subdivision of the first head of this Essay.

[2] Psalm ix. 20.

> "That they may know that this is *Thy* hand :
> That *Thou*, Lord, hast done it."[1]
>
> "And my tongue shall speak of *Thy* righteousness."[2]
>
> "We will show forth *Thy* praise to all generations."[3]
>
> "Do I not hate them, O Lord, that hate *Thee* ?
> And am I not grieved with those that rise up against *Thee* ?
> I hate them with perfect hatred,
> I count *them mine* enemies."[4]

In the second place, the Imprecatory Psalms illustrate the principle that private individuals, *as such*, ought not to satisfy their retributive sentiment by inflicting evil on transgressors; but ought to invoke the administrator of law to do what the general good requires, in satisfying this sentiment. The retributive affection is not holy, neither is it sinful; but it is normal, and must be rightly controlled. Its office is to call on the giver of a revered statute to afflict the violator of it with some kind of penal evil. It pays regard to various departments of law; and is more or less exalted, as it is applied to a higher or lower sphere of existence. It operates in the family circle, and demands a domestic chastisement for a violation of domestic rule. The child whose sensibilities are in equipoise, calls on his parents to exercise the needful discipline over his offending brother. The retributive sentiment acts in the social circle, and requires a social evil for the violation of a social law. The companion stirs up his comrades to express the general opinion of their society against their offending associate. The retributive sentiment works in the State, and insists that a civil calamity come down upon the violator of a civil edict. The statesman whose mind is well balanced, demands that there be authority in the commonwealth, and that all infraction of wise laws be visited with pain. The retributive sentiment is yet more conspicuous in man as a moral agent under a moral government: and it is not satisfied unless the moral ruler recompense every sin with the penalty which the sin deserves, and which the public weal demands. This is penalty in the *moral* sense of that term. This is the real, literal punishment. When the guardian is impelled to inflict pain on an erring child or pupil, when a magistrate is moved to let some evil fall upon the offending citizen, these calamities are not equal to the *moral* desert of the criminal; if they were so, *they would never end.* They are imposed because, and so far forth as, they are *naturally* fitted to the outward crime and to the purpose of preventing its recurrence. Domestic, scholastic, social, and civil inflictions of pain are *discipline* and *chastisement;* are proportioned to the *natural* turpitude and to certain *outward* consequences of the crime; but are not *moral* punishments, proportioned to the *moral* demerit of the sin. It is in a secondary and figurative sense that they are termed *penal*, and are said to be graduated according to *desert.* The retributive sentiment, as it energizes not only in regard to the government of God, but also to that of the family, the school, the association of friends, the commonwealth, and as it is inserted in the very make of the soul, illustrates the wisdom of him who has designed us for the domestic, social, political relations. It forms one part of the instinct of government. It proves that human jurisprudence is, in one sense, divine. Civil rule is not the result of a mere social compact. It is not an artificial growth. Its germ is imbedded in the depths of our constitution. A wise law of man is a law of Jehovah. The magistrate is "ordained of God." "There is no power but of God." He who despiseth the civil power (such is the general truth), despiseth not man *as man*, but *as the representative* of the King of kings. Here is the chief sin of disobedience in the family and school, of rebellion in the State. It is resistance to the ordinances of the great Ruler, as underlying the edicts of human rulers. "For," says the Psalmist,[1] "they have rebelled against Thee." Hence when we take a religious view of the present war, the very name *rebel* is freighted with associations of guilt. The sound of the word *traitor* is like the sound of the name Judas Iscariot. It wakens, at once, the retributive sentiment.

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[1] Psalm cix. 17–27; lix. 13.

[2] Psalm xxxv. 24–28.

[3] Psalm lxxix. 6–13.

[4] Psalm cxxxix. 21, 22. See also Psalm v. 10; x. 12; xii. 9; xxviii. 4, 5. xl. 16; lviii. 11; lxiv. 7, 8, 9; lxxiv. 22, 23; cix. 17, 26, 27; cxlii. 8; cxliii. 12.

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[1] Psalm v. 10.

But this sentiment, like the gentler affections of the soul, is easily perverted. Private individuals usurp the office which belongs to the domestic, social, public guardian. A child chastises his playmates, instead of referring their offence to the master of the household. The inhabitants of a town become indignant against one of their number; their retributive impulse quickens itself to anticipate the interposition of the magistrate, who "beareth not the sword in vain." They assemble in a mass. Such men were once denominated *mobile vulgus;* in an English abbreviation they are called a *mob.* They flatter themselves that they are moved by a high emotion of justice in bringing down the walls of his house upon the head of the offender. They *pride* themselves on having a moral nature too sensitive to endure an atrocious wrong. Now we do not blame them for being indignant against crime; but they ought to control their indignation in agreement with the general principles which were serenely propounded by a town clerk of ancient times: "Wherefore if Demetrius and the craftsmen which are with him, have a matter against any man, *the law is open and there are deputies;* let them implead one another. But if ye inquire anything concerning other matters, it shall be determined in a *lawful assembly.* For we are in danger to be called in question for this day's uproar, there being no cause whereby we may give an account of *this* concourse."

As men are tempted to satisfy their own retributive sentiment, when they should call on a human magistrate to satisfy it for them, so they are inclined to take from the Divine Ruler his prerogative of administering moral penalties. The father should not attempt to meet all the demands of justice, by inflicting on the child all the penalty which is merited by the child's impenitent will. The teacher has no right to recompense his pupils for their sinful preference, and to pain them on account of and in proportion to their spiritual ill-desert. A magistrate is not a judge over the inward demerit of his fellow men. God is our moral ruler, and all we are brethren.

We do not regard the apostle (in Rom. xii. 19, 20) as directly and precisely *stating*, but we do regard him as indirectly and darkly *implying*, all of the following rules :

> '" Dearly beloved, avenge not yourselves, but rather defer your wrath ; " let your sentiment of *moral* retribution wait on the will of Him who alone is entitled to fill up its demands ; for it is written in Deuteronomy xxxii. 35 : " To me belongeth vengeance and recompense." I will weigh out exact justice, and come up to the full requisition for it. Therefore, as it is written in the Proverbs, xxv. 21, 22 : " If thine enemy be hungry, give him bread to eat ; and if he be thirsty, give him water to drink ; for thou shalt heap coals of fire upon his head,[1] and the Lord shall reward thee. Thou shalt not afflict him in order to pay him back precisely what his sin deserves, and with the aim to satisfy thy desire that full justice be meted out to him. Still thou mayest *chastise* him ; for love bringeth upon him the melting coals ; for whom the father loveth he chasteneth, and disciplines his chosen ones. But on his incorrigible enemies he *taketh vengeance*. This moral retribution is the office of a king. This full repayment is the prerogative of one who judges the heart. This vindication of the spiritual law is the peculiarity of the Mind who gave the law, and measured its breadth and depth.'[2]

Now the Imprecatory Psalms lay an emphasis on the truth, that private individuals are not to usurp the place of a magistrate, and take the law into their own hands. These are not wild, disorganizing, Jacobinical songs ; not incendiary appeals to a rabble ; but they are governmental

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[1] Baur, of Tübingen, complains that in this phrase the apostle was misled by his passions. But he was making a quotation, and he appends to the quotation the words : " Be not overcome of evil, but overcome evil with good." To heap coals of fire upon the head of an enemy, was to load him with such kindness as would melt him into shame and penitence. The phrase may have been a common proverb.

[2] Baur and his school are confident that the Psalmists were vindictive, because the God whom they worshipped was represented by them as revengeful, and men will be conformed to their Divinity. But the apostle declares that God will be vindicative, will exercise vengeance, and therefore he exhorts men *not* to exercise it. The religion of the Bible is *clement*, partly because the God of the Bible is *just*. The *severity* of the sovereign renders it safe for the subjects to be *merciful*.

Psalms; staid, regular, reverential invocations upon the monarch to wield his own sceptre.[1] It was a favorite phrase of the late Mr. Webster, 'that the *people* of the United States call on their *President* to maintain the honor of the laws.' In the governmental Psalms, the *people* of the theocracy call on their *Presiding Spirit* to defend his own government. They do not invent ordinances for him, but they refer to *his* ordinances, and plead: "*Thou hast ordained judgment.*[2] If they invoked a god like Mars or Jupiter to fight for them, they would be in danger of cherishing an infuriated spirit. But this is their defence: they trust in the fairness and the charitableness of the divine administration, and remember him who "when he was reviled, reviled not again; when he suffered he threatened not, *but committed himself to him that judgeth righteously.*"[3] It is safe to invoke the aid of the benignant ruler in honoring those enactments of which David said: "Oh, how love I thy law!" It is prudent to call for the raising of the arm of him who is "very pitiful and of tender mercy," and will never intrench upon the claims of our frail nature. The poetry of David, when he sat on his throne, breathes the same loyalty which adorned his conversation, when he tended his father's sheep. "The Lord judge between me and thee," he said to his persecuting king, "and the Lord avenge me of thee; *but mine hand shall not be upon thee*."[1] His songs, when he was prosperous, have the same reverential tone which characterized his words, when he was afflicted. "Let me fall into *the hand of the Lord*," he said in the moment of his fear, "for very great are his mercies; but let me not fall into *the hand of man*."[2] So all the Psalmists appear to be mindful that God is love, that his government is love, and that vengeance is healthful in the bosom of love; and therefore it is seemly to call for the sword of him who never unsheathes it except for some purpose of love. It is a beautiful spirit which the Psalmists manifest, when they invoke the justice of God to befriend the poor, and the faint, and the fatherless, and him that hath no helper:

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[1] When these Psalms refer to a punishment inflicted, not by *Jehovah* directly, but by *David*, they may refer to it as inflicted by him in the capacity of *a monarch.* The English translation of Psalm xli. 10 is: "But thou, O Lord, be merciful to me, and raise me up, that I may requite them" [my enemies]; Calvin translates the last clause: "*and I will* recompense them"; Hengstenberg, "*so will I* requite them." The requital is to be a *result* of his deliverance, but is not the final cause of it. Calvin defends the expression, partly on the ground that "David was not one of the common people, but *a king appointed by God, and invested with authority.*" Com. on Psalm xli. 10. It is noticeable that certain words of this Psalm, which is often represented as one of the most objectionable of the Imprecatory Songs, are associated in John xiii. 18 with the history of Christ. De Wette, Maurer, and Hupfeld, do not adopt the mild exposition of Calvin, but needlessly translate the וַאֲשַׁלְּמָה לָהֶם of Psalm xli. 10, "auf dass ich ihnen vergelte," "Ut rependam iis," etc.

[2] Psalm vii. 6. See Hupfeld's Com. B. I., s. 122. In B. III. s. 254, Hupfeld complains that the Psalmist does not *trustfully* refer all chastisements to the divine justice, without entreating that they may be inflicted upon his enemies. On a similar principle we may ask, why we should not *trustfully* refer all favors to the divine goodness, without entreating that they may be bestowed upon our friends. Why should men *pray* at all? Why not simply *trust*?

[3] 1 Pet. xi. 23.

> "Thou didst cause judgment to be heard from heaven;
> The earth feared, and was still,
> When God arose to judgment,
> *To save all the meek of the earth*."[3]

In the third place, the Imprecatory Psalms illustrate the duty of acquiescing in the evils inflicted upon a fellow being, when these are the *minor* evils, preventing the occurrence of the *larger*. We may acquiesce in the pain attending the removal of a cataract from the eye; for this pain is a smaller calamity than the blindness which would ensue without it. We may acquiesce in an amputation of the arm; for the loss of a limb is a smaller evil than the loss of life, which would otherwise result. "Ye know nothing at all," said the high-priest to his counsellors, "nor consider that it is expedient that *one* man should die for the people, and that the whole nation perish not."

In the memoir of Rev. Dr. Channing, the celebrated Unitarian divine of Boston, a man remarkable for the gentleness of his temper, we find him uttering the following words:[4]

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[1] 1 Sam. xxiv 12. [2] 1 Chron. xxi. 13. [3] Psalm lxxvi. 8, 9.

[4] See the Memoir of Channing, Vol. II 348. See Memoir of Dr. Samuel Hopkins, Section XLIV. J.

"There are some in whose depression I acquiesce. When I read Byron, for example, I have a satisfaction mixed with compassion in hearing from him the tones of gloomy, angry despondence. I mean that my sense of justice is satisfied. I see him receiving a fit recompense of his guilt. He refused to see and walk in the 'light of life,' and deserved to walk in darkness. He renounced his allegiance to God and to the everlasting law of duty, and abandoned himself without restraint to self-will and pride; and how fit and necessary was it that he should endure the miseries of a lonely, desolate soul!" If this mild writer can acquiesce in the direst affliction of a fellow man, simply because the affliction is deserved, how much easier is it to acquiesce in the affliction when it is viewed, not merely as merited, but also as essential to the welfare of the community!

Some commentators, desiring to make the Imprecatory Psalms appear as mild as possible, have stopped with the theory that these Psalms are mere prophecies of evil. But we cannot rest satisfied with this explanation. We are *allowed*, however, although we are not *obliged*, to stop with the theory that some of the Psalms, although not all of them, are expressions of acquiescence in the will of God when he chooses to afflict the disturbers of the public peace. We can defend these Psalms, if we adopt a more difficult explanation; therefore we are not compelled to adopt this. But we are authorized to defend some of them not as simple prophecies, indeed, but as prophecies involving a hearty *submission* to the Judge who sends the predicted woes. This element of submission enters into the sentiment of the Psalmist, even when it is not the whole of that sentiment; and it may sometimes exhaust the meaning of one text when it does not exhaust the meaning of the context. The Imperative and the Future Indicative of the Hebrew tongue, the modes and tenses of all languages which can have an optative force, can also denote a *willingness* rather than a *wish*, an *acquiescence* rather than a *request*. "*Let* the heavens be glad," "*Let* all those that put their trust in thee rejoice," "*Let* them ever shout for joy;"—

these words breathe a desire for the event. On the other hand: "*Let* him alone, and *let* him curse," "*Let* them curse, but bless thou," "It is the Lord, *let* him do what seemeth him good;"—these words breathe a simple acquiescence in the event. They are compatible with an earnest longing that the calamity be, if it can be, averted. If our faith be too weak to offer the words "*Let* thy will be done," as words of entreaty, we are still not frail enough to recoil from them as words of submission.[1] What and who are we, meditating on a chastisement as purposed by our Sovereign, and yet holding back our consent that he execute his own plan? What and who are we, hesitating to acquiesce not so much in the calamity, as in the ordinance of our Father who deems the calamity useful to the universe?

The citizens of the United States have been fond of saying, that the king of our Israel brought our fathers as a vine out of Egypt, that he cast out the heathen, and caused his chosen plant to take deep root, so that the hills were covered with the shadow of it. If, now, the knife of the marauder be raised against this goodly vine, and be allowed to sever the branches of it, then will not only our own land of promise be desolate, but all other lands will be afflicted; there will be arrayed against each other, not merely two confederacies, but three, or four, or seven; and there will be unremitting war among them; and the cause of freedom will be down-trodden, not on this continent alone, but throughout the world; and the church of Christ will suffer, for it is to our united republic that men look for an enterprising, an aggressive, a practical, a hard working religion. Therefore, as merciful citizens, desirous of liberalizing the despotisms of the Old World, and of Christianizing the heathen tribes, we call on our rulers to arrest this illegal and unreasonable rebellion. If it cannot be stayed without the loss of treasures and blood, *let* the loss come. If it cannot be stayed without inflicting the extreme punishment of the law on some ringleader in the revolt, we grieve for the necessity, but the chastisement will "rescue us from robbery in the time of peace, and from piracy in the time of war," and *let* it come. But if he be given up to this fearful punishment, he must endure not only pain but lasting ignominy. Our tears flow for the ignominy, but it will preserve us hereafter from wholesale theft, from perjury, from barbarism; and *let* it come. But if he be doomed to the legal punishment of his crime, his children will be fatherless and his wife a widow. It is a terrible woe. But unless it come, not a few only, but thousands of children will be fatherless; not one only, but hundreds of wives will be widows. *The government must be upheld;* therefore *let* his household be left desolate. But if he expiate his crime on the gallows, his children will become vagabonds and beg. We are saddened at their misery. We forewarned him of it, we entreated him to spare his unoffending offspring. Still, unless treason be now rebuked with all the emphasis which the law allows, every hill and dale will ere long echo and reëcho with the cry of mendicant children. Then let his little ones *be* vagabonds and beg, rather than that all the families of the land be scattered, mothers fleeing with their babes from the *guerilla* hordes which bring famine in their train.

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[1] See Matt. xxvi. 42; Luke xxii. 42; Acts xxi. 14; also many passages like Psalm vii. 6 (see p. 208 below); Matt. xxvii. 25.

Mistaken men have decided, that if the hundred and ninth Psalm contains a *request* for the chastisement of the malefactor's wife, children, parents, the Psalm is not inspired. Now if we *must* believe that the Psalm is not inspired, provided that it expresses a request for such calamities, *then* it is logical to believe that the Psalm does not express a request for them, but rather an acquiescence in them. The evidence for the inspiration of the Psalm is clearer than the evidence that its apparent meaning is its real one; and therefore *if* it be needful to adopt the alternative that the Psalm is not of divine origin, or else that it does not utter a wish for the woes of the traitor's household, we have a logical right to interpret the Psalm as breathing a spirit not of positive desire for these woes, but of cordial submission to them. Thus:

'It is the divine plan to afflict the small household of the traitor, and thereby to save the large multitudes who had otherwise been undone by the treason. Therefore, while rivers of waters run down mine eyes, I sing:

"*Let* his children *be* fatherless,
And his wife a widow.
Let his children be continually vagabonds and beg;
Let them seek their bread also out of their desolate places."

'As he has tempted men to extortion, he may now fitly receive back the influence of his crime; and accordingly

"*Let* the extortioner catch all that he hath,
And *let* the strangers spoil his labor."[1]

'He has stirred up his comrades to inhuman and relentless deeds, and so I rest satisfied with thine arrangement:

"*Let* there *be* none to extend mercy unto him:
Neither *let* there *be* any to favor his fatherless children."
"*Let* his posterity *be* cut off,
And in the generation following *let* their name *be* blotted out."

'It is a law of thy kingdom, that the influence of a crime descends to the son and daughter of the criminal, ascends to his father and mother, and moves not only downward and upward, but also to every side. I am overwhelmed by the appeal which this law makes to all ungodly children, for they bring evil on their parents; and to all ungodly parents, for they bring evil on their children. The parents of the traitor deserve to be afflicted *for* his crime and *in* his punishment. His father encouraged him in barbarous enterprises, and this is a symbol of the misdeeds for which he deserves to have the iniquity of his children left unpardoned. His mother nourished within him a malignant will, and this is a type of the sins for which the evil-minded woman deserves to have the iniquity of her offspring remain unforgiven. And now, it must be so, — my lips tremble with fear while I resign myself to thy plan. Let the guilty parents receive that expression of thy justice which consists in judicially afflicting their traitorous child:

"*Let* the iniquity of his fathers *be* remembered with the Lord,
And *let* not the sin of his mother be blotted out;
Let them *be* before the Lord continually,
That he may cut off the memory of them from the earth;
Because that he remembered not to *show mercy*,
But persecuted the *poor* and *needy* man,
That he might even slay the *broken in heart*."'

We shudder as we read these words. We have no reason to deny that David shuddered when he was inspired to utter them. For when he uttered them he was representing the Prince of Peace. He was acting as a symbol of the Meek One, whose office it is to chastise an unforgiving spirit, and to defend the lowly against their oppressors. Even Hengstenberg admits[1] that the author of this Psalm was not only giving us an ideal representation of every "suffering righteous man," but he "had before his eyes, at the same time, the family of David, and especially Him in whom that family was destined to reach its summit." From the hint in Acts i. 20 we have the right to imagine, that the spirit of this Psalm was breathed by the gentle Redeemer as he foresaw that Judas would cherish an unpitying temper, and would endure such pains as flow from a selfish, unsympathizing, malignant spirit. For, the spirit of this Psalm is that of compassion toward the suffering poor, as well as of submission to God who rebukes the oppressive traitor:

> '"*For my love* they are my adversaries,
> But *I give myself* unto prayer.
> And they have rewarded me evil for good,
> And hatred for my love."
> 'Therefore,
> "Set thou a wicked man over him,
> And *let* the accuser stand at his right hand."'[2]

'With the tenderness of my pity toward the good man who is the *victim* of abuse, I blend an approval of thine ordinance against the cruel man who is the *cause* of that abuse, and I am in sympathy with thy decision that all his crimes be charged upon him:

> "When he shall be judged let him be condemned,
> And *let* his prayer become sin."[3]

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[1] Commentary on Psalm cix.

[2] This contiguity of the stern to the mild sentiments in Psalm cix. 4–6, indicates that the sternness is not vindictive.

[3] Psalm cix. 7. This verse has a striking resemblance to Psalm lxix. 27: "Add iniquity unto their iniquity, and let them not come into thy righteousness"; i.e. Give to their iniquity its appropriate punishment, and let them not enjoy thy pardoning mercy. If any sentiment in the Imprecatory Psalms be hostile to the evangelical spirit, it is this. But the two Psalms, lxix and cix., which breathe this sentiment most obviously, are associated most decidedly with Christ in the New Testament. See the second subdivision of the first head of this Essay.

> "For it *is* sin. Let it be *treated* as sin. I consent unto the law that it is good, when it judges the crime *as it is.* How often would I have saved the traitor from offering the prayer which is an abomination unto the Lord; but he would not be saved. How long did I call and wait, but *he would have it just as it now is.* How can I give him up? But even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight. *Let it not* be as I will, when I think of his misery; but *let it be* as thou wilt, when thou comprehendest all things."'

In the fourth place, the Imprecatory Psalms illustrate the principle, that while we may grieve over an event, viewed in one aspect, that of involving certain calamities, we may rejoice in the same event, viewed in a different aspect, that of involving transcendent blessings. Many a phenomenon in life may be looked at as two-fold; and may be regarded as on the whole a rich favor, but in some of its parts a dire evil. Its complex nature elicits joy and sorrow. We are glad, to have the magnificent city rise upon the ruins of a forest; but we are grieved, that the gorgeous trees can no longer adorn the once undulating ground. We are cheered by the rising of the sun; still we miss the stars, which retire when the morning shines. We hail, with delight, the prosperity of the arts; they bring joys far outweighing their sorrows; yet our railroads, our manufactories, our cathedrals, our capitols are built at the expense of wounds and bruises of beasts and men; at the sacrifice of family comfort and of valuable life. One scale of the balance will not rise, unless the other sink. Not that we delight in the fall of the one scale; but we are gratified by the ascent of the other. When we read the history of a great conflict, our sympathy is aroused for the good and true. As the virtuous combatants prevail, we are exhilirated; — but their success is attended with the anguish of their opposers, still our hearts leap in hilarity at their triumph; — but their gain is purchased by the sighs and dying shrieks of their enemies, — we cannot allay the pain, — we would if we could; but the calamity is less hurtful than the victory is useful, therefore are we enlivened at the ascendancy of the right. We mourn for the Egyptian taskmaster. He was not prepared to meet his Judge. His malignant barbarism made his death only the more grievous. But if he had lived, he would have plunged the whole civilized race into deep waters. Jerusalem would have remained unbuilt, and the new Jerusalem would have lost myriads of its citizens; therefore we shout: "The *Lord* hath triumphed gloriously; the horse and his rider hath he cast into the sea." The ingenuous child, the delicate woman, the mild philanthropist peruse the narrative of Christian armies fighting against the pagan; of Protestant armies contending with the papal; of civilized armies battling against the savage; and the secret tide of sympathy flows, without ebbing, in behalf of Constantine, and Gustavus Adolphus, and William Prince of Orange, and our Puritan soldiers exposed to the tomahawk and scalping knife of the Indian. What child has read the story of the red men burning the villages, murdering the wives and babes of his pilgrim forefathers, and has not felt a thrill of joy that his ancestors at last overcame the foe who would have devoured them? But the success of the upright is the defeat of the wicked. The honor crowning the noble is attended with the infamy encircling the mean. The very malice of those who are vanquished, adds the sting to their death. We do not revel in their pangs. We are in tears. "The men would have it so." Still, we do exult that the disaster of barbarous tribes is attended with the prosperity of the civilized; that the scale of the virtuous has gone up, while the scale of the vicious has gone down, in one movement of the balance rod; that the sunbeams of religion shine, even if they who love darkness are chagrined by the light. Their pain is not so great an evil, as the triumph of virtue is a good. The ruin of a few malignant men is not so grievous a calamity, as the virtue and the happiness of the world are an affluent blessing.

On a day when the hearts of men failed them through fear; when our national capital was left unguarded; when the army of the rebels was reported and believed to be within a march of thirty hours from Washington; when the venerable chieftain who has just retired from the command of our forces, was hemmed in by intriguing foes; when the bridges were burned, the railways demolished, the wires of the telegraph cut, so that the friends of our Union could afford no relief, nor even transmit a message to their civil *fathers*; when the city of Baltimore had insulted and stoned and butchered our soldiers, our neighbors, our friends; and in her streets the life of our President elect had just been deemed insecure, the query reverberated through New England: "What can be done?" The spontaneous answer was: '"Through Baltimore." The ark of God must be rescued. The archives of the nation must be preserved. The temple of virtue must be kept inviolate. The jewels of our fathers must not be vilely cast away.' "Through Baltimore," was the thrilling watchword of generous men and pitying women and weeping children. And as I stood in a crowd, before a public edifice, in one of our commercial capitals, suddenly I saw a placard hung out on the wall, "Baltimore is to be shelled this day." — "We are glad of it," was the instant shout of sober men, considerate men, humane men. They knew the horrors of the bombardment. Some of them had property which would be destroyed by it. But *the salvation of the people*, — that is the controlling idea. *The triumph of freedom throughout the world*, — that is the dominant thought. In the cannonading of that town, the hearts of many innocent women will be wrung with anguish; many defenceless babes will be torn away from all that might solace their coming years. But *the hope of the world is in the prosperity of this land.* An ambitious and envious city arrays itself against the welfare of mankind. As a selfish town, interfering with the general welfare, it ought to fall, must fall, shall fall. — "We are glad of it," was the irrepressible shout. It came up from the depths of civilized humanity. It came from men, not as individuals, but as the representatives of the race. It came from the constitution of the human soul. God has made men so that they shall feel indignant at high crime, and express their indignation in resolute words and deeds. 'We are glad," not at the tears and heart-aches of misguided citizens, but "glad" at the triumph of principle, the victory of right, the rolling onward of the chariot of law through or over every impediment.'

The advocates of a just retribution were afterwards most happily disappointed. There was great joy when they heard that the catastrophe need not come, that the nation could be saved and the city also. Good men will be glad when the arm uplifted for the blow, can accomplish its aim without striking the threatened malefactor. They are never in glee because a blow is struck, but only because after it is struck the general well-being, which otherwise must have been impaired, is now augmented.

It was in anticipation of a similar calamity that the inspired patriot uttered words[1] which have been represented as unworthy of a civilized age, but which may be defended more easily than the words of the crowd in relation to Baltimore. He had seen hung out, on the placard of prophecy, the announcement that Babylon was to be destroyed. The process of destroying it had been commenced when he wrote; and he had read the words foretelling that the ruin would go on to its consummation.[2] "For I will rise up against them, saith the Lord of hosts, and cut off from Babylon the name, and remnant, and son, and nephew; and I will sweep it with the besom of destruction, saith the Lord of hosts." "Their children also shall be dashed to pieces before their eyes, their houses shall be spoiled, and their wives ravished. Behold, I will stir up the Medes against them. Their bows also shall dash the young men to pieces, and they thall have no pity on the fruit of the womb; their eye shall not spare children."[3] While contemplating this massacre of the infants, the Psalmist does not *express* any joy of his own in such a cruelty. He announces the mere fact, that the *Medes and the Persians* will be jubilant when they make an utter end of their annoying and corrupting foe. *The Medes and the Persians* will congratulate each other, as all victorious warriors make themselves happy, when they have so far succeeded in their conflict that nothing more can be feared from their opposer. *The Medes and the Persians* will be congratulated by their countrymen at home, as all conquering heroes are, when they have eradicated a fruitful mischief, so that not one germ of it can take life and grow up to afflict the world any more. It is, then, in the foresight of the felicitating words of the *Medes and Persians* that the poet sings:

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[1] Psalm cxxxvii. 7 – 9.

[2] See Hengstenberg on this Psalm.

[3] Isa. xiv. 22, 23; xiii. 16 – 18, also 19 – 22.

'"O daughter of Babylon, who art to be destroyed,"

'Who hast been already destroyed in part; and the decree has gone forth for thine uttter ruin;

"*Happy* shall he be that rewardeth thee
As thou hast served us;"

'For it has been, and is to be, the order of the divine administration under the old covenant and the new, that 'with what measure ye mete it shall be measured to you again;

"*Happy* shall he be
That taketh and dasheth thy little ones against the stones."

'I mourn that thou hast inflicted the same cruelties upon Jerusalem. I mourn that it is the common mode of warfare to murder the infants with their mothers and fathers.[1] I am not happy because the Medes and the Persians will be, as you have been, unpitying. But I look upon their deed as a *sign* that our world is at length to have rest. I look upon their deed, not as a moral act, but as a *symbol* that peace and virtue will prevail when the disorganizing empire of Babylon is laid low. I look *through* the sign, I look *beyond* the symbol, I look *at* the health of the body when the gangrened limb is lopped off by an unsympathizing surgeon. I am not happy in the motive of the Medes and Persians as they fulfil the purpose of God; but I am happy in the motive of God, in the reasonableness and the usefulness of his purpose; for it shall be a benefaction to our wronged humanity when the decree is fulfilled that "Babylon, the glory of kingdoms, the beauty of the Chaldee's excellency, shall be as when God overthrew Sodom and Gomorrah. It shall never be inhabited, neither shall it be dwelt in from generation to generation."[2] As it is right for God to form this decree, so it is right for me to rejoice in it; and all my joy I express, not as the Medes and Persians express theirs, but in breathing forth my *desire* that God would execute his own purpose upon Edom[3] as upon Babylon, and that he would show forth the fitness of his providences in meeting one sin with the very chastisement most appropriate to it.[4] Therefore I pray:

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[1] See Hengstenberg, Tholuck, and Hupfeld, on Psalm cxxxvii. 7–9.

[2] Isa. xiii. 19, 20.

[3] Jer. xlix. 7–22; Ezek. xxv. 12–14; Oba. 8–16.

[4] The Psalmists make their *sense of fitness* so prominent that it is often mistaken for a *spirit of retaliation*: Psalm vii. 16, 16; xxxv. 8, etc.

"Remember, O Lord, the children of Edom,
In the day of Jerusalem:
Who said, Raze it,
Raze it, even to the foundation thereof."[1]

Our hearts palpitate with fear as we breathe the words of the hundred and thirty-seventh Psalm. Sitting calmly in our rooms, we should never have inserted such words among the songs of Zion. But they are true to the first principles of the soul, when it is stirred to its lowest depths. They find an echo in the very constitution of trembling orphans, and timid widows, and oppressed men, and defrauded sovereigns, when the hidden fountains of their anxiety are stirred, and when they can have no relief, and the commonwealth can have no peace, unless their malignant enemy be destroyed. As I mingled with the crowd whose emotions of justice prompted them to desire the bombardment of a town rather than submit to the ruin of a nation, I detected in that throng a rude resemblance to another scene sketched by a painter, whose delicate and gentle spirit assures us that his words are humane:

"And a mighty angel took up a stone like a great millstone, and cast it into the sea, saying, Thus, with violence, shall that great city Babylon be thrown down, and shall be found no more at all;" "and no craftsman, of whatsoever craft he be, shall be found any more in thee," "for thy merchants were the great men of the earth," "and in her was found the blood of prophets, and of saints, and of all that were slain upon the earth." "*Rejoice over her thou heaven, and ye holy apostles and prophets; for God hath avenged you on her.*"[2]

Now he who uttered these words was "that disciple whom Jesus loved." But Jesus loved him because that disciple chose virtue rather than peace; the holiness of the many rather than the agreeable sensations of the few. For he who "did not strive nor cry, neither was his voice heard in the streets," did yet, while on earth, reëcho the principle of the Imprecatory Psalms, and he will reiterate the same "when he shall come in his *glory*, and all the holy angels with him," and "shall sit upon the throne of his *glory*," and say "unto them on the left hand: Depart from me, ye *cursed*."[1]

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[1] In this passage of the Psalmist he, doubtless, *intimates*, although he does not *avow*, his joy in the fulfilment of God's decree. See Calvin, on Psalm cxxxvii. 8.

[2] Rev. xviii. 21, 22, 23, 24, 20. Comp. Psalm lii. 6; liv. 7; lviii. 11.

In the fifth place, the Imprecatory Psalms illustrate the principle, that we may pray for a complex event when the blessings involved in it are vividly seen to be far greater than the evils incidental to it; when the evils are vividly seen to be such as cannot be averted, even if we do entreat God to avert them; and when the blessings are vividly seen to be such as may be gained, in fuller measure, if we pray for them, than if we refuse to pray. We do not offer our supplication for the *evils* unavoidably incident to the blessings; but we entreat for the *blessings* only. Nor do we pray for the good forming one part of a complex event, unless we have a clear view of it as overbalancing the calamities which form the other part of it. Nor do we pray for the event as including both the preponderant blessing and the lesser evil, unless we see that we cannot prevent the evil, even if we do bestir ourselves to prevent it.

We have said already, that it is not so difficult to justify an expression of acquiescence in a calamity, as it is to justify an expression of desire for an event including the calamity. We should often prefer to have our own language interpreted in the easier, rather than in the harder way; as breathing a spirit of submission to the evil, rather than as breathing a wish for an occurrence which comprehends the evil. Accordingly, there is a "golden rule" of interpretation, which allows us to explain some words of the Psalmists, as we would wish to have some of our own words explained. But what is here *allowed* is not *required;* and what is permitted *sometimes* is not permitted *always*.

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[2] Matt. xxv. 31–41; xxi. 41–44; Luke xxiii. 29, 30.

In interpreting *all* of the imprecations we *may*, in interpreting *some* of them we *must*, adopt the harder method. The element of submission may be recognized as pervading all the Imprecatory Psalms. Some gentler minds may choose to regard it as the sole element which forms the character of some passages in these Psalms. If we gratify the wish of these mild critics to resolve certain passages into expressions of mere acquiescence, we cannot make this concession with regard to other passages.

Nor need we, if we could. For we have already seen, that we may rejoice over a *past* event which comprehends more of a blessing than of a calamity; on the same ground we may wish, and express our wish, for a *coming* event, which, though it contains a sad ingredient, is yet on the whole far more useful than hurtful. So the principle of acquiescence, in one aspect of a dispensation, assumes the form of desire in another aspect of the complex dispensation. We submit to an occurrence, when we place in the foreground its grievous nature, even though it does contain an overbalancing good. We desire that occurrence, when we place in the foreground its overbalancing good, even though it does involve a lighter harm. When we have reason to believe that our all-wise Father regards the event as essential to the common welfare, and when the usefulness of the event depends in any way or degree on our coinciding and coöperating with him, is it wrong that we pray for the event, viewed as unfolding a good which far outweighs the evil? Was it unmerciful, for inspired men to have a preference in unison with that of him who gave the inspiration? Do not his severest inflictions emanate from his mercy to the entire universe? Was it unfeeling, then, for the writers *who knew his wise plans* to cherish a desire for what he desired? If he did not choose the event as hurtful, neither did they. If he did not choose the evil in and for itself, which was connected with the good, neither did they. If he chose the good, notwithstanding its painful incidents, in despite of them, so did they. In whatever sense he deemed it wise to inflict a woe on men, in that sense we may suppose that the Psalmists requested him to act according to his own wisdom. They knew that the providences which involved the sorest harm, were designed by their author to nourish a kindly temper among men, and to rebuke an ungenerous, unforgiving spirit. Was it selfish for them in writing their songs to express their choice that He who inspired these songs should fulfil the designs of his own compassion?

Dr. William E. Channing once remarked, that the spirit of the Imprecatory Songs may be indicated by the tones of voice in which they are uttered. If rehearsed with harsh accents, they express a malignity which the inspired men did not feel. If recited in sympathetic intonations, they may signify a desire for that dispensation of Providence which must include some causes of grief, but will certainly preclude more causes of deeper grief. Our pitying accents may intimate that the sweet singer of Israel was praying for the less of two grievances, one of which must needs come; and not for the grievance, as such, but for an advantage which is tied to some necessary drawback; for a rainbow which spans a dark cloud; for a sunset which precedes a sombre twilight; for a rest which presupposes hard work; a victory which implies a war; a resurrection which follows a death. He does not check his song in order to analyze his words, and distinguish between the evil "in itself considered, and the good all things considered;" but our elocution must breathe out this analysis for him when, in the choked utterance of grief, he asks for justice to malefactors.

'"Let them be as chaff before the wind:—
Let their way be dark and slippery:—
Let destruction come upon them at unawares,
And let the net which they have hid catch them:
Into that very destruction let them fall."

'I note these melancholy scenes in my prayer; but these are not the *end* for which I pray. My desires fly above *them*, and alight on the glory of the Most High as it blooms out in his giving shelter to the weary. I do name these mournful appendages to the blessing which I crave; but my affections leap above *them*, and rest on the comfort of every man who can say: "*For I am thy servant,*"[1] "*Because I follow that which good is.*"[2] The aim of my entreaty is the honor of Him who *fits* his dispensations to the needs of the race; who makes his rewards *exact*, *apt*, *appropriate*, *pertinent*: and thus cheers the virtuous man in his ways of pleasantness. Therefore I go on with my song:

> "But my soul shall be joyful in the Lord: —
> All my bones shall say,
> Lord, who is like unto thee,
> Which deliverest the afflicted from him that is too strong for him."'[3]

In the sixth place, the Imprecatory Psalms illustrate the principle, that in particular emergencies we may give an unqualified statement of one truth, provided that in other emergencies we give an unqualified statement of the antithetic truth. One thing lies over against another. There is a north, and also a south; a zenith, and also a nadir; the positive and the negative pole. Things go in pairs. All things cannot be told in the same moment. We may look intensely upon one object at one time, and may describe it vividly; but at another time we must look at a different object with equal singleness and enthusiasm. The calm philosopher succeeds in a comprehensive survey of the two objects, and in an analysis of the principle that underlies them both. The earnest orator prevails by a lively description of one object at a time. It cannot be expected that an artist, delighting in vivid pictures, will introduce upon his bright canvas any scene which may spoil its unity. He will dash the brilliant coloring upon one piece, and will cast the sombre hues upon a different piece, and will not stop to explain or modify either, so as to weaken the impression of both. The summer and the winter are parts of one year, and depend on one law of gravitation; but the summer is not intercalated into the winter; the frost is by itself; the noontide heat is alone.

There were wise reasons why He who knew what was in men, gave them, first, a law which was their schoolmaster to bring them to Christ. In that law he laid the foundation of the gospel. But he did not lay there the top stone of it. He left his chosen people to adore his justice toward the heathen, and to bring this attribute into the foreground when they prayed. His justice is right. His grace is right. The justice is presupposed in the grace. But the one-sided critic is impatient of the Imprecatory Psalms, because they are shining delineations of the justice that punishes the heathen, and do not sketch, with equal brilliancy, the grace that offers an atonement to Gentiles as well as Jews. They are like the cartoons of Raphael, intimating, in a slender sketch, one part of a vast scheme, all the sections of which we are too puny to take in at one glance, and a finished picture of which no man can look upon and live.

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[1] Psalm cxliii. 12; cxvi. 16; cxix. 125.

[2] Psalm xxxviii. 20.

[3] Psalm xxxv. 5–10. For other Psalms, indicating that the writers denounce sin *because they pity the poor,* see Psalm x. 9–18; lxxix. 6–9; cix. 16, etc.

After the spring time came the harvest. The nature, spirit, and extent of the atonement are now more luminously revealed. But there are critics on the gospel, who complain that it favors the passive, gentle graces, and fails to stimulate the active, bold virtues. It lowers the aspiring mind into that humility which is near the ground; tones down a brave soul into that meekness which is akin to pusillanimity; lulls a resolute spirit into that obsequiousness which will reward the theft of a coat with the gift of a cloak also; but it forms no manly character, and does not nerve the spirit for hazardous or noble exploits. This is the one-sided criticism of men who listen to the robust phrases of the Imprecatory Psalms, and are *shocked*. What would satisfy them? If we pipe unto them, they will not dance; if we mourn unto them, they will not lament. If the divine word be mild, it is too mild; if it be stern, it is too stern.

Some professed friends of the Bible have confined their view to its unqualified commendations of the gentle virtues and have been thus allured into an incomplete form of ethics. They forbid all war, because we are told to volunteer our escort of two miles for a usurper who demanded only one mile. They disapprove of capital punishment, because we should turn the other cheek to him who has already smitten us on one cheek. They disallow family punishment, and corporeal punishment, and all punishment.[1] *But where are the Imprecatory Psalms?* These old songs were written with the design of suggesting certain conservative truths to *us*. Their sentiment was arrayed in burning words, in order to flash upon our eyes a light which we must look at, whether we will or not. They were uttered with a rousing emphasis which was intended to arrest our progress toward a one-sided virtue, and to *make* us consider, willing or unwilling, that the element of justice is involved in a complete love. If we disjoin the tenderer mandates, which are unqualified, from the sterner mandates, which are also unqualified, and if we persevere in keeping them dissevered, and in clinging to the gentle while we recoil from the severe, we throw away one half of the truth; we lose our equilibrium; we extend a reasonable clemency into an unscriptural effeminacy; what was intended to foster a *principle* of benevolence, we pervert into an excuse for an *easy good nature*. This womanish kindness may in still times be a lovely instinct, but in times of peril it may ruin the commonwealth. It has no moral ground. It is an impulse rather than a principle. Therefore let us not flatter ourselves that we have outgrown the main use of the Imprecatory Psalms. They are needed when the souls of men are tried.[2] They

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[1] The very passages of the New Testament, Matt. v. 38, sq.; vii. 1. sq.; Luke xxiii. 34; Acts iii. 17; vii. 60; Rom. xii. 14, 19, sq.; 1 Pet. ii. 23; iii. 9, which Hupfeld (in his Com. ü. Ps. B. III. s. 254) cites as antagonistic to the Imprecatory Psalms, are frequently, and with equal reason, cited as antagonistic to all kinds of punishment.

[2] While delivering a patriotic address in Boston, on the 16th of October 1861, Hon. Edward Everett gave a startling narrative of the miseries which have been inflicted on our land by eight or ten leaders of the Southern rebellion. When he had quickened his auditors into a befitting sympathy for the injured people, he gave vent to the words:

"Is there not some hidden curse,
Some chosen thunder in the stores of heaven,
Red with uncommon wrath, to blast the man
That seeks his greatness in his country's ruin?"

We are informed that at the recital of these verses, the thrill of the assembly was well nigh unprecedented; the "running fire of applause," which had been elicited by previous words of the orator, now "burst into a volcano of enthusiasm." Such verses *demand* that he who rehearses them, should feel the tenderest pity for those who are suffering from the ambition of traitors. So unless our prove the inspiration of that volume which was designed as for all men, so for those men who are bleeding under injuries, and who can relieve themselves by timely courage, and who ought to come *straight up* to their duty of self-defence. At the present day, when it is possible for us to astonish the advocates of a despotic government by demonstrating the power of republican institutions, and when it is also possible for us to exemplify the weakness of these institutions, and to impair their credit throughout the world, we need the stimulus of these Psalms. Their voice comes to us like the sound of a trumpet, calling us back from a pusillanimous non-resistance; an emasculated love of peace rather than of right; a compassion for the criminal rather than for the victims of his crime; a gentleness toward those who *do* wrong, but an indifference toward those who *suffer* wrong. The religion of some men consists in a pity for all *except* the virtuous, trembling poor.

There is a different class of men, equally ill-balanced. The Imprecatory Psalms and kindred scriptures *fill* their vision. They rivet their gaze so long and so sharply upon law, justice, retribution, that they become blinded to the grace which is radiant in the Old Testament as really as in the New. Thus they fortify a hard character. Those words which were intended to build up a reasonable manliness, they distort into an apology for an austere life. But where are the Beatitudes? Where is the thirteenth chapter of Paul's first letter to the Corinthians? Where is the mellow tone of Immanuel: "Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do."

Perhaps the Bible would never have inserted the retribu-

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sympathies be aroused for the bleeding Protestants, we revolt from the Sonnet of Milton "on the late Massacre in Piedmont":

"*Avenge,* O Lord, thy slaughtered saints, whose bones
Lie scattered on the Alpine mountains cold;
Ev'n them who kept thy truth so pure of old,
When all our fathers worshipped stocks and stones,
Forget not."

Compare these lines with Psalm cxxxvii. 7; Rev. vi. 10; also with pages 197, 200 of this Essay. An *insulated* imprecation repels men who will be reconciled to it, when they *enter into* such reasons for it as are intimated in Psalm ix. 13–20; x. 2; liv. 3, et al.

tive prayers of the Psalmists, if it had not designed to introduce an appendix breathing the calm sentiments of the Redeemer. Perhaps it would never have reported the melting accents of the Son of David, if it had not already introduced a preface written in the uncompromising style of David's imprecations. No man is prepared to accept mercy, unless he approve of justice. No man is qualified to approve of justice unless he delight in mercy. The terrible threat which startles us, interprets the soft persuasive that charms us. We are appalled by some stern words of David. But he uttered them, because his mind had been subdued by the tenderness of his Son, against whom all opposition is barbarous. We are soothed by the kindly sentiments of the Lord of David. But he uttered them because he had felt the power and the majesty of justice, and he knew our need of some friend of the law, who would deliver us from its grasp. It is very true, that the power of the Bible comes in part from its intensity in impressing upon us one truth at a time. But when we take the full range of its teachings, we find that *combination* gives the durability to its power. It is sharp in its analysis, but also broad in its synthesis. It mingles many rays into one beam. As a whole, it is a model of comprehensiveness. When we are too bold, it overawes us by its denunciations of a wrath which we tremble to portray; and when we are too despondent, it cherishes us with a warmly-breathing love, of which a mother's pity for her first-born is but a chilling emblem.

Although the general style of the Bible is to give one fervid utterance here and another fervid utterance there, without attempting to adjust the two into a system, yet sometimes it sets off the sterner sentiment by the milder one, in immediate contrast. When God reveals himself in his word, he sometimes causes the Alpine flower to bloom on the verge of the cold precipice. When he publishes his written volume, he sometimes bids the volcano to blaze forth from the midst of an Italian garden.

> "O Lord my God, if I have done this;
> If there be iniquity in my hands;

> If I have rewarded evil unto him that was at peace with me;
> *(Yea, I have delivered him that without cause is mine enemy:)*
> Let the enemy persecute my soul and take it;
> Yea, let him tread down my life upon the earth;
> And lay mine honor in the dust.
> *Arise, O Lord, in thine anger,*
> Lift up thyself because of the rage of mine enemies,
> And awake for me, Thou who hast ordained judgment."[1]

The day will come when we shall learn not to dislocate the Imprecatory Psalms from their appropriate junctures. That will be the day of the revelation of the righteous judgment of God. Then we shall look upon his purposes as the inspired Psalmists looked upon them. We ourselves shall be, *as it were*, inspired. Then we shall see with our eyes whom God intends to save, and whom he intends to punish. Then we shall be able to comprehend the spirit of the songs, a few of which were sung on Mount Moriah,[2] and the same may be sung again in the upper temple. We shall see drawn out, in attractive lines, all the lowly graces of redeemed men, and of Christ their Redeemer; all the patience and sympathy and forgiving love of the children of God and of God himself; both his and their willingness to do all and to yield all that could be reasonably done or yielded; and when the Judge stands forth an impersonation of every winning virtue, of the self-denying spirit which God himself has exercised in behalf of creatures and of enemies, then will shine out, resplendent as the face of him who shineth like the sun, *the love of God*, which cannot secure the well-being of the universe unless the spirit of the Imprecatory Psalms be fulfilled. "Let justice be done," or the universe can have no quiet. "Let justice be done," or heaven itself will be despoiled by traitors. "Justice *must* be done," or the wicked will never cease from troubling, nor the weary be at rest. On that day these oft-repeated Psalms will strike up a blaze of light, illumining the justice and the grace of God; that justice to the few which is benevolence to the many; those retributions on ten thousand which are essential to the safety of ten thousand times ten thousand and thousands of thousands. The whole genius of these abused Psalms will then be unfolded by the final event, and will be recognized as compressed in the two words which we use so idly and vainly on earth: Amen, Alleluiah. That sound which the beloved apostle heard in Patmos, was the resonance of these old Psalms

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[1] Psalm vii. 3–6. See also Psalm cix. 3–6; cxxix. 21–24; 2 Tim. iv. 14–16. Hupfeld acknowledges that the Old Testament *here and there* rises above its ordinary standard of benevolence, and he specifies Psalm vii. 4 as one example of its kindly spirit. See his Com. on Psalm xli. 10.—It is worthy of remark, that in Psalm vii. 5 the poet employs the same forms of speech for imprecating (if we may use this infelicitous term) evil on himself, *provided that he* is guilty, which he employs for invoking evil on his enemies, *provided that they* remain impenitent (see p. 179 above). It should seem more natural, however, to interpret the words יִרַדֹּף, וְיַשֵּׂן, and וְיִרְמֹס as words of cordial resignation, than as words of positive request.

[2] We are careful not to affirm that *all* the Imprecatory Psalms were sung, either in the service of the Jewish temple, or the synagogue. Perhaps the lxxxii., xciv., cv., cxviii., cxx., cxxv., cxxxv., cxxxvi., may be considered as belonging, more or less fully, to the genus of the Imprecatory Psalms, and these were sung in the Jewish temple. See Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. XVI. p. 202. Hymns and Choirs, p. 26.

"I heard a great voice of much people in heaven, saying Alleluiah: — for true and righteous are his judgments, for he hath avenged the blood of his servants.—And again they said, Alleluiah. And her smoke rose up forever and ever. And the four and twenty elders fell down and worshipped God that sat on the throne, saying, Amen, Alleluiah. And I heard as it were the voice of a great multitude, and as the voice of many waters, and as the voice of mighty thunderings, saying, Alleluiah; for the Lord God omnipotent reigneth. Let us be glad and rejoice, and give honor to him." There shall be no joy in heaven at the misery of rebels; no joy at their sin in resisting so kindly a government; no joy at the *necessity* of penal woe. But there shall be joy that the battle at length is fought; the victory at length is won; the loyal citizens of the empire may now have peace. There shall be joy, because Love, Mercy, and Grace will now reign unmolested; because there will never be again one single act of successful injustice; never again one single triumph of fraud, or envy, or malice, or revenge; and there shall be no more harm to the good man; neither sin nor temptation; neither shall there be any more peril to the cause of truth and charity.

ARTICLE VII.

REMARKS ON RENDERINGS OF THE COMMON VERSION (IN THE EPISTLE TO THE GALATIANS).

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THE object in the following remarks is not to revise the translation of this epistle, in course or minutely; but to point out some of the more obvious changes, which are regarded by interpreters as due to the sense, or to a clearer representation of the sense, of the original text. It may not be out of place to take occasion, in a few instances, to uphold the received rendering against a different view of the meaning from that adopted in our English version. Some of the changes, in the corrected translation, it will be seen, are required by the progress in textual criticism which has taken place during the two hundred and fifty years since the earlier English versions were wrought over by the revisers of A.D. 1611. An attempt has been made, in the corrections suggested, to disturb the familiar phraseology of the English scriptures as little as possible. In what follows, the current translation of the passages to be examined is presented first; and the altered form is then given, with brief explanations. The Greek has been cited, to some extent; but the force of the remarks may not always be understood without referring to the Greek Testament.

CHAPTER I.

Verse 6. *I marvel that ye are so soon removed from him that called you into the grace of Christ, unto another gospel* (οὕτω ταχέως μετατίϑεσϑε ἀπὸ τοῦ καλέσαντος ὑμᾶς ἐν χάριτι Χριστοῦ εἰς ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον). ‘I marvel that ye are so soon removing from him that called you in the grace of Christ, unto a different gospel.’ In this passage μετατίϑεσϑε means *are removing*, turning aside (lit. *transfer oneself*); and implies, first, that the change was voluntary on their part; and, secondly, that the defection was not yet complete, but in progress, and might be arrested. This form, as middle, was in common use to denote the act of renouncing one set of views and feelings for another, or of passing from one political party or philosophical sect to another party or sect. For this usage, see Wetstein, *Nov. Test.* vol. II., p. 216, and Kypke, *Obs.*, vol. II., p. 273. The examples are abundant, and need not be adduced here. Hence the greater familiarity of Greek readers with this sense of the expression, and the manifest pertinence of the thought, require that we so understand it in this instance. The passive form, *are turned aside*, or removed, implies that they acted not so much from their own choice as from the instigation of others, and thus suggests an apology for their conduct. But such an exculpation is not only at variance with the general tone of the epistle, but especially out of place just here, at the outset of the discussion. The common version makes the present act a past one, and confounds the middle with the passive. 'In the grace of Christ' (ἐν χάριτι Χριστοῦ) denotes the medium through which God extends to men the blessings of the gospel. See Rom. iii. 24 – 26. The ground of the call, which makes the believer an heir of salvation, is found in the love of the Son who was sent, as well as of the Father who sent him. The other rendering, '*unto the grace*,' can be justified only as = *called you to be partakers in the grace*, etc., which is needlessly periphrastic. Besides, we have commonly not ἐν, but εἰς or περί, after this verb in speaking of the privileges to which Christians are called; see v. 13; 1 Cor. i. 9; 1 Thess. ii. 14; 1 Tim. vi. 12; 1 Pet. ii. 9, 21; v. 10. Again, we should translate εἰς ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον, *unto a different gospel*, i.e. *different* from that which he preached. The change of the pronouns (see ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο in the next verse) cannot be accidental, and the translation should notify the reader of the variation. Scholars agree in this force of ἕτερον, whether they express it by *another*, or *different*. Compare the use of ἕτερον in Mark xvi. 12 and Luke ix. 29.

Verse 8. *But though we, or an angel from heaven, preach* *any other gospel unto you than that which we have preached unto you.* ‘But even if we, or an angel from heaven, should preach to you any other gospel contrary to that which we preached.’ *Καὶ ἐάν* is *even if;* not *although*, which would be *ἐὰν καί*, or *εἰ καί* (compare Mark xiv. 29). See Klotz, *Devarius*, II., p. 519; and Hartung, *Lehre von den Partikeln*, I., p. 139. The supposition is viewed as one but remotely possible. The translation of *εὐαγγελίζηται* should mark the future contingency involved in *ἐάν* with the subjunctive. In *παῤ ὃ εὐηγγελισάμεϑα*, the preposition has the stronger sense, and not the weaker, as denoting what is merely additional or supplementary. It is worth mentioning that, at the time of the Reformation, the Protestants contended for the latter meaning, and declared that those incurred the anathema pronounced in this place who insisted upon traditions, decrees of councils, and the like, in addition to the written word; while the Catholics replied that the passage forbids nothing except what can be shown to set aside or contravene the teaching of holy scripture. The aorist of the verb goes back to the time when Paul was among the Galatians.

Verse 9. *As we said before, . . . if any man preach any other gospel contrary to that which ye have received.* ‘As we have said before (*προειρήκαμεν*) . . . if any one (*τις* only in the Greek) preaches to you any other gospel contrary to that which ye received.’ Wiclif, Coverdale, and the authors of the Rheims version, render the perfect correctly here. I suppose the apostle to repeat the asseveration in the previous verse; but we must render the verbal form in the same way, if, according to others, we understand that he would recall a declaration made at the time of his last visit. As Ellicott suggests, we must change ‘preach’ to ‘preaches,’ in conformity with the different moods in the original. The apostle deals here with the concrete case, which had arisen among the Galatians. The aorist in *παρελάβετε* refers to the definite time when the readers of the letter professed to believe.

Verse 10. *If I yet pleased men.* ‘If I were still pleasing (*ἤρεσκον*) men.’ We have here a marked instance of the continuative imperfect. The tentative sense, *was seeking to please*, is out of place here. The apostle, before his conversion, had actually gained as well as desired the applause of men; and *εἰ ἔτι* supposes the case of his doing over again what he had formerly done.

Verse 12. *For I neither received it of man, neither was I taught it.* 'For I also (*οὐδὲ ἐγώ*, i.e. as little as the other apostles) did not receive it from man, nor was taught it.' Some would express the same contrast by *neither did I* any more than they. See Wieseler's remark (*Brief an die Galater*, p. 57), and Jelf's *Gram.* § 776, Obs. 5 (ed. 1861). See, also, the elaborate note in Buttmann, *Neutest. Sprachgebr.*, p. 315. The change of *οὔτε* to *οὐδέ* is unwarranted.

Verse 14. *And profited in the Jews' religion above many my equals.* 'And went forward in Judaism beyond many companions of the same age.' The etymology of *προέκοπτον* (*to strike* or *cut forward*, make one's way by blows, press onward) might seem to justify a stronger phrase; but usage weakened the meaning, and effaced nearly all trace of the original figure. Compare Luke ii. 52; Rom. xiii. 12; 2 Tim. ii. 16; iii. 9, 13. If we say '*profited*,' as in the common version (after Wiclif, the Genevan, and Rheims versions), we are led naturally to think of some superiority, on the part of Saul, as a scholar or teacher; whereas the participial clause which follows (*περισσοτέρως . . παραδόσεων*) states in what field it was that he gained such pre-eminence. This rendering presupposes or favors the false view that *Ἰουδαϊσμός* denotes Jewish learning and theology. Tyndale and Cranmer, with a nearer approach to accuracy, say '*prevailed*.' *Συνηλικιώτας* which our translators render '*my equals*' (found here only in the N. Test., and rare in the classics, but no doubt = *συνήλικες*), denotes *those of the same age*, and especially those who at the same time live together, or associate with each other. See the examples in Wetstein, *Nov. Test.*, Vol. II. p. 217. All the lexicons give 'comrade' as one of the senses. The apostle refers in all probability to those near his own age, with whom he was brought into contact as fellow-pupils in the school of Gamaliel (*παρὰ τοὺς πόδας Γα-*

μαλιὴλ πεπαιδευμένος, in Acts xxii. 3), who, from the nature of the case, must have been numerous (πολλούς), and earnestly devoted to the support of Judaism. He does not say (be it observed) that he surpassed many of his contemporaries of that class, as if *some* of them might have excelled him, but that among his many youthful associates at that period, he had absolutely no superior in his fanatical zeal for the law. If now we say "many equals" simply (as in the common version), one might be led to think of nothing more than a parity of rank among them; or (which is a marginal reading, and nearer the truth) if we say "equals in years," we might think of the age as the only respect in which they were equal, without the idea of a personal association. The opinion entertained by many critics, that πολλοὺς συνηλικιώτας were all the Jews in Palestine during the apostle's youth, his contemporaries in that wider sense, can not well be correct; first, because the construction would naturally have been πολλοὺς τῶν συνηλικιωτῶν; and secondly, because the statement merely that he surpassed many of his countrymen, or many countrymen (if so hard an expression could be used), would fall short both of what was true in the case, and what his argument would make it so pertinent that he should say. Our version depends here on the Rheims (A. D. 1582). It may be well, therefore, to replace essentially the vernacular rendering of the earlier periods. Tyndale, Cranmer, the Bishops' Bible (1584), and the Genevan have *many of my companions*, and Wiclif, *many of myn eune eldis*, probably with the same import.

Verse 18. *I went up to Jerusalem to see Peter.* 'I went up to Jerusalem to become acquainted with Cephas.' There is no doubt here as to the meaning of ἱστορῆσαι. It is neither simply = ἰδεῖν, *to see*, nor ἐπισκέψασϑαι, *to visit*; but implies, in addition to what these words express, that the parties met and became known to each other for the first time. Though used of things more commonly, it could be applied to a person also; as in Joseph. *Jud. Bel.* VI., 1, 8, οὐκ ἄσημος ὢν ἀνὴρ ὃν ἐγὼ κατ' ἐκεῖνον ἱστόρησα τὸν πόλεμον. See Dr. Robinson's *N. T. Lex.* s. v. The best authorities read *Κηφᾶν* in this verse, and not *Πέτρον*. Here at Jerusalem, on Aramaean ground, Paul had often heard that name applied to Peter; and it is perfectly natural that the name should come back to him, as he recalls the events of that occasion. It is not improbable that in foreign lands the Judaizers adhered tenaciously to the Aramaic name (see 1 Cor. i. 12), and hence it may be that Peter himself, in his epistles, uses the Greek form as a silent protest against them.

Verse 23. *But they had heard only that he which persecuted us.* 'But they were only hearing that he who persecuted us.' Luther's version agrees here with the English. The idea is not, however, that '*they had heard*,' but (*ἀκούοντες ἦσαν*) *were only hearing* from time to time. All that they knew of their former persecutor, rumor brought to their ears. The participle is emphatic, as opposed to the idea of any personal acquaintance with him.

CHAPTER II.

Verse 3. *But neither Titus, who was with me.* 'But not even Titus.' *Ἀλλ' οὐδέ* is a true reading. Paul's views might have been deemed erroneous or imperfect, or some of his measures objectionable; *but*, so far from incurring any such censure, *not even Titus*, who stood before them as an impersonation, so to speak, of the whole difficulty, was *compelled to be circumcised.* Being of heathen parentage, his submission to the rite under other circumstances might have been thought advisable, as a matter of expediency (as in the case of Timothy, see Acts xvi. 3); but now, when the Judaistic party (see the next verse) would have misunderstood or perverted the act as a sanctioning of their doctrine that men must be circumcised in order to be saved (Acts xv. 1), even that other and lower view of the rite was not urged as a reason for circumcising Titus. For the force of *οὐδέ* compare Matt. xxvi. 29; Luke xxiii. 15; Acts xix. 2.

Verse 4. *And that because of false brethren.* 'And that because of the false brethren.' The article (*τοὺς*) before ψευδαδέλφους points out the class as notorious for the part which they acted. The connection with the preceding verb may be obscure; but, on the whole, our version, which some would alter here, has dealt fairly with the case. According to the best view, the connective δέ has its iterative use here, and repeats *ἠναγκάσϑη περιτμηϑῆναι,* as negatived by *οὐδέ.* "He was not, I say, compelled to be circumcised by the other apostles; and the reason was, that there was a party in the church who demanded it on grounds utterly subversive of the gospel as a system of grace." See Acts xv. 5. Compare δέ in Rom. iii. 22, and Philip. ii. 8. There are other views of the construction and the sense; but there is no one which the later exegesis supports to a greater extent than the current one of the English versions (from Tyndale and perhaps Wiclif, onward). For a very full discussion of the point see Fritzsche, *Opusc. Academ.*, p. 180 sq. Winer (*Gram.*, § 63, I. 1) favors Luther's version, and would begin a new sentence here. Buttmann (*Neutest. Sprachgebr.*, p. 329) is undecided.

Verse 5. *To whom we gave place by subjection, no, not for an hour.* 'To whom we yielded the subjection (*εἴξαμεν τῇ ὑποταγῇ*), no, not for an hour.' Our translators make *τῇ ὑποταγῇ* almost a tautological repetition of *εἴξαμεν.* It is *the subjection* demanded in this matter of circumcision which is meant; it is the emphasized word, therefore, and forms the *punctum saliens* of the verse.

Verse 6. *But of those who seemed to be somewhat.* 'But from those reputed to be something' (*ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν δοκούντων εἶναί τι*). It is difficult to separate from the expression 'who seemed to be somewhat' the idea of a "covert irony" on the part of Paul, with respect to the justice of the reputation which the three apostles (see v. 9) enjoyed. See Trench, *Authorized Version*, p. 185. The Greek affords no ground for such a reflection on his impartiality.

Verse 8. *For he that wrought effectually in Peter to the apostleship of the circumcision, the same was mighty in me toward the Gentiles.* 'For he that wrought for Peter in behalf of the apostleship of the circumcision (*ὁ ἐνεργήσας*

Πετρῷ εἰς ἀποστολήν) wrought also for me in behalf of the Gentiles.' The dative *Πετρῷ*, and so *ἐμοί*, is the dative of the person for whom, and not that of the sphere in which, the act was performed. With the latter meaning, the *ἐν* in *ἐνεργήσας* should be repeated before the dative, as in iii. 5; 2 Cor. iv. 12; Philip. ii. 13, etc. The translation (*εἰς ἀποστολήν*), *to the apostleship*, limits the declaration incorrectly to the appointment to that office, and *towards the apostleship* (as some prefer) is needlessly indefinite. The idea is that God (*ὁ ἐνεργήσας*, see 1 Cor. xii. 6; Phil. ii. 13) exerted his mighty power to qualify his servants for their work, and to make them successful in it. Further, our English version interpolates '*the same*' as the subject of *ἐνήργησε*; as if the question was not whether Paul had the same evidence of his apostleship as Peter had, but whether the evidence in the two cases came from the same source. The idea is that God who accredited the commission of the one, accredited that of the other.

Verse 11. *But when Peter was come to Antioch, I withstood him to the face, because he was to be blamed.* 'But when Cephas came to Antioch, I withstood him to the face, because he was blamed.' The external evidence demands *Κηφᾶς*, instead of the received *Πέτρος*. See the testimonies in Tischendorf. The gerundial force which our version (Vulg. *reprehensibilis*) ascribes to the participle (*κατεγνωσμένος*) is incorrect. Nearly all critics discard now this sense. Winer notices the error in his *Gram.*, § 45, 1 (p. 307). See Ellicott's note *in loc.*, and Robinson's *New Test. Lex.*, s. v. The traditionary incorrect translation is confessedly less obscure than the correct one. *How* or by *whom* was Peter blamed? The answers are various: by his own conscience (Rückert); by his previous conduct (Windischmann); in the sight of God (Ewald); by the Gentile converts (Wieseler); by the better part of the Jews and Gentiles (Ellicott). The meaning, in any event, is not that Paul censured Peter simply because others had done so, but that he censured him with good reason because he was so palpably in the wrong as to be already condemned (as the case may be) by the verdict of his own conscience, or by the voice of those who were still faithful. The object was to show how greatly Peter had gone astray, and not how excusable it was in Paul to expose the error.

Verse 14. *I said unto Peter before them all.* 'I said to Peter in the presence of all.' Of course ἔμπροσθεν is local here, as in Matt. v. 16; vi. 1, etc. '*Before all*' in the common version, might suggest that Paul singled out Peter as the object of his censure, instead of others who were guilty of the same offence. We are to omit '*them*' in italics, as wholly gratuitous.

Verse 18. *For if I build again the things which I destroyed, I make myself a transgressor.* 'For if the things which I pulled down, these I build up again, I make myself a transgressor.' The architectural figure in κατέλυσα and οἰκοδομῶ (see Matt. xxvi. 61; xxvii. 40; Mark xiv. 58, etc.) should be brought out in the translation of one verb as well as the other. Since the demonstrative ταῦτα repeats ἅ, the former is emphatic certainly, whether ἐμαυτόν has or has not an antithetic relation to Χριστός in v. 17. The order in English should preserve that emphasis. The meaning presents itself then more clearly to the mind of the reader. In the preceding verse the apostle repels with indignation (μὴ γένοιτο) the idea that Christ can be represented as the abettor of sin. It is not so, he affirms here anew; for (γάρ) instead of having been led to do wrong by the Saviour's requiring us to give up the law, we do wrong by the opposite course, to wit, in going back to the law after having been taught to renounce it.

Verse 19. *For I through the law am dead to the law.* 'For I through the law died to the law.' The error is that of disregarding the tense of the verb (ἀπέθανον). The apostle is not setting forth his present state as such, but referring to an effect of the law which at a certain time changed his relation to it as a ground of reliance; viz., that of its having led him to see the deficiency of his own righteousness, and his need of some other way of acceptance and sanctification; see iii. 19 sq., and Rom. vii. 6 sq. Thus the force of *γάρ*, as justifying what is said in the previous verse, becomes evident. "The wrong step (*κατέλυσα-παραβάτην ἐμαυτὸν συνίστημι*) is taken, I say, when we reassert the obligation of the law (*οἰκοδομῶ*); for (*γάρ*) we then act at variance with the proper office and effect of the law itself, which should be our schoolmaster to bring us to Christ."

Verse 20. *I am crucified with Christ: nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me.* 'I have been crucified with Christ; yet I live no longer, but Christ liveth in me.' The perfect (*συνεσταύρωμαι*) is employed here, because the apostle would evidently derive his present state as *being* crucified from his union with Christ, as *having been* himself crucified when Christ suffered on the cross, "the just for the unjust." Again, *συνεσταύρωμαι* is simply the negative side of *ϑεῷ ζήσω* in v. 19; for dying with Christ, in the Christian psychology, is dying unto sin, and consequently is inseparable from rising again to a new spiritual life (Rom. vi. 4). So that *δέ* after *ζῶ* is meant to oppose the apostle's living unto God (of which the intervening *συνεσταύρωμαι* states merely the privative ground) to the idea that Paul himself, in his natural character (*ἐγώ = ὁ παλαιὸς αὐτοῦ ἄνϑρωπος* in Rom. vi. 6), was or could be, in any sense, the author or sustainer of this new life, for which he was indebted to his participation in Christ's death. Hence one other change is required here. The English version would lead us to put a comma after *δέ* in the text, as well as after *ἐγώ*. The objections to this are, that there is no *ἀλλά* before *οὐκέτι*, as that view assumes, and that it weakens the opposition between *ἐγώ* and *Χριστός*, if Paul must be understood to say, as it were even hastily, that he had life, and then must correct himself, and deny or modify that assertion. Point, therefore, *ζῶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγώ, ζῇ δὲ ἐν ἐμοὶ Χριστός*. Wiclif follows the right punctuation; but Tyndale breaks up the clause, as in the current version. Nearly all scholars agree in the necessity of this correction. So Lachmann, Winer, Schott, Hahn, Rückert, Usteri, Matthies, Tischendorf, B. Crusius, De Wette, Meyer, Hilgenfeld, Wieseler, Conybeare, Ellicott, Alford.

Verse 21. *I do not frustrate the grace of God; for if righteousness come by the law, then Christ is dead in vain.* 'I do not set aside the grace of God; for if there be righteousness through the law, then Christ died without cause.' The sense of ἀϑετῶ is *set aside*, render superfluous (compare Mark vii. 9), rather than *frustrate*. The argument is not that Peter's theory (i. e. the one upheld by his conduct) defeated the end of Christ's death, but that it made his death unnecessary. On the contrary, Paul's system recognized the gospel as the only method of man's salvation, and thus honored the wisdom and grace of which it is the evidence and fruit. We must change, also, '*is dead*' (ἀπέϑανεν), to *died*, i. e. when Christ yielded up his life on the cross. The question between Peter and Paul was not in any sense whether Christ was dead or still living, but whether the condition of men demanded the sacrifice of his death. Hence follows so pertinently δωρεάν, *without cause*, as in John xv. 25 (ἐμίσησάν με δωρεάν); lit. *giftwise*, i. e. gratuitously, for nothing. See Tittmann, *de Synon. in N. T.*, p. 161. Chrysostom says: περιττὸς ὁ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ϑάνατος. If '*in vain*,' therefore, be understood to mean *without effect*, it misleads the reader.

CHAPTER III.

Verse 1. The words τῇ ἀληϑείᾳ μὴ πείϑεσϑαι after ἐβάσκανε, are wanting in all the later critical editions, or are marked as spurious. They express an appropriate meaning, but have been transferred undoubtedly to this place from ver. 7. See Green's *Developed Criticism*, p. 146, and the digest of readings in Tischendorf, Meyer, Wieseler, and others. Hence the corresponding words in our version, '*that ye should not obey the truth*,' must be dropped from an amended translation. We pass over here the several questions relating to the sense of προεγράφη. It appears to us that our version is correct, as opposed to those who would connect ἐν ὑμῖν with the verb: *was evidently set forth among you* (which would be so unnecessary after οἷς κατ' ὀφϑαλμούς), instead of joining it with the emphasized ἐσταυρωμένος, *having been crucified among you.* The apostle would bring home to them yet more closely the scene of the tragic occurrence. It was among the Galatians, in the midst of themselves, that the cross with its dying victim had been reared, as it were, anew. Some critics would reject ἐν ὑμῖν, but against the probability that the apparently superfluous expression would be omitted rather than inserted. Tischendorf, Meyer, Ellicott, Wordsworth, decide that we should retain it. See the Table in Wieseler's *Appendix.*

Verse 8. *And the scripture, foreseeing that God would justify the heathen through faith.* 'And the scripture, foreseeing that God justifies the heathen (or Gentiles) through faith.' The Greek verb here (δικαιοῖ) is present, because it sets forth the divine plan of justification as an abiding fact or principle. See Winer, *Gram.* § 40, 2. Besides, as Meyer remarks, the foreseen or predicted time (προϊδοῦσα) was the present Christian time.

Verse 15. *Though it be but a man's covenant, yet if it be confirmed, no man disannulleth or addeth thereto.* 'If a covenant has been confirmed, though it be a man's, no one sets it aside, or adds thereto.' The Greek sentence is involved, and may be recast in the translation for the sake of greater perspicuity. It is arbitrary to limit the act of ἀθετεῖ (see the use in ii. 21) to a part of the object (διαθήκην), instead of the whole, i.e. *sets aside* something from the compact. The idea, on the contrary, partakes of the nature of the argument *a minore ad majus:* the parties are bound by the compact after ratification, so as not only to have no right to break it up altogether (ἀθετεῖ), but not even to add new conditions (ἐπιδιατάσσεται), which would interfere in any way with the original purpose.

Verse 17. *And this I say, That the covenant that was confirmed before of God in Christ,* etc. 'But this I say, that a covenant which has been confirmed before of God unto Christ,' etc. Instead of '*the covenant*' (the article is wanting in the Greek), we should say *a covenant*, i.e. one which as the apostle proceeds to mention, has a certain characteristic. If we retain εἰς Χριστόν, we must translate *unto*

Christ, i. e. in his character as the head and representative of the true seed (*τῷ σπέρματι ὅς ἐστι Χριστός* in v. 16), to whom, in that sense, were guaranteed (*προκεκυρωμένην*) the blessings of the mode of justification (*διαϑήκη*), of which Abraham was the example. See Rom. iv. 16. But the genuineness of the expression is uncertain. The oldest witnesses (see Table in Wieseler's *Appendix*) testify against it. Griesbach, Lachmann, and Tischendorf discard it. Some others, as Ewald, Wieseler, Wordsworth, argue for it, but with doubtful success. Our translators, in this same verse, have '*cannot disannul*' for *οὐκ ἀκυροῖ, does not disannul.* The unnecessary interpolation was taken from the Geneva version.

Verse 19. *Ordained by angels in the hand of a mediator.* 'Having been ordained (*διαταγείς*) through angels (*δι' ἀγγέλων*) by the hand of a mediator.' That is, ordained on the part of God as the legislator, and *through angels* as the medium of the promulgation; compare *ὁ δὶ ἀγγέλων λαλεϑεὶς λόγος* in Heb. ii. 2, and *εἰς διαταγὰς ἀγγέλων* in Acts vii. 53. *'Εν χειρί* (= *διὰ χειρός*) *in the hand*, stands simply for בְּיַד (see Lev. viii. 36; xxvi. 46; Numb. iv. 38, etc. in LXX. and Hebrew), and describes the agency or ministry of Moses (the mediator intended here) in his character as *internuncius* or messenger between Jehovah and the people at the giving of the law (*ὁ γενόμενος ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ μετὰ τοῦ ἀγγέλου ἐν τῷ ὄρει Σινᾶ καὶ τῶν πατέρων ἡμῶν* in Acts vii. 38). The common rendering '*in the hand*,' would more naturally signify that the law was under the supervision and control of the mediator. Unfounded remarks have often been made on the passage, with that view of the meaning.

Verse 20. *Now, a mediator is not a mediator of one; but God is one.* 'Now, the mediator is not of one; but God is one.' The common version borrows the italicised *mediator* (see the English Bible) from the Geneva version. We render the passage as it stands in Wiclif, Tyndale, Cranmer, and others, except the obvious correction of the article. Whether *ὁ μεσίτης* means *the mediator*, according to the idea of the office or *the one* in a given instance (these are the only opinions), we must make the expression definite. In a sentence of such extreme obscurity, it is desirable to adhere as closely as possible to the original. As long ago as 1829, Winer reckoned up here two hundred and fifty interpretations. Wieseler, the latest German commentator, says that the number is now three hundred. He devotes sixteen ample pages to a renewed discussion of the meaning. He inserts an extensive list of the monographs and articles which have been written on the passage. Yet none of these diverse explanations rest upon any uncertainty of the text, or (unless we confound paraphrase and translation) admit of a different representation in English.

Verse 22. *But the scripture hath concluded all under sin, that the promise by faith of Jesus Christ might be given to them that believe.* 'But the scripture shut up all under sin, that the promise by faith in Jesus Christ might be given to them that believe.' We copy Meyer's note here, which will justify the translation. "What God has done (see Rom. iii. 9 – 19), since it is testified or recorded in scripture, is represented as an act of scripture which the latter has performed by a declaration of its testimony. Scripture, i. e. (as viewed apart from its personification) God, according to the testimony of scripture, *has brought all into custody* under sin, i. e. has put all, without exception, into the relation of bondage, in which sin as a power that tyrannizes over them (compare Rom. iii. 9), holds them, as it were, locked up under bolts and bars. The *συνέκλεισεν* placed first has the emphasis, *shut up*, so that the idea of freedom, i. e. the attainment of the *δικαιοσύνη* is out of the question. But *συνέκλεισεν* does not denote shut up *together, with one another*, as Bengel, Usteri, and some others think (also not in Rom. xi. 32), against which it is conclusive that the term is very often used where *one* only, not one with others, *is shut up* (see Ps. xxxi. 9; Polyb. 11. 2, 10, etc.); but *σύν* corresponds to the idea of a *complete* imprisonment, in which the captive is held utterly and altogether by the restraints imposed on him." It may be added that some would connect *ἐκ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* with *δοϑῇ* rather than *ἡ ἐπαγγελία*; and in that case it would be clearer in

English to put '*by faith in Jesus Christ*,' after '*might be given*.' But what Paul means probably is that the attainment of the promised inheritance (*κληρονομία* being the object of *ἐπαγγελία*) depends, not on faith in general (as the Judaizers might in some sort admit), but more specifically *faith in Jesus Christ;* and hence the apostle, in aiming to exclude that error, must conjoin the *ἐπαγγελία* and *ἐκ πίστεως*, and then after *δοθῇ* limit the blessings to the persons who fulfil the condition (*τοῖς πιστεύουσι*). With this view, our version is correct.

Verse 28. *There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female.* 'There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is no male and female.' The connective in the last clause is *καί*, but *οὐδέ* in the other cases. Perhaps the mode of expression merely adjusts itself to the familiar בָּרָא אֹתוֹ זָכָר וּנְקֵבָה in Gen. i. 27. The same combination is found in Matt. xix. 4 and Mark x. 6. Others seek for a deeper principle. The alterable social distinctions are separated from each other, the natural unalterable one is left undivided (Alford, Ellicott). At all events there is no reason why the English should not conform to the Greek. The gender is neuter (*ἄρσεν*, *θῆλυ*), as the only one which excludes the abolished distinction. The difference between the Greek and the English idiom makes it impossible to transfer this peculiarity.

ARTICLE VII.

NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

PROFESSOR WILLIAM PREGER'S MATTHIAS FLACIUS ILLYRICUS AND HIS TIMES.[1]

WE welcome this production, first, because it is the only satisfactory biography of Flacius Illyricus, and secondly, because his character has been misjudged and undervalued. Next to Luther and Melanchthon, he had most influence in settling the theology of the Lutheran church. His reputation has suffered in consequence of his opposition to Melanchthon. It seems to have been forgotten that his opposition consisted in a candid and logical defence of the doctrines of Luther. He was undoubtedly a hot disputant, but he was as undoubtedly conscientious and strong in argument. During the life-time of Luther, Melanchthon's tendencies to yield to the Catholics in point of church order and ceremonies, and to Calvin in matters of doctrine pertaining to the Lord's supper, were held in check by the authority of the great Reformer; but no sooner was this pressure removed than Melanchthon began to give vent to his pent-up feelings, and to give utterance to sentiments which Luther would not have tolerated for a moment. If it was right for a sincere follower of Luther to espouse the cause of his deceased friend and teacher, and to show by the severest logic that the Lutheran church was, under Melanchthon's guidance, drifting away from its moorings, then Flacius is to be exonerated from the charge of uncharitableness, and his plea must be allowed, that the unhappy division was not chargeable to him who defended the old Wittenberg theology, but rather to him who introduced innovations. We say nothing now about the truth of the one or the other view; we only remark that Flacius was the undoubted champion of the genuine theology of Saxony, as taught by Luther. We cannot, then, uphold Luther and condemn Flacius. In theology we cannot say that what Luther, as the first reformer, had a right to teach, Flacius, his inferior in authority, had not a right to maintain against so great a man as Melanchthon; for the theologian swears allegiance not to men but to principles. Flacius could justly reply to all who thus reproached him, that if Melanchthon was great, truth was greater.

So much Preger makes out and establishes on the most incontestible evidence. On the other hand, the course of Melanchthon admits of a similar relative justification. In yielding to a qualified approval of the Leipsic Interim, a Saxon modification of the Emperor's Augsburg Interim, in both of which the Protestants were required, for the sake of peace, to tolerate, if not to approve of, certain papal forms of government and worship declared to be non-essential, Melanchthon only manifested the same spirit of concession which appeared in him at Augsburg in 1530, and at which Luther, then living at Coburg, showed such impatience. This was entirely in accordance with Melanchthon's mild and timid nature, and with his well-known indifference to forms of worship. Flacius could maintain that Luther would never have given in his adhesion to the Leipsic Interim. We can now see that it was inexpedient for others to do so, and yet defend the moral character of Melanchthon. He undoubtedly made a blunder, but it was an innocent error in judgment, on a question of expediency. On another point, which after Melanchthon's death produced such excitement, his son-in-law, Peucer, suffering imprisonment with others for carrying out Melanchthon's views, the latter, notwithstanding the censure heaped upon him by the Lutheran church, will, in the judgment of most men, receive more than a bare sentence of acquittal on mere moral grounds. Luther's theory of Christ's bodily presence in the eucharist was less and less satisfactory to Melanchthon, the more he reflected on it. The clumsy philosophical justification of that theory on the ground of the ubiquity of Christ's body appeared more and more absurd to Melanchthon the more he examined it. That what was true of one nature in Christ might be affirmed of the other, could be easily admitted in a popular sense; but that such a licence could be taken in a metaphysical use of terms, was what the clear intellect of Melanchthon could not admit. He came gradually to believe that neither the scriptures, properly interpreted, nor reason, taught or admitted such a doctrine. Luther loved mystery, and often admitted it when there was no proof of its existence. Melanchthon required positive evidence of a mystery before he admitted it. Luther was not unfrequently a mystical interpreter, and was deficient in philological accuracy. Melanchthon saw that Luther's rule in interpreting the words, "This is my body," would lead to contradictions and absurdities if applied to other passages. The result was, that when Melanchthon's mind was left free to follow its own convictions, he modified his statements materially respecting the doctrine of the supper. Flacius, of course, could not brook such an insult to Luther's memory. The controversy was fierce and bitter, and Melanchthon and his party were in the end overruled by the Saxon theologians. Now how stands the matter as it affects the intellectual and moral character of the two chief combatants? Flacius clearly had Luther's great authority on his side, and that was enough for him. Melanchthon saw that the Genevan and Strassburg theologians entertained clearer and more scriptural views of the subject than Luther and the party of Flacius. With him the authority of Luther was not final. According to Flacius, all questions of theology and church usages were to be decided by the authority of the Bible *and of Luther*. According to Melanchthon, they were to be decided by the authority of the Bible *and of reason*. Both were sincere and deeply in earnest. Both make out their points by irresistible logic. Schmidt, in the new Life of Melanchthon just published by him, vindicates Melanchthon's character in this controversy triumphantly. Preger has done the same for Flacius. Flacius shows more firmness and tenacity, Melanchthon more conciliation and forbearance. The former had such a reverence for truth, or what seemed to be truth, that he forgot the respect due to a great and good man. He was mercilessly but conscientiously contentious. The latter was so amiable and fond of peace that he would for the sake of it yield what he might have maintained. He was never a polemic, except by necessity. While it pains one to see such men engaged in controversy at a time that the Protestant interests demanded their combined strength against the common enemy, now insolent in the exercise of superior power, it gives the indifferent spectator no little pleasure to witness the logical skill of two such combatants. If Melanchthon is the more comprehensive, Flacius is the more pungent. Both excite admiration for their abilities. We are indebted to Preger for bringing to light the long-forgotten treatises of Flacius, and furnishing us ample means of judging for ourselves of the learning, acuteness, and logical vigor of the Illyrian theologian.

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[1] Matthias Flacius Illyricus und seine Zeit, von Wilhelm Preger, Professor u. s. w. 2 Bde. Erlangen. 1859-61.

There is still another point in which these representatives of opposite schools of theology disagreed. Melanchthon was, when he published the first edition of his *Loci*, a strict predestinarian, adopting fully the doctrines of Augustine and of Luther on this point. When the controversy on the freedom of the will broke out between Luther and Erasmus, Melanchthon, by nature and education more predisposed to sympathize with the latter than with the former, felt himself irresistibly drawn towards the sentiments and views of the opponent of his own doctrine rather than to those of its bold, strong, and slashing defender. The young Melanchthon had at the outset such unbounded confidence in the great reformer, so much more mature and prominent than himself, that he adopted some of his doctrines, and this among the rest, more on his authority and that of Augustine than on a particular study of the subject. He never had passed through the violent internal conflicts which characterized the religious experience of those marked characters. He was spiritually born, not in the midst of storms and tempests, but in the calm sunshine of a quiet day. Religion with him was a genial spiritual influence, and the conception of the mode of its operation formed by Erasmus came nearer to his own spiritual consciousness than that formed by Luther. While Luther was so strong in his faith as to stumble at no difficulties, and allowed them unhesitatingly their full force, in order that grace might have the greater triumph, Erasmus fixed his eye on the human side rather than the divine, and portrayed it with such aptness and grace as to win the heart and the intellect of the gentle and classic Melanchthon. How awkward was his position! He was too candid to be a partisan, and therefore could not refuse to yield himself up to his conviction. He admitted, at first silently, the arguments of his opponent, and felt satisfied that his most intimate friend was in the wrong, and gradually showed himself in his modified views; and Luther, though fully aware of all this, silently tolerated the unpalatable change. But the theology of the

Lutheran church was founded on the *Loci* and the Augsburg Confession and Apology — all written by Melanchthon — as well as upon the Schmalcald Articles and the Greater and Lesser Catechism, written by Luther. The *Loci* and the Confession were revised by their author; and, strange to say, the church abandoned Luther and followed Melanchthon on this ticklish point, but rejected him with scorn and hatred for his more rational view of the eucharist. And ever since, crypto-Calvinist has been a term of reproach, partly on account of the secrecy implied, but chiefly on account of Calvinism, — the ugly thing concealed, — not the doctrine of divine decrees, but the denial of the omnipresence of Christ's body.

How different the position of Flacius and Melanchthon in this controversy! The former having before him the straight course of vindicating the doctrine of the Lutheran church as contained in all the symbolical books, the greater part of them written by his opponent himself; the latter being obliged to make such a curve as to face about in the opposite direction. There is a strange sort of romance in these situations. It would seem that history was unhinged, and events took an abnormal direction. How singularly these changes cut up and modify the veneration now felt by the Germans for both of these great reformers! The one taught the abhorred doctrine of necessity, in opposition to the freedom of the will; the other held the still more shocking doctrine of a spiritual presence in the supper. Strange, that the supposed error of Melanchthon on the latter point should excite tenfold more interest than the supposed error of Luther on the former.

The controversy of Flacius with Osiander on justification is one of deep theological interest. It leaves little that is new to be said by others on the subject. No later writers have shown greater acuteness in the treatment of the subject. The interest of his controversy with Major and Menius is as great, but it is more of a historical and personal nature. The various attempts at union among the German Protestants, first by theologians and then by the princes, as recorded in these volumes, give one a clear insight into the spirit of the times in respect to ecclesiastical matters. Flacius could never be quiet so long as there were any persons in the church whose faith was not as strictly Lutheran as his own; and yet all Wittenberg went, for the time being, with Melanchthon rather than with the deceased reformer. The reader, if he is a Christian, will be devoutly thankful that he was not born in those times. Of the three graces, faith, hope, and charity, the first only remained in full vigor; for, while there was much faith (in creeds), there was little hope, and no charity. The evils of Luther's dangerous principle, that the ultimate authority in deciding what creed should be maintained, and what prohibited, lay with the prince or ruler, soon began to appear. Hence such a man as Melanchthon, even in Luther's lifetime, must promise submission to the creed declared by the Elector to be the true one, or be banished. Flacius experienced all the workings of this principle. He was first supported by the Duke, in Jena, and all the ministers of the Duchy were required to sign a confession drawn up in conformity with his views. He was then forbidden to insist on those views, and was finally dismissed, and ordered to leave the country for adhering to what the Duke himself had once approved and enforced. It is truly humiliating to see the churches and clergy of a principality vexed and annoyed on questions of theology by a muddle-headed prince, himself, perhaps, the tool of a courtier. From the moment that Luther transferred the power of the pope to the civil ruler, he made the church the servant of the state. The prince, ruling by divine right, was responsible only to God for the exercise of his power; and the church no less than the state was to acquiesce in his decision. It is a somewhat remarkable fact that Flacius was incessantly persecuted, and often driven from place to place for teaching exactly what Luther taught. He was evidently a tenacious man, and born to be a polemic; but, notwithstanding his bad name for disputatiousness, he was far less violent and abusive in his language than his opponents, and more measured and unimpassioned than Luther. It was the sharpness of his logic, and the unsparing severity with which he exposed to the light of day any deviation from Luther that so galled his opponents. They charged him, and perhaps not unjustly, with assuming to be the guardian of the church. He did, indeed, endeavor to persuade princes and magistrates to watch over the purity of Christian doctrine, and confessed that he called every man to account, no matter what his rank or position was, who either openly or secretly attempted to destroy what Luther had built up. At the same time he affirmed that he did it as a faithful son of the church, doing only what every one was bound to do, namely, to guard its purity with all the power and skill he possessed. He furthermore maintained that, as the pupil and friend of Luther, he owed it to his memory to defend him and his doctrines against all assaults, even though they were made at Wittenberg itself, and by no less a man than Melanchthon. He was undoubtedly governed by conscientious motives, however he may have erred both in matters of doctrine and of expediency; but when he trusted in princes to preserve the orthodoxy of the church, he found to his grief that he trusted to a broken reed.

Though unfortunate in his life, and a wanderer and fugitive in his old age, and apparently unsuccessful in the chief aim of his life, still he ranks third among the men of his age in his influence upon the doctrines of the old Lutheran church. He has, indeed, been long almost forgotten, except as an ecclesiastical historian. His astonishing labors in church history in the Magdeburg Centuries, and in the *Catalogus Testium* are well known; his doctrinal discussions and treatises, to which the attention of the reader is directed by his biographer, do him equal honor as an acute thinker.

The great defect of the mind of Flacius was, that it was one-sided, being directed solely to abstract truth. He had a love, and even a passion, for that, but for scarcely anything else. His religion consisted in loving truth rather than in loving man. He could not even retain his friends. They nearly all turned against him. It could not be for his heresy, for he was as near the truth as they were. There must have been something in his temperament and manner that alienated them one by one from him. No doubt they saw that he was becoming more and more unpopular. Perhaps they wished the friendship of the Elector Augustus, his bitter and cruel enemy. He was left without a home, and finally died in a reformed convent, protected and nursed by its abbess, though persecuted by the civil authorities. He was to the very last true to his doctrine, and strong in the defence of it. Logically, he had the advantage over his numberless opponents.

E. H. ZOBER'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE HISTORY OF THE STRALSUND GYMNASIUM. In Six Parts.[1]

THERE are, in Germany, several gymnasia which have flourished for a period of three centuries. The four higher classes in these gymnasia correspond substantially to the classes of our colleges. The results of so much experience in the work of furnishing a liberal education, cannot be a matter of indifference to us. They have had a long, varied, and instructive history. Different modes of organization, of instruction, and of selecting and arranging studies, have been faithfully tried; and it would be strange indeed if they furnished no valuable lessons to the friends and patrons of learning of the present day. Of several of these learned schools we have valuable histories, written by men who understood the subject. Few authors of such histories have performed their task as well as the one named at the head of this Article. For more than twenty years has he been employed on this work. The whole makes a handsome quarto volume with portraits and plates, furnished at a very moderate expense. Its contents are partly antiquarian, partly biographical, and largely illustrative of modes of instruction and discipline.

On the day after Melanchthon's death, April 19, 1560, was dedicated the Stralsund Gymnasium, a building formerly occupied as a cloister, but now repaired and converted into a school-house. The burgomaster Gentzkow, in the presence of the city council, the clergy, and other distinguished citizens, delivered an address in Latin, and installed the rector and his assistant teachers. There were seven classes, besides a temporary preparatory class which was called "nulla classis." Besides the *Rector scholae*, there was a *conrector*, a *cantor*, a *subrector*, two *concentores*, and a *succentor*. It is remarkable that music was held in such high estimation that a majority of the teachers received their titles from their skill in that art. It will be perceived, also, that the *cantor* took rank of the *subrector*. The school had about three hundred pupils at the beginning. It was a public school, and was under the control of the city government, though the clergy were often consulted, and were generally appointed examiners. It is certainly not a little singular that, in an age when the school was a part of the church, and philosophy was the *ancilla theologiae*, the clergy of Stralsund should have no direct control of the schools. The teachers were supported partly by the income of the old funds originally belonging to the cloisters, and partly by the pay received for their musical services at church, at weddings, and at funerals. At first, the rector received eighty guilders, and the other teachers about twenty. Their salaries were afterwards repeatedly increased. The assistant teachers lodged in the school building.

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[1] Zur Geschichte des Stralsunder Gymnasiums. Stralsund. 1839–60.

The course of instruction was, at the beginning, very similar to the "Saxon Order," introduced by Luther and Melanchthon; but before the close of the sixteenth century, the system of John Sturm, for a long time the best in Germany, was introduced. The school laws were revised a second time in the year 1643. It will be interesting to see what, after eighty-three years' experience, was deemed necessary for the highest prosperity of this school. In respect to supervision, it was placed under the entire control of a Board of visitors, consisting of one chosen from the consular order, one from the syndics, one from the senate, and the superintendent (a high ecclesiastic) or some other theologian. Here we see the clergy properly represented in the Board of control. One member of the Board, at least, was required to visit the school every month, and go from class to class, through the whole school, to ascertain whether all the studies received suitable attention, and whether they were taught in their proper order, and in a manner adapted to the capacities of the pupils. He was also required to ascertain, either by personal examination or by inquiring of the teachers, the progress of the pupils in their studies and in good morals. If anything required immediate correction, it was attended to on the spot; if the case admitted of delay, it was reported to the Board. The visitors were all to attend a public examination once a year, in order to *examine sedulously*, in singulis classibus quid et quomodo doceatur atque discatur. The laws were afterwards to be read before the whole school, and at each one of the laws the question was to be put, whether it had been observed by teacher and pupil throughout the year. From prudential considerations, the next sentence shall be given without a translation. Si quid a praeceptoribus secus quam decet actum deprehendatur, sevocati in proximum conclave coram caeteris collegis fideliter admoneantur.

The duties of students are thus summarily presented to view: 1. A love for religious worship. 2. Respect for parents and teachers 3. Diligence in study and school exercises. 4. Purity and civility in morals and manners. Every student was required to make himself perfectly familiar with Luther's Catechism. It was learned in German and in Latin, and formerly even in Greek. The Decalogue was also carefully studied and made a rule of life. If any were not able to observe it in its spiritual import, they were nevertheless to abstain from all gross vices. They were required to attend church regularly, on Sundays and festival days, and without noise or whispering, to follow the directions of the chorister and aid him in both kinds of singing (choral and variegated). Among the many other good rules was one that the pupil should not, in recitation, stealthily look into a book, or give out as his own what a fellow student may whisper in his ear, or point out in any other way. There were in the laws sixteen directions for those who sang for charity at the doors of the rich (leges ostiatim canentium).

In the paragraph prefacing the course of study, it is said that there are different kinds of students in the classes, some going through the course mechanically, either because of mental imbecility, or on account of having other ulterior aims; and some who study in earnest, because they intend to devote their lives to study. Et horum videtur potissima habenda ratio (good), ita tamen, ut caeteris etiam, quantum fieri convenit, cura impendatur (also good). "Above all things, let not the studies be so multiplied as to overload the mind and impede its progress." After repeating that students of good talents should not be retarded by the stupidity of others, nor yet receive so much attention that the others shall be neglected, the order proceeds to say, that the object of the school is to secure such a religious, moral, literary, and scientific training, ut discentes fundamenta doctrinae Christianae noscant, honestis moribus sint praediti, pure et eleganter Latine loquantur et scribant, Graecum auctorem styli non admodum difficilis intelligant, dialecticae et rhetoricae praecepta habeant cognita, nec omnino sint ignari rudimentorum mathematicorum, imprimis quae ad musicam et arithmeticam pertinent, adderem et metrica elementa cum astronomicis, si in posterum id fieri commode potest.

If we make allowance for the age to which this system of instruction belongs, we must pronounce it good. Whatever may be thought of the manner of religious and moral instruction, the place given to this most important part of education must be admitted to be the true one. The creeds may have had too prominent a position for persons so young; and too much reliance may have been placed upon penalties in making young men moral. But that the education given was from beginning to end thoroughly Christian, is what not only every good man, but every wise man, must approve. Nor must we suppose that the great teachers of that age were wholly in the dark in respect to the best means of forming the character of the young. It is full three hundred years ago that the question was put: "Why is *amo* of the first conjugation, and *doceo* of the second?" and the answer given: "Because you must *love* before you *teach*." In the present state of learning, the Latin language and literature should not so predominate over the Greek as they do in the course here laid down. The Latin has ceased to be the language of books and of literary intercourse; and the greater affluence of Greek literature and art is now better understood than it was then. Mathematics, also, justly hold a higher place now than they did in the seventeenth century. Science has almost come into being since that time.

The school hours were five each day, except Saturday, from eight o'clock to ten in the morning, and from twelve to three in the afternoon. The pupils dined at eleven o'clock, and in earlier times had an exercise at six o'clock in the morning, which was now discontinued.

In the documents accompanying this history there are many interesting details. The oldest document is a diary of the Burgomaster, giving an account of his official acts relating to the school. The first sentence is: "E. D. ward vam rade bewilligt, dat men dat schwarte closter buwen und to einer scholen anrichten scholde," i. e. "the same day (May 10, 1559) it was granted by the council that one should repair the Black Cloister, and fit it up for a school." This curious specimen of old Low German is a sort of middle link between the High German and English. "April 20, 1560, the rector Widemann was installed with much honor in the new school at St. Catharine's, and the government of it committed to him by me in a Latin oration." "May 31, I was appointed with J. S. and J. N. by the council an overseer of the new school, but I would accept only for one year." The next year we find this remarkable entry: "I read the new laws before the rector and his colleagues. They requested a copy, and a *terminum deliberandi* whether they would accept them, or rather leave the service." The unfortunate rector had a difficulty with his wife, and went to the burgomaster for advice. A few months afterwards we find this sad record: "Magister Widemann's wife was with me (was Mgr. Widemanns wieff bi mi), and gave me her decision that she would not receive her husband again." The next extract will give us a change from the grave to the gay. "The Cantor sent me to-day (Jan. 7, 1565) from the school a song for four voices, which he himself, perhaps, composed. What he means by it I do not know, but conjecture that it may be to remind me of a former one with which he honored the city, *propter remunerationem quam hactenus forsan avide expectaverit.*" O Mr. Burgomaster! With this we must stop, although there are several touching letters respecting the hard service and pecuniary distresses of teachers which we should like to present, as they would be sure of finding sympathetic readers. It is with regret that we part with an author who is so true a scholar and who has so genuine an antiquarian spirit. Upon the last half of the work we have not entered at all, nor can we do so now.

ELLICOTT ON THE EPHESIANS.[1]

IN the preface to this volume Prof. Ellicott, acknowledges his obligations to Harless's Exposition of the Epistle to the Ephesians, "which," he says, "for accurate scholarship, learning, candor, and ability, may be pronounced one of the best, if not the very best, commentary that has ever yet appeared on any single portion of Holy Scripture" (page v). He also makes respectful mention of Dr. Stier's Exposition, and that of Prof. Eadie. He avows his great and peculiar obligations to Dr. Meyer. It is evident, however, that Prof. Ellicott is himself an independent critic. We have often characterized his comments as brief, lucid, pertinent, and sensible. His learning is full and accurate. He is less influenced than some of our American commentators, by theological prejudices and by mere theories of religion. His aim is to ascertain the grammatical meaning of the sacred word, to explain scripture by scripture; and not to exercise his ingenuity in reducing the utterances of the apostle to a merely human standard. The present edition of his Commentary on the Ephesians is carefully printed; in some points it is more correct than the English copy; and Mr. Draper merits the thanks of American scholars for giving them so valuable a work in so attractive a form, and for so low a price.

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[1] A Commentary, Critical and Grammatical, on St. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians. With a revised Translation. By Charles J. Ellicott, B.D., Professor of Divinity in King's College, London, and late Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge. Andover: Warren F. Draper; Boston: Gould and Lincoln; New York: John Wiley; Philadelphia: Smith, English, & Co. 1861. pp. 190. 8vo.

ELLICOTT'S LIFE OF CHRIST.[1]

DURING the last quarter of a century, a larger number of works on the life of Christ have been published than ever appeared before within so brief a period. Many of these works have been written in the interest of rationalism or pantheism; and have been elaborate attempts to prove that the narratives of the evangelists are not accurate, or that the character of Jesus is not faultless. The present volume is not only evangelical in its tone, but is earnest and enthusiastic. It stands in marked contrast with the Life of Christ by Strauss, and Hase, and even Neander. It sometimes glows with religious feeling, where we should expect a strictly argumentative and critical discussion. The volume would have been more satisfactory to scholars, if it had discussed with more definiteness certain disputed questions in regard to the life of Christ; and it would have been more fascinating to the general reader, if it had introduced more of the dramatic element into its narrative. This element is less conspicuous in the work of Ellicott than in the antiquated work of Hess on the same theme, and is of course far less conspicuous than in the Gospels, from which all these biographies of Christ are derived. The present volume will be read with profit not only by clergymen, but also by laymen interested in sacred studies.

PROF. STUART ON THE HEBREWS.[2]

PROFESSOR Stuart's Commentary on the Hebrews was the first of his expository works which gave him a European reputation. It was favorably reviewed by Prof. Bleek and others in Germany, and by Dr. J. P. Smith and others in England. The nature of the subjects discussed in the volume is such, that different evangelical parties unite in commending this Commentary; while the nature of the subjects discussed in Prof. Stuart's work on the Romans is such as arrays different evangelical parties against each other in their estimate of that work. Professor Stuart was an original critic, although he studied extensively the writers who preceded him. No candid man can read his pages without feeling the inspiration of the author's mind. It is unusual to find in a textual commentary such a glow of intellect, such a critical enthusiasm. Professor Robbins has been faithful in his abridgement of the work. and has developed an affluent and exact scholarship in what he has added, as well as in what he has omitted. Every clergyman should own this volume.

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[1] Historical Lectures on the Life of our Lord Jesus Christ; being the Hulsean Lectures for the Year 1859; with Notes critical, historical, and explanatory. By C. J. Ellicott, Professor of Divinity, King's College, London, late Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge, Author of Critical and Grammatical Commentaries on St. Paul's Epistles. Boston: Gould and Lincoln; New York: Sheldon and Company; Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1862. pp. 382. 12mo.

[2] A Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews. By Moses Stuart, late Pro-

HOPKINS'S HISTORY OF THE PURITANS.[1]

THIS volume completes the work on which Mr. Hopkins has expended so much labor, and which has been heretofore repeatedly noticed in the Bibliotheca Sacra. The work is well adapted to interest the general reader, and is rich in its suggestions to the student who is versed in history. Some features in its plan diminish the authority of the work as one of historical reference, while they add freshness to it as a picture of the Puritans. It is difficult to combine the vivacity at which Mr. Hopkins aims, with the statistical and verbal accuracy which characterizes a volume for historical reference. The moral impression of the three volumes is healthful and invigorating. They reflect high honor on Mr. Hopkins. The publishers, as well as the author, merit the gratitude of the community for presenting to us so suggestive a history in so attractive a style, at a time when men's hearts are failing them for fear, and when they need a faithful portraiture of the Puritans. May this portraiture stimulate the sons of the Puritans to a heroism like that of their fathers!

OLIVER'S TRANSLATION OF THE SYRIAC PSALTER.[2]

A NEW translation of the Hebrew Bible is a new commentary on it. A new translation of a version of the Hebrew Bible is in like manner, al-

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fessor of Sacred Literature at Andover. Edited and Revised by R. D. C. Robbins, Professor in Middlebury College. Fourth Edition. Andover: Warren F. Draper; Boston: Gould and Lincoln; New York: John Wiley; Philadelphia: Smith, English, and Co. 1860. pp. 575. 12mo.

[1] The Puritans: or the Church, Court, and Parliament of England during the Reigns of Edward VI. and Queen Elizabeth. By Samuel Hopkins. In three volumes. Boston: Gould and Lincoln; New York: Sheldon and Company; Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1861. Vol. III. pp. 675. 8vo.

[2] A Translation of the Syriac Peshito Version of the Psalms of David, with

though not in like degree, a commentary on the Hebrew. We have been interested in the present translation of the Syriac Peshito version of the Psalms, because it reflects light upon our old English Bible, and suggests many hints which lead into a more exact comprehension of the inspired Psalms than we obtain from our authorized version merely. At the same time, we rise from a perusal of this version with a quickened love for our old English Psalter. When we compare the following translations from the Syriac with the corresponding translations from the Hebrew, we feel, if we do not see, the superiority of King James's words: "Streams of waters come from mine eyes, because they keep not thy law;" "As for wicked men, I will not take salt with them;" "Thy people shall be glorious in the day of power; in the beauties of holiness, from the womb, I have begotten thee, O youth, from the beginning." In regard to the last-quoted verse, the translator says in his preface, p. vii: "It will be observed that in Psalm cx. the original is made to contain a reference to the eternal generation of the Son of God." We often hear complaints of the grammatical inaccuracies in our English translation. A similar want of grammatical nicety is seen in the present translation from the Syriac: "Thou open*est* thine hand, and satisfi*eth* the desire of every living thing." On the whole, however, the English style of the present volume is excellent. The preface, too, is interesting and valuable, and the notes are judicious. The entire work is well worthy of repeated perusal, and reflects high honor on the carefulness, fidelity, taste, and scholarship of Mr. Oliver. We are particularly gratified to see that a volume exhibiting so much erudition has been prepared in a rural parish of Vermont, and its accomplished author has done so good a work amid "the want of those literary facilities which are seldom found in the libraries of parish clergymen." (Preface, p. xiv.) This remark is a rich hint to many pastors in our rural settlements.

COLLEGE EDITION OF HAMILTON'S METAPHYSICS.[1]

This volume is prepared on the basis of Sir William Hamilton's Lectures, and contains such additions to these Lectures as are derived from his Discussions, Notes on Reid, the Memoranda of his English editors, etc., etc. The additions are made with care and skill; the needless repetitions of the Lectures on Metaphysics are omitted, and the arrangement of the Lectures is somewhat and judiciously modified. Sir William's language is preserved throughout the volume, with the exception of a few instances where slight

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Notes Critical and Explanatory. By the Rev. Andrew Oliver, M.A. Boston: E. P. Dutton and Company. London: Trübner and Company. 1861. pp. 331. 12mo.

[1] The Metaphysics of Sir William Hamilton, collected, arranged, and abridged for the use of Colleges and Private Students. By Francis Bowen, Alford Professor of Moral Philosophy in Harvard College. Cambridge: Sever and Francis. 1861. pp 563. 12mo.

changes were indispensable; these alterations are designated by brackets. It is easy to distinguish the assertions in his Lectures from those in his Discussions, Notes, etc. We think that a more connected, complete, and lucid view of Hamilton's Metaphysics can be obtained from this volume than from either of the volumes previously published, and pertaining to this branch of his studies. It is well fitted for an introduction to his entire works. At the same time it does not dispense with the necessity of perusing his Lectures on Metaphysics, or on Logic, or his Discussions, or his edition of Dr. Reid. The volume has been the result of patient study on the part of Professor Bowen, and it illustrates his conscientiousness and scrupulous exactness in his editorial labors.

A MEMORIAL OF REV. GEORGE B. LITTLE.[1]

WE have refrained from noticing this volume hitherto, because we have regarded it as sacred to private affection, and *printed* for the solace of bereaved friends, rather than *published* for the use of the entire community. We are happy to know, however, that the volume has been purchased and highly prized by many who were personal strangers to Mr. Little, and that it is regarded as one of the most appropriate and comfortable New Year's gifts which can be made to the invalid, and to the friends of the invalid, and especially one who is slowly lingering, as was the subject of this memorial, on his way to the tomb. It records with great simplicity the words of a man whose taste had been refined by skillful culture, and whose intellect was enriched with the fruits of many sciences. He was a lover of music, and of all the fine arts. He was an exact linguist and an accurate metaphysician. He was a diligent student of the Bible, and an earnest, wise preacher of its truths. He was eminently modest, humble, devout. He was well furnished for the scene of his death. The words which he uttered during the wearisome months appointed to him, were simple, natural, alive with thought and feeling; many of them are bright gems. They were his own words; not cast in a stiff mould, not stereotyped from metallic plates. The freshness of his utterances, their unstudied pertinence, their lowly tone, their hopefulness, their rich hints, ingratiate them into the heart of the reader who remembers that he must die at some time, and that he may die soon. The sententious instructions of Mr. Little are clothed in the garb of easy conversation; and we are *taught*, while we regard ourselves as merely *reminded* of what we knew before. His words are arranged in this volume with a logical care which hides itself under a charming unconsciousness of skill; and so they are delicately fitted to soothe the sorrowful, and especially to light the invalid in his path to the better land. We will only add, that the typographical execution of the volume is neat and rich, exquisitely adapted to its literary and religious character.

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[1] A Memorial of Closing Scenes in the Life of Rev. George B. Little. Riverside Press: Printed by H. O. Houghton, Cambridge. 1861. pp. 171. 8vo. For sale at the Depository of the American [Boston] Tract Society.

LIFE OF JOHN ANGELL JAMES.[1]

We naturally feel an interest in the private life of a man who has given to the world such volumes as "The Anxious Inquirer," "The Christian Father's Present," "Christian Duty," "The Course of Faith," and seven or eight other works of nearly equal popularity. An American will not feel an interest in all parts of the present biography, although the attachment of Mr. James to our own land awakens within us a peculiar affection for him. Some statements in the Memoir it would have been well to omit altogether. Still, from a large portion of this volume the clergymen of the United States will derive great profit. The pastoral life of Mr. James is itself a study. It would be an immense advantage to our own churches, if they would imitate in many respects the example given them by the faithful parishoners at Birmingham. We have been especially interested in the suggestions with which this volume abounds, concerning the secret of a prolonged success in the ministerial office. The remarks on the influence of "Popular Preaching" upon the religious character of the preacher himself, are eminently valuable; see, for instance, pp. 216 seq. The entire volume is a comment on the worth of a devoted pastor. Perhaps it is not too much to say, that more persons in this country have heard of Birmingham as the residence of John Angell James, than as the seat of manufacturing and commercial enterprise. One righteous man exalteth a city. The work, however, which has given to him and to the place of his abode so great and so good a name, was mainly performed within his own heart, and in the solitude of his closet and study.

GREEN'S HEBREW GRAMMAR.[2]

The two essential qualities of a good Hebrew Grammar are, in the first place, a clear apprehension and lucid unfolding of the great theoretic principles which underlie the various phenomena of the language; and, secondly, fulness and accuracy of detail. In both these respects Prof. Green has, in our judgment, succeeded well. In addition to the labors of

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[1] The Life and Letters of John Angell James; including an unfinished Autobiography. Edited by R. N. Dale, M.A., his Colleague and Successor. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, No. 530 Broadway. 1861. pp. 633. 8vo.

[2] A Grammar of the Hebrew Language. By William Henry Green, Professor in the Theological Seminary at Princeton, N. J. New York: John Wiley. 1861. 8vo. pp. x and 322.

Gesenius and Rödiger, whose grammatical system has been mainly followed hitherto in the United States, he has diligently availed himself of the works of Nordheimer, Hupfeld, and other modern grammarians, and especially of Ewald, who unites, in a wonderful degree, profoundness of theory with copiousness and accuracy of detail. Prof. Green's plan, as given in his own language, is " to combine whatever is valuable in each " of the three " leading grammars of Gesenius, Ewald, and Nordheimer." The principles of the language are clearly and happily stated, and the numerous details are given under each head with a fulness that is at the same time devoid of prolixity. We are pleased to notice those numerous *collections of particular forms*, under specific heads, of which every student feels the need. As illustrations, we select at random the following: under the head of verbs *Pe Nun*, § 131, Rem. 4, " The rejection of Nun from the Kal construct infinitive occurs in but few verbs; viz." — and then follows a list of all the cases. Again, in § 112, Rem. 4, we have a list of all the verbs *Pe Guttural* that " always take simple Sheva under the first radical in the species whose initial letters are annexed to the root." This is followed by lists of the verbs in which usage varies, either generally, or in particular passages.

The classification of nouns has always been a stumbling-block to beginners in Hebrew. Rejecting the arrangements of both Gesenius and Nordheimer, and all other arrangements of declensions, Prof. Green attempts to simplify the matter by the substitution of " a few general rules respecting the vowel-changes, which are liable to occur in different kinds of syllables," which, he says, " solve the whole mystery, and are all that the case requires or even admits." That no such thing as proper declensions exists in Hebrew, is certainly true; and also that those made out by Gesenius are " cumbrous " and " not exhaustive." Yet it seems to us that a classification of Hebrew nouns might be made, based on the fundamental distinction of mutable and immutable vowels, which should help, and not puzzle, the beginner.

In the department of Syntax, Prof. Green is very concise. In lieu of the three hundred and eighteen pages of Nordheimer, and the eighty-three pages of Rödiger's Gesenius (Conant's translation), he has but forty-seven pages. Nordheimer's Syntax, though very able, is too prolix and repetitious. The last seventeen pages of Rödiger's Gesenius belong, to a great extent, to the department of lexicography, and might be much abridged. Prof. Green's Syntax admits of no abridgment. It is as condensed as possible. Perhaps a somewhat larger space might have been profitably devoted to the fuller developement of its striking peculiarities.

The grammar now under consideration is highly creditable to American scholarship, in the department of sacred literature, and we hail its appearance with pleasure.

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ARTICLE I.

DOCTRINES OF METHODISM.

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It is our purpose in the present Article to furnish a brief statement of the doctrines of the Methodist Episcopal Church, especially those points in which there exists an issue with Calvinism. As a receiver of those doctrines, it will of course be expected, and probably desired, that the writer should present them favorably, and as they are viewed by their advocates. Occasional argumentative issues may be stated, in order that the points of collision may be more easily understood; but it forms no part of our province to *prove* the doctrines presented. It is believed that such a statement, at the present time, may tend to remove misunderstanding, and serve the cause of Christian unity.

In regard to the issue, it may be generally remarked that in those points which more immediately concern the divine government, Calvinism affirms more than Arminianism, and that more the latter declines to accept. Both sides, for instance, affirm foreknowledge, free-will, and the necessity of divine grace to salvation; Calvinism superadds to these respectively, foreordination, necessity, and irresistibleness, to which Arminianism declines assent. On points less central, as final apostasy, entire sanctification, and witness of the spirit, our Arminianism affirms, and Calvinism rejects.

FUNDAMENTAL MAXIM OF DIVINE GOVERNMENT.

The fundamental maxim upon which the issue above named is primarily grounded, and from which, if we mistake not, most of the other issues logically result, is the Edwardean maxim, that it is no matter how we come by our evil volitions, dispositions, or nature, in order to responsibility, provided we really possess them. Or we may state the maxim thus: God judges us as he finds us to be, good or evil, and holds us responsible without regard to the means by which we became so. We do not say that all who are considered Calvinists hold this maxim. But upon the acceptance or rejection of this proposition it logically depends, as it appears to us, whether the man *should be* a Calvinist or Arminian. From our rejection of this maxim it is, that we differ from some or all the classes of Calvinists on the subject of *free-will*, *divine sovereignty*, *predestination*, *election*, *primary responsibility for inborn depravity*, *partial atonement*, and *final perseverance*. To this maxim, that *it is no matter how we come by volitional state in order to its being responsible*, we oppose the counter maxim that *in order to responsibility for a given act or state, power in the agent for a contrary act or state is requisite.* In other words: "*no man is to blame for what he cannot help.*" *Power underlies responsibility.* Non-existence of power is non-existence of responsibility. The only limitation of this principle is the maxim that *self-superinduced inability does not exclude responsibility.* The agent who abdicates his powers we hold to be responsible for his impotence, and for all the non-performances which legitimately result. Our entire axiom, then, is: *all inability to an act or state, not self-superinduced,* *excludes responsibility.* The man who maintains, counter to this our position, the above-specified Edwardean maxim, must, we think, if a logical reasoner, support all the Calvinistic views above enumerated. The man who adopts our maxim is as logically bound to reject them.

FREE-WILL.

When a man trangresses a divine requirement by a wrong volition, the question arises: *Could he have willed otherwise?* He is held by the law penally responsible for the act. If, now, the maxim be true that God regards not the way in which he became possessed of the volition, then no power to the contrary is required. God may create him without power for other volition; may create him in fixed and necessitated possession of the volition, yet may still hold him responsible, and consign him to endless penalty. If, on the other hand, adequate power for a contrary volition must underlie obligation for a contrary volition, and so for responsibility for the actual volition, then there must have existed in the given agent power for a volition contrary to the volition actually put forth.

Methodism has, in accordance with this view, from the beginning maintained this doctrine of free-will. We have ever maintained that it imputes injustice to God to suppose that he holds us responsible for a necessitated act or condition; or that he ever requires an act or condition for which he does not furnish the adequate power. It is the apparent making of this imputation in the various doctrines of Calvinism with which Methodism has taken issue.

Our view of free-will is tolerably well expressed by the formula: "the power of contrary choice." It would, perhaps, be more accurately expressed by the formula furnished and condemned by Edwards (p. 419, Andover Edition, 1840): "*The power of choosing differently in given cases.*" The question proposed by Fletcher to Toplady was: "*Is the will at liberty to choose otherwise than it does, or is it not?*" The man who affirms the first member of this question is bound to be an Arminian; the affirmant of the latter member must, as we suppose, logically be a Calvinist. Hence we do not hold either of the four following positions:

1. *The doctrine of volitional necessity* (*ordinarily called philosophical necessity*), as it is ably maintained by Edwards. This doctrine, as we understand it, supposes that every choice is determined to be as it is by some one antecedent strongest motive. Preëxistent causes fix and limit the volition, excluding all adequate power for a different volition instead. Every transgression, therefore, as to us it appears, is volitionally committed without adequate power for a volitional avoidance. Sin is *always a thing which cannot be helped by the sinner.*

2. *The distinction of moral and natural inability, as a solution of the problem of responsibility.* This *natural ability*, as we understand it, is the *power to do as we will*, which has no relation to the question of volitional freedom; or it is the power to *will as we will*, that is, to *will as we do will*, and no other way. That is, the will is supposed to have the power to act solely and merely as it does act, and no otherwise; which is a power possessed by every machine and every physical cause. By our axiom above, this view appears to us to be necessity, and it excludes the possibility of responsibility.

3. The law of *uniform action of the will.* We understand some who affirm the doctrine of the power of contrary choice, also to affirm that, nevertheless, there is in all instances a *one certain highest or strongest motive*, in accordance with which, though possessed of diverse power, the will *does certainly act.* This substitutes for the *law of causation* the *law of uniformity.* Both laws we should view as equally universal and equally apodictical. But it is the law of uniformity in causation which renders the causative limitation of will to a sole possible volition subversive of responsibility. It appears logically as impossible for an act to take place contradictorily to the law of uniformity as to the law of causation; and responsibility in both cases seems equally excluded.

4. *The antecedent securement of the certainty of the sole*

volition. Some who deny *necessity* affirm the previously secured certainty of the volition. By the *certainty* of an event we mean its *simple futurition.* It is a simple *will-be*, perfectly pure from the *must-be.* Now there are those, as we understand, who affirm that antecedent causation does not secure the *necessity*, but does "*secure the certainty*" of the future volition. They thus seek to evade the difficulties of *necessity.* But be it noted that *to secure a thing* has both a positive and a negative side. To secure a thing absolutely and perfectly is to exclude the possibility of a different thing instead. To secure the certainty of a given volition, therefore, is to exclude the possibility of a different certainty. To secure the futurition of a given volition is to exclude the possibility of the futurition of a different volition; which is necessity, and, therefore, appears exclusive of responsibility.

Our views of responsibility require us, therefore, to affirm fully and unequivocally the doctrine of *the freedom of the will.* With the limitation which we have already indicated in our axiom, every obligatory and every responsible volitional act is a *free act;* that is, put forth with the adequate power of putting forth a different act instead. Thus far we have rejected the limitations to this power arising from *necessity*, *uniformity*, or *secured certainty.*

DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY.

We hold it to be a doctrine both of natural and revealed religion, that God is an omnipotent being, possessed of power for all operations which involve not a contradiction. But any act, the expression of which involves a contradiction, we consider to be no act at all; so that this exception is not a limitation of divine power, but only a definition of the true idea of omnipotence. God is sovereign over the realm of nature and of free agents; yet in both cases he limits his uniform action by self-circumscribing laws. The laws of nature are the uniform rules of God's action, imposed by himself upon himself. And these self-imposed laws are necessary to the very existence of the kingdom of nature; and they do, in fact, give God his position as sovereign of nature, and therein are necessary to his divine sovereignty. In the realm of free agency, also, God finds, as we think, his highest exaltation as sovereign, by so circumscribing his own modes of action as to leave unviolated the full exercise of the freedom of the agent, so far forth as he is a free and responsible agent. For God to secure absolutely and limitatively the one possible volition of the agent, and yet leave him a free agent, is, in our view, a contradiction; as genuine a contradiction as for God to cause a heavier body to ascend, and yet preserve the law of gravitation. The requirement that God's sovereignty must jealously *cause* and *secure*, as well as limit, every act of the agent, in our estimation reduces God from his position as a sovereign to the predicament of a mechanist. He is no longer king of free beings, but a mover of automatons. The highest glory of God as a divine sovereign consists, as we conceive, in his giving the fullest permission for the freest range of responsible agency, though it sweep the scope of half the universe; and yet so taking the wise in their own craftiness, and over-mastering the mighty in their might, as to accomplish all his own grand designs, and produce the best and most glorious possible of ultimate results.

DIVINE PRESCIENCE AND PREDETERMINATIONS.

God we hold to be not only omnipotent but omniscient; and of this omniscience *foreknowledge* is a particular phase. We hold that God knows or foreknows all contingencies, possibilities, and real events in the future. God's predeterminations are acts; and inasmuch as God, with all his attributes, must precede his actions, just as all cause must precede its effect, so God's foreknowledge must precede his predeterminations. Yet as both these — his foreknowledge and his predeterminations — are viewed as in some sense eternal, so the priority of knowledge to act must be, perhaps, viewed as a priority in nature, rather than in time. Sir William Hamilton's doctrine of the unknowableness of the infinite must here, perhaps, be so far accepted as to incline us to acknowledge that we discern truth, not as it is in itself, but truth as it appears to us. Be it a contradiction or not, the eternal cause must, to our conception, in the order of nature precede the eternal effect; that is, God as foreknowing must be viewed as preceding God as predetermining. All the acts of God, even his predeterminations, we view as perfectly free; just as truly free as the freest actions of any agent in the universe. And, holding that the knowledge of free action does not impede their freedom, so we hold that God's foreknowledge of his own free actions, including his own predeterminations, does not impede their freedom.

The proposition that "God foreordains whatsoever comes to pass," taken in its natural and what we have supposed its historical meaning, and its full extent, we are compelled to reject, both from our antecedent views of human responsible freedom, and because, taken in that same proper sense and extent, it seems to us, in spite of every effort at avoidance, to amount to the proposition that *God is the author of sin.* To foreordain a thing or act seems to us to be a divine volition, causatively fixing and determining that thing or act, rendering it thereby fixed and necessary. To foreordain, also, has its positive and negative side. It seems to fix positively that the act shall be thus and so, and to exclude negatively the possibility of its being otherwise than thus or so; and thus, limiting the act to one sole result, excludes liberty, and so responsibility, from existence. Again, to *foreordain an act* seems to us to be the same as intentionally to will that act; and if the act be a sin, the most and the worst that we can say of the human sinner himself is, that he intentionally wills the sinful act; and thereby we appear obliged to affirm of God that he is as truly the author of sin as the sinner. The difference between the two appears to us to lie, not in the reality of the intentional volition, that is, the authorship, but in the number of the intermediate media through which the causation is transmitted, which is a difference no way affecting the chargeableness of the authorship.

Desirous to avoid these consequences, we would rather say that God's foreordinations, or rather predeterminations, are to be *limited to his own acts.* Supposing that in the infinitely distant anterior period of "timelessness," God is employed in selecting from all possible systems that which his wisdom best approves, the system which he is to be viewed as finally adopting is *a system consisting properly and directly of his own future actions.* Knowing, indeed, by the absolute perfection of his own attribute of omniscience all future possibilities, including all possible results from any supposed arrangements, God does, in full foreknowledge of all results in the case, so plan all *his own* actions and courses as seems to him wisest and best. So far forth as sequently upon any act or course of God any free being will sin, for that sin the free *being*, being fully able to avoid it, and bringing it unnecessarily into existence, is alone responsible. He alone has intruded it into existence. God neither predetermined, foreordained, willed, nor desired it. God's predeterminations of *his own* future action, or courses of action, are to be considered as so far *contingent*, as that their execution or coming into existence is conditioned upon the coming into existence of many presupposed free actions of finite agents, which are able not to be put forth. Yet, nevertheless, inasmuch as God's omniscience does truly and fully foresee the free volition which will actually be put forth, *there is no proper danger that God will be deceived in the perfect wisdom of his plans, or be frustrated in any of his actual purposes.*

Whether there are not many theologians at the present time, who use the terms *predestination* and *foreordination*, and hold themselves to believe in the doctrines properly designated by those terms, who yet do so define these terms as to make their views nearly or quite coincide with the above statements, is more than the writer of this Article is able to say. We trust that such is the fact; and our objections then would be mainly verbal, lying against the propriety and clearness of the terms and the phraseology used. Let us hope that mutual explanation will be productive of increased agreement.

FOREKNOWLEDGE.

It might at first appear fair to say, that the reconciliation of foreknowledge with free agency is *the* difficulty of our theology. Yet there seems to be a great difference, of which a theology ought to avail itself, between the admission of simple foreknowledge and the additional admission of predestination. If the term *predestination* has any proper significance, it implies a strict causative relation between the long past predestinating act and the predestined event. If it becomes anything less than this, it becomes simply *prerecognition*, with non-prevention in view of some collateral good; which is, properly speaking, foreknowledge. The true distinction, in fact, between foreknowledge and predestination is, that the former simply cognizes the act which another cause will put forth, while the latter causatively determines its putting forth, purposely excluding, by necessitative limitation, any other act instead. God may be supposed to *foresee* the act because the agent will put it forth; but God cannot properly be said to *predestinate* the action because the agent will put it forth; on the other hand, the agent must perform the act because it is predestinated. The act of the agent cannot properly be free, because it is antecedently limited and determined.

Our views of the reconcilement of foreknowledge with free-agency may, in brief, be represented in the following paragraphs:

1. The utmost doctrine of free-will does not require us to deny that there is *some one way*, and no other, in which all free volitions will be put forth. The infinite number of free volitions, singly and collectively, while put forth with full power otherwise, will be put forth *in some one way*, and no other. We have, then, only to affirm that, some how or other, we know not how, this *one* infinite series of volitions, put forth with full power otherwise, is perfectly foreknown by God. That is, the volitions are perfectly free, yet completely foreknown.

2. From this, it follows that it is perfectly just and true that an agent can do otherwise than the way that God knows

he will do; and yet it is not true that God can be deceived. The first is true; for if the foreknown act be that one act put forth with full counter power, then, by the very supposition, there is full power to perform an act different from the one foreknown. The second is *not* true; for, by the very supposition, the act which will be put forth, whichever that is, is the one perfectly and truly foreknown. God's foreknowledge, then, is sure of verification.

3. Foreknowledge does not *cause* the free act to be unfree. In conception, we first posit the free act; namely, the act as free as if there were no foreknowledge, or as if there were no God. This conception is, in itself, perfectly possible. Then, for that intrinsically free act to be foreknown, does not *cause* it to be unfree, nor in any way affect its intrinsic nature. Foreknowledge is not the cause of the free act; properly speaking, the particularity of the free act is the cause of the particularity of the anterior knowledge.

4. Nor does foreknowledge *prove* the act to be unfree. For, by the very supposition, the act put forth with diverse power, is the act foreknown. How the Deity came in possession of that power, we are, indeed, neither able nor bound to say; no more than we are bound to say how God came in possession of his self-existence.

To the Edwardean argument, that the fixedness of the eternally past effect, namely, *foreknowledge*, proves the necessitative character of the cause, namely, the *act*, we have our reply. That cause is, for instance, now transpiring, — a free volition, put forth with free counter power. That act, as cause, reflects its effectuation into the anterior eternity, and into God's eternal foreknowledge, there reproducing, in idea, just its own actual nature. The fixedness or immutability of that foreknowledge proves nothing; for the very supposition is that God's knowledge has the right act in possession (namely, the act which will, in full possession of power for other act, be truly put forth), and no other. But if the right act be in the divine eternal anterior knowledge, what need of any change or mutability? If it has the right act, that foreknowledge is bound to be fixed and unchanging in its rightness. But, as before shown, this makes no difference in the intrinsic nature of the act.

DOCTRINE OF SIN AND GUILT.

Sin is, according to John, *anomia*, or disconformity to the law; and the term, therefore, though primarily applicable to actual trangression, is nevertheless used, both in theology and scripture, to designate a moral *state* or *condition* of being. Should, however, a being be placed in such a state otherwise than by his own free act, with full power of acting otherwise, for such a state we hold that he could not be strictly responsible, or, with absolute justice, punishable. In such a being there would be *evil*, *moral evil*, *sin*, but not responsibility, or desert of penalty. Should such a state of being be brought about by the agent's own free act, the responsibility would, we think, exist in full force; or, should the free being in such a state, possessed of full power to act otherwise, nevertheless sanction and appropriate to himself his depraved condition, making it the controlling power of his life, he thereby contracts the responsibility. Such a depraved state, in our view, has never been produced in any being by God, but always by free secondary agents. All responsible sin, therefore, whether of action or condition, arises from the action of free finite beings, in disconformity to the law, and in abuse of their free agency.

Sin, therefore, being produced, not by the infinite, but by the finite agent, can claim, in our view, no origination, ratification, or sanction from God. He neither willed it, ordained it, determined it, ordered it, located it, nor approvingly permitted it. He chose, indeed, that system of *his own actions* into which he knew that others would obtrude sin. The free agency by which it is produced, is itself, as a quality created by him, sublimely excellent; and is so created on account of its superior excellency and vast superiority over a system of inanimate beings or necessitated agents. But as a system of free agents would be superior to a system of necessitated agents, so the system of free agents who would freely choose to be perfectly holy, would, we hold, doubtless be superior to a system of sinful free agents. Sin, therefore, actual and real, can be considered as no benefit to the government of God. It is evil in nature and evil in effect. Nor does God need sin in order to the production of the highest and best results. Where the sin will, however, be freely committed, God does place sequences of particular good, which would not take place but for that antecedent sin; although without the sin he might secure some still higher good. He often makes a particular good the sequent of a particular sin, which, did not that sin exist, would be by him effectuated from some other antecedent. In the present system, also, a particular sin, as, for instance, the sin of Adam, may be the condition absolutely requisite to the possibility of a particular highest good in the now existing system; which highest good may be the most exalted theme of angelic anthems; yet all this does not preclude the fact, that, were there no sin in the universe, a still more glorious, as well as a more happy, condition of things might exist.

The act of the will, put forth with full power otherwise, in intentional disconformity to the law, is actual or *actional sin.* The resultant ethical quality of *condemnability*, which our moral sense sees as inhering in the personality of the agent in consequence of the commission of such sin, we call *guilt.* And as the moral sense can see this guilt solely in the personality of the committing agent, it is impossible for this guilt to be transferred to another personality. Correlative to this *guilt*, the moral sense sees inhering in the person of the guilty *a desert of just punishment.* These correlations are fundamental and axiomatic. *Punishment*, therefore, is no more transferable, literally, than *guilt.* Neither is any more transferable than is a *past act* personally performed by one agent transferable to another agent. When, therefore, an innocent man is said to suffer in the stead of a guilty man, it is only in figurative conception that the guilt and punishment of the guilty are attributed or imputed to the innocent man; the literal fact is, that the innocent man is still *innocent*, and the endurance by the innocent is simply *suffering*, but not literally, to him, *punishment.*

THE FALL AND DEPRAVATION OF MAN.

In the primordial man, Adam, as in every primordial progenitor, a whole posterity is conceptually enfolded. As in the acorn is enclosed, not only the oak, but a whole descending lineage of oaks, so in our first parent was enclosed a whole system of diverging lineages embracing a race. As his primordial nature shall stand higher or lower, so shall the deduced nature of that race be higher or lower. Under this fundamental law, extended through the whole generative system of creation, and based upon reasons of the highest wisdom, man, with his fellow races, animal and vegetable, is placed on earth. That law, that self-limiting law, God cannot wisely change. Upon the first man he bestows a nature of transcendental excellence, yet with a free and plastic power of self-degradation by sin. As man stands or falls, he stands or falls in his typical character; and his whole race, under the universal lineal law, must bear the same physical, intellectual, and moral type. And with this natural law corresponds the theodicic arrangement. Under the same moral and judicial conditions in which man places himself, must, as we believe, his posterity, if born, be born.

Historically, man, by sin, places himself under conditions of depravation, including the threefold death — corporeal, moral, eternal.

The individual, Adam, is shut off from the tree of life; and is thus, perhaps, left to a natural mortality, through the decay and disintegration of his physical system. His sin has excluded the Holy Spirit; and thus the love of God can no longer be a motive of action, and the main source of spiritual light and knowledge is lost, and the vacillating will is so weakened, that it no longer firmly holds to the right. This state of things is not caused by the act of the infinite will, but is the result produced by the lawless action of the finite will. By his own free act, Adam has excluded from himself those conditions by which the love of God could be his motive of action, and, therefore, has rendered holy action an impossibility to himself. He is, indeed, perhaps, still in every respect intrinsically and organically a free agent. Yet, inasmuch as holy action is placed beyond his reach, he is no longer *objectively* free to holiness and right, and is unable to do that which is pleasing in the sight of God. He is, therefore, under sentence of temporal, moral, and eternal death.

Under these conditions, shall he bring a posterity into existence? He can bring them into existence, by the laws of nature, only with his own character, and, apparently, to his own destiny. For, conceptually, as above stated, his whole race are seminally existent in him. The sentence of condemnation is addressed to him individually, indeed, yet to him, containing his whole race within himself. Shall the individuals of that race, by the prosecution of the natural generative law, be brought by him into personal existence? Man, then, by a second procedure, would consummate the terrible evil of his first procedure. He, under the fundamental laws, in the prosecution of second causes, would plunge a race in endless misery, *naturally* resulting from his unholy procedures. There are but two methods, that we can conceive, of arresting man in his full course of evil-doing. By the first method, the full force of the sentence may be executed and exhausted upon himself, by the infliction of temporal, spiritual, and eternal death immediately interposed, previous to the production of offspring. God's veracity is thus sustained, and the evil of sin is manifested by the abortion of the race. By the second method, a redemptive system may be interposed, by which, on the continued basis of free agency and probation, man, the whole race, or that part of the race which attains the end of its probation, may be restored to even, perhaps, a higher glory than the Adamic race could have attained.

That the sentence would have received its full literal execution in the person of Adam, precluding actual posterity, we infer from a contemplation of the supposable condition of the race as brought by Adam into natural existence in his own moral position: 1. The moral death includes in its idea the exclusion of any possible fulfilment of the moral law from the agent's reach. True, then, to our axiomatic foundation, we firmly deny that he could be justly responsible and liable to its penalties. Born under the law, the law has a right to measure his moral character, and affirm his *anomia*, that is, his *disconformity to the law*, both in action and in moral condition; but the moment the law attempts to inflict the penalty, the rightfulness of its own action is by itself condemned. Nor can this difficulty be removed, as we conceive, by any natural or moral ability supposable in the case. All natural ability is under control of the volitions; the volitions are under control of the inclinations; and those inclinations are controlled by necessitating causations. There is no imaginable ability, therefore, which relieves the agent from an adamantine necessity, enclosing him as tightly within his moral evil as a fossil reptile is imbedded in the solid rock. The agent, therefore, as tried by the law, is evil, — morally evil; and as all *anomia* is *sin*, his nature and his actions are *sinful;* and yet he is not responsible, or justly liable to penalty. 2. Corporeal death, if it does not preclude birth, includes the idea of disease, decay, and mortality during a temporary life. As a mere nature, this may be justifiable, under a law of compensation; but, as a judicial penalty, we have before shown that the law has none it can inflict. 3. Eternal death would, of course, follow, from the very immortality of his nature, being an immortality of evil — moral death perpetuated. As a natural process, this cannot be justified; for the evil is too great for compensation; still less can it be justified judicially, for still less has the law a penalty it can inflict. It is this state of condemnation by the law of a race and nature born under the law, which requires the legal fiction of imputation to render penalty a nameable thing. Conceptually alone, not literally or truly, can man, in this condition, be said to be guilty, and liable to the judicial penalty of death, temporal or eternal. It may, at first sight, seem strange, that the divine, like the human law, should deal in *legal fiction.* But it is no more strange than true. *Pardon* itself involves a legal fiction. *Justification*, by a legal fiction, supposes its subject to be innocent, and free from the penalty, and treats him as such who is guilty, and justly liable to the penalty. Justification and imputation are antithetic fictions. The former of mercy, the latter of severity; the former, seeing innocence where there is guilt; the latter, if not seeing guilt where there is innocence, certainly seeing guilt where there is irresponsibility. That fiction, as a basis of penalty, if the race without the atonement were not merely hypothetical, would be a most serious matter, an irreparable injustice in the government of God. Its true use is not fully understood until, subsequently to the redemption, it is introduced to illustrate, by its antithesis of imputed guilt, the principle of imputed innocence under the Redeemer.

THE REDEMPTION.

The introduction of the Redeemer, sequently upon the fall of man, was not a divine afterthought. By a divine predetermination, *conditioned* upon that foreseen apostasy, Christ was the Lamb slain from before the foundation of the world. In view of the compensations by it afforded, expressions of deeper severity towards sin are made, than otherwise would have taken place. A Redeemer is introduced, who, by a death of infinitely more value than that of Adam and all his race, is entitled to take humanity into his guardianship, and measure out mercy and justice according to the laws of a wise probation: 1. In view of the future atonement, the natural continuity of the human race remains uninterrupted, and a basis is thus afforded for a new system. 2. In view of that same atonement, the Holy Spirit is restored, whereby motives in the direction of spiritual realities may become grounds of action, and their proper improvement may lead to justification and regeneration. Man does not thereby receive any new faculty. He is not even organically *made* to be a free agent; for he never ceased to be such; only spiritual things, and the possibility of pleasing God, are again *brought within the reach* of his free agency. Nor is the Holy Spirit, nor any other influence, normally so brought to bear upon his free agency as to be *irresistible*, or *secured to be unresisted;* since that would be to overwhelm his free agency on the other side. To afford him such aids as render him able to accept salvation without overcoming his ability to reject it, probationarily leaving the decision to his own free will, is the precise law by which the dealings of God with him are now governed. 3. Though, both in the matter of temporal and eternal death, man still remains under liability, so that, by rejection of the Redeemer, he may come under full execution of the primal sentence, yet by the proper exercise of his free will, aided by the Spirit graciously bestowed, in accepting and obeying the Redeemer, he may finally attain a glory through Christ, greater, perhaps, than he lost through Adam.

For a *created* inclination, necessitated in its character, bad though it be,—morally bad, disconformed to the law,—we are, as before intimated, utterly irresponsible. It may rightfully be called *sin*, for all anomia is sin; and the man is a sinner, but not a *responsible* sinner, since for any other than sin there is no power. This arises from our rejection of the maxim, that the law takes no cognizance of the way in which we became possessed of our evil; and our affirmation of the axiom that power for the contrary must underlie all responsible action. On the other hand, inclinations conformed to the law, created necessitatedly within us, without any power of modification in our will, are truly excellent, morally excellent, innocent, and in all these senses, perhaps, properly called *holy;* yet, they afford no moral desert. They are loveable, but not strictly rewardable. It is not, then, until there is redemptively conferred upon man what we call a *gracious ability* for the right, that man can strictly be responsible for the wrong. With this inauguration, therefore, upon the redemptive basis, responsibility, and a true and just divine government become possible. Under the redemptive system, the man is born into the world, from Adam, a depraved being. It is as a depraved being that he becomes an Ego. But instantly after, in the order of nature, he is met by the provisions of the atonement. If he is not thereby immediately, unconditionally justified and regenerated,[1] his death before the commission of actual sin would place him out of the category of condemnation. He is held guiltless until the moment of his responsible agency arrives, and personal sin has subjected him to the personal penalty of the law; and then the forfeiture of the justifying and regenerating influences of the atonement, so far forth as they may be admitted to exist, has brought him into complete responsibility for his

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[1] It is not clear to the present writer that there is in our theology any authoritative and uncontradicted decision of the question of the actual status, in all respects, of the infant under the atonement. That the dying infant is saved, and saved by the atonement, we all agree. But his precise condition, as affected by the atonement, while a living infant, seems to be a somewhat undecided matter. Probably a large majority of the Methodist Episcopal Church have, for some time past, held, without much discussion, that the living infant was both unjustified and unregenerate, and yet upon his death he obtained both blessings. This making death the condition of justification and regeneration appears to many hardly logical, and not without danger. Mr. Wesley's earlier expressions of opinion indicated a holding of the churchly doctrine of baptismal regeneration in infancy. His later indications of opinion indicate that he held all infants to be members of the kingdom of heaven; and he also held that regeneration is a condition to membership in the kingdom of heaven; but he does not expressly draw the inference that all infants are regenerate. Fletcher maintained the doctrine both of infant justification and regeneration. Dr. Fisk held to infant justification. Our baptismal service first declares, in its Scripture lesson, of infants, that "of such is the kingdom of God"; and yet declares "that none can enter into the kingdom of God unless he be regenerate." But neither here is the inference expressly drawn. The subject is a matter of calm discussion, and perhaps the number of those holding the doctrine of infant regeneration has decidedly increased. This does not affect the question of depravity through Adam; since the maintainers of infant regeneration fully affirm that the individual becomes a complete living person depravedly and in Adam; and that the effects of the atonement to justify and regenerate are, in the order of nature, immediately subsequent to the completed personal existence; nor does regeneration in the infant, any more than in the adult, completely abolish the old organic nature, so but that propensities to evil, and full power of complete apostasy, permanently remain. Yet they hold that spiritual culture may, even before the moment of full responsible age, develop the spiritual powers; for the child may pass the line of responsibility an erring and feeble, yet truly regenerate, Christian.

Adamic depravity, which is now fully sanctioned, and appropriated into his own voluntary course of action.

So far as we can see, these statements present the antithesis between our loss through Adam, and our gain through Christ, in full accordance with its presentation by Paul in the fifth chapter of Romans. By the sin of the former, we incur death and judgment unto condemnation, and are made sinners. By the righteousness of the latter, we receive life and justification, are made righteous, attaining a grace much more abundant than the previous sin. And inasmuch as we are made sinners antecedently to the atonement, without the power of being other than sinners, we can be held in that case as responsible sinners only by a conceptual imputation of sin. Under the atonement, that conceptual imputation is continued only as the logical antithesis to the conceptual imputation of righteousness to the guilty through the atoning righteousness of Christ.

RIGHTEOUSNESS AND GRACE IN THE REDEMPTION.

In regard to parts, if not the whole, of the provisions of the redemption, as thus stated, it will be said that they are but provisions of justice and not of grace. If powers were necessary in order to the fulfilment of requirements, God was bound, in righteousness, to grant them; and, in justice, could not withhold them; and they are therefore not gracious. Nevertheless, we hold that such provisions are none the less by grace because by righteousness. Benevolence is the goodness of God exhibited in nature; grace is the goodness of God exhibited in redemption. And as God could not be justified in the works of nature without appealing to the proofs of benevolence, it might be said that "God is bound to furnish that benevolence; and it is therefore no benevolence, but mere righteousness." Nevertheless, it is none the less benevolence because necessary to justify God's righteousness. The righteousness and the grace are but different views of the same thing.

Thus it may be said that, if God required the exercise of a moral ability, he was bound to grant such ability; it is, therefore, properly not called a *gracious ability.* It might as truly be argued, that if God require us to obey the Mediator, he is obligated to furnish the Mediator. If he require faith in the atonement, he is bound to furnish the atonement; if he require us to follow the guidance of the Holy Spirit, he is bound to furnish the Holy Spirit; so that none of these gifts are gracious, and grace is excluded from the redemption. With equal truth it might be said that because God requires us to serve him with all our natural endowments, existence, life, faculties, and advantages, therefore none of these are by benevolence, but by debt. Hereby grace is banished from redemption, and benevolence from nature. Every endowment that man receives, by nature or redemption, even though it be the basis of a duty and a requirement, is none the less a gratuity. God gives the grace, and imposes the requirement, because it is a grace; nor does the requirement abolish the grace.

NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE ATONEMENT.

Christ as truly died as a substitute for the sinner as Damon could have died as a substitute for Pythias. Yet to make the parallel complete, Damon should so die for Pythias, as that, unless Pythias should accept the substitution of Damon in all its conditions, he should not receive its benefits, and Damon's death should be for him in vain; Pythias may be as rightfully executed as if Damon had not died. If the sinner accept not the atonement, but deny the Lord that bought him, Christ has died for him in vain; he perishes, for whom Christ died. If the whole human race were to reject the atonement, the atonement would be a demonstration of the righteousness and goodness of God, but would be productive of aggravation of human guilt, rather than of salvation from it. The imputation of the sin of man, or his punishment, to Christ, is but a popular conception, justifiable, if understood as only conceptual; just as we might say that the crime of Pythias was imputed to Damon, in order that we also might be able to say that

Damon was *punished* instead of Pythias. In strictness of language and thought, neither crime, guilt, nor punishment is personally transferable.

Christ died for all men, and for every man, and for no one man more than for another. The personal, voluntary reception of the atonement, in its full conditions, by the sinner himself, constitutes the difference between one man and another in the obtainment of its benefits. A fountain stands for the entire inhabitants of a town, for one man no more than for another; and the personal drawing and drinking of the water may constitute the only difference in the enjoyment of its benefits. The atonement itself is universal and irrespective; the personal appropriation, by which the individual sinner secures his share of its benefits, is in each case particular.

JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH.

The method by which the sinner appropriates a share of the benefits of the atonement personally to himself, is comprehensively said to be *by faith*. By the works of the law, that is, by a Christless morality, can no flesh be justified. The law finds us in sin and in depravity, made responsible by volitional action, and reveals our sin unto us. When its perfectness is comprehended, all hopes of meeting its full demands must die within us. We can, therefore, only hope for salvation by the acceptance of the offered atonement for past sins and future short-comings.

The *faith which justifies*, implies the belief of the intellect, the accord of the affections, and the submissive acceptance by the will. By this entire act of the whole soul, the sinner surrenders himself to Christ for salvation. The sincerity of this faith implies the full renunciation of sin by repentance, and the full self-commitment to obedience to Christ. This act of the sinner is accepted of God, and is imputed to him for righteousness. By the law of the redemptive kingdom, he stands justified before God for all his sins past; the record of condemnation is blotted out, and his name is enrolled in the Lamb's book of life. In accordance with the conditions of the atonement, the Holy

Spirit is now imparted unto him, not merely in its convicting, but in its witnessing, enlightening, strengthening, and sanctifying power.

This faith, by the ordinary laws of mind, is preceded by normal preparatories, viz. by the ordinary gracious ability bestowed through the atonement, by perception and reception of truth, by conscientious feeling, by exercise of reason, by prayer to God, by realization of sin, by successive stages of preparatory faith in the revelations of the law and the gospel Repentance towards God precedes the act of justifying faith in Jesus Christ. The *immediate performance of this whole work* is in one sense *requirable* of the sinner, since the law demands his punishment for past sins, and the wrath of God abides upon him, until the moment of his justification. His inability instantaneously to perform the whole work required is self-superinduced by his past sinful life, and is, therefore, not excusatory. Yet it is not in accordance with the laws of mind to expect, or to teach, that the whole process actually can be instantaneously accomplished.

The gracious influences of the Spirit ever precede our action, working within us both to will and to do, and is ever graciously given more abundantly upon our action; so that in attaining justifying grace, God and man previously co-operate.

Though the *convicting* influences of the Spirit are often, for a time, to a degree *irresistible*, measurably awakening the conscience and convincing the reason, in spite of our resistance, yet neither is the influence that results in saving faith, nor the saving grace which follows, properly *irresistible* by the will. Justifying faith is voluntary and free. The soul is normally able to withhold it; nor is the operation of the Spirit such as necessitatively to secure it.

We are not saved by the *merit* of faith. Faith may indeed be considered in one sense as a *work*, a good work, a right work, the rightest work which, in the case, the sinner can perform. It has in itself the same sort of *good desert*, or ethical merit, as we ascribe to every act which in its given place is morally right. The contrary act would be morally wrong. And it is because of the meetness and ethical fitness and moral rightness in the case, that faith is selected as the proper medium of reconciliation and acceptance. Yet the *value of this faith is not such as that it merits the salvation* sequently bestowed upon it. Abstractly, God might rightfully drop the being into non-existence at the instant of its accomplished faith. The sinner has presented no equivalent for the salvation he receives, and he is truly saved by the free and abounding grace of God.

We do not hold that it is necessary, in order to the graciousness of our justification, that the faith should be resistlessly secured by the previous operation of God. Nor is it necessary for the graciousness of this salvation, that the act of faith should, by the natural laws of mind, be secured by the antecedent operation necessitatively, as the assent of the intellect is secured by a mathematical demonstration. For even those who hold to this necessitative securement believe that *all* right acts of the will are secured in the same way, so that by their own view there is as much moral merit in the act of accepting faith as in any other right, free-volitional act. The difference between us here lies, not in the meritoriousness we are bound to ascribe to the accepting act of the will, but in our views of the nature of the freedom of the will itself. By our views of the freedom of the will, it is necessary to the responsibility or moral good desert of an act, and of this as of all other acts, that it should be performed with full power of other action instead. And when this act is performed in the possession of such power, we are no more obliged to ascribe the great salvation, of which it is the condition, to the merit of the act, than our brethren opposed are obliged to ascribe the salvation to the merit of the necessitated act.

POSSIBILITY OF APOSTACY.

In full consistency with that doctrine of human freedom and responsibility which pervades our theology, we maintain that, inasmuch as we were free in first performing the conditions of salvation, so we are free in the continuance or cessation of their performance. The volition by which we accepted the terms, we could have withheld; neither our probation nor our freedom on that test-point has ceased at our conversion. Amid the temptations, the unbeliefs, and the backslidings of life, the test-question may again and again recur, whether we shall hold fast our first faith; and there still exists the same freedom for decision for either alternative. The different views of our two theologies on this point are truly logical corrollaries from their antecedent views of free agency and responsibility. If it be consistent with free probation that God not only require the consent of our will for justification, but also causatively to secure it, that same causative securement must also necessitate our *persevering* volition. But it seems to us a perfect contradiction of probation and of the freedom for the act to be absolutely secured.

We affirm, indeed, that God grants full enabling grace to persevere. He protects us so that none can snatch us from our Father's hand, nor separate us from the love of God; he keeps, supports, and guards; he confirms us when we are strong, and raises us when we are fallen; but he performs all this for us, not as *things*, but as *agents* from whom the consenting accordance and co-operation are conditionally presumed, both in the promise and performance of all these preserving acts of grace. After all these gracious aids on the part of God, there still remains, by the very nature of free agency, an ultimate element of *selfhood*, which alternatively decides whether or not that grace shall be in vain. That free selfhood intrinsically remains, however it may sometimes objectively be circumscribed, through the entire existence of the self.

Promises, no doubt there are, in abundance, in the word of God, which are verbally in unconditioned form. Yet the law of conditionality, belonging, as it does, to the gospel terms of salvation, is ever to be held as implied. Were that all-pervading law of *conditionality* but *once* clearly expressed for all, it would be unreasonable to expect that it should be slavishly inserted, and never implied or assumed in any verbal form of the promise. Much more, when that conditionality is abundantly and explicitly declared, are we bound to hold it as implied in those passages where God engages faithfully to perform the divine side of the gracious covenant.

REGENERATION.

We have said that, consequent upon our justification, the Holy Spirit is imparted unto us no longer in its mere convicting power, but in its enlightening, quickening energy; giving us not, indeed, a new organic faculty, but the power and disposition, with our existing faculties, freely to love God with all our heart, and our neighbor as ourself. This is regeneration. Though always concomitant with justification, it is in the order of nature consequent. So truly *new* is this gift by the Holy Spirit, so new and powerful are the views, feeling, purposes of the man, that it is said he is a new creature; that all things with him are made new; that he is born anew, born of God, regenerated. He is now a child of God — a member of the justified family of God.

We thus hold that regeneration *succeeds* justification. It is the unregenerate, who is first convinced of sin by the Holy Spirit, who considers upon his wicked ways, and seeks repentance, who examines the law of God, and the Gospel of Christ, in order to learn the method of escaping the wrath to come, who bows in penitent prayer for the continuing guidance of the Holy Spirit in order to the accomplishment of the work, and who does at successive points receive, in consequence of these his preparatory doings, the gracious aid of God. To the question, can these actions of the unregenerate man be holy, and so acceptable to God, we seem to ourselves to have abundant answer. They are not holy in the absolute sense of the word; and yet in their place they are acceptable and accepted by God, as by him prescribed to the man in his case. As the first step of the prodigal son, though performed in the land of his profligacy, at a moment when he should be in his father's house, was the rightest he could in the case perform, was the necessary condition to his return, so that act of the prodigal was accepted, even before the prodigal himself was accepted. It is not necessary that an act be absolutely *holy* in order to God's bestowing upon it a relative approbation. God can confer an imputative holiness, even upon the utensils of the temple. In the substance and in the organism of man God recognizes, because there exists, notwithstanding its pravity, a sublime excellence, both of substance and structure. Man's immortality and high moral being, intellect, affections, conscience, and will, with his power of realizing eternity, retain him, fallen as he is, at the head of God's lower creation. Though the gold be totally dim, God cognizes the preciousness of its substance. Even while dead in trespasses and sins, his holiness permits him to love us, and he still knows how to accept us. And when, by the aid of the Holy Spirit, man before repentance performs works meet for repentance, and before justifying faith, exercises faith preparatory to justification, God conventionally accepts those works and faith, so far as they go, before he fully accepts the man; and when, by the enabling aid of the Holy Spirit, he performs before acceptance the faith conditional to acceptance, God justifies him,— "justifies the ungodly." Unless the sinner can perform preparatory and conducive acts to regeneration, if all actions are wicked, and equally wicked, and equally unacceptable to God, then we see not how a sinner can take any course towards regeneration and salvation. The whole work appears arbitrary and unconditioned, and the bewildered sinner has only to sit and wait the sovereign grace.

Regeneration is the act of God. It presupposes conditions previously performed by the man; but in the work itself, God is the doer, and man the submissive recipient. It presupposes anterior justification, and the performance, by the free will of the sinner, of all the conditions requisite to the work. The Holy Spirit aids in those conditioned acts, but, except, perhaps, at particular points, never necessitates.

The sinner acts as a free, responsible agent, and his free agency, so far forth as it exists and extends, excludes necessitation or predestination as its contradictory. Upon the decision and choice of the man as a free agent, it ultimately depends whether the condition be performed and salvation attained, or rejected and eternal death incurred. This is the *great alternative point* of man's free probation. From his own essential and central self is the decision most freely made; upon his own central and essential self must the eternal responsibility rest. And, hereby, though man be condemned, God shall be justified.

WITNESS OF THE SPIRIT.

Where God performs directly the work of justification and of regeneration, is it not to be expected that he will as directly give notice of so wonderful a mercy? And this thought suggests the reasonableness of the doctrine of the witness of the Spirit, directly testifying to us that we are born of God.

The *witness of our own spirit* is that self-judgment which we are rationally able to pronounce, in the light of consciousness and scripture, that we are the children of God. This is a logical inference, drawn from the fruits we find, by self-examination, in our minds and external conduct.

But besides this, is there not felt in every deep religious experience, a simple, firm assurance, like an intuition, by which we are made to feel calmly certain that all is blessedly right between God and our own soul? Does not this assurance seem to come into the heart as from some outer source? Does it not come as in answer to prayer, and in direction, as if from him to whom we pray? Scripture surely makes the assuring and witnessing act of the Spirit to be as immediate and direct as the justifying or regenerating acts. Hereby, then, we have the *witness of God's Spirit*, concurrent with the *witness of our own spirit*, testifying to the work of our regeneration. "The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit that we are the children of God." Rom. viii., 16.

ELECTION AND REPROBATION.

All God's choices are *elections.* Some of these elections are unconditional; namely, all his predeterminations in regard to material, non-volitional objects, the absolute disposing of which violates no free agency in the exercise of responsible volition. But there is also a class of conditional elections or predeterminations by God, which are so far contingent, as that they are conditioned upon the actual performance of certain free acts by the finite agent as foreseen. Those free acts, required by God as conditions to this election, are by divine grace placed in the power of every responsible agent, so that the primary reason why any are not elected is, that they do not exercise their power of meeting those conditions. And since every responsible agent has the power to make his own calling and election sure, and every elect person has full power to reject the conditions, so it is not true that the number of the elect can be neither increased nor diminished. Every man has gracious powers to be elected according to the eternal purpose of God. All men may be saved. Every individual, by grace divine, may place himself in the number of those who are chosen from before the foundation of the world. The reprobates are those who, abusing the conferred grace of God, resisting the Holy Spirit, reject the conditions of salvation, and so fail to present the necessary tests to their election. The elect are chosen *unto* good works, to holy faith, to persevering love, to a full manifestation of the power of the gospel during their probationary life, and upon their full performance of this their work and mission, they attain, through grace divine, to a rich, unmerited salvation.

IMMUTABILITY OF THE LAW.

The law, as given to Adam, requiring pure and perfect holiness, has never been withdrawn from the race, and can never be changed. It is its perfectness and immutability which necessitate the atonement and the redemption. Through our whole human history, its pure ideal stands to reveal to us, by our distance beneath its level, the depth of our fall. Whether our sin be responsible or not, it is by the law that we measure its amount. By it, too, we measure the elevation through which we must pass by the redemption to our final restorement in the glorification. Yet inasmuch as we have, by our own voluntary sinfulness, ratified our original sin, and taken upon ourselves the control and the guilt of our sinful nature, so the law furnishes us the measure of our voluntary ruin. And for the finally impenitent, inasmuch as they had the means to the full restorement in the glorification, the law furnishes the just amount of their final condemnation. The law is indeed holy, just, and good; yet for the finally guilty, by the law is the knowledge of sin and the experience of hell. By the deeds of that law can no flesh hope to be justified. In the presence of that law can no human merit stand. Under the Christless infliction of its penalty must all flesh die. For one and for all the only hope of salvation is by the way of faith alone, in the abounding atonement of the dying son of God.

ENTIRE SANCTIFICATION, OR CHRISTIAN PERFECTION.

At our justification we are held by God as absolved from all past sin, and treated as if perfectly pure from the guilt of sin. The law, though not abolished, and though it still remains the standard of our condemnation, apart from Christ, is *not the standard of our acceptance through Christ.* If, then, we are accepted by the law of faith, do we also receive from Christ the power to retain that undiminished acceptance without our complete fulfilment of the pure Adamic law?

Experience shows, at any rate, that few, if any, do, from the moment of their justification, retain the fulness of that first acceptance. Though regenerate, and breathing holy aspirations after holiness empowered within them by the blessed Spirit, such is still the inexperience and ignorance of the ways of satan, such is the natural bent of former habit, and such the unsteadiness of the will, that most, if not all, do grieve the Holy Spirit, and come under condemnation; not, indeed, the condemnation of the entire unbeliever, but the condemnation of an offending child. Such a condemnation, the result of spiritual weakness, endangers apostasy; and the warning of God then, is: "Be watchful, and strengthen the things that remain and are ready to die, for I have not found thy works *perfect* before God." Rev. iii. 2. If, now, through the Holy Spirit granted under the atonement, the soul of the earnest Christian be so spiritually enlightened and strengthened, that it may return by repentance to the gracious guiltlessness of its first justification, and be enabled to retain the fulness of the divine acceptance, his "works" may be found "*perfect* before God:"—perfect, not according to the Adamic Law, but *perfect* by the standard of his ever justifying acceptance, the law of faith. Our views may, perhaps, appear, then, in the following formula:

Through a maturity of Christian experience and the fulness of the spirit imparted, the spiritual powers of the faithful Christian may be so strengthened, that he may, and often does, maintain, through grace, for a longer or shorter period, a permanent state of the undiminished fulness of his acceptance with God, and under no more actual condemnation than at the moment of his justification.

Every thing which has attained the normal completeness of its own class or kind is rightly called *perfect.* Not after an ideal, but a normal standard, we speak of a *perfect egg*, a *perfect chicken*, a *perfect full-grown fowl.* There may be a perfect child or a perfect man. And everything which is wanting in none of the normal complement of qualities, in normal degree, is *perfect* in its class. Now the Christian who has attained to the description of our formula, is at the normal standard of a *perfect* man in Christ. We use an abundantly scriptural term, in calling this a state of Christian *perfection.* It is a state in which all the normal qualities of the Christian are permanently, or with more or less continuity, possessed in the proper completeness. And as this spiritual strength and power over and against sin, derived from the Holy Spirit, is *sanctification*, so in the completeness which we have described, it is not improperly, perhaps, by us called entire sanctification.

Of this state of sanctification, the actual divine acceptance, in its uncondemning fulness, is, according to our present statement, the actual standard. With how much short-coming from the perfect law this is in any case possible, the Spirit is itself in every case judge. It may, therefore, not be possible to answer this question by antecedent words, especially to a metaphysician, demanding absolute exactness; and in this fact, perhaps, consists the basis of the complaint often made by theologians, that they cannot understand the thing we attempt to describe.

The evangelic law requires love with all our present feeble powers to God, and to our neighbor as ourselves. As we are unable to love God with full Adamic powers, the perfect law even then condemns us. Moral weaknesses contracted by past sinful habits, moral ignorances resulting from our own past fault, prejudices of which we are more or less unconscious, nervous irritabilities and physical idiosyncrasies, may produce condemnation from censorious man, where there is still acceptance from him who "knoweth our frame." So far as the will is concerned, Mr. Wesley excluded from the sanctified state all "voluntary transgressions;" but it is questionable whether under the term "involuntary" he did not really include countless numbers of minuter *volitions*, inevitably escaping from our moral weakness, in spite of our most vigorous tone of spiritual purpose and spiritual activity. With how much of all these "infirmities" the uninterrupted fulness of the divine approbation can consist, it is, as we before remarked, impossible in human words exactly to define, even if we could exactly conceive. Thus much, at any rate, is fully certain, that Leighton correctly describes it as an "imperfect perfection." Ample work, doubtless, is found from these short-comings for a permanent exercise of the most *perfect* repentance; as well as the most perfect faith in the blood of Christ. Ample reasons will be found for praying "Forgive us our trespasses." Ample verge there is for all those texts of scripture which affirm that there is none that "sinneth not;" that is, in the wider sense of the word "sin." Nor is there any difficulty in understanding how the most exalted of our Christian saints, in the light of the pure and perfect law, looking at themselves with the eye of a sanctified conscience, can scarce find words sufficient to express their deep humiliation, not only for the depths of the fall of their own nature, but for their own short-comings and for their sins against infinite purity.

But the law is our schoolmaster to drive us to Christ. And yet when in Christ, it is not our duty to keep our shuddering eyes perpetually fixed upon the *schoolmaster*. Greater spiritual power, as well as higher spiritual joy, can be derived from dwelling in Christ, and holding up before ourselves the measure of Christian holiness we can attain through him. A goal is thus set up for our holy ambition; a positive standard for which we may labor. Thence a more cheerful piety arises in him who contemplates what he may gain through Christ, than in him who is ever trembling under the lash of the law, and who is ever exclaiming: "I am all sin, and nothing but sin." Hence, as the doctrine of apostasy constitutes a real warning against backsliding and sin, so the doctrine of Christian perfection is a living incitement to progressive holiness.

PERPETUITY OF MAN'S FREE AGENCY.

By substance and by conformation of his spiritual nature, man is intrinsically a free agent, and such he doubtless is through all the stages of his existence. That free agency may be externally restricted by the absence of alternatives of choice, or by external circumscription *from* given courses, or *to* some one particular course. By the depravation of the fall, without changing his intrinsic nature as a free agent, the way of righteousness, and the possibility of pleasing God, were placed beyond his reach. Neither the motive nor the object were to him a possibility. So the sinner who, by perseverance in sin, destroys his moral sensibilities, diminishes, and ultimately destroys, the avenues to a course of righteousness. The damned, enclosed in hell, are surrounded by objective, insuperable obstacles, to even choosing true repentance and return to holiness. The freedom of the will is, in all these cases, objectively obstructed, not intrinsically destroyed. Nevertheless, as in these last two cases, the suppression of the action of the will is self superinduced, it furnishes no excuse. The free agency still continues, and no bar to penal responsibility can arise from these self-imposed restrictions.

So, also, the holy being in heaven is still intrinsically a free agent. The radical nature of his being, in this respect, is not changed. But the conditions of the possible choice of sin are removed from around his will. His glorified body can be neither stimulant nor instrument of sin; the sphere of heaven is no possible place of sin; the holy atmosphere of heaven, the inbreathed Spirit of God, exclude all possible motive for sin. Sin is therefore objectively impossible. Yet, inasmuch as by achieving his probationary mission, the glorified soul has, through grace, attained to glory, God does recognize in his holy service of praise all the rewardable merit of his most free performance during the period of his probation.

Conclusion.

Upon the whole, the writer of this Article has doubtless failed in his task, if he has not made it conceivable to a candid examiner from the other side, that our Arminianism is a well-defined, symmetrical system, which a mind possessed of the broadest logical consistency may reasonably be imagined to accept as the best approximation to a satisfactory solution of the facts of the divine government. It is an attempt to show the reconcileability of the divine sovereignty in the plenitude of its holiness with the freedom and responsibility of man, by a method securing the divine honor, and affording the most powerful motives for human piety. It may further appear, that as both systems evidently aim at these great objects, though by methods subordinately different, a respectful consideration of each others method may be beneficial to both sides. If this Article shall exert any favorable influence toward that result, it will be greatly due, as we take pleasure here and elsewhere in recording, to the truly Christian courtesy, both in matter and manner, with which the present writer has repeatedly been editorially invited to furnish it for these pages. We are happy to acknowledge the eminent style of piety often attained under the teachings of Calvinism. We place very high in the calendar of true Christian saintship the names of a Calvin, a Baxter, an Edwards, and a Payson. Candid Calvinists will place in the same rank the names of Arminius, Henry More, Fletcher of Madely, and Francis Asbury.

ARTICLE II.

ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY, AS ADAPTED TO POPULAR USE: ITS LEADING FACTS AND PRINCIPLES.

WITH A BRIEF SYNOPSIS OF ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES.

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There is a great neglected science of etymology, awaiting the day of thorough exploration; when, under the skilful hands of those who shall gather together its blocks of quarried marble, from out of the rubbish amid which they now lie confused, it shall rise as if by magic into a grand structure of columnar and turreted beauty, to be the joy of every eye that shall gaze upon it. English, as now used, is, in the comprehension of even our educated men generally, but a mass of opaque arbitrary conventionalisms; utterly destitute of any of those pictorial elements, which belong to language in its own true living forms. Modern words accordingly which once were in themselves veritable thought-pictures, are now without coloring to most eyes, and are but mere skeleton-drawings, instead of being lifelike sketches of the things which they represent.

Multitudes, from mere idle ignorance, imagine that etymology is foredoomed in its very elements and essence to be, at the best, but a mass of elegant vagaries and fancied surprises; and that anything beyond the range, where the testimony of the eye or of the ear is decisive in its favor, must be all a matter of uncertain guess-work. But truth has here, as elsewhere, a deeper significance than any of its mere superficial aspects would indicate.

As chemistry is not only a beautiful science by itself, but pours wonderful light also on geology, natural philosophy, and almost all the practical arts of life, — so, etymology, by its analyses and syntheses and its manifold beautiful evolution of the ideas enwrapped in words, as their very substance, gives large illumination, both in its exact definitions and in the elementary ideas still treasured in its brief expressive symbols, to the truths of theology, metaphysics, history and social experience, as well as to all the debatable elements of human inquiry and of human progress.

It is often said with truth that "ideas rule the world," as also that men generally act to a surprising degree on the greatest questions of duty and interest, according to mere theory; but might it not be declared also quite as positively, that mere words themselves after all rule mankind? The widely expanded and ever newly expanding power of a mistake contained in the single word of some creed or dogma or dictum, is certainly one of the greatest of all marvels in the history of human opinions. Words acquire by long use a potency that is almost inexplicable, and retain their hold, as descriptive of human rights in law or of human interests in religion, upon the minds of generations that have long ceased to use them, in the ordinary currency of social intercourse. Thus words come to be regarded as sacred in themselves, when their function for the ordinary purposes of life has ceased. What scholar does not for this reason feel that, however much he may himself desire it, or however great the boon would be to the mass of thoughtful Christian readers, there cannot be attempted with success, for the present at least, any new translation of the scriptures into our language. And so, who can justly expect that the advancing light of human faith will suffice, for a long time in the future, to expel from the church any of the set phrases, so valued now for their antiquity, that have been used for ages in describing the great doctrines of revelation, however imperfect may have been the vision, at so much earlier a period, of those who contrived them; or however hastily or selfishly dogmatical[1] their spirit. Many of the greatest differences, controversies, and litigations of the world have been mere wars of words. Indeed, while the question is not yet settled, and is not likely soon to be to universal satisfaction, whether men always by necessity think in words, or can and do think without them, — it is manifest enough that words mean things, to such a degree that most persons accept them as such. The remark of Farrar, a recent English writer on "the origin of language," is as beautiful as it is true: "When two men converse, their words are but an instrument; the speaker is descending from thoughts to words, the listener rising from words to thoughts." Whewell also, in his "History of the Inductive Sciences," well observes that "language is not only the instrument of thought, but also the nutriment of thought." Whoever accordingly succeeds in turning attention to the concealed riches embosomed in the study of words; and so, much more, any one who carefully explores himself its mines of wonder, and furnishes to others the results of his researches in all their varied utility and beauty, is so far a benefactor to the great community of thoughtful minds; as, in enlarging to any one the means for greater facility and power of expression, he adds so much stimulus and strength to the exercise and habit of thinking itself.

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[1] Of how many of the foistings of human arrogance, or at least of human weakness, into the pure text of Christian doctrine, as furnished from above, must something very similar be said, if the truth were told just as it is, to what Alford so justly says of the Received Text of the Greek Testament, which is that of the second Elzevir edition, founded on the third edition of Robert Stephens, which was itself founded on the fifth edition of Erasmus. "Erasmus," he says, "besides committing numerous inaccuracies, tampered with the readings of the very few manuscripts which he collected; and Stephens's work appears to have been done with levity and carelessness."

The main object in this Article is to show most conspicuously the hither or English side of English etymology as such, rather than the thither or classical side: with the hope that some may thus come to see in a new light the lexical wealth of our mother-tongue and be allured to enter with gladness upon the wide and inviting field of study here opened before them.

The ideas which we would detail to the reader on this subject are expressed in the following analysis:

I. Some of the applications of general philology to the study of English etymology.

II. First principles and facts of leading interest, in the study of words themselves.

III. Specific facts particularizing English etymology as such.

What then are:

I. The applications of general philology to English etymology.

1st. The English is one of the Teutonic family of the Indo-European languages. Of this branch of languages, which is large and noble both in itself and in its varied literature, Danish, Dutch, German and English, — as the spirit of art is the all-animating genius of the Greek and that of law, authority and mechanism pervades the Latin as its inward life, — the one great ever-present element of its distinctive vitality is the spirit of individual freedom, in the language itself, as in the hearts of those who speak it.

2d. Grammatical identity is the basis of all linguistic analysis. According to their grammar, which is in fact their inward osseous structure, all languages are readily classified into distinct determinate families. The English is very largely Latin in its vocabulary, but not at all in its grammar. Its outward order of architecture is therefore wholly German, although its inward furnishings are of various sorts besides German, although chiefly Latin.

3d. The earlier grammatical elements of lingual structure and development were more numerous and minute than in the later derived languages. The tendency in the onward progression of lingual forms is always from the complicated to the simple. The style of changes that language has undergone from the past to the present, will be understood at a glance by the statement of the mutual alternation of its two great elements in the ancient and recent forms of language. Anciently, grammar was rich in forms, and lexicography poor; while recently grammar is poor in them and lexicography rich, not only in respect to the absolute volume of its vocabulary, but also in its multiplied resources for expressing the most minute and subtle relations and articulations of thought.

4th. Indo-European philology is in itself a system of high philosophical verbal analysis; and its relations as such to English are as definite and practical in their results as those of chemical analysis to the forms of vegetable and animal life or those of mathematical analysis to the abstractions of arithmetic or geometry. But in English that analysis is applicable rather to derivation chiefly, than, as in the classical languages, to inward structure also. The genetic rather than the progressive and pathological history of forms is here the one chief element of etymological interest; and phonology which is so large a solvent of difficulties in the ancient languages, has here far less scope and function, and cannot be reduced to any scientific treatment by itself on account of its small action on the language in any determinate manner. No such analysis for example can be traced in English as in the verb-forms of Greek and Latin: as

	Augment.	Verb-Stem.	Tense-Characteristic.	Mood-Vowel.	Person-Ending.	Union-Vowel.	Voice (Passive)
Greek,	ἐ	βουλευ	σ	α	ντ		ο
Latin,		ama	ba		nt	u	r.

The separate elements of original grammatical forms have been wonderfully borne away in English. In the person-endings of verbs, the obliteration of the primordial elements of verbal declension, mi, si, ti, mus, tis, nti (I, thou, he, etc.), is very marked. In Greek we find them with few changes variously defined in the verbs ending in -ω and -μι alike and in both the present and preterite tenses, and especially of the passive voice; and in Latin they appear with wonderful distinctness, especially in the imperfect tenses. But how greatly have they disappeared in German and English! The only remaining traces left of them in English occur in the endings of the second and third persons singular of verbs in which the original endings *si* and *ti* have become *st* and *th*, as in the forms, thou lovest, he loveth. The ending *th*, of the third person, has become also interchangeably *s*, in more recent use; as in the double forms, new and old, of the third person present active of all verbs, as doth and does, loveth and loves; which change of *th* to *s* is like that of the change of the ending τι to σι in the third pers. sing. present of verbs in -μι. Thus δίδωσι is for the earlier form δίδωτι, he gives. So too in the possessive case, the only one of the separate original eight cases of the noun which is found in English, and the most important case-form in itself of any language, we have in the case-sign *s* not only a genuine, but also a beautiful, relic of the same characteristic mark of the genitive in the ancient classical languages. The suffix *s* in the word friend's, possessive case of friend, is exactly the same as in the corresponding genitive form Freundes in German, or as in the genitive σοφία-ς of Greek and sermo-n-is of Latin. There is moreover no such apparatus of tense-systems outwardly, as there is no such genius for tense-organism inwardly, in any of the modern languages as in the ancient; although in the French and Spanish, auxiliaries are used much less than in German and English; and in respect to verb-forms as to person-endings, these languages are constructed very obviously after the fixed models of their parent Latin tongue. In English, as we have abandoned separate case-forms, for prepositions, so have we separate tense-forms also, for auxiliary verbs. Contingent and conceptional ideas, or the forms of subjunctive modality are expressed in English by an abundant variety of conjunctions, and therefore with great versatility and exactness compared with the system of distinct moods for their expression, as in Greek and Latin.

5th. The graphic symbols of all languages are in every case of one common Phoenician origin. The first step in the evolution of alphabetic characters was that simple step, which so many rude tribes in all ages have taken, but have never left behind them, for one above it: that of a picture in outline, more or less exact in itself, and more or less filled up in detail, by different people according to the breadth and strength of their ideas. The next step onward towards the invention of the alphabet was that of shortening-in the picture, so as to make it in effect but an abbreviated symbol, rather than as at first a pictorial image. Thus the Hebrew, or rather Phoenician, א, aleph, which means an ox, is a symbol of that animal; in which we have certainly, besides the merit of brevity and simplicity, an ingenious combination of the horns of the animal with the plane of his structure, and, that according to his general habit when erect, prone towards the ground. So in the letter ב, beth, a house, we have the most compact possible symbol of a house, containing the four elementary ideas of it, as a piece of architecture: a base, an upright support, a covering, and an entrance within. The same analysis might be applied to each of the letters of the Phoenician alphabet, seriatim. The last and successful step in the invention of alphabetic letters, and in itself the greatest stride of all towards the consummation of this greatest of all human inventions, was that of making the abbreviated symbol when obtained, representative, not of the material objects themselves for which they were at first designed, as a sort of system of short-hand pictures, but of the individual sounds and letters used to denote them.

II. First principles, and facts of leading interest, in the study of words themselves.

1st. Words are in no language in any case, however strong the seeming, mere arbitrary symbols of thought.

There is no real contingency in matters of human speech, any more than anywhere else in the wide realm of causation divine or human; but only what is apparently such, from our ignorance of instrumental causes; as we speak of apparent motion, in common parlance as real, respecting the heavenly bodies. Each word has had not only a distinct designed origination somewhere in the past, but also a sufficient reason for it, in some specific use that it was to answer: as truly as each one of the various dramatis personae of a tragedy is purposely introduced, for the sake of the part that he is to fill in the development of the grand whole; or, as every portion of a complicated machine answers some intended service, in the production of the final result, for which it is all employed. The tendency is in practice indeed uniform, if not resistless, for words to become altogether conventional and mechanical, in their general use. Language is in itself an imitative art and goes down by as necessary laws of sequence and inheritance from one generation to another, as men themselves; and mankind generally, moreover, are far more interested in results than in processes; or, in utilities and practicalities, than in the philosophy of them.

2d. A given part of every word, variously called its root, stem, base, or crude form, contains all its absolute sense as such; and whatever other accretions are formed upon it, in the shape of prefixes or suffixes, have come there, as a purposed increase or modification of that fixed signification. Such after-growths upon the simple elementary constitution of words are not parasitical or accidental, but are the determinate results of determinate wants, in their use and growth.

3d. Mutilations of original word-forms are to be everywhere expected, if not indeed assumed as an almost historical necessity, in the transmigrations of words from age to age and from one language to another. The wear of time shows itself on words as on things; and there is besides an ever-present tendency in all departments of human experience to take the shortest route to any desired result, and in every way possible to save needless labor.

4th. Each word, in order to be put in its right etymological attitude, must be set in full correlation with other cognate words, not only in the same language but also in the various kindred languages.

The almost universal instinct of biographers to place the subjects of their sketches amid those family surroundings, as in a clear harmonious setting for the better display of their characters and fortunes, under the influence of which they became what they really were, is both practically and philosophically a true one. Each individual man is stamped, inwardly as well as outwardly, with strong hereditary aspects; but the same energetic interplay of determinate influences from one class, family or generation of words upon another, is apparent as among the different tribes and families of men. Words must be studied in their many correlations like the scattered facts and elements of any of the natural sciences, or the mutually connected doctrines of theology, or the several parts of a deep-sounding harmony. They are thus correlated, not only in one language compared with another, but in each separate language also by itself; so that they not only grow in clusters from one parent stem; but also, as often in nature, growths of the most opposite character are frequently found united in a common vitality. Words fix themselves in constellated groups, like the stars themselves: they shoot out from a common centre, like crystals overlying each other and reflecting light one to the other in endless beauty: they grow in masses like trees in the forest, and greatly affect by their height and breadth each others progressive fulness.

5th. The etymology of a word decides its real radical signification, as an absolute historical fact. Specific *usus loquendi* is indeed the proper rule for the interpretation of given words and phrases; but that "usus loquendi" is itself amenable to definite canons of verbal criticism, in the form of clear decisive etymological facts and principles. While there is but little opportunity for improving the spelling of our words; and while, whatever alterations may be made, should be those, for etymological reasons, involving as close a return as possible to original forms, instead of any such iconoclastic processes as Webster sought to initiate, — there is abundant scope for a large reformatory improvement of the natural derivations, and consequent natural definitions of words in English lexicography.

6th. No two separate words, whether from the same or different roots, however alike in their general sense, or in any of their specific uses, are yet precisely alike in their entire signification; so that one can be substituted in each and every case for the other. From this remark some half dozen technical words, like dictionary and lexicon, circumlocution and periphrasis, which, one from the Latin and the other from the Greek, have come in scholarly usage to be interchanged one with the other, must be excepted. The statement made however, with these exceptions, is as true as it is sweeping, and can be verified to any extent whatever, at one's leisure, of mingled conviction and humor.[1]

As our language is, in its very elementary constitution, the full round blended union of two wholly distinct hemispheres of lingual development, Anglo-Saxon and Norman Latin; many synonyms occur in it, from the self-retentive power or tenacity of life possessed by great numbers of kindred words, in each of the component languages. They are such as hate and despise, liberty and freedom, love and charity, understanding and intelligence, strength and power; and they serve greatly to enrich our facilities for varied and precise expression. So also in some cases we obtain through the French and Latin two separate adjectives, synonymous in their origin and fundamental sense; but descriptive in particular, one of the inward or subjective relations of the word, and the other of its outward objective or formal aspects: as from the Lat. lex, Fr. loi, the words *legal* and *loyal*, and from Lat. rex, Fr. roi, *regal* and *royal.*

7th. The same word will readily take upon itself different variations and shades of its fundamental meaning, according to the different classes of minds that use it, or the different ages or periods of civilization in which it is found in common use. As the human face and form, while in their great aspects always grandly human, are yet so impressible to climatic, local and personal influences as to be able to bear, at one and the same time with their proper generic qualities, all the specific diversities of national, family and individual characteristics; or, still again, as the hard bony skull indeed accommodates itself to the size and growth of the soft brain within, — so, language, although fixed and rigid in its forms, yet agrees in its outward capacities of sense and use, with the wants of the ever growing public mind that works consciously and actively within its living bands.

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[1] The author would suggest, for the reader's self-amusement in such a way, the following synonyms as specimens: see and perceive; think and reflect; know and understand; seize and grasp; give and bestow; escape and run away; sick and diseased; speak and talk; change and alter.

8th. As different words are often alike in outward form, a supposed identity of derivation may be arrived at by a guess, which is yet utterly unsubstantial. This style of etymologizing has been much practised by random strollers in the field of etymology, who have thereby brought the real truths and riches of this great but yet undeveloped science into much disfavor. A seeming resemblance of bases, however minute, is not enough to establish an actual derivation or correspondence. Phonetic analogies and discordances make strongly for or against alleged connections of words. Minor correspondences also in specific derived forms from the same base are greatly helpful to the same result; and, in the case of English words derived from the Latin, much determinate light is often obtainable from intermediate forms in the other modern tongues.

9th. Some words in every language, and they are absolutely if not relatively many, cannot be traced to any satisfactory derivation.

They are isolated in their own existence, without any of those accompaniments of connected forms which enable one to resolve them satisfactorily to their primal condition. The wonder is, not that they are so many but so few; when we remember, that no one, of all the millions that have used these words in the past, has had any direct purpose to preserve them or their history for critical inspection. Literature however conveyed from one generation to another, and particularly the printed page, have been the great preservers of words, especially as used by the more educated and considerate minds of the day. But on how few words, since the common affairs of life come so little within the pale of literary art or endeavor, has their preserving power been exerted in the ancient languages. Exact criticism and careful scholarship have passed very few of the world's mental products in the past through their scales and under their measuring-rod to our eyes.

10th. Words are always by necessity as such retrospective in their bearings, and conservative of the results and influences of the past; instead of being anticipative or prospective in their signification.

They are not in themselves prophetic but historical. They are the coins used in the exchange of preceding generations; representative of what has been, instead of what is agoing to be; and, as the human mind grows from age to age and human wants multiply, they must yield to the strain of new uses; or, rather, like the skin which expands or contracts according to the fulness or leanness of the body which it covers, language is in itself elastic, and dilates or contracts in the dimensions of its use and sense, just as necessity requires.

11th. As the senses are the inlets of knowledge, and sensation is preliminary to speculation, and the physical always anticipates the intellectual and the spiritual, in the order of development, — so, all those words, which form in fact the great mass of language, that describe the estimates, wants, acts and states of the human mind, are in themselves figurative and pictorial in their sense. Language therefore, which to us moderns appears at first sight so unadorned, and indeed quite arbitrary in its elements, is yet full of concealed and also partially obliterated pictures. It is, in other words, metaphorical and so, poetical, to a vastly greater extent than it is philosophical in its elements; which yet is now its more leading form of manifestation.

12th. As words are the symbols of things, and things themselves are full of multiform analogies; so, the words that represent them are and must be full of irrepressible tendencies to the expression of analogical ideas and impressions. The ultimate words accordingly of a language have a sort of ganglionic vitality and value in them, and show at every point an ever active tendency to burst forth into continually new forms of life.

And the same word also, in instances almost without number, shows in itself a ready convertibility to a great number of secondary related senses.

13th. Words, like vegetable and animal organisms, are in perpetual processes of change, or, of growth and decadence.

Words pine away and die as truly as men themselves or books. Many whole languages have disappeared in other days, as in every language many words are perpetually losing their vitality, like Autumn leaves that have fulfilled their use, and when their occupation is gone drop useless to the ground themselves. The greatest preservative antiseptic influence that can be secured for a word is its use in works of standard literature.

14th. Great, silent yet determinative laws of criticism and so, of general acceptance or condemnation, are ever at work upon words, deciding their position among mankind at large; as if before a court without any appeal.

Their action is certain, although undefinable to our vision, like the seemingly blind laws of the weather; which yet, however multiplied in their sources or subtle in their action, rule infallibly not only the questions of human labor and of human harvests, but also to a great extent those of human health, power, and enjoyment.

15th. As the spelling of words is manifestly designed to represent to the eye their real sound to the ear; the number of silent letters in the present forms of any language is a striking index of the greatness of the changes wrought upon the substance and volume of those forms by time.

16th. The osseous fabric or elementary structure of words consists in their consonantal parts; and the vowels are but the needful filling-up of their framework. Changes and obliterations in the vowel-elements of words are therefore much more frequent than in the consonantal.

17th. The revealing power of language, as a sure medium of historical interpretation, is one of its most striking peculiarities. We see plainly each nation as it is, for aim and effort, for spirit and achievement, for power and progress, in the intellectual rush or tramp or pace of its words and phrases, as well as each different age in every nation, according to its varying moods of energy and aspiration. The Greek is full of deep aesthetic elements, as were the people that spoke it; the Latin, of martial pomp and of the busy stir of active life; the French, of sprightly glancing turns of thought and of much sweet honied phrase; the German, of dreamy revery indeed, but also, and far more, of the rich and tender satisfactions of beauty; and the English, of all large full-freighted stores of free thought and divine truth, and of large sympathy with human rights and human interests.

18th. Climatic influences, direct and indirect, which are ever also at work in modifying more or less the living languages of the world, have very decisively modified all languages in the past; and more then than now, as there was less social intercourse then, to make their forms of speech trite and fixed; and the influences of a more narrow and incomplete literature than ours were also less decisive in the same direction, in respect to both the phonetic and dynamic qualities of words. Even in the same language, at the same period of its development, whether early or late, physical individualities of soil, climate and occupation have always sufficed to distinguish, more or less distinctly, according to various geographical divisions, different dialects, one from the other. The impressibility of language to external influence of all kinds is one of its most remarkable facts; as well as its wonderful reflex power, in imaging to view the local and historical, as well as also both the inward and outward, peculiarities of those who speak it.

19th. Nowhere is the fact of an "imperium in imperio" more manifest than in language. Not only has every science, art, trade, and employment its own technics, inside of the general sweep and circuit of every language; but the various circles of fashion have their different circulating media of words and phrases, down to the most unfashionable portions of society, whose slang language advertises their rudeness wherever they go. Thus scholars, lawyers, merchants, farmers, mechanics, miners, sailors, all have their own separate forms of speech.

There are also large sections of every language, from which no one man, in whatever employment, ever takes a word for use, any more than if it were an utterly foreign language; and even of the common stock of unprofessional words, which constitute the great average staple of any language, the difference of use among men, of the higher and lower forms is quite remarkable. As the poorer classes in society do not partake of the dainties of the market, and the world's rich garniture of fruits and flowers is practically not at all for them; so, they pass by unused, because unnecessary to them, all the higher and better portions of their mother-tongue.

20th. The facility and certainty with which words, having in themselves a broad capacity of sense, can be permanently specialized to a confined contracted use, is a very noticeable point in the natural history of words.

All technics, doctrinal, scientific, legal and professional, have been formed out of such material in such a way. As a few simple specimens from a great abundance of such a sort, take the following: a minister is in Latin (cf. minor and minimus)any servant, as deacon is in Greek (*διάκονος*); a presbyter (*πρεσβύτερος*) is literally an older person, as is also a senator (Lat. senex), and the ecclesiastical word elder (Germ. älter comp. of alt old, Lat. altus), and a priest is also etymologically but an elder, being but a contracted form of *πρεσβύτερος* (Germ. Priester, Fr. prêtre, originally prestre).

21st. Onomatopoetic words, or those that are formed in imitation of some sound or set of sounds in nature, occur in all languages and are quite as apt to be indigenous in them as to be derived.

They are of quite a variety of classes such as the following: (1) Those indicating mere sound as such: as, in Latin, susurro to whisper; murmur, the noise of running water etc.: and in English, gobble, buzz, cackle, caw, quack, hum, hiss, growl. (2) Those indicating sudden or startling motion or excitement as, dash, flash, gash, gnash, rash, smash, splash; so, crack and crackle, hack and haggle, smack and whack and clasp, gasp, rasp. (3) Those descriptive of pain, as, groan, howl, shriek, scream, wail. (4) Those descriptive of a mixing-up of things together, to whatever sense the fact is addressed, as huddle, muddle, puddle, fuddle. (5) The nasal words, *nose*, *nasal*, *sneer*, *sneeze*, *snicker*, *snore*, *snout*, *snooze*, *snub*, *snivel*, *sniff*, *snuff*.

22d. The self-defining power of words in English is as remarkable, in the light of recent etymological research, and as useful, as in any of the more primitive languages. The amount of interest to be found, in the proper study of this element in Greek and Latin, is far beyond any general appreciation of it. Thus: *cash* (Fr. cacher to hide) was something hidden carefully from view when the word was first adopted for the thing. Cf. the word coffer, as in the phrase "the coffers of the rich" (Fr. coffre, Ital. cofano, Gr. κόφινος a box, Eng. coffin).

Sick (Lat. siccus, dry, thirsty) describes as no other one word could so well, the one almost universal symptom of all serious disease, undue heat or fever.

Pay (Lat. pacare to pacify, Span. pagar, Fr. payer) reminds us strongly of the urgency of men to have their debts or dues rendered to them; this is the only way to *satisfy* them the word says. *Hut* (Germ. hütte) and *hat* (Germ. hut) and *hide* (Ger. haut), all agree in the common idea of being a covering, and are all from one common root (Germ. hüten to cover, Gr. κεύθειν with which cf. σκῦτος and κύτος and Lat. cutis). A *pearl* (Lat. pirula dim. of pirus, a pear) is a little pear in shape. *Fangs* and *fingers* are seizers (from Germ. fangen, fing, etc. to catch). A *hinge* (Germ. hangen, hing, etc. to hang) is a contrivance for hanging a door. A *hilt* of a sword, like a *halter* (from Germ. halten, hielt, etc. to hold) is a holding place as this is a holding thing. A *fashion* (Lat. factio, from facio to do, Fr. façon) is the general way of doing things. *Treasure* (Fr. trésor, Lat. thesaurus, Gr. *ϑησαυρός*, from *τίϑημι* to place aside and *αὖρον* gold), is wealth garnered for future use. A *garnet* is a shining *grain*, as *granate* is a rock full of grains and a *pome-granate* (pomum granatum) is an apple full of the same. Examples of such words in common use, that define themselves in their own etymology, might be endlessly multiplied. The foregoing have been selected for their commonness; with the design, that the implication which they bear with them should be seen and felt as real; — that, if such words carry their own sense distinctly within them, however latent at first sight to the common eye, so do, much more, most of those higher words, which pertain to the more important elements of human experience and the mutual intercourse of men.

23d. Words are in themselves the most permanent of all human records and relics.

Homer often calls words, and well, "winged words." They are winged and, much as they fly through many storms and changes from one land and age to another, their wings are seldom much broken. As language is one of the chief imitative arts; and as the growth of the public mind of the world has been hitherto slow in the mass; and as reverence for the past is an instinct that nowhere, except in religious forms, has a stronger hold on mankind at large, than in respect to both words themselves and set forms of words also: it is manifest that we should naturally expect to find language a firm vehicle for the sure conveyance of ideas, traditions, laws, customs and historic facts and memorials unimpaired from one generation to another. Horace said rightly, as all time since has shown, of the power of his written verse to perpetuate his memory: "exegi monumentum aere perennius." "I have wrought out a monument more lasting than brass." What a petty fragment of all the glorious magnificence of Greece could we find anywhere in the world, if all the "in memoriam" records of the thoughts and deeds of her great men had perished from the eyes and hearts of mankind!

But such thoughts alone do not express the full scope of the general statement, which they are adduced to illustrate. It is also true, that, in the very fabric of a language itself, aside from any and all forms of literature inwrought into its substance, there is in the texture of its elements, as such, a wonderful self-perpetuated power of continued identity; preserving with itself all the influences stamped upon it, in whatever way, by the myriads that have breathed their thoughts and feelings through its manifold combinations.

24th. The true centre and pivot of all modern etymological research is the Latin language, which mediates, in its forms, between those of the more primitive languages and those of a recent date, which owe so much of their parentage directly to the Latin. In English especially is it necessary to make thorough scholarship in Latin etymology the preparation, for an adequate etymological handling of its forms.

III. Specific facts pertaining to English etymology, as such.

1st. Generally.

(1) English etymology is in itself, as such, a vast unity in diversity. Our language is indeed a conglomerate, but one of great firmness and of the finest possible working qualities, for all purposes of word-masonry and of word-ornamentation. No figure, however, drawn from mere inorganic matter will describe the inward characteristics of our mother-tongue, which is full of organic life and strength, quite individually its own. While the Teutonic and Latin elements greatly prevail over the rest, a number of other elements, in greater or less proportion, are connected with them in the same unique vital structure. Nor are the two cardinal elements of its composite unity, themselves of one single definite type. The Latin element, while it is often pure in its manifestation, is also often strongly Normanized; and sometimes it has besides a distinct Spanish or Italian modification; while the Teutonic element is sometimes thoroughly Saxon, or High German, and sometimes altogether Danish, Swedish, or Low Dutch.

But, however diversified in the various elements of its origination, there is in the very genius and vital force of the English language itself, as such, an ever-present, and an all active, assimilative energy at work, which binds them all into one grand comprehensive, thoroughly harmonized unity. In the wonderful energy of its self-assimilating action upon the materials of which it is composed, it shows, in the most conclusive of all ways, the reality and power of its own individuality as a language.

(2) In English, far more than in the three classical languages, Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin, the facts and principles pertaining to both the genetic structure and pathological affections of words are much concealed beneath the surface. Euphonic changes and substitutions are of so infrequent occurrence, and have so little scope and definiteness as such, as not to be open to any thoroughly discriminative analysis.

(3) The English allows, in its present mature state of development, no license to the caprice or choice of individual minds, in the making of new words; or, in the putting of any new arbitrary senses upon old ones. An academy instituted here, as in France, with a sort of plenary power over the forms of the language, "to kill and to make alive" at their pleasure, would be regarded as an immense social absurdity.

(4) The English is, like the Latin and French languages, beyond all others ancient or modern, owing to the practical business habits of the people, addicted to abbreviations of its forms. In Greek and Latin, whatever abbreviations occur, are made by the actual rejection of different letters and syllables; but in English and French the letters themselves are retained, while their sounds are dismissed: the abbreviation made is orthoëpical only, instead of being also orthographical. Such almost sacred reverence had the Greeks for the original or normal forms of words, that, in making euphonic changes in them, which sometimes involved a contraction of their elements, they made them on such analogical principles or left such obvious traces purposely of the changes wrought, that neither an antiquary's tastes nor a

scholar's wants were left unsatisfied. But in Latin the contractions which abound in derived forms are not at all, as in Greek, self-announced. It is a matter often of much scholarly research to find and determine them. As to the multitude of orthoëpical contractions in French and English, one, who would deepen his sense of their number and greatness, can readily do so, by comparing the vast array of their silent letters with the full-volumed, vocal forms of the stately Spanish and the exact German. An iconoclastic spirit like Webster's, however narrow its range of operations, is quite foreign to the genius of all the etymological traditions of the language; and both will be resisted, and should be, in its attacks upon the time-honored forms of our words.

(5) The extent to which many Latin-English words have been unjointed from their original form, or *de-Latinized*, in coming to us through the French, Spanish, or other Romanic languages, is quite remarkable. Two or three examples must suffice. It is through the Spanish jamon (j being pronounced as h) that we get *ham*, from the Latin gamba a leg; while through the French jambe, from the same root, we get also the word *jamb*. Our word *ambassador*, which is thus rightly spelled (Mid. Lat. ambasciator from ambascia, entrusted business; derived from part. ambactus, with which cf. Germ. ambacht) is often wrongly spelled embassador as indeed Webster advocates that it should be, because of the kindred word, embassy (from the Spanish form, embaxada, which is special to itself). *Much* (Span. mucho) represents the Latin multus; *rent* (Fr. rendre) Lat. reddo; *dupe* (Fr. duper) Lat. decipere (cf. dû, owed, part of devoir, to owe from debere, and duire to suit, from decere); *beauty* (Fr. beau and bel) from Lat. bellus (dimin. of bonus, being contracted from benulus).

As many Latin words came into our language, as such, not by Roman or clerical but strictly Norman influence; it is natural that they should have some Norman mark upon them whose removal without damage, as a blemish, true scholarly taste would both sanction and demand

Thus who does not approve Webster's restoration of those pure Latin words in English, *honor*, *favor*, *labor*, etc., to their true form, by dropping out the u, which they used to have and have still in Walker, from the spelling of the equivalent French forms, honneur, faveur, etc. Of the same acceptable nature is the substitution of s for c, in the former mode of spelling such words, as *defense*, *offense*, *pretense*, all directly derived from Latin supines spelled with an s. Here obviously the original Latin should rule the orthography of the English, rather than the degenerate French form. But is not the change of -tre to -ter, in such words as centre (*κέντρον*), lustre (lustrum), theatre (*ϑέατρον*), utterly abnormal in itself and offensive to all true scholarly feeling, not to say conscience! Can the combined efforts of all the type-setters of our newspaper offices, although so pertinacious in the attempt, succeed in making this purposed abuse into a law? We trow not. And here a word concerning Webster: its etymology is, simply and plainly described, horrible; and of course its exegesis, or the whole department of its definition of words, both practical and philosophic, rests on no adequate basis in the words themselves. Unless it be utterly renovated, and that in the most radical and critical manner, it must fall dead by its own weight from the hands of the next generation of scholars.

2d. Particularly.

(1) Many English words are of the same identical origin, and so of the same fundamental sense, which yet present in themselves no such appearance of such a fact. Examples:

§ 1. *Day* and *diary* (Lat. dies) on the one hand, and on the other, *journal*, *journeyman*, *adjourn*, *sojourn* (Lat. diurnus, Mid. Lat. jornus, It. giorno, Fr. jour). § 2. *Captain* (Fr. capitaine) and *chief* (Fr. chef, cf. also achever, and Eng. achieve) are both from Lat. *caput*, the head; as from *capitulum* (a diminutive of caput) a small head, are our words *chapter* (Fr. chapitre) and *capitulate;* and from capitalis (pl. capitalia, principal forms of property) come our words *cattle* and *chattels*. § 3. *Aperture*, *aperient*, and *April* (the month of the earth's opening for new seed) are from *aperio*, to open, as is also *overt* and *overture* (Fr. ouvrir) and *open* (as well as the corresponding German offen). § 4. *Propitious* (Lat. propitius), *propinquity* (propinquus), *property* and *propriety* (proprietas), *appropriate* (Mid. Lat. appropriare) all have their common root and idea in the word *prope*, near, near to or by, as have also the following words. *approach* (Mid. Lat. appropiare), *proximity* (sup. proximus for propsimus), *approximate*, *proxy*. § 5. From Lat. canna a reed (Gr. *κάννα* a reed) come *can*, *cane*, *canon*, a law or rule (Gr. *κανών*, a straight rod), *cannon* (Fr. canon, It. cannone), *canal* and *channel* (Lat. canalis, Fr. chenal). § 6. From Lat. spatula (dim. of spatha, Gr. *σπάϑη*, any broad blade, from *σπάω* to draw out — from which come also spasm, spavin and spay — Germ. spaten, a spade, Fr. épaule and epaulette), come our words *spatula* (an anatom. term), *paddle*, *spade* and *epaulet.* § 7. From Lat. unus, archaic oinos (cf. Gr. *εἷς* for *ἕνς*, one, *οἶος* alone and also *ὄνος* and *οἴνη* ace or dice), come *onion* (Fr. ognon Lat. unio), *one*, *union*, *unit*, *atone* (at-one), *alone* (Germ. allein, lit. all one), *lone*, *lonely*, *lonesome.* Other specimens of the same sort might be added to any degree desired.

(2) Many words contrarily which seem to be of the same origin, and are often regarded as such, are of a totally diverse etymology. To *count* is from Fr. compter, Lat. computare (Eng. compute); but the noun *counter* is from Lat. contra, over against, from which comes also *country* (cf. Germ. Gegend, the country, and gegen, over against, i. e. the eye). *Just*, righteous, is from justus, and *just*, now, is from juxta. *Toil*, a net (Lat. tela a web, Fr. toile and toilette, Eng. toilet) has nothing to do with *toil*, labor, which is a word of Saxon origin. *Chance* (Fr. chance, Lat. cadens) has nothing to do with *chancery* (Lat. cancellaria Fr. chancellerie). *Tempt* and *attempt* (Fr. tenter, Lat. tentare to try) are of a different origin from *contempt* (Lat. contemno, sup. contemptum). The same fact is still more striking in several composite words. Thus compare *surface* (super + facio) and *preface* (praefatio from for, to speak); *explain* (ex + planus) and *complain* (con + plango); *suffuse*

(subfundo) and *refuse* (recusare, Span. rehusar, Fr. refuser); *prize*, as a token of honor (pretium, from which also, precious, appreciate etc.) and *prize* as something taken in battle (Lat. prehendere Fr. prendre, part. pris, lit. taken, from which also enterprize, reprisal, prison and misprision). How different the origin of the same terminational forms often in English, as in the following specimens of *-able: agreeable* (Ital. aggradevole = ad + gratum + volo); *parable* (Gr. παραβολή = παρά + βάλλω); *syllable* (συλλαβή = σύν + λαμβάνω); and *able* (Fr. habile, Lat. habilis, from habeo). The termination *-gale* in *nightingale* has no relation to gale a breeze, but is from the Lat. gallus, a bird (cf. Germ. Nachtigall) and signifies a *night-bird.* In the word *humble-bee* the prefix "humble" is not our ordinary adjective so named, but the German Hummel, anglicized (from hummen to sing, Eng. hum).

From what a vast variety of sources comes the termination *-ay* in English. Thus *decay* is from Lat. decadere, Sp. decaer; *day* is from Lat. dies, Germ. tag; *fray*, Lat. fricare, Fr. frayer; *gay* Fr. gai (perhaps from Lat. gallus); *lay*, Lat. locare, Germ., legen; *pay* Lat. pacare, Span. pagar, Fr. payer; *ray*, Lat. radius, Fr. raie; *stay*, Gr. ἵστημι, Lat. sto, stare, Germ. stehen; *way*, Germ. weg, Lat. via, etc.

(3) Many instances occur in English of double forms of the same radical word as *blaspheme* (βλασφημέω, to speak reproachfully) and *blame* (Fr. blâmer, originally blasmer); *example* (Lat. exemplum) and *sample; paralysis* (παράλυσις) and *palsy; history* (ἱστορία) and *story* (It. storia); *fantasy* (φαντασία, from φαίνω to appear), and *fancy; thorough* and *through* (a shortened form); *costume* and *custom* (a shortened form of stem consuetudin), for the double sense of which two words compare for analogy the two corresponding senses of the word habit (from habeo, to have); *plane* and *plain* (Lat. planus, Fr. plain) — for the varying modes of spelling which words, compare the two derived forms of manus in our words *man*age (manus + ago) and *main*tain (manus + teneo) — the word *piano* (It. piano soft or smooth, Lat. planus) is also a third modern form of the same root;

secure (se without, cura, care) and *sure; state* (Lat. status) and *estate* (Fr. état for estat, Span. estado); *spy* (Lat. specio, (It. spiare) and *espy* (Span. espiar); *regulate* (Lat. regulus) and *rule; seek* (Lat. sequor, Germ. suchen) and *beseech; repel, repeal*, and *repulse* (Lat. repello); *truth* and *troth* as in betroth; *construe* and *construct.* The adjective and adverbial suffixes, -like and -ly (Germ. lich) are duplicates of each other as in godlike and godly (Germ. gottlich), -like being in imitation of the spelling, and -ly, of the pronunciation of the syllable. So *captive* (Lat. captivus) and *caitiff* (Fr. chétif) are the same word, one describing his relations to others, and the other, the results of the same; and so likewise with *debt* and *duty* (Lat. debere, Fr. devoir part. dû); *canvas* and *hemp* (Gr. κάνναβις, Lat. cannabis, Fr. chanvre, Germ. Hanf, Eng. hemp); *chance* (Lat. cadens) and *cadence; gelid* (Sansk. jalitas, Lat. gelidus, Germ. kalt) and *cold; tierce* (Lat. tertius, Fr. tiers and tierce) and *third* and *tier. Emir* (a Turkish prince) and *admiral* are the same word (from Mid. Lat. admiralius which was also variously admiraldus). *Provident* (Lat. providens) *prudent* (from prudens a contracted form of providens), *prude* (Fr. prude) and *proud* (Fr. prud' homme), are all the same word in varied degrees of more or less. So is it with *compute* and *count; propound, propose* and *purpose; plum* and *prune* (Lat. prunum, Fr. prune, Germ. Pflaume).

(4) Some words, especially when combining with others in composition, lose nearly or quite their entire radical substance. Thus *ink* is from Fr. encre (Lat. encaustum, lit. burned in, Gr. καίω fut. καύσω, cf. Eng. caustic). In the word *ease* (Lat. otium, Fr. aise, glad or at my ease, from otiosus) not a letter remains of the original form. Who would at first thought imagine that *negotiate* (= nec + otium) was of the same direct origin? To *couch* is from collocare (It. colcar, Fr. coucher). *Sue* is from sequor, (Fr. suivre); *autumn* (Lat. auctumnus) is from augeo, to increase, *strange* is from extraneus (Gr. ἐκ, Lat. ex, extra, etc. Span. extraño, It. stranio); *hotel* is from Lat. hospitalis, Fr. hôtel, originally hostel; *island* (Lat. insula) is from in sale (Gr. ἐν

ἀλί). *Other* is from French autre (Lat. alter — comparative form of alius — from which come also directly alter and alternate in English). *Sir* is from Fr. sieur, Lat. senior. *Soda* is from Fr. soude, Lat. solida nom. pl. neut. of solidus (from which also come Eng. solder to make solid, and soldier, Fr. soldat, Lat. solidum, a gold coin and solidarius [Mid. Lat.], a soldier). So do words hang, often, by only one remaining letter to their original parent stem. The wonder is that their true primal forms are so little injured as they are.

(5) Metathesis occurs occasionally in English, as in the ancient languages. This change in the relative order of the radical letters of a word, sometimes originates in our language itself, and sometimes it is brought with the word from some other modern language; as, *palsy* from paralysis; *larceny* (Lat. latrocinium, Fr. larcin); *almond* (ἀμυγδάλη, It. mandola, Span. almendra, Fr. amande); *mercy* (Lat. misericordia, Fr. merci); *treasure* (Gr. ϑησαυρός, Lat. thesaurus, Fr. trésor); *spoil* (Lat. spolio); *foil* a leaf (Lat. folium, Fr. feuille) and *trefoil* or clover, literally having three leaves (tria folia); tool (Lat. utilis, Fr. outil); morning (Germ. morgen).

(6) Quite a large number of English words are simply Latin, Greek, German, French and Spanish, or other words, as such: or with only such little change as shall just suffice to remove the gender-sign or declension-form that is added to the stem. Indeed there is quite a manifest tendency in the English to use, if not to demand, the unencumbered stems of words, beyond most of the languages lying historically between it and the Sanskrit. Observe the following specimens. § 1. From the Greek: *harp*, ἅρπη, a sickle; *ache*, ἄχος; *ball*, βάλλω, to cast; *basis*, βάσις; *bomb*, βόμβος, a whizzing sound; *idea*, ἰδέα, form, semblance; idol, εἴδωλον, an image; coffin, κόφινος; panther, πάνϑηρ; scope, σκόπος; spleen, σπλήν. § 2. From the Latin: axis, circus, color, error, favor, honor, humor, miser, nausea (Gr. ναυσία from ναῦς a ship), nucleus, pauper, virus; which are just as good Latin words as they are English, in their present form.

And what numbers are there of other words that have been changed only from their nominative form to their absolute stem-form into English as: alien, antique, angel, familiar, mortal, part, ration, spirit, vent, etc. § 3. From the French such words are imported bodily into English as, rendezvous (lit. render, or report yourselves); lieutenant (Lat. in loco tenens); revenue (that which comes back), mortgage (lit. security, in case of death); chemise (Lat. camisia); loyal (Lat. legalis) and royal (Lat. regalis); sage. § 4. From the German, as our language is in its grammar wholly German and in its vocabulary largely so, instances might be furnished to almost any extent.

Differences of form in English cannot be clearly resolved, as has been stated, by phonetic laws and principles, and classified as in the classical languages; but side-influences of all sorts, for variety and force, as of internal commotions, emigration, conquest, commercial intercourse, and sympathetic contact in whatever way with the elements of power and progress in other nations, have at different times struck our language and impressed themselves upon it. It bears as remarkable evidence of having been once in a grand chaotic state of wild interfused elementary agitation, which has been afterwards calmed and consolidated into one grand harmonious whole, as the geologic crust of the world itself. The one mighty all-assimilating energy, that has subdued its struggling elements to each other and to itself, has been the inward-working, divinely-illuminated, ever-advancing, gospelized, English mind, that has clothed itself in its living words, as in a garment of light and of praise.

(7) New words are introduced from time to time into our language; but they are uniformly names of new inventions and discoveries in the arts and sciences; instead of being descriptive of any new results or wants in the great sphere of abstract thought. Our language is competent in itself without any enlargement, as a vast, complicated, elastic instrument of thought and speech, to express all possible combinations of perception, conception, sensibility, desire and will. For, aside from the argument, that while combina-

tions are many in possibility, their elements are in actuality few and simple: — how have all the reaches of the human mind in all ancient times, even with the torch of revelation in its hand, been adequately transferred into English! and how has English thought itself already spread its wing in the upper blaze above!

Not more sensitively does the sea glass the sky in its broad bright mirror, than in the different historic phases of our language are reflected the different forms and stages of mental and moral progress, made by the common English mind. The different ends and objects of English thought, at various periods, in the mass; and so, the differences of expression that they have found in its national literature, whether in its own volumed vastness or in its mere verbal details, — may be grouped under several separate classifications, as sentimental, poetical, philosophic, practical, true or errant, substantial or fanciful, subjective or objective, aggressive, progressive, self-vindicatory, or self-laudatory, just according to the style and measure of the balancings and counterbalancings of public thought, from age to age. The subjective period of perpetually self-measuring consciousness, as indicated here in intense Edwardeanism, and, in England, in the philosophy of John Locke, has happily well nigh passed away; and this age is not only one of more material practicality, as also of martial inspiration, but one at the same time of increasing poetic sentimentalism, as appears abundantly in the number and characteristic style of our essayists, historians, orators, and preachers, as well as poets. In our ever new and blooming literature therefore, rather than in any new growths of words as such, are the signs of advancement or decadence in our language to be found. Newspapers, novels, and periodical literature, from coming in contact, as they do, directly with the mass, can and do give favor or umbrage, under the strong magnetic influence of able glowing pens, to apt words and phrases, imported or imitated from the current literature of other languages, especially French and German. Such words as cañon, canard, spirituelle, personnel, blasé, roué, have thus become almost or quite naturalized among us of late. So stand-point, and shimmer from the German, and from other sources, filibuster and squelch have been brought into new honor recently by the press. The use of the word *normal* also has gotten to be lately quite enormous. Of all the new words sought to be introduced by some none is homelier than the word *resurrected.* So also new phrases appear from time to time, as within a few years past such as these: "manifest destiny," "irrepressible conflict," "glittering generality," "bitter end," "military necessity," slaves as "contraband of war," "the development theory," etc.; which, like axioms, maxims, apothegms, and proverbs, have a value, when once strongly announced, for their perspicacity, brevity, and utility, which preserves them ever afterwards as a vital component part of the common speech of the land. Such indeed is the power of skilful cunning phrase for conveyancing error as well as truth acceptably from mind to mind, that pseudo-philosophy always seeks carefully to clothe its false theories in such a garb. Hence Auguste Comte calls his infidel reveries, "positive philosophy;" and, in explanation of what he means, declares that there are "three philosophies of things, or general systems of conceptions, each of which excludes the other: the theological or fictitious; the metaphysical or abstract; and the scientific or positive: the first being the necessary point of departure of the human understanding; the second, merely a state of transition, and the third its fixed and definitive state." So, Darwin speaks of "*the struggle for existence*, amongst all organic beings, which inevitably follows from their high geometrical powers of increase," the laws of "natural selection," and their influence in "inducing divergence of character." In such books, as also in "The Vestiges of Creation," "Mansel's Limits of Religious Thought," "Restatements of Christian Doctrine" (in behalf of "the Broad Church of the future") and in "Essays and Reviews" by seven English churchmen, — how much is falsely expected to be gained, by a mere phantasmagoric use of words. But, while words may be employed as dishes and vases for containing and conveying truth, they cannot be used as corner-stones for any of its solid structures. They cannot constitute or support the truth in any form, but only represent it.

(8) Words have sometimes in English a totally different sense from that which their originals had. Thus, *carpenter* is from Lat. carpentarius, a wagon maker; *perspire* means literally to breathe through, from a false theory in vogue in ancient times, that one of the chief offices of the pores was the aëration of the blood. *Privilege*, which according to its etymology means a private or separate law, was originally a law not *for*, as now, but *against* a person. From caballus, a nag, come through the French cheval, a horse, our words *cavalier* and *chivalry*, both words of honor. From pupus, a young child come not only *pupa* (the chrysalis state of insects) and *pupil* (Lat. pupillus, dimin. of pupus), and *babe*, *bub* and *booby* (Germ. bube, Dutch babyn), but even also *pup* and *puppy* . For similar variations of sense, analogically, compare πῶλος, a colt and Lat. pullus, the young of any animal and a chicken, with English *pullet* and *foal* and *filly* (Germ. Fohlen and Füllen). So, in French crin means horsehair only, while in Latin crinis means any kind of hair, human as well as animal. *Sudden* is from Lat. subitaneus (sub + eo, to go under), Fr. soudain, and is in its original sense properly a military word and refers to coming slily under the walls of a town, for the purpose of a quick successful attack. *Demon*, an evil spirit meant originally as in δαίμων (its Greek original) the divinity.

(9) A good many words in English, whose etymology neither demands nor suggests, any such sense, have acquired in usage a permanently depreciatory or evil signification. Consider the following specimens: *notorious* (Lat. nosco to know and noto to mark) with which compare notable and noble (Lat. nobilis for noscibilis, worthy to be known); *adroit* (Fr. adroit for Lat. ad directam, sc. viam, lit. towards the right direction); *animosity* (Lat. animosus, lit. full of spirit); *ambitious* (Lat. ambitiosus, lit. disposed

to go around among others); *artful* (lit. full of art or skill); *casuistry* (lit. the act, habit, or art of answering cases of conscience); a *caitiff* is etymologically but a captive; *conceit* (It. concetto from Lat. conceptio) is in itself but a conception; *craft* is Germ. kraft, power, or faculty; *criticism* is (Gr. *κρίνω*, to discriminate, Lat. cerno, dis*crimen* etc.) properly the mere act or art of passing judgment, and should be of course used to find excellences if possible and not blemishes, except so far as is necessary to truth and duty; *conspire* means lit. to breathe together; *cunning* is from Germ. können, to know how, to be able, from which comes also *can; cupidity* (Lat. cupio) means in itself only desire. The following words also exemplify the same fact: *despot* (lit. a master); *domineer* (to rule over), *desperate* (de + spes, lit. without hope), *empiric* (lit. relying on experience from *πειράομαι* to try or prove, from which comes also *pirate*, lit. an adventurer, Gr. *πειρατής*; and yet with *πέιράομαι* is connected also Lat. experior and through it in English, experiment, experience, and expert); *emissary* (one sent forth from or by another); *jealous* (but another form of zealous, Gr. *ζῆλος*; *lust* (lit. desire, merely); *officious* (performing service or duty); *plausible* (approvable); *pertinacious* (holding on throughout); *prejudice* (a judgment in advance); *persecute* and *prosecute* (following one onwards); *prostitute* (placing one's self before or in the way of another); *resent* (to think back on or towards); retaliate (re + talis, to give the like back); *wilful* (full of will); *vile* (lit. cheap); *vulgar* (lit. belonging to the common people).

So an ironical sense has been often permanently imparted to a word in certain connections, as if a component part of its essential meaning, as in the words, respectable, considerable, fair, meek, pretty, when applied to things considered as in themselves below par.

(10) Some few English words contain in them the names of places, in which the thing described first came into use or notice. *Bayonet* is from Bayonne where it was first made; *copper*, from Cyprus (Gr. *Κύπρος*, Cyprus, Lat. Cyprus; and cuprum, copper, Germ. kupfer, Fr. cuivre);

cherry, from Cerasus (Fr. cerise, Germ. kirsche); *crayon*, from Creta (Lat. creta chalk, Fr. craie and crayon, a pencil of chalk); *indigo*, from Indicus (an Indian dye); *meander*, from *Μαίανδρος* (a winding river in Caria), *parchment*, (Lat. pergamena, Fr. parchemin) from Pergamum in Mysia, where it was first invented by Eumenes, its king; *peach* from Persicum (sc. malum), lit. the Persian apple (Germ. pfirsche, Fr. pêche, orig. pesche); *dollar* (Germ. thaler) from Joachim's*thal* (Joachimsdale) in Bohemia where in 1518 thalers were first coined.

(11) Some of the special peculiarities of the English appear most strikingly, when being grouped in contrast with those of other languages, especially Greek and Latin; with which scholars of whatever nation are most apt to compare their own language.

Notice § 1. Our system of double names for the domestic animals, when viewed as such, and when used as food as: *ox* and *beef* (Lat. bos, bovis, Fr. boeuf, Eng. beeves); *sheep* and *mutton* (Fr. moutons); *calf* and *veal* (Fr. veau, Lat. vellum); *pig* or *swine* and *pork* (Lat. porcus); *fowl* (Germ. vogel, a bird), and *poultry* (Lat. pullus, from which also pullet); *deer* (Germ. thier, Gr. ϑήρ) and *venison* (Fr. venaison, Lat. venatio, something hunted); so, similarly we call *grapes* (from same root with grab, grapple and gripe, Germ. greifen to clasp), when dried, *raisins* (Fr. raisin, a grape, Lat. racemus a bough, whence also Eng. race); and *plums* (Germ. Pflaumen) we call, when dried, *prunes* (Fr. prune, Lat. prunum, a plum). So in Spanish a fish in the water is pez (Lat. piscis) but in hand it is pescado and, if salted and dried, pescada; and the French call linen in the piece, toile (Lat. tela from which subtilis, Eng. sub*tle*), but when made up, linge.

§ 2. The variableness or divisibility of some of our grammatical forms, compared with those of other languages. The English, and it is alone in this peculiarity, has three forms for the present tense active of every verb, as, I love, I do love and I am loving; while in other languages but one form is ever used. The English, like the Greek, has a double form of the preterite (the perfect, have, and aorist, did), while the Latin has but one. The Latin is poorer also than the English, in having no article and no perfect active participle. In the subjunctive or conceptional mood, the mood for expressing all contingent suppositional and relative ideas, what a range beyond other languages, for both variety and exactness of expression, have we in our might, could, would, should, etc., which in Greek and Latin were but one undiscriminated form.

§ 3. The indifference to the minute modal analysis exhibited often in the forms of other languages. We express, by the word *know*, both the idea of being acquainted with, as a friend (which in German is kennen and in French connaîtr) and the idea of understanding anything, as a science; which in German is wissen and in French savoir. In those languages, those separate kinds of knowledge must have a separate designation; but not in ours. We can *take* a horse or a book equally well from one place to another; but the Germans *führen* a horse and *tragen* a bundle, as the French also are particular to *mener* a child or anything that can walk, and to *porter* a package or anything that they bear in their hands or arms. We can *receive* anything equally well, a call, a present, a message etc.; but the Germans *bekommen* a disease, *erhalten* a letter, *empfangen* a present, and *einnehmen* money. We can *ride* equally well on horseback or in a carriage; but they call the first *reiten*, and the second, *fahren.* Our language has many nice distinctions for philosophic uses but few for those of curiosity. So, our word *umbrella* (dimin. of umbra, a little shade) breaks in French into *parapluie*, as being used to keep off rain, *paravent*, to keep off the wind, and *parasol*, to keep off the sun.

§ 4. Some English words are in themselves elliptical, and so represent now former phrases or combinations of words, instead of single words.

So, in Latin, while many intransitive verbs are made transitive, by the force of prepositions combined with them by composition, the reverse process takes place sometimes, and by omitting the reflexive pronoun *se* a transitive verb becomes by ellipsis intransitive, as, in the phrase, nox precipitat (sc. *se*). Thus to *couch* down is for se collocare in its original Latin form; to *interfere* is a short form of inter (alios) ferre (se).

In our compound forms of verbs, made after the model of that abundant class in German, whose combining particles are separable in practice from the verbs to which they are united in sense, we have ellipses of every kind of curious signification. If the reader will ask himself what nouns were used or plainly implied after these various adverbial appendages in their first and proper use as prepositions, he will find much to amuse if not instruct him. They are such as these: to burn up, to burn down, to swallow up and to swallow down, to fix up, dress up, hurry up, hurry on, come on, come out, look out, wake up, give in, give out, give up, talk up and talk down, starve out, scare up, dash out.

The adverbial particle most combined in this way with verbs is the word *up;* and the one verb that surpasses any and all others, in the variety and strangeness of the senses that it takes or gives in combination with other words, of whatever sort, nouns, adjectives and adverbs, is the verb *get.* In evidence of this remark, consider such adverbial combinations with this sort of polyglot verb, as these: to get along, by, in, on, out, up, down, over, through, off, away, behind, etc. etc.; and such different senses as this Protean word has, in such phrases as, to get a fortune, a cold, a blow, a fall, a wish; and to get well, clear, rid, warm, wet, dry, fixed, done. The word *keep* stands perhaps next to *get*, in variety of sense.

§ 5. Some English words have been much corrupted in their apparent etymology, by a false popular pronunciation of them as: *baluster* (Gr. *βαλαύστιον* the blossom of the pomegranate, It. balaustra of same sense, It. balaustro a small pilaster (from resemblance in its form), Fr. balustre), which is almost universally pronounced and spelled bannister; *postumous* (Lat. postumus, Span. postumo) which is spelled posthumous (as if from post humum); *asparagus* (ἀσπάραγος from σπαράσσω to lacerate, referring to its irregular head) is extensively called and written sparrowgrass; *pompion* (Dutch pompoen) is getting to be quite generally spelled, as it is pronounced, pumpkin; *cigar* (Lat. cicada, a grasshopper, Span. cigarra — and cigarron, a big cicada and a big cigar, from resemblance of shape, Fr. cigare) is now quite often spelled segar.

§ 6. As in Greek and Latin there are verbs of double forms, modified by reduplication or nasalization, so as to express in the two classes of verbs themselves, in a condensed way, a weaker and a stronger sense; and as in Latin there are a few duplicate verbs having in particular a causative sense, (as sisto, reduplicated form of sto, meaning to cause to stand, and jacio to cast, or cause to lie, from jaceo to lie), so in English there are a few duplicate verbs having a causative force; and they are all of German origin: as to *lay* causative of to *lie*, and so, *set* and *sit*, *fell* and *fall*, *raise* and *rise*.

§ 7. As there is a portion of every language, which is used as current coin by the cultivated classes only, and forms what is ordinarily termed their standard speech, or what in French is called "la langue oratoire," — so of course is it in English; and in as marked a degree, as can be found in any other language ancient or modern. And not only so, but, as in no other language unless it be the Latin, is it true that there is a large branch of the language that is used only or chiefly for the purposes of poetry. But for their rhythmical value, they would pass at once by general disuse out of the language, and this although having many of them the merit of brevity compared with other forms which are retained, as well as also being much more conformable to their originals. They are such as mount (Lat. mons) compared with mountain (Fr. montagne from the adj. montanus); fount (Lat. fons) and font, compared with fountain (Fr. fontaine); and so with eve and morn compared with evening and morning; and ere, yore, olden, yon, sire, afar, reft, ire, clime, lave, lit (for lighted), spake, writ (for written), eyrie, eaglet, sheen, marge, blithe, ween, etc.

§ 8. Abstract relations are expressed in English more copiously and exactly, than in any other language except the German.

It is especially rich in particles, as prepositions, conjunctions, and qualifying adverbs of every possible shade of sense and degree of force. There is, for example, in the precise use of a given preposition always in English, a closely defining power, which the Latin ablative, with its limited range of possible signification, though much more versatile in use than any other case in Latin, did not at all possess; nor the Greek dative, which was the Latin dative and ablative combined. And besides the greater variety of modal forms in the English subjunctive, already alluded to, even compared with the German, which is yet our chief parent-tongue, what a rich variety of minute, subjunctive senses have we at command, in what may be called our subjunctive conjunctions, or, those conjunctions which give to verbs in connection with them a contingent or relative sense.

We have with the German the two articles; which, while they are by true grammatical analysis, but shortened forms of the demonstrative and numeral pronouns with which they correspond, are yet almost or quite as useful as they, in particularizing objects; while the Greek has only one of them and the Latin neither.

In respect also to grammatical gender, while being less pictorial than the Latin, Greek, and German, we are more philosophical than they, in predicating sex only where it really belongs, and so in making all things, besides living beings, directly impersonal. We do not therefore, like the Germans, speak of a boot as *him*, nor, like the Latins, call a mountain masculine and a tree feminine. And as a proof how curiously extremes can sometimes meet in this world, the words in German for maiden, young lady, and wife (das mädchen, das fraülein and das weib) are all neuter, in obedience to the usual neuter character of the terminations in which they all end.

In conclusion. The grand inward, ever-working, ever-assimilative, energies of the English tongue and the accumulative influences and evidences of individual home-growth, do not show themselves, as in Latin and Greek, in any perfected grammatical forms as such, or in any phonetic harmony or homogeneousness of development, in even its lexical elements; but rather in an intense unity of bearing and sense in all the material elements of the language; making it a splendid unique product by itself, as it were, of all foregoing humanity and human progress:—so that it has in it, as the great ultimate language of the world in these times, all the power, for exactness, of the Latin; for versatility of expression, of the Greek; for range of beauty, of the German; and for solemn grandeur, of the Hebrew itself: with all the upper lights of revelation glowing full and strong in the vaulted sphere of its past and present literature.

The Latin roots selected for use in the continuation of this Article, as the "brief illustrative synopsis" promised in the title, will be chosen chiefly for two purposes: to exhibit the mode, in which words hang in clusters, as the true normal mode of their growth and at the same time to show what variations of form words of the same immediate origin may assume.

The connections of words in the same language, of the same ultimate origin, will be found to be as remarkable for their mutual strangeness of form and sense, as any one can have ever conceived the connections of various families of nations, or of languages, with each other to be.

ARTICLE III.

PERMANENT PREACHING FOR A PERMANENT PASTORATE.

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SOME eminent critics found their systems on very narrow principles. Almost every critic has a system, and his remarks revolve around one centre-point, and, if its position is a false one, his criticism is imperfect. Longinus on the Sublime is a kind of canonical book, though it is hard to find out what his sublime is. He has no centre-point. Dionysius Halicarnassus, in his criticism on Herodotus and Thucydides, seems to have romance in his eye, rather than truthful history. He blames Thucydides for not being as pleasing as Herodotus; that is, for not telling as many lies. Dr. Bentley is very minute on the chronology of Milton's Paradise Lost; the very last thing my humble self would think of in reading that divine poem. Dr. Johnson, in his Lives of the Poets, has one ruling canon; and that is, the CURIOSITY with which we read a book to the end and "cast our eyes," he says, "on the last leaf, as a solitary traveller in a desert looks at the setting sun." He even applies this rule to Milton: "But original deficiency cannot be supplied. The want of human interest is always felt. Paradise Lost is one of the books which the reader admires, lays down, and forgets to take up again. None ever wished it longer than it is. Its perusal is a duty rather than a pleasure. We read Milton for instruction, retire harrassed and overburdened, and look elsewhere for recreation; we desert our master and seek for companions."[1]

Coleridge, though a worse critic, has a far more noble canon: "Not the poem which we have *read*, but that to which we *return* with the greatest pleasure, possesses the genuine power and claims the name of *essential poetry*."[2]

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[1] Lives of the Poets, Vol. I. p. 167.

[2] Biographia Literaria, Vol. I. p. 22.

In painting, the picture which glares most at first, exhausts its power on the first inspection. There are tunes which we hear once with delight, and never wish to hear repeated.

It is unfortunate for a preacher to have sermons which resemble these pictures or tunes, — where the cause of the first interest is the very cause of the want of interest in the second hearing. Some preachers seem to be doomed to their fate. It is hardly their fault that they wear out. Their very genius is a brush-wood fire which blazes and burns out in its own transient splendor. We cannot expect, we ought not to ask, that the meteor which shoots athwart the heavens, should have the permanence of a fixed star, of longer endurance but inferior brightness. There is another evil; there is nothing that mankind so severely revenge as their own inflated admiration. If they have set a man too high, they never forgive him for their own injustice. The Athenians ostracised their citizens because their own folly had made them too popular, and they dreaded the effects of their previous admiration.

We plant the summer flower, and we know it must soon fade; we plant the oak, and we hope it may wave for centuries. Supposing that the general aim should be for a long pastorate, let us inquire what are the qualities which prepare for this durability, and what is the cultivation which carries these qualities to the highest possible perfection.

It must be confessed that all the requisitions are not of the literary kind. Though our inquiry will *chiefly* be confined to the characteristics of preaching, yet as these, however excellent, may be counteracted by other impediments, it may be proper to glance at some of them. The strongest tower may have stones in its foundation which impair its strength and hasten its fall.

One requisite for a permanent ministry is a contented mind. *Godliness with contentment* is great gain to a preacher, as well as to a private Christian. Ambition should not enter his heart in its narrow form, nor should he measure the importance of his power by the sphere in which it acts. The flower cares not how low the vale may be in which it grows, if it can fill the whole circuit with its fragrance. Let your good angel whisper to you what Milton has put into the mouth of his devil:

"What matter where, if I be still the same?"

Not that we need to adopt a superstitious tenacity in holding to one spot. We are to hear the voice of God, we are to be willing to follow the indications of providence.

But there is another thing very essential to a permanent pastorate; indeed it is essential to all enterprises in which truth is the design and man is the instrument. Let us secure a personal attachment from our people. They must love us if we expect our permanent plans to do them good. If we consult history we shall find that nearly all the great leaders of the world have been remarkable for almost a fascinating power over the hearts of those that came near them. The great heresiarchs of the church in all ages have begun here. Paul alludes to it in his third chapter of Galatians, first verse: *O foolish Galatians, who hath* BEWITCHED *you that ye should not obey the truth?* It was something that seemed like witchcraft; and we are told by Jerome that most of the leaders in heresy had great personal attractions. We have similar testimony concerning the warriors and political leaders of antiquity. Alexander was beloved by his friends; Caesar was adored by his soldiers; Cicero, Cato, and even Antony, were men greatly beloved; Gustavus, Cromwell, Pitt, Bonaparte, the same. Even our blessed Saviour, supreme in power and divine majesty, did not disdain this golden key as unlocking the human heart. We have a remarkable proof of this in John xx. 17: *Jesus saith unto her* [i. e. Mary] *touch me not, for I am not yet ascended to my father.* That this woman should have wished to embrace him, whom she must have regarded as almost a ghost, is a proof how great her affection. The spirit of the passage seems to be: "Ah, Mary, the hour of human friendship and fondness is at an end. I belong to the celestial family now; no more time must be spent in fond embraces; you may still love me, but love me as your risen Lord. *For I ascend to my Father and your Father,* *and to my God and your God.*" Paul, it is clear, won the affections of all with whom he came in contact; and it gave him immense power in preaching the gospel. Like Moses, we may say his face shone with benignity and love. The hardy centurion, the stern judge, the slave-owner, and the tyrant always favored him. No wonder he said to Timothy: *Let no man despise thy youth.*[1] He had a right to put his admonition into this reflected form. He had proved the power of the passions over the action. How much significance is there in that simple declaration: *And Julius courteously entreated Paul, and gave him liberty to go unto his friends and refresh himself.*[2] If Paul gave this fact to Luke, in the conduct of this centurion he modestly related his own.

The preacher of the obscurest parish is the hero of a little world; and in that circumscribed sphere there is room for the greatest skill, and the exercise of the most gigantic virtues. It is true, there is a sense in which the world will hate the faithful preacher of righteousness. But it is a curious kind of hatred. If it has an underground of veneration, it often breaks down at the touch of a finger. It is a hatred which, without a miracle, is most miraculously subdued.

This love is won, not by worldly art, or sacrificing high principle; but by a steady, manly course of discharging duty; by saying the right thing at the right time; by provoking no one, and cringing to no one; but moving, as the sun does, over the bogs and over the gardens, over the hills and over the vales, in the same steady, refulgent course and never clouded but by mists, which gather darkness only to be dissipated again.

But our concern is especially with preaching. This may be divided into two departments: the matter and the manner. As to the matter, we have it provided at our hands in the richness of revelation. We draw from a fountain ever flowing and never exhausted. But we may be misled even by truth, if we pervert its maxims and misunderstand their application. Even the example of Paul may mislead us, if we receive his words without his spirit. He was determined to know nothing among the Corinthians but Jesus Christ, and him crucified. But this maxim, like the wings of the condor, may support a long flight, because it covers a wide space. The gospel has one centre; but what a circumference! Unity in variety is its character. The crucified Jesus is the light and the motive of how many doctrines; how many duties; how many hopes; how many fears; how many songs; how many praises; how many prophecies; how much history! A whole universe of thought and glory revolves around this brilliant centre. The whole nature of man and the designs of God are wrapped up in that little expression. There is no want of affluence, then, in the subjects. The fountain is to be dispersed on every side in little rills for the refreshment of mankind.

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[1] 1 Tim. iv. 12.

[2] Acts xxvii. 3.

The simple question, how it is to be presented to mankind, is answered in the Bible. It is presented especially in a historical form. History prepares the way and gives the exemplification. God lays his right to man's obedience in his benevolence and in creation. The first chapter of Genesis has something to do with the crucifixion. Eden, the Fall, the Antediluvian history, Abraham, the patriarchs, Sinai, the old dispensation, the rites, etc., all look to the central fact of our redemption. Yes, we must know nothing else than Jesus Christ, and him crucified; but the Bible is Christ's word; and whatever theme is there presented, in its boundless variety of facts, precepts, doctrines, and narrations, may teach us the unity of its design, and the copiousness of its executions.

I suppose a preacher may write a sermon on every text in the book of Proverbs, and not forget the theme of Jesus Christ, and him crucified.

Be this your pattern, then, a many-colored circumference, wide and beautiful, revolving around one centre. Do not cramp a noble maxim in a narrow mind.

But the manner is also important. It is impossible to look round this world and not see, in the variety that is presented, a distinction in things, as to the permanency of the impression they make. Some arrest attention and fasten on the memory; others slip from our minds and are forever forgotten. Some delight at first, but the first delight is the very reason why it is not lasting. A temporary interest is the prelude of a speedy decay. A Lombardy poplar and an elm are sure to make different impressions on every beholder. The poplar produces a short admiration; the elm is lasting. A regular garden, where

> No pleasing intricacies intervene,
> No artful wildness to perplex the scene;
> Grove nods to grove, each alley has a brother,
> And half the platform just reflects the other.
> The suffering eye inverted nature sees,
> Trees cut to statues, statues thick as trees,

compared with the interwoven paths and endless diversity of Mount Auburn. The ocean and a fish-pond have different attractions. It is vastly important not to please too soon, if we wish to please long. The rose is the queen of flowers, owing to its reserved beauty and its endless variety. "The irregular combinations," says Dr. Johnson, "of fanciful invention may delight awhile, by that novelty of which the common satiety of life sends us all in quest; but the pleasures of sudden wonder are soon exhausted, and the mind can only repose on the stability of truth." All this passes into the imitating works of man. The mirror keeps the laws of the landscape it reflects. We are never tired of some poems; and some astonish us at first, and every repetition weakens the pleasure:

> Haec placet semel, haec decies repetita placebit.

Sometimes men of astonishing ingenuity exhaust their powers in a short time, because they refuse to follow the path of nature. If I understand a "conceit," it means a very pretty thought, very curious, but having no foundation in natural suggestion and natural feeling. Thus the following thought in Shakspeare is a conceit — a concetto. When Prospero is describing his being put into *a rotten* *carcass of a boat;* and banished from Milan, he tells his daughter:

> The very rats
> Instinctively had quit it; there they hoist us,
> To cry to the sea that roared to us; to sigh
> To the winds, whose pity, sighing back again,
> Did us but loving wrong.

Now every one sees that this description has no pathos in it, because it has no foundation in nature. The author meant to be fine, but he forgot that he must lose the simplicity of feeling in the profusion of his ingenuity. The concert of the crying victims to the roaring sea, one striking the tenor and the other the bass, we may suppose; and then the mutual sigh of the sea and the souls, producing the *loving wrong* of the former, — what a frozen admiration it produces in every reader of taste! Such combinations cannot last. Notwithstanding the attempt of Rogers and Coleridge to restore to our perusal such writers as Thomas Fuller and George Herbert, I might safely defy any man to read either of them for half an hour on a stretch. Who ever read the whole of Young's Night Thoughts? We no sooner enter the garden of his spices, than we are suffocated by their fragrance. No relief; no plain interstices, no soft green for the eye to rest on. His peonies, his pinks, and his dahlias blush before us in the most crimson profusion; and his poetry has every excellence but simplicity and nature. Alas, a biased mind always turns to bad models. The faults of Young are owing, partly, at least, to the beauties of Seneca. He has sometimes literally translated him. What a pity it is that his susceptive eye could not have fallen on a passage in Pliny,[1] in which he shows that the earth, after a long drought, having been drenched in a shower, as it lies resting beneath a setting sun, and spanned by a rainbow, emits a peculiar exhalation, to which the fragrance of no single flower can be compared. It is hardly perceptible at first; but it increases in sweetness as it gains on our attention, and would not exhaust its power should it continue forever.

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[1] Lib. XVII. c. 5.

These are no new discoveries; Cicero saw them from his own experience. Hear his testimony. "A style of speaking," says he, "is to be selected, which especially detains the mind, which those who hear may not only hear with delight, but be delighted without satiety. I do not suppose you expect from me a caution that you should avoid the barren, the uncultivated, the vulgar, the obsolete. The genius of the age demands something greater. It may be hard to say why it is that what gives pleasure at first should so soon wear out, and alienate us from itself, in fastidiousness and satiety. But how many more things are there gaudy and florid in new pictures than in old ones, which, though at first sight they captivate us, cannot please us long; when in old paintings, the same objects, rough and plain, never weary us. In singing, how much more soft and delicate the turns and the falsetto notes, than the simple and severe, which not only the rigid critics, but the very multitude reject. This we may see, too, in the other senses. We are not so long pleased with unguents of the highest flavor and sweetness, as those that are moderate. We praise more the smell of the earth than the richness of the crocus.[1] Our touch is not pleased with what is too soft. Even the taste, which is the most voluptuous of all our senses, and which relishes sweetness more than all the rest — how soon is that which is too sweet rejected and despised. Who can long drink or eat what is over-seasoned? In each case, the slighter the stimulant the less the satiety. Thus in all things, the greatest fastidiousness borders on the highest pleasure. We need not wonder it is so in public speech, because we can see, both from orators and poets, that a fine, nice, ornamented, holiday strain, without intermission, without reprehension (i. e. in single paragraphs), without variety, cannot delight long, however beautiful the pictures, or however bright the colors. It is true, in a spoken composition, whether poetry or prose, the disgust comes sooner, because we judge by instinct more than by mental rule. When a composition is written (and read alone), these tawdry faults are known less by the ear and more by the judgment."[1]

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[1] See Pliny in the last-quoted passage.

The lasting man has a simple manner, true feeling, some substance, severe ornament; he is a child of nature, has great earnestness and little show. He never overdoes; he has no forced pathos; no pounding violence. He weeps only from the magnitude of the occasion, and he weeps but seldom. It is said, I think, of Washington, that he wept only once during the revolutionary war, but they were terrible tears. The lasting man is likely to leave on the conviction of his hearers an impression of reserved strength. He completely loses himself in his subject; he never does his best; or, if he does, it is a profound secret to every one besides himself. He has no pompous preparation about him; he sounds no trumpet, and he never gives an egotistic emphasis to his most original remarks. They steal from him free and limpid, like water from the spring beneath the rock. The lasting man turns even his impediments into facilities; and his weights are wings sometimes to exalt his flight. I have known very impressive speakers to begin by stammering; and one, I know who actually lisped. Paul, we may infer, was such a specimen. He was too modest a man to say it, but we learn the secret from what others said of him. What else can be the meaning of 2 Cor. x. 10. *For his letters* (*say they*) *are weighty and powerful; but his bodily presence is weak, and his speech contemptible.* This last expression may be understood of the first ten paragraphs of his discourses. Nobody said this, but he who went out of the meeting before he closed; for he once continued his speech until midnight, and only one fell asleep.[2]

The great secret is, to touch a chord that will vibrate forever. There are two important elements, which we must study to learn and join. First, an earnest DISCUSSION of the most important truths; and secondly, fully to unfold their bearing on the life and heart. Here we have Paul's example, who begins his epistles by stating and proving the most recondite principles of religion, and in the close shows how they bear on practice. No one can have all the ammunition for a lasting ministry, who does not DISCUSS. It will not do to follow Dr. Blair's example, who avoids the doctrinal as a pitfall. Whatever your opinion, wherever you stand, do not have any covered wells, which you dare not open; any important topics on which you preserve a mysterious silence. On any subject on which the readers of the Bible *must* think, you must sometimes speak. How much interest, for example, did Dr. Emmons give to his long ministry by his earnest discussions. But it is by no means necessary to think exactly as Dr. Emmons did, to show the good policy and profit of frequent discussion. Wherever you stand, whatever your opinion, canvass and examine the great principles of our being and happiness. It is what the plainest congregation hungers for; and though they at first may shrink from it with a fidgety repulsion, yet the frankest examination will gain in the end. Take the doctrine of election as an example. Every one knows how much Dr. Emmons preached it. But I can bring an opposite example. The late Dr. Popkin was my predecessor at Newbury: the greatest sceptic perhaps that ever undertook to preach the gospel. Professor Stuart said of him, that he rather thought that two and two make four, but he was not sure. Now let me ask the reader: can you suppose that this nervous, trembling, doubting mind would ever encounter the doctrine of election? A man, who when he ventured to say anything positive, his own courage would almost frighten him to death on reflection. Shall Dr. Popkin meet the doctrine of election; and how in the world will he treat it? Yes, he did encounter it, and preached a series of sermons on the doctrine of unconditional election. And how did he treat it? Why, just like himself, in the true Popkinsian way (which, of course, was not the Hopkinsian). He first preached several sermons as strongly arguing as possible in its defence, quoting what the learned Calvin and Augustine said, and then the inspired Paul, as if he would fasten it on his people's minds with rivets of iron; then he turned round for several sabbaths, and gave the strongest objections, quoting what the learned Episcopius said, and the learned Whitby, and especially those passages of scripture which imply the obligations of morality and the freedom of man; then he left the people to remember, weigh, and judge. The consequence was, they were in a blue maze: they hardly knew what to think. They said it was a great and awful subject; and this was, perhaps, the very impression the preacher designed to make. Now I will not contend that this is the best way to bring a people to a knowledge of the truth; but with such a curious mind as the speaker possessed, what could he have done better? He gave his people food for meditation; and, however imperfect his faith, he made a noble attempt to sound the depths of our being. How much better than that superficial matter, which is so obvious that no one regards it.[1]

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[1] De Oratore, Lib. III. sec. 25.

[2] See Acts xx. 7, 8, 9, 10.

And yet the obvious bearing of simple principles must not be neglected. It is a great art to make the hortatory part of preaching impressive. It is the end and upshot of all principle. It is too often the case that the man that is successful in doctrinal discussion acquires an exclusive taste for it, and becomes negligent and weak when he passes into the practical part of his preaching. Let him resemble the oak, which, though yearly it swells and strengthens its massy trunk and branches, never fails to clothe their rigor with the trembling leaves of a living vegetation. It requires as much talent, perhaps more, to write an effective sermon on candor, meekness, patience, contentment, justice, fidelity, as on the higher points of systematic theology. *These ought ye to have done, and not to leave the other undone.* Like Sampson, the champion must get hold of the two pillars on which the house stands, and thus kill the Philistines. This part of the work demands great effort, and should be studied. The union of these departments gives vigor to both. Practical preaching has double power when it grows out of fundamental principles. We must study the practical part in our own hearts and in the wants of our people. But it is well also to study models. One of the most beautiful is Dr. Evans, of London, "Discourses concerning the Christian Temper." They are written with a severe simplicity, but great strength. Two other models may be mentioned, because their comparison and contrast are more instructive than their separate impression. I allude to Jeremy Taylor and Richard Baxter, both of them writers of great copiousness of matter, and endless profusion of illustration. But what a difference! What superiority in the rich simplicity of one over the hot-house abundance of the other! I never could accept the character with which Taylor has been delivered to us. He is never self-forgetful; he always detains you on the image; he plays his corruscations before you as Whipple would his dissolving-views; and you always admire the robe, without thinking of the form that wears it. Now whatever Taylor *was*, Baxter *was not;* so unconscious in his art, so negligent in his profusion; snatching you, in a chariot of gems, to the goal of the journey you are impatient to finish. Perhaps it may assist us to put Taylor in his right place, to see how his ornaments struck his cotemporaries. Dr. South has characterized him without calling him by name; and though South was a sullen man, he was a true critic. He never minced matters. In his eleventh sermon, fifth volume, preached on Ascension day, April 30th, 1668, speaking on simplicity in preaching the gospel, he says, "'*I speak the words of truth and soberness*,' said Paul,[1] and 'I preach the gospel, not with *the enticing words of man's wisdom.*'[1] This was the way of the apostle's discharging of things sacred. Nothing here of *the fringes of the north star;* nothing of *nature's becoming unnatural;* nothing of *the down of angels' wings*, or *the beautiful locks of cherubims;* no starched similitudes, introduced with a *thus have I seen a cloud rolling in its airy mansion*, and the like.[2] No, these were sublimities above the rise of the apostolic spirit. The apostles, poor mortals, were content to take lower steps, and to tell the world, in plain terms, *that he who believed should be saved, and that he who believed not should be damned.* And this was the dialect which pierced the conscience, and made the hearers cry out, *Men and brethren, what shall I do?* It tickled not the ear, but sunk into the heart; and when men came from such sermons, they never commended the preacher for his taking voice or gesture; for the fineness of such a simile, or the quaintness of such a sentence; but they spoke like men conquered with the overpowering force and evidence of the most concerning truths; much in the words of the two disciples going to Emmaus: *Did not our hearts burn within us, while he opened to us the scriptures?*"

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[1] Far be it from me to wish to depreciate this simple-hearted and wise man; and more wise because he was so simple-hearted. A selection of his writings has been published by President Felton. His criticism on the Greek Tragedies is the most curious specimen in the English language. Two currents are running in opposite directions in his mind, a deep veneration for the traditional opinion, and an individual impression of his own, which it distresses him to present. His watch-word seems to be, "I almost half think that these great men are not quite right. I *seem* to think it may be otherwise." One cannot help smiling, when almost the first word that meets him in his Latin preface to the third volume of the Graeca Majora, is *opinamur*.

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[1] Acts xxvi. 25.

I pass over the various topics suggested by the clouds and sunshine of passing events, all of which must have some utterance from the pulpit; though every pious preacher will abjure that poverty of mind which regards a storm or the explosion of a steamboat, or an accident on a railroad, as a sort of God-send to eke out subjects for popular attraction. I hasten to notice another mode of preaching once current, now too much neglected; a mode most likely to secure to the humblest invention the riches of the Bible: *the art of expounding.*

Our early fathers thought much of this; but it has of late years very strangely fallen into disuse, to the great detriment both of ministers and people. The pulpit has lost one of the brightest radiations of its glory. There is a general impression that it is unpopular; and the only reason is, that it has fallen into reluctant hands. We can make any style of preaching unpopular by not learning our trade. If it is unpopular, you must make it popular. The burning of the anthracite coal was exceedingly unpopular until people had learned how to use it. The truth is, there is no mode of presenting sacred truth so rich, so various, so impressive, so fascinating. You have all history, *rich with spoils of time*, to help you. It has this important benefit, that it connects your philolgical studies with your public ministrations. It keeps up your interest in biblical investigation; it makes you a better Hebrew scholar, a better Greek scholar;[1] it makes you at once a familiar tenant, both of the old world and new; and you bring down the wealth of the former to increase the accumulated importations of the latter. It leads you to inspect every part of the Bible, and the more you spend the richer you grow. I can conceive of nothing more improving than tracing the progress of language (the sacred language of God, too), the laws of thought, the uniformity and variety of revelation, comparing the two opposite poles of the extremest ancient and modern life; and the divine art by which God himself unfolds his complicated purposes to man. *A fountain of gardens, a well of living waters, and streams from Lebanon.*

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[1] 1 Cor. ii. 4.

[2] Remark how the excess and absurdity of Taylor's expressions are increased by being insolated and separated from the context. Such was the malicious skill of the critic.

One important point in lecturing or expounding on a chapter, a psalm, or a section, is selection; that is, with a quick eye to discover what is practical and proper for the people. This is the cumulative point of all legitimate investigation. We must not be pedants; we must not attempt to lead the people through the mazes of learned wisdom or learned trifling, which amuses the recesses of academic subtilty. Selection, skilful selection, must be your rule. You are to see, with a divine tact, what belongs to yourself and what to offer to your people. Sift the material, and keep the bran to yourself, and offer the meal to them. This maxim, of course, belongs only to the evangelical class. If I were one of the Tübingen historical school, I should never think of a popular lecture on the Bible. Their investigations evaporate into nothing —

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[1] Let me turn aside gratefully to remember the advice the late Prof. Gibbs gave me, when a young man and he a fellow student, but less of a fellow student than an instructor. Mentioning to him the danger of forgetting our studies in the care of a parish; "There is," said he, "one excellent way to prevent this: take a passage, — a Psalm, a chapter in Isaiah, or a whole book, — study it critically and thoroughly, and expound it to your people; you need not, of course, bring out all the points you examine; but bring out the result. You will find the benefit both for you and for them." Never were words more fitly spoken; and this, and many other counsels, I can only forget when I follow him to the grave, and perhaps not even *then*.

> Rich windows, that exclude the light,
> And passages that lead to nothing.

The laborers of this school keep digging and scratching in their gold mine, amidst noxious gases and frail safety lamps, to bring up their glittering pyrites, which they have, over and over again, assured us are worth nothing. The Bible, if it be worth anything, has an end, a result; and that result can always be presented, with the deepest interest, to the plainest congregation.

The benefits of this mode of preaching are, that you keep fresh your seminary lessons; you become a biblical critic; your Hebrew and your Greek never fade; they are renewed, by little and little, every week; you occupy rich ground; you forestall your own narrowing idiosyncracies; you are never at a loss for a subject; you throw yourself on the towline of Providence; you find wonderful coincidences; your discourses will have a surprising application; you are often faithful to existing sin, without seeming to design it; you are always sheltered behind a sacred shield; you neglect no part of revelation; you almost become a prophet of God, and you go to Egypt to encounter its corruptions and its hosts with the rod of God in your hand.

After all, it must be confessed that a long pastorate does not depend on preaching alone. There are other elements. Some men, who seemed to have every excellence in forming a sermon, have had very short settlements; the attractions of the desk being counteracted by the imperfections of private life. The causes of change are various; let us glance at some of them; I shall state them in the concrete, frankly saying that these instances, offered under John Bunyan names, have been suggested in actual life, though I hope no one will be impertinent enough to hunt out or find the living examples.

Dr. Rhetoric was always changing; he was a man of disproportionate power; with a fine person and a thrilling voice. He had passages in his discourses which would almost start the house from its foundation. But his taste was incorrect; if he often hit, he sometimes missed; and his great impediment was, that somehow his very eloquence created a craving he could not satisfy; he had, at last, to compare himself to Noah's dove, who left the ark to find no rest for the sole of her foot. The Rev. Mr. Indiscreet was, his pupil; I watched him from the first, and never did a preacher so disappoint me. He began by imitating Dr. Rhetoric, and, as Dr. Johnson had clearly proved that no man ever became great by imitation, I set him down as a failure. But no: Indiscreet survived his imitations, soared above them; had every quality for a permanent preacher, so far as sermonizing is concerned; but, alas, failed for want of common sense. He was always moving. Mr. Finespun was a remarkable example. Finespun had power, had ability; imitated nobody, and was original to the last degree. But his combinations were forced; his figures were brought from the ends of the earth. Nothing could be more curious than his introductions; and when he named his text, no hearer could divine what would be the subject; yet Finespun was a man of real power; and if, when he left his mathematics, he could have remembered that a straight line was the nearest distance between two given points, it would have been better for him.[1] He always had use for his wings.

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[1] Burke, to be sure, in his speech on the Nabob of Arcot's Debts, has the following passage, which I quote, both to give some idea of our friend's manner, and to show how Burke could sometimes *go down* towards Finespun's beauties, though Finespun could never *get up* to Burke's faults. "From the marrowless bones of these skeleton establishments, by the use of every sort of cutting an

Shotover had short pastorates, and abundance of them. He has left the world a lesson which himself never would learn. Shotover was too politic; he played the politician about cabbages. He always had a plot, because he always imagined a counter-plot against him. If he had the simplest measure to carry in his church, his friends must meet; there must be a caucus; "we may have opponents; we must be ready for them, etc., etc.," until finally, he had use for all the machinery he had prepared; and what was very sad, Shotover could see the last need of his machinery, but never could see the origin of the evil. Wigfall I always sincerely pitied; for he had short settlements without any great cause. Somehow or other, he always made the impression that he was a great man, and in a few years the people always found out that he was not so great a man as they thought him. They were indignant, and rose at once to revenge their own mistake on their fugitive victim. He went to another vineyard to make the same impression and to find the same treatment. Sensitive was killed by gossips, busybodies, and tale-bearers. O if he could have put on the shield of indifference — but he did not wholly make himself. Wantwill tried to please everybody, and ended in pleasing none, not even himself. Rev. Mr. Flash had a most pleasing and pathetic voice, and might have spoken for years with effect, if he could have found anything to say; but he died a pastoral death, smothered in his own previous popularity. Wronghead had a short career, because he never could put two ideas together. His sermons generally consisted of one idea, which he would repeat over about seven thousand times, with astonishing variety of language. He would endeavor to make the bantling pass for a new baby by putting on a new slip; but when the audience found it out, they dismissed him and his bantling together. But the most melancholy example of the temporary was my

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every sort of fretting tool, he flatters himself that he may chip and rasp an empirical alementary powder, to diet into some similitude of health and substance the languishing chimeras of fraudulent reformation." — Burke's Works, Vol. II. p. 393.

dear friend Mr. Prim. Prim was a good scholar, a man of common sense, a diligent worker, and a true Christian; and yet he was slow to find a settlement, and never could keep what he had slowly found. What was the matter? Dr. Franklin makes poor Richard say, "a little neglect may breed great mischief: for want of a nail, the shoe was lost; for want of a shoe, the horse was lost; and for want of a horse, the rider was lost, being overtaken and slain by the enemy; all for want of a little care about a horse-shoe nail." Prim was obstructed by little impediments, and which he knew to be little at the time. Nobody must speak to him going to meeting; no one must intrude on particular hours; f he had a call for settlement, he must put in some vexatious condition: they must have a new bell, or change the lamps, or the hymn-books. His manner was always precise, and his very laugh was ungenial. In short, he was a rose-bush full of verdure, flowers, and fragrance; but you could not touch him but some hidden briar would scratch your fingers and repel your friendship. He fell a victim to little briars.

The conclusion is, that short pastorates are more owing to defects in the clergy than faults in the people. Let a preacher have discretion, industry, piety, and common sense; let him love his work and understand his people; let him be firm without stiffness, and yielding without false conformity; let him wish to be permanent, and he will be so, if he can only GET THROUGH HIS THIRD YEAR. Pindar, in one of his odes, speaks of those who reach the immortal fields by enduring the three purgations.

ARTICLE IV.

PLACE AND VALUE OF MIRACLES IN THE CHRISTIAN SYSTEM.

BY REV. JOSEPH HAVEN, D.D., PROFESSOR IN CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

As in all warfare, so in the attack and defence of Christianity, the battle-ground changes, from time to time, as the enemies of the truth change their tactics, or direct their assault now upon this, now upon that point in the line of our defences. At present, it is the *supernatural element* in Christianity that is more directly and fiercely assailed. Around this the battle rages. And, what is not a little remarkable, it is from the professed friends of Christianity, from those who call themselves its disciples, rather than from its open and avowed enemies, that this attack mainly proceeds. It is no longer the Jew, the Mohammedan, the pagan, but the rationalist and sceptic, within the sacred precincts of the Christian temple, and before its very altars, who take it upon themselves to call in question, or utterly to deny, the supernatural element of the Christian religion.

Miracles, we are told, are no longer to be relied upon as evidences of the divine authority of the Christian system. However appropriate they may have been in a remote and less enlightened age, they are now quite out of place. As civilization and science have progressed, they have left this method of thinking and reasoning wholly in the back-ground. It is now understood, by all cultivated and philosophic minds, that in the domain of matter everything moves on by fixed and determined laws, which are never violated, never suspended, and which never change. This invariable operation, this universal order and unity of physical causes, is the first principle of the laws of nature, and whatever is at variance with this principle must be unconditionally and unhesitatingly rejected. The material universe is discovered to be one great system of self-sustaining and self-evolving laws, a grand whole moving on in harmony, and adequate to itself. Even the idea of original creation is now coming to be rejected as an antiquated notion, in view of the recent developments of science with respect to the origination of species. In a word, any interference with or deviation from the established and eternal order of things, is a physical impossibility, which no amount of evidence can substantiate; and the miracles, so called, of the Christian system, which in a ruder and darker age were considered as its main supports and defences, are, in reality, at the present day the chief hindrances to its acceptance.

Such is the position taken by the modern sceptic and rationalist. It is a position which the advocates of Christianity are called upon to meet. Mere denunciation and reproach of those who thus reason, will not suffice. Ecclesiastical censure will not meet the case. There is a demand for thorough investigation and solid argument. The position is one which overlooks and commands one of the most important defences of the Christian system; and to leave it in possession of the enemy, is to abandon Christianity itself as incapable of defence. Under these circumstances, it becomes necessary for the disciples of the Christian faith to re-examine, with special care, the whole matter of the *supernatural element* in Christianity, and possibly to re-adjust, in some respects, their own position with respect to it.

There are, in any such investigation, three questions to be specially considered: What *is* a miracle? What *proves* a miracle? What does a miracle *prove?*

I. *What* IS *a miracle?*

It is of the first importance in this controversy that the advocates of the Christian system should understand precisely what it is that they are contending for, — how much and how little is involved in, and essential to, the idea of a miracle. If we mistake not, some uncertainty, perhaps we might say some vagueness, of opinion exists on this point in many minds; some are disposed to include more, and others less, under that term. With some it means one thing, and with some another. Sometimes it is used to denote whatever is *wonderful*, as prodigies, portents, matters inexplicable, — the *mirabile* of the Latins, the τέρας of the Greeks. Others, again, restrict the term within much narrower limits, understanding by it some *contradiction* or *violation* of the laws of nature. By others, it is regarded as a *suspension*, rather than a contradiction, of those laws; while yet others would prefer to call it a *deviation* from, rather than either a contradiction or suspension of, natural laws. A miracle, according to some, is a departure from all law; with others, a departure not from all, but merely from all *known* law.

What, then, is a miracle, and how much shall we include under it? Is it any and every wonderful, apparently inexplicable thing? Is it a direct violation or contradiction of the laws of nature? Is it a suspension of those laws? Is it simply a deviation from them? Is it a thing without and above all law, or has it laws of its own?

If we seek for that which is *essential* to a miracle, in distinction from what is merely *incidental* or *occasional*, we shall find the ultimate idea to be that of divine interposition to accomplish, by special and supernatural agency, a specific end, not otherwise attained. Whether the result be a violation of the laws of nature or not, whether it be a suspension of those laws or not, it must at least be something beyond the power of mere nature to accomplish; something supernatural, requiring for its accomplishment divine interposition and agency. Whether this agency be immediately exerted, or mediately, through human or other instrumentality, the power must be ultimately divine power, and that not according to the ordinary course of divine operations in nature. Where we have this, we have all that is essential to a miracle, — Deity interposing to accomplish, by special agency, an effect not to be reached in the natural course and order of events.

This is accordant with the definitions given by standard authorities. Thus *Webster* — "an event or effect contrary to the established constitution and course of things, or a deviation from the known laws of nature; a supernatural event." The term *miraculous* he defines as—"performed supernaturally, or by a power beyond the ordinary agency of natural laws; effected by the direct agency of almighty power, and not by natural causes."

Johnson gives the following: "*miracle*—1. a wonder; something above human power (*Shakspeare*); 2. [in theology] an effect above human or natural power, performed in attestation of some truth (*Bentley*); *miraculous*—effected by power more than natural (*Herbert*); *miraculously*—by power above that of nature (*Dryden*)."

The essential idea, as expressed in these definitions, is that of *divine interposition and agency*—not *necessarily* involving any contradiction or suspension of natural laws; but only a power working above and beyond those laws; *praeter*, but not of necessity *contra*, ordinem naturae. Whether the latter idea is really involved in the true notion of a miracle, we shall presently inquire.

As the subject relates particularly to the miracles recorded in scripture, a brief examination of the terms used in the scriptures to denote miraculous events may cast light on the question before us. The terms most frequently employed in the New Testament to denote miracles, are δυνάμεις, σημεῖα, and τέρατα. When the idea prominent in the mind of the writer or speaker is that of the divine power, or source, from which the miracle emanates, the term δυνάμις—Hebrew גְּבוּרָה—*strength*, *power*, is employed; plural, *mighty works*. Thus the miracles of Christ are designated in Matt. xi. 20, 21, 23; xiii. 58; Mark vi. 5, 12; Luke x. 13; and those of Paul in Acts xix. 11. The term is also used by Paul himself, in his epistles, as 1 Cor. xii. 10; Gal. iii. 5.

Where the prominent idea is not that of the power employed in working the miracle, or the source whence it emanates, but rather the object to be accomplished by it, *its evidential force on the mind of the spectator*, the term employed is σημεῖον—Hebrew אוֹת—*sign*, by which anything may be known, and specifically, by which the divine power and presence may be recognized. Miraculous events are σημεῖα, inasmuch as they *indicate* or evince the presence and power of the supreme Being. Thus 1 Cor. xiv. 22, the gift of tongues is called "a *sign*, not to them that believe, but to them that believe not;" and, i. 22, the Jews are said to require a *sign*. So Jonah was a *sign* to the Ninevites, Luke xi. 30; and the child Jesus was to be a sign spoken against, Luke ii. 34. In all these cases, the miracle is designed as a token by which the unbelieving world may be convinced — and so, is σημεῖον, a *sign*. Accordingly the various miracles wrought by or required of our Lord and his apostles, *in proof* of his divine mission, are termed σημεῖα. Thus, Matt. xii. 38 and Mark viii. 11, 12, the Pharisees seek a *sign* from him; that is, something miraculous, to prove that he was divine. So Luke xi. 16. So also John ii. 18 and vi. 30: What *sign* showest thou? and ii. 23: Many believed on him, seeing the *signs*, or miracles. The miracle at Cana, John ii. 11, is spoken of as the beginning of miracles (signs), on the part of Christ. So also Nicodemus, John iii. 2: No man can do these miracles (*signs*) which thou doest, except, etc. See also John vi. 2, 14, 26; vii. 31; ix. 16; xx. 30. The term is also applied to the miracles wrought by the disciples, in proof of their divine mission, after the ascension of their Lord. Thus Mark xvi. 17, 20: These *signs* shall follow them that believe; The Lord working with them, and confirming the word with *signs* following. In these and the like passages, we have the clue, if we mistake not, to the true significance of the miracles of the New Testament. They are tokens or evidences of the divine commission of the person who performs them. The cases above cited, under the term *σημεῖα* especially, seem to refer to miracles as *evidences producing conviction and belief in the mind.*

Where not so much the *end* or *object* of the miracle is the idea prominent in the mind, but rather the effect of it in *exciting astonishment or fear*, the term *τέρας* — *wonder, prodigy* — is employed; *always, however, in connection with σημεῖον.* Thus, Acts ii. 19: Wonders in the heaven above, and signs in the earth beneath, — *τέρατα* — *σημεῖα*; vii. 36: Wonders and signs in Egypt and the Red sea; John iv. 48: Except ye see signs and wonders, ye will not believe; Acts ii. 43: Many wonders and signs, done by the apostles. See, also, iv. 30; v. 12; vi. 8; xiv. 3; xv. 12, where the same expressions are used with reference to the miracles wrought by the apostles. The terms are sometimes employed, also, with reference to the miracles, or pretended miracles, of false prophets, as in Mark xiii. 22, and Matt. xxiv. 24, and 2 Thess. ii. 9.

The use of *τέρας* in connection with *σημεῖον*, in this manner, is evidently borrowed from Hebrew usage, which in like manner connects the corresponding words — אוֹתוֹת and מוֹפְתִים.

A miracle, then, so far as the scripture use of terms can guide us, is some wonderful event, such as requires divine[1] power to perform, and which may therefore be regarded as a sign or indication of divine presence and agency.

That a miracle is not any and every wonderful or even inexplicable thing, we need hardly pause to affirm. All miracles are wonderful, but not all wonders are miracles. Everything is wonderful on its first occurrence. The first observation of an eclipse, of the eruption of a volcano, of an earthquake, or even a thunder-storm was, doubtless, very wonderful to the observers, and may very well have passed for something miraculous, as such events still do among the savage nations.

It is necessary to the idea of a miracle that the event should be not merely wonderful,[2] but that it occur not in the ordinary course of nature's operations; that the power which produces it should be the special interposition of divine agency. This cannot be said of the eclipse, the storm, or the volcanic eruption. Such events, however remarkable, however fearful, and even unusual, they may be, are still within the range of natural events, and to be accounted for on natural principles. But should the order of nature be reversed, or set aside; should some event occur clearly beyond the power of natural causes to produce, and requiring, beyond reasonable doubt, the divine interposition and agency for its accomplishment, we should properly call such an event a miracle.

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[1] We say such as requires *divine* power to perform; for the idea that miracles may be performed by created beings, or even by evil beings, whether men or angels, other than as mere instruments of almighty power, finds, as it seems to us, no countenance in the scriptures.

[2] The definition by Augustine: "Miraculum voco quidquid arduum aut insolitum supra spem vel facultatem mirantes apparet" (De utilitate cred. c. 16), is certainly faulty in this respect. It is, as Trench has well observed, a definition of the mirabile rather than of the miraculum.

Now it may be difficult to decide, in many cases, what is, and what is not, a natural event; whether a given result lies within or without the range of natural causes; in other words, to prove a miracle. That is not now the point under discussion. All that we say is, that when it is once clearly settled that the phenomenon under consideration is not merely some wonderful and unusual, but still natural event, but, on the contrary, is really supernatural, and has been brought about by some special divine interposition, working to accomplish this specific result; then, and not till then, are we warranted to call that event a miracle.

On the question whether a miracle involves a suspension or violation of the laws of nature, or is merely something above and beyond nature, there is room for greater difference of opinion. According to the definitions already given, the latter would seem to be all that is essential. On this point, however, theologians are by no means agreed.

Neander, in his chapter on Miracles,[1] says: "Although from their nature they *transcend* the ordinary law of cause and effect, they do not *contradict* it, inasmuch as nature has been so ordered by divine wisdom as to admit higher and creative agencies into her sphere; and it is perfectly *natural* that such powers, once admitted, should produce effects beyond the scope of ordinary causes." Similar is the view of Olshausen,[2] who affirms "that we cannot adopt that idea of a miracle which regards it merely negatively as a suspension of the laws of nature. Starting from the scriptural view of the abiding presence of God in the world, we cannot regard the laws of nature as mechanical arrangements which would have to be altered by interpositions from without: they have the character of being based as a whole in God's nature. All phenomena, therefore, which are not explicable from the known or unknown laws of earthly development, are not, for that reason, necessarily violations of law, and suspensions of the laws of nature; rather they are themselves comprehended under a higher general law; for what is divine is truly according to law."

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[1] Life of Christ, Book IV. Part ii. ch. 5.

[2] Commentary, Vol. I. p. 335, on Matt. viii. 1–4.

In like manner *Trench*: "But while the miracle is not thus nature, so neither is it against nature. That language, however commonly in use, is yet wholly unsatisfactory, which speaks of these wonderful works of God as violations of a natural law. *Beyond* nature, *beyond* and *above* the nature which we know, they are, but not *contrary* to it."[1]

To the same effect *Augustine* remarks: Omnia portenta *contra* naturam dicimus esse, sed non sunt. . . . . Portentum ergo fit non contra naturam, sed *contra quam est nota natura.* And elsewhere he remarks: "contra naturam non incongrue dicimus aliquid Deum facere, quod facit contra *id quod novimus in natura.*" Augustine does not admit that anything comes to pass contrary to nature, since nature is but the will of God, and he cannot be supposed to act contrary to what he has himself established. "Quomodo est enim contra naturam quod Dei fit voluntate, quum voluntas tanti utique creatoris, conditae rei cujusque natura sit?"[2]

Aquinas gives a similar view; whatever is wrought by divine power, out of the usual course of nature, *praeter* ordinem naturae, is with him a miracle: "Aliquid dicitur miraculum quod fit praeter ordinem totius naturae creatae, quo sensu solus Deus facit miracula."[3] Only it must be *totius* naturae, and not merely naturae nobis notae, of nature as known to us.

The following is the view of Knapp: "Properly speaking these miracles are wrought by God. In performing them he does not alter or disturb the course of things which he himself directs, or counteract the laws which he himself has established; but he accomplishes by means of nature, which he has thus constituted, and which he governs, something *more* than is common, and in connection with unusual circumstances."

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[1] Notes on Miracles, p. 20.

[2] De Civit. Dei. xxi. 8.

[3] Summa Theol., Lib. I. 110, art. 4.

Prof. Tieftrunk, of Halle, holds the following language, as cited by Hahn:[2] "The supernatural cause which works a miracle, neither suspends nor confounds the laws of nature, but it uses the forms and materials of nature to accomplish its work. The miraculous consists not in being *contra*natural, but *extra*natural; for the producing cause effects its operation in the sensible world according to the laws of sensible nature; an operation which would not have taken place according to the ordinary course of nature, and could not have been produced by the mere causal powers of nature. The miraculous event may be compared to the unexpected entry of an independent activity into the course of nature, but which does not obstruct nor subvert it; only we must observe that this entry and its operation do not take place by any mere natural casuality, but by a superior power acting according to the laws of sensible nature."

On the contrary, Wegscheider[3] defines miracles as unusual events, wrought by a cause superior to human power, and *suspending* the ordinary course of nature and its laws; "humanas vires superantes, et rerum naturae cursum consuetum, legesque in efficiendo ejusmodi eventu tollentes." Nor is he without authority for this. Among the Lutheran divines, *Quenstedt*[4] affirms: "Miracula vero et proprie dicta sunt, quae *contra* vim rebus naturalibus a Deo inditam, cursumque naturalem, sive per extraordinariam Dei potentiam efficiuntur." So also *Buddeus*[5] (as cited by Knapp) speaks of miracles as "operationes quibus naturae

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[1] Theology, Vol. I. p. 101.

[2] Jahrbuch des Christ. Glaub.

[3] Institutiones, p. 173.

[4] Theologia Didactico-Polemica.

[5] Institutiones Theol. Dogmat., p. 245.

leges ad ordinem et conservationem totius hujus universi spectantes, re vera *suspenduntur*."

Indeed this would seem to have been the view very generally entertained by the earlier theological writers, as it is undoubtedly that of many among the moderns.

We are by no means sure, however, that a miracle involves of necessity any violation or suspension of the laws of nature. That which is *above* nature is not necessarily *contrary* to nature. A work may be wrought by divine power, and that power may be extraordinary in its nature and operation, and so the effect may lie quite without the sphere of nature's laws and the usual course of things, and yet it may involve no contradiction or suspension of any of those laws. A higher power may come in to accomplish a special result on a special occasion, yet leave the ordinary and established laws in full force. It is a law of nature that bodies of a certain specific gravity shall fall to the earth when left unsupported in the air or the water; yet a stone or a ball of iron may be projected with such force as to counteract this tendency; it may ascend instead of descend, and so continue until it passes out of sight. The law, however, still exists, still acts, — acts upon this very projectile, and that with its full force. The gravitating power is neither abolished nor suspended as regards that missile, but only *counteracted* by another and superior force. The usual effect is set aside for the time by the intermission of a higher power. In like manner, when the iron swims, or the water burns; when the flames fail to consume, or the wild beasts to devour; when the raging tempest suddenly becomes a calm, or even death itself gives place to life, there may be in all this no violation or suspension of nature's laws, but only the coming in of a higher power to prevent the ordinary and produce an extraordinary result, — a counteraction rather than a contradiction.[1]

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[1] It is well remarked by Trench, with respect to the miracle of healing: "that it is sickness which is abnormal, and not health. The healing is the restoration of the primitive order. We should see in the miracle not the infraction of a law, but behold in it the lower law neutralized and, for the time, put out of working by

Who will say that it may not be so? All that is *essential* to the idea of a miracle is the intervention of divine power to accomplish by supernatural means, whether directly or indirectly, a result not to be attained in the ordinary course of nature. But what is above and beyond nature is not necessarily contrary to it. That iron should swim, may be *extra*-natural, *super*-natural, yet not *contra*-natural. Nay, there may possibly be, as some suppose, even within the sphere of nature itself, a power hitherto unknown, sufficient to produce that unusual result; requiring only to be called into exercise by the divine will, when the special occasion demands; and the result would be none the less a miracle, since it is the effect of special divine interposition, and is something beyond the *usual* course of nature. But whether the *means* employed are natural or super-natural, in either case the *efficient cause* is super-natural, and the event miraculous; nor is there, in either case, any necessary violation or suspension of the already existing and established laws. Those laws may remain in full force, notwithstanding the coming in of this higher power.

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a higher; and of this abundant analogous examples are evermore going forward before our eyes. Continually we behold in the world around us lower laws held in restraint by higher, — mechanic by dynamic; chemical by vital; physical by moral; yet we say not, when the lower thus gives place in favor of the higher, that there was any violation of law, — that anything contrary to nature came to pass; rather we acknowledge the law of a greater freedom swallowing up the law of a lesser. Thus, when I lift my arm, the law of gravitation is not, as far as my arm is concerned, denied or anihilated; it exists as much as ever, but is held in suspense by the higher law of my will" (Notes on Miracles, p. 4). We should not say that it was even *held in suspense*. It not only exists but *acts* as forcibly as it ever did; and the higher law of the will must *counteract* it.

To the same effect the gifted author of Nature and the Supernatural (p. 338). "A miracle is no suspension or violation of the laws of nature. Here is the point where the advocates of miracles have so fatally weakened their cause by too large a statement. The laws of nature are subordinated to miracles, but they are not suspended or discontinued by them. If I raise my arm, I subordinate the law of gravity, and produce a result against the force of gravity, but the law, or the force, is not discontinued. On the contrary, it is acting still, at every moment, as uniformly as if it held the arm to its place. All the vital agencies maintain a chemistry of their own that subordinates the laws of inorganic chemistry. Nothing is more familiar to us than the fact of a subordination of natural laws."

And so of the still more remarkable exertions of divine power; as, for example, the restoration of a dead man to life. It is certainly not according to the usual course of events, and, in this sense, not according to the laws of nature, that a dead body should be restored to life. We know of no power in nature adequate to produce this result. When such an event really occurs, therefore, we are warranted to infer divine interposition, and to pronounce the effect a miracle. But do we know that any of the existing laws of nature *forbid* such a result, and must be first abolished, or set aside, before this event can take place? Want of power is one thing, and opposition is another; inability is not incompatibility. The power to restore life may not be in nature, and yet may not be contrary to nature.[1]

A *law*, in the sense in which that term is here used, is simply *an established mode of operation.* A *law of nature* is simply *such a mode of operation as results from the nature* or *constitution* of things about us in the physical world. Now if an event takes place by some other mode of operation than that now defined, that is, by some mode of operation that does not result from the original constitution of things, the latter is not necessarily a violation of the former, nor a suspension of it. For example: the change of water into wine, by an instantaneous process, certainly is not the result of the original constitution of things in the physical world. It is not the way in which nature produces wine. But is it, on the other hand, a violation of that method? Nature, that is Deity, operating in the accustomed manner, and according to the original constitution of things, produces wine by the processes of growth and fermentation. *Now* he produces it directly, without this mediate process. Is there any contradiction here of the former method? Is there any suspension of it, even? Are not the laws and processes of nature still in force, as before? Are not vines still bearing fruit, and grapes still yielding wine, just as ever? The truth is, no law is violated, none suspended; only another force is called into requisition, in addition to the usual forces of nature; or rather, the power which usually operates in such or such a prescribed mode, now, for special reasons, and for the moment, acts in another and quite unusual mode. It is simply Deity doing, at one time, in one way, what at other times, and usually, he does in another way. The result is something which we cannot account for by the laws of nature, inasmuch as it was not produced by the operation of those laws; in other words, it is a miracle. But in thus operating by a *new* method to accomplish a special end, Deity no more contradicts or violates his *usual* mode of operation than a man's travelling by steam-car contradicts his usual and slower mode of procedure by stage coach; or than the appearance of a comet contradicts the established order of the solar system, or suspends the laws of planetary motion. The fact that God usually works in a given way, does not prove that he never works in any other. Show any sufficient reason for a departure from the usual method, and such departure becomes not merely possible, but in the highest degree probable. There will be *deviation*, but not *contradiction.*

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[1] The distinction made by *Fichte*, between an event as being *from* natural laws, and as being *according* to natural laws, strikes us as well grounded. An effect which comes under the latter designation does not necessarily come under the former.

The view now taken of the nature of a miracle obviates an objection frequently urged against the argument from miracles in favor of Christianity, to wit, that they imply a contradiction or violation of the laws of nature.[1] Those laws, it is said, are universal and invariable; and whatever occurrence professes to be a contradiction of those immutable laws, bears on its face the evidence of its own absurdity and falsity. Now if it can be shown that a miracle does not of necessity imply any such contradiction or violation of natural laws; that, on the contrary, it leaves those laws in full force and play, while it comes in beside them, and reaches beyond them, to bring about results which are not in their sphere, which lie out of their plane, it is certainly a point gained, and a difficulty met.

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[1] The whole force of *Spinoza's* arguments against the miracles of Christianity, as also the chief strength of the assault by modern scientific rationalism, lies precisely here. The rationalist is careful to define a miracle as something contrary to the laws of nature, — a violation of fixed, established order. Set this definition aside for a truer one, and you set aside at once the main force of his attacks.

The case is analogous to the reasoning of the sceptic against the mysteries of the Christian faith, that they are contrary to reason, and therefore incredible. To which we reply: No, not *contrary* to reason, but merely *above* reason. So would we say of miracles; they are not contrary to nature, but above nature.

But is a miracle a *lawless* thing? Or may there be, on the other hand, a law of miracles? Does the divine interposition, which produces a miraculous event, occur at hap-hazard or according to fixed and uniform principles? May there not be as close a connection between the peculiar circumstances which call for and demand the supernatural and the divine interposition to meet the exigency, as there is between any ordinary result and the law of nature which looks to its accomplishment? Doubtless there may be such a connection, such a law of miracles. We are not to suppose that the laws of nature comprehend *all* laws. Could we see far enough into the nature of things, we might perhaps discover a fixed and invariable connection between the *occasion for* and the *occurrence of* a miracle; so that we could say: Given, such and such things; and given, also, divine interposition to meet the case. This we do not know enough to affirm, perhaps never shall; neither, on the other hand, does any man know enough to deny it.

Much less are we to conceive of a miracle as an event without *cause*. Whether there be or be not any such thing as a law of miracles, there is and must be a *cause* of them. If natural events require a cause, much more, supernatural. We are not to think of natural causes as comprehending *all* causes. Because a thing is beyond the range of ordinary and natural causes, it does not follow that it is beyond the range of all cause. To suppose that there is no cause except natural causes, is not pantheism merely, it is downright atheism. It is to shut God out of the universe which he has himself created.

To sum up what has been said: we are not to conceive of a miracle as simply any remarkable or extraordinary event; nor yet as, of necessity, a contradiction, or even suspension, of any law of nature; we are not to conceive of it as necessarily a lawless occurrence, much less uncaused; but rather, and simply, as a divine interposition to accomplish by supernatural agency a specific end not otherwise attainable.

With these remarks on the *nature* of miracles, we proceed to the second topic of investigation.

II. *What* PROVES *a miracle?*

In other words, what kind and degree of evidence is required, in order to prove that divine power is, in any case, interposed to produce a given effect, otherwise than by natural causes? And here we are met, at the outset, by the positive denial that any amount of evidence can prove it; the denial, in a word, that a miracle is a possible thing. Thus, in the article on the Evidences of Christianity, in the "Essays and Reviews," Baden Powell holds the following language: "What is alleged is a case of the supernatural; but no testimony can reach to the supernatural; testimony can apply only to apparent sensible facts; testimony can only prove an extraordinary and perhaps inexplicable occurrence, a phenomenon. That it is due to supernatural causes, is entirely dependent on the previous belief or assumptions of the parties."[1] Again we are told, by the same author, that "In nature, and from nature, by science and by reason, we neither have, nor can possibly have, any evidence of a *Deity working miracles;* for that we must go out of nature and beyond reason. If we could have any such evidence *from nature*, it could only prove extraordinary *natural* effects, which would not be *miracles* in the old theological sense, as isolated, unrelated, and uncaused; whereas no *physical* fact can be conceived as unique, or without analogy and relation to others, and to the whole system of natural causes."[2]

In the same strain we are complacently informed, by the same authority, that in the present age of physical research, "all highly cultivated minds and duly advanced intellects have imbibed more or less the lessons of inductive philosophy, and have, at least in some measure, learned to appreciate the grand conception of universal law; to recognize the impossibility even of *any two material atoms* subsisting together without a determinate relation; of any action of the one on the other, whether of equilibrium or of motion, without reference to a physical cause; of any modification whatsoever in the existing conditions of material agents, unless through the *invariable operation of a series of eternally impressed consequences* [the italics are ours] following in some necessary chain of orderly connection, however imperfectly known to us."[1]

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[1] Recent Inquiries, &c., p. 121.

[2] Ib., p. 160.

Any interference with the established order of nature being thus assumed as a physical impossibility, which no amount of evidence can establish, we are not surprised to be told in this connection that "if miracles were in the estimation of a former age among the chief *supports* of Christianity, they are at present among the main *difficulties* and hindrances to its acceptance."[2]

As regards the utter impossibility of miracles on the ground of the absolute inviolability of nature's laws, and the invariability and universality of their operation, we fear we must confess ourselves not of that order of "highly cultivated minds and duly advanced intellects" that "have learned to appreciate the grand conception." The real question for a mind thus far advanced, as it seems to us, is this: *Is there a Deity at all?* Or is all power to be resolved into this great system of universal, invariable, eternal law, — this grand machinery of "eternally impressed consequences," that goes grinding and clanking on from eternity to eternity? If the latter, then we grant that miracles are out of the question. But *if there be* a God, as some of us in our simplicity have supposed; if we may crave the indulgence of this highly cultivated age so far as to be permitted to retain the antiquated notion of a Deity at the head of affairs; and if we place this Deity where he belongs, behind all those laws, and above them all, as their source and spring, then why may not the power that usually works in and by such and such methods or laws, if occasion require, act in some other way without or above those laws? Nay, why may he not, if necessary to the accomplishment of his purposes, even reverse, or wholly set aside for the time, those usual methods of procedure which we call laws of nature? It would seem reasonable to suppose this. The power that created and established certain laws and operations of nature, so called, can surely, if he pleases, suspend those operations and counteract those laws, by bringing in still higher forces, on special occasions, and for special purposes. The laws are surely not so invariable and inviolable as to be beyond the reach of their maker; the sublime machinery of eternally impressed consequences is not so unvarying and irresistible in its steady revolutions, but that the hand which created and set it agoing can vary or suspend its movements at will. The question now is, not whether Deity *will* do this, or whether he is *likely* to do it, but whether he *can.* If he can, then miracles are not *impossible.*[1]

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[1] Recent Inquiries, p. 150.

[2] Ib. p. 158.

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[1] It is maintained by one of our ablest modern naturalists (Dr. Edward Hitchcock, see Bibliotheca Sacra, Oct. 1854, Article, Special Divine Interpositions in Nature), that so far from there being in nature any presumption against the miracles of revelation, there is, on the contrary, an actual and strong presumption in their favor, from the fact that, to all appearances, and according to all ordinary laws of reasoning, there have been in nature itself repeated instances of divine miraculous interposition. The first introduction of organic life upon the globe, which had previously existed as an inorganic mass, through long ages and many changes gradually preparing for the future abode of vegetable and animal life, is regarded as such an interposition. The subsequent and repeated disappearance of living species, and the production of new ones in their places, which, after flourishing for long periods, have in turn disappeared, only to give place to some new and independent system, the introduction thus of new races and systems of life adapted to the changed condition of things, until we can trace at least five of these independent economies, is claimed as another evidence of miraculous interposition in nature. The final introduction of man himself upon the globe, at a period long subsequent to the introduction of vegetable and animal life, and the changes already spoken of, his appearance of a sudden, after these vast periods of time, and these successive independent groups of organic

The truth is, no consistent theist can possibly maintain such a position. The real question, when it comes to that pass, as we said before, is simply this: *are we atheists*, or *have we still a God?* And he who coolly shuts the door in the face of Deity, and shuts him out of his own creation, by assuming that nature's laws are absolutely invariable, universal, and eternal, and therefore any departure from them is impossible, under whatever cloak of science or inductive philosophy he may hide himself, is logically and practically an atheist.

But granting that a miracle is not impossible, still is it not, in the highest degree *improbable*, so much so that no amount of evidence is sufficient to establish the fact of its occurrence? That depends on circumstances, on the end to be accomplished, on the *reason for* the thing. Not under all circumstances and on all occasions is a miracle improbable even. We can suppose cases in which such an occurrence would be highly probable. If the occasion, the end to be accomplished, be something extraordinary and of unusual moment, especially if it be something not likely to be attained by ordinary methods, it is not, in such a case, *a pri-*

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beings, had passed away, is another clear case of miraculous interposition in nature.

Should it be objected to this reasoning that the appearance of any new phenomenon, as the introduction of a new species of plants or animals, for which we cannot account by any known laws, or trace its connection with any previously existing circumstances, does not of itself *prove* miraculous interposition, it may be replied that we have as good evidence of divine interposition in the cases referred to, as we have of direct creation in any case. If the first existence of life on a planet does not imply creative power and divine interposition, neither does the first appearance of the planet itself in hitherto empty space imply such agency. The development theory of Lamarck and of the "Vestiges," and also the theory of Crosse on spontaneous generation, and the more recent theory of Darwin on the origination of new species by natural causes, could they be substantiated, would indeed set aside the argument for divine interposition in the cases above cited; but we see not why they would not also set it aside in all other cases, reducing what we have hitherto, in our ignorance, called creation, to mere development, and origination of new species by laws and forces already existing. It remains only, with Powell and other naturalists, to claim for these laws and forces an *universal* and *eternal* existence, and the circuit is complete. This point reached, and we have no further evidence of, nor indeed *occasion for*, a God, whether in or out of nature. Blank atheism is the upshot.

ori improbable that extraordinary means may be employed to effect that end.

Suppose, for example, that it were proposed to make a divine revelation to man of truths not to be learned from nature — a case certainly supposable — how can this be done save in some way beyond and above the ordinary course of nature's operations? Such a revelation will be in itself a miracle, in the highest sense;[1] and therefore there is no improbability that the mode of its communication may be something miraculous. Or suppose — the greatest of all mysteries and miracles — that God himself should see fit to become incarnate; is it improbable that a lesser and subordinate miracle should be wrought to accomplish this incarnation?

But even supposing a miracle were wrought, is it possible to establish the fact by evidence? Is a miracle capable of proof? No, says *Powell*, for it is either *within* nature, and so is really not a miracle at all; or it is *beyond* nature, and so beyond the range of evidence, and within the domain of faith. No, says *Hume*, for it is contrary to human experience, and therefore incredible. No, says *Strauss*, for the case is insupposable; a miracle is an impossibility; the inviolability of the chain of second causes is a self-evident truth, and no amount of evidence is sufficient to set aside such a truth.

This latter position we have already sufficiently considered. It is a position which only the atheist can consistently hold. Nor is it to be admitted as a self-evident truth that the laws of nature *are* inviolable and invariable. We demand proof of this. It is a position assumed by *Strauss*, and those who agree with him, but nowhere proved, So far from being a self-evident truth, it is not a truth at all. The power that makes can unmake, vary, suspend. Nor even if this were so would it render miracles impossible, since, as we have already shown, a miracle does not of necessity imply any contradiction or violation of natural law.

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[1] As Olshausen has well remarked respecting Christ: "He *himself* was the wonder (τέρας); his wonderful works were but the natural acts of his being." — (Com. I. p. 335.)

The position of *Hume*, that a miracle is contrary to human experience, and therefore incredible, deserves a more careful consideration than it has, in all cases, received from those who have undertaken to answer it. We do not propose here to discuss the matter in all its bearings; it is sufficient to our present purpose to say, that neither the major nor minor premise of this argument is admissible. It is not true, as the minor premise asserts, that miracles are contrary to *all* human experience. This is assumed, and it is an assumption which begs the whole question in dispute. That miracles are contrary to *general* experience is very true; else they would not be miracles. That they are contrary to *all* human experience, we deny. So far from this, if we may believe anything which does not fall under our own immediate observation, instances of divine interposition have been occurring, from time to time, along a large part of the course of human history. It is beyond all reasonable doubt, that such instances occurred in connection with the promulgation, both of the Jewish, and afterward of the Christian systems. Just where it would be, *a priori*, probable that they would occur; just where they were needed to give authority to a religious system purporting to be of divine origin; just where we should reasonably expect to find them if such things ever do occur, just there we meet with them. The facts are well attested and unquestionable. The statements clear, full, explicit. The instances, though rare, yet in the aggregate, are numerous. The witnesses are many. They were men of honesty and sobriety, of good character and good sense. They testify to plain facts, about which there could well be no mistake. They appeal to their cotemporaries for the truth of their statements; and that testimony goes uncontradicted, nay, is confirmed, by their enemies. There can be no reasonable doubt that the remarkable events to which they testify did really occur; and as little doubt that the occurrences in question were such as come under our definition of a miracle. They are such as certainly do not occur in the ordinary course of nature; inexplicable by any known laws and forces to be accounted for only by admitting special divine interposition.

Now it is quite too late, in the face of all these facts, for the sceptic to come in with the cool assumption, that miracles are contrary to human experience. They may be contrary to *his* experience, and to ours; but why should we set up our individual experience against that of all past ages, and of so many witnesses. The fact that Mr. Hume, or any number of men, did not see a miracle, does not prove that nobody has ever seen one. Mere negative testimony cannot outweigh positive. At all events, it is a sheer begging of the question for any man to assert that miracles are contrary to human experience, when so many witnesses testify positively to the occurrence under their own observation of events, which, if they really did occur as stated, must be admitted to be miraculous.

Nor is the major premise of Mr. Hume's argument tenable. It is not true, that whatever is contrary to human experience, is, on that account, and of necessity, incredible An event is not necessarily incredible because not known to have occurred before. Is it quite certain that nothing can take place in the world which has not already taken place? Can nothing occur for the first time? If nothing miraculous had ever occurred, in the whole history of our world previous to the introduction of Christianity, it would not follow that some events of that sort might not then occur; or that they would be altogether incredible if they should occur. Even if it were conceded, then, as it is not, that miracles are contrary to human experience, it by no means follows that they are, on that account, necessarily incredible.

But what shall we say to the position of Baden Powell, that a miracle is incapable of proof, because *in and from* nature there can be no evidence of the supernatural, while that which is beyond and above nature is beyond the domain of reason, and ceases to be capable of investigation, but must be received by faith?

True, we reply, that which is *from* nature, that is, produced by natural causes, cannot be supernatural; but not true that *in* nature, that is, within the limits and domain of nature, there can be no occurrence of the supernatural; not true that God cannot, if he pleases, work a miracle *in* nature, that is, among material, sensible things.[1] This point we have already sufficiently discussed. Nor is it true, that whatever is beyond the power of natural causes to produce is therefore beyond the domain of reason to investigate, and must be received, if at all, only by a blind and unquestioning faith. That is not for a moment to be conceded. That which is extra-natural, is not of necessity incapable of proof. The question whether a dead man was, on a certain occasion, restored to life, is a question to be settled wholly by evidence and the investigation of reason. If the event *did* occur, clearly it was supernatural; the laws and forces of nature are not adequate to produce such a result. But *did* it occur? That is the real question; and it is a question which falls as clearly and fully within the range of rational investigation, and the laws of evidence, as any question in physical science.

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[1] The progress of natural science in the direction of scepticism, if we may credit recent indications, is one of the most strongly marked features of the present time. To those of us who have been accustomed to entertain the old-fashioned notion of creation and a Creator, it is somewhat startling to be informed, as we are by Mr. Baden Powell, that this idea is now in a fair way to be exploded, in fact, is already rejected by philosophic minds; that, on the high authority of Mr. Owen, *creation* is, in fact, *only another name for our ignorance of the mode of production*; that, according to the unanswerable argument of another writer, new species *must* have originated *either by developement* out of previously organized forms, *or by spontaneous generation*; that, while naturalists have been disposed to deny the development theories of Lamarck and the "Vestiges of Creation," and have refused their belief to the experiments of Crosse or of Weekes in regard to spontaneous generation, a work has appeared by a naturalist of the highest authority, — Darwin, on the Origination of Species, — which substantiates, on undeniable grounds, the principle of the *origination of new species by natural causes*, — a work, we are assured, "which must soon bring about an entire revolution of opinion in favor of the grand principles of the *self-evolving forces of nature* (Recent Inquiries, p. 156, 157); that the grand law of *conservation*, and the stability of the heavenly movements, a principle now recognized by all sound cosmical philosophers, is only a type of the grand, eternal, self-sustaining, self-evolving powers of nature (p. 151); that so clear and indisputable has the great truth become of the invariable order and necessary connection of nature's operations, moving on by grand, universal, eternal law, that not only all philosophical enquirers are now compelled to admit it as the basis of their investigations, but even "minds of a *less comprehensive* capacity," as, for example, theological and moral reasoners, are constrained to acknowledge its force (ib.).

We might be disposed to raise a question as to the correctness of these sweeping statements, and startling facts and principles of science; but as we belong to that class of minds which is of a "less comprehensive capacity," and as we are distinctly assured that the subject is really quite beyond our comprehension, and that it is "*hazardous ground* for any *general moral reasoner* to take, to discuss subjects of evidence, which essentially involve that *higher appreciation of physical truth* which can be attained only from an accurate and comprehensive acquaintance with the connected series of the physical and mathematical sciences" (ib.), we see no way but to make our bow and retire, with the best grace possible, from a vicinity so dangerous.

Let us take a given case, — the raising of Lazarus from the grave. Two inquiries at once arise: 1. Are the facts as here stated? Did these things actually occur? Was the man dead, and was he subsequently restored to life, according to the statement? 2. If so, was the event miraculous?

As to the latter, there can be no reasonable doubt. If the man Lazarus was actually raised from the dead, it was a supernatural event. It is not in the course of nature's operations for dead men to come out of their graves, and resume the functions of life. Her laws are not to that effect. It is well remarked by Dr. Taylor, that it is as much a law of nature that a dead man shall *stay* dead, as that a living man shall die when pierced through the heart. As to the other point, it is clearly a question which admits of evidence, and must be settled just as all questions concerning matters of fact are settled, to wit, by the testimony of credible witnesses. But hold, says Mr. Powell; no testimony is sufficient to prove what is contrary to the course and order of nature. We take issue with him there. The testimony of competent and credible witnesses is capable of proving *any matter of fact*, any occurrence or event; as also of disproving it. The question being: Did this thing really occur; did this man, after he had lain three days in his grave, actually come out of it, at the word of command, and return to his home a living man? The testimony of witnesses is adequate to decide that point. The question is not now as to the *cause* of the event — how it happened, but *did* it happen at all? And this is a question which men of common powers of observation, and common honesty, are capable of answering.

So of the other miracles of scripture. If the facts occurred as there stated, they are, in many cases at least, such as to leave no doubt of their being supernatural occurrences; and they are, moreover, such things as make it easy to decide whether they did, or did not, really occur.

But the so-called miracles, we are told, are, after all, mere myths, fables, illusions. They never, in fact, occurred as narrated. The witnesses are, if not imposing on others, at least themselves imposed upon. So Strauss. This is, of course, supposable; but is it probable? That the witnesses should invent a story utterly without foundation, and palm it off as reality upon those who must have known whether the events in question occurred or not, and who would at once have contradicted the statement had it been untrue,—this, surely, is out of the question. On the other hand, that the witnesses, in common with all who were spectators of the scene, were deceived and imposed upon by mere illusions of the senses, is hardly more credible. For the acts were performed publicly, in open day, and before the most prejudiced eyes. They were of such a nature that nothing would have been easier than to detect the imposition, if there were any. Take, for example, the raising of Lazarus, or the healing of the lame man, at the temple gate, by Peter and John. The observers must have known whether such things really occurred or not; whether they were facts or illusions. They were not predisposed to believe, but on the contrary to reject, the evidence of anything supernatural in the case. They had every motive to do so, but were unable. "What shall we do to these men? for that indeed a notable miracle hath been done by them is manifest to all them that dwell in Jerusalem, and *we cannot deny it*," said the sorely perplexed rulers. If there had been any reason to suspect imposition, or jugglery, strange that such men should not have made the most of it.[1]

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[1] The theory of Strauss, it should be remarked, presupposes that the narra-

Evidently two courses, and only two, are open to him who undertakes to discredit or disprove the miracles of scripture. He must show that the events narrated did not take place; or else that they were not miraculous. The first is simply a question of fact — did such and such things happen? Was the man really dead, or really a cripple, and was he really restored in the manner stated? Now we maintain that on any question of fact, of this nature, the testimony of good and reliable witnesses, honest men, possessing ordinary powers of observation, and placed in such circumstances as to be able to observe whatever occurred, is perfectly valid evidence. The question for them to decide is, not whether the thing is a miracle, — that is a matter of judgment which every man must decide for himself, — but did the thing actually happen? This it may not always be easy to determine. But when the acts in question are performed publicly, in the sight of all men, without attempt at secrecy or jugglery; when they are of such a nature, moreover, as renders imposition and deception out of the question, — as in the case of Lazarus, of the widow's son, of the lame man at the temple gate, of the man born blind, and a multitude of other cases, — it is easy for any man on the spot to satisfy himself whether such things were or were not done. And if he be a man of good character for honesty and veracity, his testimony as to the simple matter of fact, — what he saw and heard, what he knew of the previous condition of the person thus restored, and of the change in that condition, and the manner in which that change occurred, — is perfectly valid testimony, and would be so taken in any court of justice in the world.

The case is still stronger when we can summon upon the stand, as witnesses of the fact, men who have the deepest interest in denying the whole transaction, if it were possible

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tives are not authentic. If the miracles are myths, fables, the inventions of romance, then the Gospels are the invention of some later period, and not reliable historic narratives. But it is not the Gospels alone which narrate the occurrence of miracles. The Acts of the Apostles are full of them. So are the books of Moses. To make out the myth theory we must, in fact, reject not merely the credibility, but the authenticity, of the greater part of scripture.

for them to do so; but whose reluctant testimony goes to confirm the actual occurrence of the events in question. And this is precisely the case in many instances with regard to the miracles of scripture.

We hear much of the fallibility of human testimony. You cannot rely upon it, says Hume. Men often deceive, are often mistaken and incorrect in their statements. It is more reasonable that something of this sort has happened, in any given case, than that the laws of nature are reversed, or her uniformity disturbed. That, we reply, depends on circumstances. In the cases now under consideration, it is certainly more reasonable to suppose that the facts occurred as stated, than that so many men should testify to their occurrence under their own observation, and that too when, in many cases, they had the strongest motive for denying and contradicting the whole story, and yet all prove to be either false or incorrect in the statements.

Laplace has shown, indeed, that evidence diminishes rapidly in passing through successive hands; so that even supposing each witness to speak the truth nine times out of ten, by the time it has passed through twenty hands, the chances that the last or twentieth witness speaks the truth, are less than one in eight. To this it is sufficient to reply that as regards the cases under consideration, — and the same may be said of the scripture miracles generally, — we have our testimony, not from the twentieth hand, or even at second hand, but from eye-witnesses themselves, who speak what they do know, and testify what they have seen.

And here we cannot but inquire, whether the case would be, on the whole, materially altered, if in place of the testimony of others to the occurrence of a miracle, under circumstances the most favorable to honesty, and also to accuracy on the part of the witness, we had the testimony of *our own senses*. Suppose we ourselves were observers of the whole transaction, — the question being still, as before, not Was the affair a miracle? but only: Did such and such a thing take place? — Was the dead man restored to life? Was the lame man healed? — have we now the means of deciding this question with any more certainty than before? True, we have now the testimony of our own eyes, instead of those of others. But are we less liable to be mistaken or deceived in regard to a simple matter of observation than are other people under the same circumstances? Are our eyes more reliable than other eyes, our senses than other men's senses, our judgment as to what it is that we see and hear than other people's judgments as to the same thing? Have we never found ourselves mistaken as to what we thought we had observed? Would our testimony that we had ourselves seen and heard such and such things pass for more, in a court of justice, than the same testimony from any other honest and competent witness in the same circumstances?

Indeed, Mr. Powell admits that the evidence of our own senses can no more prove a miracle than the testimony of other witnesses. "The essential question of miracles stands quite apart from any consideration of *testimony;* the question would remain the same if we had the evidence of our own senses to an alleged miracle, that is, to an extraordinary or inexplicable fact. It is not the *mere fact*, but the *cause* or *explanation* of it, which is the point at issue."[1]

True, we reply, the cause or explanation of the fact is *a* point at issue; but so, also, is the *fact itself*,—that first and chiefly; and till that is settled, the other is of no consequence. Did this event really occur, is our first question; once satisfied of that, we may then inquire: Was the thing a miracle? Now it is to the decision of this first question that we call in the testimony of competent and reliable witnesses as a perfectly valid source of evidence; and we maintain that a case may easily be conceived, in which such testimony shall be equally conclusive of the fact with our own personal observation.

It is worthy of remark that the two questions: Did the thing actually occur? and if so, was it a miracle?—stand to each other in a certain fixed relation. The more extraordinary and improbable the event, and therefore the more unlikely to have occurred, the greater the probability that if it did occur it was miraculous. On the other hand, the less extraordinary and improbable the event in question, so much the less evidence is required to establish the fact of its occurrence; while, at the same time, so much the more difficult is it to show that the thing was a miracle.

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[1] Recent Inquiries, p. 159.

The case hitherto supposed — the raising of the dead — is clearly of the former class. Let us now suppose an instance of the latter, — an event not in itself wholly improbable, and to which the testimony is conclusive, but with respect to which the real question is: Was the thing a miracle, or was it the effect of natural causes? The restoration of sight to the blind by a word; the healing of the sick, without the use of natural remedies, by the mere touch of the hand, or even of the hem of a garment, or of the shadow of a person passing by; the walking on the water, without special mechanical appliances of any sort; the calming a tempest by simple word of command; — these, and the like, may fall, perhaps, under that category. There may be cases, doubtless, of this sort, where it will be difficult to decide whether the event in question is really miraculous. Still if, as in the cases supposed, the effect produced be such as is not produced by any known physical law, such as lies not within the sphere of nature's ordinary operations, or even, so far as we know, of her operations at all; if, in addition to this, there be a direct claim of supernatural agency in the case; and, further, if the occasion, the object, or end to be attained, be such as appears to require some supernatural agency, the probability would seem, in view of all the circumstances, to be very strong, that the event in question was brought about by some power above nature. Testimony, it will be observed, is not brought into the case to establish the *miraculous character* of the event, but only to establish the *fact* of its occurrence; to that it is perfectly competent; that once settled, it is for us to decide, by the exercise of our own reason and judgment, whether the occurrence be the result of natural causes, or not.

But here we are met by the objection of *Rousseau*, that it is impossible to prove a miracle, because miracles are exceptions to the laws of nature, and we do not know enough of nature to decide, in all cases, what her laws are. It is true, we reply, that we do not know *all* the laws of nature. But we know what is the ordinary course and order of her operations; and when an event so far transcends these as to be altogether inexplicable by any natural cause known to us; when it is a thing the like of which was never known to occur, under the like circumstances; when, moreover, the immediate producing cause claims to be supernatural, and the object is one that might well demand such agency, we are warranted in presuming the exertion of a power above and beyond nature. We grant that the mere fact of our inability to account for a phenomenon, does not prove it to be a miracle, for there may be laws of nature of which we are ignorant, and of which this may be the result. But when the unusual and inexplicable event occurs in connection with circumstances that are themselves peculiar, and that would render the exertion of special divine agency not, in itself, an improbable thing, in such cases the conclusion is certainly a just and reasonable one, that the event in question is the result of such interposition, in other words, a miracle.

And here we cannot but remark that the very uniformity of nature, on which so much stress is laid by those who deny the possibility of miracles, itself leads rather to the opposite conclusion in certain cases. Nature's operations are uniform and unvarying. We can calculate upon their occurrence with reasonable certainty. But here comes an effect quite at variance with all our previous notions and experience of those operations. May it not be the result of some power working above and beyond nature? Either this, or else nature is not, as we thought, uniform. Which of the two is the more probable?

It is time to pass to other topics; but we cannot dismiss the question now before us, without adverting to a point which deserves the consideration of writers on miracles. It is this: How far is the character of the *doctrine*, in confirmation of which miracles profess to be wrought, to be admitted as evidence of the miracles themselves? Can we appeal to the character of the doctrine in proof of the miracle? This is not unfrequently done. But if the divinity of the system prove the miracle, we cannot, of course, afterward appeal to the miracle to prove, in its turn, the divinity of the system, since this would be to reason in a circle. On the other hand, we cannot, perhaps, satisfactorily establish the reality of a miracle entirely irrespective of the character of the system in favor of which that miracle professes to be wrought. If the system is manifestly false and pernicious, if the doctrine is at variance with the plainest principles of morality and true religion, this, of itself, is sufficient to discredit the reality of the supposed miracle. Reason assures us that God would not work miracles in favor of such a system. On the whole, the argument from the character of the doctrine seems to be negative rather than positive. If the system be such as to make a divine origin not improbable, this removes an objection that would otherwise lie against the supposition of a miracle in its behalf. It does not, of itself, prove that a miracle was wrought.

To sum up what has been said: In reply to the question What *proves* a miracle? we take the following positions:

A miracle is *possible.*

Not under *all* circumstances *improbable* even.

On the contrary, under *certain* circumstances, may be highly probable.

The testimony of witnesses to the occurrence of a miracle, under such circumstances, is valid and reliable proof.

In other words, miracles are neither impossible to occur, nor impossible to be proved. The *reality* of the event is capable of proof by testimony; the *miraculous character* of the event is a matter which reason and the common sense of men, in view of all the circumstances of the case, is competent to decide.

We proceed to the consideration of the remaining question.

III. *What does a miracle* PROVE ?

What the value and significance of it? What place shall we assign it in the scale of evidence, and what weight allow it? Does it, in fact, prove anything; if so, what? If it were once of value, at the time of its occurrence, has it not lost its evidential force in the lapse of time, so as to be no longer of service, but rather even to hang, a mere dead weight, on the system that is compelled to carry it? These are questions of much moment, and the present age is called to meet them fully and fearlessly.

There can be no question that there has been, of late, a marked and increasing tendency, on the part of the cultivated, and especially the scientific, mind of the age, to look with less favor than formerly upon the external evidences of Christianity, and particularly to disparage the evidence from miracles. It is contended by many that Christianity carries its own evidence with it, in the simplicity and purity of its doctrine, and in its power to elevate the character and reform the life. This intrinsic and internal is the *real* evidence, we are told,—all that it needs. Thus Coleridge, who even goes so far as emphatically to protest against bringing miracles to prove a religious truth, the belief of which should be voluntary and not compulsory with the understanding. In the same strain, Mr. Newman, in his Phases of Faith, maintains that external testimony should not be allowed to overrule the internal convictions of the mind, and that no moral truth ought to be received in mere obedience to a miracle of sense. Of those who would thus discard almost entirely the external evidences of Christianity, and the evidential force of miracles, some are among the zealous supporters of the Christian doctrine, in its purest form, while others belong to an entirely different class. The rationalistic theologians of Germany, as represented by Wegscheider, De Wette, and others of that school, take the same view; while, of the Lutheran school, Döderlein hesitates not to affirm that the truth of the doctrine does not depend on the miracles, but we must be convinced of it on its internal evidence. Others again, as Paulus and Rosenmüller, while they would allow a certain degree of evidential force to miracles on their first occurrence, deny that they are of any value at the present day.

Of those, on the other hand, who would still assign to the argument from miracles an important place among the evidences of Christianity, there are many who, instead of making this the sole criterion of a divine revelation, would receive it as of force only in connection with the internal evidence derived from the moral character of the doctrine, and of the general system, in confirmation of which the miracles were wrought. This is, in fact, the view now, perhaps, more generally held by orthodox divines. It is the position maintained by Dr. Samuel Clarke, in his Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion; and also by Trench, in his Notes on Miracles. Similar is the view of Neander, who holds that miracles are not to be considered by themselves, as isolated facts, but only as a part of, and in close connection with, the whole self-revelation of God to man.[1]

As regards the general value and use of miracles, it is difficult to see how, in any other way, a revelation of divine truth could, in the first instance, be substantiated. In no other way, so far as we can see, can the *divine authority* of the teachers who proclaim such a revelation, be established.

He who comes with a claim to divine commission and authority, is bound to make good that claim, — to show good and sufficient reason for it, — else we shall not believe him. We have a right to demand such evidence. How, then, shall he show this? What shall be his token or sign, that God speaks in and through him, and that the doctrine which he sets forth is not only truth, but truth divinely uttered? If now miracles are wrought in attestation of that authority; if there is manifestly some divine interposition in the case, and not merely a pretence of such interposition;

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[1] So *Gerhard* (as cited by Trench), who even goes so far as to say: "miracula sunt doctrinae tessarae, ac sigilla; quemadmodum igitur sigillum a literis avulsum nihil probat, ita quoque miracula sine doctrinâ nihil valent." — Loc. Theol., loc. 23. c. 11.

once satisfied of that fact, and that there is no deception in the matter, we cannot but admit that the claim is sustained. The man comes before us with a claim to divine authority, and appeals to the divine omnipotence to establish that claim. The appeal is sustained. Works which are beyond the course of nature, and which only divine power can accomplish, are wrought in confirmation of the claim, and of the doctrine. It cannot be that God would interpose in behalf of imposition and a lie. It must be, therefore, that the man and the doctrine are, as they profess to be, from God.

Now this is precisely the case with the first teachers of Christianity. They appeal to their works, as evidence of their divine commission and authority. So did Christ himself. He expressly places his claim on this very ground. "If I bear witness of myself, my witness is not true. There is another that beareth witness of me," etc. "Ye sent unto John, and he bare witness unto the truth." "But I have greater witness than that of John; for the *works* which the Father hath given me to finish, the same works that I do, bear witness of me, that the Father hath sent me."[1] And again, on another occasion: "If I do not the *works* of my Father, believe me not. But if I do, *though ye believe not me, believe the works;* that ye may know and believe that the Father is in me, and I in him."[2] Accordingly we find the Jews themselves acknowledging the justness and force of this principle. "Rabbi," says Nicodemus, "we know that thou art a teacher come from God; for no man can do these miracles that thou doest, except God be with him."[3] "And many of the people believed on him, and said, When Christ cometh, *will he do more miracles* than these which this man hath done?"[4] So the man who was restored to sight: "Why herein is a marvellous thing, that ye know not from whence he is, and yet he hath opened mine eyes. Now we know that God heareth not sinners," etc. *If this man were not of God, he could do nothing.*"[5]

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[1] John v. 31–33, 36.

[2] John x. 37, 38.

[3] John iii. 2.

[4] John vii. 31.

[5] John ix. 30, 31, 33.

In like manner the disciples, wherever they proclaim the doctrines of the new religion, are able to appeal to the miraculous powers conferred upon them, as evidences of their divine commission; and that not without success. Great fear, we are told, falls upon all, in view of the signs and wonders wrought by them, and multitudes, in consequence, are added to the number of believers. Now this is precisely what we might expect in such a case; nor is it possible to see how, in any other way, the claims of the new system, and of its teachers, could possibly have been substantiated.

It is objected by those who would place the evidence of the Christian system upon the internal rather than the external ground, that the miracles of our Saviour and his apostles cannot possibly be regarded as substantiating their doctrine, or even their mission, inasmuch as miracles are sometimes wrought by bad men and deceivers, and if we admit the force of the argument in the one case we must also in the other. We fear that too much has been conceded to the enemies of Christianity by some of its best friends and advocates, in respect to this matter. Thus, Olshausen[1] affirms "that the scriptures assert not merely holy, but also evil, power to be the cause of miracles," and that in fact "two series of miracles extend throughout scripture history"; and refers us in proof to the works of the Egyptian magicians as opposed to those of Moses, and also to the signs and wonders which false prophets, and which antichrists are said in scripture to be able to make use of, in order to deceive, if possible, the very elect. And we regret to find that so able and judicious a writer as Trench, whose Notes on Miracles blend so happily the true scholarly with the true Christian spirit, has but too closely followed the less reliable German in this view. "This fact," he says, "that the kingdom of lies has its wonders no less than the kingdom of truth, would alone be sufficient to convince us that miracles cannot be appealed to absolutely and simply, in proof of the doctrine which the worker of them proclaims;

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[1] Com. Vol. I. p. 336.

and God's word expressly declares the same (Deut. xii. 1 –5). A miracle does not prove the truth of a doctrine, or the divine mission of him that brings it to pass."[1]

But *do* the scriptures present two indepedent lines of miracles running parallel with each other, — those of the kingdom of light, and those of the opposite kingdom, — as Olshausen affirms, and as Trench seems to admit? Do they anywhere assert, or imply, that evil power is ever the efficient producing cause of a miracle; or that the wonders performed by evil men are *real* miracles? These wonders are examples of the mirabile; but are they examples of the miraculum? They were wrought for the *purpose of convincing*, and hence not improperly are termed σημεῖα; but were they real miracles, or only false and deceptive appearances? Now it seems to us they are clearly of the latter sort; and that this is plainly implied in the scripture narratives. The works of the magicians are expressly ascribed to the power of their *enchantments*. They were the tricks of conjurers, hardly more remarkable than many of the wonders performed at this day by the skilful jugglers of Egypt and India. As to the signs wrought by the false prophets, the same may be said; while those of antichrist are expressly termed *false* or *lying* wonders.[2] There is no evidence that any of these were miracles, save in appearance only; nor is there any evidence from scripture that either bad men or devils have in any instance performed miracles, except as mere instruments of divine power.[3]

Indeed, Olshausen himself, in his commentary on the passage last referred to (2 Thess. ii. 9), expressly admits that "as satan himself is a created being, although a *mighty* one, the wonders also which he performs through antichrist can be merely *mirabilia*, not true *miracula*." They are "mere magical monstrosities."[1] And in the passage first cited, as if by way of furnishing the correction of his own previous remarks, he adds in a foot-note on the very same page,[2] that "In so far as evil is merely a product of created powers, we may say that the satanic miracles are merely apparent miracles; since miracles can be performed by God's omnipotence alone." What then becomes of the assertion that, according to the scriptures "not only holy but also evil power" is "the cause of miracles?" What becomes of the "*two* series of miracles" extending through scripture history? And what becomes of the objection to the evidential force of the miracles of Christianity? Is a real miracle of no force to confirm a true message, because a sham miracle may be wrought to confirm a false one?[3]

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[1] Notes on Miracles, p. 27.

[2] 2 Thess. ii. 9.

[3] The question whether miracles are ever wrought by any other than divine power, is very ably discussed by Dr Taylor, of New Haven, in opposition to the views of Dr. Chalmers, who takes the ground that it is presumption to affirm that Omnipotence alone can set aside the laws of nature. (See Revealed Theology, Vol. III. p. 396, *et seq.*)

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[1] Com., Vol. V. p. 331. [2] Com., Vol. I. p. 336.

[3] The position of Olshausen is singularly inconsistent as regards the true force of the Christian miracles. "It cannot possibly," he thinks, "be the end of miracles *to establish the truth of any affirmation.* In the sense of scripture, too, this is by no means the intention of miracles. It was only the people that so viewed them, because they allowed themselves to be influenced in their judgment by the impression of power, or the excitement of the senses; for which reasons they attached themselves to false prophets as willingly, and even more so, than to the true. The Saviour, therefore, severely rebukes this eagerness for sensible miracles (John iv. 48). But when our Lord, in other places (e. g. John x. 25; xiv. 10, 11), calls for faith in his works, and connects them with his dignity and his holy office, *this is not done in order to establish the truth of his declarations;* truth, as such rather proclaims itself irresistably to impressible minds by its inward nature." For what then, we ask, were the miracles intended? "They were intended rather," replies Olshausen, "to *demonstrate his character as a divine messenger*, for those in whom the impression of the truth, conveyed by the spirit and language of the Saviour had wrought its effect." But in establishing his character as a divine *messenger*, do they not also establish the truth of his *message;* and is not this really what they were designed to do? For what purpose is it sought to establish the character of the messenger, but to make good the truth of the message. *To establish the truth of his declarations is the very thing in view.* Even Olshausen himself admits this, in the sentences which almost immediately follow. In the human teacher, he says, though truth may greatly predominate, error cannot be conceived as wholly excluded. God, therefore, invested particular individuals, as his instruments, with higher powers, in order to distinguish them from merely human teachers, "and to *accredit them before mankind* as infallible instruments of the Holy Spirit, as *teachers of absolute truth.*" Hence, he continues, "the gift of miracles is one of the necessary characteristics of true prophets, and serves to witness their superior character, — to prove that they areto be regarded as teachers and guides of the faith, and *free from all error.*"

More consistent, though we think not more correct, is the position of Trench, who regards these wonders of satan and his false prophets as real miracles, and therefore as weakening, if not destroying, the *prima facie* evidence of the true miracles in favor of the mission or the divine doctrine of him who performs them. Yet in answer to the question, of what use then are the real miracles, he affirms,[1] that when once the doctrince has *proved* itself to be true and good by commending itself to the conscience, the miracles may then come in as "the credentials for the bearer of that good word; signs that he has a special mission for the realization of the purposes of God in regard of humanity."

Even as thus employed do not the true miracles prove both the message and the man to be from God? But is this the whole force of the scripture miracles? Must the doctrine first be proved true before the miracles wrought in connection with it can be admitted as evidence in the case? Is it not enough that there is in the doctrine or system *nothing manifestly untrue*, or *inconsistent* with the supposition that it is from God? This granted, do not the miracles come in with a positive force to substantiate the claim that man and message are divinely sent? We would, by no means, contend that the miracle is to be taken in proof of the doctrine *entirely irrespective* of the character of that doctrine; nor, on the other hand, would we require the doctrine first to prove itself, and then to prove the miracle, which, in turn, once proved, is to come in as collateral security for the very foundation on which itself reposes.

We would by no means disparage or undervalue the internal evidence of Christianity. It is good in its place. To the humble, believing disciple it comes with convincing power. It is to him the best and strongest of all evidences that the system is from God. To one already convinced,

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Precisely so. In other words, to *establish the truth of their declarations and doctrines*. The truth is, the object or end of the miracle is twofold, — primarily to attest the divine character and claims of the messenger; ultimately and chiefly, to attest the truth of his doctrine; the *former* with a view to, and for the sake of, the *latter*.

[1] Notes on Miracles, p. 28.

or disposed to be convinced, the purity of the life and of the teachings of Jesus present an irresistible argument. But it is not to such persons solely or chiefly that the evidences of Christianity address themselves. It is not the humble believer that needs to be convinced; he is convinced already. It is the unbeliever, — the man who is disposed to set aside the whole thing as unreasonable or unworthy of his notice, and to regard the teachers of the new faith as either credulous fools or cunning imposters,—that needs to be convinced that this despised faith and these despised men are indeed from God. Now, with him the internal evidence is not so likely to be conclusive. In many cases it will make no impression on him whatever. He will see no force in the argument, because not himself in a moral condition to be affected by such considerations. But let the earth open at his feet, let the prison walls be shaken, and the iron gates touched by no visible hand fly back upon their hinges, let voices from heaven be heard, let sick men be healed by a passing shadow, blind men restored to sight by a touch, dead men to life by a word; let these things, and such as these, be done in his immediate presence, and in direct attestation of the divine authority of the new system, and from such evidence the stoutest sceptic will find it difficult to turn away.

But it will perhaps be replied, the unbelieving scribe and Pharisee *did* turn away from precisely these arguments and evidences in the time of Christ and his disciples, unconvinced even by the signs and wonders. True, they did so. But if they rejected Christianity as thus attested, *how much more* would they have despised and set aside its claims had it come to them with no such manifestation of authority. What impression would the purity of the character and the elevation of the doctrines of Jesus have made upon a prejudiced and unbelieving age, had there been no other evidences of his divine mission?

And here we shall be met by the objection, that miracles are adapted to a rude and primitive age, such as that in which Christianity, for example, made its first entrance into the world; an age of great credulity and of comparative intellectual barbarism; that while they are fitted to impress with awe the minds of men in such an age, they are quite out of place in the argument for Christianity in this nineteenth century. This is the key-note of the essay of Mr. Powell, to which we have so frequently referred. Rosenmüller and Paulus also take the view that miracles were of evidential force only at the time when they were wrought, but have long ceased to be so. Similar is the view of Schliermacher who regards them as, in fact, not miracles at all, except as relatively to the apprehensions of the age.

In opposition to all such views, we maintain that those miraculous manifestations of divine power which accompanied the promulgation of Christianity were adapted not to the age, as such, in distinction from other ages of the world, not to any one age as being more or less enlightened, more or less credulous, more or less barbarous, but rather to any age that is to receive a new dispensation or revelation from God. They are adapted not to one age more than another, save as one, and not another, is to receive that revelation. No increase of intellectual or scientific culture would have obviated the necessity for such divine interpositions, at any time, when a new system of religious truth was to be inaugurated, and its claims to divine authority established. Indeed, if a new revelation were now to be made, miracles would be necessary to establish it; nothing short of this would convince the very men who reject as unnecessary all external evidences of Christianity, that God was in very deed speaking unto them. The distinction now made between the adaptation of miracles to the promulgation of a new system of divine truth, and their adaptation to the particular age in which that system happens to be first promulgated, is a distinction too obvious to require argument, but one which is wholly overlooked by the class of objectors to whom we refer.

But, it will be said, even though miracles may have been useful at the first introduction of a new dispensation, it by no means follows that they are useful now. In one sense this is true. Christianity once established as a system from

God, there is no further need of miracles to establish it. The working of miracles may thenceforth be dispensed with, unless some new occasion shall arise demanding new interpositions of divine power. But it does not follow that the miracles which *have* been wrought, and on which the system depends for confirmation, are no longer of use. They are as much needed now as they ever were. There is no need of new piers to support the dome of St. Peter's. Pier-building, so far as St. Peter's is concerned, may be discontinued when once the dome is up, and securely held in its place. It does not follow, however, that the piers already there are no longer needed, and may as well be taken down. This again is a distinction which certain minds of a "comprehensive capacity" fail to apprehend. Because *miracles* are no longer needed in support of Christianity, they conclude that the *argument* from miracles is no longer of use.

Our argument thus far proceeds on the supposition that the direct and special object of a miracle is to establish the divine commission and authority of him who performs it, and so of the truth or system which he propounds. For this it is needed. This it accomplishes, and was designed to accomplish. But does it prove anything more than this? Does it also prove the inspiration, or divine authorship of the writings that record it? We think not. Miracles are wrought, not to prove the writings infallible, and of divine origin, but to substantiate the claims of the teacher or prophet to be a man sent from God, and clothed with divine authority. They prove the inspiration of the *man*, and not of the *books* or writings, as such. The miracles of Jesus prove his inspirarion and authority, and that of his doctrine, but they do not prove the inspiration or divine authority of the Gospel of Matthew, or of the Gospel of Luke. If the problem be to establish the inspiration of the sacred scriptures, the argument from miracles is not in place, unless it can be shown that miracles were wrought with a view to establish that inspiration; but we know of no miracle wrought for this purpose. If, however, the problem be to establish the divine authority of Moses or of Paul, as speaking by commission from God, and so to confirm their teaching or message, the argument from miracles is in place, and of force; for it does prove that. And such is the use which Christ and his apostles actually make of the miracles which they perform, as shown in the passages cited above. They constantly appeal to them as evidence of their own divine commission: "Though ye believe not me, believe the works."[1] "Go and tell John what things ye have seen," said Christ.[2] To the same effect is the language of Paul to the Hebrews: "God also *bearing them witness* both with signs and wonders, and with diverse miracles."[3]

To the question, then: What does a miracle prove? we answer, it proves the divine commission of him who performs it, and so the divine authority of his doctrine. It proves Christianity to be a system of divine origin, a religion sent from God. It is the broad seal of Heaven stamped upon the system, as its credentials. This was the intention; this the accomplished fact.

ARTICLE V.

HUMANENESS OF THE MOSAIC CODE.

BY REV. J. B. SEWALL, LYNN, MASS.

WE have frequently heard the Mosaic laws alluded to as barbarous and bloody, and belonging to an age of like character; adapted, perhaps, to the degree of civilization, or rather uncivilization, which then prevailed, but altogether unfit for the present advanced stage of enlightenment and progress. An instance of this kind within our knowledge led us recently to examine the books of Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy, with this point in view. We took note as we went along, both of the features which give rise to the charge, and the opposite, the laws which must be marked as lenient and humane. We have embodied in the following remarks our results, at which we confess, on our own part, no little surprise.

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[1] John x. 38.
[2] Luke vii. 28.
[3] Heb ii. 4.

We note it as wonderful, at the outset, that a code of laws, if barbarous and bloody, should have made a people so highly civilized as the Hebrews certainly became, whatever we may say of the age. A barbarous and bloody code should belong to a barbarous and bloody people, and make them only the more so. We should expect such a people to be rude, warlike, cruel, idolatrous, and perhaps cannibal. We should think of them together with the old Assyrians, the later Scythians, and the still later fierce tribes which overbore the power of the Roman Empire, and later still, with the inhabitants of New Zealand and the South Sea Islands. We should think of them certainly as little advanced in the arts and customs of civilization. We cannot think thus, however, of the Hebrews. They were far from being a people of this character. From the day of their exodus from Egypt, a nation of emancipated slaves, they occupied the level of an unparalleled civilization. They were widely distinguished at once from the barbarous nations around them. The degraded and barbarous practices of Egypt, Edom, Assyria, Syria, and the tribes of Canaan, they were wonderfully exempt from. Observe the difference, e. g. between them and the Egyptians, a close similarity to whom, on the contrary, we should have expected. It was remarkable. The Egyptians had a civilization which, it is true, was very high in certain respects. It had arts and learning, for Moses had profited by them, being learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians. The monuments likewise which stand to this day on the banks of the Nile witness the same. It had the science of astronomy, and had carried it as far as was possible, perhaps, without the aid of modern instruments; also the science of chemistry in certainly greater degree than modern civilization had attained before the time of Lord Bacon. It had geometry too, and a grand massive architecture, as the Pyramids and temples like those at Karnac, to this day, again, testify. But this civilization was idolatrous, monarchical, sensual, and depraved. Their best worship was that of Osiris and Isis, while their common and general religion descended to the worship of animals, vegetables, and the basest of reptiles.[1] Men are as they worship. We have therefore a state of society in Ancient Egypt never exceeded, and probably not reached, by Greece or Rome in their days of lowest vice and depravity. The reading of what modern discovery has revealed in the inscriptions of the ancient ruins, carries us back to a civilization which, however surprisingly advanced in certain respects, was yet a civilization of ambition, lust of power and domain, blood-thirst, superstition, and sensuality.

The Hebrew civilization, on the other hand, born suddenly and brought to a great degree of maturity in the wilderness of Sinai, if wanting in the science and art of Egypt, was yet possessed remarkably of other elements, and those which enter more into the constitution of true civilization, — are more the essence of civilization. It was a civilization of high principles and practices in the customs and relations of life. Justice, generosity, and mercy were eminent traits. Its religion was spiritual; its worship that of the true and living God. Men are as they worship, again. It was also a free, republican civilization of the purest form. If we estimate therefore a civilization by the refinement of a people's manners and feelings, and their remoteness from savage grossness, which we maintain is a truer standard of estimation than improvement in arts and learning, we must rank the Hebrew civilization in the first order, and far before the Egyptian. We would say that a moral civilization, if we can so distinguish, is higher than an intellectual. Christian civilization is higher than any infidel or pagan civilization the world ever saw. England would not wish to change her civilization for that of Greece or Rome in their most exalted days. And this was just the difference between

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[1] Posterity might repeat the saying which had formerly been applied to the sacred animals of the same country: That in Egypt it was less difficult to find a god than a man. — Gibbon, Decl. and Fall of Rom. Emp., Vol. III. p. 524.

Hebrew and Egyptian civilization. How could such a civilization have arisen under, or together with, a barbarous and bloody code of laws?

This code, too, was evidently designed to subserve the ends of good government, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the maintenance of the public peace and welfare. We may instance the judicial arrangements.[1] Judges were to be appointed in all the gates who should judge the people with just judgment. They were neither to wrest judgment, respect persons, nor take gifts. Also the laws regarding murder, theft, and personal injuries. A code of laws designed, — and we must say efficiently, and therefore, to a degree at least, wisely designed, — to preserve equity, quiet, prosperity, and good habits, can hardly be called a barbarous one.

This code, again, is the immediate source and groundwork of the laws and institutions of our own country. And could we say that our laws and institutions sprang from a barbarous source? They were modelled immediately upon the Mosaic. Sometimes it was more than this. One of our colonies adopted as an article of its organization, that it would be ordered in its civil affairs, as well as in its ecclesiastical, by those rules which the scripture holds forth, referring principally to the Mosaic laws. In another, "in the absence of special laws, the rules of the word of God were to be followed."[2] We feel that there is not a freer, more enlightened, and efficient government in the world than our own, and that civil, political, religious, and educational blessings are nowhere enjoyed as in this land. And just that which gives us this superiority over all other lands we owe to that framework of law created in the wilderness of Sinai nearly fifteen hundred years before Christ.

One remarkable difference between the Mosaic and every other civil code, is the fact that it provides that the commission of wrong shall be remembered not merely as offence against law, but as sin against God. No other code of laws does this. It is sufficient with other codes that offence be convicted as against law. They end with conveying the knowledge of themselves and their penalties. They have no other respect to command than for themselves. They reach and care for men in no other relations than in those among themselves, and to the domain of nature over which they have authority. What shall we say, then, of a code of laws bearing in its own structure a remembrance of the Source of all law and authority, and providing that men, in obeying its statutes, shall think of the Supreme King and Lawgiver, and of themselves, in breaking them, as committing offence first of all against Him? Who can call that a barbarous code which in this way powerfully tends to promote the purest and highest culture and discipline of men?

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[1] Deut. xvi. 18 – 20.

[2] Palfrey, Hist. New Eng., Vol. I. pp. 529, 536,

It is another thing worthy of notice, that, notwithstanding the early period, and the fact that while the only modes of government then known and prevalent were despotic, save the patriarchal, that of Moses was republican. His code was a republican code. His own account of the constitution of the government in republican form — how he arranged the offices and ordered the elections — is to be found in the first chapter of Deuteronomy. And by the way, from the thirteenth verse of this chapter a sermon was preached, we are told, at the organization of the government of the Connecticut Colony, deducing these three very republican doctrines: 1. The choice of public magistrates belongs unto the people by God's own allowance. 2. The privilege of election which belongs to the people must not be exercised according to their humors, but according to the blessed will of God. 3. They who have power to appoint officers and magistrates, it is in their power also to set the bounds and limitations of the power and place unto which they call them.[1]

To us, who are familiar with, and accustomed to, republican institutions, this seems the best and simplest method in which to proceed, — the first which would occur to the mind of a wise and honest legislator. But in that day, when such institutions were unheard of, when all existing governments had arisen by pure force, and were maintained by virtue of force, it was a different thing. It bore the character of a new invention, an untried theory. There were no examples from which to copy; none to tell how it would succeed, nor to point out what were the dangers to be avoided, and what the parts to be strengthened. But remarking the simple fact that it was republican, it cannot be called a barbarous code. Republicanism is a political form belonging only to the highest degree of enlightenment and individual culture. The political form of barbarism is monarchical despotism. Whenever despotism is saddled upon an enlightened society, we feel that it is out of place. We sympathize with the revolutionary efforts as right, which are made to throw it off.

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[1] Palfrey, Vol. I. pp. 536, 537.

Beforehand, then, we have reason to believe that the Mosaic code is far from being of the low order and character some would have us think.

The particular ground upon which the charge that "the Mosaic code is barbarous and bloody" is made to rest, is the stringency of its laws and the severity of its penalties.

Of the stringency of its laws, it is only worth while to remark, that it is not a mark of barbarism, but of the opposite. Barbarism is lax. It allows great license in every direction of crime. It is rigorous only in certain forms and on certain occasions. A man may murder, only not within a certain limit of persons, and he may be severely punished, provided those interested in seeing him punished have sufficient power to do it. He may lie, cheat, and steal, and it is a virtue, provided he is not found out. He may gratify his lust to any extent, and it is no crime, provided he has ability to face a father's, brother's, or husband's vengeance. Stringency is a mark of high moral tone, — high sense and high aim in morals and discipline. As a general and pervading trait, it can belong only to a state of civilization and enlightenment.

As for its penalties, they were not so much more severe than the modern, if at all, and far less so than the penalties of the most enlightened and civilized parts of the world have been within two centuries of the present time. And if modern penalties are less severe, it remains to be proved whether they have not crossed the true line which divides severity from laxity, and whether the Mosaic do not lie upon that line; or if the Mosaic were severer than would now be required, whether, under those peculiar circumstances, that severity was not what true humanity and a high civilization required.

The penalties of the Mosaic code were these: scourging, never more than forty stripes; rendering like for like, eye for eye, etc.; restitution with compensation; and death, first, by the sword; second, by stoning. Here, the charge of severity can rest only against the death-penalty. The others are eminently moderate. The death-penalty was inflicted in five classes of crimes:[1] 1. Murder. 2. Treason. 3. Man-stealing. 4. Gross sensuality. 5. Perverse filial disobedience. Under the head of treason are classed witchcraft, sorcery, false prophesying, idolatry, and proselytism to idolatry. Such was their character, as will be readily seen when it is remembered that the Hebrew Republic was also a Theocracy; and it was the reason, manifestly, of their being followed by the death-penalty. Gross sensuality, likewise, includes several different forms of the crime of adultery. The whole number of instances in which the death-penalty was attached, under these five classes, was fourteen.[2] It is stated[3] that less than two hundred years since, the number of crimes to which the death-penalty was attached in England was one hundred and forty-eight. Under the State law of Massachusetts, the death-penalty is laid only upon the crime of murder. Under the United States laws, it is laid upon murder, treason, piracy, arson, and felony, — five classes to the five of the Mosaic laws, or if instances, five instances to the fourteen of the Mosaic. It is, however, to be remembered that, in many cases, what our laws made, not long since, capital offences, are now punishable with imprisonment for life, a penalty substituted for death, and meant to be the same, so far as society is concerned.

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[1] Professor Wines, Commentaries on the Laws of the Ancient Hebrews, makes but four classes, omitting man-stealing. See page 263.

[2] Professor Wines says, page 263, seventeen. After examination and re-examination, we can only make fourteen.

[3] Wines, p. 263.

One of the methods of the death-penalty, stoning, the most common, was certainly severer than the modern hanging, shooting, and beheading. Slaying by the sword, however, the penalty of murder, and taking the place of our hanging in great degree, is less severe. Stoning was the penalty of all the other crimes, for which we have substituted hanging, fines, and imprisonment with hard labor. We think that, in the two cases, Lev. xx. 14 and xxi. 9, where apparently punishment by burning alive was commanded, Bush shows good reason for believing that it means rather the burning of the bodies after the criminals had been put to death by stoning. If there was more severity than we should use now, and if, especially in some cases, there was a severity which we do not deem necessary now, there are two things to be remembered. First, there were special reasons for severity. These reasons are to be found in the peculiar relations in which the Hebrews stood, as a nation, to God, and the purpose which God had in view in those relations. Their republican government, as we have already seen, was also a monarchy in which God was the king. It was so by a formal covenant on the part of the people at Mt. Sinai. Certain crimes, therefore, — among them idolatry, witchcraft, and false prophesying, — were treason. Certain things became state crimes, from the nature of the case, which are now only immoralities, and which we can see very well might then necessarily be severely punished. While now they may be left to themselves, so far as legislation is concerned.

The purpose in view was a restoration, or to use lord Bacon's word, an instauration, of a knowledge of the character and will of God in the world; the instauration of true religion in place of debasing and soul-destroying idolatry, and a revelation of will and truth for all coming time. The true idea of sin and unholiness, and of the nature, authority, and government of God, was to be imparted. To this end, it is easy to see how necessary a strict, justly severe, and unbending code of laws was. Israel could not be made a peculiar people, separate from the nations about them, and marked as a people of the true God, and knowing and obeying his will, unless these strait, strong walls had been erected each side of the way. We should find that more regulations were required, and other and severer penalties, to bring children up from the streets and dens of the city into civilized society, through the House of Refuge and Reform School, than in the already well regulated Christian family. In such a family, the strong, dark lock-up for children would be an unheard of thing; it would be a barbarous thing; but in our Industrial Schools, where the pupils are children snatched from the streets of our cities, from every low den and miserable place, and already educated and well practised in vice and crime, it is both a fact and a necessity. Under different circumstances different means have to be used to the same end.

Second. While the Mosaic code did employ the death penalty more frequently than we do now, yet it never employed or allowed cruelty in punishment; and this is worthy of especial notice. Cruelty in punishment is always to be found among barbarous and uncivilized nations; and it certainly has existed, in fearful degree, in every civilization besides the Hebrew and Christian; e.g. in the Egyptian, Assyrian, Grecian, and Roman; and indeed in that Christian civilization of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries which had lost everything Christian but the name. The Hebrew law did not know imprisonment, nor exile, nor banishment, nor confiscation of goods, nor rack, wheel, knout, flaying, nor burying alive. It was a stranger to the punishment of solitary confinement in the dark cell, which crazes the brain of the prisoner in a few short hours (infinitely more cruel than death, and allowed to-day in England if not in America), and even the shower-bath, made a terrible instrument of torture at Singsing (if we may believe recent newspaper accounts), the pillory, and the stocks. Its penalties were only four — those which we have named: scourging (thirty-nine stripes — "forty save one" — given in thirteen blows, with a scourge having three lashes), giving like for like, "eye for eye," restitution with compensation, and death.

It must be acknowledged, even here, that the Mosaic code does not compare unfavorably with the codes of our modern enlightened civilization.

We turn now to the positive proofs of the opposite character we have noted.

We take, first, the following passage: "When ye reap the harvest of your land, thou shalt not wholly reap the corners of thy field, neither shalt thou gather the gleanings of thy harvests. And thou shalt not glean thy vineyard, neither shalt thou gather every grape of thy vineyard; thou shalt leave them for the poor and stranger. I am the Lord your God."[1] How beautifully it makes every man thoughtful, while gathering his harvests, of the poor man and stranger who may be his neighbor. He must leave the corners of his field unreaped, and the gleanings must not be gathered, nor every grape be carefully plucked from the vine. "Thou shalt leave them for the poor and stranger." It brought every man into immediate relation with the poor and stranger. It made him feel individually responsible for them. He could never throw off that responsibility upon any general provision, or any common body. It kept the heart open. It cherished thoughtful and generous sentiments. We can hardly conceive that a man could grow up under it a niggard and miser.

To this add all the provisions for the poor. It was said that the poor were never to cease out of the land.[1] Therefore "Thou shalt open thine hand wide unto thy brother, to thy poor, and to thy needy, in thy land." Every man was to have a care for his neighbor, and if he saw him "waxing poor and falling into decay,"—getting behindhand, we should say—he was, by law, to relieve him,[1] even though he were a stranger, not a Hebrew. No interest money was to be taken of such an one, nor any increase, i. e. no payment, in any kind, over and above the return of the amount or quantity loaned. How could law any better prevent the grinding and oppression of the poor? By one regulation of the Mosaic code,[2] a poor man was permitted to sell himself, for a time, to his more favored brother Hebrew. But in doing this, he was carefully guarded and enfolded by the protecting power of the law. In the first place, he was not to be made to serve as a bond servant. He was expressly to be regarded as one whose services were hired, and rather as a guest-friend than a servant. He was, then, not to be ruled with rigor. And, in the next place,[3] if he served six years, in the seventh he was to "go out free for nothing," he and all his; i. e. he could not be kept in servitude for any amount of indebtedness above six years, and any indebtedness which he could not solve by six years' labor should be forgiven. And, still further, he was not then to go out empty: "And when thou sendest him out from thee, ... thou shalt furnish him liberally out of thy flock and out of thy floor, and out of thy wine-press; of that wherewith the Lord thy God hath blessed thee thou shalt give unto him." Unless he came forward of himself, voluntarily, and, from love to his chosen master, declared that he would be his servant always, it was impossible that he should be held beyond the seventh year. Although perhaps our system of provision for the poor through almshouses, benevolent associations, and special appropriations is as good as in our circumstances we can have, and is humanely designed and administered, and it is meant that everything which a generous humanity could dictate shall be done, yet with what superiority, and how much more beautifully, the humanity of the Mosaic provisions shines out!

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[1] Lev. xix. 9, 10.

[2] Deut. xv. 11.

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[1] Lev. xxv. 35–37.

[2] Lev. xxv. 39.

[3] Deut. xv. 12, 13; Ex. xxi. 2.

After every forty-ninth year occurred "the jubilee year," which was remarkable in these respects — and here, again, the humanity of the code surprisingly appears: all land which had been disposed of, reverted to its original owner; so that no man could be permanently deprived of a possession in the soil (the feudal system, and that evil which exists to-day in Great Britain to such degree under the system of primogeniture, could never have existed under the Mosaic law); and every creditor gave a release to his debtor; and if the debtor was a poor man, the release was perpetual. How much finer this last than our crude system, in which a general bankrupt law is called for from time to time, or some act of insolvency (radendum tabularum) by which poor creditors, as well as rich, are ground under the stone of injustice!

A law of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts allows pawn-brokerage. It sets no limit, and makes no provision with regard to it, except a fine for carrying it on without a license. In Massachusetts, therefore, the poor man who is compelled to pawn his watch, article of clothing, furniture, precious heirloom, or keepsake, is at the mercy of the broker for the best bargain he can make; and it generally turns out that the article is lost for a tithe of its value. Our other system of pledges is by attachments, mortgages, and bonds, under which, in failure of redemption, the law knows no mercy, and is always in favor of the creditor — never of the debtor. It takes houses and lands; and not long since it took household goods, and, if that were not enough, the person too. And as it now is, it is doubtful whether the provision which exempts a certain value of property and certain articles from attachment for debt is more for the honest poor man or the rascally swindler. Set, now, in contrast with this, the Mosaic law. Pledges might be taken; but certain articles, for instance the upper and nether millstones, and the widow's raiment, might not be taken.[2] But

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[1] Lev. xxv.

[2] Deut. xxiv. 6, 10.

when pledges were taken of the poor, they were not to be kept over night. When it was raiment, especially, it was to be returned before sundown. It was a law in favor of the poor.

Still further, with reference to the poor, the fatherless, and the stranger, as if the provisions already noticed were not enough, every third year there was to be a tithing of the increase for them,[1] "that they may eat within thy gates and be filled." The stranger, also, was not to be vexed or oppressed,[2] as was the custom among the surrounding and barbarous nations, the remains of which custom are to be found in modern legislation in the form of passports, imposts, prohibitions, and all disabilities laid upon the foreigner and his traffic. For the stranger, fatherless, and widow, also,[3] the forgotten sheaf in the field was not returned for, and the olive-tree was not beaten the second time.

Notice, now, the law with regard to the servant.[4] Any cruel treatment, by which bodily injury was occasioned, by which for instance an eye was destroyed or a tooth broken out, set a servant immediately free. If any servant ran away from his master, the presumption was, that he had reason for running away. At least, he was evidently discontented, and would be unhappy if returned. Accordingly, the law was: "Thou shalt not deliver unto his master the servant which is escaped from his master unto thee: he shall dwell with thee, even among you, in that place which he shall choose in one of thy gates, where it liketh him best. Thou shalt not oppress him."[5] This is the fugitive slave law of the Hebrew code. Which is most like a "barbarous and bloody code," this, or that law, not yet erased from our national statute book, which requires that the wretched fugitive — having run the gauntlet of blood-hounds and hunters, lying still by day and making the best of his long, weary way by night, guided by the north star — be seized and returned to his master, in hopeless bondage?

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[1] Deut. xxvi. 12.

[2] Ex. xxii. 22.

[3] Deut. xxiv. 19.

[4] Ex. xxi. 26, 27.

[5] Deut. xxiii. 15, 16.

A characteristic of Hebraism was its many festival seasons. It was eminently a joyous religion. The Mosaic code provided for three principal festival seasons, and two lesser ones, during the year. They were seasons when families were reunited. In one of them, especially the Passover, friends and old acquaintance from all parts of the land met together at Jerusalem. They were times of great rejoicing. Notice, now, the beauty of the law: "Thou shalt rejoice in thy feast, thou, and thy son, and thy daughter, and thy man-servant, and thy maid-servant, and the Levite, the stranger, and the fatherless, and the widow that are within thy gates."[1]

Sometimes suffering is occasioned by thoughtlessness regarding the payment of services as soon as rendered, or by consulting one's own convenience instead of the just dues, and perhaps necessities, of the laborer. A poor woman carries home a piece of needlework; with the pay for it she is expecting to obtain a supper and the next day's supply for a half-dozen starving mouths. The payment is deferred, and the woman returns herself disappointed, and to bear disappointment to her hungry children. This, probably, is often the case in our larger towns and cities. And we have no law reaching it. Our legislators would probably think it impossible to remedy [illegible]. In the Hebrew code, however, it was not found impossible. In that wonderfully thoughtful and far-reaching body of laws is this: "Thou shalt not oppress an hired servant that is poor and needy. . . . . . At his day [when it is due] thou shalt give him his hire, neither shall the sun go down upon it; for he is poor, and setteth his heart upon it: lest he cry against thee unto the Lord, and it be sin unto thee."[2] In what statute-book in all the world is to be found that fine touch of humanity?

There is something in the military statutes of the Mosaic code, also, worthy of notice. In our military levies, all male persons between certain ages are liable to be drafted in case of war. The exceptions are, persons of certain occupation, as physicians, judges, and clergymen, and those in any way maimed or deformed. This looks, it will be seen, to the well-being of the country, — the necessities of those at home and the efficiency of the army in the field. The Mosaic code looks to this, and more. It has almost a paternal feeling and care for the people. It excepts, as we may readily suppose, the classes corresponding to these, and also every person who might be building a house, or have planted a vineyard, or who had newly married a wife; persons whose interests and feelings were especially engaged at home, and to whom it would be an individual loss or peculiar trial to leave. He who had newly married a wife, in any case, was to remain at home one year, — a law which with us would apply to officers and soldiers of the army, and navy, to seamen, and to that large number in mercantile pursuits who are mostly engaged in travelling, and would effect an important and beneficial change to their families.[1] There was an especial provision in the military laws of the Mosaic code, also, for the protection and kind treatment of women and children of captured cities. Such a law, made nearly fifteen hundred years before Christ, is in remarkable contrast with practices of nations in war not yet extinct. The campaigns of all modern civilized nations tell us terrible tales upon this point.

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[1] Deut. xvi. 14.

[2] Deut. xxiv. 14, 15.

It is familiarly known that the roofs of oriental houses were flat, and used for the entertainment of company, and for sleeping purposes. The humane and kindly law, therefore, requires that a battlement shall be placed around them: "That thou bring not blood," it says, "upon thine house, if any man fall from thence.[2]"

We must notice, finally, the laws relating to animals and birds. They are unexampled: "Thou shalt not muzzle the ox when he treadeth out the corn."[3] "Thou shalt not see thy brother's ox or his sheep go astray, and hide thyself from them; thou shalt in any case bring them again unto thy brother."[4] "Thou shalt not see thy brother's ass or his ox fall down by the way, and hide thyself from them; thou shalt surely help him to lift them up again."[1] What fine touches of humanity are these! None but the Mosaic code exhibits anything like them. "If a bird's nest chance to be before thee, ... and the dam sitting upon the young, ... thou shalt not take the dam with the young; thou shalt in anywise let the dam go, and take the young to thee."[2] If the birds were to be taken at all, and they were sometimes, for sacrifice, by those who were too poor to afford even a dove or a turtle-pigeon, the young were not to be deprived of the mother bird, for they might be starved. It was more merciful to leave the mother, who would still have her mate and be engaged in rearing another brood, and take the young!

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[1] Deut. xx. 5–7.

[2] Deut. xxii. 8.

[3] Deut. xxv. 4.

[4] Deut. xxii. 1–3.

And here is a still more beautiful provision. In every seventh year, — a year of peculiar festivity and rejoicing, a year of freedom to bond-servants, release to the debtor, and restoration of families to each other, — the whole land was to lie still and rest; and what it brought forth spontaneously was to be left, that the poor of the people might eat, "and what they leave, the beasts of the field shall eat!"[3] A seventh year jubilee to the wild animals, the birds, and insects in all the land, as well as to its human inhabitants! Set over against this our own laws, which allow us to wage unceasing war upon every poor animal, bird, or insect we imagine to feed upon the fruits of our gardens and fields! It is pleasant to know, however, there is a law in Massachusetts, and we suppose a similar one in each of the States, against killing or destroying any of some eight or nine species of birds at any time.

These are the illustrations of the humaneness of the Mosaic code we have noted. We add to them the fact that it forbids sentiments of hatred and revenge,[4] and enjoins the forgetting of injuries, the cultivation of mutual love, and showing kindness even to enemies; that indeed the command, " Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," which we associate generally with the beneficent teachings of our Saviour, is but a quotation from the Mosaic law,[1] and we think the case is established. The Mosaic, so far from being a " barbarous and bloody code," surpassess beyond comparison every other code of the world ever known, for delicate, thoughtful, and beneficent humaneness.

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[1] Deut. xxii. 4.
[2] Deut. xxii. 6.
[3] Ex. xxiii. 10, 11.
[4] Lev. xix. 17, 18.

ARTICLE VI.

THE SACRAMENT OF THE LORD'S SUPPER.

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As there were two sacraments divinely ordained under the Old Testament dispensation, so Christ instituted also two for his church. The sacraments of the New Testament, *Christian Baptism* and the *Lord's Supper*, perfectly correspond to those of the Old Testament, *Circumcision* and *the Passover.* Though differing in form, they were designed to express the same fundamental ideas. To prove the relation between the rite of circumcision and Christian baptism is not the object of the present investigation. We take it for granted, and start with the proposition, that the Lord's supper, instituted at the celebration of the passover, sustains the same relation to the passover, that the sacrament of Christian baptism does to the Old Testament sacrament of circumcision.

To obtain a right apprehension of the significance and design of the Lord's supper, we must, therefore, first enter into an investigation of the significance and design of the passover. While the previously ordained rite of circumcision had given to the Israelites a general title to the blessings of the covenant, the passover, afterwards instituted in connection with their deliverance from the Egyptian bondage, was evidently designed to point them to the foundation of that covenant, i. e. to the atonement for the guilt incurred by sin. Its first celebration was enjoined upon the Israelites as a condition of their deliverance. They were to make thereby an actual confession of their death-deserving guilt, and at the same time express their believing trust that the destroying angel would spare them, on account of the blood of the sacrificial lamb. As the deliverance from the Egyptian servitude was to be to God's people a type of their deliverance from the bondage and guilt of sin, so the slaying of that sacrificial lamb without blemish was a type of the atoning death of the sinless lamb of God on Calvary, by which alone guilty man can be spared. But the typical significance of the passover did not end there. The slaying of the lamb was not sufficient; its atoning efficacy lay in its being appropriated by them as food; it was to be eaten and assimilated, and this appropriation and assimilation was to typify the personal and vital union between Christ, the true atoning sacrifice and the recipient of the atonement. The eating of the bread and the drinking of the wine in the new covenant is, as was also the eating of the lamb in the Old Testament, a divinely ordained sign and pledge of our appropriation of the atonement, — a *sign* or expression on *our* part, a *pledge* on the part of *God.*

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[1] Lev. xix. 18.

To these general preliminary remarks, which we shall in the contemplation of the institution of the Lord's supper further explain and substantiate, we add one more. In the entire Old Testament the deliverance from Egypt appears as the highest proof of the covenanted grace. Even when God first entered into a covenant with Abraham, the promise of the deliverance of his descendants from a servitude of over three hundred years, was the type and pledge of the mercy and grace implied in the promise of the Messiah. The Lord appealed to this event, when he gave to the Israelites the decalogue (Exod. xx. 2.), when he reproved them, or gave them new commandments and new promises. Indeed, with the prophets, the hope of the coming Messianic salvation appears ever under the image of the exodus from Egypt (Amos ix. 14; Hos. ix. 10; xi. 1–11; Mic. vi. 3, 4; viii. 15; Isai. xi. 11, 15). Before eating of the paschal lamb, the following significant words were to be uttered: "*This is the passover of the Lord.*" What else could this mean than "This is a *pledge* and *condition* of your deliverance; he who eats of this lamb will be spared?" Thus, the paschal lamb was to the Israelites, not only a *remembrance* of their deliverance from Egypt, but, at the same time, a *confession* of their need of salvation, and of their faith in it, and in consequence of it a *pledge* and *seal*, that the atoning and pardoning grace would be bestowed upon them. This significance the passover retained until the true paschal lamb appeared, thus typifying the personal appropriation of the benefits of the atonement made by Christ.

Let us now proceed to the examination of the circumstances attending the institution of the Lord's supper. It was instituted in immediate connection with the eating of the paschal lamb. It is not necessary to enter into a detailed description of all the complicated ceremonies which were observed, according to the Rabbinic writings, for they do not agree among themselves, and we know not how many of them were observed, and it is not probable that our Lord bound himself to those superstitious customs, adopted without divine authority. It is sufficient that we mention the principal points observed during the paschal meal, to which the evangelists themselves refer. 1. At the beginning of the meal, the head of the family, taking a cup of wine (*red* wine mixed with a little water was used, giving it the color of blood), pronounced the benediction, "Blessed art thou, O Lord, who hast created the fruit of the vine," drank first of it, passed it around to all sitting at the table, who also drank. Of this first cup Luke evidently speaks (chap. xxii. 17). 2. Then followed the eating of bitter herbs dipped in vinegar or salt water, as a remembrance of the bitterness their fathers suffered in Egypt. Then the festive viands were served up, among which was a dish of spiced sauce, called *charoset*, into which the guests dipped their bread. To this part of the feast seems to refer what is narrated by Matthew (chap. xxvi. 21–25). During the drinking of the first cup the history of the first passover was related, and its significance explained. Psalms cxiii. and cxiv. were read, and the second cup was passed round. 3. Immediately after this began the meal proper. The head of the family took two unleavened, round, and thin cakes, broke one of them, laid the broken pieces upon the unbroken cake, and pronounced the benediction, "Blessed art thou, O Lord, that thou bringest forth bread from the earth." After this they ate of the lamb, and of the other viands. Then they drank of the *third* cup, called the "cup of blessing," while they sang Psalms cxv.–cxviii. Afterward they drank of the *fourth* cup, singing Psalms cxxix.–cxxxvi., then followed the *fifth* and last cup, which closed the festival. The question now is, whether our Lord observed all the usual ceremonies of the passover (including the third cup), and whether he broke the bread *once more*, after the drinking of the third cup, in order to institute the eucharist of the New Testament; or whether at the customary breaking of the bread he instituted the New Testament sacrament in place of the old one, and instead of using the words, "This is the bread of misery, which our fathers ate in Egypt" (which words God never ordained), with reference to the positive precept in Exodus xxii. 27, "It is the sacrifice of the Lord's passover" (for which the significant words were often substituted, "this is the *body* of the Lord's passover"), he said: "This is *my* body," thereby declaring that they should no longer eat of the paschal lamb as a remembrance of their deliverance from Egypt, but that he instituted the bread as a symbol of his body (typified by the paschal lamb), which is now to be given to procure the spiritual deliverance and eternal salvation for his people. We give the latter view decidedly the preference, and it is confirmed by the account of Luke and Paul, according to which the cup was taken *after* supper. For doubtless it was the *third* cup — "the cup of blessing" — which Jesus gave to his disciples as the cup of the new testament, and which was given only after the lamb had been entirely consumed, and no one was allowed to eat any more. After Christ had spoken of the shed blood, the disciples ceased drinking of the fourth and fifth cup; hence the usual ceremonies after the third cup were dispensed with, and his sublime farewell discourses, recorded by John, were substituted, which very likely continued till night.

Why our Lord did not make the flesh and blood of the paschal lamb (which properly typified his atoning sacrifice) the symbols of his broken body and shed blood, but bread and wine, may easily be conceived. We are thereby taught, 1. That in the new covenant all typical sacrifices of animals were to cease. Even the Jewish rabbins seemed to anticipate this, when they said: "When the Messiah shall have appeared as a priest after the order of Melchisedec, all sacrifices of animals will cease, and the offering of bread and wine only will remain." 2. That our Lord's supper is neither a repetition of the once offered atoning sacrifice of Christ, nor a carnal eating of the flesh of his broken body — as the Roman Catholic teaches — but an appropriation of the merits of Christ's death, and therefore a spiritual union with the living Christ. Besides, bread and wine constituted a part of the paschal supper, and fully answered to the significance of the sacrament of the new covenant. As the red wine strikingly represents Christ's blood, shed for the remission of our sins, so bread — this universal and indispensable food for man — is the most appropriate symbol of his flesh, of which our Lord said: "*I will give it for the life of the world*" (John vi. 51). For, as the common bread satisfies the wants of our mortal bodies, and gives them life and strength, so Christ's atoning death — his broken body — alone can give life to, and satisfy the longings of, the immortal soul after salvation.

We are now prepared to consider the words of the institution. Three evangelists and the apostle Paul give us an account of these words. If we collate them, they read as follows: "*Take, eat* (Matthew, Mark, and Paul); "*this is my body*" (Matthew, Mark, Luke, and Paul); "*which is* *given for you*" (Luke); "*which is broken for you*" (Paul); "*this do in remembrance of me*" (Luke and Paul); "*drink ye all of it*" (Matthew); "*this is my blood of the new testament*" (Matthew and Mark); "*this cup is the new testament in my blood*" (Luke and Paul); "*which is shed for many, for the remission of sins*" (Matthew); Mark omits "*for the remission of sins;*" Luke says: "*which is shed for you,*" (Paul omits this clause entirely); "*this do ye in remembrance of me*" (Paul). How are we to explain this verbal discrepancy? It seems to us one of the strongest proofs against the theory of verbal dictation by the Holy Spirit. For, if ever the inspired penmen wrote what the Holy Spirit verbally dictated to them, it is certainly to be expected with reference to the solemn words uttered by our Lord at the institution of this sacrament of the new covenant. The advocates of the verbal inspiration suppose that our Lord *probably* repeated these words several times, and now turning to John, and then to Peter, changed or modified them, as the occasion required it. But this interpretation appears to us as forced as it is unnecessary. As omissions and abridgments of events and discourses by one or the other of the sacred penmen are by no means opposed to the idea of inspiration, it is much more natural to suppose the Holy Spirit did not verbally dictate the words, but recalled only to their memory their true meaning. They do not contradict each other in the manner of quoting or stating the words. This difference serves only to explain their true meaning fully, and is attributable to the guidance of the Holy Spirit.

That the Lord's supper, designed as it is to unite all true believers, has been the occasion of the most violent contention, is certainly one of the saddest phenomena in the history of the Christian church. Nowhere does the apple of discord produce a sadder impression than when it is thrown upon the table of love. The only consoling reflection is the truth that the blessing of the Lord's supper does not altogether depend upon the interpretation of the words of its institution. With reference to these we have to place ourselves at the disciples' point of view, and ask: How did *they* likely understand their master? An infidel author is not entirly wrong, when he says, with more impartiality than many dogmatists: "To the authors of the Gospels the bread in the eucharist *was* the body of Christ; but had they been asked whether the bread had been transubstantiated, they would have denied it; had they been told that Christ's body was eaten *in* or *under* the form of bread, they would not have understood it; had it been said that the bread and wine only signify his flesh and blood, they would not have been satisfied." O, that all Christians would agree with each other in realizing that in partaking of this sacrament, they have not only a symbolic representation of Christ's death, but a real communication of Christ himself to them in all the fulness of his redeeming love!

Let us, then, in their successive order, carefully examine the words, by which our Saviour instituted this sacrament. "TAKE, EAT." As bread is the symbol of Christ's body, given for us as an atoning sacrifice, so the eating of it is the symbol of the reception and appropriation of that atonement. Recognizing in his disciples all his future followers, our Lord says, "TAKE, EAT," thereby designating the act of eating as a moral act, dependent upon individual volition.

"THIS IS." The copula "IS" has been the occasion of the most violent and tedious theological controversies. Without laying any stress upon the fact that, in the Aramaean language spoken no doubt by our Lord at the institution of the eucharist, no copula was used, and the mode of connecting subject and predicate in the Greek and Hebrew, and indeed in many of the modern languages, often denotes mere comparison (Gen. xi. 12; Exod. xii. 11; Luke xii. 1; John xv. 1; Galat. iv. 24; Hebr. x. 20, etc.); we shall, in the first place, thoroughly examine the various meanings that the laws of language admit of being attached to the copula "IS."

I. The Lutheran Church no less than the Roman Catholic Church ascribed to the copula "IS" the meaning of real *substantiality;* — although the Lutheran Church, respecting the *mode* of this subsistency, differs as much from the Roman Church as those who give the copula only a figurative meaning. The Roman Church asserts that Christ distinctly predicated of the bread he gave his disciples that *it is* his body, and hence draws the inference that it has ceased *to be bread.* But as this inference directly contradicts 1 Cor. x. 16, and xi. 26–28; where "the bread which we break," is still called bread, so it is equally inconceivable that our Lord meant the *elements distributed* by him to be the *material parts* of his living body. Such a misapprehension, on the part of the disciples, was not only impossible at the institution of this sacrament, but our Lord obviated it with reference to every subquent celebration by adding, "which is given or broken for you." Upon this strictly literal interpretation the Roman Church based the monstrous doctrines: 1. That the priest has the power, by means of the consecrating formula, to change the substance of bread and wine into the substance of the flesh and blood of Christ, although the accidents, such as color, form, taste, etc., remain unchanged. 2. That the body and blood of Christ once presented upon the cross, is again presented by the priest in the mass, under the form of wine, as a propitiatory sacrifice. 3. That the body of our Lord is indissolubly joined to the consecrated *hostia* (wafer), and is therefore to be worshipped independently of the sacramental act.

Luther protested against the Roman doctrine of transubstantiation, but he likewise contended that the copula "IS" must be understood to express *real substantiality*, with this difference, that Christ predicates of the subject — the bread, — that IT IS his body; hence, what he gave his disciples, *was at the same time* bread and a part of his body; or, in other words, the flesh and blood of Christ are substantially present in the eucharist (although in a glorified state), and are received by the communicants *in*, *with*, or *under* the form of bread and wine. This is called consubstantiation. But this interpretation, viewed from a purely exegetical point of view, is untenable, because it involves a direct self-contradiction; for we cannot predicate of a definite concrete that it *is another* definite concrete, unless we mentally supply the words, "at the same time" (the bread is at the same time bread, and at the same time the body of Christ), which the text does not justify, and whereby the strictly literal sense is relinquished. It is to be observed that the point in question is not whether the thesis, that Christ is substantially present in the bread and wine, is reconcilable with reason, but whether *we are at liberty, according to the laws of language, to attribute this meaning to the words of Christ.* It is an indisputable law of language that the copula *never* declares two different existing things as identical; and this law is recognized even by those who maintain that the elements are at the same time bread and wine and the flesh and blood of Christ, assuming only a juxta-position of the bread and flesh, instead of an identity of both. To assert that the copula must be presumed to identify the subject and predicate, where no metaphor is used, is entirely illogical. The premise of this conclusion is not only not proved, but refuted by an indisputable law of thought and language. We see, then, that, apart from any other reasons, the copula "IS," in its grammatical and logical relation, cannot be understood in its strictly literal meaning; hence the question arises:

II. What other meaning can be attached to the copula "IS?" It may have a twofold meaning: 1. This (bread) *signifies* my body — is a symbol of my broken body, of my propitiatory death. This is Zuingli's interpretation. 2. This (bread) *is a pledge of my body*, that is, he who receives the elements, receives with them all the blessings flowing from my atoning death. This is Calvin's interpretation. Both these interpretations lead us to a closer investigation of the question: What are we to understand under the predicate? "MY BODY?" That our Lord did not mean his *natural* body, as the Roman Church teaches, has already been shown. The Lutheran dogma is that our Lord speaks here of his body with reference to its glorified state. But this interpretation is not compatible with the additional remark, "which is given for you" (Luke), or "which is broken for you"

(Paul). For, 1. The foundation of the remission of sins is Christ's sacrificial death, not the reception of his glorified body. 2. Jesus could not have spoken of his glorified body, because it was not yet glorified, and the disciples could not have understood him. The idea of a twofold material body of Christ — the one sitting opposite them unchanged, the other being eaten by them — would certainly have been new and strange to them; and had the words of our Lord produced this idea in their minds, they would, doubtless, have expressed their astonishment, and, as it was their custom, asked their master for an explanation. 3. If our Lord spoke of his glorified body, how are we to understand the words: "For this is my blood of the new testament, which is shed for many, for the remission of sins"? What are we to understand under the glorified blood? The glorified blood would certainly be included in the glorified body. Hence, we see that the expression, "this is my body," cannot mean the literal body of Christ, whether glorified or natural, and we are forced to take the words in a figurative sense?

In order to arrive at the correct understanding of the words in question, we must return once more to the consideration of the passover. As the paschal lamb was only a type of "the lamb of God," and the "*passing over*" of the destroying angel a type of the New Testament pardon and justification; so Christ, contrasting himself with the paschal lamb, declares his death to be *the true* and *real atoning sacrifice*. That he would give his life as a ransom for the sins of the world, that he would be violently put to death, and that his death would be a sacrificial death, — this our Lord had often intimated to his disciples, but they were not able fully to comprehend it; and it is an undeniable fact that during his public ministry he did not make the doctrine of his propitiatory death as prominent as his disciples did after his death and ascension, for in the apostolic writings it is presented to us as the centre of the entire doctrinal system of Christianity. But now the time had come when he desired clearly and solemnly to disclose to them the fundamental doctrine of the atonement through his death, and to impress it indelibly not only upon their own minds, but upon the minds of those who through their preaching would believe in him unto the end of the world. As the disciples well understood the typical significance of the passover, he declared at its last celebration his death to be the fulfilment of what was typified by the paschal lamb. He showed them how his body was to be delivered unto death once for all.

The key for the correct understanding of *the nature and design of the Lord's supper is, therefore, to be found in the atonement through the death of Christ.* With reference to this, our Lord declares: "This is my body, which is given for you;" that is, "This (bread) signifies my body" (typified by the paschal lamb). The bread is a symbol of Christ, the bread of life (John vi. 35, 41); the broken bread is a symbol of the broken body of Christ, and the wine is a symbol of the shed blood of Christ. The act of eating and drinking is a symbolic act, signifying *that the participation in an atonement can be obtained only through an essential union with the atoning sacrifice.* This idea lay typically in the passover, for the death of the paschal lamb was not sufficient; the slain lamb *was to be eaten.* The life of every Israelite was spared at the first celebration of the passover; and at every subsequent celebration he was made a partaker of all the blessings of the covenant by means *of eating and assimilating the lamb*, whose blood was shed for his atonement. As the death of the paschal lamb was only a type of Christ's death, so the eating of the lamb was a type of that vital union which is to subsist between the believer and Christ who died for him. The typical lamb entered, as material food, into a mere bodily union with the Israelite; Christ, the true propitiatory sacrifice, on the other hand, enters into a *personal, spiritual union with the soul*, so that he becomes our head, and we his members. That our Lord does not mean, by the partaking of bread and wine, an actual eating and drinking of his glorified blood and body, but an appropriation of the benefits of the atonement made by him, he had declared before, in his discourse at Capernaum (John vi). But as the passover was not only a type of the future redemption through Christ, but a *pledge* and *seal* of the mercy of the old covenant; so *bread* and *wine* are not merely symbols of Christ's broken body and shed blood, but the *pledges* and *seals* of the New Testament redemption, which consists in a *personal and vital union with Christ*, who is the sacrifice for our sins, and the food for our souls. Just as in the words, "*It* (the lamb) *is the Lord's passover*" (Exod. xii. 11), the typical redemption is figuratively predicated of the lamb; so Christ predicates of his body, figuratively represented by bread and wine, the actual or real deliverance from sin through his death. The lamb was not the act of the Lord's passing over, but its pledge and seal; so bread and wine are not Christ's real body and blood, but a *pledge* and *seal* of the atonement made by his death. This interpretation is confirmed by the inspired authority of Luke and Paul, who explain the words, "this is my blood of the New Testament," by the phrase, "*This is the New Testament in my blood*" (i. e. the New Testament made *in* and *by* my blood, and not through the blood of the Old Testament sacrifices).

In accordance with this view, our Lord, by uttering the words, "this is my body which is broken for you," doubtless intended to say, "*This* is the new covenant, made *in* or *by* my broken body, and not by the body of the Old Testament sacrifices." Considering, as we do, the Lord's supper as well as the passover *an act of covenant*, it ought, nevertheless, to be remembered that both ordinances were designed for those only *who were already in a covenant relation with God, and desired a continual renewal of this covenant.* As he only could partake of the passover who, through circumcision, had been received into the old covenant; so in the new covenant, the communicant ought not only to have become a member of Christ's body, the church, by the rite of baptism, but also *by faith.* Even the words "*for you*," imply that the proper recipients of this sacrament are such as trust in the death of Christ, as the only ground of their reconciliation with God. The Lord's supper is a pledge and seal of the new covenant only to those who are actually in covenant relation with God. As regards those who have never been convicted of their sins; or those who *once* knew Christ as their Redeemer, but are now apostatized, and yet presume to partake of the Lord's supper with an impenitent and unbelieving heart; these receive nothing else but bread and wine; and the apostle declares that he who does not discern the Lord's body from common food, is guilty of the body and blood of the Lord (1 Cor. xi. 27, 29); that is, that he, so long as he remains in this impenitent state, is adding to his innumerable sins the guilt of rejecting the only atoning sacrifice, and therefore "eateth and drinketh damnation to himself;" just as to him who rejects the gospel, that which is, in itself, a savor of life unto life, becomes a savor of death unto death.

We have now seen that the sacrament of the Lord's supper *is not only a symbolic rite, commemorative of Christ's sacrificial death, but a covenant act by which we appropriate to ourselves all the benefits of the atonement, and enter into a personal, vital union with Christ* (which union is symbolically represented by eating bread and drinking wine). The partaking of the Lord's supper ought not merely to remind us of Christ, as though he was *absent;* for then it would only be a means of strengthening the Christian's faith and of renewing his love to him, and would have no greater importance than the hearing of a gospel sermon. According to this view, it would not be Christ meeting the believer and imparting himself to him, but the believer ascending, as it were, into heaven, and bringing Christ down. Hence faith would not merely be the condition but the *cause* of the union with Christ, and thus the ordinance would lose the nature and design of a *sacrament.*

This is the defective side of Zuingli's view, and *Luther* was right in objecting to it. But he went to the other extreme, when he asserted that the sacramental union with Christ takes place independently of the co-operation of man, and only by means of the consecrating words, once uttered by Christ, and repeated in the consecration of the elements.

This view ascribes to the elements the power of imparting to the communicant Christ's body and blood the moment he receives them, whether he be a believer or not. According to this view, the reception of Christ's body and blood is unconditionally made the consequence of the partaking of the consecrated elements; but whether the eating of Christ's body and blood will have a saving or damning effect, is said to depend upon the character of the communicant. The truth lies between Zuingli's and Luther's views, and is to be deduced from the proposition, that Christ manifests his actual presence in the eucharist, and imparts his own self to the communicant.

This presence and self-communication of Christ does not consist, as Luther taught, *in that he unites himself bodily with the bread and wine, and thus communicates his body to our body; but in that Christ, as the God-man, reveals and communicates himself to the believing soul in all his life-giving and saving power;* just as the vine reproduces itself, its sap, juice, and strength, in every branch. It is true, that this self-communication is not confined to the sacrament, but begins as soon as we enter into a personal, vital union with Christ, through regeneration, and continues so long as we do not drive him out by hardness of heart and wilful apostasy. The difference between other manifestations of Christ's presence in the soul, and that which takes place by means of this sacrament, is simply this, that in the latter the Lord *guarantees* to the believing communicant a new communication of his full salvation so *positively* that we dare not doubt it. As the Israelite received a new assurance of the blessings of the covenant as often as he appropriated to himself the typical sacrifice by eating of the paschal lamb; — so the personal and vital union, into which true believers have entered with Christ by appropriating the benefits of his propitiatory death, is renewed, sealed, and strengthened as often as they partake of the emblems of his broken body and shed blood. The apostle Paul expresses the same idea, when he says: "The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ? The bread which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ?" (1 Cor. x. 16.) As there can be no appropriation of the merits of Christ's death, except through a personal and vital union with Christ, so there can be no other vital union with Christ, except through the appropriation of the benefits of his atonement. *The communion of the death of Christ and the personal, vital union with Christ, sustain a necessary reciprocal relation to each other.* This cardinal truth is the central idea of the doctrine of the Lord's supper. In the solemn moments of his last meal, which he introduced by some remarks concerning his impending bodily separation from his disciples, our Saviour intended to seal, by the sacrament, the personal, vital union, into which the believer enters with him by virtue of his atoning death and through faith.

This significance and design of the Lord's supper has not been sufficiently appreciated, as indeed all that the New Testament teaches us respecting the real, though spiritual, self-communication of Christ to the believer. Christ calls himself the vine, and the believers the branches: he says that "if a man love me, he will keep my words, and my Father will love him, and we will come unto him, and make our abode *with him*." "I am in the Father, and *ye in me, and I in you*." "He that eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, *dwelleth in me and I in him*." The apostle Paul, speaking of the same personal, vital union of the believer with the Son of God, says: "For we are members of his body, of his flesh, of his bones," etc. (Eph. v. 30–32). He says, as man and wife are one flesh, so the believer and Christ are one. In 1 Cor. vi. 15, 17 he says: "Know ye not that your bodies are the members of Christ? . . . . . But he that is joined unto the Lord is one spirit." Doubtless, the apostle intends to express more than a mere subjective union with Christ, when he says that "Christ dwells in your hearts by faith," that "no more he [Paul] lives, but Christ liveth in him," that "they are changed from glory to glory," that "their life is hid with Christ in God." This real, personal, and vital union of the believer with Christ is renewed, sealed, and strengthened at every celebration of the Lord's supper. This idea is beautifully expressed in the Palatinate Catechism, in the following words: "What does it mean to eat Christ's broken body, and drink his shed blood? It does not only mean to appropriate to ourselves, with believing hearts, the whole suffering and death of Christ, and thereby receive pardon of our sins and eternal life; but also *to give thanks through the Holy Spirit, who dwelleth both in Christ and in us, and by whom we are more and more united with his blessed body;* so that, though he is in heaven and we on earth, we are nevertheless flesh of his flesh, and bone of his bones, and are quickened and guided by one Spirit, as the members of our bodies are by the soul."

"THIS DO IN REMEMBRANCE OF ME." These words, which are recorded only by Luke and Paul, contain the command, from henceforth to substitute for the passover the celebration of this ordinance; and we clearly see that whatever objective influence, on the part of Christ, may be ascribed to this sacrament, it is, nevertheless, conditioned by the subjective act of the communicant. Those who speak so harshly and contemptuously against this sacrament as a *commemorative* rite of Christ's death, ought to consider that, according to the inspired testimony of Luke and Paul, Christ himself expressly and prominently makes the *commemoration* of his death a design of the sacrament; hence their severe censures fall back upon its Founder. On the other hand, however, we must not forget, that even in the Old Testament it has a deep meaning of reality, when God speaks of recording his name in any place, and says of that place to his people: "I will come unto thee, and will bless thee" (Exod. xx. 24). Thus, if we remember him truly, he will surely remember us by coming to us to bless us. The same idea is expressed by the declaration of the apostle Paul: "Ye do show the Lord's death." Those approaching the table of the Lord, show forth to one another, and to the world, that they have part in the atonement by the death of Christ, and in his life; and through them the testimony of the church is continued "till he come."

ARTICLE VII.

THE DIVINE DECREES.

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That God has decreed or "fore-ordained whatsoever comes to pass," is a doctrine which holds a conspicuous place in the history of dogmatic theology. It has been a prominent element in not a few of those great controversies which have agitated the church. Upon it, and the ethical and metaphysical problems intimately connected with it, has been expended much of the profoundest thought of every age. It has often been discussed with earnestness and eminent ability, though not always with Christian candor and charity. By many it has been defended on biblical and rational grounds, as one of the most fundamental doctrines of Christianity; by others it has been rejected as contrary to reason and scripture, and as having no place in the Christian system. Some have claimed for it the highest practical value, while others have insisted that, if true, it is a purely speculative doctrine, having no connection whatever with the practical duties of religion; and yet others have branded it as a false dogma, fraught with all manner of mischievous tendencies. It is a doctrine which can be easily misrepresented and caricatured; and which has often been rejected through sheer misapprehension and prejudice; while it is manifestly held, in its true spirit and substance, by many persons who sedulously exclude the formal statement of it from their creed. Indeed we are persuaded that not a few of its most vehement opposers might, by an unprejudiced inspection, find all the essential elements of this doctrine among their most cherished convictions of religious truth. We are willing, moreover, to admit that the formal rejection of the doctrine, and the prejudice entertained against it, are in part, at least, traceable to the infelicitous manner in which it has sometimes been represented and defended. There has not always been, on the part of its advocates, a judicious and discriminating use of terms, nor a sympathetic appreciation of the difficulties and objections with which, to most minds, the doctrine of divine decrees is environed. It has been made to wear a stern and forbidding aspect, which does not properly belong to it, and needlessly to assume an attitude of antagonism to certain other well-established truths.

It is earnestly hoped that the present discussion of this important doctrine may tend to abate prejudice and misunderstanding, and to promote that unity of faith which may reasonably be expected to characterize those who are taught by the same "Spirit of truth."

I. Statement of the Doctrine.

In stating what we believe to be the Calvinistic and true doctrine of divine decrees, we shall aim to distinguish it, on the one hand, from fatalism, and on the other, from Arminianism; from the views of those who pervert it, and from the views of those who reject it. It stands midway between the doctrine of necessity and the doctrine of contingency. It invests God with a universal sovereignty and dominion; but does not reduce the universe to a mere piece of complicated mechanism, moved alike, in all its parts, by the direct exertion of his omnipotent and resistless power.

In discussing this subject we encounter at every step the difficulties arising from the ambiguity and inexact use of language. Here the subtle boundary line between truth and error is easily obscured by a double-meaning word or phrase. We shall not, therefore, rely wholly upon any one formal statement or definition of the doctrine; but having given such a statement or definition, shall endeavor to elucidate it, and guard it from misapprehension.

By the doctrine of divine decrees we mean that, *God from eternity purposed or determined so to constitute and govern the universe as to make it certain that all events would take place precisely as they do take place.*

To indicate further the exact meaning of this statement, it is important to observe several things:

(a) The decrees of God are to be distinguished from his laws, statutes, edicts, and commands. The term "decree" is, in many respects, an unfortunate one to denote the thing intended. It is apt to suggest the idea of legal enactment and authoritative requirement. It is generally used, except by theologians, in this legal sense. It is often so used by the sacred writers. Hezekiah "published a decree" throughout all Israel, requiring the passover to be kept (2 Chron. xxx. 5). Cyrus "made a decree," commanding the rebuilding of the temple (Ezra vi. 3). "Caesar Augustus made a decree," requiring that the people throughout his empire should be taxed (Luke ii. 1). The Christians were accused of doing things "contrary to the decrees of Caesar," that is, contrary to his laws or edicts. But in theological discourse the word "decree" has a very different meaning. It is not a synonym of law, command, precept; but of plan, purpose, determination. When it is said that God decrees an event, it is not meant that he commands or requires it; but that he has a purpose respecting it, which renders its occurrence certain. An event may be commanded which is not decreed; and so an event may be decreed which is not commanded, but prohibited. It is important in treating the subject now under discussion not to overlook this distinction; and to remember that a divine decree is not a law, rendering the thing decreed obligatory on any body, but is a mental purpose or determination, which renders the thing purposed certain to exist.

(b) The decrees of God are to be distinguished from his wishes, desires, and preferences. A decree may involve a desire, or it may not. Much the same distinction exists here as was pointed out above between laws and decrees. God may desire what he does not decree, and may decree what he does not desire. His commands always imply that he sincerely wishes the thing commanded to be done; but his purposes or decrees imply no such wish. When therefore it is said, as it sometimes is, that God wills everything which he decrees, it must be remembered that when *will* is used as a synonym of *decree*, it is not then a synonym of *wish* or *desire*.

(c) The decrees of God are to be distinguished from his prescience or foreknowledge. Foreknowledge and decrees are intimately connected, but not identical, though in Greek the same word (*προγινώσκω*) is often used to denote both. Without raising the question, at this point of the discussion, which is the ground of the other, we wish distinctly to state that by divine decrees we mean something different from divine prescience. To say that God foreknows all things, is not the same as to say that God decrees all things, or purposes to do what secures the certainty of all things.

(d) The decrees of God are to be distinguished from his creative and administrative agency. There are those who hold that the purposes of God are themselves the producing cause of all events; that they have an inherent, causative energy; and that there is no intermediate act, on the part of God, between his purposes and the existence of the events purposed. But this theory we cannot adopt. All analogy is against it. Human purposes have no inherent power of causation. Man determines to do something, and then does it; and the act of doing is distinct from the determining purpose. May we not hence infer that it is so with God? And even aside from the analogical inference, may we not affirm that the divine purposes are not themselves the immediate efficient cause of the events to which they relate? Do they not long lie inoperative in the mind of God? Did not the purpose of creation exist untold ages before anything was created? And was not the creative act a distinct act put forth at that point of time to carry into effect the prior purpose? It is important then to distinguish, since there is ground for the distinction, between the purposes and the creative and providential agency of God. Our statement of the doctrine under discussion is, not that God so created and so governs the universe as to render it certain that all events will take place as they do; but that from eternity God so *purposed* to create and govern the universe, etc. "God *executeth* his decrees in the works of creation and providence."

(e) The decrees of God are not merely his purposes to *permit* events to take place as they do. Some hold that, with regard to the existence of sin, we can only affirm that the divine decrees extend to it in the sense that God determines to permit it, that is, not to prevent it. But this language does not seem to express the whole truth. God might, indeed, be said to decree the existence of whatever he could have prevented, but determined not to prevent. But the decrees of God are not mere negatives. They are purposes positively to do something, and to do that which renders certain the existence of all events, sin included.

(f.) It is important to notice, that according to our statement of the doctrine, the decrees of God relate *primarily* to his *own acts.* He purposed, from eternity, to do precisely as he has done, and as he is doing, and as he will do; that is, to create the universe as he did create it, and to govern it as he is governing it. But while the decrees of God relate thus primarily to his own acts, they relate *secondarily* to all events which follow directly or indirectly as a consequence of his acts, or have the ground of their certainty in his acts. And if all events come into existence, not necessarily, but certainly, in consequence of what God does (which we hold to be the case), and if God does as he does in consequence of his decrees, then may it be properly said that all events are decreed, and that God has purposed "whatsoever comes to pass."

(g.) It is important, further to observe, that our statement of the doctrine of decrees designedly discriminates between *certainty* and *necessity.* It does not affirm that God determined that all thinge *must* take place as they do, but that he determined that all things *will* take place as they do. It does not say that God purposed so to create and govern the universe as to render it *necessary* for all things to come into existence precisely as they do, but so to create and govern the universe, as to render it *certain* that all things would come into existence precisely as they actually do. No one can correctly understand the doctrine of the divine purposes who overlooks this most important distinction. It is sometimes said that this distinction is not real, but imaginary. But we most unhesitatingly and confidently affirm its reality. The mind easily and instantly distinguishes between the two ideas of certainty and necessity, whenever they are brought before it. Language abundantly recognizes this distinction. The terms and propositions employed to express certainty are not the same as those employed to express necessity. To say "he *will* do that," is not equivalent to saying "he *must* do that." To say "an event *certainly will* take place" is one thing; to say "an event *must necessarily* take place" is quite another thing. The difference is plain, and is acknowledged and acted upon, by all men in the common intercourse of life. Certainty has sometimes been called "moral, or philosophical necessity;" but President Edwards distinctly says, that it is "improperly so called." It is better to call it by its proper name. It is certainty, and nothing else; as distinguishable from necessity as from uncertainty. Accordingly in our statement of the doctrine of divine decrees, we are careful to use no terms which suggest the idea of necessity, but only those which imply the certainty of future events. And by the certainty of events we mean their simple futurition. We only affirm that, in consequence of what God has purposed to do, it is rendered certain that they *will be;* not that they *must be.* Respecting the *manner* in which they will be brought into existence, whether by a necessitating cause, or otherwise, we here make no affirmation. That point is not included in our statement, but is designedly and carefully excluded from it, and is left to be determined by its own proper evidence. So far as respects the doctrine of decrees, it is an open question whether events which are certain to take place, will, or will not, take place under the law of necessity or of physical causation. A rejector of the doctrine of decrees may believe in the literal and absolute necessity of all future events; while an advocate of the doctrine of decrees may consistently and firmly believe that many future events will not take place necessarily, that is, as the unavoidable effects of a necessitating cause.

We have dwelt upon this point, because it is by recognizing and emphasizing this manifest distinction between certainty and necessity that the Calvinistic doctrine of the divine purposes is distinguished from all forms of fatalism.

With these remarks, designed to indicate more clearly the meaning and scope of our formal statement of the doctrine under consideration, we now proceed to adduce some of the

II. Proofs of the Doctrine.

There are single arguments in favor of this doctrine which to our own mind, are, independently of the others, conclusive; and if the cumulative force of all those to be presented be not convincing to our readers, the fault will doubtless be in the defective mode of their presentation, rather than in their intrinsic weakness.

1. Our first argument is derived from the works of creation and providence, or from what God actually does. It is admitted by all theists that whatever God himself really does, he from eternity purposed, or predetermined to do. The only question then is one of fact, viz. Does God, by his creative and providential agency, secure the certainty of whatsoever comes to pass, or render it certain that all events will take place precisely as they do take place? No one will hesitate to answer this question in the affirmative, in respect to a very large class of events. The existence of whatsoever comes to pass as the immediate result of divine agency, without the intervening voluntary agency of any other being, is confessedly rendered certain by what God does. All events which are effects, of which God is the sole efficient cause, are rendered infallibly certain by the causative action of God, and so by the eternal decree which rendered certain that causative action. Here there is no room for any difference of opinion. But are the acts of moral beings, and the events which are the inevitable consequences of such acts, rendered certain by the divine agency? If so, then the doctrine of divine decrees, as we have stated it, is manifestly true. The question may be restricted to the voluntary acts of moral beings, since all events consequent on

such acts are rendered certain by their certainty. Does then God do what renders it certain that moral beings will always act precisely as they do act? In seeking for the true answer to this question, we observe:

(a) That the acts of moral beings are certain, whatever may be the cause or ground of that certainty. Take any past act, for example, Judas's betrayal of Christ. It certainly has taken place, and the event proves that it was certain to take place. Its *post*-certainty is no greater than its *ante*-certainty. We can conceive of a person looking forward eighteen hundred years, and beforehand knowing its future existence to be certain, just as a person can now look backward eighteen hundred years, and know that its past existence is certain. So of all moral acts which have been, or will be, put forth. The very supposition is, that they *will be*, and their certainty is a mere will be, a *simple futurition.*

(b) There must be some cause or ground of the certainty of moral acts, whether we can determine what it is, or not. If any event is certain, there is some reason why it is certain. This is as true of moral acts as of anything else. There certainly is a fact to be accounted for.

(c) It cannot be satisfactorily accounted for unless it be referred to the divine agency. It does not result from *chance*. No theist will say that moral acts *happen* to be certain; neither can the certainty of their occurrence be referred to any law of necessity. Mathematical truths are necessarily true. In the very nature of things, the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides of the triangle. But we cannot thus explain the certainty of moral actions. There is in the nature of things no necessity for their existence, and of course none for the certainty of their existence. What imaginable ground of their certainty, then, is there, if the divine agency be excluded? If what God does, does not render their existence certain, it is past our power to conjecture what does render it certain.

(d) We come, then, to the inquiry: What positive evidence is there that the creative and providential agency of God does render certain the moral acts of his moral creatures? For convenience, we will pursue the inquiry with reference to the moral actions of mankind only. It will, we suppose, be readily conceded by all, that the agency of God extends to the existence of all men, to every part of their natural constitution, and to all the circumstances of their life. He creates them. He gives to them their complex nature, so "fearfully and wonderfully made," with its material and immaterial properties. He appoints the time and place of their birth, and all the conditions under which their life begins, and all the circumstances in which they act from the beginning to the end of their career. Now, is there not in what is thus unhesitatingly referred to the agency of God, a ground of the certainty of the moral actions of men, or the reason why they act as they do? Had God given them a different nature, or caused them to be born at a different time, or in a different country, would not all their actions have been different from what they now are? Take any given moral act: A man takes up arms to aid in suppressing the great rebellion now existing in our country. Manifestly, if God had caused him to be born blind, or had given him a weak and puny or crippled body, he would never have performed that patriotic act. Who cannot look back and specify some particular providential event, but for which the whole after-course of his life would have been very different from what it has been? If, then, it be true that the present moral acts of men would not have been, if the divine agency towards them had not been just what it has been, are we not warranted in saying that it was the divine agency which rendered their present acts certain? Had God constituted and circumstanced them otherwise than he has, they had certainly acted otherwise than as they do; therefore, in constituting and circumstancing them as he has, did he not render it certain that they would act as they do? This view, we think, accords with the practical judgment of men in daily life, and with the conclusions of the ablest mental philosophers. When seeking for an explanation, or reason of human conduct, do not men ordinarily trace it to their circumstances and their constitutional propensities? Is it not a dictate of that common sense of mankind, which is the soundest philosophy, that men act as they do, because of the nature they possess, and the circumstances in which they act, including in circumstances all outward influences that affect them? Whatever extreme theory of the contingency of moral actions some persons may adopt, even they will betray, in their ordinary dealings with men, a practical conviction that the ground, or occasion of human conduct, — that which renders it certain, — is as stated above. This conclusion of the practical common sense of men, is the same which President Edwards so incontrovertibly established, and which he expressed by the formula that "the Will always is as the greatest apparent good," or "is always determined by the strongest motive." He did not mean that the will, in the literal and proper sense of the word, is *necessitated* to follow the strongest motive, but that it *certainly does.* He speaks, indeed, of the necessity of volitions being as they are, but he is careful to say that by their "necessity," he means "nothing different from their certainty."[1] His doctrine is, that there is in motives that which renders volitions certain. But by motives he does not mean exclusively objective motives. At least, he refers the strength of objective motives, in part, to the nature and state of the mind itself. Thus he says: "Things that exist in the view of the mind, have their strength, tendency, or advantage to move or excite the will, from many things appertaining to the nature and circumstances of the thing viewed, *the nature and circumstances of the mind that views,* and the degree and manner of its view."[2] He thus distinctly recognizes the combined influence of objective and subjective motives, as the ground of the "philosophical necessity," — that is, the certainty, of all volitions, or of all moral acts. But this motive-influence is what it is, because men are constituted and circumstanced as they are, and their constitution and circumstances are determined by the divine agency; and hence it is the divine agency which renders the moral acts of men certain. And if this point be established, then is the doctrine of decrees true; for whatever God actually does, he eternally purposed to do.

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[1] Inquiry, Part I. sec. 3.

[2] Ibid, Part I. sec. 2.

2. Our second argument is analogical, based on the intimate connection which subsists between the natural world, and the moral world. These two great departments of creation are not separate and independent systems, but are correlated and constituent parts of one whole; and together make a UNIVERSE. So close is this relationship, so perfect is the unity, that we are naturally led to presume that, if God has a place or purpose which extends to every thing included in the one department of the universe, it will extend to every thing included in the other department also. The very oneness of the system, renders it highly improbable that certainty would reign throughout one half of it, and contingency throughout the other half. And the more we study the intimate connection between the natural world and the moral; and observe how the two are interwoven and interdependent, and how each is sensitive to whatever affects the other, the stronger does this improbability become, and the more are we inclined either to deny that there are any divine decrees, or else to believe that they extend to all objects and events whatsoever.

And we reason all the more confidently, from the evidence of decrees in the natural world, to decrees in the moral world, from this circumstance, that these two great departments of the universe are not only intimately related, but the relation of the former to the latter, is that of the lower to the higher,—the inferior to the superior. Manifestly, the material creation is subordinate to, and has its final cause in, the spiritual creation. And can we believe that God would constitute and govern the lower and less important part of his universe according to a predetermined plan, and yet have no such plan in regard to the higher and more important part? Will he have everything arranged from the beginning, according to the counsel of his own will, touching "that which is least," and leave every thing relating to "that which is greatest," to caprice and contingency? If he has decrees which extend to the realm of matter, will he not much more have decrees extending to that nobler realm of mind for which all material existences were created, and are governed? What, then, is the truth in regard to the natural world? What is the testimony of all the physical sciences as to the doctrine of divine decrees? Do they not with one voice proclaim the universal reign of order, method, law? Do they not find throughout the entire field of their investigation in every object, however vast or however minute, traces of intelligent design or purpose? And as these natural sciences advance, how do the evidences of design, and of unity of design multiply in every direction! Nature is written all over with the proofs of the eternal purposes of its Creator. And now can we believe that he who acts so invariably according to a predetermined plan, in this subordinate part of his universe, acts without a plan, equally comphehensive in the higher spiritual realm? If the scaffolding exhibits such forethought and orderly arrangement, in its minutest details, is it not incredible that the Great Architect should have no definite and fixed purpose in regard to the building itself, including all the particulars from the foundation to the topmost stone?

The study of nature is thus fitted to commend to our faith the doctrine of the divine decrees. Justly has a living divine, discoursing on the "Oneness of God in Revelation and in Nature," observed: "And if there be one doctrine of religion, in theory, which a natural philosopher should embrace more generously than another, it is the doctrine of decrees. Law in nature — decree in religion. The two revolve around each other like twin stars. Both are developments of one truth — that God acts by plan and not by caprice."[1] And the same author appositely cites the following testimony of Hugh Miller as to the harmony of the "two revelations" touching this doctrine: "In looking abroad on that great history of life, of which the latter portions are recorded in the pages of revelation, and the earlier in the rocks, I feel the grasp of a doctrine first taught me by my Calvinistic catechism, at my mother's knee, tightening instead of relaxing. The decrees of God, I was told, 'are his eternal purpose, according to the counsel of his own will, whereby, for his own glory, he hath fore-ordained whatsoever comes to pass.' And what I was told early I still believe." Such testimony is alike honorable to the head and heart of him who made it.

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[1] Prof. A. Phelps's Convention Sermon. 1859.

3. Our next argument is derived from the character of God, particularly from his foreknowledge and benevolence.

(a) *Foreknowledge.* God from eternity foreknew all future events, or "whatsoever comes to pass." But a future event cannot be foreknown unless its existence is absolutely certain. It is a palpable contradiction to say that God can foreknow an event as certain which is uncertain. By the very supposition it is an event that will exist; of its future existence there is an absolute certainty. But if an event is certain, there must be some ground or cause of its certainty. Foreknowledge does not make it certain, but implies that it is already made certain. As President Edwards well says: "There must be a certainty in things themselves before they are certainly known, or (which is the same thing) known to be certain. For certainty of knowledge is nothing else but knowing, or discerning the certainty there is in the things themselves, which are known. Therefore there must be a certainty in things to be a ground of certainty of knowledge, and to render things capable of being known to be certain."[1] What, then, is it that renders certain the existence of foreknown events? We have already shown, as we think, that the certainty of future events can be accounted for in no possible way, except by referring it to the divine agency, and so ultimately to the divine decrees. Either all events are made certain by what God does, and so by what he decrees to do, or else they are uncertain, and if uncertain, then unknown, and if unknown, then is God destitute of foreknowledge.

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[1] Inquiry, Part II. sec. 12.

Thus, if it be granted that the divine foreknowledge extends to whatsoever comes to pass, the doctrine of divine decrees seems to be a legitimate and unavoidable conclusion. Foreknowledge is conditioned on, or founded in, decrees. In various ways have men endeavored to invalidate this simple argument. Some have taken the ground that it is, in the very nature of the case, impossible for the free moral acts of men to be known beforehand. This, it is said, no more implies any disparaging limitation of God's foreknowledge, than the fact that there are some things which are impossible to him — that is, which his power cannot accomplish — implies a disparaging limitation of his omnipotence. But the cases are by no means parallel. Things which God's power cannot accomplish are instantly seen to be, in their very nature, impossibilities; e. g. God cannot enclose a triangle within two straight lines, and cannot make two parallel lines meet, and cannot make twice two equal five. These are manifestly inherent impossibilities, and imply no defect of power on the part of God. We cannot conceive them to be done. But it is not so in regard to a knowledge of future moral acts. It is conceivable. There is nothing in their nature which renders them inherently unknowable; and ignorance of them implies a defect of knowledge inconsistent with our idea of an omniscient God. And what an idea does this theory give us of God, as creator and sovereign! He blindly exerts his creative and administrative power to bring into existence and sustain and govern a universe, in regard to all the most important and sublime issues of which he is beforehand utterly ignorant! But it is enough that this theory, which denies that the free acts of his moral creatures are, or can be, known to God, is contrary to the whole tenor of scripture, which represents God as in manifold instances foreknowing and foretelling the conduct of men. The very idea of prophecy, which pervades the Bible, implies that moral acts may be, and are, foreknown.

In order to avoid the manifest absurdity of denying the possibility of God's foreknowledge of moral acts, some have adopted a still more absurd theory, viz. that God has the power of foreknowing all things, but chooses not to exercise it in regard to the voluntary acts of moral agents. He is not only ignorant beforehand, but is voluntarily ignorant, of all that his intelligent creatures will do, that is, of the most important events in the universe which he has brought into existence! The statement of such a theory is its best refutation.

Others, who admit that the divine foreknowledge extends to all events, moral acts included, deny that we can legitimately infer decrees from foreknowledge. God can foreknow, it is said, what he has not decreed. Of those who take this position, some merely affirm that God foreknows moral acts in a way unknown to us; while some go further, and affirm that instead of decrees preceding and being the ground of foreknowledge, foreknowledge precedes and is the ground of decrees. In regard to the first point, that we do not know how God foreknows, and therefore have no right to say that his purposes are the ground of his foreknowledge, we reply that we do know that God cannot foreknow an event which is not absolutely certain. It is a contradiction to say that an actual event can be foreknown, whose existence is, in the least, uncertain or contingent. But if a foreknown event is certain, there must be some ground or reason for that certainty, and that ground or reason must be known to God, and it must be either his purpose or something else. But we have already shown that there can be no conceivable cause of the certainty of an event which does not ultimately depend on the divine will or purpose. The plea, then, that foreknowledge is a mystery, and that we do not know HOW God can foreknow an event, and therefore are not warranted in referring his foreknowledge to his decrees, is not valid. But the most plausible objection to this argument is that urged by those who affirm that the divine foreknowledge must, in the order of nature, precede the divine decrees. They put the case thus: God, with all his necessary and essential attributes, must be conceived of as existing before any of his acts; foreknowledge is one of his necessary and essential attributes, while his decrees are acts; therefore his foreknowledge must precede his decrees. But the fallacy of this syllogism is obvious. It lies in the minor premise. The foreknowledge of actual future events is not an *essential* attribute of God. We can conceive of him as a perfect God without it. If he had not chosen to create a universe, he would still have been God. But, in that case, there would have been no future events, and therefore there could have been no knowledge of future events. *Fore*knowledge must be distinguished from knowledge. The latter *is* an essential attribute of God, and extends to all possible existences; but the former can extend only to things which will actually exist. It must, then, first be determined that events *will be*, or there can be no foreknowledge of them. They must be transferred from mere future possibilities which are objects of God's knowledge, to future certainties, before they can become objects of his foreknowledge. But this transfer can be made only by the will of God. He alone can determine whether a thing that *may* be *will* be. His determining purpose must precede and be the ground of its certainty, and so of his foreknowledge of its certainty. Therefore God as decreeing must be conceived of as preceding God as foreknowing, and hence it is perfectly legitimate to reason from his foreknowledge to his decrees.

(b) *Benevolence.* God is benevolent as well as omniscient. Knowing all things, he could select from all the possible systems open to his contemplation, the best — that by which the highest good of the universe would be secured. If he did not select the best possible system, that is, the best which, so far as it depended on his agency, could be actualized, then he is not perfectly benevolent. If he did select the best, then either the system actually existing is that best system, or else he has not brought into existence what he selected as the best system, but an inferior one, and so, again, is not a God of perfect benevolence. If it be said that, although God chose the present system as the best, there are some things now included in it which he did not purpose should be included, we reply, *first*, he knew that the things referred to would be included in it, if the system itself were selected; therefore, in purposing the system he really purposed their existence. *Again*, in regard to the events referred to, one of three suppositions must be true. Either God was indifferent to their existence, or he purposed that they would not exist, or he purposed that they would exist. The supposition that a wise and benevolent God is indifferent to the existence of any event, in a system where all things are closely connected, and where momentous consequences flow from trivial causes, is wholly inadmissible. The supposition that he has purposed that an event would not take place, which yet does take place, is a denial of his power to prevent it. But, in respect to the mere power of God, it is manifestly adequate to prevent the existence of the whole system, and any and every part of it. The remaining supposition, therefore, must be true, that the existence of all actual events was purposed by God, in the sense we have explained, when, in the exercise of his infinite benevolence, he purposed the existence of the system in which they are now included.

4. *The Biblical Argument.* If the doctrine of decrees is plainly contrary to the teachings of the Bible, it must be rejected, however plausible the arguments from reason in its favor. If the scriptures are silent respecting it, giving no testimony either for or against it, though it may be true, and may have a place in our philosophy, we cannot claim for it a place in the great system of Christian truth. And if the testimony of the scriptures is not altogether explicit and decisive, some passages seeming to affirm the doctrine, and others seeming to be unfavorable to it, and all, without violence, being susceptible of either interpretation, then are we warranted in adopting that interpretation which shall make the testimony of the scriptures accord with and confirm the deductions of reason. Were the last supposition

true (the first two being manifestly untrue), we should have no hesitation in placing the doctrine of divine decrees among the doctrines of revelation. The scriptures certainly do seem, in some passages, to teach the doctrine, and the speculative arguments are, to our mind, so conclusive, that we can but let them rule in all cases of otherwise doubtful exegesis. But we go further than this, and express our conviction that the testimony of the scriptures, taken as a whole, is not doubtful, but is sufficiently clear and decided to warrant us in calling the doctrine of decrees emphatically a biblical doctrine. To present this scriptural evidence exhaustively, would require a treatise. Much of it, moreover, scarcely admits of a formal statement. It is incidental and indirect, and must be felt rather than stated, but is for this reason none the less convincing. This doctrine underlies the whole scriptures, shaping the language and thoughts of the inspired writers, even where it is not distinctly and directly alluded to, just as a geological formation of rock shapes the features of the earth's surface over half a continent, and is known to do this, although it *crops* out and becomes visible to all in only a comparatively few localities. We shall only attempt to indicate a few of the *outcroppings* of the doctrine of divine decrees in the scriptures.

(a) The scriptures abundantly teach that God has decreed some things. Though they do not use the word "decrees," they speak of God's "counsel," his "determinate counsel," "the counsel of his will," his "eternal purpose." They speak of things which he "has determined before to be done," which he has "foreordained," and which he has "predestinated."

(b) The scriptures teach that the decrees of God, in their execution, extend to things in our view the most casual and trivial. "The lot is cast into the lap; but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord" (Prov. xvi. 33). "Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of them shall not fall on the ground without your father" (Matt. x. 29).

(c) There are general statements which naturally imply that the divine purposes extend to all things, whether in the material or spiritual world. "I am God, and there is none else; I am God, and there is none like me; declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, saying, My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure" (Isa. xlvi. 9, 10). "Who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will" (Eph. i. 11).

(d) The scriptures teach that God's decrees extend to events in the moral world which involve the voluntary acts of free agents; e. g. the enslavement of Israel; their exodus and possession of Canaan (Gen. xv. 13; Acts vii. 6). A decree rendering certain these great events would be a nullity if it did not include and render certain also the conduct of Joseph and his brethren, of Pharaoh, and of Moses. So of the crucifixion of Christ. "And truly the Son of Man goeth, as it was determined" (Luke xxii. 22). "Him being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken and by wicked hands have crucified and slain" (Acts ii. 22). "For of a truth against thy holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the people of Israel were gathered together, for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined to be done" (Acts iv. 27, 28). Here we are taught that not only the *fact* of Christ's death was predetermined, but also the very *mode* of it; "by wicked hands;" by the murderous gathering together against him of Herod, and Pilate, and the people, both Jews and Gentiles. The certainty of innumerable moral acts must have been involved in the certainty of the Saviour's crucifixion. The sanctification and salvation of men, involving their own free agency, are events often and in most express terms referred to the divine purposes. "And as many as were ordained to eternal life believed" (Acts xiii. 48). "Who hath saved us with an holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began" (2 Tim. i. 9). "According as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without blame before him in love: having predestinated us unto the adoption of children, by Jesus Christ, to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will" (Eph. i. 4, 5). "For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate[1] to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the first-born among many brethren. Moreover, whom he did predestinate, them he also called; and whom he called, them he also justified; and whom he justified, them he also glorified" (Rom. viii. 29, 30).

Is it said that the predestinating purpose of God, thus variously expressed, is based on the foreseen repentance and faith of men? We reply that repentance and faith are the very things said to be included in the divine purpose. "Chosen *that we should be holy;*" predestinated to be "conformed to the image of his Son;" but there can be no holiness, or conformity to the image of Christ, which does not involve repentance and faith; and no repentance and faith which does not involve some measure of holiness and conformity to Christ. And, furthermore, it is abundantly taught in the scriptures that men, left to themselves, certainly never will repent and believe. If any do repent and believe, it is because God gives them the special influences of his Spirit. It is his Spirit, and so his decree to give that Spirit, which renders their repentance and faith certain, and therefore his foreknowledge of their conversion does not precede his decree to convert them. Such is the kind of evidence which the Bible affords, to prove the doctrine that the divine decrees extend to all events, both in the natural and the moral world. Nor does it seem possible, on any just principles of interpretation, to set aside this testimony of the inspired word.

In the course of our discussion we have made no effort to prove, as a distinct point, the *eternity* of the divine decrees. This has seemed to us needless. It would be, to our apprehension, much like attempting to prove a self-evident truth, to attempt to prove that whatever purposes God now has he always had and that whatever he decrees at all he decrees eternally. We can conceive of a succession in his decrees in the order of nature, corresponding to the succession in their execution in the order of time; but to suppose that God forms new decrees, and is now, from day to day, adopting new plans, seems repugnant to our most fundamental conceptions of his character. Moreover all objections raised against the doctrine are as valid against present as against eternal decrees. And it is, doubtless, owing to the plausibility of certain objections against the doctrine, more than to any defect in the arguments in its favor, that it fails to gain universal credence among philosophers and Christians. Any discussion of the subject, therefore, would be incomplete which did not notice the principal of these objections. To these, therefore, we now turn.

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[1] "There seems to be no difference here between *προέγνω* and *προώρισε*, while, too, in Acts ii. 23; 1 Pet. i. 2; Rom. xi. 2, *πρόγνωσις* is used directly for the divine will."—Olshausen, Com. in loc.

III. Objections.

The objections of greatest weight against the doctrine of divine decrees, and which we would here consider are three, viz: "that it is inconsistent with the moral character of God," and "inconsistent with the moral freedom of man, and is harmful in its practical influence." Are these objections valid?

1. The doctrine of decrees is inconsistent with the holiness, benevolence, justice, and sincerity of God. We might ,in a general way, reply to this objection, by observing that it lies quite as much against the doctrine of divine providence as against the doctrine of divine decrees. Decrees are God's purpose to do as he actually does, thereby rendering certain whatsoever comes to pass. If there is nothing in his agency inconsistent with his moral perfections, then is there nothing in his decrees inconsistent with them. But we will examine the objection in detail. How is the doctrine of decrees inconsistent with the holiness of God? By making him the author or approver of sin, says the objector. But to make God the author of the sins of his creatures the doctrine must affirm or imply that God is the efficient cause of the sinful acts of his creatures. But

this it neither affirms nor in any way implies. Our statement of the doctrine is that God determined so to constitute and circumstance his creatures that *they will* act as they do, not that they will, by their constitution and circumstances, *be obliged* to act thus, or be moved as machines or automatons. The relation of decrees to free-agency we shall consider more particularly hereafter. It is enough here to say that that is a gross misstatement or misconception of the Calvinistic doctrine, which makes the divine purposes sustain to the sinful acts of men the relation of cause to effect, and so makes God the author of sin. But if the doctrine does not imply that God is the author, it does at least, says the objector, "imply that he is the approver, of sin; and so *particeps criminis*." But if decrees imply approval of sin, it must be because they imply that God commands or desires men to sin. But decrees are not at all of the nature of commands or laws, as has been already explained. Neither do they necessarily imply a desire that the thing decreed exist. Here is just where the objection appears most plausible. Why, it is asked, did God determine so to constitute and circumstance men that they certainly would sin, if he did not wish them to sin? But, as a matter of fact, he did so constitute and circumstance them that they certainly would sin, whether he decreed to do so or not. The difficulty, therefore, is not peculiar to the doctrine of decrees; it is the old problem of the existence of sin. But our doctrine does not necessarily imply that God wished sin to exist, for its own sake, or for any other reason. It is certainly supposable that he decreed the existence of sin, that is, decreed to do what rendered its existence certain, for other reasons than because he desired men to sin.

Some have supposed that sin inevitably results from the very limitation of finite natures, and hence that, in whatever circumstances God should place moral beings, there would be "conditions privative," which would render an experience of sin certain. This supposition is not absurd, nor without some degree of plausibility, and might perhaps be accepted, were it the only alternative to the rejection of the doctrine of divine decrees. But in our view, there is another supposition far more satisfactory, viz. that God purposes so to constitute and circumstance men that they certainly will sin, not because he wishes them to sin, not because he does not, in every instance, prefer their holiness to their sin; but because there would result from such a change of their constitution and circumstances as would prevent their sinning a greater evil than their sin is. This supposition does not imply that God *could not* prevent sin in a moral system, but that such a modification of the present system as would be necessary to its prevention would involve evils greater than its existence. Neither does it imply that sin is brought into the system as "the necessary means of the greatest good," but that *the system* itself, in which sin does exist, but ought not to, is the necessary means of the greatest good. God chose the system, not on account of the sin, but notwithstanding the sin, which it includes. He prefers this system with sin to an inferior system without sin; but he would still more prefer this system just as it is in other respects with holiness in the place of sin. He decrees the existence of sin, therefore, not because he desires it, but because that divine system or arrangement into which sin is sure to enter, is indispensable to the highest good of the universe. Hence there is nothing in the decrees of God relative to sin, inconsistent with that immaculate holiness by which his whole nature is set in intense and unchangeable opposition to sin. He may foreordain its existence, that is, foreordain what renders its existence certain, and yet hate it with perfect hatred, and do all which a regard to the highest good of the universe permits to prevent its existence.

And if the doctrine of decrees, relative to sin is not inconsistent with the holiness of God, how is it inconsistent with his benevolence? The objector affirms that a perfectly benevolent being cannot purpose the existence of that which is itself so great an evil, and which draws so many dire evils in its train. But it is an indisputable fact that a perfectly benevolent being can *permit* the existence of sin; for he does, and therefore he can, decree to permit it; for it is plain that what benevolence can do, it can decree to do. But as respects this objection, what is the difference between saying that God permits sin, and saying that God so constitutes and circumstances men that they certainly will sin? The permission of sin can be explained only on the supposition that it may be better for God to permit than to prevent it. But this same supposition explains how he can give men such a nature, and place them in such circumstances, that they will sin, and how he can decree to do this. It may be that by no other arrangement could the highest good of the universe be secured. Benevolence, therefore, may require God so to endow and circumstance men that they will sin, and to decree thus to endow and circumstance them; which is only saying that benevolence may require God to decree the existence of sin.

And if the doctrine of decrees is not inconsistent with the divine *holiness* and *benevolence*, wherein is it supposed to be inconsistent with the divine *sincerity* and *justice?* Is it said that God cannot consistently forbid nor punish what he has himself decreed? But if, as we have already shown, his decreeing a sinful act is perfectly consistent with his most intense disapproval of the act, then may it be consistent, also, with an expression of that disapproval, in the form of prohibition, and threatened and inflicted penalty? There is surely no insincerity in his forbidding, and no injustice in his punishing, what is intrinsically hateful and ill-deserving; but the intrinsic nature of sin is in no way affected by the fact that it is decreed. This last point will come more distinctly under notice, when considering the second great objection to the doctrine of decrees; and to that we now turn, confident that there is nothing in the doctrine, as we have stated and explained it, which does not harmonize perfectly with right conceptions of the moral character of God; yea, more, that right conceptions of the moral character of God logically necessitate a belief of this doctrine.

2. But the objection which is oftenest urged against the doctrine of divine decrees, is its alleged inconsistency with man's *free moral agency.* We are willing to concede, that, if this objection be valid, it utterly disproves the doctrine of decrees. We believe that all truths, or facts, are self-consistent and harmonious; and we fully believe that man's free-agency is a fact, established by the best possible evidence, — that of consciousness. Therefore, we are ready to grant that any supposed fact which is inconsistent with the free-agency of man cannot be a real fact. If the doctrine of decrees and the doctrine of free-agency can be shown to be inconsistent, so that the one or the other must be rejected as false, we have no hesitation in saying, let the former be rejected and the latter be retained. But their inconsistency must be clearly shown. So many and weighty are the arguments in favor of the doctrine of decrees, that they cannot be set aside for any slight or dubious reason. Surmise and assertion are not enough, however plausible; we want positive and conclusive evidence that divine decrees are inconsistent with human freedom. But where shall we find evidence of such inconsistency? The Bible does not furnish it; consciousness does not furnish it. If it exist anywhere, we may expect to find it in the very nature of free-agency, or in the very nature of decrees. But what is there in the nature of free-agency inconsistent with a divine purpose so to create and so to condition men that they certainly will act as they do act? Free-agency consists in freely choosing; and we can as easily conceive of a person putting forth a choice which accords with the divine purposes as one which is opposed to them, or one in regard to which there is no divine purpose. The nature of the choice is the same, whether we suppose there is, or is not, a previous purpose or plan with which it harmonizes. If this seems like a *petitio principii*, then let us see if there is anything in the nature of decrees to sustain this objection.

If the divine purposes interfere with human freedom, they must do so, it would seem, in one of two ways: either by causing God to employ influences in securing their fulfilment which are *irresistible ;* or by causing a *certainty* that the moral actions of men will be what they are.

Is it, then, necessary to suppose that, if God has purposes relative to the moral actions of men, he must, in their execution, employ influences which are irresistible, and which leave no room for freedom or choice on the part of men? We may suppose him to employ two classes of influences, in consequence of his purposes, viz. the *common* influences of motives, and the *special* influences of his Spirit. And is there anything in the influence of motives to which God subjects men, inconsistent with their free-agency? They cannot act morally without motives; and if in any case the influence of motives which secures choice be consistent with freedom, then may it be consistent with freedom in all cases. And does any one suppose that when men by motives influence one another to action they thereby impair the freedom of their action? And cannot God influence a man by motives without interfering with his freedom, as well as a fellow-man can? It matters not by whom motives are employed; the nature of their influence is always the same; and if that influence be an irresistible energy necessitating all human action which it secures, then is there no such thing as free-agency in the universe, and no such thing is possible; and therefore it is idle to object to the doctrine of divine decrees on the ground of its inconsistency with the doctrine of free-agency, since there is, and can be, no free-agency for decrees to interfere with.

But such is not the nature of motives. They are necessary to all choices, but choices are never a necessary consequence of them. They influence the will, but do not compel it. Men yield to motives, but they yield freely, and might in all cases and ought in many cases, to resist them. The perfect consistency of motive-influence with moral freedom is attested by the consciousness of every man. There is nothing, therefore, in those ordinary influences which the decrees of God may be supposed to cause him to employ in securing their fulfilment which in the least degree sustains the objection we are considering.

The same is true of whatever *special* influences God may be supposed to exert upon men in consequence of his decrees. Such influences he doubtless does exert in securing right moral action, whether it be in consequence of his decrees or not. But do these special influences of the Holy Spirit subvert human freedom? Are they irresistible and compulsory? There is no more evidence that they are than there is that the influences of motives are. We may, for aught that appears to the contrary, act as freely under the special influences of the Holy Spirit, either yielding or resisting, as we do under any other influence. The immediate, no more than the mediate, agency of God can be shown to conflict, in the slightest degree, with the free agency of those who are the subjects of it. And if those special influences which God actually does exert on men may consist with their freedom, the case is not altered by supposing those influences exerted in the execution of decrees. The influences themselves are precisely the same in kind and degree, whether they emanate from decrees or not. They may, therefore, emanate from decrees, and yet leave the free-agency of man uninfringed.

If, then, the divine decrees do not interfere with human freedom, by causing God to exert on men any irresistible influences, do they, by causing a *certainty* that men will act as they do?

That the divine decrees do, through the divine agency in their execution, render the moral acts of men certain, is involved in our statement of the doctrine, and is explicitly maintained in our discussion. But is the certainty of a moral act thus secured, inconsistent with the freedom of the act? How inconsistent? Why may not the *freedom* of the act be made certain as well as the act itself? This we believe to be the case. The freedom of all moral acts is one of the things decreed and made certain. God has eternally determined that nothing shall interfere with man's free-agency. But still many cling to the belief that certainty does somehow prevent a moral act from being free, that is, necessitates its existence. But the mere fact that an event will take place, has no causal relation to the production of that event, and exerts no influence whatever that tends to bring the event into existence. The fact that a man certainly will act in a given way, does not necessitate his acting thus, nor influence his will in the least. He acts just as freely as if there were no certainty in the case. Certainty is not necessity, and does not produce necessity. Here is where this objection takes its rise. Things radically diverse, are confounded, or are supposed to be inseparably connected. Let the real distinction between certainty and necessity be clearly apprehended and held fast; let it be seen that there is a wide difference between a *will be* and a *must be*, and all ground for the supposed interference of divine decrees with free-agency will vanish.

But if the certainty of moral acts is inconsistent with their freedom, then the difficulty is one which others have to encounter, as well as the advocates of the doctrine of decrees. All events prophetically announced were certain to occur. A prophecy or prediction of an uncertain event would only be a guess or surmise. But the conduct of men was repeatedly foretold. The Jews' rejection and crucifixion of Christ, for example, was announced by Isaiah centuries before the advent. Were not the Jews, therefore, free and responsible in their shameful treatment of the Saviour? So, likewise, if certainty renders events necessary, then all foreknown events are necessary, whether they are foretold or not, for all foreknown events are certain. Foreknowledge does not *make* an event certain, but *proves* it to be already made certain. Its future existence cannot be known, if it be at all uncertain. Every possible future event is either certain or uncertain. If it is uncertain, it cannot be certain, and therefore cannot be known to be certain. In other words, its certainty must be a fixed reality, before its future existence can be an object of foreknowledge. Whoever, therefore, holds that God foreknows the moral acts of men, must either believe that they are not free, or else admit that their certainty does not interfere with their freedom. Nor is the difficulty avoided even by a denial of foreknowledge in respect to moral acts; for events are certain, whether they are known or not. With reference to events which have taken place, we can conceive of a point in the past when they were future, and when it was certain that they would take place. So if any events shall hereafter take place, their future existence is, by the very supposition, now certain: they *will be.* This is as true of events in the moral as in the natural world. If, therefore, certainty causes or implies necessity, all events are necessary, and there is, and can be, no such thing as moral freedom, or free-agency, in the whole created universe; yea, and God himself is no more free than his creatures are; for surely his own acts are certain, and are foreknown, and therefore on this supposition necessary, so that the whole universe, the Creator included, is under the iron dominion of relentless fate. There is no logical escape from bald fatalism, if we take the ground that certainty and necessity are identical, or are inseparably connected. If we shrink from the conclusion, let us abandon the premise. And if it once be conceded that moral actions may be certain without being necessary, then the objection against the doctrine of decrees which we are considering falls to the ground. If certainty is ever consistent with free-agency, it is none the less so when it results from a divine decree. If men can freely choose, as they do, while there is a previous certainty that they will thus choose, then can they choose freely while there are divine decrees, which render their choices certain.

Thus we find no evidence, either from the nature of free-agency or from the nature of decrees, that the two doctrines are inconsistent one with the other. Why then should an inconsistency be supposed, of which no proof can be found? We need not attempt to prove that they are consistent; still less to show *how* they are consistent; it is enough that there is not a shadow of proof that they are inconsistent.

A *third* objection often brought against the doctrine of divine decrees is drawn from its supposed bad practical influence. It is charged with a tendency to discourage effort and prayer, and to induce those adopting it to lead a care-less and inactive life. Some rejecters of the doctrine go no further than to deny that it has any *good* practical influence. Thus Archbishop Whately says of one aspect of this doctrine, *election:* "When thus explained, it is reduced to purely speculative dogma, barren of all practical results;" and of this and kindred Calvinistic doctrines he observes: "It is not contended that the doctrines in question have a *hurtful* influence on human conduct, and consequently are *untrue;* but that they have, according to the soundest exposition of them, *no* influence on our conduct whatever; and consequently that they are not to be taught as *revealed* truths."[1] But how can we be sufficiently sure that a doctrine has no practical influence, to be warranted in deciding *on this ground alone* that it is not scriptural? A doctrine, though it may not directly point to and enforce any duty, may yet have a moulding influence on the entire character, and constitute one of those inward moral forces which shape the whole outward life. We are all daily influenced by truths to which we do not often have any conscious reference. They are not so much objective as subjective motives. Held among our fixed convictions, they may be ever silently working out their legitimate and beneficent results, although we may be unable to trace those results to their cause. It is not safe, therefore, to set aside a doctrine either as untrue, or unscriptural, simply because *we cannot see* that it exerts any good moral influence.

But most of those who reject the doctrine of decrees, go further than Whately does, and assert that it exerts a positively hurtful influence on those who hold it; or at least that its legitimate tendency is pernicious, though it is often escaped by a happy inconsistency. In reply to this objection we would observe:

(a) It cannot be shown that the doctrine generally exerts a hurtful influence on those who embrace it. If an appeal be made to facts, or rather to the character and lives of men, Calvinists need not shrink from the test. Without any disparagement of others, it may confidently be affirmed that in depth and richness of religious experience and strictness of practical morality and scope of active benevolence, no class of Christians have surpassed those who have held the doctrine under consideration.

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[1] Difficulties in the Writings of St. Paul, Essay 3.

(b) If evil sometimes apparently results from the docrine, this may be owing to the fact that *the real* doctrine has not been clearly apprehended, or is not held in connection with other correlated doctrines, which are needful to give it its proper place and adjustment in the great system of religious truth. Almost any doctrine of the Bible may be so distorted, or misunderstood, or be taken out of its proper connections, and so pressed into undue prominence, as to exert anything but its wholesome, legitimate influence. But in such a case the fault is not in the doctrine, nor can the resulting evil be justly urged as an objection to it.

(c) In some instances it is doubtless true that "ungodly and unstable men" "wrest" the doctrine of decrees "to their own destruction." But this is only what they do with all other scriptural truths; not only those which "are hard," but also those which are easy, "to be understood. How many wrest the doctrine of the divine love, and make it the occasion of their endless ruin! And perhaps there is that in the nature of the doctrine of decrees, which renders it peculiarly liable to be thus wickedly wrested. Dr. Emmons shrewdly observes: "It is a mark of the moral depravity of mankind, that they are generally more inquisitive to know their fortune than to know their duty. They are more solicitous to know what God intends than what he requires."[1] But this disposition to neglect known requirements, in search of unknown purposes, is an argument for the doctrine of human depravity, rather than an argument against the doctrine of divine decrees.

(d) There is no reason apparent in the nature of this doctrine why it should tend to exert an unfavorable moral influence on any candid, truth-loving mind. "It discourages effort and prayer," says the objector. But how, if, as we have endeavored to show, it in no way impairs man's freedom and responsibility? A duty is made no less a duty by being decreed. And the neglect of duty is rendered no less sinful by being decreed. Effort is none the less important, and prayer is none the less efficacious, because included in God's eternal purposes. Yea, more: effort and prayer avail solely because God's purposes do extend to them and to their results. If this objection has any force, it is on the ground that all events are rendered certain by the divine decrees. But they are certain whether decreed or not, and are foreknown as certain. A belief in God's foreknowledge, therefore, or in the certainty of all events, has as much tendency to discourage effort and prayer, as a belief in God's decrees has.

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[1] Works, Vol. IV. p 286. Boston. 1842.

We might go further, and easily show the adaptedness of this doctrine to exert, instead of a hurtful, a most healthful and benign influence on all who cordially and intelligently embrace it. We might show how it is fitted to inspire the heart with humility, reverence, submission, confidence, and religious joy; how it furnishes a needed check and counterpoise to other doctrines, and gives symmetry to the whole system of Christian truth. But this would be virtually to introduce a new argument in favor of the doctrine; whereas, we are here only answering an objection often urged against it; and that objection is sufficiently answered, negatively, by showing that there is no evidence whatever that the doctrine, rightly understood, is fraught with any harmful tendencies.

In conclusion, we are happy to add that we can honor and esteem those of our Christian brethren whose views on this subject do not harmonize with our own, while we sincerely regret their failure to receive a doctrine which, for us, solves many more theoretical difficulties than it occasions; the benign practical influence of which we have experienced; which is to us "as the shadow of a great rock in a weary land;" and the general rejection of which, we feel confident, would detract not a little from the working forces of our holy religion.

ARTICLE VIII.

NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

A. F. Gfrörer's Pope Gregory VII. and his Times. In seven volumes. 1859–61.[1]

This is not a biography, but a history. It is a history of Europe in its religious and political relations to the papal see, for a period of forty years, from A. D. 1046 to 1085. The subject is, for the most part, treated by topics, after the manner of Gibbon; and to the several topics are prefixed very elaborate preliminary views, not unlike that of Robertson, in his History of Charles V. These special introductions are not mere compilations, but are founded on original investigations, bringing much new matter to light, and often handling subjects of which no author has treated before. The work is a rich storehouse of facts, drawn from the rarest and most recently discovered documents. The novelty of its matter and the exuberance of its sources of information, may be reckoned among its chief merits. Nor is it a dry presentation of facts. These, on the contrary, are skilfully grouped, and, in their historical combination, show rather an excess than a deficiency of ingenuity. The author, though a little too fertile in his invention, always gives the reader the means of judging for himself. It is hardly too much to say that Gibbon himself did not study the sources of his history more thoroughly than Gfrörer has studied his in the work before us. Those who do not accept his views, will, as in the case of Giesebrecht, acknowledge that they have derived much new information from his book. One cause of distrust, beside that already intimated, in respect to the author's conclusions, is the fact that, after having been known for most of his life as an extreme rationalist, he became a Catholic a few years before the publication of this life of Gregory. Whether the study of his subject made him a Catholic, or his Catholic sympathies led him to the choice of his subject, it is not easy to decide. He informs us that he spent ten years in the preparation of his work;[2] and he became a Catholic in 1853. It is not a little remarkable that another great historian, Hurter, was converted to the Catholic faith by his studies for the biography of the greatest of the popes, Innocent III. Drumann, the biographer of Boniface VIII., who ranks as third in ability among the bishops of Rome, is, we believe, no less a Protestant than ever; but Reuter, who is now engaged in re-writing his Life of Alexander III., which gives a panoramic view of Christian Europe, not unlike those given by Hurter and Gfrörer, betrays so warm a sympathy with his hero that some of his friends have been apprehensive that he, too, is "on his way to Rome."

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[1] Pabst Gregorius VII. und sein Zeitalter durch A. Fr. Gfrörer. Schaffhausen.

[2] He died after having nearly finished the preface to the last volume. Only three lines are added to it.

But it may be said of all these biographers of the great popes, that there is no taint of Jesuitism in their writings; that they are conscientious and honest as well as able historians, though their faith may influence their judgment.

It is impossible to give a correct impression of the character of the work of Gfrörer, without descending to particulars. The author's chief aim is to represent the age of Gregory VII. in all its important features, using as means of information every known document that has reached us through a period of eight centuries. Of the early life of Hildebrand, afterwards known as Pope Gregory VII., scarcely anything has been transmitted to us from which a biography can be constructed. We only know that he was at first a pupil, and then a monk at Clugny; that he was a mature and a very remarkable man at his first public appearance. From this time onward — from 1046 to 1073 — he was, successively, papal chaplain under Gregory VI., steward under Leo IX., legate under Stephen X., and cardinal under Nicholas II. and Alexander II. From 1073 to 1085, he sat upon the papal throne. In all these places, and throughout this whole period of forty years, he was essentially the same man. The earnest and devoted Catholic priest, the unrivalled diplomatist, and the ruling spirit of the age, whether behind the throne or upon it. On this account the author determined to give a great historical picture of Europe, with Gregory as the central figure. It is one of the scenes, and one of the most interesting, of the great drama of mediaeval Rome successfully struggling, both for good and for evil, to become a second time mistress of the world. Its chief actor corrected many abuses, and restrained many evils among the clergy and laity alike; but in so doing, acquired for the church an authority dangerous for herself, and oppressive to society. The good was temporary; the evil, abiding.

In that age, the most important public relations of the church of Rome. were those subsisting between it and the German Empire. For this reason the author devotes most of the first volume to a description of the political state of Germany. The exact character of the feudal system in Germany in the eleventh century; the time and the manner in which the great fiefs became hereditary; the history of those families of the aristocracy out of which dynasties sprang; the internal organization of the empire, its duchies, metropolitan districts, and marches, all required special attention, as they were the hinges on which turned the affairs of Germany under Henry IV., the chief rival of Gregory VII. for the supremacy. The power against which Henry had to contend at home was that of the nobles. What the character of that power was, and on what it depended, the author has informed us better than any other writer. Still, it strikes us as a little odd, that, in a Life of Gregory, we begin and continue to read hundreds and hundreds of pages about Lorraine, and Flanders, and Saxony, and Franconia, and Suabia, and Bavaria, their geography, their political history, and their ruling families, with as little allusion to the great pope as to the Great Mogul. A little light, however, begins to break upon the reader on the five hundred and sixtieth page; for there he finds mention made of Italy and of several of the predecessors of the man whose history he is to read. In the remainder of the first volume we have an account of Italy up to the time that Gregory ascended the papal throne. This portion of the history of the Roman see is not only essential to a comprehension of the pontificate of Gregory, which is but a continuation of the preceding policy, but is directly connected with the author's design, as nearly all the plans that were, during that period, executed at Rome proceeded from his counsels.

The second volume opens with a full narrative of the course of events in Germany, from the point where it broke off in the first volume, and continues it to the year 1073, when Gregory was placed at the helm of the Roman state and church. It was a period of great confusion and turmoil. Henry IV. was still a boy. His father, Henry III., at his death, appointed Agnes, the queen-mother, regent. The political leaders of Germany, who were dissatisfied with her administration, had already procured her overthrow. Two of these political leaders, archbishop Hanno of Cologne, and archbishop Adalbert of Bremen, were heads of opposite factions, and alternately guided the young profligate emperor, and consequently held the reins of power. All these individuals made it one part of their policy to manage for themselves, as well as they could, with Alexander II., then bishop of Rome. On this tangled web of history the author has labored, not without success, having succeeded in bringing many new facts to light.

It would naturally be supposed that the author now, having fairly reached his subject, would enter upon it without delay. But no; he has, in his method another contrivance, by which he can bring forward an unlimited amount of preliminary matter. He reminds us of a certain landholder, of whom, we once heard, who said that "he was not anxious to add much to his possessions; he only desired the land which bordered upon his." He now takes a survey of country after country in its relations to the holy see. In order to do this intelligently, it is of course necessary to take a retrospective view of each, and to settle its geographical boundaries and divisions in the eleventh century. We are the less inclined to complain of such licence, since these are the most novel and instructive features of the work. We get very rare and valuable information, about which we care more than we do about the pope of Rome. The author, however, makes a plausible defence for all his numerous digressions. He says, the estimate to be made of the pontificate of Gregory VII. is one of the most contested points in history; and that the controversy is to be settled, not by debate, but by a more careful study of the history of the times, of the considerations that influenced him, and of the political and social effects of his policy. While this is set forth as an argument in favor of his arrangement, it is, in fact, a key to the understanding of the whole work. He affirms that he could not dispense with the treatment of these apparently extraneous matters, because there were no works that treat of them satisfactorily for his purpose to which he could refer.

He therefore begins his survey in the middle of volume second, with a chapter entitled "The Relations of the Holy See and of Gregory VII. to the Slavonic and Scandinavian Nations of the North." This is too large a subject for us to enter upon here, and is, moreover, too remote for our purpose. The author next passes, in volume third, to Denmark, England, and Normandy, as forming a middle link between the northern and southern nations of western Europe. These nations all sprang, more or less directly, from the bold rovers of the northern seas, and were closely connected with the Roman church. It is a well-known fact that Gregory VII. was the chief adviser and support of William the Norman in his conquest of England. He was warmly, almost passionately, attached to the conqueror. He pronounced him the only king in Europe who was a true son of the church. He contemplated making him protector of the church and the first monarch of Europe, instead of the emperor, who was so unfaithful to his trust. But the king, after having fully established his power in England, did not in all respects answer the expectations of his spiritual father. One thing, however, is certain, that England is much indebted to Gregory for what she now is by virtue of the Norman conquest. Indeed, it must be confessed that a better order of things was introduced into the north-west of Europe, in part at least, by means of his influence.

In the fourth volume is contained an account of France under the reign of the first four Capetans,—Hugh, Robert, Henry, and Philip. All of Neustria became hereditary fiefs much earlier than did the territories on the other side of the Rhine. The history of these Neustrian fiefs is given, in which it is shown that many of them were originally more powerful than that of the Capetan family. The author undertakes to show, furthermore, how it was that this house, of such moderate possessions, made great acquisitions of territory, and finally gained a supremacy over all its rivals. In this respect he claims some originality. He admits that the success of the Capetans was owing, in part, to several fortunate accidents; but maintains, at the same time, that while they dared not resort to force, they practised secret designs and cunning, not unmixed with injustice and treachery, which in the end divided and entangled their enemies. Having reached this point under Henry I., they united with the high ecclesiastics, who were also jealous of the other ruling families, and thus, by the union of their own force with the clerical influence, finally raised themselves to sovereign power. Gregory, who, for good reasons, desired to see both the Norman power and the Capetan firmly established, that being the only way of curbing the factious spirit of the nobles, skilfully employed all his influence to prevent collisions between them. When we consider what characters Gregory had to deal with, we feel somewhat reconciled to their having fallen into his hands. The aid of the church was not given to the French monarchs without an equivalent. They were obliged to accept certain conditions, which justified the clergy and the nobility in renouncing their allegiance, if the rights of the church were infringed. Thus the apostolical see had, in the clergy and nobility, a check upon the French king; and in him, kept under its guidance and aided by its support, a check upon the nobles. It had a difficult part to act in preventing the ecclesiastics from being unduly under the influence of the king. Nothing but the determined spirit and vigor of Gregory carried him successfully through the struggle against the independence of the Gallican church. While he commanded the bishops of Bourges, Rheims, Sens, and Tours, who were subjects of the Capetan dynasty, to set before the king the danger of disregarding his counsels, he threatened them with excommunication if, out of regard to the king, they faltered in their duty to him. It fills the mind with almost painful apprehensions to follow the rise of the French monarchy, and see how often it escaped destruction, when the chances seemed to be against it.

The last half of volume fourth treats of the see of Rome in its relations to the Christian and Saracen kingdoms of Spain. We abstain from touching at all upon this extensive and complicated subject.

The fifth volume, whose dimensions are swollen to nearly a thousand pages, gives a complete account of the rise and growth of the States of the Church, and their history to the beginning of the eleventh century. Such a history is of itself a stupendous undertaking. It is executed with a decidedly apologetic tendency. The author aims not only to show how the temporal possessions of the church of Rome originated, but how necessary such an independent means of support was to the efficiency of the Papal power in curbing and controlling the spirit of secular princes. No doubt, the history of the Roman States under the previous popes, and an insight into their policy, will contribute much to unravel the history and solve the enigmas of Gregory's administration. The power of the papacy was owing, in no small degree, to the steadiness of the policy which was pursued for centuries, and to the prestige of usage and of antiquity. This circumstance, if it does not fully justify the author's method, offers a plausible excuse for yielding to his propensities, and pouring out a flood of documentary information upon his readers. We know not how to present an outline of this volume. Its table of contents alone occupies sixteen pages.

It would appear from the documents published by Baronius, that as early as 324, houses, lands, and rents were presented to the three principal *basilicas*, or churches, at Rome by Constantine. From the letters of Gregory I. (590–604), we learn that the church of Rome had possessions in Gaul, in different parts of Italy, in Sicily, in Illyricum, in Dalmatia, and in Africa. The fact that the emperors, in the fourth century, found it necessary to make laws against legacies to the church, leaves no room to doubt whence its wealth came. Under Gregory II. (715–731), we learn from fragments of a book of rents, that the church of Rome possessed seven patrimonies in Italy; that the *patrimonia* were divided into *massae*, or groups, and these again into *fundi*, or estates. Even before the time of Gregory I., there was a class of officers called *defensores*, whose duty it was to take charge of this ecclesiastical property. He added to the system, by raising seven of them to the rank of *defensores regionarii*, an honorary title indeed, but the office conferred was that of general agents for as many provinces. Although the landed estates belonging to the church of Rome were found in all the territory now constituting the States of the Church, we must not suppose that they occupied all that territory. They were everywhere separated from each other by lands not belonging to the church.

The popes at this time were chosen by the people, clergy, and nobility of Rome, but confirmed by the emperor at Constantinople. The government of the towns belonging to the church was still in the hands of officers of the crown. All the property of the church was taxed by the emperor. The armies of Italy were under the command of imperial generals. But in the time of Gregory I. and his immediate successors, the rule of the emperor was so weak in Italy, that the pope employed soldiers at his own expense, which served under imperial generals, if there were any present; if there were none, then they obeyed their own officers. With a nominal subjection to the court of Constantinople, the bishops of Rome, in the absence of defenders from thence, took more and more upon themselves, and, from necessity, formed a treaty of peace with the Lombards, who had laid waste their lands without hindrance. They kept agents, or ministers, at Constantinople, and at other courts, to look after the interests of the church. The emperors seemed to be pleased, for a time at least, with having such distinguished subjects. When the emperors became powerless in Italy, it was natural that the popes should look elsewhere for a protector. It is difficult to say whether the bishop of Rome most needed the military support of Pepin, or the latter for himself and his family, the spiritual sanction of the former. When the alliance was formed, the lands which had been plundered from the church by the Lombards were restored, and others given in place of those seized, by the emperor. Here we find the germ of the papal state.

The design of the Bishop of Rome was to establish a German Christian Empire to take the place of the Eastern Empire, the shadow of the old Roman Empire. He promised the same allegiance to the King of the Franks which he had shown to the Eastern Emperors. For this submission of the pope to his supremacy, and for the stipulated right to reject or confirm any papal election, as seemed to him good, the head of the new empire engaged to protect the church, and gave him certain territorial possessions. The arrangement was a very advantageous one on both sides. The Frank was hereby made the legitimate possessor of his usurped throne. He was made the superior of all the kings of the West. The pope secured a powerful military arm to defend him against the Lombards and other freebooters. The arrangement originated with the Roman bishops. Gregory II. made the proposal to Charles Martel, but without effect. Afterwards Gregory III. in 739 sent an embassy to that monarch with the keys of the tomb of St. Peter, which was a sign of fealty, urging him to hasten with an army for the protection of Rome. Nothing, however, was done till Stephen III. in 754 went in person to Pepin's court and crowned him, and made him and his two sons, Charles and Carloman, patricians of Rome. Pepin, in turn, promised to compel the Lombards to surrender certain territories to the Roman see; and in 755 succeeded in humbling the Lombards, and in making them give over Ravenna and the Pentapolis to the church. Eighteen years later Charlemagne annihilated the power of the Lombards, assumed the title of king of Lombardy, and greatly increased the donation of his father Pepin to the church of Rome.

The testimony in regard to the supremacy of the emperor over the Roman bishop is explicit. The language of the original statement as given in the Monumenta of Pertz, is: Adrianus domino Carolo—patriciatus dignitatem ac ordinationem apostolicae sedis concessit. When Leo III., in 795, was elected bishop of Rome, he immediately sent to Charlemagne the keys of St. Peter's tomb, and a communication, to which the king replied in these words: "The perusal of your letter has given me great joy, partly on account of the unanimity with which you were elected, and partly on account of your humble obedience, and the assurance of your loyalty." Charlemagne was careful to connect such conditions and limitations with his donations of territory to the Holy See, as to retain the supreme power in his own hands. Often the donation was but little more than nominal, formally giving to the church what it already possessed, adding certain empty honors.

Passing over between six and seven hundred pages of the continuation of the early history of the States of the Church, we come to the description of the city of Rome as it was in the time of the emperor Otto III., about the year 1000. If the emperor Constantine had revisited the world at that time, he would, notwithstanding the sacking and plundering of the city so many times by the barbarians, have found it substantially as it was in his day. Of the walls of the city, twenty-two Roman miles in circumference; of its 362 towers; its 6900 breastworks, from which archers and slingers could assail beseigers; of its fourteen gates; of the eight bridges across the Tiber; of the fourteen brick aqueducts, so large that a man could ride through them on horseback; of its sixteen palaces, ten baths, thirty-one triumphal arches; its circuses, theatres, forums, pillars, and statues, the author gives a most interesting account from contemporary authorities.

The subject of the sixth and seventh volumes corresponds to the title of the work, "Pope Gregory VII. and his times." It is not, however, limited to his pontificate, nor to his public life, but goes back to the beginning of the reign of Henry II., emperor of Germany, about the time Gregory was born. The sixth volume gives the history of the papacy, in its stricter sense, from Gregory's birth in the year 1002 to his elevation to the papal throne in 1073; and the seventh continues the narrative with special reference to the protracted contest with Henry IV. till Gregory's death in 1085. Although the period is the same as that gone over in the work more than once before, the subject is changed.

We may omit this history without exposing ourselves to the charge of being subject to a centrifugal force as strong as that of the author; for while his subject was Gregory VII. and his times, ours is the author's ponderous work. We therefore leap over the whole of the sixth volume, and a part of the seventh, till we come to another interesting digression, occupying two hundred pages, on the origin of the cities, the industrial arts, and the trade of Germany. We have compared this part of the work with Barthold's valuable book on the History of the German Cities, and find them equally exact, and generally in agreement with each other. The ancient Germans, as is well known, were averse to living in cities. As late as 356, when they crossed the Rhine and captured Strasburg, Worms, Spire, and Mayence, they took up their residence, not in the cities, but in the country round about them. The first cities were built, or rebuilt, mostly by bishops for their residences, along the borders of the Roman Empire, especially on the west bank of the Rhine and on the south bank of the Danube, and in the adjoining districts. So it was with Salzburg, Freising, Eichstadt, Wurceburg, Passau, Brixen, and Bamberg, in the south; and with the cities above named, together with Chur, Constance, Basle, Cologne, Triers, Mastricht, Liege, and Utrecht, in the west. Other cities were built on the numerous royal estates under the Franks, called palaces or courts; and in later times, palatinates. Duisburg was the first city that was so built, about 430, under Clodio. Coblence was resuscitated and made a royal city about the middle of the sixth century. Bingen was a castle and royal town under the Merovingians. The episcopal towns, Worms and Spire, were raised from their ruins by the aid of Dogobert I. Strasburg, one of the oldest free cities of Germany, was the residence of Childebert II., in 540. Thus far had the building of cities, as residences of bishops and kings, often on the spot and from the materials of old Roman cities in ruins, proceeded under the Merovingians before the year 700. But they were confined to the frontiers of the Roman Empire. The interior of Germany was still as destitute of them as it was in earlier times. Though most of the lands from the middle Rhine to the tributaries of the Neckar belonged to the crown, there were neither palaces nor churches, to say nothing of cities, in this whole region, which was still pagan. Frankfort, the first royal residence, was built in the eighth century. Before the time of Charlemagne there were a little more than twenty cities built in the manner above described. About fifty were built, or raised from the rank of villages to cities, during his reign; among which were Zurich, Ulm, Ingoldstadt, Linz, Frankfort-on-the-Maine, Bonn, Deventer, Antwerp, Ghent, Erfurt, Munster, Isnabruck, Halberstadt, Bremen, Hamburg, Magdeburg, and Halle. All the cities which were built in this period, originated in episcopal sees, royal demesnes, or monasteries, except about a half a dozen commercial towns in the Netherlands.

It is a wide-spread error that Henry I. (919–936) was preëminently "a builder of cities." It can hardly be said that he built any. The mistake has arisen from a misunderstanding of the terms used by the monk Widukind of Corvey. The word *urbs*, used by him, uniformly means burg, or castle. Henry caused several such castles to be built along the Slavonic borders, as a military protection of the country against the incursions of the Slavonic cavalry. It was under his son and successor, Otto I. (936–973) that the policy of Charlemagne in building cities was resumed. Under him rose to the rank of cities Brunswick (which celebrated its millennial anniversary in 1860), Quendlenburg, Dortmund, Brandenburg, Merseburg, Misnia, Prague, Oldenburg, Posen, Schleswic, Zeitz, Havelburg, and six or seven other towns of less note. Under Henry II. (1002–1024), were added Breslau, Naumburg, Nüremberg, Lubeck, and four or five others, which were either founded or raised to importance by him.

The information given on this subject by our author, and by Barthold, is not only interesting in itself, but explodes the erroneous views in respect to the rise of German cities, so often put forth by certain popular writers.

We had intended to close this Article with a general view of Gregory's character and administration; but having extended it already to an undue length, we must relinquish that purpose. Perhaps the omission will be no matter of regret. The somewhat desultory details which have been presented may be of more interest to the reader than any speculations of ours upon a character in respect to which so much has been written, and so much diversity of opinion still remains. The prevalent view of historical critics at the present day is, no doubt, expressed by Kurtz in his Church History, in which, after condemning Gregory's system as "not consonant with the gospel," he says: "Not vulgar love of power, nor vain ambition, animated him, but the idea of the high destiny of the church, to which he devoted his life with enthusiastic ardor." Gregory's theory of the relations of the church and the state to each other was substantially as follows: There are on earth, by divine appointment, two kinds of government,—a government of force and a government of religious authority. The wickedness of men made it necessary that there should be a civil power to restrain it, by punishing the guilty with fines, imprisonment, and death. The Christian religion requires that there be a church clothed with authority to maintain and propagate its doctrines and worship. The emperor is the head of the one; the bishop of Rome, as the Vicar of Christ, is the head of the other. Their offices are distinct. The former has no right to interfere in religious matters; the latter has no right to interfere in civil matters. The pope can inflict moral penalties, can impose penance, can excommunicate, can put under the interdict; but he cannot wield the sword. In his own Italian states he may exercise authority, as other civil rulers do, but not elsewhere; nor as spiritual head of the church. Thus far his theory and that of the emperors were the same. But at this point they begin to diverge. The emperors remembered that the earlier popes promised obedience in secular matters to Charlemagne. This was not so well remembered by Gregory; but he remembered that the king of the Franks received his crown from the pope; and therefore inferred that by abusing their power the emperors forfeited their crowns, just as the emperors inferred that the pope, by violating his promise of obedience, forfeited the tiara. While the emperors maintained their view by deposing refractory and obstinate popes, Gregory maintained his not only by asserting it, but by showing its reasonableness, from the fact that among all the kings from the beginning of the world we find only here and there a saint; whereas there have been not less than a hundred and fifty among the successors of St. Peter, which is about two thirds of the whole number.

In order that he might exercise a fatherly care over the state when kings violate their obligations, it was necessary for him to reform some serious abuses in the church. It had ceased to be what, in his view, it should be. The monastic orders had become corrupt. The clergy were guilty of simony, and became worldly in consequence of disregarding the law of celibacy. The bishops, having large landed estates attached to their sees, were often appointed by kings and emperors. Bound by this dependance, and often by ties of blood, to their sovereigns, they became subservient to the state, where they ranked as secular princes. In case of a collision between the emperor or king and the Roman pontiff, it was by no means certain which party they would join. It was therefore necessary that there should be a reform in the appointment of bishops, and that they should receive their investiture not from monarchs but from the Apostolic See. It was furthermore necessary that there should be a purer and more spiritual priesthood; one cut off from all domestic ties and worldly connections, and devoted wholly to the interests of the church, so that, as teachers of religion, they might guide the public sentiment and form the public conscience, and thus give a surer support to the church and its representative head. To effect such a reform, and to establish such relations between the secular and spiritual powers, was the gigantic undertaking to which Gregory directed all the energies of his great mind, to the last. We cannot withhold our admiration from a character so energetic, so earnest, and so sublime, while we deplore that it was so utterly mistaken in its aim. The signal success of his undertaking, during his own life, and still more afterwards, is one of those mysteries of Providence which we are not yet permitted to understand.

PHILIP MELANCHTHON'S LIFE AND SELECT WRITINGS, BY DR. CARL SCHMIDT.[1]

WE rose from the perusal of this life of Melanchthon with the impression that, for the first time, we had seen the whole man. Not merely the outlines of his history, his relations to Luther, and his theological works, which form the substance of most of the biographies of Melanchthon, but his whole life, up to the last hour of it, and all that is historically connected with it, are spread before us with a completeness of view and fulness of detail that leave nothing to be desired. Luther is not treated as the chief character, accompanied by Melanchthon as a mere attendant. His history is presupposed, and merely referred to, except where it is so interwoven with Melanchthon's that it could not be omitted. The effect produced upon the mind by this new view of Melanchthon's life, is a thorough conviction of his greatness, and of his great influence upon the leading characters of the age, both Protestant and Catholic. With the true scholars of all parties whom he met at the numerous conventions and colloquies which he attended, and where his presence was more desired both by friends and foes than that of Luther, he stood higher and higher the more he was known. There was scarcely a country in Europe that did not desire to possess him, and hardly a reigning prince that did not offer him most flattering terms to induce him to accept an appointment. Remarkably free from passion, comprehensive and sober in his views, learned and vigorous at the same time, he was unrivalled in his power of drawing up public religious documents. Exhausted by the disputations carried on during the day by contending parties in a conference, he would often during the night prepare a paper, setting forth the views of his party, to be presented the next morning, which astonished his friends, and which his opponents, well knowing that they could not produce one to match it, usually attempted to neutralize by getting up some objection to its presentation. It was as a scholar, philosopher, and logician that he stood above the men of his age, Luther himself not being excepted. The latter was by far the abler disputant. He could silence an opponent better than Melanchthon could; but he could not bring one over to his opinion so well. Luther often spoke of Melanchthon's "philosophy," sometimes in a good and sometimes in a bad sense. The term was well chosen, and was characteristic.

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[1] Philipp Melanchthon. Leben und ausgewählte Schriften, von Dr. Carl Schmidt. pp. 722. Elberfeld: 1861.

Passing over the history of Melanchthon's youth, we find his public life divided in a very marked manner into three periods: the first extending from the time of his arrival at Wittenberg in 1518 to the presentation of the Augsburg Confession in 1530; the second, from that time to Luther's death in 1546; the third, from the time of Luther's death to his own in 1560. In the first he was altogether a subordinate character as compared with Luther; in the second, he was next to him in rank and influence; in the third, he was at the head of the Protestants of Europe.

Although the evidence of fresh investigation is spread over the whole work under review, the value of the new material increases steadily as we advance from stage to stage, just as Melanchthon's importance increases to the very last. The second and third periods, therefore, — that preceding and that following Luther's death,—will be of greatest interest to the reader. The author has wisely avoided giving a general history of those periods, preferring to adhere rigidly to the method of a true biography, and to pass lightly over even great events, if not immediately connected with his hero's life, and to give special prominence to all those in which he acted a conspicuous part. He does not attempt to set forth the theology of Melanchthon in an elaborate system, but rather gives a historical view of his opinions and writings, with the variations of doctrine as they actually appeared in his life. It is also well for the readers that no place is set apart in the volume for Melanchthon's select writings, but that the spirit of his more important writings, with very brief extracts, is interwoven with the narrative. Indeed, the title of the book would have been more correct if the words "Select Writings" had been omitted. They were undoubtedly retained for the sake of uniformity, as the other volumes of this series of biographies will conform in this respect to the title.

The transactions at Augsburg in 1530 are too well known to require any comment here. The best result was, not the conclusions to which the diet arrived, nor the tone of feeling manifested by the emperor, but the publication before the whole world of the Augsburg Confession and of the Apology. These effected on a larger scale what Luther's address had done nine years before at Worms. The Protestants were now no longer represented abroad by their enemies, but by themselves, in a manner that reflected the highest honor upon their cause.

The calm and considerate deportment of Melanchthon at the diet of Augsburg, his moderation, learning, and skill in discussion, inspired a general respect for him in the minds of the good men of the Catholic party Wherever there was a willingness to reform the grosser abuses of the church, and a desire to restore union between the Protestants and Catholics, there was a disposition to employ his services as a mediator between the two extreme parties. There was, at this time, a Lutheran party at Paris Margaret of Navarre, sister of the king, favored it. Francis I. himself was not averse to a moderate reform and a union of the parties, as he then wished to strengthen himself against the emperor by a league with the Protestants. Bellay, a counsellor of the king, and his brother, who was bishop of Paris, both favored this policy. The former, when ambassador in Germany, had consulted with Bucer at Strasburg about the best way of effecting the union. He induced the king to send a messenger to Melanchthon and Bucer, to obtain their views in writing, to be laid before the Protestants and moderate Catholics in Paris. A young German by the name of Chelius, the friend of Bucer and of John Sturm, then at Paris, was selected for this purpose and sent to Wittenberg in 1534. Melanchthon drew up a paper, according to request, and directed it to Bellay. Bucer and Hedio, at Strasburg, did the same. Francis I. seemed to be pleased with these communications; but, unfortunately, some violent placards were put up at this time by men calling themselves Protestants, which so excited the opposition of the Catholics that they stirred up the king to acts of persecution, which put an end to all attempts at union. Meanwhile, copies of Melanchthon's and Bucer's letters addressed to Bellay, were circulated in Germany, which, taken in connection with the persecutions that followed, excited dissatisfaction among their friends at home. The next year, however, in 1535, the king of France was induced by the friends of the French Protestants to resume the work of effecting a union which had been so suddenly and so violently broken off. Voré, a learned nobleman, who had been much in Germany, spoke in high terms to the king of Melanchthon's learning, ability, and honorable character. He even ventured to say that he had been a pupil of Melanchthon's, and to give a flattering account of the doctrines and lives of the Protestants. The relations of Francis I. to the emperor were now such as to make him wish for an alliance with the Protestants. Voré was therefore sent to Germany to invite Melanchthon and Bucer to Paris. Sturm, who was still there, wrote to them earnest letters, urging them to come and lend their powerful aid in protecting the persecuted Protestants. "It lies in your hands," said he, "to say whether the Protestants of France shall enjoy life and freedom, or suffer the severest oppression. The king is inclined to listen to your counsels. Do not arouse his anger by refusing to accept his invitation."

On Voré's arrival in Germany, the fears of the Germans were again aroused, and their complaints against Melanchthon and Bucer renewed. There was a general distrust of the motives of the king of France. Melanchthon hesitated, and gave no decisive answer to Voré, but asked for time to write to Sturm for further information. "The invitation to France," he writes to the latter, "is the most difficult question I have ever had to consider. I do not fear for my own personal safety, for I am ready to sacrifice everything for the honor of Christ and for the good of the church; but I fear that I can be of no use." He asked to have this point, of the probable utility of such a visit as was proposed, cleared up; and urged Sturm to use his influence to induce the king to cause a synod to be held. Voré returned to Paris and informed Francis I. of the distrust of the Germans, and requested a more definite guaranty of the personal security of Melanchthon, in case he should undertake the journey. Bellay was thereupon authorized to assure Sturm that the king only wished to have a personal interview with some of the most distinguished Protestant theologians, to aid him in devising the means of preserving the peace of the church till a general council should be held. Melanchthon, he said, should not be confronted with the Sorbonists, but each party should be consulted separately, and then the king could decide on his course for himself. Francis I. also wrote to Melanchthon, inviting him to visit Paris either in the name of the government, or in his private capacity. Voré brought the letter, with others from Cardinal Bellay, from Margaret of Navarre, from Roussel, her Protestant chaplain, and from Sturm, all urging him to accept the royal invitation. Voré was authorized to extend the same invitation to the Strasburg theologians; and the city government gave its consent for Bucer and Hedio to make the journey. But it was otherwise in Saxony. Melanchthon's doubts were not removed by the letters he received; nevertheless he determined to go rather than to appear concerned about his own safety, or to trifle with the French monarch. But on going to Torgau to obtain permission of his prince, John Frederic flatly refused to give his consent. Melanchthon returned home disappointed and chagrined. He sent an urgent petition to the elector, requesting that he might go as a private individual, and have a three months' furlough for this purpose. Luther supported him in this petition, entreating the elector not to abandon the French Protestants in their need, who had fixed their hopes upon Melanchthon. The refusal might offend the king, to whose anger their brethren in France would become victims. He even went to court to endeavor to change the mind of the prince. It was all in vain. The latter had been warned against the perfidy of Francis I., who had no intentions, it was said, of favoring the Protestants, but merely wished the temporary support of their influence in his contest with the emperor. Perhaps the elector was displeased that the application had not been made directly to him. Perhaps he thought a connection, at this time, with France would be prejudicial to the interests of the Protestants in Germany, by betraying a sympathy with the enemy of the emperor. Perhaps fears were entertained that Melanchthon, left to himself, would go too far in the way of concession, to which apprehension the paper mentioned above gave some pretext. Enough; the elector himself wrote to Francis I. that his request could not be granted, offering as a reason that Melanchthon could not be spared from the university at that time. Melanchthon believed that, for political reasons, the elector was so offended with his course as to be betrayed into treating him unkindly and unjustly; but he submitted, determining to show by his own fidelity that there was no cause for dissatisfaction with him.

Another monarch equally sincere in his sympathy with the Protestants, Henry VIII. of England, made similar attempts to obtain the services of Melanchthon, with a similar history and result. An interest in the religious questions of the day was the pretence, a divorce from Queen Catharine was the real object.

Melanchthon had long been dissatisfied with his *Loci*, published in its first rude form in 1521. As early as 1530, he contemplated a new edition of it. In 1533, he delivered a course of lectures on the subject. In the midst of the engagements above described, he labored on this work. He observes: "I am at one time in my thoughts in France, at another in England, and then again I am here in the midst of our own troubles. If I belonged to myself, I would retire to some solitude instead of living in this turmoil of business." In 1535, the second edition appeared, with such alterations and admirable improvements in form as to make it almost a new book. It was much more complete than the first, more regular in its form, more learned in its execution, and more quiet and assured in its tone. This was the basis of the numerous subsequent editions which were published. It was about this time that Luther said to the students, "Read the Loci of Philip together with the Bible. That is the best book. Augustine, Ambrose, Bernard, Bonaventura, Lyra, Gabriel Biel, Staupitz, and others, have many good things; but Master Philip knows how to explain the scriptures, to penetrate his subjects, and represent them with brevity and clearness." The author devotes two chapters to the changes made in the new edition of the *Loci*, which are particularly attractive to the theologian, but which we must pass for want of space.

In 1539, Duke George, of the Duchy of Saxony, the bitter enemy of Luther died; and his brother Henry, who succeeded him, being a Protestant, invited Melanchthon, Justus Jonas, Cruciger, and Myconius, to aid him in introducing the Reformation into the duchy. Melanchthon's task was to reform the university of Leipsic. The ranting monks were silenced. Amsdorf and Hess of Breslau were recommended as professors of theology; and John Sturm for the department of ancient literature. As Sturm declined the appointment, Camerarius took his place.

In the same year Melanchthon was invited to Berlin to assist the Margrave of Brandenburg, as that part of the present kingdom of Prussia was then called, in carrying through the Reformation commenced the year before. Then followed a series of those meetings and colloquies for settling religious differences which were the torment of Melanchthon's life, and in which his services were in special demand. Such were the meeting, or convention, at Smalcald, the colloquy at Hagenau, the colloquy at Worms, all in 1540; and the colloquy at Ratisbon in 1541. It was near the close of another tedious and useless colloquy at Ratisbon in 1546, which Melanchthon did not attend on account of ill health, that Luther's death occurred. The celebrated Council of Trent opened the year before, and the Smalcald war, which for the time annihilated the power of the elector of Saxony and the Landgrave of Hesse, at the battle of Mühlburg, was, after a short duration, brought to a close the year after. From this time, the fate of Saxony seemed to lie in the hand of the new and somewhat treacherous elector Maurice, and that of the doctrines of the church in the hand of Melanchthon, now the theologian of Germany, by way of preëminence.

It was in the beginning of November, in 1546, that Maurice, having formed a dishonorable alliance with the emperor, approached Wittenberg with a hostile army. The inhabitants were filled with terror, and fled, in great numbers, from the city. "Old men, women, and children," says Melanchthon, "were seen departing in a long train of wagons, covered with the falling snow." The university was closed, and the students advised to disperse. Some of the professors removed to Magdeburg, the only city where there was perfect safety, proposing to keep up "the shadow of a university" there during the winter. Melanchthon remained to the very last,—till the army stood before the gates of the city and demanded its surrender. He then withdrew to Zerbst in Anhalt, about twenty-five miles distant, with his family, whither he had sent forward his servant to provide lodgings. Though he wished to return, if he could with safety, to Wittenburg, where he had left Bugenhagen (Pomeranus), Cruciger, and Eber, and collect the students together again, if the winter should pass without a severe siege, he yielded to the urgency of his colleagues, who had fled to Magdeberg, to join them. But the city government was unwilling to provoke a powerful enemy by the reassembling of the Wittenberg students in that place, and consequently the contemplated courses of lectures were not opened there. Melanchthon therefore returned to Zerbst, having met on the way, at Dessau, his friend Camerarius, who had fled from Leipsic. In Zerbst he was soon reduced to want. The Burgomaster of Nordhausen sent him fifty dollars, which he divided with his friends. From the king of Denmark he received one hundred and fifty, and, at a later period, two hundred, for himself, Bugenhagen, Justus Jonas, and Luther's widow Though he was invited to Berlin, to Nordhausen, to Brunswick, to Nüremburg, and to Tübingen, he declined the invitations, as his eye was still steadily fixed on Wittenberg. Near the close of the year 1546, the army withdrew from that place, and Melanchthon hastened back. But he found the state of things so unfavorable, that he remained there but a few days. While the war between the elector, John Frederick and Maurice, the successor of Henry, as Henry was of George, in the Duchy of Saxony, was carried on with varying fortunes, Melanchthon still remained at Zerbst, engaged more or less in literary occupations. It was at this time that he lost his daughter Anna, the wife of Sabinus, rector at Königsburg. He said she was dearer to him than his own life. She had experienced sorrowful days as the wife of that distinguished but wayward man.

While the prospects of the elector seemed to be brightening, and Melanchthon was so encouraged that he called a meeting of the professors to elect a new rector, the friends of the university were thunderstruck with the intelligence that on the 24th day of April, 1547, the emperor and Maurice gained a complete victory over the elector at Mühlberg, taking him prisoner, and condemning him to death. Melanchthon said, in a letter to his friend Cruciger: "If I could shed as many tears as there are drops of water in the Elbe, I could not weep away the sorrow which I feel at the subjugation of our prince, who was always the friend of the church, and zealous for the right." Melanchthon was no longer safe in Zerbst, for Charles V. was particularly embittered against him as the chief offender among the Protestants. The emperor's Spanish soldiers spared neither rank nor sex. Several of the clergy were murdered, and among the rest the venerable Bartholomew Bernhard, of Kemberg, the first priest who had ventured to enter into wedlock in Saxony. Melanchthon with his family and the widow and children of Luther, removed to Brunswick. They attempted to go to Denmark, whither they were invited by the king, but were stopped at Lünenburg, and were obliged to return.

On the 25th of May, the emperor, for the first time, entered Wittenberg, the heretical city. In the capitulation of the 19th, it was stipulated that the electorate should pass to Maurice and be joined with the duchy, which introduced a radical change in the geography of Saxony. Melanchthon now accepted the invitation to Nordhausen, when he again received invitations to become professor at Frankfort-on-the-Oder, and at Tübingen. He was inclined to accept the latter, being attached to his native Suabia; but delayed the journey, hoping something would turn up that should bring him again into "his beloved nest on the Elbe." He had already sent to the imperial secretary a written petition that the professors of law, of medicine, of languages, and of the mathematics, might be permitted to return to Wittenberg, alleging that it was reasonable to separate their case from that of the theologians, who were in odium on account of the religious controversies, and that to retain such men in his service would be an honor to the emperor, who could not be supposed to wage war against letters. He received a friendly answer, intimating that the new elector Maurice, intended to reopen the university, and that he could not do otherwise than reappoint the former professors, as there were so few learned men in Germany. Melanchthon himself, he said, might remain; or, if he preferred to go to Tübingen, the emperor would consent to that, provided he would give up theology, which led to so much controversy, and devote himself to those literary pursuits in which he had won such fame. This last suggestion found no favor with Melanchthon. On the 8th of June, the elector Maurice instructed Cruciger to invite the professors to return to Wittenberg. The next month he invited Melanchthon, Bugenhagen, and Cruciger to visit him at Leipsic. He assured them that he did not propose to re-establish the papal abuses, but, on the contrary, to protect the word of God and its ministers, and to be the patron of learned men and of letters. He paid the expenses of their journey, and made them presents. He promised to recall Camerarius to the university of Leipsic, and requested Melanchthon to accept an appointment there, which was declined. Melanchthon, leaving his family, for the time, at Nordhausen, returned to Wittenberg July 25, 1547, after an absence of eight months. Although a feeble beginning in instruction was made in October, no funds were provided till the beginning of the next year.

By a very natural, but unfortunate, course of events, Melanchthon was brought into delicate relations to the young dukes, sons of the captive elector. When the latter, as a prisoner in the train of the emperor, was permitted, on his way southward, to have an interview with his sons, he advised them to remove the university from Wittenberg to Jena. They made the attempt; but, as Maurice determined to maintain the university at Wittenberg, they succeeded only in part. They founded the new university at Jena, without being able to make it take the place of the older one. The title of elector, and the greater part of the territory of the old electorate, had passed to the hands of Maurice, who retained also his own duchy in the southeast of Saxony. The new electorate corresponded substantially to the present kingdom of Saxony. To the sons of the dethroned elector was given only a small territory in the western part of the old electorate, corresponding to the several small duchies of Saxony at the present day. None but the bitterest feelings could exist in the breasts of the young dukes towards Maurice, whom they regarded as a traitor and a robber. Now what was Melanchthon to do! Should he, out of fidelity to the old elector, who had stood by him so bravely in all perils for fifteen years, take up his residence in the territories of his sons, and, in connection with the other professors, whom the young princes hoped to gain, endeavor to build up a new Wittenberg in Jena; or should he wait and see what should become of the old university, where he and Luther and their associates had labored so long and so gloriously together? A sense of gratitude might prompt to the former course; and a prudent regard to the interests of Protestantism might make him feel that he was under obligations to pursue the latter. After much delay and hesitancy during his stay at Nordhausen, he came to the conclusion that it was best to return to Wittenberg, as he was invited to do by Maurice, and not abandon the old cradle of the Reformation. The young dukes were thrown into a passion by this decision. They accused Melanchthon of ingratitude, of violating his promise, and of basely joining their greatest enemy. Nothing but violent party feeling and political rancor could make them put such a construction upon Melanchthon's considerate and cautious course. Now what could be more natural than that the theological opponents of Melanchthon and the young dukes, in their disappointment and chagrin, should sympathize with each other, and that Flacius, Amsdorf, and their party, should find a congenial and a welcome home in the new university! Enough has been said to make it easy to comprehend the *odium theologicum* and the fierce and protracted controversies of the two parties represented by the universities of Wittenberg and Jena. From this time onward neither Melanchthon, on the one hand, nor Flacius, on the other, had any peace till they found it in their graves.

The Augsburg Interim, drawn up by Julius von Pflug, and, by the emperor's order, presented for approval at the diet of Augsburg in 1548, was a source of much trouble to the Protestants. As the Council of Trent, now removed to Bologna, refused to do anything for the reformation of the church, Charles V. determined to take the work into his own hands, and to force a plan of union upon the Protestants. He was taken by surprise when Maurice, instead of adopting the Interim, said he must consult his theologians on the subject. They, of course, could not yield so much of the Protestant ground already gained, as that instrument required. After several consultations between Maurice's advisers and his theologians, the elector carried through in Saxony a modification of the Interim more favorable to the Protestants, which modification was called the Leipsic Interim. Melanchthon's position in respect to this Interim was doubly embarrassing. Though consulted, for the sake of his influence, more perhaps than any other man, and yet so consulted that he might receive advice from the elector and his wary minister, Carlowitz, rather than give it, he approved of the Leipsic Interim only in part, just enough to excite the violent opposition of his theological opponents in Saxony, but not enough to satisfy Maurice and his court. He undoubtedly yielded too much to the Catholics; and an unfortunate letter written privately to Carlowitz in a moment of timidity and weakness, was made public, to his great injury. In respect to that part of the Interim which he did not approve, he said the elector could do as he pleased, but must take the responsibility upon himself. The Protestant theologians of both parties, that of Flacius and that of Melanchthon, regarded the subject as of the greatest importance, the former maintaining that the Interim only prepared the way for a return to the Catholic church through some scheme of the Council of Trent, the latter affirming that it was the only means of appeasing the anger of the victorious emperor, and of preserving Saxony from complete destruction by Spanish soldiers. But after all the infinite trouble that was thus caused to the Saxon church, bringing upon it a blight from which it did not recover during the sixteenth century, it turned out that Maurice was only amusing the emperor, and keeping up appearances till his own plans should be completed for changing sides again, and putting himself at the head of an army to defend the oppressed Protestants. This is apparent from the fact that after his relations to the Emperor were changed, he took no pains to enforce the Interim, which had answered its purpose. It would seem to be a pity that both parties of theologians, who were rendered hostile to each other by their opposite relations to this Interim, could not have known that Maurice, who seemed so tyrannical in forcing it through and publishing it as a law, was not in earnest about it.

This, however, was a secret, which could not be entrusted to any one. Besides, a knowledge of the elector's plans could not have helped the matter at all; for the theologians could not openly approve of an iniquitous document, with a private understanding that no use was to be made of it; and the elector could not mislead the emperor by anything short of the Interim itself, actually published and forced upon the Protestants.

The theological dispute between Melanchthon and his opponents in regard to the Interim, related to "indifferent things" in religion, or the *adiaphora*, as they were called. Melanchthon maintained that, so long as pure doctrines were taught, ceremonies which did not contradict these were indifferent. His opponents maintained that a return of the Protestant church to a state in which she should be governed by bishops, and especially by the bishop of Rome, could not be indifferent to those who had followed Luther in the rejection of all such authority; that it would be a practical surrender of the principle of Protestantism; and that the wearing of sacerdotal robes was not indifferent, if it was imposed upon the clergy by the civil authority; that it was the duty of the church to assert and maintain its liberty.

Maurice, when the proper time arrived, developed his plans rapidly. Having made a capitulation in November of 1551, with Magdeburg, which the emperor had authorized and instructed him to subdue on account of its resistance to the Augsburg Interim, he retained his army; and, in the beginning of the next year, formed an alliance with Hesse to deliver the landgrave, his father-in-law, from his unjust imprisonment. He attacked Augsburg on the 1st of April, 1552, and Inspruck on the 20th of May following; and being completely victorious over the imperial troops, he met the commissioners of the humbled emperor in Passau on the 1st of June, where a treaty was made, by which Charles V. gave up the cherished objects of a lifelong pursuit, freeing the elector and landgrave, and guaranteeing peace and security to the Protestants. This treaty was confirmed in an imperial diet held at Augsburg in 1555; and though it was violated in the Thirty Years' War, it was permanently re-established, at the close of that bloody religious war, by the Peace of Westphalia.

Melanchthon was taken altogether by surprise when Maurice entered upon this brilliant part of his career, and was so fearful of an unhappy result that he attempted to dissuade him from the undertaking. But the Treaty of Passau put an end to all the troubles growing out of the attempts of the Catholics to force the Interim upon the Protestant churches. While, however, the external condition of things was favorable to peace, Melanchthon had other sources of grief. Controversies, in which he was sooner or later involved, multiplied on every hand, as that originated by Osiander on justification; that on the freedom of the will, occasioned by Melanchthon's new edition of the *Loci;* that on the necessity of good works; and that endless one in regard to the nature of the eucharist. It would require much space to give any satisfactory account of these controversies. Besides, the story has been so often told by those who have written the history of the doctrines of the Lutheran church, that it is hardly necessary to repeat it here. In respect to the bodily presence of Christ in the supper, it may be incidentally remarked that Melanchthon, in his later years, occupied a position between that of Zuingli and Calvin, though nearer the latter than the former. The theories would be shaded off in a true picture, from the highest to the lowest point, somewhat in the following order: the Catholic or scholastic theory of transubstantiation; Luther's theory of consubstantiation, or more exactly, of the ubiquity of Christ's body; Calvin's theory of a real spiritual presence by faith, which ascends to heaven in the eucharist; Melanchthon's theory of a spiritual presence without any explanation of the manner of it; and, finally, Zuingli's theory of a symbolical presence, the bread and the wine merely representing the body and blood of Christ. Though Melanchthon, whose experience qualified him to judge of the utility of colloquies as a means of settling doctrinal difficulties, came to entertain a dread of the very name, he was obliged to attend one more, that held at Worms in 1557, which turned out much as he expected. Its only effect was to separate the Wittenbergers from the Flacians, the Protestants from the Catholics, and the Lutheran church from the reformed church more widely than ever. The remaining three years of Melanchthon's life were passed in similar disquiet. He abstained from controversy as far as possible; and longed for a world where the weary might be at rest.

G. AHLHORN'S LIFE AND SELECT WRITINGS OF URBAN RHEGIUS.[1]

THIS work comes very fresh from the press, having been published but a few months. The matter itself here presented will, to the great majority of readers, be as new as the pages on which it is recorded. While the great features of the Reformation will always remain essentially the same, the details connected with the lives of subordinate actors in this grand scene, give new views on points where they are most needed, making us intimately acquainted with the private lives of public men, and thus throwing a clearer light on the whole subject. The more we become acquainted with the social relations of the leading men of that age, their early companions and friends, the better can we judge of all those public acts which are insensibly influenced by personal feelings of attachment or aversion. How many of the friends of the Reformation, and of the Reformers themselves, were for a time influenced by the circumstance that they were the literary friends and correspondents of Erasmus! Bound, by attachment, to him as the promoter of ancient learning, they entertained kind feelings for those Catholic prelates and scholars who were in sympathy with him.

All this is beautifully illustrated in the life of Rhegius. Born (in 1489) on the northern shore of Lake Constance, educated for the university in the neighboring school of Lindau, he entered the university of Freiburg in 1508. Here he lived in the house and became the personal friend of his country-man Xasius, the great jurist of that day. This distinguished professor warmly espoused the cause of learning, and in many respects favored the Reformation; but, like so many others, he found it too radical, and therefore stood aloof from it, and finally opposed it, after the manner of Erasmus. Here in Freiburg, Rhegius belonged to a powerful literary circle composed of Catholics of a moderate reformatory character, in which there was as yet no separation of the Protestant and Catholic elements. Here lived in friendship and harmony men who were afterwards leaders of opposite parties. As now, in the two great hostile armies of our country, military commanders who were once classmates and friends, are fighting against each other unto the death, so, a few years after the period of which we are now speaking, the friends and acquaintances of Rhegius were found in conspicuous positions on opposite sides. Here were Capito and Zell, afterwards reformers in Strasburg; Aesticampianus, the distinguished classical scholar, afterwards professor in Wittenberg; John Eck, now the particular friend of Rhegius, as he was later the chief opponent of Luther. His removal to Ingoldstadt in 1512, where he was made professor of rhetoric and poetry, and afterwards crowned as *poeta et orator laureatus* by the emperor Maximillian, served only to multiply his connections with this class of men. Here Eck, who had also removed to Ingoldstadt, was one of his colleagues in the faculty of instruction, and Hubmair, subsequently known as an Anabaptist leader, was another. Here he became intimately acquainted with Faber, then vicar of the bishop of Constance, afterwards as minister and confessor of the emperor, Ferdinand I., a most dangerous and powerful enemy of the Protestants. He was well acquainted with Erasmus, who, in one of his letters calls him *urbanissimum Urbanum*. It is a curious fact that at the very time, 1519, when Faber and Rhegius were upholding their friend Eck in his controversy with Luther, they were holding a most friendly correspondence with Zuingli. And yet, strange to say, in a manner unknown to us, within a year, in the midst of these friends, Rhegius came to see the whole truth, and sent to Luther, through a friend who was writing to him, the following salutation: "Urbanus Rhegius greets you, learned Martin, and has so much the more claim to a friendly recognition, as he has come to love you, not from any sudden impulse, but from calm conviction."

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[1] Urbanus Rhegius. Leben und ausgewählte Schriften, von Dr. Gerhard Ahlhorn, Consistorialrath in Hannover. pp. 370. Elberfeld: 1861.

Rhegius, meanwhile, laid in large stores of learning. Though distinguished as a classical scholar, he was, while at Freiburg, a student of law; and during the whole period of his residence in Ingoldstadt, from 1512 to 1520, he was a diligent student of theology. In view of all these things, it is not strange that when Oecolampadius, in his despondency, came to the unwise conclusion to resign his place as preacher at Augsburg, and enter a monastery, Rhegius should be appointed his successor. Luther had appeared before Cajetan at Augsburg in 1518, and made a favorable impression on the minds of such distinguished men as Peutinger, Langenmantel, and Frosch. In less than a year Oecolampadius was invited to preach there, and on his retirement, it was a friend of Luther, Adelmann by name, that secured the election of Rhegius. As Oecolampadius was not sufficiently settled in his views, at that time, to be very decided in his preaching, and as Eck succeeded in having the bull against Luther published in Augsburg, the character of Rhegius was put to a severe test. His development as a Protestant leader was rapid. He published anonymously several satirical works, keenly attacking the papacy, and setting forth the merits of Luther. The latter had just uttered his heroic words at the Diet of Worms (1521), and Rhegius seems to have imbibed his spirit and maintained it, notwithstanding Luther's concealment at Wartburg. His language was: "Luther can be extinguished, but the truth cannot." "Christ has taken such deep root in the souls of men at Augsburg, that he will live there, though the body be killed."

Before the close of the year 1521, he was obliged to leave Augsburg, to which he was so much attached, then one of the most prosperous and splendid cities of Germany. One day, as he came from the pulpit, a priest accused him of being a Lutheran heretic, and struck him brutally in the face, with a key, which he happened to have in his hand. The violence of the opposition to him was so great, that he thought it best peacefully to withdraw. He retired to his native place on Lake Constance, and devoted himself to study. Like all the men of that age who were devoted to classical literature, he had more eloquence, suavity, and wit, than of that firm adherence to principle which makes one superior to the consideration of worldly advantages, and unmoved in persecution. Erasmus and Luther are types of these two kinds of character. The troubles which Rhegius was called to experience, improved his character. In the school of affliction, under the discipline of crosses, he acquired just that strength and force of character which he most needed. While in the vicinity of Lindau, he renewed his correspondence with Zuingli, which had been dropped for two years. Zurich was not far distant; and it was just at this time that Zuingli was carrying through his reforms there, and that the bishop of Constance was calling him to an account. The latter sent a delegation, with Faber, the old friend of Zuingli and Rhegius, at the head of it, to the city council of Zurich, requiring it to put a stop to these innovations. Rhegius now wrote to Zuingli: "I learn with joy that, in the spirit of Paul, you have attacked the false apostle and his Ananias, that whited wall (Faber), and have trampled human traditions under your feet."

Having spent about half the year 1522 in his native place, he was invited to succeed Strauss, an evangelical preacher at Hall on the Inn, near Inspruck, who had incurred the displeasure of the bishop of Brixen. Strauss was afterwards a Lutheran preacher at Kemberg near Wittenberg, and at Eisenach. Here Rhegius, without interfering with the outward order and ceremonies of the church, contented himself with preaching the simple fundamental principles of the gospel. He was therefore uninterrupted till the spring of 1523, when the bishop required him to preach the dogmas of the church as well as the gospel, which he declined to do. He offered to hold a public disputation, and to bind himself to preach all that could be proved to have been preached by the apostles. The bishop called in the aid of the emperor Ferdinand, falsely asserting that Rhegius excited the people against the government. Faber was now in the service of the emperor, and did not fail to exert his great influence against his former friend. The latter thought it prudent to retire. After remaining a few mouths in his native town, he removed in 1524 to Augsburg, which had undergone no little change, in the meantime, in favor of the Reformation; and while residing there as a private citizen, he gave lectures on the Epistle to the Romans. He was soon appointed preacher, not where he preached before, but in another church. Here he remained as a judicious and successful preacher till the celebrated Diet of Augsburg in 1530. His position was a difficult one. There was no formal reformation introduced, but all sober and moderate men were allowed by the city government to preach in their own way. Rhegius stood between two extreme parties, the Catholics and the radical reformers, whose objects were as much secular as religious. This was the time (1525) when the peasants from Constance to Augsburg and Ulm, flew to arms, and 100,000 men were in the field to redress their wrongs. Rhegius saw, at the same time, the justice of their cause and the unjustifiableness of the remedy to which they resorted. In maintaining this view, he satisfied neither party. He published two pamphlets on the subject, both breathing a kind, Christian spirit. The controversy respecting the eucharist, between the Lutherans and the Zuinglians, and especially the troubles caused by the Anabaptists, who, at this time, were numerous in Augsburg, operated unfavorably for the Protestant interests. The years 1524 and 1525 were the golden period of the Reformation, in this city. From that time, the Catholics began to recover the ground they had lost. The long-expected day finally arrived when the emperor, the Catholic and Protestant princes, ecclesiastics, and theologians, were to meet at Augsburg, to settle the disturbed affairs of the church, as was supposed. The evangelical party arrived first. Duke Ernest of Lüneburg heard Rhegius preach, and was so pleased with him as to desire to secure his services in his own capital. When the emperor arrived, the Protestants were all forbidden to preach. The city authorities not only enforced this order, but meanly denied that they had appointed the Protestant preachers. Rhegius went before the council and put to them the question whether they had called him to be a preacher in Augsburg. They gave no reply. He was justly indignant, and unhesitatingly acceded to the wishes of the duke of Lüneburg. On his way from Augsburg, which he left August 26, 1530, he went to see Luther, who was waiting at Coburg, while the Diet was in session. Rhegius, who had never met him before, was as deeply impressed with the greatness and apostolical character of the man, as he had been with the dignity and simple majesty of the Augsburg Confession, presented to the Diet by Melanchthon. Through the remainder of his days did he look back to these two events, the presentation of such a confession, and his visit to Luther, as the most interesting of his whole life.

In September, Rhegius reached Celle, the residence of duke Ernest. But how changed was the scene! Instead of a great commercial city, under a vacillating government, swayed by the changing popular will, and agitated by all the conflicts and controversies of the day, he found here a petty state nearly impoverished, with a sparse population, originating nothing in business, intellect, morals, or religion, but moved only by the influence of the government. Rhegius had been bred as a gentleman, and was accustomed to refinement. The territory of Lüneburg, with its barren heaths and stagnant waters, was far more desolate and uncultivated then than it is now. Alluding to this, to the rough climate and rude population, he says he finds himself "at the extreme north, on the borders of the Vandals." He speaks of the houses of the peasants as "smoky huts, each a Noah's ark, with dogs, cats, cows, calves, pigs, chickens, and sheep, all together around one fire, where the peasant lies in straw, eating his stinking ham and bread as hard as a whetstone." As an offset for this, he found, instead of time-serving, money-loving burgomasters and councillors, a prince whose heart and soul were won for the pure gospel, having been brought up at the court of his uncle, Frederick the Wise, elector of Saxony, and educated under Luther at Wittenberg.

The Reformation had found its way, no one knows how, into Lüneburg as early as 1524. A certain Cruse was Lutheran preacher in Celle from that date until 1527. Laymen seem to have taken a very active part in introducing the new doctrines. The duke's chancellor, John Förster, was the most active and influential among them. In 1525, the very time that the Peasants' War was raging, the duke commenced the work of introducing the Reformation into other towns besides the capital, where there was one preacher of its doctrines. There was a fierce struggle between the two parties during 1526; but in 1527, the duke called an assembly of the estates, in which it was decided with great unanimity "that the gospel should be preached in its original purity, without human additions." Still there was much opposition, especially in the monasteries and in the old free city of Lüneburg, which was still Catholic.

Such was the state of the duchy when Rhegius was introduced into it by the duke as "the best treasure in all the land." He was first made preacher at Celle, and in the following year superintendent of all the churches of the duchy.

Difference of language occasioned him some embarrassment. The Low German was spoken by all the people, and was used in public documents, and in the church. The High German was spoken only at court. This was the very period when the change from the Low to the High German in the duchy commenced, to which Luther's version of the Bible, and the appointment of preachers who spoke the same language, contributed their share. Rhegius never preached in the popular dialect. The city council of Lüneburg wrote to him in High German while it wrote to the duke in the Low. His intercourse with the clergy was through the Latin. In the cities of Celle and Lüneburg large numbers could understand his sermons in High German; in the country towns he did not preach at all.

It was fortunate for Rhegius, who was a stranger in his new home, that he had occasion to spread out in writing his views on the whole subject in controversy between the Protestants and Catholics. In Hildesheim there was great discussion and confusion; and a member of the council, himself well disposed, wrote to Rhegius for advice. Whereupon the latter wrote and published his "Reply to a good friend in Hildesheim, on the causes of the present controversy in the matter of faith." In this he beautifully sets forth the two kinds of religion; the one a constrained conformity, outwarly, to what is enforced by authority; the other a candid obedience springing from a renewed heart. The controversy, he observes, does not relate to an unimportant or curious matter, but to nothing less than the true way of piety, the way that leads the sinner to God. The natural man seeks to gain heaven in the one way; the spiritual man, in the other. A statement so full, so clear, and so winning, on the practical character of the whole subject in dispute, served as a favorable introduction to all who were piously disposed, in this part of Germany. We cannot, even in outline, follow him through the ten years of his public administration as reformer of the duchy. It forms a chapter in history of too wide a range and of too many details to admit of compression within a few pages. We may say, in conclusion, that, in perusing this biography, we seem to be going over familiar ground, and yet almost every line contains something new. General history takes us through a great thoroughfare, making but few stops. Such books as the one before us, takes us a little way in the same route, but lands us at every stopping place, and gives us ample opportunity to examine every object of interest in the vicinity. With how many shadowy characters, known to us only as they appear once or twice on some great occasion, are we here made familiar! Such contributions are the best commentary on general history, at the same time that they have a romantic interest peculiarly their own. The acquaintance hereby formed with Rhegius is pleasant, both on its own account, and on account of the charming circle of friends to which it introduces us. He kept good society, and was admitted to the intimacy of many of whose private life we desire to have a more perfect knowledge. The biographer has been equally successful in the investigation and in the representation of his subject. May others, engaged in preparing this new series of biographies, have the good fortune to execute their task as well.

K. A. SCHMID'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EDUCATION AND INSTRUCTION; volume second and a part of volume third.

THIS work, the first volume of which was briefly noticed in the April number of 1859, p. 452, is too important to be classed among the literary novelties of the day. What was said in commendation of it then may be repeated with emphasis now. It is executed with a degree of ability, learning, professional knowledge, judgment, and profound Christian philosophy, rarely to be met with in such works. It will compare well with Herzog's Encyclopedia of Theology, Pauly's Encyclopedia of Classical Antiquity, or Smith's Dictionaries. The editor is aided in his editorial labors by Prof. Palmer, a distinguished author on education, and Prof. Wildermuth, both of the Tübingen university, and receives contributions from the ablest and best writers on the subject in Germany. One of its designs is to present a thoroughly philosophic and Christian view of education, which shall serve to displace the shallow "philanthropism" and gross rationalism which disfigure so many books on the subject, published during the present century. Without being polemic, it undermines the naturalism which would educate men, either as intelligent animals or as polished heathen. The range of topics is very wide; but every one is viewed in its special relations to education. The subjects on which instruction is given in the schools, the mental faculties to be employed and trained, systems of education, of instruction and discipline; philosophy, morals, and religion: the history of schools, of the school systems of different countries; biographies of men connected with education; and a multitude of technicalities relating to the schools, all find their appropriate place and their due share of attention in this work. Some articles are very long and some very short, but all of about the right length. The great wonder is that men could be found who have the ability and the leisure to condense the results of so much reading, experience, and observation, within such moderate limits. In numerous cases the writers show that they could have written a volume of solid and interesting matter on their respective topics. The work itself is almost equivalent to an educational library, while, in its several articles, it points out the best books on each subject.

The first article in volume second is on the office, relations, and duties of a "Director" of a gymnasium and other higher schools, by Deinhardt, himself a distinguished director of a gymnasium. It occupies ten closely printed royal octavo pages, and shows a master's hand.

The next article is on the treatment (including the removal) of unworthy teachers, especially those of the higher schools of learning (Disciplinarverfahren gegen Lehrer). The subject is treated on moral and legal grounds, as well as in the light of expediency, by one who understands both its importance and its delicacy. The third article is on "Dispensation" from certain required studies, such as Greek or mathematics, in the higher schools. In individual cases, a sparing and very cautious use of this is recommended. Then follows in order "cathedral schools" (Domschulen), "Division of Schools and Division of Labor" (Doppelunterricht), "Dramatic Representations in Schools," "Dullness" (Dummheit), "Marriage" (Ehe, what marriages are favorable to the education of children, and what education is favorable to married life), "The Honors due to Teachers" (Ehrenrechte der Lehrer), "The Sentiment of Honor" (Ehrgefühl, its use in education), and others without number. These examples, given in the order in which they stand, are fair specimens of the kind of topics introduced into the work. Among the longer articles are those on France, occupying 66 pages; on learned Schools, 56 pages; History in Schools, 51 pages; Göthe, what use to make of his works in schools, 24 pages; Great Britain, its system of education, 83 pages; Gymnasia, 62 pages;

the Kingdom of Hanover, its system of education, 74 pages; and the Hebrew Language, 32 pages. It is not too much to say that several of these articles, taken singly, are worth nearly the price of the whole book. That on France gives us the history of education in that country during the middle ages, and from that time to the present; an account of the colleges, of the scientific and professional, as well as lower schools of France; of the courses of study pursued in them, and the modes of instruction adopted. The article on learned schools, is written with an insight, a wise selection of matter, and with a judgment and skill that excite admiration. Only he who has wandered through books of learned lumber, finding everything except what he wants, can fully appreciate the value of such an article. The historical view is complete; and the character of the education now given in the universities and gymnasia is well represented.

The article on the place of History in the Schools, discusses clearly and ably all the fundamental questions relating to this much-debated subject, such as: What is history? Should it be taught in the schools? What portions of it should be introduced? In what manner should instruction in it be given? In nothing are we more behind the Germans than in the manner of teaching history. Every teacher of it in our colleges and higher institutions of learning would do well to read what is here written.

The article on Great Britain contains, among other things, the most complete, exact, and detailed account of the system of instruction in the English Grammar or Latin schools, — Eaton, Rugby, Harrow, Westminster, Winchester, etc., — which we have ever seen. The courses of study, the methods of instruction, and the character of English scholarship, are portrayed by one who knows what education is, and who knows what those schools are? An account given by one who has such an eye and such a discriminating judgment, is worth a hundred of those loose accounts furnished by the London book market. Arnold's Life must always be excepted from the common class of books on education. Tom Brown gives more amusement than instruction. From him we learn much of the boisterous life of the Rugby boys, but precious little about their studies.

To a college officer the article on the German gymnasia will be the most important and the most interesting. Almost every question relating to a liberal education is discussed here in a light more or less new. The gymnasia, like our colleges, are neither professional nor practical schools, but schools for general culture. They are, as John Sturm three centuries ago said, distinguished from other schools by the development of the reason and of the power of speech, — *ratione et oratione*. The chief defect of the old gymnasia was the predominance of the "*verbalia*," almost to the exclusion of the "*realia*." Next followed the shallow utilitarian period inaugurated by Campe, Bassedow, and other "philanthropists." This unfortunate experiment of teaching in the gymnasia what might be better learned on the farm or by visiting mechanics' shops, and by travelling, only prepared the way for the triumph of Wolf, Hermann, Thiersch, and Böchk, in reestablishing on a firmer foundation than ever, the study of the ancient classics. The period of the greatest development of the German gymnasia falls within the last fifty years, in which there are two distinct stages, divided with tolerable accuracy by the year 1835.

Through the influence of the great philologists, the study of antiquity was extended in the universities. At the same time, modern science came to be more fully represented in them. This circumstance created new demands upon the gymnasia, which were preparatory to the universities. The greatest exertions were made, during the first half of the period above mentioned, both by the government and by the "directors" and professors of the gymnasia, to elevate these schools to a higher position. An abler and nobler body of men than the Prussian educators of this period, including the cabinet ministers of education and teachers in the gymnasia, is hardly to be found in any age or country. What was the effect? It was that the ancient languages were studied with enthusiasm on the one hand, and mathematics and the modern sciences were placed side by side with them on the other.

This introduces the second half of the period named above, which opens with Dr. Lorinser's celebrated book on the Health of Students in the schools (zum Schutze der Gesundheit in der Schulen). The ground taken was, that while education was promoted, the health of the young men was ruined by this overstrained system of instruction. Though the array of facts presented by this medical writer was attended with some exaggerations, there was enough of truth and reason in what he said to produce an immense sensation in the minds of the most thoughtful men. Its first effect was to favor a division of study by establishing scientific schools (Realschulen, Realgymnasien), or by elevating and strengthening those already in existence. The friends of the Realschulen were not content with their establishment as practical schools to educate men of business, but wished to make them rivals of the gymnasia by making them schools of general culture, substituting mathematics for Greek. This experiment awakened two inquiries: first, whether two classes of schools of general culture could both prosper for any long period. Would not both suffer on account of the divided attention of the people, or the one prosper at the expense of the other? Secondly, whether general culture, founded on modern science and literature, could ever safely be made a substitute for the old system of liberal education. On these points, earnest controversies sprang up; both sides of which, as well as several mediating views, were ably argued by distinguished educators. Meanwhile numerous experiments were tried. Realgymnasien, or schools of science, were organized, equipped. and manned, like the other gymnasia. In some schools there were parallel courses, classical and scientific, either of which might be chosen by the students. The experiment has not proved satisfactory. The importance attached to the study of the languages was diminished in the minds of the students. Preparation in the lower schools was relaxed. The loss of classical culture thus caused, was not made good by the training given in the scientific schools. The result was undeniably a lowering in the tone of liberal education.

There is therefore, already, a return to a prescribed and uniform course of instruction, in which classical study is insisted on, as that with which liberal culture must stand or fall.

Another plan recommended by distinguished writers, and adopted in part, is, by a reconstruction of the whole course of study, to provide equally for the ancient languages and for the modern sciences in the same school. Theoretically, this plan seems to be justified, inasmuch as it furnishes the training and the knowledge which the present age demands. Without the study of the ancient classics, the mind of the pupil will be imperfectly trained; without a knowledge of modern science, it will be uninformed. The only difficulty is in practice. How is all this to be accomplished in the time now allotted to our courses of study? Shall the students be "put through" all these studies? That will produce habits of haste and superficiality. Shall the courses all be commenced, but left unfinished? That will leave the student without a firm footing anywhere, — a condition which is most unfriendly to literary enthusiasm and sound scholarship. Such a plan, though supported by an abstract view of the studies themselves, falls through, the moment we attempt to apply it to the nature and capacities of the youthful mind. It imposes upon the young much work which can be well performed only in maturer years.

Concentration and limitation of study only remain; and this is the theory most in favor at the present time. But who shall have the courage to proscribe any one of the studies that have been generally introduced? Our author proposes to drop the writing of Latin and Greek, and apply the time thus saved to modern science and the modern languages. Does he suppose that he can persuade the professors of the ancient languages to teach after his method? Will they not say that it is best to teach thoroughly, or not teach at all? Where is there an example of a thorough Latin scholar, who never learned to write Latin? No sensible man will advocate devoting less attention to the study of our native language. In the German gymnasia, general history might, perhaps, be more restricted. In most American colleges, little would be left, if the course of history were to be materially abridged. Others propose to drop all the modern languages but one, leaving them for private or future study. This may be necessary; but many men, in and out of the schools, will acquiesce in such a view very reluctantly. To attempt to make inroads upon the mathematics would be about as hopeless an undertaking as to set aside the classics. Indeed, there is now a pretty general agreement that the ancient languages and mathematics are the two main pillars of a liberal education. This is the view of the best German educators of the present day. Physics are considered as a counterpart of mathematics, or to hold to that study the same relation that literature does to language. Therefore there can be no retrenchment here. Which, then, of the children of the family shall be the victim? We will not venture to decide; but there are in Germany, just at this time, men not a few in number, nor inconsiderable in influence, who apply the knife somewhat unsparingly to the several branches of natural history. Let the indignation of the naturalists, therefore, be directed against them.

We have been thus full (comparatively) in respect to the Article on the gymnasia, partly in order to indicate what kind of questions are discussed in this profound and elaborate work, and partly on account of the interest which it is believed will be felt in the topics themselves. We have followed rather the spirit than the form of the Article, and have omitted much more than we have presented. Is it too much to say that we have no work in the English language which treats of the whole subject of education with such fulness, such power, and such judgment?

MAX MULLER'S LECTURES ON THE SCIENCE OF LANGUAGE.[1]

A COURSE of lectures on the science of language, by the author of the "History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature," and of the "Languages of the Seat of the War," could scarcely fail of exciting great expectations in the minds of scholars on both sides of the Atlantic. These expectations have not been disappointed. With learning worthy of a German professor holding a fellowship at Oxford, the author has successfully combined a correct and clear English style quite remarkable for a foreigner, and a popular mode of treatment, which renders a somewhat dry and difficult subject intelligible and attractive even to a miscellaneous audience.

There are nine lectures, each treating a topic sufficiently distinct and important, though, at the same time, admitting, of necessity, more or less of miscellaneous matter. We propose to sketch a brief outline of the leading doctrines, without marking carefully the division of the lectures, expressing them in the language of the author, or our own, as we may find most and convenient .

The *Science* of language (for this is our author's theme) scarcely dates further back than the beginning of the present century. Its very name is still unsettled. The French call it *Linguistique*. The English have been wont to speak of it as *Comparative Philology*. But philology treats language only as a means to an understanding of the literature and history of nations, and ultimately to tracing the social, moral, intellectual, and religious progress of the human race. In the science of Language, on the contrary, language is the end. Language itself is the object of inquiry. We do not want to know languages, but language, its origin, its nature, its laws. Moreover, philology is a historical science, like the history of art, of law, of poetry and philosophy, of politics and religion. But the science of language is a physical and an inductive science, like botany, geology, anatomy, and other branches of the study of nature. Language is continually changing, but these changes are as entirely beyond the control of man as the changes in his own physical system, or the phenomena of the material universe. We might as well think of changing the laws which control the circulation of our blood, or of adding an inch to our height, as of altering the laws of speech, or inventing new words according to our own pleasure. Language is a *growth*, and has a continuous life, like a tree. Or more exactly, it is a deposit, and has its periods of deposition, of upheaval and subsidence, and then of attrition, abrasion, and degradation, like the crust of the earth. In all these respects, it clearly resembles the works of God rather than the productions of men; and thus it proves itself to be one of the physical rather than the historical sciences.

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[1] Lectures on the Science of Language, delivered at the Royal Institution of Great Britain in April, May, and June, 1861. By Max Müller, M. A., Fellow of All Soul's College, Oxford, etc. London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts. 1861. pp. 399.

What we call growth in language comprises two processes (analogous to the two processes just alluded to in the *growth* of the crust of the earth), which Müller calls phonetic decay, and dialectical regeneration. So soon as a language becomes fixed by writing and the usage of scholars, its words begin to wear away, and lose more or less of their original elements, especially their terminations. Compare the Attic with the Ionic dialect in the Greek language, and the earlier with the later forms of French or English. This is phonetic decay. But in the course of ages there comes a revolution which sweeps away the established language and literature, and brings in, or brings up, some one or more of the popular dialects, which *seem* to be a new creation, but which, in fact, have been growing and forming for a long time beneath the surface. Thus Latin was the dialect of Latium, in Latium the dialect of Rome, in Rome the dialect of the patricians. The sources of Italian are to be found in the *popular* dialects of *Italy*. This is dialectical regeneration. Phonetic decay, as well as dialectical regeneration, is subject to laws, which distinguish one language from another, and enable the scholar who knows them, to predict in what form any Latin word, for instance, will appear, if it appears at all, in any one of the six Romance languages.

Like the other physical and inductive sciences, the science of language must pass — has, in fact, passed, or is passing — through three stages, the empirical, the classificatory, and the theoretical. The formation of grammars and lexicons belongs to the empirical stage. Of these, grammars are by far the most important; for the grammar of a language is its vital element and its essential characteristic. The principles and very much of the terminology of modern grammar may be traced back through the Roman and Greek grammarians to Alexandria and Athens. Beginning with the schools of philosophy at Athens, and greatly enlarged and improved by the Alexandrian critics and the scholars of Pergamus, grammar attained its greatest growth and importance at Rome, as a means of teaching Roman youth the Greek language; for at Rome, to know Greek was the same as to be a gentleman; Roman youth read Greek books, they conversed in Greek, they even wrote in Greek. The first real Greek grammar was that of Dionysius Thrax, a pupil of the Alexandrian critic Aristarchus, who settled in Rome, and wrote a practical grammar of the Greek language for his Roman pupils; and that grammar is still in existence, and we see in it manifestly the basis and framework of the grammar of the modern European languages.

The science of language never reached its classificatory stage among the

Greeks. The only classification they condescended to make was that of Greek and barbarian. It was Christianity which first broke down the barrier between Jew and Gentile, Greek and barbarian, black and white. *Humanity* is a word which you look for in vain in Plato or Aristotle. The idea of mankind as one family, as the children of one God, is an idea of Christian growth. And the science of mankind, and of the languages of mankind, is a science which, without Christianity, would never have sprung into life. The real beginning of the science of language, therefore, dates from the day of Pentecost. But Christian philologists were long kept on a wrong track by the idea, universal among the Christian Fathers, that Hebrew was undoubtedly the mother of all languages. Leibnitz was the first to explode this idea. He declared that there was just as much reason to believe that Hebrew was the primitive language, as there was to suppose that Dutch was the language spoken in Paradise; and, as the first step in an inductive process, this philosopher set all the kings and princes in Europe to work, through their ambassadors, travellers, and missionaries, in collecting words and facts. Christian missionaries were among the earliest, as they have ever been among the most efficient, agents in this work. Hervas, a Jesuit missionary, collected himself and from other missionaries at Rome, specimens of 300 languages, and composed grammars of more than forty. Then follows the well-known work, Adelung's Mithridates, which represents the science of language at the beginning of the present century.

But the study of the Sanskrit language and literature, and the discovery of the close resemblance of the language to the Greek and Latin, and thus its connection with the modern European languages, by Sir William Jones, Carey, Wilkins, Forster, Colebrooke, and other members of the Asiatic Society, founded at Calcutta in 1784, was the dawn of a new day upon the science of language. In the hands of Bopp, Schlegel, Humboldt, Grimm, Pott, and other German scholars, the study of the Sanskrit, coupled with the study of the Zend by Rask and Burnouf, and the comparison of the principal languages of Europe and Asia, ancient and modern, soon led to the discovery of the threefold classification, designated by different names (Müller calls the classes Semitic, Aryan, and Turanian), but now received by scholars as an established fact in the science of language, and an invaluable key to the history of our race. The standard of classification is furnished by Comparative Grammar. The grammatical articulation of the several branches of the same family of languages (of Sanskrit, Zend, Greek, Latin, Celtic, Teutonic, and Sclavonic, for example, in the Aryan family), is radically the same, and seems to have been produced, once and for all, previous to their separation; and the apparent differences in the terminations of Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, etc., must be explained by laws of phonetic decay, peculiar to each dialect, which modified the original Aryan stock, and changed it into so many national languages.

All the words of the most copious language are reducible by analysis to a few roots. In the Chinese language, where the roots remain unchanged and may be easily traced, a dictionary of 50,000 words is built up from 450 roots. Hebrew and Sanskrit may be reduced to about 500 roots each. The number of *words* in common use by any writer or speaker is but a small part of the whole vocabulary of the language. The Old Testament uses only 5642; Milton, 8000; and Shakespeare, with all his affluence, only 15,000; whereas the number of words in the language is variously estimated from 50,000 to 100,000. It is very instructive and entertaining to take a root in one of the earlier languages (Müller takes the roots AR, and SPAC, in the Sanskrit), and follow their derivatives through all their changes of form and signification in the various branches of the same family, and see what a number of words and what a variety of meanings are the result.

Without dwelling on the author's distinction between *predicative* and *demonstrative* roots (more frequently distinguished as the radical and formal elements of speech), which he makes the basis of a *morphological* classification, quite independent of genealogical classification, and passing by his copious illustrations of both these classifications, we come to his concluding chapter, which is on the Theoretical Stage and the Origin of Language. Two theories have been started to explain the origin of roots. According to one, they are imitations of sounds; according to the other, they are involuntary interjections. The former he calls the *Bow-wow theory;* the latter the *Pooh-pooh theory*. After showing the inadequacy of these theories, maintaining that a great part even of the words which seem to be onomatopoetic are found not to be so when traced to their source, he propounds his own theory, in substance as follows: Roots are not imitations nor interjections, but *phonetic types* produced by a power inherent in human nature. Each substance in nature, when struck, has its peculiar ring. Gold rings differently from tin, wood differently from stone. It was the same with man, the most highly organized of nature's works. Man, in his primitive and perfect state, was endowed not only, like the brute, with the power of expressing his sensations by interjections, and his perceptions by onomatopoea; he possessed likewise, the faculty of giving more articulate expression to the rational conceptions of his mind. That faculty was not of his own making. It was an instinct, an instinct of the mind as irresistible as any other instinct. So far as language is the production of that instinct, it belongs to the realm of nature. Man loses his instincts as he ceases to want them. Thus the creative faculty, which gave to each conception, as it thrilled for the first time through the brain, a phonetic expression, became instinct when its object was fulfilled.

Müller's theory is, doubtless, preferable to the imitation and interjection theories, which no one now defends. But we think he goes too far in denying the reality of the greater part of acknowledged onomatopoeas. At least, he is not successful in disproving them. It is no proof that the names of certain sounds are not imitations of the sounds, because they are different in different languages. No two children would imitate thunder, or the cry of the whip-poor-will, just alike; and yet both would give approximate imitations. We do not admit that the English word *thunder* is no imitation of the thing, simply because its root can be traced back through the Latin to a Sanskrit root which means *to stretch.* Müller is, as might be expected, perhaps, a worshipper of the Sanskrit. We believe that not only roots but words, and not only Sanskrit words but Greek and Latin and English words—words in all languages—are still, to a great extent, *phonetic types* of ideas; that it is not necessary to go back to the Sanskrit or the Gothic, as Müller does, in order to discover a reason for the significance of the *ed* in the word *loved;* that the class of letters, or rather of articulate sounds, to which *d* belongs, viz. the dentals, by reason of the very organ by which they are uttered, and the very process of utterance, naturally express an action finish*ed*, or brought to an en*d;* and that, in like manner, all the several classses of articulate sounds, from the very nature of the sounds, or from some *analogy* in the organs and processes of utterance, are phonetic types naturally adapted to express certain classes of ideas. If we were disposed to turn against the author his own weapons of ridicule, we might call his theory the *Ring* theory, from his favorite illustration, or the *Crust* theory, so far does he carry his analogy between the origin and growth of language and the crust of the earth, with its primitive deposits, upheavals, subsidences, and abrasions.

We might also point out some apparent inconsistencies in the carrying out of his doctrines, in different lectures. But the book is a very interesting and very valuable contribution to a science, which, recent as it is, has already risen to a high place among the sciences, and is second to none of them in the light which it sheds on the great problems of anthropology and theology. We rejoice to see that the author is devout, reverential, believing. He avows his full belief in the common origin of mankind — a belief which, he says, has been confirmed in his own mind, by Darwin's book "On the Origin of Species"; a belief which has been received by every nation that has any traditions on the origin of the race, and which finds new support at every stage in the progress of the science of language.

HEBREW AND ENGLISH PSALTER.[1]

THE neat little volume which bears the above title may be briefly characterized as a happy idea beautifully executed. The Hebrew text according to Hahn, with Rosenmüller's arrangement, in parallel clauses, occupies one column, and the English text of the Common Version another; the two standing side by side, so that, as far as the idioms of the two languages admit, the corresponding Hebrew and English clauses stand opposite to each other. In the few cases where the different order followed in the version makes such a parallelism impossible, it is indicated by braces enclosing the translation. As a specimen, we give the first six verses of the twenty-seventh Psalm, with the English and Hebrew titles.

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[1] ספר תהלים The Book of Psalms, in Hebrew and English. Arranged in Parallelism. Andover: Warren F. Draper. 1862.

תהלה כז		PSALM XXVII.
לְדָוִד ׀		*A Psalm of* David.
יְהוָה ׀ אוֹרִי וְיִשְׁעִי מִמִּי אִירָא יְהוָה מָעוֹז־חַיַּי מִמִּי אֶפְחָד׃	1	The Lord *is* my light and my salvation; whom shall I fear? The Lord *is* the strength of my life; of whom shall I be afraid?
בִּקְרֹב עָלַי ׀ מְרֵעִים לֶאֱכֹל אֶת־בְּשָׂרִי צָרַי וְאֹיְבַי לִי הֵמָּה כָּשְׁלוּ וְנָפָלוּ׃	2	{ When the wicked, *even* mine enemies and my foes, Came upon me to eat up my flesh, They stumbled and fell. }
אִם־תַּחֲנֶה עָלַי ׀ מַחֲנֶה לֹא־יִירָא לִבִּי אִם־תָּקוּם עָלַי מִלְחָמָה בְּזֹאת אֲנִי בוֹטֵחַ׃	3	Though an host should encamp against me, My heart shall not fear: Though war should rise against me, In this *will* I *be* confident.
אַחַת ׀ שָׁאַלְתִּי מֵאֵת־יְהוָה אוֹתָהּ אֲבַקֵּשׁ שִׁבְתִּי בְּבֵית־יְהוָה כָּל־יְמֵי חַיַּי לַחֲזוֹת בְּנֹעַם־יְהוָה וּלְבַקֵּר בְּהֵיכָלוֹ׃	4	One *thing* have I desired of the Lord, That will I seek after; That I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life, To behold the beauty of the Lord, And to inquire in his temple.
כִּי יִצְפְּנֵנִי ׀ בְּסֻכֹּה בְּיוֹם רָעָה יַסְתִּרֵנִי בְּסֵתֶר אָהֳלוֹ בְּצוּר יְרוֹמְמֵנִי׃	5	For in the time of trouble he shall hide me in his pavilion: In the secret of his tabernacle shall he hide me; He shall set me upon a rock.
וְעַתָּה יָרוּם רֹאשִׁי עַל אֹיְבַי סְבִיבוֹתַי וְאֶזְבְּחָה בְאָהֳלוֹ זִבְחֵי תְרוּעָה אָשִׁירָה וַאֲזַמְּרָה לַיהוָה׃	6	And now shall mine head be lifted up above mine enemies round about me: Therefore will I offer in his tabernacle sacrifices of joy; I will sing, yea, I will sing praises unto the Lord.

The reader will notice that the second verse of the translation is enclosed in braces, because it differs from the Hebrew order, which is as follows:

> "Upon the coming against me of the wicked to eat up my flesh —
> My enemies and my foes — they stumbled and fell."

The preacher in expounding to his congregation one of the Psalms of David, will find it very convenient to have the original by the side of the English version. For private reading and meditation, also, such an arrangement will be found very pleasant and profitable. We feel confident that this little volume will be a favorite with Hebrew scholars; and that, when they have once become habituated to it, it will be, to many of them, a *vade mecum.*

THE BIBLE AND THE CLASSICS.[1]

A BOOK from the South has always been comparatively a rare thing, like the *rara avis* of Horace, or Virgil's *rari nantes in gurgite vasto.* And the phenomenon grew more and more infrequent as the Southern states drew nearer to the gulf of secession. The public may well be surprised, therefore, at the appearance in 1861, the year of the great rebellion, of this beautiful octavo of 560 pages on the Bible and the Classics, from the pen of the lamented Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church of Virginia, and from the press of those good Presbyterians, Robert Carter and brothers, of New York.

It appears from the author's preface, that after laboring in vain more than forty years to persuade others, in his view better qualified, to undertake the work, the bishop, whose praise has long been in other "*churches*" besides his own, felt it his duty to forestall scepticism and cavilling by attempting an elucidation of the real bearing of the poetry and philosophy of heathen nations, and especially of the Greek and Latin classics, upon the Bible. This he has done with much zeal and industry. He gives a list of more than fifty distinct works, which he has consulted in the preparation. As might be expected, perhaps, the majority of these were standard works among the last rather than the present generation of scholars. Still the number is not small of such recent authors as Wiseman, Wilkinson, Rawlinson, Trench, Guyot, Hitchcock, Hugh Miller, Taylor Lewis, Fairbanks, etc. Of German authors he has made little use. Müller on the Eumenides is the only German work which appears in the list. He has made free use of these works, and of Articles in American Quarterlies, extracting copiously from them, and scrupulously giving credit for his extracts. Among others, he has drawn pretty largely from the columns of the Bibliotheca, particularly from the articles on the Theology of Aeschylus and Sophocles. With a modesty equal to his integrity and his well-known charity, the author claims only to be a compiler. The book is a thesaurus of opinions and arguments quoted directly or indirectly from an immense number of writers, on the connection between profane and sacred literature; and for these, it is really valuable to clergymen and others interested in that most important subject, though they will not always find these as well arranged and digested as they could wish. The following sentences from the preface will indicate the author's point of view: "There is no sentiment more generally admitted, than that 'the universal consent of mankind points to truth.' If, notwithstanding great perversions and corruptions, the various religions of earth point to some early facts common to them all, we have only to examine diligently where the first and true account is to be found, and then show the origin and history of all departures from the same."

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[1] The Bible and the Classics. By the Right Reverend William Meade, Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church of Virginia. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1861.

OWEN'S XENOPHON'S ANABASIS.[1]

PROFESSOR Owen's first edition of the Anabasis was published nearly twenty years since, and was the first of his classical works. As originally prepared, it was very favorably received and extensively used. The present edition has been prepared after an additional experience of twenty years in classical teaching, and increased familiarity with the language, acquired by editing several other valuable classical works. Nor are Professor Owen's own studies and experience the only advantage with which he comes to the preparation of this new edition. There has been marked progress in the study of Greek in the period referred to; and much valuable apparatus, in grammatical works, in travels illustrative of the topography, and in antiquities, is now accessible, which did not then exist in so definite and reliable a form. The present edition shows the rich fruits of these advantages, and is itself an index of our classical progress.

Besides the grammatical references in the Notes, there are very full references, through the first Book, to Kühner's Elementary grammar, and to Professor Hadley's grammar.

The work in its present form, with the beautiful Porsonian Greek type, with pertinent and well-digested Notes, furnishes the student all the necessary material, in the best form, for a critical and comprehensive study of this beautiful narrative.

Rev. Dr. Whedon's statement of the Doctrines of Methodism, which appears in the first Article of our present Number, forms the second Article in a Series, the design of which is to present the distinctive peculiarities of each theological school or sect, and to present them in such a form that the friends of that school or sect shall not complain that their views are misrepresented. The Series has been deemed important for obtaining, within a brief compass, an accurate knowledge of the present phases of theological belief among the different denominations of our land. See Prospectus of Bib. Sac. pp. 3, 4.

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[1] The Anabasis of Xenophon; chiefly according to the text of L. Dindorf, with Notes: for the use of Schools and Colleges. By John J. Owen, D.D., LL.D., Professor of the Latin and Greek Languages and Literature in the Free Academy in New York City. Revised edition. 12mo. pp. 436. New York: Leavitt and Allen. 1862.

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ARTICLE I.

CHURCH-BOOK OF THE PURITANS AT GENEVA, FROM 1555 TO 1560.[1]

(PRESERVED IN THE ARCHIVES OF THE HOTEL DE VILLE, GENEVA.

BY HORATIO B. HACKETT, PROFESSOR AT NEWTON.

Who the Refugees were.

The existence of this document became known to the writer during a recent visit to Geneva, in the course of some investigations relating to the translation of the Scriptures into English known as the Genevan Version, and prepared under the auspices of the English refugees in that city, in the age of Calvin and Knox.[1] These refugees were the pioneers of the Puritans, and belong to the class of men who, during the evil days of the relapse into popery, under the persecuting Mary, sought an asylum in Switzerland and Germany. There, as Macaulay recites, they "had been hospitably received by their brethren in the faith, had sat at the feet of the great doctors of Strasburg, Zurich, and Geneva, and had been, during some years, accustomed to a more simple worship, and to a more democratical form of church government than England had yet seen. These men returned to their country, convinced that the reform which had been effected under king Edward had been far less searching and extensive than the interests of pure religion required. But it was in vain that they attempted to obtain any concession from Elizabeth. Indeed her system, wherever it differed from her brother's, seemed to them to differ for the worse. They were little disposed to submit, in matters of faith, to any human authority. They had recently, in reliance on their own interpretation of scripture, risen up against a church strong in immemorial antiquity and catholic consent. It was by no common exertion of intellectual energy that they had thrown off the yoke of that gorgeous and imperial superstition; and it was vain to expect that, immediately after such an emancipation, they would patiently submit to a new spiritual tyranny. Long accustomed, when the priest lifted up the host, to bow down with their faces to the earth, as before a present God, they had learned to treat the mass as an idolatrous mummery . . . . . Since these men could not be convinced, it was determined that they should be persecuted. Persecution produced its natural effects on them. It found them a sect; it made them a faction. To their hatred of the church was now added hatred of the crown. The two sentiments were intermingled, and each imbittered the other. The opinions of the Puritan concerning the relation of ruler and subject were widely different from those which were inculcated in the homilies. His favorite divines had, both by precept and by example, encouraged resistance to tyrants and persecutors. His fellow Calvinists in France, in Holland, and in Scotland, were in arms against idolatrous and cruel princes. His notions, too, respecting the government of the state, took a tinge from his notions respecting the government of the church. Some of the sarcasms which were popularly thrown on episcopacy, might, without much difficulty, be turned against royalty; and many of the arguments which were used to prove that spiritual power was best lodged in a synod, seemed to lead to the conclusion that temporal power was best lodged in a parliament."

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[1] This title may not be so exact, historically, as 'Notice of the English Colony'; but it may be sufficiently exact, even as characterizing the religious position of this class of men, and is adopted as more suggestive of the aspect of the document which sets forth its special claim to attention among us. This English Church at Geneva, according to Fuller, almost a contemporary historian, took stronger ground against traditions and ceremonies than any of the exiles who fled to the continent on account of their opposition to Romanism.

[2] Les persécutions d'Angleterre contre l'Evangile faisoient, de ce temps, venir beaucoup d'Angloys à Genève, qui y dressèrent Eglise pour leur nation, vivans paisiblement et en bonne conversation. — (Chronique de Michel Roset, Livre V. Chap. 71. Ms. des Archives.)

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[1] It is an incorrect opinion that this version was designed specially for the English community at Geneva, or for the English refugees generally on the Continent of Europe. The authors of it, in their letter of explanation, address themselves to a much wider public: *To our beloved in the Lord, the brethren of England, Scotland, and Ireland.* This Genevan version was for a long time a rival of the now current version, which displaced the former only by degrees. Nine editions of it appeared in seven years after 1611, and it continued to be printed at intervals (sometimes by the king's printer, *cum privilegio regiae majestatis*) until 1644, and possibly much later. Under Cromwell measures were taken by Parliament to revise it, as superior to any other translation, but the political troubles put an end to the design. See the tract by *Philalethes*, p. 19. It is understood that some of the earliest clergymen who emigrated to this country used the Genevan version along with the authorized one, and that some of the first churches established here were better acquainted with it than with the other.

FORTUNES OF THE BOOK.

Any memorial, slight as it may be in itself, which derives dignity and interest from its connection with men who have acted such a part in their generation, whose influence recast, to some extent, the political and religious institutions of England, and has shaped the destiny of the dominant race of our own continent, is worthy of attention, and should be treasured up by those who revere their principles, with pious care and homage. It seems that the company of these exiles who sojourned at Geneva kept a brief record of their history as the members of a religious community, and that this record, on their return to England, was left in that city, and is preserved there still, in one of the public libraries. What fortunes it has shared, in the long interval between that day and this, may not be easily known. The last persons of the company who went back to England, gave the book to the magistrates of the city as a token of their regard and as a memorial of the friendship which had bound the strangers and their benefactors to each other. There is reason to believe that this manuscript is known to few comparatively, even at the present time. Still more, in former generations it must have been left to slumber in its hiding places, and have been there quite unnoticed, save as the eye of some antiquary may have chanced to light upon it. It appears to have been overlooked by most of the later writers on this branch of English history.[1] It may not furnish any important additions to our knowledge; but it has some value, certainly, as a means of controlling dates, and of enabling us to trace the movements of some of the leaders of the Reformation during the earlier and more uncertain part of their lives.

ITS PRESERVATION AT GENEVA.

It was an ample reward for a distracting search of nearly two days (I had nothing but a vague rumor to guide me at first) to discover at length the object of my pursuit in the archives of the Hôtel de Ville. Three centuries have rolled away since the fingers which wrote the pages of that book have mouldered back to dust. Some of the brightest names in the annals of human courage and self-sacrifice are recorded in it. It was no common gratification assuredly to be able to take into one's own hands so interesting a relic of that distant and eventful age. The librarian granted readily my request to see the volume, and to be allowed to make some memoranda of its appearance and contents. Before proceeding far in this examination, I was informed that a member of the Society of History and Archaeology in Geneva had read a dissertation upon this very subject before that body, which had been printed in one of their annual publications.[2] The librarian showed me the Article; and on looking it over I saw at once that it was much more complete than any description which I could prepare myself to give as the result of the hurried examination of a few hours. The author is Monsieur Th. Heyer, whose name is attached to other valuable papers in the same collection. Instead of relying, therefore, on my own recollections and personal inspection of the manuscript, I feel that I should be dealing much more fairly with those whom the subject may interest, if I simply transcribe from the original French the substantial parts of this dissertation, which fell so opportunely into my hands.

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[1] Mr. Hopkins, author of the History of the Puritans, informs the writer that he has met with no reference to this manuscript in the works which he has consulted.

[2] Société d'Histoire et d'Archéologie de Genève. The Article was presented on the 24th of March, 1853. Ten volumes of the "Mémoirs et Documents" of the Society had been published in 1854.

Some paragraphs have been omitted and others abridged as involving some repetition, or possessing a local rather than a general interest. Some additions have been made, partly in the body of the piece, but chiefly in the form of notes, and of a fuller expansion of the personal notices which illustrate the significancy of the names and incidents mentioned, from the nature of the case, so briefly in the record. Some of the letters, and extracts from letters, which M. Heyer translated from Latin into French either existed at first in English or have been translated into English by other hands. These original letters or the translations I have generally adopted, with a few slight changes, after comparing them with the original copies.[1] The few added portions, consisting principally of facts designed for the confirmation or illustration of the text of M. Heyer's Article, have been drawn from the sources named or intimated in the course of the Essay.[2]

History of the Colony.

From the year 1553, when Mary succeeded Edward VI. upon the throne of England, a great number of the adherents of the reformation came upon the Continent to seek a place where they might freely profess their faith. Some of them repaired at first to France, others to different States of the North, and finally, about the middle of 1554, a small company of them arrived at Frankfort. Having found in this city a French church, recently established, the English easily obtained of the magistrates the same favor. They were allowed to celebrate their worship in the temple provided for the French, on condition, however, that they should not innovate too much in their ceremonies.[1]

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[1] This could be done the more easily, as the Latin letters of Calvin, for instance, accompany the original Article. The limits of this mode of publication make it impossible to print them here.

[2] The main reliance has been on the publications of the *Parker Society*, relating to the Fathers and early writers of the reformed English Church. The contents of this 'Book of the English,' with a fac-simile of the chirography, might well form the subject of a tract by this Society, or at least of an appendix to one of the volumes.

Thus situated, the English here entered into correspondence with their compatriots established in Strasbourg, Zurich and other places. They sought to organize themselves, and ere long received additions to their number. John Knox, Richard Cox, and other distinguished men joined them. But if they were all agreed to repudiate the Romish faith, they were not all agreed for a long time on certain points of doctrine, and especially on forms of worship. Hence, arose discussions more or less violent, in which their brethren elsewhere in Germany and in Switzerland were led to take part.[2] The circumstances of this controversy are related at great length in a curious work[3] which appeared for the first time in 1575, and which has been reprinted as late as 1846.

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[1] This means, as we learn from the Narrative of the Frankfort Troubles, that they should follow the worship of the French Protestants as their model.

[2] "The exiles," says Neale, in his History of the Puritans, "were most numerous at Frankfort, where that contest and division began which gave rise to the PURITANS, and to that separation from the Church of England which continues to this day." One of the parties insisted that they should adhere to the liturgy and form of worship established under Edward VI., and the other, that they ought to recede further from the Romish usages, in imitation of the reformed churches on the Continent. Knox belonged to the progressive party, and, among other arguments, urged that when Providence affords us a time and place for reforming abuses, we are guilty of treason against God if we neglect the opportunity.

[3] A brief Discourse of the Troubles begun at Frankfort in the Year 1555. This narrative has been ascribed to Whittingham, whose name occurs so often in this account of the Church-Book. No one can read the narrative with a knowledge of the facts of Whittingham's history, without perceiving in it many indications which favor strongly that opinion of its authorship. The edition of the 'Discourse' which I have used is that in the 'Phœnix' (Vol. I., p. 44, sq.), printed at London in 1708.

Some among them, therefore, wrote to Calvin; and in the printed correspondence of this reformer we find the letter which he sent in reply to the English refugees at Frankfort. The nature of their representation to him may be inferred from his answer to them. The best history of this question, so fruitful in its results, is furnished by the letter of Calvin, which we here subjoin:

> "*To the godly and learned men, Mr. John Knox and Mr. William Whittingham, his faithful brethren at Frankfort, etc.*
>
> This thing truly grieveth me very much, and it is a great shame that contention should arise among brethren, banished and driven out of their country for one faith, and for that cause which only ought to have holden you bound together, as it were, with an holy band, in this your dispersion. For what might you do better in this dolorous and miserable plague, than (being pulled violently from your country) to procure yourselves a church which should receive and nourish you (being joined together in minds and language) in her motherly lap? But now for some men to strive as touching the form of prayer and for ceremonies, as though ye were at rest and prosperity, and to suffer that to be an impediment that ye cannot there join into one body of the church (as I think), it is too much out of season.
>
> Yet notwithstanding, I allow their constancy which strive for a just cause, being forced against their wills unto contention; I do worthily condemn frowardness, which doth hinder and stay the holy carefulness of reforming the church.
>
> And as I behave myself gentle and tractable in mean things (as external ceremonys), so do I not always judge it profitable to give place to the foolish stoutness, which will forsake nothing of their own wonted custom. In the liturgy of *England* I see that there were many tolerable foolish things (*ineptiae tolerabiles*); by these words I mean, that there was not the purity which was to be desired. These vices, though they could not at the first day be amended, yet, seeing there was manifest impiety, they were for a season to be tolerated. Therefore it was lawful to begin of such rudiments or abcedarys, but so, that it behooved the learned, grave, and godly ministers of Christ to enterprise farther, and to set forth something more fil'd from rust, and purer. If godly religion had flourished till this day in *England*, there ought to have been a thing better corrected, and many things clean taken away. Now when these principles be overthrown, a church must be set up in another place, where ye may freely make an order again, which shall be apparent to be most commodious to the use and edification of the church. I cannot tell what they mean which so greatly delight in the leavings of Popish dregs. They love the things whereunto they are accustomed. First of all, this is a thing both trifling and childish; furthermore, this new order far differeth from a change.

Therefore, as I would not have you fierce over them whose infirmity will not suffer to ascend an higher step; so would I advertise others, that they please not themselves too much in their foolishness; also, that by their frowardness, they do not let the course of the holy building: last of all, lest that foolish vain glory steal them away. For what cause have they to contend, except it be for that they are ashamed to give place to better things? But I speak in vain to them which perchance esteem me not so well, as they will vouchsafe to admit the counsel that cometh from such an author. If they fear the evil rumor in *England*, as though they had fallen from that religion which was the cause of their banishment, they are far deceived; for this true and sincere religion will rather compel them that there remain, faithfully to consider into what deep gulf they have fallen; for their downfall shall more grievously wound them, when they perceive you going forward beyond midcourse, from the which they are turn'd. Farewel, dearly beloved brethren, and faithful servants of Christ, the Lord defend and govern you. From Geneva, this 22d of January, Anno, 1555.

Yours, JOHN CALVIN.

This letter is dated the twenty-eighth of January,[1] 1555. We recognize in it the tone of a man who is accustomed to be heard, and who, while he gives wise counsels for the maintenance of peace, evinces clearly his desire that these English should advance still further in the work of the reformation. It is to these various suggestions, probably, that one of the parties replies on the fifth of April, in a letter preserved in our Public Library.[2] A few sentences from it will show its character.

"*Greeting:* After that our very dear brother Thomas Sampson had communicated to us, sometime since, the letter that you wrote to him touching our common controversy with certain brethren, we considered it a mark of our duty and regard to you to inform you, as early as possible, of all that has been done, and with what design. But though it may, perhaps, seem to you somewhat late to write to you, when the matter is altogether brought to a termination: yet we implore you by Jesus Christ, not to suppose that the delay has arisen from any desire unduly to undervalue your authority. For it both is, and ought to be, most highly esteemed and regarded, not only by ourselves, but by the world at large. But since your reverence was many days' journey distant from us, and because there was great hope that all that controversy could be settled with less inconvenience between the brethren themselves, we were unwilling to disturb your most important occupations by our trifling and domestic concerns.

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[1] The date in the Phoenix edition is January 22.

[2] Bibliothèque publique de Genève: Lettres diverses a Calvin, Vol. CXIII.

But though we are very loth to suspect our brethren of anything that savors of insincerity, we are, nevertheless, somewhat afraid that the whole affair and case has not been set before you with sufficient explicitness. For neither are we so entirely wedded to our country, as not to be able to endure any customs differing from our own; nor is the authority of those fathers and martrys of Christ so much regarded by us, as that we have any scruple in thinking or acting in opposition to it. And we have not only very frequently borne witness to this by our assertions, but have at length proved it by our actions. For when the magistrates lately gave permission to adopt the rites of our native country, we freely relinquished all those ceremonies which were regarded by our brethren as offensive and inconvenient. For we gave up private baptisms, confirmation of children, saints' days, kneeling at the holy communion, the linen surplices of the ministers, crosses, and other things of the like character. And we gave them up; not as being impure and papistical, which certain of our brethren often charged them with being; but whereas they were in their own nature different, and either ordained or allowed by godly fathers for the edification of our people, we, notwithstanding, chose rather to lay them aside than to offend the minds, and alienate the affections of the brethren. We retain, however, the remainder of the form of prayer and of the administration of the sacraments, which is prescribed in our book, and this with the consent of almost the whole church, the judgment of which in matters of this sort we did not think should be disregarded."

Among those who subscribed this letter, and who represented the moderate party in the church at Frankfort on this question of the needed ecclesiastical reforms, were men who had once occupied eminent stations in the church at home, or rose to them after the accession of Elizabeth. Such were Richard Cox, who had been tutor and almoner to Edward VI., and was afterwards bishop of Ely; Richard Alvey, who became prebendary of Westminster in 1552; Thomas Bacon, chaplain to Cranmer, and afterwards prebendary of Canterbury; Edwin Sandys, who was successively bishop of Worcester and London, and finally archbishop of York; Edmund Grindal, appointed to the sees of London, York, and Canterbury; Robert Horn, dean of Durham, and then bishop of Winchester; Thomas Lever, master of St. John's, Canterbury, and prebendary of Durham; and Thomas Sampson, who was afterwards dean of Christ's Church.[1]

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[1] See Notes in the Zurich Letters (2d series), Vol. II. p. 755. One of the

The other party, at the head of which was Knox, regarding itself as oppressed, did not remain inactive, but soon dispatched one of their number, William Whittingham, to Basil and to Geneva, at both which places he was equally well received. Calvin, as would appear from the sequel, promised to him an asylum for his friends; he showed to Whittingham the letter from which some extracts will be cited, and to which, on the last of May, he made a reply, which is translated in the Discourse of the Troubles at Frankfort. He there deplores anew these dissensions; but apprised as he was that the strife had grown out of the instigations of those whom he had seen, or who had often written to him, he spared not his reproofs, which he directed especially against the use of tapers, signs of the cross, and the like, which he rejected as superstitious.[1]

Upon this, some of those who had written to him the letter of the fifth of April, that is Cox, Bale, and others, sent to him a long letter, dated the twentieth of September. Though under forms of expression always respectful, they defend with warmth the party opposed to Knox and Whittingham, and expatiate, with evident satisfaction, on the misdeeds of these two friends of Calvin. They shrink not from attributing to Calvin himself a part in the rupture which they deplore. "Your letter," say they, "was to them like the club of Hercules, by which they believed that they could easily beat down all their opponents. And, indeed, your name ought deservedly to have influence, both with us and all godly persons. But if you had been well acquainted with their devices, and if you had been sufficiently aware of

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signers of the letter, David Whitehead, at a later period, embraced more thorough views, and was sequestered for non-conformity, in 1564.

[1] Our author has misunderstood Calvin's meaning here. Calvin, in his letter, alludes to these rites, not as prescribed in the English book of worship (which was not true), or as actually practised at Frankfort, but as admitted by his opponents to be wrong. He argues thence (*a majore ad minus*), that if they discarded the older ceremonies, they ought, with so much the more reason, to discard the later ones, for which no such plea of antiquity could be urged. It appears from their reply, that the defenders of Edward's liturgy also misunderstood Calvin's reasoning on this point.

their boldness and wicked designs, we have no doubt that you would never have suffered them to come near you, much less to impose on you in so barefaced a manner." They declare that they do not use lights or tapers in their worship; they justify their ceremonies as being not only unobjectionable in their character, but few in number. But as they say, it is by no means astonishing that these few and simple rites should appear too many, to *people who regard the public reading of the word of God as an irksome and useless ceremony.*[1] They recount at length the conduct of Knox, whom they charge with treason, for having published a book in which he was alleged to have uttered sentiments injurious to the German emperor, to Philip his son, the king of England, and Mary the queen.[2]

On the other side, Whittingham the next day after his return to Frankfort, wrote again to Calvin, that his friends there had already sent forward their effects, that they themselves would follow by as rapid journies as possible, and that they hoped to bring with them some of their countrymen at Basil.

ARRIVAL OF THE FUGITIVES AT GENEVA.

The chief of the church at Geneva had taken the necessary steps with the government to secure an asylum for his new friends. Already, on the tenth of June, the City Council was occupied with this subject. "Rev. Jean Calvin has represented that certain Englishmen are desirous to repair hither for the sake of the word of God, and asked that it may please the magistrates to open for them a church to enable them to preach and administer the sacraments. Therefore, Decreed that we advise the selecting of a proper place of worship for said English, and that the parties confer thereupon with Monsieur Calvin."[1]

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[1] It is well known that the public reading of the scriptures was regarded with disfavor in the early churches of New England. Prayers at funerals were unknown for a long time, and were introduced at length after much opposition. See Bib. Sacra, Vol. X. p. 61.

[2] This charge was aimed, in fact, at the life of Knox; for if a whisper of it had reached the ears of the Emperor, the reformer would have been seized and put to death. Nothing but the caution of one of the magistrates of the city saved Knox from such a fate. He was compelled, notwithstanding that protection, to leave Frankfort, and take up his abode at Geneva. The charge was founded chiefly on a sermon afterwards printed, which Knox had preached in Buckinghamshire, in which he had inveighed severely against the complicity of the sovereigns named above in the corruptions of the papal church.

This eminent man, at that time, was all powerful at Geneva. It so happened that he had occasion to make this request a few days only after the final overthrow of the Libertines. The leaders of this pestilent sect, arrested or dispersed, lay under the sentence of a capital condemnation, incurred by their attempt to effect a revolution in the state, under the pretext that too many foreigners were admitted to citizenship. They had been the political as well as the personal enemies of Calvin; and hence, deprived of their power at this precise moment, they were driven back and had left an open field to the friends of the strangers. Besides, if some of those who feared the influence of the French refugees were still found in the Council, they must have seen with pleasure the arrival of other strangers who would be able to balance the French influence. Thus everything concurred to favor the applicants, and to ensure their obtaining the same rights which had been granted to others.

Nevertheless, as several Englishmen had already arrived before any final action had been taken, Calvin, on the twentieth of October, presented himself anew before the Council, in support of his former request. He said that they had then promised to the strangers *Saint Germain* or *Notre Dame-la-Neuve*, and added: "At other times the said English had received other nations among themselves, and had given to them a church; but now it has pleased God to afflict them."[2] They appointed three councillors to examine the case and report. Subsequently, on the fourteenth of November, it was decided to grant, both to the English and to the Italians, the church of *Marie-la-Neuve*.[3] Finally, on the twenty-ninth of the same month, the two ministers named by the new congregation and paid by it, were approved by the Council and took the required oath.[1]

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[1] Registres du Conseil, vol. de 1555, fol. 102.

[2] Ib., 2d vol. de 1555, fol. 17.

[3] Ib. fol. 35.

RETURN OF THE EXILES TO ENGLAND.

The English colony having been once established and organized, our registers contain but few notices of them, for the simple reason, as we are authorized to believe, that the exiles furnished no cause for complaint. Since the colony consisted entirely of men who had fled from their country on account of the persecutions which the reformed suffered from Mary, they had of course, after the death of this queen and the succession of Elizabeth, no reason for remaining any longer, but would wish naturally to return to England.[2] Hence on the twenty-fourth of January, 1559, several among them, more especially some of the ministers, presented to the Council of the city a request, stating that, as it had pleased God to reëstablish the reformation in their own country, they desired to return thither that they might labor to extend it there; and further, thanking them sincerely for the friendly reception which they had enjoyed in the place of their retreat, they asked that they might receive a regular permission to depart.[3] Some months later, a person designated as *a bishop of England* presents himself to express his desires and feelings to the same effect, and to receive likewise a similar response.[4]

In pursuing this course, these English not only showed themselves grateful for the hospitality which they had received, but conformed strictly to the law of the Genevans, which forbade the inhabitants to leave the city without permission. Besides, some among them had obtained the rights of citizenship. About the middle of the year 1557, we find it mentioned in the records of the Council, that there were certain Englishmen who desired to be received as citizens; and the information was not unwelcome, as it was understood that some among them were wealthy merchants.[1] Still it is not ascertained that, with the exception of some of this commercial class, any were received at this period, at least from the English, except Whittingham; but about a year later, six of his countrymen were also enrolled as citizens. These were *John Bodley*, having five sons; *William Williams; Richard Amondesham; John Baron*, having one son; *John Knox*, having one son, named *Nathaniel;* and finally, *Christopher Goodman.* The first five were received on paying the usual fee, very moderate for that time, six gold crowns and a fraction; the last two were received gratuitously, out of respect to their ministry of the word of God.[2] For those English who became, in a civil sense, Genevans, it was the more necessary that they should obtain a regular leave of absence in order that they might preserve their new rights for themselves and their children. The importance of this precaution is recognized, for example, in the terms of the dismission granted, at his request, to John Bodley.[3] In the month of March, 1560, we find that Baron, named above, asked and obtained liberty to remain, during three years, for the purpose of printing a book against the Anabaptists, and afterwards to return, without loss of his citizenship, to his country of Scotland where the gospel was preached.[4]

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[1] Registre du Conseil, 2d vol. de 1555, fol. 51.

[2] "The tidings of queen Elizabeth's peaceable coming to the crown," says Fuller, "was no sooner brought beyond the seas but it filled the English exiles with unspeakable gladness, being instantly at home in their hearts, and not long after with their bodies. I knew one right well, whose father, amongst them, being desperately diseased, was presently and perfectly cured with the cordial of the good news; and no wonder if this queen recovered sick men, which revived religion itself."

[3] Registre du Conseil, vol. de 1557 – 59, fol. 361.

[4] Registre du Conseil, 2d vol. de 1559, fol. 81, August 24, 1559.

The last departure took place at the end of the month of May, 1560. The reader may be pleased to see, in full, the section of the register which makes mention of this event.

" *English citizens and residents.* Wm. Whittingham, citizen, in his own name and that of his companions, came to thank Messieurs for the good treatment which they have had in this city, and signified that to serve the church in their own country it is necessary that they should remove thither, praying us to retain them as humble servants of the state, and declaring that, at all times and in every way in which they may be able to render service to the state and to individuals of the city, they will exert themselves to do so to the utmost of their power; and requesting us to give them an attestation of their life and conversation while they have been in this city. And they have presented the 'book' of those of their nation who came to sojourn in the city, as a perpetual memorial: Decreed, That an honorable dismission be granted to them and an attestation of the contentment we have had with them, and that they be exhorted to pray for us and to do to strangers among themselves as others have done to them;—and let them always be ready to bear good affection to this city. And it is agreed that we retain those who are citizens and subjects as such in the future."[1]

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[1] Registre du Conseil, 2d vol. de 1557, fol. 206, 28th of June.

[2] Registre du Conseil, fol. 211, July first.

[3] Registre du Conseil, 2d vol. of 1559, fol. 91, 5th of September.

[4] Registre de 1560 and 1651 (1561?), fol. 16, 17, 7th and 8th of March 1560.

Description of the Book.

The 'book,' which forms the subject of this Article, exists still in the archives of Geneva. It is a manuscript of the quarto form, with a parchment cover, and bears the title,—*Livre des Anglais.*[2] It is divided into four parts. The first is the list of the English Company composing the congregation; that is, those who arrived on the 13th of October, 1555, in order to avail themselves of the privilege which was to be conceded to them (*to use the benefit of the churche then newly grannted*), those who were at Geneva before the 13th of October, and those who came afterwards. The second is the list of the ministers, deacons, and elders elected annually. The third is a record of the baptisms celebrated in this church (*eglise*). The fourth is the list of marriages (*the names of all soche persons as have bene coupled by mariage*); and finally, those of the deaths, or rather the interments (*the*

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[1] Registre du Conseil, fol. 44, May thirtieth 1560.

[2] This title, as the contents are in English, was affixed, no doubt, by a foreign hand.

names of all soche of the English congregation in Geneva as have bene buried there).[1]

If this book had been kept with entire exactness, the first part should have included all the English who resided at Geneva from 1555 to 1560; for they all came there for the single object of enabling themselves to live according to the principles of the reformation, and without doubt according to the reformation of Calvin. But we cannot count upon any such accuracy in the plan of the book. In fact, some names which are found in the last part, are not found in the first part; and in comparing this first part with the fragments of the register of the inhabitants, which we have for that period, we discover still other omissions; while at the same time we obtain a knowledge of slight details which are not noticed in the 'book.'

As a means, therefore, of ascertaining as nearly as possible, the actual number of individuals who composed the English Colony, we have, in the first place, formed a table of all the English and Scotch received as residents from 1555 to 1560, and have inserted against the names the information relating to them, furnished both by the 'book,' and by the Genevan register. We have then brought together, in like manner, all the names which are not in our public registers, but only in the first part of the 'book'; and, finally, those which are found only in some one of the last parts of the same 'book.' By this process it is found that between the twenty-ninth of March, 1555, and the twenty-eighth of October, 1559, the number of persons who belonged to the community, either single or with families, was a hundred and forty-six, making a total of two hundred and twelve individuals. The date given in our registers is not that of the arrival, but only that of the taking of the oath of sojourn, which was often delayed more or less, although according to the requisitions of the government the stranger must present himself within the first three days of his arrival. The precise date in other respects is not always given in the 'book.'

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[1] We may add a few items to this statement. The form of the book is long and narrow. The paper is thick and of a coarse material. The hand-writing abounds in contractions. The mode of spelling words, as some examples in the body of the Article show, illustrates fully the antiquated style of that period. The manuscript is still in a good state of preservation. Thrice three centuries need not efface its lines or wear away its texture. There are many blank leaves between the written pages, appropriated to the different headings. The space left for additional entries looks as if the wanderers anticipated a longer exile than it proved to be their fortune to endure. It makes on one the impression that the day of hope broke suddenly upon them, and summoned them back to help forward the reformation at home, sooner than they had dared to expect. The American traveller could hardly seek out an object of greater ecclesiastical or antiquarian interest at Geneva, than this manuscript of the English Puritan Fathers.

DATE OF ADMISSION.

The day when the greatest number of admissions took place was the fourteenth of October, 1557. Among them were forty-four applicants, who make fifty-four persons, according to our tables. But the English were not the only ones who, on that day, formed such a crowd at Geneva. The number was so great that it was impossible to give them audience at once; and it was voted to call the English first, and then the others in divisions, according to their nationality. In addition to the English, four Spaniards and forty-four Italians were received at that time. As to the French, they were obliged to be sent away for that day, and on the morrow a hundred and forty persons took the oath. In all (44+4+44+140) there were two hundred and thirty-two admissions. It may well be supposed that the women and the children augmented this number considerably, since in the case of the English, though they came from a distance we see that one hundred and forty-six individuals represent two hundred and twelve persons, that is, nearly in the proportion of forty-five added to a hundred. Assuming, then, that the number of two hundred and thirty-two, as given above, should be increased after the same ratio, we arrive at a total of three hundred and thirty-six persons admitted to residence, in two days, by a city whose population was less than fifteen thousand souls. On the eighteenth of the same month, there were a hundred and seventy-seven admissions further, almost all of them French.

This was a critical moment for Geneva. The Bernese evinced anything but a friendly disposition towards the Republic; and it was known that the duke of Savoy, Pilibert Emmanuel, after having conquered the French at Saint-Quentin, in his capacity as general of the Spanish army, was preparing to retake all his estates; while at the same time from ten to twelve thousand men were already in the province of Bresse, now the French department of Ain. Measures were taken, therefore, to sustain a siege, and the public orders announced that all those who had not taken the oath must leave the city in three days.

The two hundred and twelve individuals, of both sexes and all ages, whom we have reckoned up, belonged to almost every class of society. By the side of noblemen, or simple gentlemen, we see arranged scholars, weavers, tailors, and other artisans, as well as merchants with their servants, that is to say, their apprentices and others committed to their care.

The second Part of the book makes known the pastors, the elders, and the deacons, elected on the first of November and the sixteenth of December, 1555, the sixteenth of December, 1556, the sixteenth of December, 1557, and the sixteenth of December, 1558.

The pastors were always two in number; the elders and the deacons varied from two to four.

The third Part records, from the fourth of January, 1556 to the twenty-third of January, 1558, nineteen baptisms, of which nine were those of boys, and ten those of girls.

The fourth Part enumerates, from the twenty-fourth of February, 1556 to April tenth, 1558, nine marriages, among which there was one in which the parties were English and Italian, and three in which they were Genevans and French. It is to be remarked that we find no instance of marriage between the English and the Genevans during the entire sojourn.

Finally, the fifth Part records, from the fifth of March, 1556 to April twelfth, 1560, eighteen deaths, of which seven were males, and nine females, and two twin infants, one of them born dead, and both unbaptized (*bothe borne at abyrthe, theon alyve and thoder dede borne, bothe unchristend*).

It is quite remarkable that these different numbers of births, marriages, and deaths, distributed over about four years, correspond very nearly to those which are found among the native inhabitants of Geneva, Yet it is necessary to recollect that the English of whom we speak did not all complete a residence of four entire years.

EXPLANATION OF THE TABLES.

Instead of pursuing further, at present, this analysis of the contents of the 'Book of the English,' it may serve better, in order to give the reader an idea of its character and the interest of its details, if we now group together, in a tabular form, a summary of the information to be derived from this and other sources. For this purpose four tables or catalogues may be constructed. The first (placed last in M. Heyer's arrangement) simply enumerates all the names of the colonists, whether they are ascertained from the 'book,' or from the registers of the inhabitants and other Genevan records. The figures annexed to the names refer to the other following tables, in which the names occur in the order of the same figures. The object of the other tables will be found explained at the head of them. This first catalogue, therefore, answers in reality the purpose of an index to the use of the other tables, and by the aid of it it will be seen at once what persons belonged to the colony, and where the reader is to look to ascertain what facts the church-book or the other documents supply concerning them. Some account of the more distinguished men in the list may be suitably appended to the statistics of the subject.[1]

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[1] It may not be superfluous to state the plan of the Tables in a different form. In the first place our author examines the civil registers, and ascertains the names of the English and Scotch recorded there as admitted to habitation during the years 1555 – 1559. How far this list corresponds with that of those enrolled in the church-book as members of the congregation does not appear, of course, from this representation. Therefore,

NO. I. ALPHABETICAL TABLE.

The English and Scotch Colony established at Geneva from 1555 *to* 1560, *arranged in the Alphabetical Order of the Names of the Family with a reference to the subsequent Tables.*

Abbot, 144,
Agar (or Agas), 34, 131
Amondesham, 29, 99.
Anwick, 60.
Argall, 114.
Baker, 130.
Baron, 27.
Batman, 83.
Beaumont, 28.
Beauvoir, 16.
Bellye, 110.
Bentham, 72.
Bertran, 17.
Blackman, 75.
Bodley 21, 125.
Boggens, 53.
Bolton, 41.
Boudelley, 88.
Bradebredge, or Brodebreche, 45.
Brouhgton, 112.
Burtwick, 110.
Butler, 20.
Cant, 69.
Caryer, 136.
Catoborn, 47.
Chambres, 38.
Chasseon, 89.
Chrispe, 115.
Cole, 71.
Colins, 77.
Collyn, 137.
Cotes, 142.
Coverdale, 74.
Crofton, 12.
Daniell, 59.
Davidson, 81.
Doton, 56.
Dowes, 145.
Drauffeld, 37.
Dromond, 92.
Dunce, 97.
Duwick, 144.
East, 39.
Eill, 32.
Eneus, 85.
Ffawcon, 132.
Fferrar, 107.
Ffielde, 70.
Ffolgeham, 113.
Ffoster, 1.
Ffuller, 20.
Gatolon, 52.
Gawton, 20.
Gibbens, 68.

In the second place (the object of the third Table), he compares the civil list with the church-book, and eliminates the names in this civil list which do not appear in the part of the book, which contains the names of the members of the congregation.

In the third place, he continues the enumeration (incomplete in the second Table) of those mentioned in the book as members of the congregation, who are not mentioned as residents in the city records. As some of the foreigners became residents who did not belong to the congregation (at least do not appear as such), so, conversely, some belonged to the congregation who did not become residents.

And finally, in the fifth Table he adds four names of individuals who are mentioned incidentally in the church book, who, as far as there is any evidence to show, sustained neither the ecclesiastical nor the civil relation under remark.

Gibson, 18.
Gilby, 5.
Goodman, 8.
Hall, 47.
Hamilton, 66.
Hancock, 11.
Harrison, 113.
Harvye, 91.
Hasell, 74.
Hawkes, 66.
Hilliarde, 156.
Hilton, 13.
Hodgson, 16.
Holliar, 49.
Hollingham, 7.
Humphrey, 118.
Jackson, 6.
Johns, 42.
Johnson, 140.
Jones, 124.
Kaines, 80.
Keyes, 160.
Kett, 121.
Knell, 67.
Knollys, 23, 27, 44, 144, 157.
Knox, 111.
Lambe, 66.
Lang, 66.
Langley, 80.
Lelande, 62.
Lever, 84.
Linsey, 87.
Lock, 122.
Marchalde, 74.
Mason, 9.
Mawkes, 64.
Mores, 77.
Miles, 143.
Morley, 135.
Musgrave, 96.
Newton, 105.
Pelham, 41.
Pellam, 134.
Pigeon, 98.
Pilkington, 101.
Plumer, 14.
Ponce, 160.
Potter, 11.
Prettie, 95.
Prowtour, 76.
Pullain, 29.
Roche, 24.
Richardson, 63.
Rowland, 47.
Samon, 111.
Sampson, 106.
Samuel, 11.
Sandelandes, 98.
Sandes, alias Fisher, 1.
Seaman, alias Plumer, 14.
Smyth, 80.
Spencer, 81.
Stafford, 1.
Stanley, 117.
Stanton, 15.
Stephenson, 82.
Steward, 66.
Stevens, 146.
Strype, 106.
Stubbes, 13.
Sturm, 48.
Tailor, 33.
Umfrey (or Humphrey), 139.
Vallis, 46.
Vivian, 54.
Watson, 1.
Whittingham, 2.
Wilcoxe, 99.
Williams, 4, 86, 113, 146.
Willyes, 26.
Withers, 78, 112, 159.
Wood, 3.
Worthers, 21.
Yong (or Young), 13, 115.

No. II. TABLE OF RESIDENTS.

English and Scotch received to Residence, from 1555 *to* 1559, *with the Details furnished by the 'Book of the English,' the Registers of Inhabitants, and other Genevese Registers.*

Nos.	Date.	Name.	Details furnished by the Book.	Details drawn from the Register of the Inhabitants, or from records of Council.	No. of Individuals.
1	1555. March 29	Stafford, Sir William,	Dorothée, his wife; Jeanne, his sister; Mistr. Sandes, alias Ffoster, their cousin; Edward, his son; Elisabeth, his daughter; John Watson, Arthur, James, and Edmond, his servants, and Elisabeth, his domestic.	Chevalier and English gentleman, Seigneur de Rochefort.	11
2	Oct. 24	Whitingham, William,	(From Chester, as is seen in the fourth Part).	—	1
3	24	Wood, Thomas,	Anne, his wife, and Débora, their daughter,	From London.	3
4	24	Williams, William,	And Jeanne, his wife, ...	From London.	2
5	24	Gilby, Anthony,	Elisabeth, his wife, and Goddred, their son,	—	3
6	24	Jackson, William,	Parnel, his wife; William and Andrew, their sons; Marguerite and Judith, their daughters.	—	6
7	24	Holingham, John,	Elene, his wife, and Daniel, his son, . .	—	3
8	24	Goodman, Christophe,	—	—	1
9	24	Maston, John,	—	—	1
10	24	Knolles, William,	—	—	
11	24	Potter, Richard,	—	—	1
12	24	Crofton, Thomas,	—	—	1
13	24	Hilton, John,	—	—	1
14	24	Seburne, Christophe,	Alias Plumer, ...	—	1
15	24	Staunton, John,	—	—	1

	1556.					
16	July	27	Beauvoir, William,	His first name is seen in the second part of the book.	Merchant; native of the Isle of Guernesey.	1
17	Aug.	10	Bertran, Thomas,	——	Minister of the word of God, in the Isle of Jersey, from the time of the reformation of the word.	1
18	Nov.	30	Stubbes, John,	——	Tailor; native of Coventry.	1
	1557.					
19	June	7	Youg (or Yong), James.	And Anne his wife, ...	Tailor.	2
20		7	Ffuller, William,	Joice, his wife (whose family name was Butler, as is seen, from her decease, in the fifth part); Peter Lang (see No. 56) and Rich. Gawton, his servants; Marie Gawton, his domestic.	Gentleman.	5
21		7	Bodleigh (Bodley), John,	His wife; Thomas, John, and Laurence, his sons; Prothese, his daughter; John Boggens (No. 53) and Richard Vivian (No. 54), his servants, and Elenor, his domestic.	Native of Exeter.	9
22		7	Samuel, William,	And his wife, ...	From Camden.	2
23		7	Worchere, François,	——	From London.	
24		7	Rethe, William,	——	From Exeter.	
25	Oct.	14	Willyes, Peter,	——	Merchant.	
26		14	Pullaine, John,	His wife, and Foi, his daughter, . . .	Formerly minister in England.	3
27		14	Baron, John,	——	Student (from Edinburg, Register of the Bourgeois, 1558).	
28		14	Beaumont, Robert,	——	Student.	1

Nos.	Date.	Name.	Details furnished by the Book.	Details drawn from the Register of the Inhabitants, or from records of Council.	No. of Individuals.
	1557.				
29	Oct. 14	Amondesham, Richard,	——	Gentleman (from the county of Middlesex, Register of the Council, June 21, 1558).	1
30	14	Smyth, Harrye,	——	Gentleman.	1
31	14	Spenser, Thomas,	From Wroghton, Wiltshire (according to the fourth part).	Student.	1
32	14	Eill, Michael,	——	Gentleman.	1
33	14	Gibson, William,	Without fore-name in the first part; but, as we see from the fifth part, with that of William, in the record of his death or interment, the 16th of August, 1557; his wife and daughters.[1]	Painter.	4
34	14	Agar (or Agas), Thomas,	——	Ribbon-weaver.	1
35	14	Tailor, James,	——	Student.	1
36	14	Wiburne, Percival,	——	Student.	1
37	14	Drauffeld, Roger,	——	——	1
38	14	Chambres, William,	——	——	1
39	14	East, Richard,	——	Tailor.	1
40	14	Holiday, Adam,	——	Student.	1
41	14	Bolton, John,	——	Weaver.	1
42	14	Johans, Thomas,	——	——	1
43	14	Knolles, Thomas,	With Jeanne, his wife, ...	——	2
44	14	Knolles, James,	——	Carpenter; son of the preceding.	1
45	14	Brodereche, Augustus,	In the third part, he is called Bradebredge, as God-father of a son of Jean Bodley.	Student.	1

46	Oct.	14	Valles, John,	———	Baker.	
47		14	Catoborn, John,	———	Farmer.	
48		14	Sturn, John,	———	Apothecary.	
49		14	Hall, Rowland,	———	Printer.	1
50		14	Langeley, Thomas,	———	Farmer.	1
51		14	Hancock, Thomas,	His wife, and Gédéon, his son, . . .	Scholar.	3
52		14	Gatolon, Richard,	———	Tailor.	
53		14	Boggens, John,	Mentioned in No. 21, ...	Merchant.	
54		14	Vivian, Richard,	Mentioned in No. 21, ...	Merchant.	
55		14	Lang, Peter,	Mentioned in No. 20, ...	Servant.	
56		14	Doton, John,	———	Hosier.	
57		14	Mosgrave, Thomas,	———	Farmer.	1
58		14	Hindeson, Barnard,	———	Farmer.	1
59		14	Daniell, John,	His wife, and his sons,[1]	Weaver.	4
60		14	Anwick, John,	———	Gentleman.	
61		14	Pellain, John,	———	Gentleman.	
62		14	Lelande, Harrye,	———	———	1
63		14	Richardson, Water,	———	Weaver.	1
64		14	Mawdes, Richard,	Without fore-name in the book, . . .	Formerly minister.	1
65		14	Steward, Thomas,	———	Student.	1
66		14	Hawkes, Peter,	———	Cordwainer.	1
67		14	Knell, Thomas,	———	Formerly minister.	1
68		14	Gibbens, Richard,	———	Weaver.	1
69	Nov.	29	Cant, Edward,	———	———	1
70		29	Ffielde, Robert,	With Rose, his wife, ...	———	2
71		29	Cole, William,	From Grantham, county of Lincoln (according to the fourth part).	———	1
72		29	Bentham, Thomas,	From Sherbourne, county of York (fourth part.)	———	1
73		29	Mansfeilde, John,	———	———	1

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[1] There were two, at least.

Nos.	Date.	Name.	Details furnished by the Book.	Details drawn from the Register of the Inhabitants, or from those of the Council.	No. of Individuals.
	1558.				
74	Oct. 24	Coverdale, Miles,	——	——	
75	24	Blackman, Robert,	——	From Edmondbury.	1
76	24	Proctour, Richard,	——	——	1
77	24	Colins, John,	——	——	
78	24	Withers, William,	——	From London.	
79	24	Havell, Richard,	——	——	
80	24	Kaulius, Erckenwalde,	——	From London.	
81	24	Davidson, John,	——	——	
82	24	Stephinson, Corneles,	——	——	
83	24	Batman, John,	——	——	
84	24	(Illegible) William,	——	——	
85	24	Eneus, John,	——	——	
86	24	Williams, Charles,	Born at Leicester; made confession of his faith and received into the church, the 13th of August.	From Bristol.	1
87	24	Linsey, David,	Received the 15th of September, . .	From Scotland.	1
	1559.				
88	May 9	Boudelley, Richard,	——	——	
89	9	Chasseon, Claude,	——	——	
90	9	Hamilton, Robert,	——	——	
91	Aug. 28	Lambé, Jacques,	——	Ribbon-weaver, from Leith, in Scotland.	
92	Oct. 28	Dromond, Thomas,	——	From Scotland.	
93	28	Saudelandes, Jacques.	——	From Scotland; son of Jehan.	
					108

No. III.

Residents, but omitted in the Church Book.

[Note. — The individuals excepted here from the preceding Table are those not named in the first part of the 'Book.' Some of them were members of the church or congregation, but, through some oversight, were not recorded in the proper place. Thus, Coverdale was one of the elders, and must have belonged to the church, though he happens to be known only from his incumbency of the office to which he was chosen.]

10.	Knolles, William,	1
17.	Bertran, Thomas,	1
23.	Worchère, François,	1
24.	Rethe, William,	1
25.	Willyes, Peter, named in the third part, as father of a daughter baptized in 1558, of whom Knox is god-father,	1
27.	Baron, John, named in the third part, as father of a daughter baptized, and in the fifth part, on the death of the same,	1
46.	Valles, John,	1
47.	Catoborn, John,	1
48.	Sturn, John,	1
52.	Gatolon, Richard,	1
56.	Doton, John,	1
60.	Anwick, John,	1
61.	Pellain, John,	1
69.	Cant, Edward,	1
74.	Coverdale, Miles, occurs in the second part, among the elders elected the 16th December, 1558, and in the third part, as god-father of Eleezer Knox, the 29th November 1558,	1
77.	Colins, John,	1
78.	Withers, William,	1
79.	Hawell, Richard,	1
80.	Kaulius, Erkenwalde, is named in the fifth part, as deceased, 29th April, 1559,	1
81.	Davidson, John,	1
82.	Stephinson, Corneles,	1
83.	Batman, John,	1
84.	(Name illegible) Guillaume,	1
85.	Eneus, John,	1
88.	Boudelley, Richard,	1
89.	Chasseon, Claude,	1
90.	Hamilton, Robert,	1
91.	Lambé, Jacques,	1
92.	Dromond, Thomas,	1
93.	Sandelandes, Jacques,	1
		30

No. IV.

Continuation of Persons inscribed in the First Part of the Book, but not mentioned in the Registers.

Nos.	Dates.	Names and Fore-names.	Details furnished by the Book.	No. of Individuals.
94	1555. Before Oct. 13	Lever, Thomas,	—	1
95		Prettie, John,	—	1
96		Harvye, Nicholas,	—	1
97		Dunce, Harry,	—	1
98		Pigeon, John,	—	1
99		Amondisham, Wm.	From Heston, according to the fourth part.	1
100	Oct. 13	Ponce, John,	—	1
101	1556.	Pilkington, James,	—	1
102		Peter,	—	1
103		Willyams, Peter,	—	1
104		Knolles, Thomas,	—	1
105		Storye, John,	—	1
106		Sampson, Thomas,	—	1
107		Fferrar, John,	—	1
108		Williams, Gualter,	—	1
109		Miere, Anthony,	—	1
110		Burtwick, John,	Chevalier, and Jn. Bellye, his page.	2
111	Sept. 18	Knox, John,	With Margery, his wife; Elisabeth, his mother; James, his servant, and Patrick, his pupil or ward.	5
112	Nov. 5	Withers, Ffrancis,	His wife; John Houghton, his servant; and Ales Bronghton, his domestic.	4
113		Ffolgeham, Nich.	—	1
114		Argall, Laurence,	—	1
115		Chrispe, Richard,	—	1
116		Newton, Théodore,	—	1
117		Stanley, Thomas,	—	1
118		Harrison, Richard,	—	1
119		Yonge, John,	—	1
120		Withers, Harrye	And Stephen, brothers of Francis Withers.	2
121		Keth, William,	And his wife, . . .	2
122	1557. May 8	Locke, Anne,	Harrie, his son; Anne, his daughter, and Katharine, his domestic.	4
123		Knolles Thomas,	Senior, with his wife, and his two sons, Michael and Nicholas.	4

Nos.	Dates.	Names and Fore-names.	Details furnished by the Book.	No. of Individuals.
	1557.			
124	May 8	Jones, Thomas,	——	1
125		Bodleigh, Nichol,	Brother of John Bodleigh,	1
126		Hilliarde, Nich.	——	1
127		John James,	Children of	2
128		Mary Rowlandson,		
129		James N.	——	1
130		Baker, John,	——	1
131		Agar (or Agas), Ales	With Johan and Priscilla, his daughters, and Thomas, his son (see No. 34), from Colchester (fourth part).	3
132	Nov.	Ffawcom, Mawde,	From Hadley, county of Suffolk (fourth part).	1
133		Samon, Ales,	Widow, ...	1
134		Pellam, John,	——	1
135		Morley, William,	——	1
136	Dec. 2	Caryer, Anthony,	——	1
	1558.			
137	Feb. 17	Collyn, John,	Very aged (perhaps the the same as No. 77).	1
138	Apr. 28	Kente, Lawrence,	William, his son, and Elene, his daughter.	3
139		Umfrey, Lawrence,	——	1
140	June 2	Johanson, William,	Came to Geneva, Jan. 5, 1558.	1
141		Abbot, Nicholas,	Came to Geneva, March 29, 1558.	1
142		Cotes, William,	——	1
				69

No. V.

Those mentioned in the Book, but not mentioned elsewhere.

143.	Milles, Peter, second part, one of the deacons named the 16th December, 1558, ...	1
144.	Duwick, Thomas, third part, father of Marie Duwick, baptized the 8th of December, 1558, ...	1
145.	Dowes, John, fourth part, married the 10th of April, 1558 (said to be from Tunbridge, in the county of Kent), . . .	1
146.	Stivens, Cornelius, second part; mentioned with Marguerite, his wife, on occasion of the death of two infants and that of their mother, ...	2
		5

No. VI. RECAPITULATION.

Table No. II.	108 individuals.
No. III.	30
No. IV.	69
No. V.	5
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PERSONAL NOTICES.

The object of this memoir requires us to glance at the personal history of some of the men whose names appear in the 'book,' and impart to it so much of its interest. The most prominent among them are the following.

William Stafford. The first in the order of time, and as it seems also the first in rank, is Sir W. Stafford, Seigneur de Rochefort. He was a rich and influential man. He arrived, in fact, the 29th of March, 1555, with his wife named *Dorothée*, his sister named *Jeanne*, a cousin (Mrs. Sanders or Foster), a son, a daughter, and five domestics, of whom four were men, in all eleven persons. At the end of six months a special favor was shown to him, explained and justified by these words: "Because he is an excellent person, a man of property and education: Decreed, that he be permitted to wear his sword, — he only, and not those of his family."

The 'book of the English' informs us that on the 4th of January, 1556, this dignitary presented, in baptism, a son who was named John, after Calvin his god-father. On the 24th of February, Jeanne Stafford, widow, called also Williams, afterwards again the countess, and probably the sister of Sir William, was married to Maximilien Celsus, who belonged to the noble family of the counts of Martinengo, and was pastor of the Italian church. She died a year after that (26th of Feb., 1557). As regards Sir William himself, he is mentioned in the trial of the Libertines, as having been insulted and violently attacked some time after the disturbance of the 16th of May, 1555, by a number of seditious fugitives. He was in company at the time of the seigneurs of Verace and Mallane, returning with them from a country seat situated beyond the bridge of the Arve.[1],

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[1] Histoire de Genève, par Gautier, T. IV. p. 45 (Manuscrit des Archives).

He died the 5th of May, 1556, and that event was the occasion, some weeks later, of a violent controversy between his widow, instigated by Robert Stafford, her brother-in-law, on the one side, and Calvin on the other. The former demanded of Calvin that he should give up the children of the deceased. The matter was brought before the Council. Calvin resisted the demand, especially in regard to the child whom he had presented in baptism. He urged that the surrender would be unjust to the memory of the deceased father, who out of affection to himself had called the child by his name, and inconsistent with his own obligations since he had promised to instruct the child in the gospel, and to take care that it was not, by any neglect or artifice, led away into popery. He complained that the mother was unstable in her religious principles, and wished to go back to the follies of the world, from which she had been withdrawn by the influence of her husband. Stafford, in reply, insisted on the rights of the mother, who wished to return to France, where also the gospel was preached in some places. He complained of the arrogance of the ministers at Geneva, and assailed them in terms which Calvin resented with boldness and warmth. The parties were heard at different times on the question, and after consultation with the clergy and other learned men, the Council refused the demand of Robert Stafford. The grounds were, that the oath taken by Calvin to instruct the child, in default of the father, was now obligatory on him; that the father's becoming an inhabitant of the city declared sufficiently his desire both to live himself, and to have his children live, according to the gospel; and that in his last sickness his wish was distinctly made known, that his children should remain at Geneva and be brought up and educated there. Some time after this the Council received a letter from the same Stafford, in which he threatened that if they did not give up his sister and her children, he would appeal to the king, and obtain redress from him against the Genevans. The record closes its account of this affair with the remark: *Let no one who seeks to benefit others be surprised at anything.*

William Whitingham. He was born at Chester, in 1524, and belonged to a good family. After having completed his studies, and obtained the usual degrees at the university of Oxford, he had permission, in 1550, to travel, and went to France. He there made the acquaintance of the learned men of Paris, and was on the point of proceeding to Italy, when he was arrested by a sickness which obliged him to change his plan, and remain for a time in different cities of France. Afterward he visited the universities of Germany, and came to Geneva, where he resided till towards the end of the reign of Edward VI., at which time he returned to England. But after the death of this prince, he repassed to France, whence he proceeded to Frankfort. When the English congregation was formed at Geneva, Knox, who was one of the ministers, being obliged to depart to Scotland, Whitingham was regarded by Calvin as the man best fitted to succeed Knox in his character as preacher. He resisted for a long time, but at length yielding to the importunities of Calvin, he was made a minister after the Genevan mode of ordination. Soon after this, in connection with Miles Coverdale, Christopher Goodman, A. Gilby, Thomas Sampson, and William Cole, he undertook the translation of the Bible into English, and remained at Geneva some time after the return of most of the other members of the colony, in order to complete the work.[1] Subsequently he filled various offices in England; and, last of all, that of dean of Durham, although he appears to have been always on intimate terms with the Presbyterians. He put into English verse some of the Psalms, translated the liturgy used at Geneva, and was reputed to be the author of the *Recit des Troubles de Francfort.*

Whitingham, even after his return to the established church, was no stickler for forms; and when reproached by one of his former associates at Geneva for consenting to wear "the sacerdotal vestments," replied that "he and others knew and had heard John Calvin say that for external matters of order they might not neglect the ministry, for so should they for tithing of mint neglect the greater things of the law." On the other hand, it is not strange that with this view of the indifferent character of such rites (the *ἀδιάφορα* of Paul), those who exalted the form above the essence looked coldly upon him as "a lukewarm conformist at best."[1] He died in 1579. We have found no trace of his first sojourn at Geneva, nor of his consecration to the sacred ministry there. Three letters, however, probably of the same year, viz. 1555, addressed by him to Calvin, show his deference and devotion to the reformer, and seem to indicate that he stood in intimate personal relations to him. The first, dated at Strasburg, the 11th of March, was written just after his return from Geneva to Frankfort, and closes with the words: *Vale doctissime, atque optime vir, meque ut facis amare pergas, proprieque tuum esse tibi persuadeas.* He subscribes himself *Tuus humilimus demissimusque scholasticus.* In the second, dated at Frankfort, the 25th of March, he relates that Knox, unjustly accused of the crime of treason before the magistrates, had received orders to leave the city, much to the regret of all good people and of the magistrates themselves; and that such was his own grief that he could not bear to write at length on so sad a subject, etc. The third letter, mentioned already, is that of the 21st of September, in which he announced his approaching departure for Geneva.

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[1] This is the usual statement; but later investigation has reduced the number of associates in this work. Whitingham, Gilby, and Sampson appear to have performed the actual labor, though they may have been aided with the advice of some of the other exiles. See Anderson's History of the English Bible, p. 390.

[2] He translated some of the Psalms in Sternhold and Hopkins's Version.

He was received to habitation on the 24th of October, 1555, and to citizenship, as we have seen, on the 31st of May, 1558. The 'book of the English' mentions him, at every election, among the elders or among the deacons. He married Catherine Jacquemayne of Orleans,[2] on the 15th of November, 1556, and the contract of marriage is still preserved.[1] He presented a son (Zacharie) in baptism, on the 17th of August, 1557, and, on the 11th of December, 1558, a daughter, who died on the 12th of April, 1560. He never has the title of pastor or minister given to him. The fact that he served in this capacity as the proxy of Knox, and not so properly in his own right, may account for this omission.

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[1] The Article in Wood's *Athenae Oxonienses* relating to this reformer, is one of the worst specimens of the *odium theologicum* that disfigure that partisan work.

[2] Our author omits to say that she was a sister of Calvin himself.

Christopher Goodman (Table, No. 8). He was born at Chester, about 1519, and pursued his studies at Oxford, where he was professor of theology. He was one of those who repaired to Frankfort and thence to Geneva. The Anglican party represent him as very violent. Besides a Commentary on Amos, he wrote two works printed at Geneva in 1558. One of them was entitled: *How superior Powers ought to be obeyed of their subjects*, etc., two volumes; and the other: *The first blast of the Trumpet against the monstrous regimen of women*, one volume.[2] He was thought to be severe in his judgments on men, and seemed to praise them with great reluctance. One of his friends is said to have written this epigram on him:

> Nemo bonus, Servator ait, sed solus Olympum
> Qui regit is bonus est: Gudmane, nemo bonus.

Received to habitation the 24th of October, 1555, Goodman was nominated pastor at every election by the colony; the first time with Gilby, the three other times with Knox. He appears, in the third part of the 'book,' as god-father of three children: on the 14th of August, 1557, for a son of Francis Withers and a daughter of John Baron; in July and December, 1558, for a son of John Pullen and a daughter of Whitingham. We see that he was on very good terms with Calvin. Fuller ranks him among the fiercest of the Nonconformists.[1]

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[1] Minutes de Jean Ragueav, notaire, vol. de 1556–58, fol. 80, 31 Octobre, 1556. Dowry, 800 livres tournois; dower, 400.

[2] The better opinion now is that this 'first blast' was written, not by Goodman, but by John Knox. It was aimed at Queen Mary. A cynical critic of that day says of it:

> "No queen in the kingdom can or ought to sit fast,
> If Knox or Goodman's books blow any true blast."

Thomas Bodley.[2] Among the English families which came to Geneva, one of the most numerous, and also the most respectable, is that of which John Bodley was the head. He was received to residence the 7th of June, 1557. The 'book' mentions his wife, three of his sons, his daughter, and three domestics. Soon after his arrival in August, 1557, he had a fourth son baptized; and after his admission to citizenship there was a fifth. He is mentioned among the elders of the elections of 1557 and 1558.

The oldest of these sons, *Thomas*, afterward Sir Thomas Bodley, was born at Exeter the 2d of March, 1544. He was hardly thirteen years old, therefore, when he came to Geneva, where he remained until September, 1559. Here he continued the studies which he had begun in his early years, finished them at Oxford, was charged with various diplomatic missions by queen Elizabeth, and returning at length to literary occupations, as the great monumental act of his life, endowed and increased largely the library at Oxford, known as the *Bodleian Library.* His first measure in furtherance of this last object was to present to the university a large collection of books, purchased on the continent, and valued at £10,000. He died in 1612. He wrote his own biography up to the year 1609, in which he gives us an insight into the discipline by which he trained himself for the service of the state. At Geneva he attended the lectures of Chevelarius on Hebrew, of Beroaldus on Greek, of Calvin and Beza on divinity, and had also private teachers at home, among whom was Robert Constantine, author of the Greek lexicon, who explained to him Homer. At Magdalen college, Oxford, he was under the tuition of Dr. Humphrey, one of the Genevan exiles (page 508), who afterward became the head of that society.

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[1] Burnet makes Goodman one of the revisers of the Bishop's Bible in the time of Elizabeth. But instead of C. G. at the end of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, which he assumes to be there, the letters are G. G., and are supposed to stand for Gabriel Goodman, Dean of Westminster, who died in 1601.

[2] See No. 28 of the Tables.

In 1576, being desirous to improve himself in modern languages, and qualify himself more fully for a public career, he began his travels, and passed nearly four years in France, Germany, and Italy. He was sent abroad by the government on some of the most important embassies of the age, and was eminently successful in them. But political disappointment changed abruptly the plan of his life. He aspired to be secretary of state ; but the intrigues of rivals "having relieved him of ever expecting that troublesome office, he retired from the court, and devoted himself wholly to the care and promotion of learning."

John Pullaine or *Pullayne* (No. 26 of the Tables). Born in the county of York, he was educated at New college, Oxford, of which he was clerk and chaplain. He was admitted to the number of the senior students of Christ's Church, and was distinguished for the elegance of his Latin and English poems. Having come to Geneva, he was received to habitation the 14th of October, 1557, with his wife and his daughter. He is designated as *formerly minister in England.* He is mentioned in the 'book' as one of the deacons, at the election in 1557, and in connection with the baptism of a son (28th of July, 1558), and the death of his daughter (3d of September, 1558). After his return to his own country, he was nominated to a rectorate. He wrote a treatise against the Arians, and translated into verse several portions of the Old Testament, and other writings, as the history of Susanna, that of Judith, the Testament of the twelve Patriarchs, etc. The notices in the 'book' extend our knowledge of this reformer beyond the information furnished in the account of him in Wood's *Athenae.* It illustrates some of the difficulties to which the transition from Romanism to Protestantism in England gave rise, that a controversy arose after his death, respecting the rights of his children to his estate, because he had violated his vows of celibacy.

Thomas Bentham (No. 72 of the Tables). He was a learned and pious ecclesiastic. He was distinguished at an early age for his knowledge of Hebrew, and of the Greek and Latin languages. It is said that he withdrew from England first to Zurich and then to Basil, and it was thence, no doubt, that he came to Geneva, where he was received as resident on the 29th of November, 1557. He preached to the English at Basil, and in conformity with the practice so much in vogue among the biblical Christians of that age, expounded to them from the pulpit some of the principal books of the New Testament. Under the reign of Elizabeth, he was appointed bishop of Lichfield and Coventry. He died in 1578 or 1579.[1] Wood's outline does not mention the sojourn at Geneva at all.

Miles Coverdale (No. 74 of the Tables). He was born in the county of York, under the reign of Henry VII., was brought up in the Romish church, and became a Dominican friar. At a later period he embraced the principles of the Reformation, and entered holy orders. Nominated bishop of Exeter under Edward VI., he was deposed from his see by Mary. He was received as a resident at Geneva on the 24th of October, 1558.[2] He is omitted in the first part of the 'book,' but is found as one of the elders in 1558, and as god-father of a son of Knox (Eleaser, November 29th, 1558). He is the *aged bishop* who presented himself to the council in 1559, to give thanks in behalf of the English, and to take official leave on the eve of their departure to England. After his return he refused, probably on account of his Calvinistic opinions, to resume his bishoprick, though it was offered to him. Others ascribe his preference of a more private station to his advanced age and enfeebled health. He continued to preach, however, to the last, and died in the eighty-first year of his age. The name of Coverdale is chiefly memorable for the place which he holds in the series of translators of the Bible into English, who prepared the way for the Common Version. His was the first translation of the entire scriptures ever circulated in England. It appeared in 1535, and was printed on the Continent. He was at Geneva less than a year. His direct participation in the translation executed there has been questioned, with good reason.

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[1] It is disputed whether T. B. at the end of the Psalms, as the translator of that book, in the Bishops' Bible, stands for this Thomas Bentham, or for Thomas Becon, one of Cranmer's chaplains and prebendary of Canterbury. (See English Hexapla, p. 91.) Burnet supposes the initials (T. C. L.) at the end of Ezekiel and Daniel to refer to Bentham, and that opinion is probably correct. Though contrary to the usual order, he was accustomed in his signature to place Coventry before Lichfield.

[2] Not December, therefore, which Anderson gives as the earliest trace o Coverdale's presence at Geneva.

Thomas Sampson (No. 106 of the Tables). He was born in 1517. He was educated at Oxford. After having studied law, and been converted to Protestantism, he was ordained by Cranmer, and became a celebrated preacher, under the reign of Edward VI. He was the means, it is said, of bringing John Bradford, the martyr, to a knowledge of the truth. The rage of the Catholic Mary compelled him to leave England. He proceeded to Strasburg, and there devoted himself still further to the study of theology. The letters written from Frankfort to Calvin make mention of him. He arrived at Geneva in 1556, according to the date in the 'book.' It appears, however, from a letter which he addressed to Peter Martyr, that he was at Strasburg the 17th of December, 1558, and still later he resided at Zurich. Under Elizabeth he was offered the bishoprick of Norwich. He declined the honor on the ground, no doubt, of his opposition to the usages of the Anglican church. He occupied for a time the office of dean of Christ Church, Oxford, but was displaced because he was "an enemy to organs, ornaments of the church, clerical vestments, and the square cap." Yet notwithstanding this dissent from the church of which he continued a minister, he was esteemed by all parties, and is characterized by bishop Grindal as "a learned and pious man."[1]

John Knox.[2] This celebrated and rigid reformer is too well known to make it necessary to do anything more than simply recapitulate the few circumstances which we find respecting his residence, or rather residences, at Geneva. It appears, in fact, that he came to this city before the establishment of the colony; but of this earlier visit we have not been able to find any trace. He is not named in the registers of the inhabitants. According to the 'Book of the English,' he arrived the 18th of September, 1556, with *Margery* his wife, *Elizabeth* the mother of the latter, a domestic named *James*, and a pupil or ward designated merely under the name of *Patrick*. The two first pastors, who, as stated already, were Goodman and Gilby, were elected the 1st of November, 1555, "to preach the word of God and administer the sacraments, in the absence of John Knox." But at the three following elections, Knox and Goodman were named as the pastors. Knox is mentioned again on the 23d of May, 1557, and on the 29th of November, 1558, on the occasion of the baptism of his sons *Nathaniel* and *Eleazer*. Whitingham stood god-father to the first, and Coverdale to the second of these children. Knox is finally mentioned also, in May, 1558, as god-father of *Naamy*, daughter of Peter Willies.

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[1] See Zurich Letters, Part I. Lett. I. 32, 58, 69, and Part II. 75.

[2] See No. IV. of the Tables. M. Heyer remarks: "I will say here, once for all, that I have written the proper names as I think they ought to be written,

In our registers he is spoken of only at the time of his admission to citizenship, as has been noticed already, and in connection with a book in which he was concerned. But it may be better to cite the text of the record on this subject: "*English.*—It having been stated that a certain Englishman has written against the doctrine of predestination, so that the faithful of England have prayed the English of this city to reply to him, and this having been done, and request made that the reply be printed: Decreed, that the matter be laid before the ministers."[1] And, some pages further on, we read, in the margin, the names of Whitingham, Baron, Knox,

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without troubling myself much about the frequent variations that occur in the 'Book of the English,' but especially in our registers. Our Secretaries of State at this period were evidently but little versed in the English language, and they used and abused the right which every one feels at liberty to exercise in the spelling of foreign names. Thus (to give a single example), we find Knoxe, Dnoxe, Enoxe, Knoux, and never, I think, Knox."

[1] Registre du Conseil, 2d vol. de 1559, fol. 141, 9 Novembre.

and these lines: "In view of the request to print a treatise in English, in reply to another Englishman who has written ill on the subject, and having heard the report of the senior lector who has conferred with the ministers: Decreed, that the permission to print be allowed; and that the said Whitingham and Baron promise to reply, in case that the said treatise composed by the said Knox contain anything contrary to the catholic and orthodox doctrine."

Lawrence Humphrey (No. 139 of the Tables). Lawrence Humphrey or Humfredus, mentioned in the 'book' as having arrived at Geneva in the spring of 1555, pursued his studies at Cambridge, and devoted himself to theology. Having had permission in 1555 to travel for a year, he joined the English colony at Zurich. He remained absent beyond his time, and thus forfeited his fellowship in the college. In 1560 he was nominated professor of theology at Oxford. He was then thirty-four years old. He was for many years president of Magdalen college, and then vice-chancellor of the university. His learning was extensive as well as minute; he was especially eminent as a linguist. His numerous works which remain, mark him as one of the acutest men and ablest scholars of whom England could boast in that age. He was dean of Gloucester in 1570, and of Winchester in 1580; but his attachment to Calvinistic principles hindered him from rising to higher positions. During his absence on the Continent he became fully imbued with the spirit of the Reformation. His opponents declared that he "stocked his college with a generation of Nonconformists, which could not be rooted out in many years after his decease." To the close of his life he maintained friendly relations with the pastors of Berne, Zurich, and Geneva, who had shown him hospitality, and testified his gratitude by showing kindness in return to the strangers who came to England. *Peregrinus ipse*, he wrote to one of his friends abroad, *didici peregrinis succurrere.*

Other ecclesiastics, among those who had sojourned at Zurich, formed also a part of the Genevan colony. Such were Robert Beament (No. 28 of the Tables); Perceval

Wiburne (No. 36); Richard Chambers (No. 38); William Cole (No. 71); Thomas Lever (No. 94), who had been pastor of the English congregation at Arau; and James Pilkington (No. 101),[1] who became bishop of Durham. John Baron (No. 27) has been already mentioned, who is recorded at first as a "student," and would seem to have been a printer. Another Englishman, Rowland Hall (No. 49), is expressly represented as practising this art;[2] and after his return to his own country, he printed a translation of the Edicts of Geneva (London, 1562).[3] Besides, John Bodley and William Williams had a press at Geneva in 1558. This John Bodley, father of Sir Thomas, took a deep interest in the Genevan translation of the Bible, and is said to have defrayed the entire cost of the publication.[4]

SUBSEQUENT RELATIONS OF THE ENGLISH AND THE GENEVANS TO EACH OTHER.

This sketch would be incomplete if we should leave out of sight entirely the subsequent relation of the refugees and their protectors to each other. The republic which had granted an asylum to the colony, did not content itself with

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[1] Pilkington was the first Protestant bishop of the See of Durham. The Parker Society has published a volume of his works, with a biographical notice, edited by the late Professor Scholefield, of Cambridge.

[2] His name stands as "printer" on the title-page of the first edition of the Genevan Bible.

[3] See Mémoires et Documents de la Société d'Histoire et Archeologie de Genève, Tom. VIII. p. 439 (une Communication de M. Ch. Le Fort).

[4] The art of printing in those days was eminently a liberal art, and demanded a superior literary culture on the part of those devoted to it. Stephens and Froben, for instance, were able to correct, as well as print, the text of the classic authors, and to adorn their editions with learned and elegant annotations.

Those, it should be remarked here, designated in the Tables as 'students' formed an important part of the colony. Most of them were young men occupied with studies designed to qualify them for the ministry, or some other public sphere, in which they might defend the Protestant faith against Romanism, and, in general, advance the cause of Christian truth. They were instructed by the learned men of their own community, and to some extent heard the lectures of the foreign teachers of theology at Geneva. Similar "schools of the prophets" existed in the other English colonies. They were supported chiefly merely accompanying the exiles with their good wishes at the moment of departure. In compliance with a desire expressed by them, their friends at Geneva consented to part with one of their pastors, that he might proceed to London and take charge of the French church in that city. The person selected for this service was Nicolas Gallasius, either because no one could be found, beyond the circle of the Genevan ministers, more fitted to execute this mission, or more probably because the choice had been indicated by the bishop of London. He was a learned man, and enjoyed the special friendship of Calvin. He had lived at Geneva a long time, where he had received the rights of citizenship in 1551. In 1557 he had officiated as pastor to the church of their faith at Paris. The election of the company was ratified on the twenty-sixth of April, 1560, by the Council; and on the third of May that body granted an audience of leave (*de congè*) to the new pastor of London.[1] On the third of October, on the communication of a letter of thanks from his church, some assistance was granted to his wife, who was obliged to remain and pass the winter at Geneva.

Gallasius, on his arrival in England, did not fail to report to Calvin the friendly reception accorded to him. Under date of June 30, he wrote as follows:—

"I waited upon the bishop, by whom I was received very courteously. I presented to him, my father, your letter, which he read in my presence, with an open and cheerful countenance, and forthwith briefly related to me its contents; expressing his thanks to you for having written to him in so friendly a manner, and also for reminding him of his duty. He then accosted the elders who had accompanied me to his residence, to some of whom my arrival was

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from funds contributed by wealthy merchants in London, who were in sympathy with the exiles, and, in anticipation of happier days in England, sought in this way to provide men, who at the opportune moment could be thrust at once into the field, and gather fruit for the Lord of the harvest.

[1] The Registres du Conseil (vol. de 1560 – 61) contain various notices of this transaction, under dates of April 19 and 21, May 3, and October 3.

by no means agreeable, and exhorted them not to be ungrateful to God and you; since they had obtained more than they had dared to hope for; that they should follow my recommendations, and henceforth act in all circumstances by my advice, and shew themselves friendly towards me, and admonish the whole church of their duty towards me. Then turning to me apart, he offered me his good offices, and that I might have familiar access to him as often as I wished. I requested that all matters in our church might be determined by his authority, by which means our people would be more effectually kept to their duty; and that he would be pleased to be present, or rather to preside, at the reading of your letter to them. He replied, that in this matter he resigned all his authority to myself, but that he would willingly attend if he could be of any use. He afterwards added something about appointing as my colleague Peter Alexander, who was acceptable to the people, and had begun to gather a church before my arrival; and who was the more acceptable because he neither required any salary, nor was likely to become a burden to what is now a poor and necessitous church; for he has a valuable prebend at Canterbury, the revenue of which he could easily receive during his absence, under the plea of this appointment. I replied that I would farther deliberate and confer with him upon this matter; but that I would take no steps without consulting him."[1]

Gallasius remained in England only three years. Perhaps he found his life there made unpleasant by some troubles which he experienced from a colleague, Peter Alexander, of Arles, who had lived in the family of the archbishop Cranmer, and who afterward had been pastor of the French church at Strasburg. But be this as it may, there were serious reasons relating to his health, which compelled him to return, as the bishop himself informs us in the following letter, the original of which is in the public library (*Bibliothéke publique*) at Geneva. It is addressed to Calvin, and dated at London, June 19, 1563:—

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[1] The Zurich Letters, Vol. II. Ep. 29.

"We are much indebted, most illustrious master Calvin, to your piety, and also to your whole church, for having so long afforded us the services of the most learned master Gallasius; who has not only left to his successor, master Cousins, in a state of quietness and good order, the church which he found, at his coming, in a most disturbed condition, but has also, by his advice and prudence, been of great use both to myself and our churches. I should not, indeed, have willingly let him go, had he not had a better reason for leaving us than we could wish. Our climate, it seems, does not agree with his constitution, and has greatly injured his health, besides depriving him of a beloved wife (to say nothing of his children); so that him whom we now send back as an invalid, there would be reason to fear, if he remained among us another winter, that we should not send back at all. It was, therefore, of the first importance for him to return to his native air for the recovery of his health; and we desire nothing more earnestly than that you may, each of you, be enabled freely to preach the gospel in your common country. Although, in the present state of things, partly through the delay or rather tardiness of some parties, and partly through the over-hasty conduct of others (to use no severer term), there seems but little hope of this; yet I doubt not but that God himself, by means unknown to us, that we may not glory in men, will bring the whole matter to a happy issue. I grieve from my heart that at your age, and with so slender a frame, you have been attacked, as Gallasius informs me, with a fit of the gout. I have no doubt but that you have contracted this disorder by excessive study and exertion. Henceforth, therefore, you must relax somewhat of your former labours and unseasonable lucubrations; lest, by not sparing yourself, you greatly increase your disease, and become of less benefit to the church. Think of Gregory Nazianzen, who, because he did not, when advanced in years, relax at all from that austerity which he practised in early life, was almost constantly obliged to keep his bed, and on that account was rendered less useful to the church. As you and

Bullinger are almost the only chief pillars remaining, we desire to enjoy you both (if it please God) as long as possible. I purposely omit mention of Brentius, who, having undertaken the advocacy of the very worst of causes, seems no longer to acknowledge us as brethren.

Master Gallasius, who brings you this letter, can give you the best information of the state of our kingdom and church; so that I have at this time no occasion to write upon these subjects. Salute, I pray you, in my name, master Beza and your other colleagues; as also master Antony, the professor of Hebrew. May the Lord Jesus very long preserve your pious colony to us and to his church.

Your most devoted in the Lord,
Edmund Grindal.
Bishop of London.

This letter has been translated and printed in the collection of the Zurich Letters.[1] It is pleasant to meet with such sentiments of respect and affection for Calvin, on the part of one of the leaders of the Anglican church, who was also one of the signers of the letter written from Frankfort on the 5th of April, 1555, from which some passages were cited in the earlier part of this Article (page 476).

As to Gallasius himself, he appeared, on his return, before the Council, and presented his letters of recommendation from the French church at London, and of the English "who had formerly resided in Geneva, and cherished still a lively sense of the benefits which they had received here." In the following year he was called to serve the church at Orleans; and after 1571 he fixed himself permanently in his original country, with the sanction of the Council, at the special solicitation of the queen of Navarre.[2]

GOODMAN'S LETTER TO CALVIN.

It would be inexcusable to part from this subject without reprinting, here, at least one of the several elegant Latin epistles which, for the scholar, give so much interest to the dissertation of M. Heyer, on which the present Article has been founded. The Latin language, it is well known, was in that age, the medium of intercourse between the men of learning of different nations, and was almost as familiar to them as their own vernacular tongue. The following letter bears witness to the continued friendship, which these participants in so many common labors and dangers in the work of Christ cherished towards each other, after the cessation of their personal intercourse.

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[1] Zurich Letters, Vol. II. Ep. 42.

[2] Registre du Conseil. vol. de 1563, fol. 85, July 30.

Eruditionis et pietatis eximiae viro, D. suo colendissimo D. J. Calvino, ecclesiae Genevensis fidelissimo pastori.

Ignosce mihi colendissime praeceptor, si cum multa scribenda nunc forent, tam paucis utor: nam sola excusatio tam diuturni silentii, paucis contenta non esset, nec status verum nostrarum narratio laconismum patereter. Quibus (ut par esset) exponendis, neque otium nunc datur, neque negotium sustinet: quemadmodum ab isto, qui haec tibi laturus sit, plenius cognosces. Non me excuso, quod tanto temporis intervallo, nullas prorsus ad te (cum non ego solum sed tota Anglia tantopere debet) literas dedi. Solum hoc abs tua humanitate impetrare contendo, ne ulla beneficiorum istic acceptorum oblivione factum putes, sic enim me ipsum vita hac indignissimum judicarem: neve quod ulla unquam defuerit prompta voluntas huic officio praestando, modo vel internunciorum oportunitas, vel locorum, in quibus ut plurimum versatus fui, commoditas votis respondissent. Res nostrae variae multaeque sunt, de quibus audire (si daretur) non esset prorsus injucundum: sed omnia hujus honestissimi pariterque pii juvenis narrationi refero, ut ab eo, cum visum fuerit et vacaverit audias. Est enim apud vos mansurus doctrinae et verae pietatis adipiscendae gratia: qui et hic spectator et actor tragediae, ut plurimum, interfuit. Quo nemo rei initium, progressum vel finem, quem nunc Dei clementia nacta sit, melius aut verius exponet. Ab eo quoque religionis formam, continuationis spem, ministrorum penuriam, ceteraque impedimenta et hostes cognosces: in quibus evitandis malis, consilium tuum tempestivum ac saluberrimum desideratur: Ne quod divina clementia partum sit, nostra socordia merito amittamus. Quod ad me attinet, est quod Deo gratias ingentes agam, cujus beneficio, bonorum animi in me propensi sunt, nec est, cur aliqua in re conquerer. Tantum in hac ministrorum paucitate expecto, donec omnia (quod religionem) melius disponantur et stabiliantur: postea reversus in patriam meam, si Deo videbitur. Nam nunc (ut audio) incipiunt nostri gnatones in Anglia persenticere, quod parum profuit illorum adulatio et invidia: qui ut aliis nocerent, superstitionem, repugnante conscientia, mixerunt, religionem violarent, tandemque in odium bonorum omnium, justo Dei judicio, incurrerunt. Adeo ut nullus

veritatis zelus, nulla pietatis exempla, nulla denique pessimorum hominum supplicia, ullibi compareant. Impietas, superbia, avaritia, luxus, omnes ut plurimum occupant, et passim omnibus in locis grassantur; porro sentiunt quem promoverunt, et in coelos usque extulerunt, faeminae gubernationis fructum. Deus pro sua infinita misericordia, iram suam, quam sumus commeriti et procuramus quotidie, procul a nobis avertat. Whittingamo nostro, cui silentium ob libertatem loquendi impositum fuit, linguam relaxarunt, idque absque ulla conditione, quod nullam voluerit admittere. Cum nostris qui apud vos fuerunt, durius agitur: sed nostrae probationis tempus est, aequum namque videri debet, ut aliquam crucis portionem sustineamus, qui tam longa conscientiarum tranquilitate, nobiscum terque quaterque beatis, in vestra beata civitate Dei, fruebamur: cujus memoria omnem mihi molestiam non levat modo, sed aufert penitus. Frater noster Johannes Knoxoeus, scio ad te scribet, itaque de eo prolixius agere supervacaneum judico. Uxore sua piissima privatus ipse non satis validus corpore, animo tamen robustus, laboribus nunquam caedit. Tempestivus erat illius in Scotiam adventus, et non minus necessaria, nunc praesentia; cui precor annorum numerum, in patriae suae commodum et ecclesiae progressum augeri. Est etiam alius Johannes Wollocus diligens minister, et strenuus veritatis propugnator. Juvenes praeterea nonnulli bonae spei manum operae admovent. Sed istis commemorandis finem imponam, atque hunc juvenem D. Jacobum Kyrkcaldy, nobili Scotorum genere prognatum, religionis studiosissimum, et optimis moribus praeditum, tuae pietati commendo, simulque obsecro et obtestor, ut illi de hospite bono ac fideli, quocum permaneat, prospicias: sive ex ministris, sive ex praelectoribus, quos, scio, ejus familiaritatis nunquam poenitebit. Nominabam illi Dominum Danionem et Dominum Baesa, inter, caeteros, quibuscum se optime fore non dubito. Sed tuo judicio acquiescet per omnia, et pro omnibus, quae accepturus sit, satisfaciet. Ministros omnes queso ut meo nomine salutes potissimum D. Viretum et Dom. Farellum: Omnibus autem, tibi vero potissimum, totique Senatui vestro, me, quoad vixero debitorem contestor. Deus Opt. M. te tuosque omnes in ecclesiae solatium, quam diutissime conservet

S. Andre, 13 februarii, anno Domini 1561. E Scotia.

Tui studiosissimus Christophorus GOODMANUS.

ARTICLE II.

SEMITIC COMPARATIVE PHILOLOGY.

BY DR. L. TAFEL AND PROF. R. L. TAFEL, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, MO.

THE labors of the comparative school of philology have thus far been limited to the Indo-European family of languages. Besides the work of J. E. Renan (Histoire et Système comparé des langues Sémitique), of which the first volume, treating of the history and genius of the Semitic languages, appeared several years ago, no systematic application of this new discipline has been made to these languages. And yet a comparison of the various Semitic idioms sheds as much light upon their respective grammars, as a comparison of the Indo-European or Arian languages elucidates theirs. In the present Article we propose to make a first contribution to Semitic comparative philology, discussing *the Semitic Verb and Noun*, as developed in the Hebrew grammar of Gesenius and the more recent school-grammar of Ewald, the Chaldee grammars of Fürst and Winer, the Syriac of Uhlemann, the Arabic of Caspari, and the Ethiopic of Dillmann. The form in which we treat our subject will be a review of the above-mentioned Hebrew grammars of Gesenius and Ewald, in the light of Semitic comparative philology.

Gesenius and Ewald have been considered, for a long time, as the leading oriental scholars of Europe, and their Hebrew grammars are more extensively used than any other. The former scholar has long been familiar to our orientalists by the translations of his Hebrew grammar and dictionary; and of his life and other works, Prof. Robinson has given a detailed account in an early number of the Bibliotheca Sacra. Prof. Ewald is not so well known; and for this reason, before entering upon a discussion of his grammar, we propose to draw a short comparison between the grammars of Gesenius and Ewald, and give our opinion of the latter, both as a man and a scholar.

In the preface to his Hebrew grammar for beginners, which he published upon his return to Göttingen, after a protracted stay in Tübingen in southern Germany, on pages v and vi he exclaims: "How much labor and toil, perfectly useless, has been expended during the last three hundred years, by thousands of students, in either acquiring no knowledge of Hebrew at all, or a mere smattering for the sake of showing off! Is it not time that in this respect, likewise, we in Germany should begin to think about true use?" From this extract we are to infer that before the time of Ewald there were no able text-books for the study of the Hebrew language in Germany; while yet the grammar of Gesenius, which since his death, by the care of the learned Rödiger is kept on a level with the science, fulfils all just claims to a good grammar, and by means of other grammars, too, able Hebrew scholars have been educated. In this wholesale denunciation of a lack of knowledge of the Hebrew among his countrymen, and more especially among the Swabians in southern Germany (because in their schools they had preferred Gesenius's to his own grammar), Ewald does them manifest injustice. For the last three hundred years the Hebrew has been very thoroughly studied in all parts of Germany, and especially in Würtemberg, where great care has been bestowed upon the instruction in Hebrew, both in the theological seminaries or colleges and in the university proper. The reason why the professors in these institutions preferred Gesenius's to Ewald's grammar is, because the former is very simple and intelligible, and arranged in a convenient form; while the school-grammar of Prof. Ewald lacks even the convenience of an index, without which no grammar, and especially no school grammar, ought ever to be published.

By his low estimation of the works of others, Prof. Ewald injured his usefulness very much in the university of Tübingen in Würtemberg, to which he received a call after his exile from Göttingen; and by his supercilious manner he prevented his real merits from being duly acknowledged and appreciated. Ewald, as regards the Hebrew, we are told, is an *αὐτοδίδακτος*; since he, independent of all *ὁδηγία* of other Hebrew scholars, has made his own thorough studies of the holy scriptures; and has occasionally compared the Hebrew with the other Semitic idioms and also the Indo-European languages which he calls Mediterranean. But by the impetuous flight of his genius, he has sometimes been carried into the realm of arbitrary hypotheses, while the cautious Gesenius has remained more on "terra firma."

Yet the school-grammar of Ewald is by no means void of merit. On page iv of his Preface, he very justly opposes the common method of commencing the study of a language with committing the rules of grammar to memory, of which the students have not the slightest conception. For by this means, he says, the eyes and ears of beginners, since time immemorial, have been frightened off, their ideas confused, and their interest in learning killed." He continues: "the various wants and mental gifts of the scholars must be taken into consideration by a wise teacher; and, according to circumstances, he may either enter into details and institute comparisons with other languages known to the student, or else confine himself to the general matters (die grossen Hauptsachen) on the surface. Nor is it necessary," he adds, "for the professor to confine himself strictly to the order followed in the text-book, but he may as well commence the study of the details of the language by committing the paradigms to memory." This mode of proceeding reminds us of the course pursued by a German professor of eminence, who, whenever his boys, upon entering his room, brought their new grammars with them, took his penknife and cut out all except the declensions and conjugations, declaring that the rest, viz. the rules of syntax, the boys would have to make up for themselves. And he was not altogether wrong. In olden times, when the boys were not yet furnished with grammars in which the minutest rules of syntax were laid down, and when they had to deduce these rules themselves, there were more thorough masters of classical literature, than at the present day, when a student, with his memory inflated with rules deduced by others, exhibits the learning of others and not his own. Prof. Ewald, however, does not go quite as far; he simply opposes the committing to memory of the rules of syntax, and recommends that the students learn how to use their grammars as books of reference, under the guidance of an experienced teacher. After this preliminary talk, we enter upon the subject of the grammar itself.

Prof. Ewald, at the beginning of his work, before entering into the details of grammar, gives a synopsis of the masculine and feminine nouns in the states construct and absolute of the singular, dual, and plural numbers, with their pronominal suffixes, and divides the nouns into such of the first, second, and third formation; in the place of the nine masculine and four feminine declensions of Gesenius, which the latter gives partly in §§ 53, 55, and partly in the appendix. Afterwards Ewald introduces the verbs according to their different conjugations, and concludes with examples of the verb with pronominal suffixes.

Upon comparing the two grammars in respect to the doctrine of the noun and the declensions, that of Ewald has a decided advantage over that of Gesenius. *First*, Ewald justly includes the masculine and feminine nouns in the same declensions; for the suffix of the gender is subject to the same law as the suffix of the number and of the pronouns. *Secondly*, Gesenius, in establishing nine masculine and four feminine declensions, takes into consideration mere accidental and external analogies, without paying any attention to internal similarities; while at least the first two of Ewald's three declensions represent certain stages in the formation of the nouns. The only point where we differ from Prof. Ewald is the priority of these several stages. This point we will develop more fully hereafter, and simply state now, that in the Semitic languages the nominal and verbal roots were originally, to a great extent, the same, not only as regards the consonants, but also the vowels; and that an analogy may be traced between the declensions of the noun and the different forms of the verb. We now turn to an investigation of the primitive condition of the Semitic tongues.

Inasmuch as all things in nature, as well as among men, proceed from simple beginnings, and afterwards become developed and perfected more and more, we may assume that the grammatical forms of the first men were very simple, corresponding to their bodily and mental wants.[1] This also we find corroborated by the history of the several languages, as far as we can trace them towards their beginnings; and, with regard to the Semitic languages, it will appear in the following pages. We are not prepared, with Prof. Fürst (§ 1. chaldäische Formenlehre), to admit that the *Aramean* idiom is the oldest of all Semitic dialects; but we believe that the original Semitic people, starting from their seats in the north, spread themselves in an easterly and southerly direction, and that the common ancestral language, in different latitudes, was developed differently; and that in the original, rougher home, more vestiges of the primitive language were preserved, than in other places and idioms; for there, owing to the peculiar nature of the land, they were frequently subjugated by the neighboring people, who did not speak a Semitic tongue, and, impeded by this foreign language, the original Semitic language of the subjugated people could not be developed as readily as among the Hebrews, Phoenicians, Arabs, and Ethiopians; hence more archaic forms occur in the former than in the latter idioms.

As regards Prof. Rödiger's denial (§ 1. of Gesenius's grammar) of the originality of the monosyllabic roots which exist in the Aramean, viz. the Chaldee and Syriac, and to some extent yet in the Hebrew, and also with regard to his assertion that these roots, in the course of time, were reduced and compressed into monosyllables, this is a sheer arbitrary assumption; for Prof. Rödiger does not offer a single proof, showing that these verbal and nominal roots were ever dissyllables or trisyllables, such as are the roots in the Hebrew, Arabic, or Ethiopic. His statement that the old Hebrew, in its construction, agrees more with the modern than the old Arabic, proves nothing; this will be sufficiently proved hereafter. It is an incontrovertible fact that all languages, after reaching their adult age, i. e. after arriving at the culminating stage of their sensual or merely external development, come to a stand-still, and, in proportion as the popular mind increases in strength, begin to cast aside various forms as needless props. This process is called, by the modern linguists, one of deterioration, marking the downfall of the language; but we are more inclined to look upon it as a process of spiritualizing. Suppose we grant (which, however, we are not willing to do) that the old Hebrew originally had the same number of declensions and conjugations as the old Arabic, and subsequently, many centuries before the Arabic itself, cast them aside again; this would be but a similar process to what we notice in the Indo-European idioms, e. g. in the English we find *we*, *ye*, *they speak*, *spake*, *spoke*, compared with the German *wir sprechen*, *sprachen* (instead of *sprechem*, *sprachem*, old German *sprahumes*), *ihr sprechet*, *sprachet*, *sie sprechen*, *sprachen* (instead of *sie sprechent*, *sprachent*), and the Greek λέγ-ομες, λέγ-ομεν, λέγ-ετε, λέγ-οντι, λέγ-ουσι; and in the Anglo-Saxon, already, the distinction of the three persons in the plural has been given up, *we hab-bon*, *ge hab-bon*, *hi hab-bon* ,while in the French, three different forms have been retained for the three persons, *nous parl-ons*, *vous parl-ez*, *ils parl-ent*, of which the third person has given up the mark of the plural number, at least for the ear.

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[1] See our Review of Bopp's Comparative Grammar, Oct. 1861, p. 775.

We are, however, by no means justified in assuming that all the members of the Semitic stock attained the same development of forms as the Arabic. In nature, even, we find that not all individuals of the same species of plants or animals, though favored by apparently the same circumstances, reach a like state of perfection; and upon viewing man, we are impressed with the fact, that frequently children of the same parents not only differ with regard to their bodily constitutions, but also their mental gifts, their dispositions, and characters; and among the same people we find that different tribes have developed differently as regards their mode of thinking, and the expression of their thoughts by language. So in Great Britain there are the Devonshire and Yorkshire men, and the Low Scotch, descended from the same parentage; among the Germans the Swabians, Franconians, Saxons, etc., all differing in disposition, character, and language; and in antiquity there were the Athenians, Ionians, Dorians, etc., members of the same Hellenic stock. Many pertinent points we have to omit here, but we will recur to them afterwards.

That deterioration of form ("Formenverkümmerung," as it is called by Prof. Rödiger and others) in the Semitic languages, touches the inflection of words only, and not their roots, and Prof. Rödiger has attempted to fasten it upon the language against all law and reason; and, inasmuch as he has not furnished us a single proof, showing that dissyllables and trisyllables have ever dwindled down into monosyllables, we naturally abandon his hypothesis, and admit the existence of monosyllabic nominal roots which coincide with the corresponding verbal roots, and which are nothing else but verbal roots, expressing the realization of an activity, applied as nouns. The monosyllabic form of these nouns is קְטַל (קְטֵל, קְטֶל), which is usually found in the eastern and western Aramean, and even in the Hebrew, in the state absolute, in a number of words, as גְּבַר man (גְּבֶרֶת mistress), דְּוַי sickness (דוה to be sick), דְּבַשׁ honey, שְׁכֶם shoulder, אֲרִי for אֲרַי lion (ארה to pull to pieces), לְחִי for לְחַי cheek, צְבִי for צְבַי splendor, etc., and in the state construct, which we regard as the original form of the noun, in a still greater number. The sheva of the first radical, the embryo of a future vowel, in the state absolute, was subsequently generally filled up, in Hebrew, into a kamets, rarely into a tsere; and the pattah of the second radical, also, was lengthened into a kamets, and, by a second subsequent formation, into a tsere; but this was done in such a manner that the accent still remained upon the last syllable; e.g. דְּבַר

word into דָּבָר; עֲנַב grape, into עֵנָב; זְקַן old man, into זָקֵן; in the singular of the state absolute a tsere was afterwards employed, to mark the intransitives, as is done even in the verb. The plural, however, is still regularly formed of the original form קְטַל, the pattah in this case, according to a special Hebrew law, being lengthened into a kamets, on account of its now closing the syllable, as דְּבַר, דְּבָרִים; אֲרִי for אֲרַי, אֲרָיִים; צְבִי for צְבַי, צְבָיִים beauties, צְבָאוֹת for צְבָיוֹת (by assimilating the sound of the yod to that of the preceding vowel, which is also frequently done in the Aramean). The plural retained the original monosyllabic form, even in those cases in which afterwards the so-called segol-form had been preferred, as in מְלֶךְ (מְלַךְ) king, מֶלֶךְ, מְלָכִים; מַלְכָּה, מְלָכוֹת queens; שִׁפְחָה (שְׁפַח) maid-servant, שְׁפָחוֹת; from which it appears that the Hebrew plural partakes even of more originality than does the Aramean, as will probably be admitted even by Prof. Fürst himself. The original form of the root, also, has been occasionally preserved in the dual, the early form of which has been excluded from the language at a later period, e. g. קְרַן (קְרַן), קֶרֶן horn, קְרָנַיִם for קַרְנַיִם; לְחִי cheek, לְחָיַיִם both cheeks; דְּרַךְ, דֶּרֶךְ way, דְּרָכַיִם two ways *or* a double way.

Prof. Ewald says, § 117, p. 109: "The termination of the plural, in the common noun, is ־ִים; very seldom the Aramean form ־ִין.[1] This form was originally rather *âm*, conf. עַם people, multitude, from which it was probably borrowed; hence, also, *ôm*, *ûm*, *ûn*." We think it strange that Prof. Ewald should not mention this explanation of the suffix of the plural in his "Ausführliche Grammatik" (larger grammar), which he was publishing at the same time, and that he should have reserved for his "Schulgrammatik" this addition, which, with the exception of Dr. Donaldson in England, has not been, and probably will not be, adopted by any other Hebrew scholar; for, such a combination of two nouns, except in proper nouns, was an unheard of and unprecedented occurrence in those primitive times; all similar suffixes in nouns, as well as in verbs, having been formed of pronouns only. Moreover, the Semitic forms הֵם, הִמּוֹן, הִמּוֹ, הִנּוּן, אִנּוּן, הֵנָּן (conf. Fürst's Chaldäische Formenlehre, p. 238), which originally served for both genders, furnish all the elements necessary for the explanation of the plural of all the Semitic idioms.

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[1] How will the Professor explain the Aramean ן (Nun)?

Prof. Ewald seems to us equally unfortunate in what he says about a pretended original neuter gender among the Semites. He says, p. 19: "Many things which must have originally existed in the youthful age of the language, e. g. a distinct neuter gender, have been lost again; compound words, also, which in the Sanskrit languages describe a peculiar, still higher degree of development, with the exception of a few beginnings, have become entirely foreign to the Semitic languages." If a thing could become foreign to a language, a time must necessarily have existed when it was less foreign to it. Now we should like to know whence Prof. Ewald derived this information. As he does not give us any additional information, in his "Schulgrammatik," about the primitive neuter in the Semitic languages, we have to turn to his "Ausführliche Grammatik," published in the same year. Here he says, § 172, a: "It is satisfactorily established, by all vestiges, that the Semitic, in the primitive times, before its peculiar genius had been developed, distinguished the impersonal or so-called neuter gender. This is a matter beyond any doubt; because, before language can regard inanimate things as masculine, it must first have been in the habit of treating some inanimate things as persons, and others as impersonal things. This is clearly shown by the interrogative pronoun מִי, τίς, who? מָה, τί, what? which, no doubt, dates from that time, and the latter form of which clearly corresponds to our neuter. This interrogative pronoun, also, distinguished in this manner, is found in all Semitic languages. We are also taught by the fuller, and no doubt older, pronunciation of this word *ment* (*mant*), instead of מָה, which still occurs in the Ethiopic, that the neuter in the Semitic, as well as in the Mediterranean [i. e. the Indo-European], was formed by the letter *t* (conf. Sanskrit *tat*), which afterwards passed over into *n* or *m*.

Except in this small vestige, the Semitic has given up entirely the distinction of the neuter gender; and the reason of this is, evidently, that the distinction of the feminine from the masculine gender, which could only have been fully carried out in a second stage of the language, has prevailed in it to such an extent as to crowd out completely the other distinction, which is the older." Prof. Ewald also observes, among other things, § 182, a: "If we examine the origin of these interrogative pronouns, we find that they are already compounded, without any doubt, of the mere interrogative word *ma* and the demonstrative *na*. *Mān* or *măn*, in the sense of *who?* is found in all other Semitic tongues, and seems to have been shortened, in the Hebrew only, into *mî;* this word was originally attended by *ment*, which, from the primitive times, expressed the neuter, i. e. the impersonal gender. From *ment* first arose מָן, which is found Ex. xvi. 15. at the occasion of the explanation of a word; because, most probably, it was still understood in some [?] of the dialects, even as it has been preserved at all times in the Aramean [and, we may add, in the Arabic and Ethiopic]; from this form, finally, was shortened the Arabic مَا and the Hebrew מָה. At first, § 172, Prof. Ewald speaks of a number of vestiges which prove the former existence of the neuter gender, but immediately afterwards he confines them to the "small vestige" of the interrogative word. We are afraid that this small vestige, too, will disappear when viewed in the true light; suppose, even, the existence of the neuter gender to be laid into those "primitive times, in which the Semitic had not yet developed its peculiar genius." We contest the very first point of Ewald's argumentation, viz. that it is established beyond any doubt, that before language (i.e. man who speaks it) can regard inanimate things as masculines, it must first have been in the habit of treating some inanimate things as persons, and others as impersonal things. If here, in the place of man in general, we put a child, we may find, at any time, that he treats inanimate things as living, and thus personifies them; such, we hold, was the case with the first man through whom language was formed. In his eyes everything was alive; he only saw concrete actions of men, and took the phenomenon of an action for the actor himself; thus מִקְטַל (מִ or מַ what, קְטַל has killed) means that which has killed, and which, on this account, may kill again, = the one killing. The process of deriving the abstract from the concrete, and of expressing what is inanimate and void of gender by a particular form, did not precede but follow the process of reflection, provided the Semitic languages ever reached this state of development; which, it is well known, they never did. We doubt, very much, whether Prof. Ewald will ever make many proselytes to his theory besides his pupil Prof. Dillmann, who has probably composed his Ethiopic grammar under the influence of the master, and who has actually created this Ethiopic form a *neutrum in partibus infidelium* (Ethiopic grammar, p. 265). The Ethiopic form ምንት (*ment*) in question, is nothing else but the Ethiopic feminine agreeing with the Arabic feminine مَنَتْ (*manath*, shortened into *manth*, *menth*), and neither of these forms is more primitive than מַה, מֶה, as is supposed by Prof. Ewald, nor have they been formed, at a later period, from the masculine מַן or מָנוּ. If we are not willing to regard מִי and מַה, מֶה, as primitive forms, we may imagine them shortened of מַי; even as פֶּה and פִּי mouth, are formed from פַּי; (שָׂדֶה from שָׂדַי); אֲבִי and אֲחִי instead of אֲבַי and אֲחַי (conf. מַאֲוַי) from אֲבָה, אֲחָה; in which case the diphthongal form would be reduced into מִי and מַה, מֶה, and the former would be employed afterwards for persons, and the latter for personified things, and be mistaken for a feminine form מָה, מַח.[1] The Semitic interrogative word מַן (מָנוּ), which Prof. Ewald supposes to be compounded of *ma* and *na*, we would rather explain as being composed of מַי shortened into מְ, and the pronoun הָן (הַן) or אָן (אַן), which still survives in the Aramean, and as a suffix occurs both in the Semitic and

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[1] The Ethiopic really furnishes an old form ሚ (מִי, mee), which according to our opinion is shortened from the diphthongal form *mai*, מַי, and, with the meaning of *what?* is used of things (cfr. Dillmann, Aethiopische Grammatik, p. 265.)

Indo-European languages, and as a prefix shortened into הִן, אִן, is found in the Hebrew Niphal and the Arabic إِنْقَتَلَ (inkătălă), in the capacity of a demonstrative adverb הֵן and perhaps as an article in the Hebrew. At all events, as regards the article, it is much more natural, and lies much nearer to assume the assimilation and consequent dropping of נ in הַן (since we have a precedent of this process in מִן, מִלִּבִּי, מֵרֹב, מִיָּם, מֵאֵת, etc.), than to admit the assimilation and consequent dropping of ל in הַל, by which prefix the Hebrew article is usually explained; for the only instance where ל is found thus assimilated and dropped is יִקַּח for יִלְקַח, which form may also be explained some other way. But to return to מַה: the *a* sound of מַה, מֶה, was, afterwards, more and more regarded as a feminine ending, and as such it was, at the same time, adopted to represent what is called the neuter gender; especially since it is also written מָה. The suffix ת in *menth* or *manth*, as in the Semitic languages generally, denotes the feminine. When occurring as a prefix, it may be masculine as well as feminine, and in this case it corresponds to the Greek *τ* in *τήμερον*, etc., and also to the demonstrative *το*, *τα*, which was afterwards employed as an article; e. g. תּוֹשָׁב for תַּוְשָׁב, תִּירשׁ (תַּיְרשׁ), *the one taking possession of* [*you*]; תֶּמֶס, *the one* or *the thing melting away*, for *a melting*; תַּעֲנִית, *the one* or *the thing afflicting*, i. e. *the fasting*; תְּקוֹמֵם, *the one rising up against*; תְּקוּמָה, *a rising* or *standing up against*, *the power of resisting*.

But to return from this digression to Prof. Ewald's classification of the noun. Before discussing this subject any further, we must repeat a former statement, which will be examined in detail hereafter, in treating of the verb, viz. that the nominal and verbal roots are originally the same, not only as regards their consonants, but also their vowels, and that the only difference between them consists in a different mode of affixing pronouns; that consequently there are formations of the verbs corresponding to those of the nouns.

If, in the arrangement of the Hebrew declensions, with Prof. Ewald, we start from genetic principles, those nouns evidently constitute the *first declension*, which agree with the verb in its original monosyllabic form, with the accent upon the last syllable, and the sheva of the first radical, e. g. גְּבַר man, דְּבַשׁ honey, etc.; or in which the sheva of the first radical is filled up into kamets, e. g. דָּבָר word, זָכָר a male. This class is made the second declension by Prof. Ewald. As regards his first declension (Gesenius's sixth), we would not even make it the second, but the third declension.

Those appear to us as nouns of the *second declension* which coincide with the intransitive verbs. In these the pattah of the second radical is either varied into a tsere, chirek, cholem, or shurek, and the sheva of the first radical is almost invariably filled up into a kamets, e. g. קְטֵל, קְטִל, קְטֹל, קְטַל into קָטֵל, קָטִיל, קָטֹל, קָטוּל; נְבִיא into נָבִיא., נְשִׂיא, נָשִׂיא; יְגֹר, יָגוֹר; יְגִיעַ, יָגִיעַ; עֵרֹם, עָרֹם; עֲצוּם, עָצוּם — those nouns which are formed with chirek and shurek frequently assuming a passive meaning. In order to obtain an insight into the formation of the nouns composing this class, we must analyze the formation of the intransitive verbs with which they coincide. In the transitive verbs which belong to the first formation, the original pattah after the second radical has been retained, while this in the intransitive verbs is usually changed into a tsere in the Aramean, Hebrew, and Ethiopic; into a cholem in the Chaldee; in a few verbs in the Hebrew into shurek of the first, chirek of the second, radical; in the Arabic into a chirek; finally, it is found changed in the Chaldee and Arabic. This chirek no longer occurs in any Hebrew verb, but it is found in some of its nouns; and from the fact that we still meet with it in Chaldee and Arabic verbs and nouns, we conclude that it was of ordinary occurrence in the original Semitic tongue, before this branched out into its dialects; and that from this general language it has survived in Hebrew nouns. We now direct the attention of the reader to the difference between the transitive and intransitive verbs, viz. that the former is followed by a complemental accusative case, but the latter is used without it. A similar relation as between the transitive and intransitive verbs, we hold exists between the noun in the state construct and the state absolute. In the former state the noun is attended by a complemental genitive case, and in the latter it is used without it. The effect, in either case, upon the pattah of the second radical is the same. As in the transitive verb this pattah is retained, but in the intransitive verb is varied into a chirek, cholem, or tsere; so also in some of the nouns of the second declension in the state construct, the original pattah is retained, while in the state absolute it is varied into a tsere. When the vowel after the second radical is a tsere, this is usually changed into a pattah in the state construct, e. g. state absol. זָקֵן, state constr. זְקַן; יָתֵד, יְתַד; עָרֵל, עֲרַל; כָּבֵד, כְּבַד; שָׁכֵן. שְׁכַן; שָׂבֵעַ. שְׂבַע; in some of these nouns, however, the tsere of the state absolute is retained in the state construct, e. g. יָגֵעַ, יְגֵעַ; שָׂמֵחַ. שְׂמֵחַ. When the second radical is followed by a chirek, cholem, or shurek, these vowels are also retained in the state construct, and in the forms with suffixes.

The nouns of the *third declension* or *formation* (Ewald's first) evidently belong to a period in which the Hebrew was already detached from its sister-languages; inasmuch as no other Semitic tongue possesses the segol-forms. As regards Prof. Ewald's assertion that the reason of the removal of the accent [and, we add, the vowel] from the ultimate to the penult in the noun, is to distinguish it from the verb (Ausführl. Lehrb. d. Hebr. Spr. p. 325), we cannot agree with him, inasmuch as this removal of the accent is also found in many *verbs*, but does not occur in more than three fourths of the nouns. He may be right so far that the length of the vowel of the final syllable of the root, in the state absolute of the nouns, expresses a certain completeness and independence on the part of the noun; while the pattah of the second radical of the verb indicates a leaning of the verb towards the object which limits its action. So also the vowel of the final syllable is found short in the state construct of the nouns, by which a more intimate conjunction of the noun with the qualifying or modifying attribute seems to be expressed. In the intransitive verbs, again, the action of which is not limited by an object, we find the longer tsere and cholem, and in some dialects the chirek and shurek, as has been stated above. From all this it follows that this removal of the accent from the second to the first radical, is not for the sake of distinguishing the noun from the verb, but probably rises in a cause common both to the noun and the verb.

In order to place this statement on a firmer basis, we must be allowed to dilate on the subject before us, and to show that it has a historical foundation. As the Indo-European languages, in their ante-historical youth, when they were still united under some common idiom, lacked the article, and as in the Greek, at a time when it already belonged to history, i. e. after Homer, a definite article was created, we are led to suppose that the Semitic idioms, also, were originally destitute of it ; inasmuch as the Ethiopic, during the entire duration of its existence, seems to have done without it ; and in Hebrew poetry, likewise, the noun is used without the article, because the poets are fond of archaic forms and constructions. It seems, however, that while the Semitic languages were yet united, a beginning was made towards the creation of an article. For in the Aramean, the Arabic, and to some extent in the Hebrew, we meet with the ending *ā*, *ō*, *an*, *on*, *un*, which evidently contains the same vowels *ā* or *ō* (*ū*), that still exist in the Aramean in a sort of rudimental capacity in the article emphatic, and are likewise found in the Latin *domin-a*, *domin-o*, and the Greek *ἵππ-ο*, *ἵππ-α*, *ἵππ-η* ; in which languages these vowels gradually lost their power of an article, and became fortified by the addition of a new pronoun *s*, *n*, e. g. *hom-o-n*, *av-o-s*, avus, *δαίμ-ω-ν*.

We thus have in the Indo-European, as well as in the Semitic tongues, two suffixed articles : *first*, *a* and *o*, and *secondly*, *n* or *s*, so that in the Indo-European languages we obtain the endings *o-n*, *o-s*, and in the Semitic *a-n* and *o-n*. The ending *an* is contracted of *a-han*, and *on* of *o-hon*, *han* being a demonstrative pronoun in the Chaldee, and *hon* in the Syriac. The consciousness of the suffixes *an* and *on* being articles, became soon lost in the Hebrew and Arabic tongues, where they dwindled down into mere endings ; but in the Aramean the ending *a*, even without the addition of *n*, continued as an article. To compensate for this loss of the article, in Hebrew הַן or הַ began to be prefixed, and in the Arabic אַל. In the Arabic we, moreover, find this peculiarity, that when the article *al* is prefixed, the letter *n* of the suffix is dropped, as *malkan* king, *almalka* the king. A parallel case of this prefixing of the article, after the meaning of the suffixed article became lost, we find in the Greek *ὁ ἵππ-ο-ς*, *ὁ δαίμ-ω-ν*, while in the Latin the suffixed article sufficed, as *fili-u-s*, the son.

The prefix הַן, on account of its causing the vowel of the following consonant to be accented, exercised the same effect upon the noun, as did the stereotype וַ upon the verb, viz. by dropping the final syllable *a*, it caused the root to become again monosyllabic,[1] as happened with several other prefixes, e. g. מֶמֶר sorrow, for מְמַר from מָרַר; מֶכֶס from כָּסַס; תֶּבֶל from בָּלַל; תֶּמֶס from מָסַס. Yet we are far from maintaining that the prefixing of the article, or any other prefix, was the only cause by which the ultimate syllable was cut off; for in the Ethiopic we meet with a wearing off of this syllable without the prefixing of any syllable whatever.

By assuming the pre-existence of the suffixed article *a* or *ha*, we also have the key for an understanding of the formation of the dual, which originally seems to have been but another form of the plural, and afterwards was confined to a duality of things or persons, as in Heb. יוֹם, Chald. יוֹמָא, Samar. יוֹמָה, יוֹמַיִם for יוֹמָיִם the days; afterwards, the two days (properly it signifies *the day-they;* ־ַיִם being instead of הִים or הֵם, which is the plural of הוּא). The diphthong ־ַי was either contracted into ־ֵי, as in שְׁנֵים two; or into kamets, as in כִּנָּם for כִּנַּיִם flies, gnats, סֻלָּם steps, for סֻלַּיִם, which arose from סֻלָּהֵם or סֻלָּהִים; or, finally, it was contracted into ־ִים, which is the ordinary mark of the plural in later times. The original diphthongal form, however, may have been in use in the Hebrew for many centuries before it was reduced into ־ָים; for the form of the consonants, which alone were written originally, remained the same in both cases. Before suffixes, and in the state construct, this supposed original form of the plural ־ַיִם [or ־ַיִן] was first nasalized and indistinctly pronounced, and finally dropped altogether, as in the Syriac מַלְכַּי; the diphthong of which ending, in the Hebrew and Chaldee, was blended into ־ֵי; when, we cannot say, because the vowels originally were not expressed in writing.

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[1] As a relic of this final *a* in Hebrew we may regard לַיְלָה, where, moreover, the original ה, instead of the later Aramean א, is preserved; as is also the case in the Samaritan, which in this respect appears more primitive; for the ancient form of the suffixed article was not *a* but *ha*.

As regards the migration of the vowel of the monosyllable from the second to the first radical, which we find in the nouns of the third formation, it seems to have taken place before the primitive Semitic tongue branched out into the different idioms; nor does it seem to have been confined to the nouns, but to have pervaded a greater portion of the verbs, and in short to have become a special law in all Semitic languages, inasmuch as it occurs in all of them. Thus we find in the Aramean קְטַל he killed, but קַטְלַנִי he killed me; קְטַלוּ they killed, קַטְלוּנִי they killed me; in the Hebrew (קְטַל) קָטַל he killed, קְטָלַנִי he killed me, קָטֵלוּ, קְטָלוּנִי they killed me; מְלַךְ (מֶלֶךְ), Heb. מְלָכִים kings; Chald. מְלֵךְ, מַלְכָּא, plur. מַלְכִין.

We close, here, our discussion of the various Hebrew declensions. By classifying the Hebrew nouns strictly according to their formation, we arrive at more declensions than Prof. Ewald; but confining ourselves to laying down our first positions in this Article, we defer a discussion of the remaining declensions to a future occasion.

In respect to the so-called original cases in Hebrew, Prof. Rödiger differs from Prof. Ewald; for in treating of the remnants of old cases, ־ָה locative, and ־ִי and וֹ at the end of words, in the state construct, § 90 of Gesenius's grammar, he says: "As in the Arabic three cases are distinguished by their endings, so also in the Hebrew noun we notice three endings which correspond with the Arabic in their sound, but which have generally lost their meaning, and remain as dilapidated monuments of a fuller and more living organism; for, in the Hebrew language, in that stage in which it appears in the Old Testament, the cases are no longer distinguished by their endings." In a foot-note he continues : "As the meaning of the cases is entirely lost in the endings ־ִי and וֹ, it is not quite right to call them endings of cases ; yet it is probable that, at some time, they had a specific meaning in the language, just as ־ָה : even as the corresponding endings [*u* for the nominative, *i* for the genitive, and *a* for the accusative case] are found in the old Arabic, and became subsequently lost, as in the Hebrew." Prof. Rödiger, in his statement, starts with the same supposition which, we think, has been sufficiently disproved above, viz. that all Semitic idioms, because they are the offspring of the same mother-language, have been developed together, and reached the same degree of grammatical perfection, although the nations who spoke these languages were scattered through different climates and different tracts of country, and although, intellectually and morally, they differed very much from each other. Moreover, in the Aramean, there is not a single trace found of a local accusative, and, in the Hebrew, the local accusative is never used for the accusative generally ; although it is misemployed so as to denote, sometimes, a rest or a stay in a place, and is partly additionally supported by prepositions ; most frequently, however, it either disappears entirely, or else it is replaced by prepositions. We are therefore justified in asserting that in the original Semitic tongue, as it still survives in the Aramean, and to some extent in the Hebrew, there was wanting a proper form for the accusative case, limiting the verb, unless we take the sign אֶת or יַת for it in the Hebrew and the Aramean. Prof. Ewald, on the other hand, observes, p. 131 of his "Schulgrammatik" : "The only insignificant beginning of the formation of a case is made by the appending of a demonstrative ־ָה (rarely ־ֶה), in order to express a tendency, direction, and motion towards a place — the direction towards a person is never expressed by this ending. The idea of the accusative case, which is the case of relation and motion, might be easily connected with it, but this application of the ending has never been developed." It has only been thus applied in the southern Semitic tongues, the Arabic and the Ethiopic.

The similarity which Prof. Rödiger notices between the two other endings וֹ and ִי, and the Arabic nominative and genitive, as we shall presently see, is merely apparent and accidental. It is well known that some of his examples, with these endings, dating from remotest antiquity — we mean the compound proper nouns — are composed of the roots of ל״ו and ל״י, from which the forms ending in ה differ either in respect to age or dialect (שְׁמוּאֵל, according to 1 Sam. i. 20, stands for שְׁמוּעֵאל, just as יִשְׁמָעֵאל, and consequently does not belong here). Among these words are found אֲבוּ, אֲבִי; אֲחוּ, אֲחִי; מְתוּ; פְּנוּ, פְּנִי (?), among which the more archaic ו has gradually yielded to the softer י, as in יֶלֶד (וֶלֶד), which is a later form for יָלָד. Still, not even in such instances, where the suffix וּ or ִי is appended to triliteral roots, can we recognize marks of cases, corresponding to the Arabic. Wherever these words occur, they are either followed by genitives, or, as is frequently the case with nouns in the state construct, by words which have prepositions prefixed to them, and which are just as intimately connected with the nouns, qualified, or, at least modified, by them. If, now, we take the words ending in ִי, which Rödiger describes as genitives, we find that they differ from the Arabic in this remarkable particular, that in the Hebrew not the qualifying word, as in the Arabic, but that which is qualified by the genitive, would thus bear the mark of the genitive — which is simply absurd. For this reason we are led to prefer Prof. Ewald's explanation, who, in opposition to Prof. Rödiger (we do not recollect Gesenius himself having advanced this proposition in a former edition of his work), says, § 211, that at the end of the qualified word there was originally a copulative vowel, towards which the entire word rushed vehemently, in order to attract the better from this position the new member. Of this final vowel, however, he says mere scattered remains are left. We do not, however, quite agree with Prof. Ewald in what follows; he says: "This final vowel, at the time of its fulness, probably sounded *yâ*, which was a word of reference, and it now usually occurs in the form of *î*, as in the proper noun מַלְכִּי־צֶדֶק, properly king of right; and more rarely in that of *ô*, as in בְּנוֹ, or of *a* in *fate*, as in בְּנֵי from בְּנִי (Isa. xxx. 11); but as a general thing, the copulative vowel has become very scarce, and, except in a few proper nouns and some prepositions, as בִּלְתִּי *without*, זוּלָתִי *besides*, we only meet with it in poetry. Yet even where this final vowel is no longer visible, it has left some traces behind: 1. the ending of the feminine singular always sounds hard = *t*, as before a new vowel; 2. the ending of the feminine plural *ōth* has appropriated as a copulative vowel the vowel *ay* in *way* of the masculine plural in the state construct of the words בָּמֳתֵי [the] heights of, מְרַאֲשֹׁתֵי, at [the] heads of; also most of the suffixes have acquired it; 3. several roots of nouns in the state construct again exhibit a vowel as a part of the original root, which had been entirely given up in the state absolute, e. g. in the words expressing relations, אֲבִי father of, אֲחִי, חֲמִי (?); also, רֵעֶה or רֵעֵה friend, together with רֵעַ in the state absolute."

Thus far we have quoted from Prof. Ewald. The last word, רֵעַ, we intend to keep in sight, in order to trace it again in other words. As regards Prof. Ewald's theory about *yâ* (*jâ*), it lacks all proof, and is contrary to all probability. It seems to us that all feminines orginally ended in ת, and not only when followed by a genitive. Besides the endings וֹ and ִי, we need also to explain ֵי, ֶה, and ֵה, and as we found ourselves compelled to oppose Prof. Rödiger's explanation of the former endings, viz. וֹ and ִי, so we have now to raise some objections to Prof. Ewald's definition of the [primitive] meaning of these latter endings.

In the Aramean, and also in some non-Semitic idioms, we meet with some awkward modes of expressing the genitive case, e. g. in the Swabian (German) dialect, we hear: *meinem Vater sein Bruder* (literally: to my father his brother) instead of *meines Vaters Bruder* (my father's brother); *meiner Schwester ihr Kind* (to my sister her child), instead of *meiner Schwester Kind* (my sister's child); the very same thing is of an ordinary occurrence in the Aramean. In this language the suffix, which agrees in number and gender with the attribute by which the noun is modified or qualified, is first appended to the noun, and then follows the attribute in the genitive case. This is even done in cases where, instead of the qualified noun a preposition is used which formerly figured as a noun, though the original noun in some cases can no longer be recognized. A few examples may illustrate this : שְׁמֵהּ (his name) דִּי (of) אֱלָהָא (the God) — his name of the God, instead of "the name of God, or God's name." The same thing occurs in the Syriac. The suffix of the third person singular, afterwards because it occurs most frequently, appears to us to have become stereotyped or petrified, as it were, in the Hebrew, after its meaning had become lost in the popular understanding. Now this third person occurs in the Aramean, in several different forms, all of which may be traced again in the Hebrew, ֵה for ֵהּ (rarely ָה), ֵי and instead of this ֶי, which may have been, itself, originally ֵי for ֵהּ; unless we assume this to be shortened of ָהִי or וֹהִי. As the Hebrew was only provided with vowel-marks in the seventh century after Christ, and the letter yod had also represented the sound of *a* in *fate*, the original pronunciation of this letter, two thousand years ago, can no longer be determined with any certainty. As regards the suffix ו, this would have to be taken for the Hebrew suffix ו from הוּא, or for a dilapidated form of וֹהִי.[1] The original pronominal suffix would thus, as it seems, have been gradually reduced in the Hebrew into a mere copula or connective vowel, and a considerable number of words, the endings of which thus far appeared abnormal, would thereby receive an easy and natural explanation. If we, according to what appears above, regard the final ה in עֶשְׂרֵה *ten*, as identical with the final yod, it agrees with the Chaldee yod in עַסְרֵי *ten ;* and in שְׁמֹנֶה, also, in which, on account of its being a primitive root, we cannot expect to find four radicals, the final syllable does not belong to the root [as little as do the syllables ־ֶה and ־ֵה in the state construct רֵעֵה and אֵצֶה of רֵעַ], as is wrongly maintained by Prof. Ewald, but it is a mere copulative form for רֵעֵא or רֵעֵה. In the Chaldee forms תְּמָנֵה, תְּמָנֵי, also, the final syllables are no more marks of the feminine gender [as is imagined by Prof. Fürst, p. 242 of his Chaldee grammar] than is ־ֵה in the Hebrew עֶשְׂרֵה, or ־ֵי in אַרְבַּעְתֵּי, and תְּלָתֵי, the mark of the Chaldee feminine. But in the Hebrew (עֶשֶׂר) עָשָׂ־, עֶשֶׂ־ is the proper root, and in the Chald. תְּמַן (Heb. שְׁמֹנ, שְׁמֹן), as is even admitted by Prof. Fürst in תַּמְנֵיסַר *eighteen.* By this mode of interpreting, these two numerals are found in agreement with the archaic form עַשְׁתֵּי, which by Ewald, Fürst, and Rödiger is declared to be an obscure form, the etymology of which they have by no means cleared up. Mr. Rödiger says, p. 190: "R. Jona explains this word by עַד שְׁתֵּי עֶשְׂרֵי *till twelve*, or, as it were, *near twelve*, which is an expression like *undeviginti*, but which in the present instance would be a little out of the way. Moreover, this explanation would only fit thé feminine, while in the masculine we also say עַשְׁתֵּי עָשָׂר, instead of עַשְׁנֵי עָשָׂר for עֲדשְׁנֵי עָשָׂר, which was to be expected ; unless we admit an incorrectness of the language. Others say that it means something which is added, in thought, to *ten*, from עָשַׁת to think ; which is Prof. Fürst's explanation. This gentleman, however, adds that it may also be derived from עָשַׁת (= חָסַד), to incline, to bend, to incline towards ; so that עֲשָׁתִים means [inclinings or] an inclining towards, or an attaching, and עַשְׁתֵּי עָשָׂר, an attaching to ten." In this case, however, we add, ת would have to be written without a dagesh, which yet is written everywhere. Prof. Ewald comes much nearer the truth; for he says, "Ausführliches Lehrbuch, etc.," p. 572, and "Schulgrammatik," p. 166 : "In the place of the first numeral in אַחַד עָשָׂר masc., אַחַד עֶשְׂרֵה fem., *eleven*, there is also found עַשְׁתֵּי, which occurs only in this connection. This word only occurs in the Hebrew, and its derivation is obscure ; especially since it serves for both genders; yet it seems merely a dialectic variation of אַחַד." In a foot-note he adds: "Even as in the Samaritan עד עשׂרי is said, instead of חד, and as this very number *eleven*, being the next one to the short words for the numbers from one to ten is singularly developed in many languages."

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[1] The ו we partially find in the Syriac and Chaldee, as well as in the Ethiopic, before suffixes. The Hebrew ו seems to us to have originated in ָו = *au* (*ă* — *oo*), and this is the demonstrative suffix *a* (*a* in *far*) which we spoke of above, and the suffix הוּ, he or it. This *ă* we recognize also in the state construct of the Ethiopic, at variance with Prof. Dillmann, who identifies it with the sign of the accusative.

All this, however, is not saying much. It is not very extraordinary that in the Samaritan we should find עַד in the place of the Aramean חַד; for it is well known that the Samaritans frequently place ע in the stead of other gutturals. But this does not assist the etymology of this word any; because the Aramean form is a later abbreviation. In the Hebrew we find of the numeral אחד the secondary form יחד, and in the Arabic וחד, both as nouns and as verbs, and in addition to these we have, in our present case, the archaic guttural form עחד. Which of these forms was the original one, can now no longer be decided with any certainty. To judge by analogy, the stronger ע must be prior to א; and instances of such a transition occur in other words; e. g. עזר, אזר; עגד, אקד; עמר, אמר; עבץ, אבץ; עגם, אגם; עגב, אגב; עזל, אזל. The fact that gutturals may pass over into sibilants, is noticed in the Indo-European, as well as in the Semitic idioms: Engl. *frog*, Germ. *Frosch* (speak frosh); Germ. *Brücke*, Engl. *bridge;* Engl. *to break*, Germ. *brechen*, Fr. *brèche*, and Engl. *breach;* Gr. *παχίων, πάσσων*; *ἐλαχύς, ἐλάσσων*; סְלַק, הָלַךְ; שָׂרַג, אָרַג, to plait, etc. But more particularly we notice the change of ח into שׂ, חרך into שׂרך; חָבַט into שָׁבַט; שָׁזַר, Aram. חֲזַר. The form עַשְׁתֵּי would, therefore, be instead of אַחְתֵּי, from the feminine אַחַת for אַחֲדְתְּ or אַחֶדֶת, which, with its copula, would be united to the masculine עֶשְׂרֵה, according to rule; this form, moreover, would be on the same stage of formation with שְׁמֹנֶה for שְׁמֹנֵי, the Chaldee תְּמָנֵי or תַּמְנֵה, and the Chaldee feminines אַרְבַּעְתֵּי, חַמְשָׁתֵי, שִׁבְעֲתֵי, עֲסַרְתֵּי, etc., in which not the ending ־ֵי, but the letter ת־ is the mark of the feminine gender.

Ewald, Rödiger, and Gesenius, as well as their predecessors, are mistaken in supposing עֶשְׂרֵה to be a feminine form. For, *first*, in order to prove their assertion, they cannot furnish one single other word in which ־ֵה is a feminine ending; and, *secondly*, among the compound numbers this would be the only instance where two feminine forms would be found together; and so long as another explanation is possible, it is wrong to admit this exception. A satisfactory explanation, however, is almost forced upon us, when we compare the number *ten* in the three more archaic Semitic idioms. In the *Hebrew* we find the following forms for the number *ten:* 1. עָשָׂר, 2. עֶשֶׂר, 3. עֶשְׂרֵה, 4. עֲשָׂרָה, 5. עֶשֶׂרֶת; in the *Chaldee*, 1. עֲסַר (2. עֲשַׂר, 3. סַר), 4. עַסְרֵי (סְרֵי), 5. עַסְרָא 6. עַשְׂרָה (7. עַסְרָה), 8. עַסְרַת, 9. עֲשַׂרְתֵּי; in the *Syriac*, 1. ܥܣܰܪ (עֲסַר), 2. ܥܶܣܪܐ (עֶשְׂרֹא for עֶסְרָא), 3. ܥܶܣܪܐ (עֶסְרֵא) 4. ܥܶܣܪܰܬ עֶסְרַת, *esrath́;* when compounded with units. We thus have, in the Hebrew, Syriac, and Chaldee, three forms for the feminine: in the state absolute, Heb. עֲשָׂרָה, Syr. עֶסרֹא, Chald. עַסְרָא, in the state construct, Heb. עֲשֶׂרֶת, Syr. עֶסְרַה, Chald. עַסְרַת, עַסְרָתֵי; for the masculine, state absolute, Heb. עָשָׂר (עֶשֶׂר), Syr. and Chald. עֲסַר. After deducting these forms, there remains in all these languages one single form, which must have sounded alike in all of them, viz. עֶשְׂרֵה, עֶסְרֵא, עַסְרֵי (סְרֵי). Now, in none of these languages is there a single instance found of a feminine form ending in ־ֵה, ־ֵא, or ־ֵי, and it is perfectly inconceivable to us, how Profs. Winer and Fürst, in the face of the feminine form עַסַרְתֵּי, given in their Chaldee grammars, can still insist that עַסְרֵי is a feminine form. By doing so, Mr. Fürst even contradicts himself; for, on p. 201 of his "Chaldäische Formenlehre," he absolutely denies that substantives ending in ־ֵי can ever be feminines. Inasmuch as the three forms mentioned above are evidently identical, and as the final yod, moreover, in a large number of words, appears as a copulative form, we are led to assume that the Chaldee form in this particular instance is the older one, common to all, and that the letter ה of the Hebrew and the א of the Syriac were weakened from or exchanged for an original yod. As regards the fact of the meaning of an original suffixed word being lost from the popular understanding, and of its dwindling down into a mere grammatical form, such instances are found in all languages. We need but direct the attention of our readers to the adverbial ending *ment* in the Romance tongues, which was originally the ablative case *-mente* of the noun *mens*, and which, as may be still traced in the Spanish, at first was used only in a limited sense and with appropriate adjectives, but afterwards was employed as a general adverbial ending. *Sapienti sat!*

As regards the construction of the numerals with the numbered nouns, or with other numerals, the two grammars before us gave us satisfaction in this one respect, that their authors are no longer willing to make white appear black, and black white, i. e. to call the masculines feminines, and the feminines masculines, as is still done by their colleagues in the other Semitic idioms, viz. by *Winer* and *Fürst* in the Chaldee, *Uhlemann* in the Syriac, *Dillmann* in the Ethiopic, and *Caspari* in the Arabic. But we are not at all satisfied that these gentlemen simply mention this singular construction, without any satisfactory account of it. Prof. Ewald supposes that the numerals were originally substantives of quantity, and that, as such, they are found in the state construct of the feminine ending: שׁלֹשֶׁת בָּנִים he regards as a trine of sons, *trias filiorum;* and afterwards, when these substantives gradually assumed the character of mere adjectives, and could be placed before, or even after the nouns, without entering into a very close conjunction with them, the distinction of gender, also, among them remained settled in this manner, i. e. the form of the feminine remained for the nearer gender, viz. the masculine [we would ask the professor whether the feminine gender is not just as near as the masculine], and they were thus enabled to cast this ending entirely aside for the feminine gender. How does Prof. Ewald know that these forms ever had the feminine ending? for, in order to cast it aside, they must have had it originally. These are arbitrary assertions.

Prof. Rödiger explains this peculiarity by saying that they were originally *substantiva abstracta*, such as *decas*, *trias*, and that, as such, they could have both a masculine and a feminine form. The feminine form, according to him, was the principal form, and for this reason it was combined with words of the prevailing masculine gender; and the other form, without the feminine ending, was employed for words of the feminine gender. This distinction, however, according to him, could only have been established by usage. It was certainly established by usage, and indeed before the separation of the Semitic tribes; but no language ever goes to work arbitrarily; on the contrary, it always operates according to some fixed laws; and first among these laws are those of euphony and of symmetry. Gesenius and Rödiger look upon the feminine as the chief form; but we hope they do not regard it as the older form, from which the masculine is shortened. Unless therefore we choose to admit, with Ewald, that the forms of both genders were born as twins, there must have been a time in which the shorter form of the numerals was common to both genders, and when, after they commenced "to count above five," the masculine pronoun of the third person plural (in the Hebrew הִים = הֵם), which, at that time was likewise common to both genders, was suffixed to the units. When, subsequently, it was deemed proper to distinguish the feminine from the masculine gender by a particular ending (ַת), and, in contradistinction to the concrete masculine, to prefer for a graphic representation of the abstract the form of the feminine gender because it represents the less active and more receiving or passive element; when, finally, in the plural of this heavier form, by a lengthening of the short vowel into a long *ā* or *ō*, the endings ָת or וֹת were produced, in this case, we ask, was it not very natural that, for the sake of euphony, the ill-sounding, tautophonic endings in ת should be avoided? We ask further, whether it was not right to do justice to the law of symmetry, by wedding the shorter, now masculine form of the numeral, to the longer feminine form of the *numeral* or *noun*, and, with the same regard for symmetry, to combine the singular form of the numeral with the longer form of the plural of both endings of the noun, and, also, the singular of the nouns of both genders, not lengthened by the plural ending, with the form of the tens, ending in ־ים, which by the appending of the pronominal suffix to the originally monosyllabic units, had become dissyllabic. Among the numerals, therefore, not so much attention is paid to the genders, as to the proportional distribution of the various forms ; by which is also explained the apparent irregularity in the use of the different forms of number two, where the forms of both genders, שְׁנַיִם masc. and שְׁתַּיִם fem., are of the same length and ending, and where the construction שְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים no longer requires any particular explanation.

If, now, from the nominal roots we pass over to the verbal, which we, in conformity with Fürst, hold to have been originally monosyllabic, we differ from him in not finding the most archaic form of the verb in the third person of the Aramean perfect, but in the third person of the feminine sing. of the Hebrew verb, when it precedes a suffix, and next to the Hebrew in the Arabic and Ethiopic, viz. Heb., originally קְטַל, now קָטַל masc., קְטָלַת fem.; Arab. and Ethiop. קַתַלַת. The Hebrew form קְטָלַת evidently dates from a time when the masculine still sounded קְטַל,[1] and when the sheva of the first radical, according to a specific Hebrew usage, was not yet expanded into a foretone kamets. For this reason we hold that the Hebrew form of the plural which still survives before suffixes, is the older ; because, if the form קָטְלוּ had already existed at that time, nothing could have prevented their saying קֶטְלוּנִי, etc. Again, the Hebrew form קְטָלוּ־ (for קְטַלוּן and קְטָלוּ for קְטְלוּן = יֵדְעוּן) for the representation of both genders, appears to us more primitive; and the process of distinguishing the genders seems to belong to a time when the form הֵנָּה, which originally was common to both genders, was already employed in designating the feminine, in contradistinction to הֵמָּה; as may be seen from the Arabic *kăthălnā.* This latter Arabian form, however, again appears older than the Aramean *ketălā* and the Ethiopic *kăthălā*, because they both seem shortened from this Arabic form; unless we assume that these latter forms, viz. *ketālā* and *kăthălā*, have lost a final nasal sound.

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[1] Since we have no notice of the primitive centuries, we do not know, from the not vocalized text, when the Hebrew verb ceased to be a monosyllable.

On returning to the third person singular feminine, Gesenius is evidently right in assuming, both in the case of the verb and of the noun, that the ending ַת is original, and that the ending ָה is blunted from it, and we can see no reason whatever why Ewald should say, § 248: "Whenever these suffixes meet with the verbal pronouns, the ending ָה of the third person singular feminine of the perfect is constantly hardened into *at*, § 173," and why he should identify this verbal ending with the feminine ending, which he evidently does by referring to it. In this passage quoted he says: 'Wherever the feminine is distinguished externally, it has, as an original mark, the syllable -*at* appended to it; yet this *t* is very much (*sic!*) softened into a mere breathing, after the vowel *āh*, which is written ָה, and very seldom ָא."

Ewald removed the Niphal from its former place, immediately after the Kal, into the last place; we do not see a sufficient reason for such a removal, and we rather, with Prof. Rödiger retain the order introduced by Gesenius and his predecessors. In case this order was to be remodelled, we would propose that the Hiphil and Hophal should be placed immediately after the Niphal, in order to have together all the forms derived from the simple root. We approve, however, of Prof. Ewald's making a synopsis of the perfect tenses of all verbal forms, in order to obtain a general view of them; because they likewise represent the indicative mood. Ewald, also, is perfectly right in vindicating to the Hebrew ה, the characteristic letter of the Hiphil, the priority over the א of the other Semitic idioms; he also says that the vowel *ă* or pattah of the Piel or Hiphil first "tapered off," in the Hebrew, into a chirec, as he expresses himself. The same, also, we hold to be the case with the chirec of the second syllable of the Hiphil; inasmuch as this only appears as an exception in the Aramean, and is not at all found in the Arabic and Ethiopic. In the Hebrew, too, it is replaced in the first and second persons, by a tsere, or else a pattah stands in its place. How old the chirec of the first syllable is, in the Hebrew, and that of the second syllable, also, partly in the Chaldee, can now no longer be determined, because the yod of the ultimate in the texts represented both the tsere and the chirec, and the vowels were added only in the seventh century after Christ.

As regards the origin and formation of the imperative mood, Ewald and Rödiger differ from each other. Rödiger says: "Along [with the third person of the perfect tense] is placed a second radical or fundamental form, which sounds the same as the infinitive mood קְטֹל, also קְטַל, after which come the imperative mood, and the imperfect tense." He continues, on p. 94: "The principal form of the imperative mood קְטֹל (קְטַל) is the same which also underlies the formation of the imperfect tense, and which, in another direction, in the form of the infinitive mood, verges towards the noun." In a foot-note he observes: "It seems preferable to regard the imperative mood as an abbreviation of the second person of the imperfect tense, קְטֹל from תִּקְטֹל; but it is more probable that each of these three forms is an independent grammatical formation, and that they did not arise one from another, but that all three originated together on the foundation of the abstract verbal form. The inflection of the imperative mood, on the other hand, may have arisen from the imperfect tense." Ewald (and also Fürst, in his "Chaldäische Formenlehre"), however, does not hesitate in the least to assert that the imperative mood was generated from the imperfect tense; for he says, p. 137, 2: "The proper distinction of the imperative mood first arose by the dropping of the initial mark of the person, while the number and gender still remain indicated with sufficient accuracy." The three above-named gentlemen deserve some credit for refusing to admit any longer the absurd hypothesis of the former grammarians, that the imperative mood and the imperfect tense were generated from the abstract nominal form of the infinitive mood. But we are not quite sure what to do with Rödiger's form קְטֹל or קְטַל, inasmuch as it is neither the imperative nor the infinitive mood. What part of speech is this unknown x?

We are aware that our linguists, in their investigations, are in the habit of starting with such nameless and shapeless skeletons of word-roots; but we are convinced that such linguistical phantoms could never have existed in *rerum natura.* All words have a certain office to perform in the sentence or worded thought, and they are, therefore, parts of a sentence, and belong to some one of the well-known parts of speech. Let these gentlemen, then, declare themselves! What parts of speech are those skeletons? There is no difficulty at all in supposing that the same word may have originally served both in the capacity of a noun and of a verb; but, in this case, it would not only have preserved the same consonants, but also the same vowels. The skeleton has never existed without flesh and blood. Ewald is certainly right in objecting to the simultaneous birth of the several forms of the imperfect tense, but he is most undoubtedly wrong in making (p. 226) the mother to be the daughter, by supposing the imperative mood to be shortened form the future tense.

It is a matter of surprise to us, that our scholars "cannot see the forest, although there are so many trees;" and we wonder why they do not follow the example of *Winer*, who (like *Uhlemann* in his Syrian Grammar, page 37), in his "Chaldäische Grammatik," p. 33, very justly derived the compound form of the future, in the Chaldee,[1] from the simple form of the imperative mode. In the Semitic languages, at least, the aorist or perfect tense is the original expression of a realized activity, which first strikes the observer; this form, afterwards, is either provided with the agent or author of this activity in the form of a succeding pronoun (which is generally suffixed), or of a noun; or else the activity itself becomes personified, or "nounified" as it were, and, without changing the sound of the word any, the same word is originally used as a noun, and as a verb. The form required next in order to express our thoughts — as has been shown in a previous Article — is that by which we cause, order, or beseech, a repetition of the same activity. As this command or request is usually made for a concrete case, and is directed to an individual present, it was originally effected by a repetition of the same sound which had been employed for the expression of an activity, perceived or noticed, as is still done to some extent in the Aramean and Hebrew, Ethiopic (and Arabic) שְׁמַע, שְׁכַב, עֲבַד, רְדַף, or else this sound is used in such a manner that the pattah was reduced into the shorter *o*, *u*, or *e*, as is done, for instance, in the German, where, from *sprach* (spake) has been formed *sprich* (speak), and of *stach*, *stich*.[1] This form was afterwards completed, and applied to the other persons, but in such a manner, that the person addressed who existed before the action was to take place again, was very logically placed before, and not after, the verb; i. e. it was prefixed and not suffixed. But if this be so, the so-called jussive or commanding form of the future is the first which was formed of the imperative mood. The Semites, therefore, in forming their future or imperfect tense, did not start with the idea of *growing* or *coming into being* (Germ. *werden*), but with that of *forcing* or *ordering into being* (Germ. *sollen* or *müssen*). It is true, that thus the imperative mood and the formations of the imperfect tense, derived from it, did not express the distinct opposition of what was not yet realized, to what has been realized (which distinction was raised by Ewald). But this was not indispensably necessary; for the primitive people, in building up their language, did not care about hunting after opposites, but they simply endeavored to express their thoughts in a plain manner; they did not start with beautiful, philosophical theorems, but cared for their immediate wants. But, suppose the commanding form to have been next the perfect or aorist, the first and oldest, it must also have been the shortest, because it applied to concrete cases; and such, also, is actually the case, and in this short form it is called the *Jussive* mood. If, however, the jussive mood is the oldest form, it cannot have been shortened from the other forms, as is wrongly supposed by Ewald and Rödiger; but on the contrary, these other forms are derived and lengthened from the jussive mood. The fact that this mood was the oldest, can also be proved *a posteriori* from this consideration, that it was common to all idioms before their final separation; for the tsere of the Hebrew imperative, e. g. in הָקֵם is older than the chirec.[1] From the *vav conversivum*, however, about which we will now say a few words, it may be seen that this jussive mood of the Hebrew passed over into all the different modifications of the imperfect tense.

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[1] In the Chaldee, Syriac, and Samaritan it is seen most clearly that the imperative mood and the future tense did not arise from the nominal infinitive, because, in this language, the infinitive mood is a nominal form, made of the aorist or perfect, by prefixing the relative letter מְ, e. g. קְטַל, he, it, has killed, מְ־קְטַל for מְקְטַל (who *or*) what has killed and does kill, i.e. the killing.

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[1] English aorist, drank, imperative, drink; and in most addresses, as *fili* for *filius*; *dŏmĭnĕ*, *dominus*; παῖ, παῖς, etc.

We have mentioned above the syllabic *vav conversivum*, i. e. the vav, prefixed with a pattah or kamets, and not with a sheva; and we have there spoken of its capacity of drawing back the accent, if possible, from the last syllable to the penult, of dropping entirely the final syllable לה, and, in order to make up for these changes, of furnishing the first vowelless radical with a short segol or pattah. This monosyllabic prefix וַ has been identified with the non-syllabic וְ, and, in the hands of our modern grammarians, has become a regular wizzard, changing its color like a chameleon; at one time it removes the accent, as far as it can, from the final syllable, and, when it does not meet with any obstruction, it even amputates this syllable completely, and changes the whole constitution of the words. At another time, when put with the sheva, it does exactly the opposite; it forces the accent upon the final syllable, neglecting, apparently, the preceding syllables. It, moreover, converts, on the one hand, perfects into futures, and, on the other, futures into perfects; it is, also, placed at the head of entire books, and thus commences them with the conjunction *and*, even as a certain peasant commenced his letter with the conjunctions *but*, *however*. We confess that we do not appreciate this modern identifying of the prefixes וַ and וְ; into which position even Gesenius allowed himself to be driven in the eighth edition of his grammar, by the cross-fire opened upon him by the partisans of Ewald. Not everything that is new is good. As Ewald does not give us any satisfactory information in his school-grammar about the transformation of וְ into וַ, we must have recourse to his "Ausführliche Grammatik," where, p. 512, § 259, he makes tho following statement:

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[1] Even the Chaldee chirec of the second feminine and the plural masculine, as well as in Hebrew, is of a later vocalization, and also of later formation. As for the plural masculine, think of the English 'come! see!' spoken both to one and to several persons.

"As the preposition with its subordinate (?) noun, so also the conjunction with its subordinate verb, may form one inseparable, close combination, in which not one member modifies the other, but where both members together express a meaning which they only have in this connection. For this purpose, however, only particular conjunctions are available; inasmuch as a common conjunction, without any such power, is connected much more loosely with a sentence. Such a conjunction, with a superior power, is particularly the copula וְ, when it does not express the simple *and*, but like our *because* (Germ. *da*) and *thus* (Germ. *so*), indicates forcibly the consequence of an action, time or intention, in which case, no doubt, more stress was laid upon it in pronunciation. Wherever this or any other similar conjunction forms a composition with a tense or mood, certain progressing, connecting, and, consequently, relative tenses and moods are formed, and the tenses themselves, for this purpose, are developed more firmly in a novel and peculiar manner. Hence results, *first*, the relative progressing imperfect tense. The imperfect is preceded by the little time-particle *a*, which has reference to the past, and doubles the following consonant (perhaps it is originally *ad*, אַד). This particle is of a pronominal origin, and corresponds to to the augment: it means as much as our word '*da*' (= because, there or then), and has coalesced with the conjunction וְ *and* (which thereby becomes more forcible) into *va*, doubling the consonant which follows. The more forcible *and*, which removes an action into the past, is produced by the coalescing of these two little words." Ewald adds further that the imperfect tense becomes subordinate to this prefix in the voluntative mood, which mood, by itself, puts an action into motion, and, consequently, renders it dependent, attaching it to some point; in this manner, he says, a certain combination is formed by which the action is removed into the past, attaching it there to some point, already given, within its own series; so that the development of the action may be traced from that point. This, he says, is the *imperfectum perfecti*, which progresses from a certain given point or thought, and is never placed independently, but always in reference to some preceding point. How is it, we ask, when the syllable וַ commences entire books? According to his statement at the outset of his explanation, we expected Ewald to give us a number of conjunctions, which become thus inseparably connected with verbs; but, with the exception of וַ, he does not mention a single other instance, and he admits, himself, that the conjunctions, generally, are more loosely connected with the sentence. And this must necessarily be so, because a conjunction, though it sometimes arises from a relative particle, yet differs from it; for the office of a conjunction does not only consist in connecting parts of the following clause, but also in attaching an entire clause to its leading clause. As regards the whole theory of Ewald in respect to ו, it may be said it is *scitior quam verior*. If we choose to proceed in his fashion, anything whatever may be proved, and, compared with him, a certain scholar of antiquity who derived *Neptunus* from *nando*, proceeded less arbitrarily. We are at a loss to comprehend why Gesenius's mode of explaining the *vav conversivum* was ever abondoned by the learned; for it is certainly more natural and less artificial. While the vowel *a*, in the sense of *then* (*tum*), which has been conjured up by Ewald, does not at all exist in the language, and while there is not a single instance on record in which וְ coalesces into one syllable with a following א, in the other explanation everything follows naturally; moreover it has tradition in its favor, which ought not to be neglected, when it can be rationally confirmed, and when it can show analogies in another Semitic idiom.[1] Instead of acknowledging with Rödiger that the theory of former grammarians is wrong, who hold that וַיִּקְטֹל arose by a process of shortening and by a contraction from הָיָה יִקְטֹל, or וְהָיָה יִקְטֹל, for which denial he does not offer any reason whatever, we rather agree with the old grammarians — if it is at all proper for us to give an opinion concerning the genesis of this archaic form — and we hold that this form arose from the old verb הֲיָה for הֱיָה (הָיָה) which is only found in seven places, but still survives in the name יְהוָֹה (not יַהֲיֵה as Ewald reads, prompted by a desire of innovation). This verb, like מַה, מָה, coalesced with the following word, as in מַלָּכֶם for מַה־לָּכֶם, and the first syllable הְ was dropped, as in the Syriac. When, subsequently, the verb הֲיָה passed over into הֱיָה, הָיָה, and the people were no longer conscious of the old form, the construction itself, indeed, remained, but the prefix was wrongly taken for the conjunction וְ. The fact that the particular form of construction of commencing with the perfect tense, and following with the future or imperfect tense, did not arise on Hebrew ground, but is founded on the primitive Semitic mode of viewing and representing things, is proved by this consideration, that in the Arabic, also, we meet with a similar form of construction, and, indeed, the verb *cana*, which in this language is in the the place of the Hebrew הָיָה كَانَ يُحِبُّ (כַּן יוּחִבּוּ) *amabat*, he used to love, كَانَ يَرْكَبُ (כַּן יַרְכַּבוּ), literally: it was *or* came to pass [that] he will (would) ride, i. e. he used to ride.

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[1] Even in the Ethiopic one single instance, like a solitary relic from older times, perhaps may survive, *văyĕbē, and he said,* for it happened that he would or did say.

ARTICLE III.

A SHAKSPEARIAN GLOSSARY FOR OUR ENGLISH BIBLE.

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There are but two books, we believe, in the English language, which have been honored with a complete concordance. These books — Shakspeare and our English Bible — happily originated at nearly the same time; and the comparison of their words, therefore, for which we have such facilities, is a valuable means of clearing up the language of both.

The immense range of Shakspeare's vocabulary, and the fact that his writings were finished, though but just finished, before the version of 1611, make his works peculiarly useful as a standard to which to bring the language of the Bible. His topics are indeed largely unlike those of scripture, but this, while it diminishes the *number* of words used in common, enhances the *value* of the rest; for it shows that the words thus employed were not technically *religious*, but used in every-day life.

Our Bible, does not admit of a perfectly satisfactory collation, in respect to vocabulary, with other works of its time. For this there are two prominent causes:

1. It is a *translation;* and no translation represents with correctness and copiousness the language in which it appears. E. g. "Judge," in the sense of *rule*, is not English, but Hebrew masked as English, and must therefore not be looked for in indigenous English works. In some instances, however, a translation contains the best possible clue to a successful collation of its words, for the original serves as a kind of *Glossary for that age.* E. g. "Take no *thought*," as a version of *μὴ μεριμνᾶτε*, never could have meant "take no *reflection*." Nothing in the Greek word would have suggested "*thought*" to the translator, unless thought familiarly

meant "anxiety." Carry the word thus explained to contemporary authors, and numerous parallel passages are brought to light.

2. This translation is affected in its vocabulary by *previous translations.* The discussions of our time respecting "Bible Revision," show how the religious mind will tolerate only those deviations from a "received version" which are imperatively required. Many a word continues to flourish in the sheltered seclusion of religious fervor, when no trace of it can be found in the cold worldliness without. We know that our translators were cautioned against making unnecessary changes.

These two causes bring to us a large number of words which find their parallels only in an uncertain age or in a a foreign tongue.

Let us now just glance at the peculiarities in our version, arising from the change of vocabulary since 1611. The words that we first think of are, of course, the *obsolete.* But these, because they convey no intelligible idea, merely obstruct, but do not pervert, the meaning. They send the reader to his unabridged dictionary.

More injurious to the sense are those familiar words, which have *partially* changed their meaning, and, like well-executed counterfeits, escape detection because they are not suspected. These may be put into two classes, comprising:

1. Those which convey an obvious but erroneous meaning; e. g. "*quick* into hell;" "Take no *thought;*" "Let your *conversation,*" etc.

2. Those which produce a certain obscurity, or infelicity of expression, without leading into positive error; e. g. "Endure *hardness;*" "The former *treatise.*"

Now the difficulties arising from these words the mere reader of English imputes to the sacred writers, while the student of the original, with better piety perhaps, but with no more justice, charges the same to King James's translators.

With these few remarks, we present the following Table of scriptural words illustrated in Shakspeare. All but *seven* are words now in common use, which, indeed, except two or three, had in the time of Shakspeare the same meaning as now, but had additional meaning, since lost. The original word has been added, in almost every case, to show what the translators *ought* to have meant, while the passages from Shakspeare will show what they *did* mean.

Allow, approve. (*συνευδοκέω, γινώσκω, δοκιμάζω.*)

That ye *allow* the deeds of your fathers. — Luke xi. 48.
That which I do, I *allow* not. — Rom. vii. 15.
As we were *allowed* of God, etc. — 1 Thess. ii. 4.

Ford (to Falstaff). You are a gentleman of excellent breeding, ... generally *allowed* for your many warlike, court-like, and learned preparations.
Merry Wives, ii. 2.

Viola. . . . . . For I can sing
And speak to him in many sorts of music,
That will *allow* me very worth his service. — Twelfth Night, i. 2.

P. John. I like them all and do *allow* them well. — 2nd Hen. IV. iv. 2.

Anon, immediately. (*εὐθέως.*)

Simon's wife's mother lay sick of a fever, and *anon* they tell him of her.
Mark i. 30.

Ford. Up, gentlemen, you shall see sport *anon.* — Merry Wives, iii. 3.

Atonement, (at-one-ment), reconciliation. (*καταλλαγή.*)

By whom we have now received the *atonement.* — Rom. v. 11.

Lodovico. . . . . . Is there division 'twixt thy lord and Cassio?
Desdemona. A most unhappy one; I would do much
To *atone* them, for the love I bear to Cassio. — Othello iv. 1.

Buckingham (to Q. Eliz.). Ay, madam; he desires to make *atonement*
Between the duke of Gloster and your brothers.
Rich. III. i. 3.

Base, low in rank. (נִקְלֶה, *ἀγενής.*)

The *base* against the honorable. — Is. iii. 5.
Base things of the world . . . . . hath God chosen. — 1 Cor. i. 28.

Pistol. Discuss unto me; Art thou officer
Or art thou *base,* common, and popular? — Hen. V. iv. 1.

Besom, broom. (מַטְאֲטֵא.)

I will sweep it with the *besom* of destruction. — Is. xiv. 23.

Cade. . . . . . I am the *besom* that must sweep the court clean of such filth as thou art. — 2nd Hen. VI. iv. 7.

Bowels, seat of the affections. (מֵעִים, *σπλάγχνα.*)

The sounding of thy *bowels* and of thy mercies. — Is. lxiii. 15.
Refresh my *bowels* in the Lord. — Phile. 20.

Hector. There is no lady of more softer *bowels*
More spongy to suck in the sense of fear,
. . . . Than Hector is. — Troilus. ii. 2.

CAREFUL, anxious. (*μεριμνάω.*)

Be *careful* for nothing. — Phil. iv. 6.

Queen. . . . . . O, full of *careful* business are his looks —
For heaven's sake speak comfortable words. — Rich. II. ii. 2.

Q. Eliz. By him that raised me to this *careful* height
From that contented hap which I enjoyed,
I never did incense his majesty, etc. — Rich. III. i. 3.

CHARITY, love of the highest kind. (*ἀγάπη*)

Now abideth faith, hope, *charity.* — 1 Cor. xiii. 13.
See Rom. xiii. 10, as quoted below.

Biron. . . . . . It is religion to be thus forsworn,
For *charity* itself fulfils the law
And who can sever love from *charity.* — Love's Labor Lost, iv. 3.

Longaville. Dumain; thy love is far from *charity,*
That in love's grief desir'st society. — Love's Labor Lost, iv. 3.

CLEAN, entirely. (*ὄντως.*)

Is his mercy *clean* gone forever? — Ps. lxxvii. 8.
Those that were *clean* escaped. — 2 Pet. ii. 18.

Aegeon. . . . . . Five summers have I spent in farthest Greece
Roaming *clean* through the bounds of Asia. — Com. of Err. i. 1.

Cicero. . . . . . But men may construe things after their fashion,
Clean from the purpose of the things themselves. — J. Caesar, i. 3.

CLEAVE, adhere. (דָּבַק, *κολλάω, προσμένω.*)

Let my tongue *cleave* to the roof of my mouth. — Ps. cxxxvii. 6.
Cleave to that which is good. — Rom. xii. 9.
That they would *cleave* unto the Lord. — Acts xi. 23.

Clifford. . . . . . And this, thy son's blood, *cleaving* to my blade,
Shall rust upon my weapon. — 3d Hen. VI. i. 3.

Ariel. Thy thoughts I *cleave* to; what's thy pleasure? — Temp. iv. 1.

COMMEND, commit. (*παρατίθημι.*)

They *commended* them to the Lord. — Acts xiv. 23.

Northumberland. . . . . . His glittering arms he will *commend* to rust,
His barbed steeds to stables, and his heart
To faithful service of your majesty. — Rich. II. iii. 3.

COMMUNICATION, sharing, communion. (*κοινωνία.*)

The *communication* of thy faith. — Phile. 6.

Adriana. Thou art an elm, my husband, I a vine;
Whose weakness married to thy stronger state
Makes me with they strength to *communicate.* — Com. of Err. ii. 2.

CONSCIENCE, consciousness, belief. (*συνείδησις.*)

Should have had no more *conscience* of sins Heb. x. 2.

K. Hen. By my troth, I will speak my *conscience* of the king; I think he would not wish himself anywhere but where he is. — Hen. V. iv. 1.

K. Hen. . . . . . But shall I speak my *conscience?*
Our kinsman Gloster is as innocent, etc. — 2nd Hen. VI. iii. 1.

Convenient, proper. (*ἀνῆκον, καθῆκον.*)

To do those things which are not *convenient.* — Rom. i. 28.

Evans. ..... 'T is not *convenient* you should be cozened. — M. Wives, iv. 5.

Conversation, conduct. (דֶּרֶךְ, *ἀναστροφή.*)

To him that ordereth his *conversation* aright. — Ps. l. 23.
Be ye holy in all manner of *conversation.* — 1 Pet. i. 15.

Enobarbus. ..... Octavia is of a holy, cold, and still *conversation.*
Ant. and Cleo. ii. 6.

P. John. ..... His wonted followers
Shall all be well provided for;
But all are banished, till their *conversations*
Appear more wise and modest to the world. — 2nd Hen. IV. v. 5.

Cousin, relative not in direct line. (*συγγενής.*)

Her neighbors and her *cousins* heard, etc. — Luke i. 58.

Leonato. How now, brother? Where is my *cousin*, your son?
Much Ado, i. 2.

Sir Toby. What a plague means my *niece (Olivia)* to take the death of her brother thus?

Maria. By troth, Sir Toby, you must come in earlier o' nights. Your *cousin*, my lady, takes great exception to your ill hours.

. . . .

Olivia (to Sir Toby). *Cousin, cousin*, how have you come so early by this lethargy? — Twelfth Night, i. 3, 5.

Cumber, spoil, distress. (*καταργέω, περισπάω.*

Why *cumbereth* it the ground? — Luke xiii. 7.
Martha was *cumbered* about much serving. — Luke x. 40.

Antony. ..... A curse shall light upon the limbs of men;
Domestic fury and fierce civil strife
Shall *cumber* all the parts of Italy. — J. Caesar, iii. 1.

Cunning, knowing, skilful. (יֹדֵעַ, מֵבִין.)

That were instructed in the songs of the Lord, even all that were *cunning.*
1 Chron. xxv. 7.

Gremio. ..... I freely give unto you this young scholar, that hath been long studying at Rheims; as *cunning* in Greek, Latin, and other languages as the other in mathematics. — Taming the Shrew, ii. 1.

Capulet. ...... Sirrah, go hire me twenty *cunning* cooks.
Romeo and Juliet, iv. 2.

Dishonest, dishonorable. (*αἰσχύνη.*)

Have renounced the hidden things of *dishonesty.* — 2 Cor. iv. 2.

Touchstone. To-morrow is the joyful day, Audrey; to-morrow will we be married.

Audrey. I do desire it with all my heart; and I hope it is no *dishonest* desire. — As you Like it, v. 3.

Isabella. O, you beast!
O, faithless coward! O, *dishonest* wretch!
Wilt thou be made a man out of my vice? — Meas. for Meas. iii. 1.

Ear, plough. (חָרַשׁ.)

Five years in the which there shall neither be *earing* nor harvest.
Gen. xlv. 6.

Clown. . . . . . He that *ears* my land, spares my team. — All 's well, i. 3.

Messenger. . . . . . Make the sea serve them; which they *ear* and wound
With keels of every kind. — Ant. and Cleo. i. 4.

Earnest, advance-money, pledge. (ἀῤῥαβών.)

Which is the *earnest* of our inheritance. — Eph. i. 14.

Lear (giving Kent money). Now, my friendly knave, I thank thee; there 's *earnest* of thy service. — Lear, i. 4.

Macbeth. . . . . . This supernatural soliciting
Cannot be ill; cannot be good; — If ill
Why hath it given me *earnest* of success,
Commencing in a truth? — Macbeth, i. 3.

Emulation, envy. (ζῆλος.)

Variance, *emulations*, wrath. — Gal. v. 20.

Hector. . . . . . The obligation of our blood forbids
A gory *emulation* 'twixt us twain. — Troil and Cress. iv. 5.

Artemidorus. . . . . . My heart laments that virtue cannot live
Out of the teeth of *emulation.* — J. Caesar, ii. 3.

Endeavor, struggle. (σπουδάζω.)

Endeavoring to keep the unity of the spirit. — Eph. iv. 3.

Edmund. . . . . . Some blood drawn on me would beget opinion
Of my more fierce *endeavor.* — Lear ii. 1.

Gonzalo. All things in common nature should produce without sweat or *endeavor.* — Temp. ii, 1.

Favor, countenance, appearance. (מַרְאֶה.)

Rachel was beautiful and well-*favored.* — Gen. xxix. 17.

3d Gent. . . . . . With countenance of such distraction, that they were to be known by garment, not by *favor.* — W. Tale, v. 2.

Cassius. . . . . . Is *favor'd* like the work we have in hand,
Most bloody, fiery, and most terrible. — J. Caesar, i. 3.

Gracious, graceful, elegant. (חֵן, χάρις.)

The words of a wise man's mouth are *gracious.* — Eccl. x. 12.
Wondered at the *gracious* words. — Luke iv. 22.

Rosaline. . . . . . Which his fair tongue (conceit's expositor)
Delivers in such apt and *gracious* words,
That aged ears play truant at his tales
And younger hearings are quite ravished
So *sweet and voluble* is his discourse. — Love's Labor Lost, ii. 1.

Bassanio. . . . . . In law, what plea so tainted and corrupt
But, being seasoned with a *gracious* voice,
Obscures the show of evil? — Mer. of Venice, iii. 2.

HARDNESS, hardships. (κακο-.)

Endure *hardness* as a good soldier of Jesus Christ. — 2 Tim. ii. 3.

Imogen. . . . . . Plenty and peace breeds cowards; *hardness* ever
Of hardiness is mother. — Cymb. iii. 6.

Othello. . . . . . A natural and prompt alacrity
I find in *hardness;* and do undertake
These present wars against the Ottomites. — Oth. i. 3.

HELL, hades. (שְׁאוֹל, ᾅδης.)

Hell from beneath is moved for thee. — Is. xiv. 9.
Thou wilt not leave my soul in *hell.* — Acts ii. 27.

Titus. . . . . . And sith there is no justice in earth nor *hell*
We will solicit heaven. — T. Andron. iv. 3.

Pericles. Thou God of this great vast, rebuke these surges
Which wash both heaven and *hell.* — Peric. iii. 1.

HIS, its.

If the salt hath lost *his* savor wherewith shall *it* be salted. — Matt. v. 13.

K. Rich. . . . . . Let it command a mirror hither straight;
That it may show me what a face I have,
Since *it* is bankrupt of *his* majesty. — Rich. II. iv. 1.

Senator. . . . . . When every feather sticks in *his* own wing. — Timon. ii. 1.

HONEST, honorable. (καλός, εὐσχήμων.)

Provide things *honest* in the sight of all men. — Rom. xii. 17.
Honestly toward them that are without. — 1 Thes. iv. 12.

Wolsey (to Q. Kath.). If your grace
Could but be brought to know our ends are *honest*,
You'd feel more comfort. — Hen. VIII. iii. 1.

LEASING, lying. (כָּזָב.)

Thou shalt destroy them that speak *leasing.* — Ps. v. 6.

Menenius. . . . . . I have tumbled past the throw; and in his praise
Have almost stamped the *leasing.* Therefore, fellow,
I must have leave to pass.

1*st Guard.* 'Faith, Sir, if you had told as many *lies* in his behalf as you have uttered words in your own, you should not pass here. — Coriol. v. 2.

LET, hinder. (שׁוּב, κατέχω, κωλύω.)

I will work, and who shall *let* it? — Is. xliii. 13.
He who now *letteth* will *let.* — 2 Thess. ii. 7.
Was *let* hitherto. — Rom. i. 13.

Valentine. What *lets* but one may enter at her window?
Duke. Her chamber is aloft, far from the ground. — Two Gent. iii. 1.

Hamlet. . . . . . Still am I called, — unhand me, gentlemen, —
I'll make a ghost of him that *lets* me. — Hamlet, i. 4.

Romeo. . . . . . Therefore thy kinsmen are no *let* to me.
Romeo and Juliet, iii. 3.

LEWD, low, rude, wicked. (πονηρός, ῥᾳδιουῤγός.)

Certain *lewd* fellows of the baser sort. — Acts xvii. 5.
Or wicked *lewdness.* — Acts xviii. 14.

Gloster. His royal grace
Cannot be quiet scarce a breathing while,
But you must trouble him with *lewd* complaints. — Rich. III. i. 3.

Bolingbroke. . . . . . Mowbray hath received eight thousand nobles
In name of lendings for your highness' soldiers,
The which he hath detained for *lewd* employments.
Rich. II. i. 1.

LIST, choose, (ἐθέλω.)

Have done unto him whatsoever they *listed.* — Matt. xvii. 12.

Gregory. I will frown as I pass by; and let them take it as they list.
Romeo and Juliet, i. 1.

LOVER, friend. (אֹהֵב.)

Hiram was ever a *lover* of David. — 1 Kings v. 1.

Brutus. Romans, countrymen, and *lovers!* — J. Caesar, iii. 2.

LUST, desire, passion. (תַּאֲוָה, ἐπιθυμία.)

The mixed multitude that was among them fell a-*lusting.* — Num. xi. 4.
And the fruits that thy soul *lusted* after. — Rev. xviii. 14.

Diomedes. . . . . . Let me be privileged by my place and message
To be a speaker free; when I am hence,
I'll answer to my *lust.* — Troil. and Cress. iv. 4.

Iago. . . . . . But we have reason to cool our raging motions, our carnal stings, our unbitted *lusts;* whereof I take this that you call love, to be a sect or scion. — Oth. i. 3.

MANNERS, conduct. (מִשְׁפָּט, τρόπος.)

They do after the former *manners.* — 2 Kings xvii. 34.
Suffered he their *manners* in the wilderness. — Acts xiii. 18.

Griffith. Noble madam,
Men's evil *manners* live in brass; their virtues
We write in water. — Hen. VIII. iv. 2.

MEET, fit. (יָשָׁר, ἱκανός.)

There is that withholdeth more than is *meet.* — Prov. xi. 24.
Which has made us *meet* to be partakers. — Col. i. 12.

Panthino. . . . . . For any, or for all these exercises,
He said that Proteus, your son, was *meet.* — Two Gent. i. 3.

Licinius. . . . . . When what's not *meet,* but what must be was law.
Coriol. iii. 1.

MERRY, happy. (שָׂמֵחַ, εὔθυμος.)

A *merry* heart maketh a cheerful countenance. — Prov. xv. 13.
Is any *merry?* Let him sing psalms. — James v. 13.

Nurse. See where she comes from *shrift* with *merry* look.
Romeo and Juliet, iv. 2.

Romeo. ..... How oft when men are at the point of death
Have they been *merry!* which their keepers call
A lightning before death. — Romeo and Juliet, v. 3.

NAPKIN, handkerchief. (*σουδάριον.*)

Behold, here is thy pound, which I have kept laid up in a *napkin.*
Luke xix. 20.

Emilia. I am glad I have found this *napkin;*
This was her first remembrance from the Moor.
. . . .
What *handkerchief?*
Why, that the Moor first gave to Desdemona. — Oth. iii. 3.

Titus. ..... His *napkin* with his true tears all bewet
Can do no service on her sorrowful cheeks. — Tit. And. iii. 1.

Antony. ..... And they would go and kiss dead Caesar's wounds,
And dip their *napkins* in his sacred blood. — J. Caesar, iii. 2.

NEPHEW, grandson or descendant. (בֶּנ־בֵּן, נֶכֶד, *ἔκγονον.*)

He had forty sons and thirty *nephews.* — Judges xii. 14.
He shall neither have son nor *nephew.* — Job xviii. 19.
If any widow have children or *nephews.* — 1 Tim. v. 4.

Iago. ..... You'll have your daughter covered with a Barbary horse; you'll have your *nephews* neigh to you. — Oth. i. 1.

OR, ere. (בְּטֶרֶם, etc., *πρό.*)

Or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world. — Ps. xc. 2.
Or ever the silver cord be loosed. — Eccl. xii. 6.
We, *or* ever he come near, are ready to kill him. — Acts xxiii. 15.

Miranda. ..... I would
Have sunk the sea within the earth, *or* e'er
It should the good ship so have swallowed. — Tem. i. 2.

Salis. Or, rather then set forward; for 't will be
Two long days' journey, lords, *or* e'er we meet. — King John iv. 3.

PASSION, suffering. (*τὸ παθεῖν.*)

He showed himself alive after his *passion.* — Acts i. 3.

Lady Macb. ..... The fit is momentary; upon a thought
He will again be well: If much you note him
You shall offend him, and extend his *passion.* — Macb. iii. 4.

PECULIAR, private, one's own. (סְגֻלָּה, *περιούσιος.*)

The Lord hath chosen them to be a *peculiar* people unto himself.
Deut. xiv. 22; Tit. ii 14.

But what's his offence?
Clown. Groping for trouts in a *peculiar* river. — Meas. for Meas. i. 2.

Iago. ..... That nightly lie in those unproper beds,
Which they dare swear *peculiar.* — Oth. iv. 1.

Desdemona. ..... Or sue to you to do *peculiar* profit
To your own person. — Oth. iii. 3.

Plague, punish. (נָגַע.)

And the Lord *plagued* Pharaoh. — Gen. xii. 17.

Q. Margaret. . . . . . And God, not we, hath *plagued* thy bloody deed.
Rich. III. i. 3.

Precious, costly, serious. (יָקָר.)

Precious in the sight of the Lord is the death of his saints. — Ps. cxvi. 15.

Cres. . . . . . My love admits no qualifying dross;
No more my grief, in such a *precious* loss. — Troil. iv. 4.

Prevent, go before, anticipate. (קָדַם, φθάνω, προφθάνω.)

I *prevented* the dawning of the morning. — Ps. cxix. 147.
We which are alive . . . . . shall not *prevent* them which are asleep.
1 Thess. iv. 15.

Tal. Content, my liege? Yes; but that I am *prevented*
I should have begged I might have been employed.
1 K. Hen. VI. iv. 1.

Brutus. . . . . . But I do find it cowardly and vile,
For fear of what might fall, so to *prevent*
The time of life. — J. Caesar, v. 1.

Profit, be a proficient. (προκόπτω.)

I *profited* in the Jews' religion. — Gal. i. 14.

Mort. In faith, he is a worthy gentleman;
Exceedingly well read, and *profited*
In strange concealments. — 1 Hen. IV. iii. 1.

Proper, handsome. (ἀστεῖος.)

Because they saw he was a *proper* child. — Heb. xi. 23.

Claud. He is a very *proper* man.
D. Pedro. He hath, indeed, a good outward happiness. — Much Ado, ii. 3

Gloster. Upon my life, she finds, though I cannot,
Myself to be a marvellous *proper* man.
I'll be at charges for a looking-glass. — K. Rich. III. i. 2.

Proper, private.

I have of mine own *proper* good. — 1 Chron. xxix. 3.

Olivia. . . . . . Here at my house, and at my *proper* cost.
Twelfth Night, v. 1.

Provoke, call forth, incite. (ἐρεθίζω.)

Your zeal hath *provoked* very many. — 2 Cor. ix. 2.

Miranda. Wherefore did they not that hour destroy us!
Prospero. Well demanded, wench;
My tale *provokes* that question. — Tempest i. 2.

Gloster (to Anne). . . . . . Nay, do not pause; for I did kill King Henry;
But 't was thy beauty that *provoked* me. — Rich. III. i. 2.

Quick, living. (חַי, ζῶν.)

And they go down *quick* unto the pit. — Numb. xvi. 30.

The word of God is *quick* and powerful. — Heb. iv. 12.
The *quick* and the dead. — 2 Tim. iv. 1.

Laertes (leaping into the grave). Hold off the earth awhile
Till I have caught her once more in mine arms : —
Now pile your dust upon the *quick* and dead. — Ham. v. 1.

K. Henry. The mercy that was *quick* in us but late
By your own counsel is suppressed and *killed.* — Hen. V. ii. 2.

QUIT, acquit.

Quit you like men. — 1 Cor. xvi. 13.

Edmund. . . . . . Draw : seem to defend yourself:
Now *quit* you well. — Lear, ii. 1.

REASONABLE, rational, of the reason. (λογικός.)

Which is your *reasonable* service. — Rom. xii. 1. (Cf. Assem. Cat. "True body and *reasonable* soul.")

Beatrice. . . . . . If he have wit enough to keep himself warm, let him bear it for a difference between himself and his horse: for it is all the wealth he hath left to be known a *reasonable* creature. — Much Ado, i. 1.

SORE, severe-ly, very. (λίαν, etc.)

A *sore* botch that cannot be healed. — Deut. xxviii. 35.
The spirit cried, and rent him *sore.* — Mark ix. 26.

P. John. . . . . . I hear the king, my father, is *sore* sick.
2nd Hen. IV. iv. 3.

Edmund. . . . . . Though the conflict be *sore.* — Lear iii. 5.

SPITE, provocation, insult. (ὑβρι-.)

And entreated them *spitefully.* — Matt. xxii. 6.

Mortimer. This is the deadly *spite* that angers me, —
My wife can speak no English, I no Welsh. — 1st Hen. IV. iii. 1.

STILL, constant-ly. (עוֹד.)

They will be *still* praising thee. — Ps. lxxxiv. 4.

Q. Eliz. . . . . . But that *still* use of grief makes wild grief tame,
My tongue should to thy ears not name my boys
Till that my nails were anchored in thine eyes. — Rich. III. iv. 4.

Titus. . . . . . And by *still* practice learn to know thy meaning.
T. Andron. iii. 2.

STRAIT, narrow, small. (צַר, στενός.)

The place where we dwell with thee is too *strait* for us. — 2 Kings vi. 1.
Strait is the gate. — Matt. vii. 14.

Post. . . . . . And but the backs of Britons seen, all flying
Through a *strait* lane.
. . . . . The *strait* pass was damm'd
With dead men, hurt behind, and cowards living,
To die with lengthened shame. — Cym. v. 3.

TELL, count. (סָפַר.)

I may *tell* all my bones. — Ps. xxii. 17.

Launcelot. . . . . . I am famished in his service; you may *tell* every finger I have with my ribs. — Mer. of Ven. ii. 2.

Iago. . . . . . But O, what damned minutes *tells* he o'er,
Who dotes, yet doubts; suspects, yet strongly loves. — Oth. iii. 3.

THOUGHT, anxiety, melancholy. (*μεριμνα-*).

Take no *thought* beforehand what ye shall speak. — Mark xiii. 11.
Take no *thought* for your life. — Luke xii. 22.

Viola. She never told her love,
But let concealment, like a worm i' the bud
Feed on her damask cheek; she pined in *thought.*
Twelfth Night, ii. 4.

Laertes (of Ophelia singing). *Thought* and affliction, passion, hell itself,
She turns to favor and to prettiness. — Ham. iv. 5.

Hamlet. . . . . . Thus conscience does make cowards of us all;
And thus the native hue of resolution
Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of *thought.* — Ham. iii. 1.

Brutus. Alas, good Cassius, do not think of him [Antony];
If he love Caesar, all that he can do
Is to himself; take *thought*, and die for Caesar. — J. Caesar, ii. 1.

TREATISE, narrative. (λόγος.)

The former *treatise* have I made. — Acts. i. 1.

Macbeth. . . . . . The time has been, my senses would have cooled
To hear a night-shriek; and my fell of hair
Would at a dismal *treatise* rouse and stir
As life were in't. — Macbeth v. 6.

TROW, think, believe. (δοκέω.)

Doth he thank that servant . . . . . I *trow* not. — Luke xvii. 9.

Petruchio. . . . . . And, I *trow*, this is his house;
Here, sirrah Grumio, knock, I say. — Tam. the Shrew, i. 2.

Fool. . . . . . Learn more than thou *trowest.* — Lear i. 4.

WAX, become. (*γίνομαι, προκόπτω.*)

David *waxed* faint. — 2 Sam. xxi. 15.
Waxed valiant in fight. — Heb. xi. 34.

K. Hen. . . . . . But, in faith, Kate, the elder I *wax*, the better I shall appear. — Hen. V. v. 2.

WHICH, who.

Our Father *which* art in heaven. — Matt. vi. 9.

Senator. . . . . . Lord Timon will be left a naked gull,
Which flashes now a phoenix. — Timon ii. 1.

Launcelot. . . . . . If any man in Italy have a fairer table, *which* doth offer to swear upon a book. — Mer. of Ven. ii. 2.

WIT, WOT, know. (יָדַע, *γνωρίζω, οἶδα.*)

I *wot* that he whom thou blessest is blessed. — Num. xxii. 6.
We do you to *wit* of the grace of God. — 2 Cor. viii. 1.

Gower. Now please you *wit*
The epitaph is for Marina writ. — Peric. iv. 4.
Demetrius. . . . . . But, my good Lord, I *wot* not by what power
(But by some power it is) my love to Hermia
Melted, as doth the snow. — Mids. Night's Dream, iv. 1.

WORSHIP, respect. (δόξα.)

Have *worship* in the presence of them that sit at meat. — Luke xiv. 10.

Gloster. . . . . . Was it not she and that good man of *worship*,
. . . . . That made him send Lord Hastings to the tower.
Rich. III. i. 1.

ARTICLE IV.

THE BIBLE AND SLAVERY.

BY PROF. E. P. BARROWS, ANDOVER, MASS.

To charge all the sophistry with which the world abounds to the conscious design of deceiving men would be uncandid. The largest part of the false reasoning by which men practice imposition upon themselves and others, is probably more or less unconscious. They first adopt an opinion under the influence of prejudice or passion, and then set themselves at work to find arguments for its support. The opinion is not the result of the arguments, nor is it sustained by them; but the arguments were invented to adorn the opinion and give it a decent show of truth, and it is the opinion which sustains them. Some years ago, the people of a certain village in Ohio erected a neat house of worship. The front was adorned with a row of pilasters adhering to its body, which certainly added to its architectural beauty, and were designed to have the appearance of supporting it. But winter coming on before the pedestals of these pilasters could be placed under them, they were left till the ensuing summer hanging to the front of the house with nothing but empty air for their support, whereby their true office — to *seem*, not to *be* — was at once made manifest. In due time the pedestals were nicely adjusted, as hollow as the pilasters which they seemed to support, and on which, in turn, the front of the building seemed to rest. There they were, an admirable representation of a vast amount of the arguments current in this world of vain show. They are not the grounds of the opinions which they seem to support, but they are appended to the front of them to give them an appearance of truth.

We are very far from denying that an opinion taken upon trust, without argument, may be true, and therefore capable of being afterwards supported by valid reasons. Children must receive their opinions at the outset mainly on the authority of their parents and teachers; and even in mature years a large part of our beliefs must continue to rest on the foundation of faith. This is a great law of God's moral government. Like every other general law, it is subject to much abuse in our crooked and perverse world; yet its influence is, upon the whole, highly beneficent. But, as already intimated, we have now to do with *sophistical* arguments, invented to give a show of truth to untenable positions. To classify and describe the numerous shapes which false reasoning assumes, is no part of our present design. We simply remark that one of its most common forms — and a form, too, that has been abundantly employed in the controversy concerning American slavery — consists in an evasion, whether conscious or unconscious, of the true point at issue by the confusion of things that differ essentially in their nature. Thus, it has been argued that, since the authority which God has delegated to parents over their children is absolute, there cannot be in the possession and exercise of such authority, anything in itself wrong; and, therefore, that slavery is not intrinsically a wrong institution — an argument which rests on the false assumption that absolute authority is the essence of the relation held by the master towards his slave. Again, it was a well-known usage of antiquity, nowhere disapproved of in the holy scriptures, that the bridegroom should pay for his bride a stipulated sum to the father or brothers.

Hence it has been maintained that to buy a human being cannot be anything in itself wrong or sinful; as if the vital question were not *into what relation* the so-called act of purchase brings the person purchased; whether that of a lawful wife, with the divinely sanctioned rights and privileges of a wife, or that of an article of merchandise, to be used according to the arbitrary pleasure of the owner, and sold again at his option. Once more, it is one of the most certain laws of human society that where a weaker race coexists in intimate relation with a stronger race, the former must come naturally into a state of dependence upon the latter, like that of India upon Great Britain, or the North American tribes upon the United States. From this the very illogical inference has been drawn that, the normal condition of the African, as one of the weaker races, is that of servitude to the stronger Japhetic race; as if the relation of India to Great Britain, or of the aborginal tribes of North America to the United States were that of slavery; or, as if the essence of slavery were that of the dependence of the weaker upon the stronger.

In all the above-named arguments, and many others of a kindred character, the essential nature of slavery is kept out of view. This is nothing more nor less than *the conversion of human beings into articles of merchandise.* To know what slavery is as an institution, we must go to the statutes of the slave-states, where it is defined in the clearest and most express terms.

> "A slave is one who is in the power of a master, to whom he belongs. The master may sell him, dispose of his person, his industry, his labor; he can do nothing, possess nothing, nor acquire anything but which must belong to his master."[1]
>
> "Slaves shall be deemed, taken, reputed, and adjudged to be chattels personal in the hands of their masters and possessors, to all intents and purposes whatsoever."[2]

These definitions are explicit enough, and they settle at once the nature of American slavery. It consists in converting men and women into *property*, in the literal sense of the word — as literal as the nature of the case admits; for it makes them "chattels personal in the hands of their masters and possessors, to all intents and purposes whatsoever." See how deliberately the slave-codes, while they cannot make the slave anything else than an immortal being, made in God's image, yet proceed to strip him of all his rights as a man. He is not only "in the power of a master," as a minor or apprentice may be, but he belongs to him as his property. He has no right to his own industry or labor; for the master may dispose of these for his own interest. He has no right to himself; for the master may sell him at pleasure. In a word, he has no right of any kind; for "he can do nothing, possess nothing, nor acquire anything but which must belong to his master." He is an article of merchandise, to be bought, sold, and used, not for his own good, but for the profit or convenience of his master. *This*, and nothing else but this, is the essence of American slavery.

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[1] Louisiana Code, Art. 3.

[2] Laws of South Carolina,—Brevard's Digest, 229.

But it may be said: "True, this is American slavery abstractly and theoretically considered; but in actual practice the system is something widely different. In other words, the masters do not avail themselves of all the tremendous powers conferred upon them by the slave-code. To this it is obvious to reply: *first*, that, even were the assertion universally true, it would still be proper to judge of slavery from its laws. Suppose, for example, that a statute were to be made in Massachusetts, releasing every citizen from all his existing debts. It would be a poor apology for such a law to say that it was only a dead-letter, the citizens being too honest to avail themselves of its provisions. Men would justly reply: The statute is infamous, because it *empowers* men to be dishonest. So the slave-codes must be pronounced infamous, because they authorize one part of the community to hold another part as articles of merchandise; and that, too, without regard to the question how far men avail themselves of its provisions.

But, *secondly*, the provisions of the slave-code are not intended to be, and are not in practice, a dead letter. Every man is empowered to use them, and some do use, them to their full extent. Most cheerfully do we admit that, among the masters, many are just and merciful, and would reject with abhorrence the idea of using all the prerogatives conferred upon them by the slave-laws. But then there are other masters of an opposite character, and these laws sustain them in their selfishness and unmerciful severity, so long as they do not transcend the letter of the statutes. Thus it happens that slaveholders of all grades of character live together in the same community, all enjoying alike the protection of the state. Here, for example, there lives, on one side of the street, a family where the slaves are well fed and clothed, allowed the rest of the sabbath, and carefully instructed in the Christian religion; and where, too, the relations of parent and child, as well as husband and wife, are sacredly recognized. On the other side of the street lives one belonging to the meanest of all classes of slaveholders — a negro-grower. He raises slaves, as the farmer does horses and cattle, for the market. He makes his money by selling the children of his female slaves, though some of them should chance to be his own offspring. A little way off is the pen of a professional slave-trader, whose business is to make merchandise of human beings. What if the slave-grower and the slave-trader be, to all good men, objects of abhorrence: the law declares their nefarious business lawful, and protects them in the exercise of it. Does it not say that "a slave is one who is in the power of a master, to whom he belongs;" that "the master may sell him, dispose of his person, his industry, his labor;" that "slaves shall be deemed, taken, reputed, and adjudged to be chattels personal in the hands of their masters and possessors, to all intents and purposes whatsoever?" What are these men doing but carrying out the provisions of the law? It was made for the especial benefit of such miscreants, and it compels all the good and merciful in the community to uphold them, and, if need be, fight for them. Well do we remember how, in the days of boyhood, we often had occasion to pass by the pen of a celebrated slave-trader, with its accompaniment of sturdy mastiffs. It lay in what was then the border of a large southern city. To the general abhorrence which the community felt for him and his traffic in human flesh, we can testify. The common remark of the boys, when they saw him on the streets, was: "There goes old W . . . . . k." "Old W . . . . . k" was, with us, at that day, a near synonym for Satan. Yet the whole power of the state was pledged to uphold him in his business; for its statutes made it, and to this day make it, a legitimate business. Had necessity required, every man in the community might have been summoned to defend his slave-pen at the hazard of his own life.

Such is the essential nature of American slavery.[1] It converts a large class of the community into articles of merchandise, and compels the just and good, who scorn to avail themselves of the monstrous prerogatives conferred upon them by the slave-code, to uphold the selfish and hard-hearted, whom no scruples of conscience deter from making themselves rich by using these prerogatives to their full extent. Thus it offers a high premium to rascality. We come, now, to examine this institution in the light of revelation.

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[1] When one proposes to defend the institution of slavery, "not as it exists in this country, or as it ever existed anywhere, on the whole"; admitting great abuses, but affirming that these are "not reasons for subverting foundations laid by the providence of God, but for building upon them a superstructure more conformable to his will, and more subservient to his designs" (see a Northern Presbyter's Second Letter, pp. 10, 11), we understand him as assuming that the institution in its principle, aside from all separable accidents, has God's sanction. This is undoubtedly the true method of investigating any institution. We wish it understood, however, that we have to do with an actual, not with an ideal, system. We propose to discuss *American slavery as it is;* not as it is in the hands of very good or very bad men, but as it is *in principle.* Passing by all minor points, we shall examine the fundamental provisions of the slave codes — those provisions which are either inseparable from the very idea of the system, or which grow out of it so naturally and certainly, that they have never been in fact separated from it, and may properly be regarded as integral parts of it. And the conclusion at which we shall arrive is, that slavery is not simply abused by bad men, as are good institutions, but that it is itself an abuse, like polygamy and divorce, and standing in a common relation with them to the divine sanction.

Respecting any organic arrangement in human society, but two positions can be taken; first, that it is a *normal arrangement;* secondly, that it is an *abuse*. If it be decided that it is an abuse, the further question arises: What is the attitude of God's word in relation to it?

A *normal institution*, then, is one that is in harmony with the constitution and circumstances of the human race, and, therefore, adapted to meet and satisfy its wants. Examples of such institutions are the sabbath, marriage and the family, and civil government — civil government we here mean in its essence, without respect to its particular outward forms. All these are ordinances of God, and have their foundation in the unchangeable wants of man as man, and are therefore in place everywhere and in all ages. It is no objection to say that they have been and are shamefully perverted by human wickedness, and thus turned, in particular instances, into curses instead of blessings. Whole volumes might be filled, no doubt, with examples of the cruel abuse, on the part of husbands, of the power conferred upon them by the marriage relation, whereby the companions to whom they ought to have been a solace and support, have been compelled to drag out a miserable existence. Other volumes might be filled with cases in which wives have, by their misconduct, embittered the lives of the husbands to whose comfort they were appointed to minister. But here the evil arises, not from the intrinsic nature and tendency of the marriage relation, but from the perverseness of one or both of the parties. It still remains true that marriage is adapted to the wants of man as man, and that its legitimate tendency is to promote human virtue and happiness. Whatever evils are incident, through human depravity, to its existence, it is still an unspeakable blessing to the race; nay more, it constitutes the very foundation of social purity and virtue. We need not wonder, therefore, that God who instituted it has hedged around its sanctity by one precept of the decalogue; as he has the relation of parents and children, which grows immediately out of this institution, by another.

The same line of argument might be pursued with regard to civil government. Some forms of government are undoubtedly better than others, because better adapted to man's complex nature, and the scale of his progress in religion, morality, and general intelligence. But under every form that has yet been devised, immense evils have existed, and will continue to exist till the masses shall become righteous in their individual character. Nevertheless, civil government is, in its proper design and tendency, beneficent. Its very end is the administration of justice to all, and the protection of all in their persons and estates. Like marriage, it is an indispensable want of man as man, and therefore it must be maintained. The worst form of government is better than anarchy, and will be gladly accepted instead of it, as abundant experience proves.

An *abuse*, that is, an organic abuse, embodying itself in a system, is, on the contrary, at war with the constitution of man and the circumstances in which God has placed him. Its proper tendency, therefore, is to evil.[1] It is in its regular operation adapted to increase human wickedness and misery. In particular cases, its evils may be almost wholly abated by the personal excellence of those involved in it; but it remains no less true that the system is in itself evil, and that wherever it prevails, it will sow broadcast

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[1] Mr. Ross, in his work on slavery, denounces the idea "that right and wrong are eternal facts," — we should say *principles,* — which "exist *per se* in the nature of things," as atheism; and appends to it the monstrous inference that, if this be so, God "must study, to know them, as really as man"; and that "he comprehends them more clearly than man, only because he is a better student than man." According to him, "right and wrong are results brought into being, mere contingencies, means to good, made to exist solely by the will of God, expressed by his word; or, when his will is not thus known, he shows it in the human reason by which he rules the natural heart" (pp. 39 – 41). This theory, that right and wrong are pure creations of God's will, is liable to some objections which Mr. Ross might find it hard to dispose of. After Dr. Ross's example, we "begin at the beginning of eternity." If the universe is not eternal, God must once have existed alone, as it is written: "Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting thou art God." If, now, a world of intelligent moral beings was to be created, MUST he not have proceeded according to certain immutable principles — immutable because they were essentially and eternally right? Must he not, for example, have made benevolence, as opposed to malevolence, his own law of action, and imposed it on them as their law of action? Could he by any nude act of will have made malevolence right, and benevolence wrong? We need not place this principle outside of God's being. One may, if he will, call it a part of his being. The essential thing is that it is eternal and unchangeable. We can no more conceive of God's making or un-

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making it, than of his making or unmaking his self-existence, eternity, omnipotence, or omniscience. Once more, Dr. Ross defines sin to be *self-will*. "I, the creature, will not submit to *thy* WILL, God, the Creator. It is the I AM, *created*, who dares to defy and dishonor the I AM, not created — the Lord God, the Almighty, Holy, Eternal" (p. 42). Very well. We ask, now, MUST not this too, have been an immutable principle in the creation of any world of moral intelligences that God's will should be their supreme law of action? Is it right that the creature's will should be ruled by the Creator's because God has willed it; or has God willed it because it is right — eternally and immutably right?

But we need not thus go back to "the beginning of eternity." God *has* created us a race of moral intelligences, endowed us with a certain nature, and placed us in certain relations and circumstances. MUST he not now govern us in harmony with this nature and these circumstances? Will any one pretend that it is in itself indifferent what course of conduct he prescribes to us, on the ground that it is his prerogative to make and unmake right? Does God, for example, make gluttony and drunkenness, pride and envy, wrong simply by forbidding them, or does he forbid them because they are at war with the nature he has given us, and our relations to him and to each other? Plainly the latter. But here there is a threefold distinction which it is important to observe: *First*, There may be purely positive ordinances forbidding things not in themselves wrong, or, as far as human reason can see, injurious. This is entirely in accordance with man's nature and relations. He is made for unlimited faith, love, and obedience towards God; and God may choose to test him in these respects, as he did our first parents, and afterwards Abraham, by a command without an annexed reason. Such cases, however, are exceptional, and do not constitute the general rule. *Secondly*, There may be things so immediately and obviously opposed to man's nature and relations that they must be always forbidden. Such are idolatry, which strikes directly at God's authority; and adultery, which strikes directly at one of the most sacred of human rights. These things are properly the *mala per se*. *Thirdly*, There may be practices not in harmony with man's nature and relations, and therefore *in their proper tendency* productive of evil and misery, yet not so directly and visibly wrong but that good men may, in some circumstances, be involved in them, especially when they have been educated under them. Such were, under the Mosaic economy, polygamy and the power of divorce on the part of the husband. God's tolerance of them made them outwardly and formally right, that is, not contrary to his command. But they did not for this reason cease to be great moral and social evils. While, now, we hold God's will, expressed in his word, to be a supreme rule of right, we hold also — what we understand Dr. Ross too to hold — that he has given us reason that we may exercise it in learning his will as expressed in the nature he has given us, and the relations and circumstances in which he has placed us.

through the community the seeds of vice and misery. As examples of such evil arrangements we specify *polygamy*, and the *power of divorce* on the part of the husband. It is undeniable that these are both abuses, though both were *tolerated* under the Mosaic economy, and their evils mitigated, to some extent, by divine legislation. "Moses," says the Saviour, "because of the hardness of your hearts, suffered you to put away your wives; but from the beginning it was not so."[1] "For the hardness of your heart, he wrote you this precept; but from the beginning of the creation, God made them male and female. For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and cleave to his wife; and they twain shall be one flesh: so then they are no more twain, but one flesh. What, therefore, God has joined together, let not man put asunder."[2] "From the beginning it was not so." God himself appointed the ordinance of marriage at the beginning as a permanent union between the man and the woman. So the Saviour argues at some length. He did not then nullify the intention of the ordinance by giving to either party the right of divorce at will. But in the days of Moses, men had departed from the primitive idea of marriage. Moses found the custom of divorce sanctioned by long usage; and he suffered it for the time being, because of the hardness of men's hearts. They had not yet arrived at such a stage of moral culture and illumination as made it expedient absolutely to forbid the practice, as it was aftewards forbidden by Christ himself upon the introduction of the gospel. The above-quoted passages are of great importance, as showing that the fact of God's leaving a system already in existence without abrogating it, does not prove either that it is not an evil, or that it is always to be tolerated. The practice of divorce was an abuse having its origin in no divine appointment, — God never appoints abuses, — but suffered by Moses under his direction, because of the hardness of men's hearts, till in the fulness of time Christ should do it away.

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[1] Matt. xix. 8.

[2] Mark x. 5–9.

With regard to polygamy it is a noticeable fact that, though it was tolerated under the Mosaic dispensation, and made the subject of various regulations, it is nowhere forbidden in the New Testament, and is condemned only in an indirect way.[1] The ground of this silence probably is, that the practice had been already rejected by religious persons, so that there was no need of any express precept on the subject. But, however this may be, the fact is very significant, and we shall have occasion to refer to it again in the course of the present discussion.

We come now to the question : "Is American slavery a *normal institution*, or *an abuse ?* — a question which the men of a former generation, both North and South, regarded as so thoroughly settled that he who should have seriously attempted to reopen, it would have been remanded to the physician for a draught of hellebore. But inasmuch as it has been reopened by the modern abettors of slavery, and advocated from the sacred desk, it becomes necessary to consider it anew. Here let it be remembered, once more, that we have to do with American slavery as it is defined by the slave-codes. In the light of revelation we are to examine the legal character which these codes give to slaves, and the legal powers which they confer on slaveholders. In some respects it would be most convenient, as well as the most natural order of investigation, to consider first the intrinsic character of American slavery as compared with the principles of God's word, and then the attitude of the Bible in regard to it. But since the divine sanction of slavery is alleged as a bar to all human reasonings on the subject, we prefer to invert the order of inquiry. If we can first show that the divine sanction claimed for slavery is only the sufferance of the system, as of other usages which are acknowledged to have been abuses, then the way will be prepared to try the institution in its principles by the standard of revelation. If it cannot endure this test, it must be classed with abuses, not with normal institutions. We will consider, then, —

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[1] As in our Saviour's argument: "They twain shall be one flesh," etc. ; and that of Paul, Eph. v. 25 – 33, where he compares the union of Christ with his one church to that of the husband with his one wife. Still more explicit are his words, 1 Cor. vii. 2 : "Nevertheless, to avoid fornication, let every man have his own wife, and every woman her own husband," where monogamy is assumed as equally the law for both parties. The passages 1 Tim. iii. 2, 12 ; Titus i. 6, are of doubtful meaning. Compare 1 Tim. v. 9.

I. *The Attitude of the Bible in regard to Servitude.*

Here it would be pertinent to remark that, if the American slaveholder will appeal to Hebrew servitude, he must, in accordance with the principles of the gospel, take for his rule the laws prescribed for the treatment of Hebrew servants. The Mosaic economy made a sharp distinction between the covenant people of God and those of every other nation, conferring upon the former, in many ways, prerogatives over the latter. In accordance with this principle, the rights of Hebrew servants were carefully guarded, and they could not be reduced, at least without their own consent, to perpetual servitude.[1] But the gospel is the full realization of the idea that God "hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth."[2] It teaches us to regard the whole human family as one brotherhood, for whom the one atonement of the gospel has been provided, and who are entitled to be dealt with according to the one law of Christian love. The whole spirit of Christianity is beautifully embodied in our Lord's parable of the good Samaritan, in answer to the question: Who is my neighbor?" Certainly the treatment which servants are entitled to receive under the Christian dispensation, from masters calling themselves Christians, ought not to be more severe than that prescribed for Hebrew servants from their Hebrew masters.[3] But on this point we will not insist. With respect to the scriptural treatment of servitude, we shall maintain the following positions:

1. *Hebrew servitude did not have its origin in any divine*

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[1] See this whole subject discussed in the January number of the Bibliotheca for the present year, under the head of Saalschütz on Hebrew Servitude.

[2] Acts xvii. 26.

[3] See our remarks on this point in the Article above referred to, pp. 71, 72

ordinance, and it is not sanctioned, in the Old Testament, in any other sense than that of being tolerated and regulated, as are polygamy and the power of divorce. The first part of this proposition needs no lengthened discussion. It will not be pretended by any well-informed man that servitude *originated* with Moses or with Abraham. When Abraham bought servants with money, he acted in accordance with a usage which he found already in existence. The origin of slavery is lost in the mists of antiquity. To say that it had its beginning in a divine ordinance, as did the normal institutions of marriage and the sabbath, is to affirm what cannot be maintained by a particle of evidence. No. Slavery, like polygamy, had its origin in human selfishness. Very likely it originated in the land of Nod, in the family of Cain, where we first hear of a man that had two wives.[1]

But no matter, say the abettors of slavery, it is *sanctioned* in the Old Testament, and that is enough. We are not disposed to quibble about a word. We should prefer to restrict the term *sanction* to institutions positively ordained and commanded by God. But if men will apply it to Hebrew servitude, — a widely different thing from American slavery, as we shall show in the proper place, — then we go behind the sound of the word, and inquire what it must mean in the present case. It can mean only that he *suffered* it and *regulated* it by specific enactments. No man in his senses will seriously pretend that he *commanded* or even *encouraged* it.[2] If a practice, whether in its nature salutary or hurtful, was to be allowed under the old economy, of course it must be regulated. This is precisely what is done in regard to *divorce* and *polygamy*. In Deut. xxiv. 1—4 we read: "When a man hath taken a wife and married her, and it come to pass that she find no favor in his eyes, because he hath found some uncleanness in her, then let him write her a bill of divorcement, and give it in her hand, and send her out of his house. And when she is departed out of his house, she may go and be another man's wife. And if the latter husband hate her, and write her a bill of divorcement, and giveth it into her hand, and sendeth her out of his house; or if the latter husband die, which took her to be his wife; her former husband which sent her away, may not take her again to be his wife, after that she is defiled," etc. That the words rendered "some uncleanness," or, as they are more literally given in the margin, "matter of nakedness,"[1] do not refer to fornication or adultery, but (as in Deut. xxiii. 14, where the same words occur in the original), to something about her person offensive to her husband, in respect to which he was to be the sole judge, is manifest from the fact that the Mosaic law punished with death adultery or concealed defilement before the consummation of the marriage relation;[2] but especially from the fact that,

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[1] Gen. iv. 19.

[2] We say "seriously pretend," for Dr. Ross, in the record he has given us of his speech on the subject of slavery before the General Assembly at New York, after a solemn protest "against having a Doctor-of-Divinity *priest*, Hebrew or Greek, to tell the people what God has spoken on the subject of slavery or any other subject" (pp. 59, 60), has made out a sham argument, apparently for the benefit of the people "up there in the gallery," whom he addresses on p. 58. It turns on the use of the English auxiliary, *shall*, in Lev. xxv. 44 – 46: — "Both thy bondmen and thy bondmaids, which thou shalt have, shall be of the heathen that are round about you; of them shall ye buy bondmen and bondmaids," etc.; on which he comments thus: "Sir, I do not see how God could tell us more plainly that he did command his people to buy slaves of the heathen round about them," etc. (p. 63). No wonder that the Doctor has a horror of

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Hebrew, when any person, north or south of Mason and Dixon's line, who was moderately versed in the language, could tell him that, so far as the grammatical form is concerned, the word rendered "shall ye buy" might be equally well rendered *may ye buy*, and that *always* in the Hebrew the choice between the two modes of rendering is to be determined by the context. But since the author cries out: "Don't run into the Hebrew" (p. 61), we will test his argument by "King James's English Bible," though we have always understood that this too was the work of "Doctor-of-Divinity priests in Hebrew and Greek." In Deut. xxi. 10–14, we read: "When thou goest forth to war against thine enemies, and the Lord thy God hath delivered them into thy hands, and thou hast taken them captive, and seest among the captives a beautiful woman, and hast a desire unto her that thou wouldest have her to thy wife; then thou shalt bring her home to thine house, and she shall shave her head," etc., "and after that thou shalt go in unto her, and be her husband, and she shall be thy wife," etc. Dr. Ross knows, because he is not destitute of common sense, that this is simply permission; and so it is in the other case.

[1] Heb. Here and in Deut. xxiii. 15 (Eng. version, xxiii. 14), עֶרְוַת דָּבָר, *nakedness of a matter*.

[2] Deut. xxii. 13–21.

while our Lord allows fornication as a valid ground of divorce, he disallows the Mosaic precept as not in harmony with the true idea of marriage, but given because of the hardness of men's hearts.[1] Here, then, we have very specific regulations in respect to a custom which, our Lord himself being judge, was an *abuse* fraught with evil to society. One may say, if he will insist on the term, that the Mosaic law *sanctioned* the right of divorce, — that is, divorce according to the arbitrary judgment of the husband, — but when we go behind the sound of the word to its sense, we find it to mean that God *suffered it by reason of the hardness of men's hearts.*

Equally explicit is the regulation concerning *polygamy* or rather *bigamy.* "If a man have two wives, one beloved and another hated, and they have borne him children, both the beloved and the hated; and if the first-born son be hers that was hated; then it shall be when he maketh his sons to inherit that which he hath, that he may not make the son of the beloved first-born, before the son of the hated which is indeed the first-born. But he shall acknowledge the son of the hated, for the first-born, by giving him a double portion of all that he hath; for he is the beginning of his strength; the right of the first-born is his."[2] See how exactly the form of the precept agrees with those concerning servitude: "If a man have two wives;" "If thou buy an Hebrew servant;"[3] "If thy brother that dwelleth by thee be waxen poor, and be sold unto thee."[4] There is another precept, equally explicit, given in the same hypothetical form: "If he take him another wife," in addition to the maid-servant whom he has betrothed, "her food, her raiment, and her duty of marriage shall he not diminish.[1] "Her duty of marriage" (Heb. עֹנָתָהּ) is her right to conjugal cohabitation with him. "There, sir," exclaims Dr. Ross, after quoting the above passage with its context, "God sanctioned the Israelite father in selling his daughter, and the Israelite man to buy her, into slavery and into polygamy. And it was then right because God made it right."[2] Undoubtedly it was right in the sense that God allowed it. But he allowed it as an abuse of the primitive institution of marriage; and the ground of his allowance was the hardness of men's hearts. This is all the sanction that can be claimed for it. Dr. Ross says: "I never yet produced this Bible in its plain, unanswerable authority for the relation of master and slave, but the anti-slavery man ran away into the fog of *his* Hebrew or Greek, or he jabbered the nonsense that God permitted the *sin* of slave-holding among the Jews, but that he don't do it now! Sir, God sanctioned slavery then, and sanctions it now. He made it right, they know, then and now."[3] The jabbering of nonsense, which he imputes to anti-slavery men, is something of his own manufacture. There may be, in the world, for anything that we can tell, men foolish and illogical enough to affirm that God "permitted *sin*," among the Jews. But this is not the position of anti-slavery men. They affirm that God suffered, for the hardness of men's hearts, practices which were, in their nature, *abuses* fraught with evil; and that he did so, Dr. Ross must admit, or deny the Saviour's authority, and hold, moreover, not only slavery but polygamy and the arbitrary power of divorce, to be customs in themselves good, and in harmony with man's nature and relations. So far as the Old Testament is concerned, God sanctioned polygamy as fully as he did slavery; and if the former is admitted to have been a great abuse, why not the latter? By Dr. Ross's concession, the Jewish law of polygamy was never repealed, and "Christ and his apostles do not declare polygamy to be a sin."[4] True, he introduces from the New

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[1] Between the rabbinical schools of Hillel and Shammai, was a dispute concerning the right of divorce; the former maintaining, from Deut. xxiv. 1, that it might take place according to the arbitrary decision of the husband, the latter restricting it to the case of adultery. In his answer, our Lord virtually concedes the true interpretation of the Mosaic precept, for substance at least, to the school of Hillel, but gives the right of the question to the school of Shammai, on the ground that they held the true view of the marriage relation, as originally ordained of God. "He answered them that this was done by Moses *on account of their hardness and sinfulness,* as a *lesser of evils,* and belonged to that dispensation which παρεισῆλϑεν." — Alford on Matt. xix. 5.

[2] Deut. xxi. 15–17.

[3] Ex. xxi. 2.

[4] Lev. xxv. 13.

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[1] Ex. xxi. 10. [2] Ross on Slavery, p. 62. [3] Ib. p. 60. [4] Ib. p. 45.

Testament an *inferential* argument against polygamy, which, however, is, on exegetical grounds, very doubtful. This we will consider in the proper place. But we prefer to consider one thing at a time. We have now to do with the argument from the Mosaic institutions. We say, then, that the fact that a usage was allowed — or, if one choose, "sanctioned" — under these institutions, and was never afterwards prohibited by any divine declaration, cannot be in itself any warrant for our following it. The permission given, Deut. xxi. 10 – 14, to the victorious Hebrew to take, by his own arbitrary will, a beautiful woman from among the female captives to be his wife, was never repealed. So far, therefore, as the argument from *express precept* is concerned, "God sanctioned it *then*, and he sanctions it *now*." It follows, that it remains the rule for modern warfare! Here is plainly a case where "the letter killeth." We must rise above this, to the spirit and principles of God's word. Then we shall have no trouble in showing the anti-scriptural nature of the usage. Just so must we do, also, if we would have a correct apprehension of American slavery.

That God should, for many successive centuries, have suffered usages which we now see to have been manifest abuses, may appear to some strange and inexplicable. But let them remember that his administration of the government of this world, ever since the apostasy of Adam, has been a *redemptive* and *remedial* system. Every such system must be progressively developed — "first the blade, then the ear, after that the full corn in the ear." God took men as they were, gone astray from himself and enveloped in a night of ignorance, moral blindness, and error. In recovering them to holiness, he began, not by attempting to lift them up, at once, to that exalted grade of religious and civil culture which will, as we believe, be the glory of the coming millennial age. The fundamental principles of his government struck, from the beginning, at the root of every form of social as well as personal wrong. But he did not, at the outset, lay a prohibition upon every organic evil that human selfishness had introduced into society. He began with the ten thunders of Sinai; but some abuses he suffered for the time being, not because his holy soul had any delight in them, but because this was the wisest and best course for their ultimate removal. Nor did this principle of progress cease with the introduction of Christianity. The gospel is, itself, perfect; but in its applications to human society, it must necessarily be progressive, as we shall have occasion to show more at length hereafter.

Thus far we have considered Jewish servitude; but for American slavery this is not the true standard of comparison. This brings us to our next position:

2. *The only system that can be properly compared with American slavery, is Greek and Roman slavery; and this the New Testament does not sanction in any proper sense of the word.* The proposition consists of two parts which we will consider in order.

We affirm, then, in the first place, that the true affinities of American slavery are with that of Greece and Rome, not with the ancient Hebrew servitude. Here let it be distinctly understood that we have to do primarily with the systems themselves, not with the character of individual masters under them. The proper tendency of every normal institution is to foster and strengthen all that is good in human nature. Yet in the hands of bad men it may be so perverted as to become the occasion of much wickedness and misery. Brutal husbands and fathers will treat their wives and children in a brutal manner, because they brought into the conjugal and parental relations a brutal spirit; not because these relations are adapted to engender or foster it. So, on the other hand, the evils of a vicious relation, like that of polygamy, may be, in individual cases, greatly mitigated by the good character of the parties entering into it. Yet it is in itself inherently evil; and wherever it prevails, its evils will manifest themselves on a broad scale. Its proper tendency is to degrade and abase the female sex, to destroy the comfort and peace of the domestic relation, to prevent the proper education of children, and to work mischief in many other ways. When it produces these pernicious results, it does so by its own proper tendency; nor does it confer upon society any benefits that can counterbalance the enormous evils to which it gives rise. How strange, now, would it seem, if some denizen of Utah, in order to prove the excellence of polygamy, should adduce, on the one side, certain alleged cases of happy families under the rule of polygamy, and then should expatiate in glowing terms on the quarrels and miseries that abound under the system of monogamy! Yet this is what the abettors of American slavery are constantly doing. If they can name cases of happy and contented slaves, and of miserable and discontented free blacks, — although, for anything that they are able to show, it is the system of slavery itself that keeps down the colored man, — they think their cause made out. Now this is confounding all distinctions. It is virtually taking the ground that one arrangement of society is as good as another, or, rather, that all arrangements are in themselves indifferent. We can never arrive at the truth in this way. If we would form a correct judgment of any institution, we must look at it on the broad scale, carefully distinguishing between the good or evil that *exists in spite of it*, being due to counteracting influences, and that which is its proper result. Now we do not affirm that there are not in the Southern States many good masters who would compare well with the old Hebrew masters. Much less would we deny to them, as a body, the possession of kindness and humanity superior to that of heathen masters in Greece and Rome. If it were not so, it would be a poor compliment to the Christian religion, which many of them profess, and which has exerted, in some measure, a leavening influence upon society there, as elsewhere in Christendom. But it is with the different systems themselves that we have to do, in their intrinsic nature and proper results.

We say, then, that the true affinities of American slavery, as a system, are not with Hebrew servitude, but with the slavery of Greece and Rome. The condition of a Hebrew servant had little in common with that of a Southern slave.

True, he was bought with money, but here we must go behind the act of buying, and consider the relation into which he was bought. According to ancient usage wives were bought; that is, a consideration in the shape of property was given by the bridegroom to the father or brothers of his bride. But this did not convert her into an article of merchandise. It was not property given for property; but a consideration for the privilege of receiving her as his lawful wife, with all the rights and privileges of a wife. The poor Hebrew who was sold to a Hebrew or a resident foreigner, is never once called a servant. On the contrary, the purchaser is forbidden compelling him to serve as a bond-servant. His patrimony, though temporarily alienated, returns to him at the year of jubilee, and he resumes the use of it as a freeman.[1] When one buys a Hebrew servant, he remains with his master six years, and in the seventh goes out free for nothing, unless it be his choice to remain.[2] So when a man sells his daughter to be a maid-servant, it is with the understanding that her master shall betroth her to himself as a wife, or otherwise provide for her settlement in marriage. If he fail to do this, she is to go out free without money.[3] In all the above regulations, the rights and interests of the servant are carefully provided for. To compare the relation of a master to his Hebrew man-servant or maid-servant under the Mosaic law with that of an American slaveholder to his slaves, is simply absurd.

With regard to servants of foreign origin, the enactments of the Mosaic law are fewer and less definite. The relation between them and their masters seems to have been left more to the usage of the age. For a full discussion of this subject the reader is referred to Saalschütz on Hebrew servitude.[4] We will only here add that, in the Mosaic code, the rights of these foreign servants — their rights both corporeal and spiritual — are recognized and protected. If a man smote out the eye or the tooth of his servant or maid, he was compelled to let him go free for this mutilation.[1] Here the servant's rights as a human being are assumed. He does not live wholly for his master; he lives for himself also. Though in bondage, and compelled to do service at his master's discretion, he is yet a man, and his rights as a man are to be respected. It is for the *servant's* sake that he is set free, not for the master's sake. He has a right to the undamaged possession of all his members, and for the destruction of one of these, though it be but a tooth, his master must compensate him, as far as lies in his power, by giving him his liberty. In its spirit this precept covers all acts of cruelty by which the body is maimed or deformed, such as cropping, branding, and the like.

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[1] Lev. xxv. 39–43, 50–52.

[2] Ex. xxi. 2–6; Deut. xv. 12–18.

[3] Ex. xxi. 7–11.

[4] In the Bibliotheca Sacra for January last.

There is another regulation to which we will direct our attention. "If a man smite his servant, or his maid, with a rod, and he die under his hand, he shall surely be punished. Notwithstanding if he continue a day or two he shall not be punished; for he is his money."[2] This regulation plainly had reference to blows inflicted with a *rod* in the act of chastising a servant. The kind of instrument used afforded presumptive evidence that there was no intention of taking life. There is no ground for supposing that the murder of a slave with a deadly weapon, or the destruction of his life in any other way in such circumstances as afforded proof of an intention to kill was not punished with death. If the servant survived a day or two the master was not to be punished. The reason added is: "for he is his money." The meaning of these words is not that the master is to escape punishment because the servant, whose death he has caused, was an article of property, for the destruction of which punishment was not required (which would be in direct contradiction of the context); but rather that, being worth money to his master, it is to be presumed, in the absence of express evidence to the contrary, that there was no intention of killing him, while he suffers a penalty to a certain extent in the loss of the servant.

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[1] Ex. xxi. 26, 27.

[2] Ex. xxi. 20, 21.

There was another case in which a distinction was made between the life of a servant and a free Israelite. If an ox that had been wont to push, gored the latter so that he died, his owner might be punished with death, or required to ransom his life by a sum of money. But if it was a man-servant or maid-servant that had been gored, a fine only was allowed.[1] But if the protection which the Mosaic code gave to the life of a servant was less in some respects than that given to a freeman, the punishment of a servant was less also, at least in one remarkable case. Whoever defiled a free woman betrothed to a husband, was with her to be put to death. But if she was a maid-servant, she and her corruptor were both to be scourged.[2]

If, now, we look to the religious privileges secured to servants by the Mosaic law, we shall find that they comprehended *all that were enjoyed by freemen.* This law did not simply *allow*, it *commanded*, that servants should have the full benefit of every religious ordinance under the theocracy. They were entitled to the rite of circumcision,[3] and this not only brought to them the privilege of attending the great national festivals, but made it incumbent upon them to do so, as also to partake of the passover.[4] Although the attendance of females was not made imperative, yet it was customary; and in the regulations concerning the feast of tabernacles both men-servants and maid-servants are mentioned. "And thou shalt rejoice before the Lord thy God, thou, and thy son, and thy daughter, and thy man-servant, and thy maid-servant, and the Levite that is within thy gates, and the stranger, and the fatherless, and the widow, that are among you, in the place which the Lord thy God hath chosen to put his name there."[5] The rest of the sabbath was also secured to men-servants and maid-servants equally with their masters; and with this came in later ages the synagogue-worship, to the full privileges of which they were admitted. At the end of every seven years, "in the solemnity of the year of release," all the people were to be gathered together, "men, women, and children," with "the stranger," that the law of Moses might be read in their hearing. This, in an age when the art of printing was unknown, and when it was impossible that any but the most wealthy should possess copies of the law, was an inestimable privileges. In a word, there was no religious privilege enjoyed by a free-born Israelite which was not, by God's express appointment, secured also to the lowest of his servants.

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[1] Ex. xxi. 28–32.

[2] Lev. xix. 20–22.

[3] See our remarks upon this point in the January number of the Bibliotheca Sacra for the present year, pp. 62–64.

[4] Ex. xii. 44.

[5] Deut. xxxi. 10–12.

Now contrast with all this the spirit and enactments of modern slave-codes. By these, at least in the majority of the slave states, to teach a slave to read or write is forbidden under heavy penalties; and thus the bible is made to him a sealed book, except so far as his master may see good to communicate to him its contents. How opposite is this to the spirit of the Mosaic law! Who but a slaveholder can doubt that, if the art of printing had been understood in Moses's day, and copies of the law accessible to all for a mere trifle, he would have required all, servants and handmaids included, to study it diligently? Who but a slaveholder, blinded by self-interest, will venture to defend those enactments which seal up to the colored man the written page of inspiration, on the ground that the ability to read, were it generally possessed by the slaves, would make them less valuable and less safe to their masters as personal chattels?

If, now, we compare American slavery with Greek and Roman servitude, we shall find, with some differences, a substantial agreement between the two systems. Greek and Roman slavery did not, like that of our Southern States, rest on the odious distinction of *race*. They neither knew nor cared anything about the modern doctrine, that the normal condition of the African is servitude to the white man. They had no scruples about making slaves of all classes, white or black, who had come into their power by the right of conquest, or in any other way conformable to the usages of their times. Nor did they find it necessary to divest the slave, by formal enactments, of all the rights of manhood, and declare him to be a personal chattel in the hands of his master, "to all intents and purposes whatsoever." While the old Roman law jealously guarded men's rights as Roman citizens, it did not trouble itself about men's rights as men. *I am a Roman citizen* — these words were an effectual safeguard against scourging and examination by torture; but the plea: *I am a man*, would have been met in a Roman court only by laughter. It is the light shed by Christianity upon the dignity of human nature and man's inalienable rights as man, which has compelled the slave-codes to fence around the master's prerogatives by formal definitions declaring the slave to be a chattel personal, and as such formally divesting him of all rights. Still there is a substantial agreement between the two systems. The slaves of heathen Rome were, as a matter of course, regarded as the property of their masters, to be bought and sold like horses and mules; and there were large slave-marts in connection with this traffic in human flesh. In point of law, whatever a slave acquired belonged to his master, since he could hold no property, except by his master's consent. Nor could he be a legal witness to a testament, on the ground that he could not inherit by testament. Nor could any proper matrimony be contracted between slaves; but only that connection called *contubernium*, the continuance of which depended on the arbitrary will of the master, who could sell one party away from the other. In point of practice, the servile classes received almost no education in the proper sense of the word, though to this general rule there were remarkable exceptions. The masters enforced obedience, and punished disobedience by blows, scourgings, chains, and torture. Originally, the masters had the power of life and death, though this was afterwards abolished. "On the whole, we may regard the condition of the slaves in the later days of the Republic, and during the Empire previously to the reign of Constantine, as one of great hardship. Their lot was dependent on the disposition of particular masters, not on the laws, nor on a humane and enlightened public opinion."[1]

Assuming, now, the substantial agreement of American with Roman slavery, we proceed to show, in the next place, that the latter is not sanctioned in the New Testament in any proper sense of the word. The constitution of the Israelitish commonwealth being a theocracy, its different arrangements were matters of *direct divine legislation.* We have seen that God thus legislated on the subjects of divorce, polygamy, and female captives taken in war, as well as servitude, not forbidding the existing customs, but prescribing regulations concerning them; and that to infer from such legislation that he meant to sanction them as institutions in themselves in harmony with human nature and good in their proper tendency, would be unwarrantable, since it is conceded that the three former of these usages, at least, were *abuses* only suffered for the time being by reason of the hardness of men's hearts. But in the New Testament we find *not a word designed to regulate Roman slavery as an institution.* Roman slavery was not of divine, but of heathen origin. It breathed a heathen spirit, and was regulated upon heathen principles. As an institution, the writers of the New Testament said nothing about it, any more than about the despotism of imperial Rome. They simply recognized its existence, and laid down general precepts for the conduct of all who stood to each other in the relation of master and servant.[2] What, now, do these precepts prove? So far as they are addressed to the *servants*, they prove much for Christian instruction; but, as it regards the character of the system, they prove nothing at all. Many of the Christian slaves were subject to heathen masters. They were held to service by law and immemorial usage. Irrespectively of the character of the system, they were held to cheerful obedience by the higher law of Christ. A refractory and unfaithful spirit in them could not but have redounded to the dishonor of the gospel, and to their own spiritual ruin. They must be subject to their masters with all fear; "not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward."[2] They must count their own masters "worthy of all honor," that the name of God and his doctrine be not blasphemed. And if any have believing masters, they must "not despise them, because they are brethren; but rather do them service, because they are faithful and beloved, partakers of the benefit."[2] In dealing with servants, as with all persons in circumstances of outward depression and affliction, the apostle brings in that great fundamental principle of Christianity, that true peace and blessedness lie not so much in the external condition as in the internal state of mind. He acknowledges that freedom is a better condition than servitude; but would not have servants feel that they cannot have inward freedom and happiness in a condition of bondage, if such be the appointment of their heavenly master. "Art thou called, being a servant? care not for it; but if thou mayest be free use it rather. For he that is called in the Lord, being a servant, is the Lord's freeman; likewise also he that is

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[1] Writings of Prof. B. B. Edwards, with a Memoir, Vol. II. p. 97. To his three Articles on Slavery in Ancient Greece, Roman Slavery, and Slavery in the Middle Ages, the reader is referred for fuller information on the subject of ancient servitude.

[2] The term *δοῦλος*, *servant*, Eph. vi. 5; Col. iii. 22; iv. 1; Titus ii. 9, etc., though in itself generic (compare Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ δοῦλος), is in common usage applied to Greek and Roman slaves, and is indeed the proper legal term for designating them. Its opposite is *ἐλεύϑερος*, *free.* Compare 1 Cor. xii. 13 (*εἴτε δοῦλοι, εἴτε ἐλεύϑεροι*); Rev. vi. 15; xiii. 16. The other term, *οἰκέτης*,

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1 Pet. ii. 18, which properly means *one belonging to the house*, is (except in Herodotus, where the word is also used for *one's family, women and children*) applied to *house-slaves*. The designation of a *hired servant* is μίσθιος, μισθωτός, never δοῦλος. The expression ὑπὸ ζυγὸν δοῦλοι, 1 Tim. vi. 1, cannot be understood of other than bond-servants. The correllative terms in the above-named passages are κύριος, *lord*, Ephes. vi. 5; Col. iii. 22; iv. 1; and δεσπότης, *master*, 1 Tim. vi. 1; Titus ii. 9; 1 Pet. ii. 18. Of these the latter (though sometimes used loosely in a more general sense) is the appropriate legal term for the master of slaves, and that by which his slaves address him. In classical Greek the word κύριος is not much used in the sense of δεσπότης. But in the Septuagint (where it represents the Hebrew אֲדוֹן, Latin *dominus*, equivalent to both *lord* and *master*), and consequently in the New Testament also, this use of the word is common.

[1] 1 Pet. ii. 18.

[2] 1 Tim. vi. 2.

called, being free, is Christ's servant."[1] But who does not see that this has nothing to do with the equity of slavery as a system?

But there are precepts for believing masters, also, which demand our careful consideration. In Eph. vi. 9 the apostle, after exhorting servants (vs. 5–8) to obey them that are their masters according to the flesh, "with fear and trembling, in singleness of heart, as unto Christ, not with eye-service as men-pleasers, but as the servants of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart; with good will doing service, as to the Lord, and not to men; knowing that whatsoever good thing any man doeth, the same shall he receive of the Lord, whether he be bond or free," adds: "and ye masters, do the same things unto them, forbearing threatening, knowing that your master also [or, as some manuscripts read, "the master of both you and them"] is in heaven; neither is there respect of persons with him." The words: "do the same things unto them," must refer to the *spirit* in which the servant is commanded to act, with good will and hearty sincerity, as one that serves Christ, and not men. This spirit is to be reciprocated by the master. In Col. iv. 1, after similar injunctions to servants, the apostle adds: "masters, give unto your servants that which is just and equal; knowing that ye also have a master in heaven." These precepts undoubtedly recognize the relation of master and slave as an existing fact; and, so far as its outward legal form is concerned, they leave it untouched. To construe them as directions to manumit the servants, is simply impossible. The words: "forbearing threatening," imply, of course, that the servant is to remain under the authority of his master. To one who was sending out his servants free, there could be no occasion for such an admonition. In its outward legal form the apostles left the relation as they found it. The ground of this attitude, which the apostles took towards Grecian and Roman servitude, will be considered further on. At present we remark: first, that these precepts no more prove that the institution of Roman slavery was not an abuse and a great evil, than do the precepts concerning polygamy that that was not an abuse. If one organic evil might be suffered by reason of the hardness of men's hearts, so might another. Secondly, that by the very terms of the precepts, the masters are restrained from the exercise of that absolute power which belongs to the very essence of slavery. In Greek and Roman, as in modern American slavery, the fundamental principle is *property in man* — property in the literal sense of the word. Slaves are considered as chattels in the hands of their masters, to be bought, sold, and used for their interest. They can do nothing, possess nothing, nor acquire anything but which must belong to their masters. From this it follows immediately that, if the institution itself is good and scriptural, the trade in slaves is good and scriptural also. Slave-markets belong as necessarily and as legitimately to slavery, as cattle-markets to the traffic in cattle. We are not speaking, let it be remembered, of any abuse, as kidnapping, which can be conceived of as extrinsic to the system itself, but of what belongs to its essence. We say, then, that if the precepts now under consideration, sanction Greek and Roman slavery as a system, — and, inferentially, American slavery also, — they sanction the traffic in human flesh and the marts by which this traffic is facilitated. A believing master might then address the slaves in his pen — believers and unbelievers — thus: "The holy apostle has commanded masters to render to their servants that which is just and equal, behaving towards them with good will,[1] as the servants of Christ, who have also a master in heaven. In pursuance of these precepts, by which the institution of slavery is fully sanctioned, I now put you up on the block for sale to the highest bidder; for remember that, by the code of the system, you are chattels personal in my hands, to all intents and purposes whatsoever." The professional slave-trader might see, in this, nothing incongruous; but we are sure that the majority of southern masters would reject it with horror as blasphemous; and we know that the apostle would have done the same. Neither from him, nor from any other writer of the New Testament, is there a word authorizing the buying and selling of servants as articles of merchandise, which is an essential part of the system of ancient Roman and modern American slavery.

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[1] 1 Cor. vii. 21, 22.

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[1] Greek, *μετ' εὐνοίας, with benevolence.* The servants are to show this towards their masters, and the masters to "do the same to them."

Another principle of the system, growing indeed directly out of that which has been just considered, is the subordination of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, to the will of the master. Slaves are, in law, the property of their masters, and, as such, must not be subject to encumbrances beyond the control of the latter. If the interests of the owner require the sale of a father or a daughter, the fact that he is a husband, or she a child, must not be allowed to stand in the way of the transaction. Such is the institution, and such also is the usage of all who choose to carry it out according to its proper provisions.[1] But we know that the apostle would never have tolerated the disturbance of these divinely constituted relations. His precepts were not designed to sanction the system of Roman slavery, with all the despotic power which it confers upon the masters. Rather did he seek to bring into the outward legal relation the new law of Christian love. This would empty it, in a great measure, of its heathen contents, and finally destroy the system itself, as we know historically to have been the case in respect to the old institution of Grecian and Roman servitude. How vain, then, to adduce these precepts of Paul as a sanction for the heathen system of slavery as an institution in itself good and proper! With much more reason might one adduce the directions of Moses, that a man who had two wives should deal justly by each, as a proof that polygamy was, in itself, a good institution, walled around by the divine sanction, and not to be spoken against.

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[1] In particular cases the slave-codes may limit the master's power over the domestic relations of his slaves; as, for example, by forbidding the separation of a child from its mother before a given age. But such special enactments always assume the general supremacy of the master over these relations, and leave it in the main untouched.

But it may be said: Christ and his apostles abolished polygamy, but not slavery. Were we disposed to argue the question on this ground, we should say that the proof of their having forbidden polygamy is very doubtful. That they never declared polygamy to be a sin, is admitted by all. It is, however, contended by many that it is indirectly prohibited in the directions of Paul, that bishops and deacons should be husbands of one wife.[1] But in what sense husbands of one wife, is a question that has been much discussed. In the same epistle he gives, among other qualifications for the widow who is to be put on the list of those entitled to public maintenance, that she shall have been "the wife of one man." This is most naturally interpreted to mean: who had been married to but one husband, and who, after his death, had remained single. If so, the precept concerning bishops and deacons ought to be interpreted in an analogous way.[2] The most natural explanation of the fact that there are no commands in the New Testament against polygamy is that they were not needed. It was not a Grecian or Roman custom; and seems to have been gradually abolished among the Jews, before our Lord's time, by the progress of religious light and knowledge. They justly viewed the precepts of Moses respecting polygamy as suffering, for the time being, an evil which it was their privilege to do away, even as it was afterwards the privilege of the Christian church to do away the old Roman institution of slavery, the renewal of which, in modern Christendom, is its shame and curse.

But we prefer to discuss the question on the foundation of general principles. Suppose, then, that Christ and his apostles did not forbid slavery in its outward legal form, what then? By the new law of Christian love, which they introduced, they inflicted a deadly wound on its spirit, under the influence of which it must languish and die.[1] What if they did not forbid slavery as a civil institution under the control of pagan Rome; does that prove that they meant to hedge it in with the wall of their authority, as a system sacred for all time? The advent of Christ found the world full of abuses, the product of human selfishness, handed down from remote antiquity, venerable and moss-grown from very age. There was the despotism of imperial Rome. There were the cruel usages of war, with the sale of captives, at auction, as slaves. "When Pindemissus was taken by Cicero, the inhabitants were sold for more than $100,000. Augustus, having overcome the Salassi, sold as slaves 36,000, of whom 8,000 were capable of bearing arms. Caesar, in his Gallic wars, according to the moderate estimate of Vallerius Paterculus, took more than 400,000 prisoners."[2] Then there were the gladiatorial shows, where men were set up to butcher each other for the amusement of the spectators. Of these and other heathen usages then prevalent, the New Testament says nothing. Are we, then, to understand that a religious silence concerning them is imposed on our lips, to the end of time? Did the gospel indeed come to petrify the progress of society, and thus perpetuate all existing abuses clear through the millennial age which it promises? We are told by our Lord that "the kingdom of heaven is like unto leaven, which a woman took and hid in three measures of meal, till the whole was leavened."[3] It works inwardly upon the spirit of society, and thus it produces changes in its outward form. It works from within outwardly, and the outward manifestation is at once the result and the proof of the inward power. That would be poor leaven which did not *raise* the mass of dough, but only *preserved* it in its original heavy condition. Christ and his apostles cast into society the leaven of the gospel, not that it might lie there inoperative, but that it might work within, and thus without. By its quickening, illuminating, purifying, and elevating power, it reveals to the Christian understanding and feeling old abuses in their true deformity. Then is the time to attack them with the principles of Christianity and in its spirit, and thus to remove them.

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[1] 1 Tim. iii. 2, 12.

[2] A thorough investigation of this question would require an extended research into the opinions and usages of the ancients concerning second marriages. Some have held the opinion that the Apostle has in mind persons who have been connected after divorce with a second husband or wife.

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[1] That is, when the gospel is preached in its true spirit, and faithfully applied to human relations; not when those who are appointed to be its preachers set themselves to the base work of defending and magnifying the institution of slavery from scripture.

[2] Writings of Prof. B. B. Edwards, with a Memoir, Vol. II. p. 84. This was the rule for foreign wars. There was a rule forbidding prisoners taken in civil wars to be dealt with as slaves, though it was sometimes disregarded. — *Ib.*

[3] Matt. xiii. 33

There remains the case of Onesimus, of which we wish to say a few words. It is manifest then, in the first place, that in this matter Paul acted as a Christian minister, not as a public functionary; and that his action is no rule for civil legislation. As well might one adduce his advice to the Corinthian church concerning marriage[1] as a foundation for civil legislation on the subject. Although the state ought always to be administered in the spirit of Christianity, it is nevertheless true that it has its own sphere of action. Its legislation must be controlled by general considerations of public justice and expediency, and cannot always coincide with what may be the right or the duty of individuals acting freely in view of specific circumstances.

Secondly, They who press the example of Paul in sending back Onesimus to Philemon, are bound in consistency to press the manner and circumstances of the act. Onesimus seems to have been willing, and even desirous, to return, and only to have asked from his spiritual father a conciliatory letter to Philemon. One thing, at least, is manifest, that no compulsion was used. In the character of Onesimus, moreover, Paul had the highest guarantee that he would not be treated as a slave, or sold into servitude to another man, but received, "not now as a servant, but above a servant, a brother beloved." Small indeed is the capital which the abettors of American slavery can make out of this transaction. The pith of the whole matter is fairly given by Dr. Justin Edwards, in the following "Instruction" to ver. 12 of the "Family Bible with Notes."

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[1] 1 Cor. vii.

"If a servant who has left a Christian master and gone to a distant place, has himself become a Christian, and wishes to return, it is right for other Christians to assist him by requesting his former master to receive him in a Christian manner, as he would one of them, especially when they know (vs. 17, 21) that he will do what they ask of him."[1]

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[1] Concerning the forcible rendition of servants by public authority, we find in the scriptures but one solitary precept: "Thou shalt not deliver unto his master the servant which is escaped from his master unto thee: he shall dwell with thee, even among you in that place which he shall choose, in one of thy gates where it liketh him best; thou shalt not oppress him" (Deut. xxiii. 15, 16). The Jews understood this as addressed to Israel as a people, — "Thou shalt not deliver him"; that is, thou, the Israelitish people: and this interpretation is favored by the words "in one of thy gates." Accordingly they understood the prohibition as referring to servants escaped to them from the surrounding heathen nations. This view (which is the least favorable to the servant's freedom of any that can be proposed) would leave the matter of fugitives from Israelites to Israelites without legislation. Of course it would furnish no *warrant* for fugitive slave laws, since, whatever be its extent, it is wholly *prohibitory*. But let us examine the matter more nearly, from a simply biblical point of view. The precept of the Mosaic law, then, if it have any authority for us, forbids the rendition of servants to masters of another country. It does not appear that a simple league or confederacy between sovereign and independent states (as, for example, that between David and Hiram king of Tyre) could alter the matter. But the constitution of the United States is peculiar. It makes us one nation without destroying the individuality of the different states. In respect to the many and important prerogatives of sovereignty which the separate states have resigned to the nation as a whole, they are to be regarded simply as part of that whole. But in respect to the prerogatives which they have retained, our laws regard and treat them as distinct states, as much as they do England and Spain. The Southern States, for example, legislate on the subject of slavery in an independent and sovereign way, just as Spain does, and the Constitution acknowledges their right to do so. Can any one show, then, why the Mosaic prohibition under consideration, if it have any binding force for us, should not in equity apply to them in the matter of slavery, as well as to Spain? It may, perhaps, be argued that the nations to whom the Israelites were forbidden to restore fugitive servants were heathen, having barbarous slave-codes, and treating their servants in a barbarous manner. But for the advocates of slavery this would be giving the argument an unfortunate turn, since it would authorize us, before deciding the question of duty, to inquire how far the southern slave-codes are heathenish in their character.

The truth is, that we are bound to return persons fleeing from service only by an express provision of the constitution, which is, we do not say anti-scriptural, but extra-scriptural. It is a compromise contrary to the spirit of the Constitution; and for this reason it has been, and will continue to be, an apple of discord. It subjects us to the power of the slave-holding states in a sphere where we are forbidden to have any voice. They may make their slave-codes as barbarous as

We have dwelt at length on the argument from the Bible, because it is here that the modern abettors of slavery take their stand, endeavoring to build up around the system a hedge of scriptural authority. When any one begins the work of examining and trying the institution by its principles and fruits, they cry out:

> "Procul, O, procul este, profani
> ——— totoque absistite luco;"

"Far off, far off, ye profane; this is a sacred enclosure; do not intrude upon it." We have shown that the alleged divine sanction for the institution of slavery is a nullity; that it consisted in simply suffering the system, like other organic abuses, for the hardness of men's hearts. The way is, then, opened for the remaining source of argument.

II. *The intrinsic Character of American Slavery and its legitimate Results, as compared with the Principles of God's Word.*

On this we do not propose to dwell at length. It will be sufficient to indicate the general heads of argument, for they are self-luminous.

In the first place, then, the foundation on which they place the system of American slavery is anti-scriptural. This is no other than *the distinction of race.* While the Bible declares that God has made of one blood all nations of the earth, that he is the common Father of them all, and that they are all brethren bound to accord to each other the rights of manhood, and to deal with each other according to the Christian law of love; while this is the doctrine of God's word, the doctrine of American slavery is that the normal position of the African race is that of slavery to the

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they choose, and we, who have no voice in the making of them, may be compelled, at the point of the bayonet, to assist in keeping the slaves subject to them. Nevertheless, it is a part of the Constitution, and, until it shall be constitutionally repealed, we must acquiesce in it; for the only alternatives — we have reference to the ordinary course of law in a time of peace, not to any military exigencies which the existence of civil war may impose on our government — are the *Constitution* or *revolution.* But let no one pretend to justify it from the holy scriptures.

white races: not merely the dependence which naturally belongs to the weaker in their relation to the stronger, but *slavery:* that they are in their appropriate condition when they are reduced to chattels, divested of all their rights as men, and bought and sold like horses and cattle. And they have made up an argument from the prophetic curse of Noah, which, if it were valid, would only prove that God uses them, as he did Pharaoh and Nebuchadnezzar, Herod and Pontius Pilate, as ministers of his "determinate counsel and foreknowledge." But the argument is not valid; for the curse of Noah fell not on them, but on Canaan, none of whose posterity settled in Africa.[1] One knows not which to admire most, the audacity or the wickedness of this position. We white men of the Saxon race, who are rich and strong, take it upon ourselves to decide that God intended the Africans to be our slaves, and then enforce the decision by handcuffs and manacles. The position involves, of course, the moral rectitude of the foreign as well as the domestic slave-trade. For if slavery is appointed by God to be the normal condition of the African race, the condition in which they are in fact most happy and useful, then it is altogether right and proper that they who have ships to send to Africa and money to buy slaves there, should help to place them in their right relation to the white race. Such is the logical result of the doctrine; and we find accordingly that the abettors of slavery are rapidly drifting in this direction. They cannot do otherwise; for whoever mounts a lie will soon find himself at the stable of the father of lies, whence the black horse came.

But the great central principle of American slavery, that which constitutes its distinctive character, and sharply separates it from all other kinds of servitude, is *property in man.* This the slave-codes not merely assume, but affirm, with the most shameless perspicuity. They take pains to tell us that slaves are "chattels personal in the hands of their masters and possessors, to all intents and purposes whatsoever;" and they deliberately proceed to divest them of their rights as men; declaring that their masters may sell them, dispose of their persons and labor, and that they "can do nothing, possess nothing, nor acquire anything but which must belong to their masters." It follows, by natural consequence, that the master claims as his lawful property the children of his female slaves, whoever may be their father, on the same ground that the farmer does the increase of his flocks and herds, viz. that they are his personal chattels. The very spirit of the system, as defined by the laws, is that the slave, like any other article of merchandise, is to be held and used for his owner's interests, not for his own. We need not spend time in showing that this is contrary to the spirit of the gospel. The great law of Christianity is: "*Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.*" In direct opposition to this the slave-codes authorize the master to love himself supremely, and to buy, sell, and use his neighbors and their offspring, as chattels personal, for his own private advantage. We are far from denying that many masters endeavor to deal with their slaves according to the law of Christian love. But this they do, not in accordance with the spirit of the system, but in spite of it; not by carrying out in practice its provisions, but by abstaining from doing so.

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[1] See on this subject our remarks in the January number of the Bibliotheca Sacra, pp. 72, 73. See also in the April number of the New Englander for the present year the Article entitled "Noah's Prophecy."

It is very difficult to hold the abettors of slavery to this point. The idea of converting men and women into articles of merchandise is so manifestly abhorrent to the spirit of Christianity, that it needs only to be looked at to be condemned. This the defenders of slavery well understand. They talk of the power which the father has over his children; as if such power, limited in duration, and having for its end the good of the child, were the same thing as converting men and women, with their offspring forever, into chattels personal, to be bought and sold, not for their good, but for the profit of their owners. They talk of the power of husbands over their wives, and how dreadfully it is abused. Now, so far as wives in barbarous countries are by common law and usage converted into drudges, we will only say that their husbands rule over them in the true spirit of American slavery. Yet even they are not made articles of merchandise, to be transferred from hand to hand. But the normal institution of marriage has, as these sophists well know, nothing in common with slavery. Though the woman is by divine authority subordinated to the man, her welfare is as much consulted as his in the union between the two. So long as men remain wicked and selfish, the conjugal relation will be alloyed with many evils; but these do not, as in the case of slavery, grow out of the proper nature and tendency of the institution. They talk once more — these defenders of slavery — of the sale of fair women in high life for money; meaning, of course, matches made up from considerations of property. Yes, but this is a matter of private and individual folly. There is no *institution empowering* men to buy and sell women for money, using them in the meanwhile as they see good. This is what slavery does; for it makes women "chattels personal in the hands of their masters and possessors, to all intents and purposes whatsoever." No wonder that the champions of slavery are ashamed of its fundamental principle — property in man; for it is as opposite to Christianity as light is to darkness. But there it is, embedded in the very centre of the institution; and to eradicate it would be to pluck up the system itself.

Another anti-Christian feature of American slavery, growing immediately out of the principle of property in man, is *the supremacy of the master over the domestic relations of his slaves.* It is true that conscientious masters respect these divinely appointed relations. But the slave-laws are not made for the especial benefit of conscientious men. They always have regard, in their provisions, to the interests of the great body of slaveholders. If one of these personal chattels is to be sold, it would not be convenient to hamper him with the encumbrance of a wife and children. The buyer may want him, and not his family. Then, the laws allow him to take him away from his family and carry him off to a distant state. What if God has joined together the husband and wife, and commanded that man shall not put them asunder; is his law to interfere with the pecuniary interests of the buyer? By no means. He is a good field-hand, and will fetch a large sum in the cotton-states. Away with him.[1] So, too (with the exception of special restrictions as to age, in some of the states), the child may be taken from its mother and sold into a distant region. There are negro-growers, whose business is to raise slaves for the market, and who, as soon as the children have arrived at a profitable age, sell them away from their mothers, with no more care for their feelings than if they were beasts of burden. All this the institution of slavery *sanctions;* and therein it stands self-condemned as the antagonist of the divine law.

Another feature of American slavery is *the systematic mental degradation of the slaves.* We say systematic, because it belongs essentially to the system, and is carried out systematically by the laws. According to the theory of slavery, the whole person of the slave, soul and body, is a chattel, to be held and used for the master's interest. The slave has no more right to use his intellectual than his corporeal powers, for his own personal advantage. Now, the masters judge that the acquisition of knowledge will diminish the value and security of their property in slaves. Accordingly it is made, in most of the slaveholding states, a high crime and misdemeanor to teach a slave (and, in some of them, a free negro) to read and write, or to give them any book or pamphlet, though it might happen to be the word of God. All this follows, very logically, from the nature of the system. When men are to be governed as men, by equitable and wholesome laws, the more intelligence they possess the better. But when they are to be despoiled of their rights as men, and converted into articles of merchandise, the more profound the ignorance in which they are immersed, the more secure the tenure by which their masters hold them. So early as 1740 South Carolina, while yet a province of Great Britain, enacted a law forbidding, under penalty of a heavy fine, the teaching or causing any slaves to be taught to write, or the employing of any such slaves as scribes in any writing whatsoever. The preamble to this law reveals the whole secret. It is in the following words: "Whereas the having of slaves taught to write, or suffering them to be employed in writing, may be attended with great inconveniences." "With great inconveniences" — to the masters, namely; and it is their interests which the slave-laws always consult, at whatever costs to the slaves themselves. So it is in regard to reading also. To be able to read the word of God would be to the slave a privilege how inestimable! But then his ability to read this, includes his ability to read other things also. He might read the newspapers, the debates in Congress, the writings of Clarkson and Wilberforce, and even the opinions of Washington and Jefferson, condemnatory of slavery. All this would doubtless be "attended with great inconveniences" to the master. So the slaves must be kept by legal enactments in ignorance, that they may be safer and better property. Such is the spirit of American slavery, and it is as opposite to that of the gospel as midnight is to noon.

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[1] From the New American Cyclopaedia, article "Slavery," we copy the following legal view: "Of the marriage of slaves it is difficult to speak with positive certainty. The prevailing, if not universal, rule would seem to be, that the incapacity of a slave to make a valid contract extends to the contract of marriage. It has, indeed, been distinctly held that the marriage usual in these states, which is only cohabitation with consent of the master, is not legal marriage. Chancellor Kent, quoting from this case, appears to refer the invalidity of the marriage to the want of legal formalities; but in the same case it is put on the ground of their entire inability to contract. There are statutes which speak of their marriage, but not in such a way as to declare their marriages legal, and attended with the legal incidents of marriage. Even in Louisiana such a marriage is held to be a moral marriage, but to produce no civil effect whatever, because slaves are deprived of all civil rights. So far as the law or the usage on this subject can be ascertained, a slave cannot as a married person commit adultery or polygamy, nor be held liable on a wife's contracts, or for necessaries supplied to her, nor be made incompetent as a witness on the ground of the relation of marriage. Nor does it appear that any consent of the master can make the marriage legal, if it do not have the force of emancipation. And as what is called the marriage of the slave rests wholly on the master's consent, there is no hing in the law to prevent him from revoking his consent, annulling the marriage, and separating the parties." Let the reader remember that this systematic degradation of marriage, and with it the whole family relation, — this putting the master in the place of God, with power to separate husband and wife at will, — is not simply an incident of the system, but one of its legitimate results. The fountain is bitter, and this is one of the bitter streams which it sends forth.

We might proceed further in unfolding the unjust and anti-scriptural character of the institution. But here we rest the matter. Four murders, well proven, are enough to hang a man. The four iniquitous principles of American slavery that have now been set forth, all of them essential parts of the system, are enough to condemn it, as alike opposed to the Bible and unperverted human reason.

It may be, and often has been, said by slaveholders, that though this may be slavery in theory, yet in their practice it is something very different. If there are men unwillingly entangled in the system, and ready to do what lies in their power to disenthrall themselves, we have no word of censure for them. But if they set themselves to defend slavery as an institution, then we reply: True, you may conscientiously refrain from selling a slave, but your neighbor across the street is a slave-trader, whose business is to traffic in human flesh; and the institution which you abet sanctions his nefarious employment, and protects him in it with all the power of the state. In the case of your own slaves you may sacredly regard the conjugal and filial relations; but your neighbor over the way, who keeps the slave-pen, is every day trampling these relations under foot, without pity or remorse, and in this wickedness he has, of course, many co-adjutors. Yet the system which you uphold authorizes him to separate husband and wife, parent and child, and protects him in the monstrous iniquity. To the full extent of the slave-laws, and perhaps beyond them, you may instruct your slaves in the religion of the gospel; but the system which you defend sets itself, in the most determined spirit, against the work of educating and enlightening the slaves, and makes it a penal offence to teach them to read any book, God's holy word not excepted. In upholding the institution, then, you uphold all the abominations which it authorizes.

Respecting the *results* of slavery a volume might be written; but we do not propose, now, to go into any details.

The consideration of the manifold evils which grow out of the system naturally and necessarily, will come up more appropriately under the head of the relations of slavery to the state. At present we simply remark that this institution, like every other, must be judged of by its results — its results not in certain select cases and in limited periods of time, but its results as they manifest themselves on the broad scale. A bad institution, founded on bad principles, will produce bad results, and the results will be the proof that the system itself is vicious. This is the scriptural way of reasoning. The tree is known by its fruits, the fountain by its stream; an olive-tree bears olive-berries, and a bramble-bush thorns; a salt fountain sends forth salt water. If we know the tree or the fountain, we know the fruit or the stream; and, conversely, if we know the fruit or the stream, we know the tree or the fountain. All we ask is that slavery should be judged, like every other institution, by this equitable scriptural rule. But its modern abettors pursue a very different course. With timber taken, as they affirm, from the Bible, they build a fence around a field of brambles, and then tell us that it must be an olive-yard, because it is walled in by scriptural authority. We answer: Since your field yields only a harvest of thorns, year after year, it must be a plantation of brambles, not of olive-trees; and as to its alleged scriptural hedge, that is made by human hands, out of texts of scripture diverted from their true meaning. In exactly the same way have hedges been built around the alleged divine right of kings, and the divine right of the Romish hierarchy. But God, both by his word and providence, repudiates all such defences, and so must we. We must and shall try the institution of slavery, as we try other systems, by its principles and its fruits. And if we find it to be "a root that beareth gall and wormwood," we shall not be guilty of the folly and blasphemy of calling it a tree of God's planting.

In bringing this Article to a close, we add a few remarks concerning the attitude of the New Testament towards Roman slavery. To some it has seemed inexplicable that, since slavery is a relation of law, the apostles did not enjoin on masters the duty of manumitting their servants in legal form. We suppose the reason to have been that God's views are comprehensive; that he looks at human nature on all its sides, and at the interests of society in all its relations, and will not interpose, by direct legislation, for the removal of even great abuses before the way is properly prepared to do so. But here we must restrict his forbearance to abuses of such a nature that good men who are involved in them can fulfil, towards him and their fellow men, the great law of love. This limitation is of vital importance. That an evil is organic and interwoven with the whole structure of society, is no reason why God should tolerate it, provided it strike at his law and the welfare of others in such a way that any connection with it implies of necessity the rejection of his authority or maltreatment of men. In the days of primitive Christianity, idolatry was a state-system, so interwoven with the institutions of the Roman empire that Christians found it exceedingly difficult to avoid participation in it without subjecting themselves to the charge of contumacy. Yet the apostles and their successors never yielded any tolerance to Roman idolatry, because it struck openly and directly at Christ's authority. But in the matter of Roman slavery the case was different. Though the institution was cruel and selfish, it did not compel the master to use all the despotic power which it conferred upon him. He could treat his servant, not as an article of merchandise, but as a Christian brother; and this the law of Christ enjoined upon him. Meanwhile there were weighty reasons why the apostles should not interfere with the legal relations of master and slave. At the time when Christianity was introduced, slavery was an old and inveterate institution in the Roman empire. The number of slaves was immense, and the influence of the system permeated the whole structure of society. Any plan for transferring this mass of bondmen from a state of servitude to one of freedom, in such a way as to benefit both parties, and thus society at large, must have had the intelligent co-operation of the freemen of Rome. It is indeed true that, when men obstinately cherish old abuses, and will not let them be removed in a regular and constitutional way, the providence of God will at last interpose for their violent overthrow by war and revolution. But if they are to be abolished by peaceful legislation, there must be a movement from within the community. Except in the case of provinces which are mere dependencies of large empires, no mere outward force of law will do the work. But such an inward movement implies a much greater degree of illumination and moral elevation than belonged to imperial Rome in the days of the apostles. Great as the Romans were in war and statesmanship, they had no clear idea — we might better say, no idea whatever — of men's rights as men. During the long and bloody conflict of Christianity with pagan Rome, the most enlightened of her emperors failed to recognize the rights of conscience in religious matters. In the words of Neander, the Roman statesman "requires, inasmuch as he looks upon it as a matter of the state, unconditional obedience to the laws of the empire. With the character of the religion he has nothing to do. Whatever that might be, defiance of the imperial laws must be severely punished."[1] To such men a movement on the part of the Christians for the emancipation, in legal form, of the slaves, on the ground of their inalienable rights as men, must have been regarded as inflexible obstinacy and sedition. It would have constituted a new element of opposition to Christianity without any counterbalancing advantage. It was necessary that the gospel should first create a more enlightened and elevated public sentiment before it could be turned (as it was afterwards, with entire success) against slavery as an institution.

Meantime the apostles, while they abstained from any interference with slavery, in its outward legal form, introduced into the relation, on both sides, the new law of brotherly love, which, so far as it actually prevailed, emptied this old and selfish system of the main part of its contents, and gradually prepared the way for its outward and formal removal. The proofs that Christianity did thus gradually extinguish slavery as an institution, the reader may find succinctly but very clearly stated in the last of the three Articles of Prof. B. B. Edwards, to which reference has already been made.[1]

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[1] History of the Christian Religion and Church; Torrey's translation, Vol. I. pp. 98, 99, where see the words of Pliny: Neque enim dubitabam, qualecunque esset quod faterentur, pervicaciam certe et inflexibilem obstinationem debere puniri.

And now in these latter days, when, under the guiding hand of Christianity, the principles of civil and religious freedom are slowly but steadily wending their way among the nations of the earth; and in this fair republic too, whose foundations were cemented with the richest blood of freemen, and where the principles of freedom, social, ecclesiastical, and personal, have been more discussed, and ought to be better understood, than in any other nation under heaven, — here, in these latter days, this demon of discord, that had been once forced down to the pit by the power of the gospel, rises again, bearing in one hand the torch of civil war, and in the other a halter for free speech; steals from the sanctuary, through the ministry of its unfaithful servants, the sacerdotal frontlet of pure gold, inscribed HOLINESS TO THE LORD; binds it with a ribbon of perverted scriptural texts to his own snaky forehead; and then cries out: "*I am sacred; let no man touch me!*" But the conspiracy will not succeed; for God is on the throne, and he will thrust the demon down again to his own place, though it may not be in any way of our devising

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[1] Writings of Prof. B. B. Edwards, with a Memoir, Vol. II. pp. 127 – 130. See also the second Article, pp. 107 – 112.

ARTICLE V.

QUATREFAGES AND GODRON IN REPLY TO AGASSIZ ON THE ORIGIN AND DISTRIBUTION OF MANKIND.

BY JOSEPH P. THOMPSON, D.D., NEW YORK.

It is about twelve years since Professor Agassiz startled both the religious and the scientific world with his theory of the multiple origin of mankind, through the creation of different races in distinct zoölogical zones. This theory contradicts the biblical account of the derivation of all men from a single pair, and the distibution of mankind into communities and nations from a common centre in Western Asia; and therefore its announcement by so eminent a scientist startled the religious world. The theory also contravenes the generally received doctrine of naturalists, that *species* is defined by lineal descent from a single pair, and supposes multiple protoplasts of one and the same species; therefore it was regarded with surprise and incredulity by the scientific world. The revolutionary bearing of the theory upon the common doctrine of species, is clearly set forth in a recent essay upon "The Origin of Species," by Professor Asa Gray, of Cambridge.[1]

"The orthodox conception of species is that of lineal descent; all the descendants of a common parent, and no other, constitute a species; they have a certain identity, because of their descent, by which they are supposed to be recognizable. So naturalists had a distinct idea of what they meant by the term "species," and a practical rule which was hardly the less useful because difficult to apply in many cases, and because its application was indirect, — that is, the community of origin had to be inferred from the likeness; that degree of similarity, and that only, being held to be conspecific, which could be shown or reasonably inferred to be compatible with a common origin. And the usual concurrence of the whole body of naturalists (having the same data before them), as to what forms are species, attests the value of the rule, and also indicates some real foundation for it in nature. But if species were created in numberless individuals

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[1] American Journal of Science and Arts, March 1860.

> over broad spaces of territory, these individuals are connected only in idea, and species differ from varieties on the one hand, and from genera, tribes, etc., on the other, only in degree; and no obvious natural reason remains for fixing upon this or that degree as specific, at least no natural standard, by which the opinions of different naturalists may be correlated. Species, upon this view, are enduring, but subjective and ideal. Any three or more of the human races, for example, are species, or not species, according to the bent of the naturalist's mind.
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> "The ordinary and generally received view assumes the independent specific creation of each kind of plant and animal in a primitive stock, which reproduces its like from generation to generation, and so continues the species. Taking the idea of species from this perennial succession of essentially similar individuals, the chain is logically traceable back to a local origin in a single stock, a single pair, or a single individual, from which all the individuals composing the species have proceeded by natural generation. . . . . . From this generally accepted view the theory of Agassiz differs fundamentally in this, that it discards the idea of a common descent as the real bond of union among the individuals of a species, and also the idea of a local origin, — supposing, instead, that each species originated simultaneously, generally speaking, over the whole geographical area it now occupies or has occupied, and in perhaps as many individuals as it numbered at any subsequent period."

Professor Agassiz broached this theory, in this country, first through the pages of the Christian Examiner, for March and July, 1850; and afterwards in 1854, in an essay on "The Natural Provinces of the Animal World, and their Relation to the Different Types of Man," published in the volume of Nott and Gliddon, entitled "Types of Mankind," — the Cambridge Professor having unwittingly allowed his name to be associated with two of the veriest charlatans that ever sought to impose upon the ignorance and credulity of the public with "science falsely so-called." The object of this essay, as defined by its author, is "to show that the boundaries within which the different natural combinations of animals are known to be circumscribed upon the surface of our earth, coincide with the natural range of distinct types of man." Regarding the local circumscription of *faunae*, with the special adaptations of each *fauna* to its zoölogical zone, as proof that every such zone was a distinct centre of creation, Professor Agassiz argues that "the laws which regulate the diversity of animals, and their distribution upon the earth, apply equally to man, *within the same limits* and *in the same degree;*" and in view of such alleged facts, he insists upon "the probability of an independence of origin of all nations; or, at least, of the independent origin of a primitive stock for each, with which at some future period migrating or conquering tribes have more or less completely amalgamated, as in the case of mixed nationalities." Yet the essay also maintains that the unity of mankind is compatible with such diversity of origin, since "unity is determinal by a typical structure, and by the similarity of natural abilities and propensities."

The following extracts from the Christian Examiner for July, 1850, more fully define his view:

> "The circumstance that, wherever we find a human race naturally circumscribed, it is connected in its limitation with what we call, in natural history, a zoölogical and botanical province, — that is to say, with the natural limitation of a particular association of animals and plants, — shows most unequivocally the intimate relation existing between mankind and the animal kingdom in their adaptation to the physical world. The arctic race of men, covering the treeless region near the Arctics in Europe, Asia, and America, is circumscribed in the three continents within limits very similar to those occupied by that particular combination of animals which are peculiar to the same tracts of land and sea. . . . . . Such identical circumscriptions between the limits of two series of organized beings so widely differing as man and animals and plants, and so entirely unconnected in point of descent, would, to the mind of a naturalist, amount to a demonstration that they originated together within the districts which they now inhabit. We say that such an accumulation of evidence would amount to demonstration; for how could it, on the contrary, be supposed that man alone would assume new peculiarities, and features so different from his primitive characteristics, whilst the animals and plants circumscribed within the same limits would continue to preserve their natural relations to the fauna and flora of other parts of the world?
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> "If the creator of one set of these living beings had not been also the creator of the other, and if we did not trace the same general laws throughout nature, there might be room left for the supposition that, while men inhabiting different parts of the world originated from a common centre, the plants and animals now associated with them in the same countries originated on the spot. But such inconsistencies do not occur in the laws of nature.
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> "The coincidence of the geographical distribution of the human races with that of animals, the disconnection of the climatic conditions where we

have similar races, and the connection of climatic conditions where we have different human races, show, further, that the adaptation of different races of men to different parts of the world must be intentional, as well as that of other beings; that men were primitive by being located in the various parts of the world they inhabit, and that they arose everywhere in those harmonious numeric proportions with other living beings, which would at once secure their preservation and contribute to their welfare. To suppose that all men originated from Adam and Eve is to assume that the order of creation has been changed in the course of historical times, and to give to the Mosaic record a meaning that it was never intended to have. On that ground, we would particularly insist upon the propriety of considering Genesis as chiefly relating to the history of the white race, with special reference to the history of the Jews."

Finally, in his *Contributions to the Natural History of the United States*, in the preliminary essay on Classification, Agassiz seeks "to remove from the philosophic definition of species the idea of a community of origin, and consequently, also, the idea of a necessary genealogical connection." Assuming that his theory of multiple protoplasts in distinct zoölogical zones is established, he asserts that "the evidence that all animals have originated in large numbers, is growing so strong, that the idea that every species existed in the beginning in single pairs, may be said to be given up almost entirely by naturalists." And again he speaks of it as becoming "more apparent that species did not originate in single pairs, but were created in large numbers in those numeric proportions which constitute the natural harmonies between organized beings."[1]

Notwithstanding the confident tone of these last citations, the theory of distinct geographical centres of creation, especially as applied to the human races, finds little favor with men of science. Indeed, since the theory was broached, the weight of scientific evidence and authority has been most decidedly in the opposite direction; and luminous and conclusive replies have been made to the speculations of Agassiz by men of the first repute in scientific circles. The object of this Article is to lay before the readers of the Bibliotheca Sacra, in the form of a condensed translation, the substance of the criticisms upon this theory lately published by two eminent French savans, Messrs. A. De Quatrefages and D. A. Godron. Quatrefages, a member of the Institute (Academy of Sciences) holds the Professorship of Ethnology in the Museum of Natural History, in the Jardin des Plantes, Paris; Godron, Doctor of Medicine and Science, is Dean of the Faculty of Sciences at Nancy, Professor of Natural History in the same Faculty, and director of the Jardin des Plantes in that city. He is also a chevalier of the Legion of Honor.

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[1] Essay, Sec. vi., on Species.

Mons. De Quatrefages has lately published a volume of four hundred pages, entitled "*Unité de L'Espèce Humaine.*[1] He discusses the question, *What is man?* as viewed purely in the light of natural history. After a preliminary chapter upon the inorganic and organic "empires" of nature, each of which he subdivides into "kingdoms," he separates man into a distinct *kingdom* (*le règne homminal* ou *règne humain*) differing from the animal as much, and in the same way, as that differs from the vegetable. "Man is an organized being, living, sentient, with the power of spontaneous action, endowed with morality and religiosity." The anthropologic characteristics which distinguish and ennoble this kingdom, are "the idea of *right*, which springs from intellectual superiority, and the idea of *duty*, which springs from morality and religiosity,"—endowments which belong only to man in the wide empire of organized nature. In defining *species*, Quatrefages adheres to what Professor Gray styles the "orthodox doctrine" of lineal succession from a single primitive pair, indicated by the permanent reproduction of certain resemblances. "L'espèce est l'ensemble des individus, plus ou moins semblables entre eux, qui sont descendus ou qui peuvent être regardis comme descendus d'une paire primitive unique par une succession ininterrumpue de familles." Upon this ground he maintains the fixity of species as something primitive and fundamental in nature, varieties and races being marked by certain exceptional characteristics among the members of the same species. These variations are induced largely by a combination of influences which the author expresses by the term *milieu*, for which *media* is the nearest equivalent, — "the sum of all conditions or influences whatever, physical, intellectual, or moral, which can act upon organized beings." Next follows a chapter upon vegetable and animal races, with an application to the natural history of man. Here the author uses the recent results of exploration in inner Africa to illustrate the gradual transition from one race to another. The nature and the extent of variations in the animal races and in the groups of mankind are then considered; after which the origin of varieties, and the formation of animal and human races are discussed at length. Several succeeding chapters are devoted to the discussion of hybridization and the crossing of races in the vegetable and animal kingdoms, with a special application of the principles evolved to the human races. The conclusion of the author from this line of argument is, that "Humanity throughout forms but one *species;* the groups we there discover are only *races of that species.* To this conclusion we are led, not by a theory, nor by a preconceived idea, nor by a dogma, but solely by scientific observation and experience, applied to the study of man as those are applied to the study of other living creatures; not an observation of a few years upon a small number of isolated facts, an experience bearing upon certain races, animal or vegetable, but observation and experience covering centuries, embracing all species, animal or vegetable, subjected to the action of man. If this method is just, if there is really but one universal physiology, subjecting all organized beings to the same laws, *then there exists but one species of men.*"

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[1] Paris, Librairie de L. Hachette et Co. 1861.

From this point Quatrefages proceeds to an examination of objections to the doctrine of monogenism. He shows that the question is one of *taxonomy*, and that by the almost universal accord of naturalists, species, both in the vegetable and in the animal kingdom, is regarded as something fundamental, and essential to organized nature in our geological era. He considers various examples of crossed races, and analyzes the effects of "milieu" in inducing varieties and races in the one species of man. At length, in Chapter Twenty-one, he discusses the theory of Agassiz, as given above. This portion of the work we shall present almost entire.

The theory of Agassiz is at bottom nothing but that of La Peyrère.[1] The nature of the theory is not changed by adding arguments supposed to be furnished by modern science, to the Biblical arguments upon which the gentleman-theologian almost exclusively rested it in his day. Certainly it is not one of the least curious results of anthropological discussions, that after more than three hundred years of labor, accomplished in the natural sciences, they have led men of unquestionable merit, friends of philosophy and of progress, but carried away by a system, to go back to the opinions of a theologian of the seventeenth century. However, there might be reasons for such a theory in any age; and any opinion revived and advocated in the name of science by a naturalist such as Agassiz, deserves serious examination.

From that exclusively scientific point of view where we have taken our stand, the doctrine of La Peyrère might at first sight appear seductive. It explains quite naturally the diversity of human groups; it contradicts none of the facts that we have set forth; there is in it nothing repugnant to general physiology, our supreme guide in this discussion. Observation, experience, teach us nothing as to the *fact* of the existence of one or many primitive pairs. Scientifically speaking, either alternative is equally possible. If we suppose that several pairs appeared at once, either they were precisely alike, or they presented just the differences that we now remark between races. On this last hypothesis, the distinctive characteristics of race and species already laid down, are found none the less in these original groups.

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[1] Isaac de La Peyrère, of Bordeaux, was a gentleman of the house of Condé. He published, in 1655, a book on Preadamite races of men. It made a great noise, and the doctrine being condemned as heretical, he was obliged to retract it.

The question is evidently the same, whether we suppose these groups centred upon one single spot of the globe, or admit that they originated in regions more or less remote, more or less multiplied. Physiology, equally satisfied by all these hypotheses, cannot decide between them. The considerations which have thus far guided our discussion are here entirely at fault, and to invalidate or to establish the hypothesis of La Peyrère, it is necessary to have recourse to quite another circle of ideas. This, Agassiz has done. Reproducing the opinion of his predecessor, or rather, doubtless, having arrived at the same belief by an entirely different method, he founds his whole doctrine upon *zoölogical geography.*

This doctrine has placed this distinguished naturalist in a singular position. Agassiz resolutely insists that in his view there is but one species of men. He ought, then, it would seem, to be welcome among the advocates of the unity, and in bad repute among those who believe in the multiplicity of species. Well, just the opposite has happened. He is enthusiastically extolled by the polygenists, and most vigorously assailed by the monogenists. The latter openly denounce Agassiz as a turncoat, and give him to understand that, in order to gain with the Southern States the high position that he has held for several years, he has not hesitated to modify the opinions he had avowed in Europe; that at least he has endeavored by a sort of subterfuge, to conciliate passions which are so much the more exacting because they have at bottom very positive interests.

For ourselves, we do not hesitate to say that these imputations are without foundation. The whole life of Agassiz is a protest against the motives that are imputed to him. In Europe, he has made for science material sacrifices that his friends had a right to consider extreme; quite recently, he has refused the high position that the French government would not have failed to give him, if he had consented to come and occupy the Museum. We are fully convinced that calculations of interest have not in any way influenced the opinions of a *confrère* as honorable as he is justly celebrated. Besides, to look at it from that point of view, what would Agassiz have lost by avowing the purest monogenism, if such had been his conviction? A professor's chair in the Slave States? But he would quickly have found another in some university of the Free States, and surely these would have been happy to welcome and indemnify the *savant*, who, by his lectures and his writings, has diffused throughout the United States the taste—the passion, one might say—for natural science.

It must be obvious, however, that to be hailed with transport by the polygenist, and rejected even with violence by the monogenist, a doctrine which admits the unity of the human species must at least involve obscurities and contradictions. Both in fact are found in it; and to explain such defects in a theory emanating from a man of so much consideration, it is necessary to go back to his previous works. There we discover that Agassiz has never given an exact description of *species, race, variety.* This naturalist begins where Cuvier ended, with Palaeontology; and in those of his works whose object is the study of living animals, we find almost always something of the first impressions which extinct animals have left upon him. Here, without doubt, is the first cause of all that one can object to in the anthropological writings of Agassiz.[1]

In 1840, in his *Principles of Zoölogy*, Agassiz appears to define species as "the last term of classification, at which naturalists stop." Certainly no botanist, no zoölogist, *practised in living species*, would accept this general statement. Its author takes the effect for the cause. Species existed before naturalists were arrested by it. The classifier stops when he finds it; he does not make it. The terms used by Agassiz, on the contrary, would make species nothing but a consequence of classification, a conventional group, resting only upon slight morphologic differences. In the same work, Agassiz regards man as belonging to one *species;* but at the same time he admits *races* distinguished from each other by slight *primitive differences*, becoming more and more pronounced under the influence of diversity of food, of climate, of customs, etc. To a mind disposed to see, in species, nothing but a group almost artificial, existing only in form, what could races be, separated by *original differences*, but *species of species?* Even then it might have been said that Agassiz was oscillating between the doctrine of unity and that of multiplicity, and attempting to mix two ideas that reciprocally exclude each other.

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[1] The proneness of Prof. Agassiz to theorize is at once evident in his lectures and his published works; and one can trace in these the influence of his Palaeontological studies upon his speculations touching the species of our own geological era. The reader may verify this statement of Quatrefages, by examining the views of Agassiz on species, in Chap. II. sect. vi. of his Essay on Classification, in his "Contributions to the Natural History of the United States," and again in the Atlantic Monthly for April, 1862, p. 455. While he objects to the prominence given to species in scientific classification, and denies that "sexual connexion, resulting even in fertile offspring, is a trustworthy evidence of specific identity," and while he enumerates some nine or ten characteristics of species, he nowhere gives a scientific definition of the term. Yet after underrating species as a basis of scientific study, he affirms that "species are created by God," and asserts their immutability during immense cosmic periods. It is difficult to obtain from Agassiz's writings his own idea of species.

This tendency became more evident in a *Sketch of the Geography of Animals*, published in 1845. "All organized beings," Agassiz then said, "have a limited area. Man alone is spread over the entire surface of the earth; animals as well as plants are restricted within fixed boundaries," while man inhabits every climate. The totality of plants and of animals inhabiting any such region are known as its *flora* and *fauna*. From that time Agassiz has believed it possible to establish a certain coincidence between the limits of faunae and the space occupied by certain human groups; he already ascribed to one identical primordial cause the distribution of animals in *species*, of humanity in *races*, upon a given territory, and allied thus intimately the diversity of human populations with that of faunae. "But," he added, "this diversity, which has the same origin, has it the same signification with man as with animals? Plainly not. While animals are distinct species in the different zoölogical provinces to which they belong, man, in spite of the diversity of his races, constitutes but one and the same species over the entire globe. In this respect, as in so many others, man appears as an exceptional being in that creation, of which he is at once the object and the end."[1]

Here the author affirms, more distinctly than before, the two opposite opinions that he strives to combine. Thus the contradiction becomes more palpable; and in order to harmonize his theory with the facts, he is obliged to admit that man is an *exceptional* being, in a question purely of natural history and of physiology. This work, published in Europe, contained the germ of the whole doctrine which Agassiz has since developed in America.[2]

Reduced to simple terms, the theory of the Cambridge professor contains nothing, we repeat, incongruous with the ideas we have expressed upon race and species. If in all other respects it were found to accord with the facts furnished by observation and experience, we should be compelled to regard it as an ingenious hypothesis, no doubt very difficult to demonstrate, but no less difficult to contradict; it would be put in the category of those *possibilities* with regard to which one would not pronounce with confidence. But on the one hand, this accordance does not exist, and the opinions of Agassiz are in diametrical opposition to the laws of that department of science by which he believes them to be sustained — the laws of *zoölogical geography;* and on the other hand, the manner in which he presents his opinions as a whole, the arguments that he uses to prove their correctness, make of his doctrine a true polygenism, hardly disguised by the contradiction that we have already detected, and that here becomes striking. No one in America is deceived by it, and the disciples of Morton least of all. So Nott and Gliddon have welcomed, with open arms, the eminent auxiliary who has gone over to them. The memoir of Agassiz figures in the place of honor, at the head of their great work. In this essay we meet, at the outset, a fault easy to foresee, the absence of precise notions of *species*, *race*, and *variety*. The author states the question well, and in the fairest manner, but he answers it in a vague and unsatisfactory way, little in harmony with the actual state of science.

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[1] Revue Suisse de Neuchâtel.

[2] As this theory has already been given in the words of Agassiz, we here omit the statement of it by Quatrefages.

Agassiz formally excludes from the definition of species all idea of reproduction. He sneeringly rejects the idea of the *filiation of existences*, of which all great minds since Linnaeus and Buffon have so well comprehended the importance. He does not distinguish mongrels (*métis*) from *hybrids;* and speaking of the latter, he says in so many words: "it matters nothing for the question, whether hybrids have or have not an indefinite fecundity between themselves." Now from Buffon to Müller and to M. Chevreul, all zoölogists, all physiologists, all the thinkers who have touched upon these questions, have admitted, as one of the most fundamental points, the necessity of knowing whether this fecundity was or was not unlimited. In advancing opinions so contrary to those which *all* the princes of science have professed, he should at least have given the reader some good reason for this new manner of viewing the subject. On this point Agassiz says not a word.

The notions of time, of filiation, of degrees of fecundity, being thus pruned from the idea of species, Agassiz renounces his old definition and adopts that of Morton, which he develops in the following terms: "*Species* are distinct forms of organic life, whose origin is lost in the primitive establishment of the existing order of things; and *varieties* are such modifications of species as may return to the typical form, under temporary influences." Here we see that *form*, only, the *actual* form, is all that in the eyes of Agassiz constitutes species. In all this part of his work, the author speaks like the most decided polygenists, and is open to precisely the same charges.

But here is something still more grave. Agassiz well puts the question: What is race? But he does not answer it. Like all polygenists, he does not define the word upon which the whole discussion hinges, and yet he avows himself ready to prove "that the differences existing between the human *races* are of the same nature with those that separate the families, genus, and species of simia or other animals." He develops this idea and adds: "the chimpanze and the gorilla do not differ from each other more than the mandingo from the negro of Guinea; and neither differ more from the orang than the malay and the white differ from the negro." In the mouth of a *naturalist* who has reduced the idea of species to a question of forms, is not this language as explicit as possible? Is it not evident that these *human races* are nothing else than *species*, and that nothing remains but to divide humanity into families and genus, as is done with *simia*, which do not differ from each other any more, nor in any other respects, than do men? No, indeed! For Agassiz declares yet once more that, in spite of all these differences, men are none the less of the same species; but this profession of faith in absolute contradiction to all that precedes it, cannot remove from his work its essentially polygenistic meaning. But placing ourselves on the ground chosen by Agassiz, upon the ground of *zoölogical geography*, accepting for a moment all his ideas, however contradictory they may be, is it possible to harmonize his theory with the results reached by science, apart from all anthropologic pre-occupation? By no means. This we shall now endeavor to prove in approaching the geographical question.

Agassiz bases his theory upon the application, to man, of the doctrine of *centres of creation.* That doctrine we accept as well as he.. Indeed, whoever will keep aloof from every consideration foreign to science, and hold himself to what observation and experience teach, will admit that all animals and plants could not have originated at one and the same spot on the globe.[1] Observation teaches that every extensive region has its species, its genera, its peculiar types; and experience continually proves that certain species can be transported from one region to another, and there live and thrive. In that case, the conditions of life in the new region agree with them; and if man has not found certain species in any given region, it is because they could never have existed there. To explain the actual distribution of animals by supposing *one common centre of creation*, we must choose between two hypotheses equally untenable scientifically. Either we must admit the transformation of primitive species, and the formation of new species under the force of present conditions (and Darwin himself does not go to that extreme), or we must admit the total extinction of a multitude of species which disappeared between the point *de départ* and the point *d'arrivée*, — a view which palaeontology expressly contradicts. In fine, physiology and experience teach that the polar species could not have lived for a moment, by the side of the equatorial species; *a fortiori*, therefore, all existing species could not have lived together, side by side, during the time necessary to bring about the separation and the distribution (*cantonnement*[1]) of each. Thus everything concurs to prove that, from the beginning of the present era, animals have appeared at different points, in *multiple centres of creation.* But in accepting this doctrine, one cannot divorce from it the results admitted beyond controversy by naturalists who, without thinking of man, have laid down the principles of *zoölogical geography* in works bearing upon several of the great divisions of the animal kingdom. Such naturalists and such works are numerous. In the first rank we still place Buffon, with his admirable researches upon mammifers, extended and confirmed by those of Geoffrey St. Hilare, Desmarets, Isidore Geoffrey, etc. Then follow Mons. Duméril and Bibron, master and pupil, who have studied reptiles from the same point of view; Fabricius and Latreille, those two princes in entomology; Maclay, Spence, Kirby, Lacordaire, who have also made insects the object of their investigations; Mons. Edwards, whose work upon the geographical distribution of crustacea is a true model; and a host of other savans whose studies have borne upon less extended groups. From the whole range of these researches a certain number of general facts or laws may be selected, which ought to bear out the theory of Agassiz, if that is true. But so far is this from being so, that it is easy to establish an entire disagreement between these laws and the proposed theory.

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[1] In this concession Quatrefages is not sustained by such naturalists as Sir Charles Lyell and the late Professor Edward Forbes.

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[1] *Cantonnement,* a word derived from the distribution of troops in quarters: "The troops were *cantoned* in various villages."

And first, Agassiz conceives of the centres of creation themselves as something much too absolute. With him the influence of these centres is general; it extends to *all* the products of a region, and establishes between them direct relations, whether they belong to the land, to rivers, or to shores. In his idea, men, plants, birds, mammifers, insects, fishes, and crustacea, whether marine or fluvial, are all brethren, in the sense of being children of the same soil. He seems to see in forms, human, animal, or vegetable, the product of a unique local force impressing upon all existences a kind of *cachet*, which attests their community of origin.

This *datum* is inexact. If it seems to be verified at certain points of the globe, and when one examines only a very small number of groups, it is at fault as soon as one takes *all* into account. New Holland, for example, whose mammifers are separated so distictly from those that one sees anywhere else, and which in this point of view forms, with some little islands, a region so special, loses this character when one compares its insects with those of New Zealand and of New Caledonia. In its mammalogy, it forms a centre perfectly distinct and isolated; but by its entomology, Mons. Lacordaire has united it with the whole Archipelago. Such facts become still more striking when we compare the tenants of the air with those that live in the water, or even the latter among themselves, when two different seas are separated by a small extent of land. At the isthmus of Suez, the aerial faunae are almost identical upon the coasts of the Red Sea and of the Mediterranean; the marine faunae, on the contrary, are extremely unlike upon the opposite coasts. M. Edwards has not found a single crustacea common to both. Thus tested by facts derived from animals alone, the fundamental idea in the doctrine of Agassiz is contradicted by the result of observation.[1] Let us see, then, how it fares when applied to the history of man.

Among the facts universally admitted in zoölogical geography, — facts which Agassiz himself states in this work, are the two following: (1) all the great centres of creation are characterized by certain *types*, — embracing a number of species, of genera more or less considerable, — types which are peculiar to them or hardly represented elsewhere. Thus New Holland is essentially the country of *marsupialia*, America of *edentata.* (2) Between two centres of creation really distinct, there are almost no common *genera*, still fewer common *species*, and the characteristic differences are more and more marked in proportion as one examines the higher groups. For example, taking the the old continent and the new throughout, we have two zoölogical regions, the most extended that it is possible to compare. Now these two regions possess, in common, only five or six genera of bats, and but one species of the same group. Not a single genus, much less a single species, of simia is found, at the same time, in both. New Holland forms, with these two regions, a contrast still more striking. But one finds men none the less in America and in Australia, as well as in Asia, in Africa, and in Europe. Now these men, according to the polygenists, form a genus composed of several species. If this were well founded, it would follow that the *genus*, or rather the *type*, the most profoundly marked, will have produced itself in *all* the centres of creation, instead of characterizing one only, like the source of the edentata or the marsupialia. According to Agassiz, man forms only *one species*, but his *multiplied races* have originated at all points of the globe. If Agassiz were in the right, this *species*, the most exceptional of all that organized nature presents, has appeared in zoölogical regions the most distinct: in the old and the new continents, which have not a single simia in common, as well as in Australia, which has no simia at all!

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[1] Since the work of Quatrefages was published, a highly interesting sketch of the fauna of the Red Sea has appeared in Petermann's Mittheilungen (Jan. 1861), th. v. Heuglin's Forschungen über die Fauna des Rothen Meeres und der Somáli-Küste. The geology of the isthmus is well treated in the "Percement de L'Isthme de Suez," par M. Ferdinand de Lesseps.

It is impossible to imagine a disagreement more complete with the laws that we have brought to mind, laws that may be regarded as the most absolute, the most general of zoölogical geography. The *mitigated* polygenism of Agassiz and his disciples is in contradiction with zoölogical geography, as the *pure* polygenism of Desmoulins, of Morton, and others, is with zoölogy properly so-called, with physiology. Evidently the ideas that we are combatting were formed under the impression produced by certain coincidences that could hardly fail to manifest themselves. The grand centres of creation have in general features (*milieux*) not less characteristic than their fauna or their flora. It is not surprising that these have impressed upon the human race formed under the influence of such surroundings something special. In this sense, this *something* is the product of a local force. The coincidence which the circumscription of fauna and flora presents, in certain cases, with that of human races, is very naturally explained by those influences of *milieu* that are found everywhere in anthropology, and which are so strongly contradictory to the polygenists. These coincidences, which have misled Agassiz, and which afford him an argument almost unique, are very far from being as general and as complete as this *savant* supposes. To satisfy ourselves of this, it is enough to examine upon zoölogical principles (*en zoölogiste*) the chart and diagrams that accompany his memoir.

Agassiz makes eight principle centres of creation, which he calls *zoölogical kingdoms.* These are the Arctic, the Mongolian, the European, the American, the Negro, the Hottentot, the Malay, the Australian. This distribution is arbitrary in certain respects; we nevertheless accept it as the author gives it, thus placing ourselves exactly upon the ground that he has laid down. Thus the American kingdom comprehends the entire new continent; and the redskinned man of the United States is, with the author, the human type of that region. But with all zoölogists, with all botanists, America forms at least two centres of creation perfectly distinct. The study of animals and plants leads then to a different distribution of organized existences from that involved in the theory that we oppose. It is true that Agassiz divides these kingdoms into zoölogical *provinces*, and subdivides these yet again. In the course of this work, and especially in his publications which have followed it, he states with reason that *the American man* presents numerous modifications; with him each of these modifications characterizes one of those *races* which he has made as like as possible to *species.* By virtue of his theory, if these races were created on the spot, if they are the product of the same local force which has given birth to animals of the same region, in order to be faithful to the laws of zoölogical geography, they ought to exhibit relations with those of other centres of creation exactly like those which unite the animal species. Yet precisely the contrary appears, and that even in America, where the doctrine that we are combatting had its origin.

In fact, what do zoölogists teach us, who, preoccupied with no theory, have studied the distribution of animals? All agree in declaring that, in the old and the new continents, not only the northern, but the temperate regions also, present striking resemblances in their zoölogical inhabitants. North America possesses a large number of genera, several species even, which are common to Europe on the one hand, and to Asia on the other; in North America, as in Europe and Asia, one finds almost always the same types, and this even among the mamifers, that is to say, the class most elevated in organization. South America, on the contrary, whether compared with Asia or with Africa, constitutes a zoölogical centre far more distinct. Characteristic types appear upon all sides; common genera diminish in a very striking proportion, and we find almost no species in common. Thus, considered as a centre of *animal creation*, North America is almost confounded with Europe and

Asia, while South America is completely separated from both, as well as from Africa.

But when we consider these two halves of the new world as centres of *the creation of man*, precisely the contrary appears. Be it that the red man of the United States is much less isolated from other races than polygenists in general admit, he is none the less the human type most characteristic of the new continent, and therefore Agassiz figures him as the representative of the people of his American zoölogical kingdom.[1] Well, he inhabits precisely that North America where are the fox and the beaver of Europe, and where are found nearly all our principal genera of carnivorous animals. In South America, on the contrary, are found men of a yellow color, with projecting cheek-bones, with eyes contracted and oblique, so like the Asiatics that they themselves recognize the resemblance, and at first sight call the Chinese their uncles. On the same soil live other nations, which, though not so white as an Englishman or a German, have a clearer color than we commonly see in Spain and Italy. Mons. Augrand has also met natives resembling the Canarians. Thus, considered as a centre of *human creation*, North America isolates itself both from Asia and from Europe, while South America almost blends with Asia, and even approaches Europe and Africa. The men of the new continent have, therefore, with the men of the old world geographical affinities, in an order exactly inverted from that established between animals of the same regions. Upon all these most fundamental, most essential points, the theory we are combatting is thus at variance with facts. We might rest here; but it is well to follow out at least one of its applications in detail, the better to demonstrate its weakness.

We have seen that Agassiz divides the terrestrial globe into eight zoölogical kingdoms, and that the first of these grand divisions is the *Arctic kingdom*. This comprises all the barren lands which, both in the old and in the new continent, lie beyond the limits of the forests. It is bounded on the south by an undulating line lying mainly between the sixtieth and the sixty-fifth degree of latitude. Certainly no region presents a combination of circumstances more in harmony with the views of Agassiz; the general conditions of life are almost identical over this vast extent, because *cold* controls and dominates all others. Yet no more there than elsewhere do we find confirmed the coincidences promised by this theory. Agassiz characterizes this kingdom by the presence of five mammifers and a bird, which are consequently with him the *corresponding geographical limits* of the Esquimaux, regarded by the author as the type of *the boreal man.*

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[1] See the zoölogical chart furnished by Agassiz for Nott and Gliddon's "Types of Mankind."

The Esquimaux and the races which have the most general resemblance to them, are in fact pretty much restricted within the limits indicated by our author; but whoever will rightly estimate the action, at once so uniform and so powerful, which the polar climate must have upon man, will see that this could not be otherwise. That climate does not act only in a direct way by its temperature, it imposes upon all its inhabitants manners, habits, a mode of life, a diet, almost entirely the same. Is it surprising, then, that there should be among those inhabitants very strong resemblances, a likeness almost complete? Plainly the doctrine of the influence of *milieu* is sufficient to account for this fact, which we admit without reservation. But does it follow from this that the boreal human races are connected with the animals that surround them, in the way that Agassiz maintains — that they so intimately approach the fauna? No. Among the mammalogical species that Agassiz has selected as the most suitable representatives of the polar fauna, two only, the white bear and the walrus, really belong, in type and as species, to the glacial regions. As a species, the *phoca* of Greenland belongs equally to those regions; but the genus of which it is a part is found in all the seas of Europe, and its type exists throughout the globe. The reindeer and the true whale are still more unfortunate selections. The latter belongs to a genus which has its direct representatives in nearly all seas, and in the Middle Ages it frequented the coast of France. If at this day it is found only within the polar zone, it is because it has been hunted out from every other. The same is true of the reindeer, which in the time of Caesar inhabited the forests of Germany, and which even now, where it has not been exterminated, descends more than twenty degrees south of the limits assigned to it by the theory we are combatting. As to the eider, selected as representing the birds of the pole, it builds its nest every year in Denmark, twelve or fifteen degrees south of the polar circle. Thus of the six animal species sketched in the chart of Agassiz, and which are supposed to represent most faithfully the fauna of the Arctic kingdom, three at least may be regarded as belonging almost equally to the region which he calls the European kingdom. However, Agassiz has certainly selected the examples best fitted to support his doctrine, and science could offer nothing better to his choice. That a naturalist so eminent has succeeded no better, is evidence that the thing was impossible.

In fact, notwithstanding a small number of special traits, the fauna of the polar regions is plainly but an extension of the fauna belonging to the great centres, in Europe, in Asia, in America, which lie contiguous to those regions. This is the result obtained even from the small number of examples chosen by Agassiz among mammifers and birds. The study of insects leads to exactly the same results. Says Mons. Lacordaire, in his *Introduction to Entomology*: "the polar region is characterized less by the *spécialité* of its entomological products than by their small number." Hence we see that, in spite of certain appearances almost purely local, no more at the pole than at the equator is there a real accordance between the geographical distribution of animals and that of human races.

Quatrefages next speaks of the temptation of Agassiz to depart from purely scientific argumentation, through his laudable desire to popularize science in America; and more than hints that, had he been writing for the scientific world, he would not have deigned to resort to the arguments which he addresses to the general public in his letter to Nott and Gliddon. He also replies briefly to the unscientific view of human language into which Agassiz is betrayed by his theory of multiple centres of creation — a point which we shall notice further on. In conclusion, he says: "Man comes under the general laws that govern all living beings. All the great centres are characterized by some special type. The zoölogical provinces, the secondary centres even, have their genera, their species which are peculiar to them. Man, that type apart, that species privileged among all, even if we see in him nothing but a physical being, — could he have originated at the same time in every place? No; for then he would have constituted an altogether unique exception, of which we do not yet know an example. Therefore, when we have affirmed — what zoölogy and physiology demonstrate — that 'all men form but one species;' we can add, 'This species originated in one single country of the globe, and *probably* that country was proportionally limited.'

"Where is that corner of the earth from which came forth the being who should subdue all other creatures, and even constrain to his service the brute forces that govern inanimate matter? This is not the place to examine this question in detail. We are restricted to the answer that everything points toward central Asia as the first cradle of man, as the point whence, radiating upon every side, the tribes of men took their departure to people the most distant solitudes."

Turning from Quatrefages to Godron, we find some additional thoughts of value, in reply to the theory of Agassiz. Godron's work is in two volumes octavo, of more than four hundred pages each. It discusses the question of species and of races in organic nature, and with special reference to the differences between plants and animals in a wild state, and when domesticated by the hand of man. It demonstrates the fixity of species in the geological periods that preceded the creation of man, and also in all wild plants and animals since man appeared upon the globe. It then proves that, notwithstanding the modifications produced by domestication, the species of animals and plants still retain their most important and exclusive characteristics; that man, while he forms a class, and psychologically a kingdom apart, is subject to the same physiological laws with the animal creation; that the organic and physiological differences observed in different varieties of men, are analogous to those which exist under every species of domestic animals, and which, being neither primitive nor permanent, do not invalidate the unity and continuity of the species itself; therefore, there is but one single species of man. After this elaborate and masterly discussion, the author takes up the theory of Agassiz, and replies to it as follows (II. 408 – 412):

"Zoological geography, whose testimony is invoked in support of this theory, proves, as it seems to us, quite the contrary of that which it is brought forward to establish. If some authors deny that all men belong to one and the same species, there is no one who would refuse to admit that all human varieties form one, and only one, natural genus. But what genus of mammifers is met with, all at once and originally, in every country of the globe? Of two hundred genera of mammifers there are one hundred and sixty which have their habitat limited to a single country and under a single zone. There are twenty that inhabit both the torrid and the temperate zones, but which are excluded from the northern zone. There are twenty, however, which are spread over all zones, and which seem to constitute an exception; but this exception is only apparent; for these genera are not indigenous in every place where we find them, and they consist of domestic animals, or of small mammifers, such as rats, mice, etc., which man unwittingly has everywhere introduced with himself. It is not only as species that the mammifers of Australia differ from those of other continents; it is as genera, and even as families. Whence we should conclude, with as much reason as the advocates of the opinion we are combatting, that the Australian man ought to be of another genus from ours, if he was really autochthonous.

"It is true, indeed, that wild animals have geographical limits, clearly defined for each species; limits which they do not pass over, at least not of their own accord. This stability is a law applicable to wild animals, which, following only the impulse of their natural instincts, have no motive to leave the places of their birth; and yet it is necessary to except several species that perform regular migrations. But this law does not apply to domestic animals, now spread over all parts of our planet, a great number of whose species are certainly not indigenous. It is by the agency of man that the ox, the goat, the sheep, the horse, the ass, the hog, the dog, the cat, the hen, have been disseminated in all inhabited lands. But if man has been able to modify the laws of zoölogical geography in that which respects the animals subject to his dominion, why may he not have done this in that which concerns himself? The laws of zoölogical geography could not fetter the will and the liberty of man, nor hinder the workings of his adventurous spirit. History and tradition have preserved the memory of great migrations of people, and the colonies established within three centuries, in almost all countries of the globe, are flagrant exceptions to the law upon which this novel doctrine professes to rest. The reasoning upon which its advocates rely, is based entirely upon the idea that all parts of the earth were primitively and originally peopled by the nations now found upon them, — an hypothesis which should first be transformed into a rigorous demonstration. To prove that the American man is primitive in the new world, that the Australian had in New Holland his special centre of creation, that the Polynesian is autochthonous in his islands, it is at least necessary to prove that the presence of man in these countries is not the result of migrations, which have taken place in all ages. The instinct which attaches the animal to the soil, in man is conquered by intelligence, by the passion for discovery, by the desire of wealth, by the need of procuring, more easily, the means of subsistence; in fine, by some imperious necessity." From this point Godron gives the evidence of human migrations, and concludes that the whole earth was peopled from a common center.

The scientific reader will be interested in a recent essay upon the permanence of species, by the Bavarian naturalist H. Wagner, published in the *Sitzungsberichte* of the Royal Academy of Munich for 1861 (I. Heft III., pp. 308 – 353). The writer discusses at length the views of Nathusius, Darwin, Geoffrey St. Hilare, and Agassiz; and gives his conclusion in favor of the commonly-received doctrine, — that in the idea of species are included all those individuals that are derived from their like, and that reproduce their like. Or, defining the term somewhat more sharply with reference to organized beings, "the collective total of individuals which are capable of producing, one with another, an uninterruptedly fertile progeny, constitutes a species." Wagner repudiates the views of Agassiz, and declares his hearty agreement with Godron, especially upon the important question of the unity of mankind. The theory of Agassiz, in the twelve years in which it has been before the public, has signally failed to receive the suffrages of leading men of science. Indeed, the principles laid down by Prof. J. D. Dana, in his Thoughts on Species (in the Bib. Sacra, vol. xiv. p. 866), seem conclusive upon the whole subject. The grounds upon which Agassiz denies community of origin to mankind, would compel us to regard the different races of men as distinct *species*. But, says Dana: "Man, by receiving a plastic body, in accordance with a law that species most capable of domestication should necessarily be most pliant, was fitted to take the whole earth as his dominion, and live under every zone. And surely it would have been a very clumsy method of accomplishing the same result, to have made him of many species, all admitting of indefinite, or nearly indefinite, hybridization, in direct opposition to a grand principle elsewhere recognized in the organic kingdoms. It would have been using a process that produces impotence or nothing among animals for the perpetuation and progress of the human race."

It remains only to say a word touching the cavilling tone in which Professor Agassiz has seen fit to speak of the evidence that language affords of the unity of mankind. In his essays in the Christian Examiner, in his letter to Nott and

Gliddon, and more recently in his Articles in the Atlantic Monthly, Agassiz speaks of "the evidence adduced from the affinities of the languages of different nations in favor of a community of origin," as having no scientific value. He compares such affinities to the resemblances in the notes or cries of birds and animals of different species. "Similarity of vocal utterance among animals is not indicative of identity of species; I doubt, therefore, whether similarity of speech proves community of origin among men."[1] He thus ignores the intellectual characteristics of language as the vehicle of thought, and its philosophical structure in the various and often complicated systems of grammar, — in a word, all that makes it language, — and reduces this most marvellous creation of the human mind to a merely instinctive and physical process of vocalization! In reply to such a view of language, it is enough to quote the noble, the inspiring words of one of its greatest masters: "However much the frontiers of the animal kingdom have been pushed forward, so that at one time the line of demarcation between animal and man seemed to depend on a mere fold in the brain, there is *one* barrier which no one has yet ventured to touch, — the barrier of language. . . . . We cannot tell, as yet, what language is. It may be a production of nature, a work of human art, or a divine gift. But to whatever sphere it belongs, it would seem to stand unsurpassed — nay, unequalled in it — by anything else. If it be a production of nature, it is her last and crowning production, which she reserved for man alone. If it be a work of human art, it would seem to lift the human artist almost to the level of a divine creator. If it be the gift of God, it is God's greatest gift; for through it God spake to man and man speaks to God in worship, prayer, and meditation."[1]

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[1] Atlantic Monthly, April, 1862.

[2] Max Müller, Lectures on the Science of Language, Introduction.

ARTICLE VI.

HOPKINSIANISM.

BY REV. ENOCH POND, D.D., PROFESSOR IN BANGOR THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

HOPKINSIANISM is Calvinism, in distinction from every form and shade of Arminianism; and yet not Calvinism, in precisely the sense of Calvin, or of the Westminster Confession of faith. It is a modification of some of the points of old Calvinism, presenting them, as its abettors think, in a more reasonable, consistent, and scriptural point of light. These modifications originated in New England, more than a hundred years ago. They commenced with the first President Edwards, and were still further unfolded in the teachings of his pupils and followers, Hopkins, Bellamy, West, the younger Edwards, Dr. Emmons, and Dr. Spring.

The name "Hopkinsian" is derived from Dr. Samuel Hopkins of Newport, R. I., and was fastened upon those who sympathized with him, not by himself, but by an opponent. It originated, as Dr. Hopkins tells the story, in this wise: "In the latter part of the year 1769, Mr. William Hart of Saybrook, published a dialogue, under the following title: 'Brief Remarks on a Number of false Positions, and dangerous Errors, which are spreading in the Country; collected out of sundry Discourses lately published by Dr. Whittaker and Mr. Hopkins.' Soon after, there was a small pamphlet published, which was doubtless written by the same Mr. Hart, in which the doctrines which I, and others who agreed with me, had published, were misrepresented and set in a ridiculous light; and with a particular design to disgrace me before the public, he called them *Hopkintonian doctrines.* This is the origin of the epithet; and since that time, all who embrace the Calvinistic doctrines as published by President Edwards, Dr. Bellamy, Dr. West of Stockbridge, and myself, have been called Hopkintonians or Hopkinsians.

Thus, without designing it, I am become the head of a denomination, which has since greatly increased, in which thousands are included, ministers and others, who, I believe, are the most sound and consistent Calvinists."

In the year 1796, Dr. Hopkins says again: "About forty years ago, there were but few, perhaps not more than four or five, who espoused the sentiments which have since been called *Edwardean* and *New Divinity*, and still later (after some improvements made upon them), *Hopkinsian sentiments*. But these sentiments have so spread since that time, that there are now more than a hundred ministers in the United States, who espouse the same sentiments; and the number appears to be fast increasing."[1]

Some have doubted whether President Edwards had much to do in originating the Hopkinsian peculiarities; but we have here the testimony of Dr. Hopkins to this effect. We have also the testimony of his own published writings, and of his son. The late Dr. Edwards has an entire Article entitled, "Remarks on the Improvements made in Theology by President Edwards."[2] The topics mentioned by Dr. Edwards, on which his father was supposed to have shed new light, were the following: The ultimate end of God in creation; liberty and necessity; the nature of true virtue or holiness, as consisting in disinterested love; the origin of moral evil; the doctrine of atonement; Adam's sin and Christ's righteousness; the state of the unregenerate, their use of means, and the directions proper to be addressed to them; also the nature of regeneration, and of true experimental religion. Some of these topics were very fully discussed by Edwards himself; others were treated more at large by his followers.

Previous to the time of Edwards, the subject of *moral agency* had not been thoroughly investigated, and was not understood. Certain things were supposed to be involved in freedom of will, which are not involved in it; and from this mistaken supposition resulted consequences unfavorable to the truth. Up to this period, for example, freedom of will was supposed by many to imply *indifference* of will, or that fallen man is not the subject of any controlling, natural bias to evil. Hence, those who held the doctrine of natural depravity were charged with denying the freedom of the will.

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[1] Autobiography, pp. 96, 102.

[2] Works, Vol. I. p. 481.

It was formerly insisted, too, that freedom of action necessarily implies *contingency* of action, or that there can be no previous certainty, or moral necessity, relative to the actions of free agents. Hence, many were led to argue, from the conscious freedom of man, against the doctrines of God's foreknowledge and decrees; while others, who admitted these doctrines, felt constrained, on this account, to deny the freedom of the will.

It was moreover asserted by Arminians, and admitted by some distinguished Calvinists, in the days of Edwards, that freedom of will necessarily implies *a self-determining power of the will.* Calvinists, who made this admission, felt the necessity of maintaining, in opposition to materialists and fatalists, the proper freedom of the will; and they knew not how to do it but by admitting that the will determines itself, or that man originates his own volitions, independent of any external cause.[1]

It was under these circumstances, that Edwards undertook his celebrated treatise on "The Freedom of the Will." Never was a work of the kind more needed, and few works have ever exerted a greater or better influence. In this work (after occupying a few sections with his definitions of terms) President Edwards goes on to show — in opposition to Arminians, Pelagians, and Infidels — that liberty of will does not imply indifference of will, or contingence, or a self-determining power, but merely *choice*, or *the power of choice*, "without taking into the meaning of the word anything of the cause or original of that choice, or at all considering how the person came to have such a volition." In other words, President Edwards maintained that freedom is an *essential property of will.* He insisted that "wherever there is volition, there is free action; wherever there is spontaneity, there is liberty; however and by whomsoever that liberty and spontaneity are caused."

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[1] The younger Edwards, speaking of the state of things in the religious world, at the time when his father commenced writing his treatise on the will, says: "The Calvinists themselves began to be ashamed of their own cause, and to give it up, so far at least as relates to liberty and necessity. This was true especially of Doctors Watts and Doddridge, who, in their day, were accounted leaders of the Calvinists. They must needs bow in the house of Rimmon, and admit *the self-determining power,* which, once admitted, and pursued to its ultimate results, entirely overthrows the doctrines of regeneration, of our dependence for renewing and sanctifying grace, of absolute decrees, of the saint's perseverance, and of all the other doctrines of grace." — Works, Vol. I. p. 482

This is not the place in which to examine minutely the arguments of Edwards, or to point out the manner in which he disposed of the objections of his subtle adversaries. Suffice it to say that, in the opinion of no less a man than Dugald Stewart, his arguments "were never answered, and never will be;" and his replies to objections were such that, after long and frequent discussion, the fairness and conclusiveness of them have not been successfully impeached.

We have dwelt so long on Edwards's improvements in regard to this one topic of moral agency, that we shall not have time to touch upon some others, which were elaborated solely or chiefly by himself. His treatise on "Original Sin" was, perhaps, less satisfactory to most of his followers, than any of his works; and yet he scarcely differed from the views now prevailing among the orthodox of New England, except in a single point, viz. the constituted *oneness* of Adam and his posterity, so that they literally "sinned in him, and fell with him in his first transgression." Few among us at the present day would say, we imagine, as much as this. Yet we all say, with Edwards, that there is, in the posterity of Adam universally, and as a consequence of his first transgression, a prevailing *bias* or *tendency* to sin, through the influence of which they are from the first corrupted; sin is natural to them; and they go on sinning, and only sinning, until they are renewed by sovereign grace. To establish this fundamental doctrine, in opposition to Taylor, Whitby, and others, who denied it, was the main design of Edwards's treatise; and, although some who revere his name would not adopt his entire phraseology on the subject, yet all agree in regarding his work as, perhaps, the ablest defence of human depravity, and of the connection of this depravity with the first sin of Adam, that was ever written.

Some of the topics referred to by Dr. Edwards were discussed more fully by the followers of his father, than by himself. Thus the difficult question as to the origin of evil, and the reasons why it is suffered to exist, was treated with much ability by Bellamy and Hopkins. Bellamy's "Wisdom of God in the Permission of Sin" is a work very generally known. In the year 1759, Hopkins published three sermons on the same subject, which have been less read, but are equally satisfactory.

But it is time that we consider more particularly some of the main points of the Hopkinsian theology.

As the peculiarities of the Hopkinsians were of gradual development, there was not, and could not have been, an entire agreement among the leaders in this movement. Hopkins, though a favorite pupil of the elder Edwards, did not adopt all his statements; nor was Emmons an exact follower of Hopkins; nor do those at the present day who accept, in general, the views of these great theologians, feel bound to follow them implicitly. Freedom of speech and of opinion has always been cultivated among them; and hence, of necessity, there has been, and is, some variety of statement. In presenting an abstract of their opinions, we shall confine ourselves to a few leading points, on which, it is supposed, there is a substantial agreement.[1]

DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY.

The sovereignty of God belongs to him as the Supreme Disposer, and consists in his perfect right, and perfect ability, to do as he pleases. He sits upon the throne of the universe, "far above all principality, and power, and might, and dominion," where he reigns supreme and alone, doing all his pleasure. Job understood this doctrine when he said: "God is in one mind, and who can turn him? and what his soul desireth, even that he doeth." Nebuchadnezzar understood it, when he said of the Most High: "He doeth according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth, and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, What doest thou?" Still better is the doctrine expressed by Jehovah himself: "I, even I am he, and there is no god with me. I kill, and I make alive; I wound, and I heal; neither is there any that can deliver out of my hand." "I am God, and there is none else; declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, saying, My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure."[1]

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[1] We use the word "Hopkinsian" in this Article, not in an ultra and restricted sense, but in its original application, as including all those who adopt, in general the New England explanations, in distinction from those of the older Calvinism.

God is a sovereign in his *purposes*. They are eternal and immutable like himself. They are from everlasting to everlasting, neither needing nor suffering any change. They are also strictly universal, extending to all beings and worlds, to all creatures and events, to everything that was, or is, or is to come, throughout his immense dominions.

God is a sovereign also in his *providence*. His providence is the great revealer and executor of his purposes. He is rolling along the vast wheel of his providence in its appointed course; never disappointed or defeated in any of his plans; upholding, controlling, and governing all things. "Who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will" (Eph. i. 11).

God is a sovereign, too, in the dispensations of his *grace*. "He hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth" (Rom. ix. 18). He takes one and leaves another, saves one and destroys another, as seemeth good in his sight. Nor is he under obligations to explain to his creatures, any further than he pleases, the reasons of his dispensations. These are among the secret things, which belong only to himself. "He giveth not account of any of his matters" (Job xxxiii. 13).

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[1] Job. xxiii. 13; Dan. iv. 35; Deut. xxxii. 39; Isa. xlvi. 9.

Still, there is nothing arbitrary or oppressive in the sovereignty of God, or in his mode of executing it. It is an infinitely wise and benevolent sovereignty. Like himself, it is holy, just, and good. He has the best reasons for all his purposes and dispensations, though these, for the present, may be a secret to us. He is aiming, in all, at the noblest ends, by the wisest means. He is promoting, by all, his own highest glory, and the greatest possible good.

Nor is there aught in the sovereignty of God which allies it to the doctrine of heathen fate. The fates of the heathen were an endless relentless chain of causes and effects; holding everything by an invincible, physical necessity; binding alike both gods and men. The sovereign purposes of God are the plans of an infinitely wise and good being, freely adopted and freely executed; not merely leaving, but securing, his intelligent creatures in the exercise of a free, responsible agency. But this brings us to another point of Hopkinsian divinity.

THE DOCTRINE OF FREE-AGENCY.

We have already given some account of the labors of the first President Edwards, in this department of theology. His great work on the "Freedom of the Will," was designed to remove certain objections which had long been urged against the Calvinistic doctrines. And most effectually it did remove them. They could no more stand the fire of his logic, to use the language of Isaac Taylor, "than a citadel of rooks could maintain its integrity against a volley of musketry." He exposed to contempt, in all their evasions, the Arminian notions of contingency, and indifferency, and a self-determining power, as being essential to freedom of action.

Hopkinsians of a later day would not hold themselves responsible for every statement in Edwards on the Will. Owing to a defective mental philosophy, some of his expressions are ambiguous, and may be interpreted to signify the very opposite of what the author probably intended.[1] Still, as to the conclusiveness of the reasoning, and the correctness and value of the work as a whole, there has been but one opinion. By all Hopkinsian teachers of theology, it has been used as a text-book, from the time of its publication to the present hour; and distant be the day when it shall lose its place and its authority in our theological schools.

We need not dwell longer on this topic, or go into more particular explanations. Whatever may have been thought and said as to the bearing of some parts of the Hopkinsian system on the question of free-agency, the fact is undeniable that there have been no more strenuous advocates for a full, unembarrassed human freedom, than are to be found among theologians of this class. With united voice they would adopt the language of a venerable Hopkinsian teacher, who once addressed his pupils in the following terms: "We wish you to feel the importance of maintaining steadfastly, and under all circumstances, the unembarrassed free-agency of man. Whatever else you may deny, be sure that you hold fast to this. Whatever theories you may be led to form, or views of doctrine you may embrace, be sure that you make room for this. Abandon the free, responsible agency of man, and the very foundations of religion and morality are all broken up. The purposes of God become fixed fate; man is converted into a sort of intellectual automaton; the sense whether of good or ill desert, is but a vulgar prejudice; moral distinctions are obliterated; virtue and vice are but mere names; and there is nought left on which so much as a theory of religion and morality can be based. Again then I say, whatever else you hold or deny, hold fast the free, responsible agency of man."

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[1] Pres. Edwards followed Locke in referring all our mental phenomena to *the understanding and the will;* ignoring entirely the great central department of the sensibilities. In consequence of this we find him referring, sometimes to the understanding, and sometimes to the will, what clearly belongs to the sensibilities. In this mistake he was followed by most of the earlier Hopkinsian writers.

THE NATURE OF SIN.

There is a difference of opinion on this point, between Hopkinsians and the generality of old-school Calvinists. The latter make two kinds of sin, original and actual, the sin of nature and of practice; whereas the former hold that all sin is of an active nature — an actual transgression of God's holy law. All sin, they say, is, purely or partially, directly or indirectly, *voluntary*.

By this, however, they do not mean that sin attaches only to our executive volitions and outward actions, but use the term "voluntary" in a much wider sense. Our resolutions, our purposes, our intentions, our preferences, our wishes, our moral affections, our desires — such of them, at least, as are not instinctive — are as really voluntary as our executive volitions, and are either holy or sinful, as they conform or not to the standard of God's law.

Nor do these writers understand that sin is *altogether* of a voluntary character. Many of our sinful affections and actions are in their nature complex, partly intellectual, partly sentient, and but partially voluntary. Take the sin of intemperance, or any form of sensual indulgence. Here are improper thoughts involved, which are intellectual; inflamed appetites, which are sentient; and the choice to gratify them, which is voluntary. And so of fraud, theft, murder, and many other sins. They are of a complex character. When strictly analyzed, although the voluntary element enters into them, and makes them sinful, they are found to be but partially voluntary.[1]

Many of our mental affections are holy or sinful, because they are, to some extent, under the direction of the will. This is true of our trains of thought. These are so far under the control of the will, that improper thoughts, when indulged, become sinful thoughts. And the same is true of our sentient feelings. We are commanded to be of good cheer, to rejoice in the Lord, and to sympathise with those around us, in their sorrows and joys. The states of mind here indicated are chiefly sentient; but being more or less under the control of the will, they are with propriety enjoined upon us. When duly exhibited, they are right; when otherwise, they are sinful.

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[1] Many of our holy affections are in like manner complex. Take *repentance* for an example. This involves conviction of sin, which is chiefly intellectual; sorrow for sin, which is sentient; and a turning away from sin, which is voluntary.

These explanations will show how much is intended, when it is said that all sin is, in its nature, active; that it is, purely or partially, directly or indirectly, voluntary. It is not meant that all our sinful affections are purely voluntary; but that into them all the voluntary element enters, so as to make them active, and give them a moral and a sinful character.

In proof that all sin is, in the sense explained, active and voluntary, the following considerations have been urged:

1. All sin is positively prohibited in the scriptures. We are commanded to be holy; we are forbidden to be sinful: "Cease to do evil; learn to do well." This is the substance of all the commands and prohibitions of the Bible. Now though there are various things involved in these commands and prohibitions, they are all addressed, obviously, to our *active natures*, and the things required or forbidden imply an exercise of will. The imperative phraseology: *Do this*, *Do that*, or *Thou shalt not do this*, *Thou shalt not do that*, implies that there is something to be done, or not done; something in which the subject is supposed to be voluntary. Unless, therefore, some form of sin can be pointed out which God has not prohibited, and which cannot with propriety be prohibited, we are bound to believe that all sin is alike in one respect: it is, in its nature, active.

2. Not only does God prohibit every form of sin, he uses all proper *motives* with his sinful creatures, to induce them to forsake their sins and become holy. He invites them, entreats them, pleads and reasons with them, and urges every motive which ought to have influence upon their minds and hearts. Now all this necessarily implies that in sinning and repenting, men are voluntary; that sin is, in its very nature, active. On any other supposition, motives would be quite

out of place, and all attempts at persuasion would be impertinent.

3. In proof of the active nature of sin, an appeal has been made to the testimony of conscience. It is assumed that conscience approves of whatever is holy within us, and condemns what is sinful. But does conscience approve or condemn us, do we feel worthy of praise or blame, reward or punishment, for that in which we have had no active concern? Let any person make the experiment. Let him try it on himself, or on another. The African may feel sometimes, perhaps, that his complexion is his misfortune; but endeavor to impress upon him a sense of guilt, and make him feel that he is to blame, and deserving of punishment, for the color of his skin; and see if you can succeed in the undertaking. But why not? The most ignorant African has sense enough to reply: "I did not make the color of my skin. I had no active concern in it. How, then, am I to blame for it?" This is a subject on which the common sense of all men speaks out; and to force a theological dogma, or a philosophical speculation, in opposition to common sense, is to encounter an invincible assailant.

Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret. No man ever felt himself blameworthy, no man's conscience ever approved or condemned him, for that in which he was not himself active. It follows, since conscience does condemn us for whatever is morally wrong or sinful within us, that sin, in all its forms and degrees, is active.

4. It is further urged, in proof of the same point, that it is for their *deeds* only that men are to give an account in the day of judgment. "We must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ, that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he *hath done*, whether it be good or bad" (2 Cor. v. 10). "Who shall render to every man according to *his deeds*" (Rom. ii. 6). "Then shall he reward every man according to *his works*" (Matt. xvi. 27). All persons who believe in a coming judgment suppose that men will be called to an account there for their sins, and for all their sins. But if this be true, then it follows, from the

passages quoted, that all their sins fall under the category of *works, deeds;* which is but saying that in all their sins they are voluntary and active.

5. The apostle John has given us a definition of sin, in which the same view is presented. "Sin is a transgression of the law." And lest this might not be sufficiently explicit, he tells us, in the same verse, what he means by transgression. It is *actively to commit sin.* "He that *committeth* sin transgresseth also the law" (1 John iii. 4). If John understood aright the nature of sin, this surely ought to settle the question.

6. It is still further said, in illustration of the views which have been presented, that as all holy affections are, in essence, love — supreme love to God, and impartial, disinterested love to the creatures of God, so all sin may be resolved into *selfishness.* By selfishness is meant, not that instinctive desire of happiness which is a mere feeling, which no one can or should repress; nor that love of ourselves which we are bound to exercise, as constituting a part of the great whole; nor that care and interest which every one is bound to take in respect to his own proper concerns, without needlessly interfering with those of others; but by selfishness is meant a *supreme love of self:* a setting up of self above everything else, making it a central point, and estimating other objects as they bear upon this. Selfishness, in this sense, is the opposite of that holy, disinterested love, which is "the bond of perfectness," "the fulfilling of the law," and on which "hang all the law and the prophets," and consequently may be regarded as comprising all sin. As every holy affection may be resolved into love, so envy, avarice, pride, revenge, and every other sinful affection may be resolved into selfishness. But selfishness, certainly, is an active principle. A dormant, passive, inert selfishness is a contradiction in terms.

The importance of the views here expressed, in regard to the active nature of sin, will more fully appear, as we proceed with this discussion. At present, we turn to a kindred topic of great interest:

THE ATONEMENT.

Our older standard authors have little to say, in terms, respecting the atonement. The word seldom occurs in their writings, except in reference to the typical atonements of the Old Testament. They merge what is now technically called the atonement in the more general subject of redemption. And since the atonement has come to be separately discussed, there is not an entire agreement among evangelical Christians with regard to its nature and efficiency. The old-school Calvinists consider the atonement of Christ as consisting in his personal obedience and death; the latter availing to the believer as the ground of his forgiveness, the former as the ground of his reward. But Hopkinsian writers, while they attach an indispensable importance to the perfect obedience of Christ as a prerequisite to the atonement, — as that without which no atonement could have been made, — still regard the atonement as consisting essentially in his sufferings and death. In proof of this position, several considerations have been urged.

In the first place, Christ's obedience could not meet the chief *necessity* of an atonement. That which is needed is something to sustain law; something to stand in place of the threatened penalty of the law; something which will answer all the purposes of moral government *as well* as the execution of the penalty. An expedient of this nature would be an atonement; anything short of it would not be. Now it is obvious that the perfect holiness of Christ was no substitute for the penalty threatened to transgressors. It was not adapted to be. It could not be. There was need of suffering here. The penalty of the law consists in suffering, and an equivalent, a substitute, must be of the same nature.

A like view is presented in the typical atonements of the Old Testament. These all prefigured the atonement of Christ, and may be supposed, so far as they go, to prefigure it accurately. Now it was indispensable to the acceptableness of an offering under the law, that the animal offered should be perfect in its kind. It must be without spot or blemish; thus indicating the necessity of the perfect holiness of Christ. Still, the typical atonement did not consist in the spotlessness of the lamb, but in the shedding of its blood. It was the blood, emphatically, which made the atonement. So the atonement of Christ prefigured by that of the law, must be supposed to consist in the shedding of his blood.

The same view is presented in numerous passages of scripture. The utmost stress is everywhere laid in the scriptures upon the cross, the blood, the death of Christ, as that in which the expiation, the atonement, properly consists. To quote passages in proof of this point would be superfluous. Christ is said to have been a sacrifice, an offering, an oblation, a propitiation for sin. He is said to have suffered for our sins, to have died for our sins, to have been delivered for our offences, and to have been made a curse for us in hanging on a tree. The strongest expressions are used in different parts of the Bible to set forth the nature of Christ's atonement, as consisting in his sufferings and death.

And while so great stress is laid on the death of Christ, we find his obedience spoken of in only a few instances; and in most of these, if not all (as the connection shows), the reference is to what has been called his *passive* obedience, or his obedience unto death. "Yet learned he obedience by the things that he *suffered*" (Heb. v. 8). "Being found in fashion as a man, he became obedient *unto death*" (Phil. ii. 8). "By the obedience of one, shall many be made righteous" (Rom. v. 19). These are the only passages in the Bible, in which the obedience of Christ is spoken of. The first two refer, certainly, to his obedience in suffering; and by the most judicious commentators, the last passage quoted is interpreted in the same way.

There is a difference, also, between Hopkinsians and other Calvinists as to the *efficacy* of the atonement, or the manner in which it avails to our justification. Some have believed that, by suffering for us, Christ literally *paid our debt to divine justice.* So taught Anselm, in the twelfth century, and Aquinas in the thirteenth, and many others of later date, in both the Romish and Protestant churches. But to this theory there are insuperable objections. In the first place, the demands of governmental justice against us are not of the nature of a debt, and cannot be cancelled as such. And then if they were so, and the atonement of Christ had cancelled the debt, we should owe nothing to the law. The law would no longer have any demands against us. We should need no forgiveness, nor would forgiveness be possible; as nought would remain to be forgiven.

Some have said that the death of Christ availed to make an atonement for sinners, not by paying a literal debt, but by his suffering for them the strict and proper *penalty of the law*. But to this statement there are also serious objections. The first grows out of the very nature of the penalty in question. This is *eternal death* — an eternal separation from God and from all good — the eternal destruction of body and soul in hell. It involves all the agonies of the bottomless pit; not the least part of which are the direct results of *present personal sin and guilt*; — the indulgence of the most hateful, painful passions; the stings and reproaches of conscience; dissatisfaction with God and his government; and a perpetual, burning sense of his displeasure. Did our Saviour suffer all these, or any of them? Being perfectly holy, was it possible that he should? How could such a being endure the pangs of unsated malice, envy and revenge? How could he suffer from the stings and reproaches of conscience? In other words, how could he suffer the pains and agonies of the bottomless pit, which go to constitute the proper penalty of the law?

But suppose that Christ did suffer all this. Suppose him to have suffered, not only as much as all his elect would suffer in hell forever, but the *very same*, "agony for agony, and groan for groan;" would he even then have suffered the proper penalty of the law? Manifestly not; and for the very sufficient reason that he was not the *transgressor* of the law. The penalty of the law is denounced upon the transgressor, and upon no one else. "In the day that thou eatest thereof *thou* shalt surely die." "The soul that sinneth *it* shall die." Such is the language which the law uses, in setting forth its penalty; and we see, from the very terms employed, that the *penalty* can fall upon none but the transgressor. Another may step in and endure a full *equivalent*, and so make a full expiation; but the proper penalty he cannot endure, even though he should suffer in kind and amount the same.

There is yet another objection to the theory in question — the same as that before considered. If Christ has suffered the full penalty of the law for us, then the law has no further demands against us. We need no forgiveness, nor is forgiveness possible. There is nothing left to be forgiven. Forgiveness is a remission of the incurred penalty of the law. But the penalty, on the supposition, has all been endured. It no longer remains to be remitted. God will not exact it twice; nor can he remit it, when it is no longer due.

But if the death of Christ did not avail to make an atonement, either by paying our debt to justice, or by his suffering for us the proper penalty of the law, how did it avail? In what does its atoning virtue or efficacy consist? Hopkinsians answer these questions by saying that, although Christ did not suffer the proper penalty of the law, he suffered a full *equivalent* for the penalty — a complete governmental *substitute for it.* His sufferings and death in our room and stead as fully sustain the authority of law, as fully meet the demands of justice, as fully answer all the purposes of the divine government, as would the infliction of the penalty itself; and consequently they are a complete *substitute* for the penalty, or in other words, a complete atonement.

It is believed by all evangelical Christians, that Christ's death was *vicarious*, or that he died as a *substitute.* But a substitute how, and for what? Not that he endured the proper penalty of the law for us, but an adequate *substitute for that penalty;* so that the penalty itself may now be safely and consistently remitted. Were the penalty all borne, nothing would be left to be remitted. But as it has not been borne, but only a governmental substitute for it, as it has not been removed, but only a way opened in which it may be; there is as much need of forgiveness, and as much to be forgiven, as though the Saviour had not died.

It is claimed as an advantage of this view of the atonement, that it makes it, as to its sufficiency, *universal.* The other view goes to limit the atonement; and so it is understood by those in general who advocate it. Christ would not endure the full penalty of the law for those whom it was not his purpose to save; and who, of course, would not be benefitted by his death. And yet the scriptures assure us that, as to its nature and sufficiency, the atonement of Christ is universal. It was made for all men. He "died for all;" he "gave himself a ransom for all;" he "tasted death for every man;" he "is the propitiation, not for our sins only, but also for the sins of the whole world."[1] Christ's atonement is as sufficient for one as for another. It is sufficient for all who will embrace it, and rest upon it.

Accordingly, the invitations of the gospel are sounded forth indiscriminately to all men. "Ho, every one that thirsteth, come ye to the waters;" "look unto me, and be ye saved, all the ends of the earth;" "whosoever will, let him come, and take the water of life freely." Such, clearly, is the scriptural view, as to the extent and sufficiency of the atonement; and such is the view presented in the Hopkinsian or governmental theory. This makes the atonement universal in its very nature. There is nothing to limit it but the sovereign pleasure of him who made it, or to whom it was made.

Another advantage of this theory is, that it harmonizes entirely the idea of a full and complete atonement, with that of *free grace* in forgiveness or justification. On the other theories noticed, these ideas can never be reconciled. If Christ paid our whole debt to justice, or suffered for us the full penalty of the law, then, supposing forgiveness possible (which it is not), certainly there could be no grace in it. There might be grace in providing the substitute, but none in remitting a debt which had been fully cancelled, or a penalty which had been already endured. But on the other theory, the penalty of the law has not been endured, but only a governmental equivalent. Hence, as before remarked, there is as much need of forgiveness, and as much to be forgiven, and *as much grace in bestowing pardon*, as though the Saviour had not died. On this ground, the sinner is "justified freely *by grace*, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus" (Rom. iii. 4).

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[1] 2 Cor. v. 14; 1 Tim. ii. 6; Heb. ii. 9; 1 John ii. 2.

The views of Hopkinsians as to the nature of sin (of which we have before spoken), give a peculiarity to their ideas on another subject, viz.:

NATURAL DEPRAVITY.

Those who hold to two kinds of sin, original and actual, the sin of nature and the sin of practice, regard the former of these as *innate*. It is born with us. It attaches to the very nature and constitution of the soul, and, is with the strictest propriety, called our *sin of nature*. It lies back of everything active within us, and is the prolific fountain of corruption, out of which all actual transgression flows.

Such views of natural depravity, Hopkinsian writers, of course, do not accept. They believe in the doctrine of natural as well as entire depravity; that sin is natural to us; that we are the subject of a natural bias or tendency to evil, under the influence of which we sin, and only sin, until we are renewed by sovereign grace.

Hopkinsians believe that, in our fallen state, we have a *nature to sin;* nor would they object to the phrase *sinful nature*, if by this is meant an *active nature;* something which stirs itself spontaneously, actively, within us, and consists in an active sinning against God. But to the doctrine of a sinful nature which is not active, which is back of everything active within us, the source of all actual transgression, and without a change of which no right action can be performed, they have strong objections.

They find no ground in the scriptures or in their own consciousness, for these two kinds of sin; for the one of which we feel guilty, and are conscious of deserving blame and punishment, but for the other of which we feel no guilt, since in it we have had no active concern.

Then the theory here examined makes God the responsible author of sin, at least of that sin which attaches to our nature, and is the source and fountain of all the rest. If God is not its responsible author, who is? Certainly we have had no active concern in its origination. It was born with us; it attaches to the very constitution of our souls; and must be charged, for aught we see, upon the great author of our being.

Also the theory under consideration divests us entirely and confessedly of every kind of ability to do our duty. We are utterly disabled. Until our natures are changed, and in this change of nature we are entirely passive, we can no more perform a good action than we can fly without wings, or work miracles.

Hence, the Bible, on this ground, is utterly in fault, in requiring sinners to do their duty, and in threatening them so severely in case they refuse to comply. It is in fault, too, in using motives with sinners to induce them to do what they have no ability of any kind to perform.

On this ground, ministers have little or nothing to do for the sinner, unless it be to condole with him, pray for him, and commend him to the mercy of God, who, peradventure, may have mercy upon him. Certainly, ministers can give no directions to the sinner, according to this theory, except that he use means with such a nature as he has, and wait and pray for God to change it.

It is further objected to the theory in question, that it is inconsistent with facts recorded in the scriptures. This theory accounts for all sin, by referring it to a sinful nature, and denies that actual sin can be conceived of as possible, on any other supposition. How, then, are we to account for the first sin of the rebel angels; and for that of our first parents? Did their first sin arise from a sinful nature? And if so, how was this sinful nature acquired?

But it is needless to pursue this theory of depravity further. It is a theory, not of the Bible, but of the schools. It is a philosophical theory, or rather a very unphilosopical one, of stating and defending some of the doctrines of the gospel. It is believed that the Hopkinsian view of sin and depravity, as before explained, runs clear of all the above objections, and is in strict accordance with the Bible, with sound philosophy, and with common sense.

NATURAL AND MORAL ABILITY AND INABILITY.

Another peculiarity of the Hopkinsians consists in their cognizance and use of the very important distinction between natural and moral ability and inability. They cannot be said to have originated this distinction, because it is as old, probably, as the use of words. We find it in all languages, ancient and modern. We find it in all books, and in reference to all sorts of subjects; so that those who are inclined to repudiate it, find it next to impossible to succeed. The *μὴ δύναμαι* of the Greek, the *non possum* of the Latin, the *ne puis pas* of the French, the little *cannot* of the English, are continually used in two different senses; the one expressing what is called a *moral*, the other a *natural* inability; the one a mere inability of disposition and will, the other an inability extraneous to the will, and over which the will has no power. We ask a pious friend to lift for us a thousand pounds. He replies: "I cannot do it." We ask him to go to some place of amusement on the Sabbath; he replies again: "I cannot do it." In both cases he pleads, and pleads properly (as terms are used) an inability. But who does not see that here are two kinds of inability? Our friend has no natural power to lift a thousand pounds. He could not do it, if he would. He *has* the natural power to comply with the other request, and only lacks the willing mind.

We ask a companion who is walking with us in the field to leap to the top of a precipice fifty feet high. He says "I cannot." But having clambered to the top, we ask him to leap down; he says again "I cannot." In both cases, his answer is the same in terms. He is unable either to leap up, or to leap down. But clearly, the inability in the two cases is not of the same nature. Our friend could not leap up the precipice, if he would; but he could break his neck by leaping down, if he was so inclined.

The distinction here illustrated is that between natural and moral ability and inability. It is a distinction, as we said, which runs through all languages and all books. It recurs continually in common conversation. Not one of us passes a single day, unless we pass it in utter solitude, without respeatedly using the words *can* and *cannot* in the two senses above indicated.

This distinction shows itself very often in the Bible, and that, too, in reference to a great variety of subjects. In the following passages, the inability spoken of is natural: "When Eli was laid down in his place, and his eyes began to wax dim that he *could not see*" (1 Sam. iii. 2). "The magicians did so with their enchantments to bring forth lice, but *they could not*" (Ex. viii. 18). The men in the ship with Jonah, "rowed hard to bring it to the land but *they could not*" (John. i. 13).

In the following passages, an entirely different kind of inability is spoken of. Joseph's brethren "hated him, and *could not* speak peaceably unto him" (Gen. xxxvii. 4). "We *cannot* but speak the things which we have seen and heard" (Acts iv. 20). I have married a wife, and therefore I *cannot* come" (Luke xiv. 20). In each of these cases there is obviously no lack of capacity, of natural power. The inability is wholly of a moral nature, the inability of will.

In establishing the fact of the distinction in question, we have indicated, to some extent, the nature and grounds of it. Natural ability has respect to the natural capacity or faculties of an individual. Moral ability has respect to the disposition, the concurrent will, or (which is the same) to the predominant motive, with which the will always coincides. We have the natural ability to do whatever is within the reach of our natural capacity, faculties, or powers — those with which the God of nature has endowed us. We have moral ability to do whatever, under the influence of the predominant motive, we are inclined, disposed, or willing to perform.

Calvinists of the old school deny the natural ability of the sinner to turn to God, and do his duty. He is utterly incapacitated for the performance of right actions. His very nature is sinful, and must be changed, before he can do anything that God shall approve.

From views such as these, Hopkinsian writers dissent. They assert, as strongly as any others, the entire sinfulness of the natural man; but his sinfulness does not destroy the faculties of moral agency, but rather implies them. He is still a free, moral, responsible agent, and as such is naturally capable of doing his duty. His inability to perform it is wholly of the moral kind — the same which Joseph's brethren felt when "they hated him, and *could not* speak peaceably unto him;" the same which Peter and John were under, when they "*could not* but speak the things which they they had seen and heard."

It is objected to what we have called natural ability that, if possessed at all, it must be a useless, worthless endowment; since, unless united with moral ability, or a moving, concurrent will, it accomplishes nothing in a way of action. It is admitted that mere natural ability, or faculties alone, accomplish nothing. Still it does not follow that this kind of ability is of no importance. Are not our faculties of body and mind important to us? What could we do, or how subsist as moral beings, without them? If mere natural ability accomplishes nothing, in a way of action, it is certain that nothing can be accomplished without it.

Besides, this kind of ability constitutes the ground and the measure of our moral obligation. We are morally bound to do, and God justly holds us responsible for doing, all the good which he has given us the natural ability, the capacity, to accomplish. We may not do this, or any part of it; but our neglect does not release us from the bonds of obligation. As God has given us our faculties, he may justly require us to exercise them all in his service. And this is all that he *can* justly require. Should he command us to exert powers which he had not given us; should he command us to love him with more than all our heart, and soul, and mind, and strength, the requisition would be unreasonable.

It may be further remarked, that natural ability is essential to free-agency, and is the ground of it. We must have the power to choose and refuse, to turn this way, that, or the other, to act differently from what we do, or how can we be said to act freely?

There are others who would exclude *moral* ability and inability, at least from the nomenclature of theology. If the moral *cannot* is no other than a *will not*, then why not drop it altogether, and use will not in its stead?

To this we answer, first of all, that the *moral cannot* is found in all parts of the Bible; so that without recognizing the distinction between natural and moral inability, the Bible cannot be rightly interpreted or understood.

Nor is this phraseology peculiar to the Bible. It is found, as we have said, in all languages and in all books. It occurs continually in common conversation, and in reference to all subjects. Hence, to exclude it altogether from theology, would be to render the language of theology entirely different, in this respect, from any other language.

Besides, there is a *propriety* in this peculiar phraseology. This is evident from the general currency which it has obtained. It is also evident from the facts of the case. A moral inability is a real inability; very different in its nature from a natural inability, but not the less real. In every case of moral inability, though there may be the requisite faculties, there is wanting the predominant motive and the concurrent will, without which no action will be performed.

It should be further remarked, that the *moral cannot* is not altogether synonymous with *will not.* It expresses indisposition, aversion, unwillingness, with much greater emphasis and strength. It is sometimes said of sinners that they *will not* come to Christ; but when their criminal aversion to him is to be set forth in all its energy, the *moral cannot* is used: "No man *can* come to me, except the Father which hath sent me draw him." It would but feebly set forth the moral perfection of an angel, to say that he *will not* sin against God. We rather say, he *cannot*. It would be an equally inadequate use of terms to say of Satan, that he *will not* submit to God, and return to his duty. He *cannot*. Yet in both these cases, the *cannot* is altogether of a moral nature.

We have the strongest use of the *moral cannot*, when it is applied, as it often is in the scriptures, to the Supreme Being: "Your new moons and solemn assemblies I *cannot* away with" (Isa. i. 13). "In hope of eternal life which God, that *cannot* lie, promised before the world began" (Tit. i. 2). "He abideth faithful; he *cannot* deny himself" (2 Tim. ii. 13). In each of these cases, the *cannot* expresses, not the want of natural ability, but the infinite aversion of the mind of God to everything that is wrong. It would be no honor to the Supreme Being to deny his natural ability to do wrong; for if he has no natural ability, or (which is the same) no faculties, no capacity, to do wrong, he has none to do right, or to do anything of a moral nature. But we do honor God, when we deny his moral ability to do wrong; for this implies that, though naturally able, as a moral agent, to do wrong, he never *will* do it; he is infinitely and immutably averse to it.

Hopkinsians attach a high importance to the maintenance of the distinction here insisted on, and that for several reasons. In the first place, without a knowledge of this distinction, the case of the sinner under the gospel cannot be rightly understood. He is represented in scripture as being, in some sense, *unable* to come to Christ and to do his duty. But how unable? If *naturally* unable, then he has a sufficient excuse for not doing his duty; the same that he has for not lifting the mountains or creating worlds. But if his inability is altogether an aversion of will, constituting a rooted disinclination to come to Christ and do his duty, then he has no good excuse. An inability of this kind is obviously criminal; and the greater it is, the more criminal.

Again, without maintaining the distinction here insisted on, it is impossible, with any show of consistency, to give the right *directions* to the inquiring sinner. Those who regard his inability as natural, one which he has no power of any kind to overcome, can only direct him to read and pray, and use means with such a heart as he has; while those who take the other view, will feel no hesitation in directing him, as God does, to make to himself a new heart and a new spirit; to repent of sin, and believe the gospel.

It may be further said that, without understanding the distinction in question, our need of the Holy Spirit, and the nature of his operations, cannot be rightly understood. We need the Holy Spirit, not to increase our natural ability, or to give us any new faculties or natural powers. Our difficulty lies, not in the want of faculties, but in the abuse of them. We need the influences of the Holy Spirit to overcome our *moral inability* — the natural aversion of our hearts to God. We need these influences to make us *willing* in the day of God's power — willing to use the faculties which God has given us, in his service and for his glory.

We only add that the distinction here illustrated requires to be understood, since without it, it is impossible to refute the cavils of the captious, or to justify the ways of God to man. Not a few of these objections which are urged against God and the claims of his gospel, owe all their plausibility to a confounding of the distinction between natural and moral ability and inability. "I knew thee, that thou art an hard man, reaping where thou hast not sown, and gathering where thou hast not strewed;" requiring more of creatures than they have any power to perform, and then punishing them for not fulfilling a requirement so unreasonable. Now what shall be said to objections such as these? How shall they be met and answered, but by recurring to the obvious distinction between natural and moral ability? God does *not* require of his creatures beyond what they have the natural ability, the capacity, the faculties to perform. He justly blames them, and will punish them, unless they repent, not for failing to perform impossibilities, but for *the perverseness of their hearts*, which renders them morally unable to submit to his will and obey his gospel.

REGENERATION AND THE MEANS OF IT.

Those persons who believe in the active nature of sin and of holiness will also believe, if they are consistent, in the active nature of regeneration; and this constitutes another peculiarity of the Hopkinsian theology.

The advocates of a passive sinful nature make regeneration a passive change. It is a change wrought in the soul by the new creative power of the Holy Spirit, with which the subject of it has no active concern. It is a change, too, without which no duty can be acceptably performed, and nothing really good can be done. By the very nature of his depravity, the sinner is entirely disabled, and can only wait, either stolidly or anxiously, as the case may be, for the Spirit's power to be exerted, to take away the heart of stone and give the heart of flesh.

From such views of regeneration, Hopkinsian writers dissent. They regard the heart — in the moral, spiritual sense of the term — as belonging, not to the substance or faculties of the soul, but to its affections. The sinful heart is made up of sinful exercises or affections; the holy heart, of holy affections; and a change of heart is a change in the affections, from those which are sinful to those which are holy.[1] Of course, it is an active change. It is the first yielding of the sinner to the motives and influences of the gospel; the first turning of his heart from sin to holiness, and from the power of Satan unto God. The change is wrought in the soul by the power of truth and of the Holy Ghost, but in perfect consistency with the free and natural actings of the human mind; so that, while it may be truly said that God gives the new heart and the new spirit, it may be said as truly that the sinner makes to himself a new heart and a new spirit, and comes, of his own accord, into the embrace of the gospel. — The arguments by which Hopkinsians maintain these views of regeneration are the following:

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[1] We use the word regeneration here in the larger sense, as synonomous with the new birth, a change of heart, conversion, etc.

1. Regeneration may be supposed to be, as to its nature, *the opposite of the fall.* And as the fall of man consisted in his yielding to the seductions of the tempter, and beginning actively to commit sin, so his regeneration consists in his yielding to the motives of the gospel, and beginning actively to love and serve God.

2. Truth, motives, moral considerations, are represented in scripture as the means, the instrumental causes of regeneration. "Born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, *by the word of God*" (1 Pet. i. 23). "I have begotten you *through the gospel*" (1 Cor. iv. 15). But moral considerations are addressed, of course, to the *active* nature of man. Motives have no power or tendency to bring about a physical change, or one in which the subject is passive, but only those in which he is active.

3. God exhorts and commands sinners to make to themselves new hearts, or (which is the same) to become regenerate persons: "Make you a new heart and a new spirit" (Ezek. xviii. 31). "Circumcise the foreskin of your heart, and be no more stiff-necked" (Deut. x. 16).

4. God not only commands sinners to make to themselves new hearts, but severely threatens them in case they do not comply. "Except ye be converted, and become as little children, *ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom of God*" (Matt. xviii. 3). "Circumcise yourselves to the Lord, and take away the foreskin of your hearts, *lest my fury come forth like fire, and burn that none can quench it*" (Jer. iv. 4).

5. Christ sends forth his ambassadors for this very purpose, that they may urge men to repent and turn to God, or (which is the same) to become new creatures.

6. The apostles and first preachers of the gospel engaged in this work without the least seeming embarrassment from their philosophy. They besought sinners, in Christ's stead, to become reconciled to God. They cried in the ears of guilty and lost men: "Come, come, for all things are now ready." And if any did not come, they told them plainly it was because they would not.

7. An appeal is made, on this question, to the *conscious*

experience of all truly regenerated persons. Christ has various methods of dealing with men, in preparing them for his spiritual kingdom; and yet they all enter the kingdom by the same narrow gate — *conversion* or *regeneration.* And of what are they sensible in conversion? What kind of a change is it, so far as their consciousness extends? Have any new faculties been imparted? Have they been physically wrought over into some other kind of creatures? Have they been sensible of any constraint upon the free and regular exercise of their natural powers? Nothing of all this. But they are conscious, in some way, of *giving their hearts to God;* of yielding, in some form, to the motives and influences of the gospel. They are conscious, now, of freely, spontaneously loving God, of submitting to God, of turning away from former sins, and putting their trust in the Lord Jesus Christ. They feel that they have experienced a great and glorious change; but it has been a change (so far as their consciousness can reach) in the free exercises of their own minds and hearts; a change in the affections from sin to holiness; a change from the love of self and the world, to the love of God, and the things of his kingdom. Such is the change which they have experienced, and the consciousness of it leads them to hope that they have truly passed from death unto life. The view of regeneration here exhibited is thought to be one of great practical importance, more especially to ministers. In the belief of it, the minister of Christ may go to his fellow men on the subject of religion, as he would on any other important subject, and instruct, and warn, and endeavor to persuade them, feeling that the point urged was one in which they were to be active, and in reference to which persuasion was pertinent and necessary. Thus, obviously, the apostles addressed their hearers. "Repent and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out." "Repent ye and believe the gospel." They felt no more embarrassment in calling sinners to repentance than in calling Christians to the performance of any spiritual duty.

But let the other view be taken. Let it be settled in a minister's mind that the sinner is passive in regeneration; that a change must be wrought in him, in which he is to have no active concern, before he can perform any spiritual duty; and what can such a minister say to impenitent men on the great subject of the soul's salvation. He may pity them, and pray for them. He may direct them to pray and use means with such hearts as they have, and wait for a change. But he cannot urge them to immediate repentance, or to the direct performance of any spiritual duty. Or if he does address them in exhortations such as these, it will be with a secret feeling that his exhortations are inconsistent with his belief; and in such a state of mind they will lack heart and earnestness, and will not be likely to do much good.

In this view, we are constrained to regard the doctrine of passive regeneration as one calculated to strip the gospel minister of his armor, and to clog and embarrass him in his master's work; at the same time, it is calculated to fill the mouths of sinners with excuses and objections, and furnish them with new refuges of lies, under cover of which they may sleep themselves into perdition.

It is painful to look back a generation or two, and see how good men have been hampered with this notion of passive regeneration, and what strange and unscriptural directions, under the influence of it, have been given to the impenitent. The following passage, addressed to sinners, is from Boston's "Four-fold State":

"'Though you cannot recover yourselves, *nor take hold of the saving help offered to you in the gospel*, yet, even by the power of nature, you may *use the outward and ordinary means*, whereby Christ communicates the benefits of redemption to ruined sinners, who are utterly unable to recover themselves out of the state of sin and wrath. You may and can, if you please, do many things that would set you *in a fair way* for help from the Lord Jesus Christ. Though you cannot cure yourselves, yet you may come to the pool, where many such diseased persons as you are have been cured. And though you have none to put you into the pool, yet you may lie at the side of it; and who knows but the Lord may return and leave a blessing behind him?"

So Mr. Willison, in his "Sacramental Directory," says to impenitent souls, and says it with a view to their coming to the Lord's table: "Stir up yourselves to take hold of Christ, when he is so near, and in your offer. Strive earnestly, while there is an ark prepared, and a window opened in the side of it, and the hand of mercy is put forth to pull in shelterless doves that can find no rest elsewhere. Strive to come near, by the wings of faith; *make your nest beside the hole's mouth;* be not found hovering without, lest the flood wash you away, and ye perish miserably. Try, O poor soul, if you can get a grip of Christ, especially upon a sacramental occasion, when you are nearer to him than at other times. You must not sit still, and do nothing, but *use all means in your power. Hoist up the sails, then, and wait for the gales.*"

Mr. Ebenezer Erskine, in his sermon on the "Assurance of Faith," says: "Let us store our minds with the pure and precious truths of God, and acquaint ourselves with those things which are to be believed. And having thus laid in the seed into the soil of our hearts, let us look heavenward, and *wait for a shower of the Spirit's influences.* They that offered sacrifices of old, though they could not make fire come down from heaven and consume the victim, yet they could fetch the bullock out of the stall, or the lamb out of the fold; they could bind it with cords to the horns of the altar; they could gather sticks and lay in proper fuel; and, *having done their part,* they could look up to heaven for the celestial fire to set all on a flame together. In like manner, I say, *do what is incumbent on you;* gather your sticks, lay in the proper fuel, and store your minds with the materials of faith, which you are daily reading or hearing in the word."

We can hardly conceive of instructions to impenitent souls more directly at variance with the gospel, than those which have been here introduced. Yet these were the instructions of eminent Christian teachers, gifted and godly men, whose minds had been warped from the simplicity of faith by the then commonly received dogmas of natural inability and passive regeneration. And it is mainly owing to the efforts of Hopkinsians, that like instructions are not given to sinners now. The whole subject of means and of directions to be given to the impenitent was very fully discussed, from fifty to a hundred years ago, by Hopkins, Bellamy, Spring of Newburyport, Emmons, and several others, who passed under the general name of Hopkinsians. In the year 1761, Dr. Mayhew, of Boston, published a volume of sermons, in which he endeavored to show that there are promises in scripture to the doings of the unregenerate. Dr. Hopkins replied to these sermons. This brought him into controversy, not directly with Dr. Mayhew, but with several Calvinistic ministers, as Mr. Mills of Ripton, Conn., Mr. Hart of Saybrook, and Dr. Hemmenway of Wells, Me. In 1784, Dr. Spring, of Newburyport, published his "Dialogue on Duty," in which he strenuously controverted a sermon by Dr. Tappan, afterwards Hollis Professor of Divinity at Cambridge, on the same subject. Dr. Tappan maintained that "persons in a state of unrenewed nature may perform some things," such as attending on the means of grace, "which are their duty, or which, in some respects, are truly right." This Dr. Spring denied; not meaning to deny that it is the duty of *all men*, whether saints or sinners, to attend upon the means of grace. But then, they must attend with right affections, and from right motives. They must read and hear the gospel right; must pray right; must perform every duty in such a spirit and manner as God has required and will accept. In other words, it is the duty of all men to submit to God, to become new creatures, and to use the means of grace in the only way in which it is possible for a sinner to use them, by *yielding to them at once*, and giving the heart to God. It was by discussions such as these, on the part of Hopkinsians, that the subject of regeneration, and the means of it, were rescued from previous perversions, and brought out into the clear light of the gospel.

PERSEVERANCE.

The views of Hopkinsians as to the nature of sin and of regeneration lead to some peculiarities of statement in regard to *perseverance.* If regeneration is a passive change, in which the subject of it receives a new nature, a something which he had no power of any kind to secure, and, when once secured, which he cannot lose; then his perseverance becomes a natural necessity. He cannot fall away, if he would. He is in no danger of final apostasy, and needs no warnings or exhortations to preserve him from it.

But such, obviously, is not the scriptural view of Christian perseverance, nor is it the view taken by Hopkinsian writers. They believe assuredly that the true Christian will persevere. He will endure to the end, and be finally saved. This is secured by declarations and promises which can never fail. But then *how* shall he persevere, and *why?* Not because he cannot possibly fall away, and is in no danger of it; but because, by the grace of God, *he will be kept*, and kept in the free and active exercise of his own intellectual and moral powers. His perseverance, at every step, is an *active* perseverance; a holding on, and a pressing on, in the divine life, a growing up in a meetness for the heavenly world.

But if this is the scriptural idea of perseverance, then the Christian needs *motives* to induce him to persevere, and just such motives as are set before him in the gospel. How is he to persevere *actively*, but under the influence of motives such as these? He needs to be plied with injunctions, exhortations, persuasions, warnings. He needs to be told of the *necessity* of an active, patient, unfailing perseverance. He must endure to the end, if he would be saved. He must be faithful unto death, if he would inherit a crown of life. He needs to be told, not only of the sin and guilt of a final apostasy, but of its terrible consequences. "If any man abide not in me, he is cast forth as a branch, and is withered." If the righteous man turn from his righteousness, and commit iniquity, and persist in it, he shall surely die." He needs warnings more awful even than these. He needs to be told that, "if those who have been once enlightened, and have tasted of the heavenly gift, and the good word of God, and the powers of the world to come, if they shall fall away, that it will be impossible to renew them again unto repentance, seeing they have crucified to themselves the Son of God afresh, and put him to an open shame."

If the children of God were kept passively, and not actively; if they were so kept that they could by no possibility fall away; inducements, warnings, such as these would be impertinent. There would be no place or use for them. But if the Christian's perseverance is, from first to last, an *active* perseverance; if he is to be kept, if kept at all, in the free exercise of his own faculties and powers; then, as before remarked, he must have motives. The end in view cannot be attained without them. And it is altogether pertinent and consistent for the inspired writers to present and urge just such motives as those which have been brought into view.

Most of the objections urged against the doctrine of perseverance are entirely obviated by the explanations which have here been given. It cannot be said, for example, that this doctrine is inconsistent with human freedom; for it teaches, on the very face of it, that Christians are, and must be free. They must persevere freely and actively, or not at all.

Neither can it be said that this doctrine is inconsistent with the use of motives, or religious means. On the contrary, it implies that there *must be* means. How shall Christians hold on their way, persevering actively, voluntarily in the exercise of religion, but under the influence of appropriate means — the means of grace?

Nor is the doctrine at all inconsistent with those scriptures, which represent believers as *liable* to fall away, and in actual danger of so doing. For those who hold the doctrine truly, insist that Christians *are* liable to fall; that in themselves they are in danger of falling; that they have need to be exhorted, persuaded, threatened, warned; and that their only security is in the promise and grace of God.

It is sometimes said that this doctrine must be of an *immoral* tendency; that those who regard themselves as converted, feeling sure of heaven, will give loose to their evil propensities, and plunge into sin. It is possible, indeed, for the hypocrite and self-deceiever to pervert the doctrine of perseverance in this way. But then, such persons would soon discover themselves; the mask of hypocrisy would be taken off; and their real character would be known. A real, sincere Christian — one who has the *heart* of a Christian — can never so abuse a precious doctrine of God's grace. He rather exclaims, with Paul: "How shall we who are dead to sin live any longer therein?" Such an one will be melted under a sense of the divine goodness and grace, and will regard the promises of perseverance not as an inducement to negligence and sloth, but rather as an encouragement to struggle on in the Christian race, to fight the good fight of faith, and thus prepare for the rest of God's people. This, indeed, is the very purpose for which the promises of perseverance were made to us, — to operate as motives of encouragement; and thus they will be received and acted upon by all who are truly the children of God.

The doctrine of perseverance, rightly understood, is a great and precious truth of the gospel. It is so *theologically*. It forms an indispensable link in a chain of connected doctrines, commonly called the doctrines of grace — a chain reaching from eternity to eternity, from the sovereign election of the believer before the world began to his final glorification in heaven. "For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son; and whom he did predestinate, them he also called; and whom he called, them he also justified; and whom he justified, them he also glorified." Here, at the end of the golden chain, hangs the perseverance and final glorification of the saints: "Whom he justified, *them he also glorified*."

This is a precious doctrine, too, in its practical influences.

It is one full of encouragement to the tried, afflicted, tempted, and sometimes almost despairing, people of God. We can have no better encouragement in any great undertaking than the assurance of success. With such assurances, persons often accomplish that which they would not have dared to attempt without them. But the Christian, when pressing through the narrow gate, and entering upon the work of preparation for heaven, engages in a great and difficult undertaking. Beset with enemies, within and without, and in the midst of temptation, trial, and conflict, he is pressing his way onward and upward to glory. And now, for his encouragement, he hears a voice calling out to him from the skies: "Struggle on; never give over; hold fast that thou hast; fight the good fight of faith; and you shall be sustained; you shall be carried through; you shall come off a conqueror, and more than a conqueror, through him who hath loved you and died for you." And now what precious encouragement is here! What a motive to perseverance! Who would not lay hold of it, and make the most of it? Who would recklessly cast it from him, and endeavor, without it, to win his way to heaven?

We have thus endeavored, briefly indeed, to sketch some of the leading peculiarities of what has been called Hopkinsianism. The intelligent reader will perceive that, while it sets forth prominently all the great points of Calvinism, it is Calvinism of a peculiar type. It differs variously from the Calvinism of the seventeenth century, and is, as its friends insist, an improvement upon it. It presents many of the old Calvinistic doctrines in a more reasonable and scriptural point of light, and frees them from objections which had been urged against them.

These new explanations, as before stated, originated in New England more than a hundred years ago; and though they have spread far and wide throughout the land, and throughout the Protestant Christian world, still, New England has been the principal seat and focus of them. Here they have prevailed more generally than elsewhere, and here, it might be expected, their influence would be manifested. And this leads to an objection which has been persistently urged against them, with the consideration of which this Article must close.

It has long been insisted by our brethren of the old Calvinistic school, and more especially those in the Presbyterian Church, that the introduction of Unitarianism into New England was owing to the prevalence of the Hopkinsian theology. This, it is said, was a loosening and letting down of the bars of Calvinism; and these once let down, errors in doctrine came in like a flood. Let us look, then, at this subject a moment historically.

There was no Unitarianism in New England, of any kind, so far as we have the means of knowing, until subsequent to the great revival of 1740. It was not long after the close of the revival, that Arianism began to creep in privily among us. And who brought it in? Who were the Arians of that period? Were they among the friends and promoters of the revival — the pupils and followers of President Edwards? *Not*, we venture to say, *in a single instance.* So far from this, the Arians of that day were, to a man, of the opposite class. They had been settled as Calvinists, or moderately so, but in their zeal against the revivalists — against vital spiritual religion, and its most earnest supporters — they had swerved from the faith, and were secretly introducing another gospel. They called themselves Arminians, but were really Arians, or semi-Arians. We do not now recollect a church, where the doctrines of Edwards and his followers were preached, from sixty to ninety years ago, which has since become Unitarian; while it would be easy to mention scores of churches, which once called themselves Calvinistic, in distinction from Edwardean or Hopkinsian, which first became Arminian in doctrine, and lax in discipline, and over which Unitarian ministers have long since been established.[1]

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[1] Among the earliest Arian ministers in New England, according to the first President Adams, were the Rev. Messrs. Bryant of Braintree, Chauncey and

The doctrinal influences which led to the corruption of a portion of our churches are very manifest. These corruptions resulted from the notion of a *physical depravity* in fallen man, and a consequent *natural inability* to love God and perform spiritual duties. It was because the sinner was regarded as altogether *unable* to turn to God, that he was urged to *use means* in an unregenerate way. To what else should he be urged? To repent of his sins and perform spiritual duties he had no ability of any kind; and what should he do, or be directed to do, but to use means with such a heart as he had. It was this state of things which led to the discussions before spoken of, respecting unregenerate means and doings.

It was under the influence of the same notion of inability that the sinner was urged, in many instances, to come to the Lord's table, as a means of conversion; "to come to the pipes," as one expresses it, "through which the healing waters of salvation are ordinarily conveyed to the soul."

And when, in consequence of such instructions, unconconverted men had been committed to the churches, they soon found their way to the pulpits; and so the ministry and church were corrupted together. There can be no doubt that our ministers and churches were *spiritually* corrupted, years before they were doctrinally corrupted. Arminianism and Unitarianism were in the heart before they took possession of the head.

From this account of the matter, which no one acquainted with our religious history can doubt, we see how utterly unfounded is the charge that Unitarianism came into our churches in consequence of the Edwardean or Hopkinsian theology. It was introduced rather in *spite* of this theology than by means of it. It was introduced under the influence of some of the mistaken assumptions of the old Calvinistic faith.

Of the theology which has been sketched in the foregoing

Mayhew of Boston. Shute and Gay of Hingham, and Brown of Cohasset: all of them opposers of the revival, of Edwards, and his followers. See his Letter to Dr. Moore.

pages, no intelligent Christian, we are sure, has any reason to be afraid. Without pretending to a uniformity in all things, it may be described, in general, as that theology which began to be taught by President Edwards, and has been followed up by such men as Bellamy and Hopkins and the younger Edwards, and West of Stockbridge, and Smalley, Spring, Emmons, Austin, Griffin, Worcester, and Dwight. It is the theology which has been preached in nearly all our revivals for the last fifty or sixty years; which has filled up our churches with young and active members; which has aroused and sustained the spirit of missions; which has fostered and directed nearly all the charitable enterprises of the age; which, so far from conniving at essential errors, has ever been foremost to expose and withstand them; which, while it claims to be the same as the theology of the apostles, has produced, in no stinted measure, the same blessed results. Let this theology be preserved in its purity, and preached in fidelity, free from all foreign admixtures and adulterations, and, we repeat, no intelligent Christian has any reason to be afraid of it. "Wisdom is justified of her children." "The tree is known by its fruits.

ARTICLE VII.

NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

RECENT WORKS ON EGYPTOLOGY, ORIENTAL TRAVEL, AND GEOGRAPHY.

FEW books of Oriental travel cover so wide a region of territory, and so many places and topics of interest, as are embraced in H. Petermann's two comely and portly octavos.[1] Leaving Berlin in June, 1852, he proceeded by the Danube to Constantinople, arriving there about the first of July. After a fortnight spent in the Turkish capital, in which he accomplished little more than the usual routine of sight-seeing, he went by steamer to Beirut, and from that point began a course of travel and literary and antiquarian exploration in the East, which terminated early in June, 1855, — three years from the date of his departure. By the favor of the late king of Prussia, — to whose liberal patronage Orientalists and Egyptologists owe many thanks, — Petermann was commissioned to purchase manuscripts for the royal library, and coins and antiquities for the royal museum — a function which gave a peculiar character to his oriental tour. From Beirut he proceeded at once to Damascus, where he remained until March, 1853. Leaving Damascus with the opening of spring, he journeyed southward through Râsheiya, Hasbeiya, Huneïn, Safed, Tiberias, etc., to Jerusalem, — where he spent several weeks, — and then, after various excursions in Palestine, returned by the coast to Beirut, about the middle of August. From Beirut he went again to Damascus, by way of Zahle, Zebedâny, and the Sûk Barada; and after a few days, he set out northward, by way of Baalbek and the cedars, coming down upon the coast at Tripoli, and then following the coast southward to Beirut, with occasional digressions to convents in the interior of the Lebanon. This occupied till the last of September, 1853.

In October, once more starting from Beirut, he followed the coast northward as far as Tarsus in Cilicia, and on his return, visited and explored the island of Cyprus. Again in November, 1853, making Beirut his point of departure, he went to Jerusalem, and thence began his long journey into the interior of Asia; first to Hâleb, thence to Süerek Diarbekir, Maredin, thence to Mosul; from Mosul to Bagdad, following the Tigris, from Bagdad to Babylon, and down the Euphrates to Sûk esch Schiuch, near the junction of the Euphrates with the Tigris. From this point he returned to Bagdad, and thence went down the Tigris, and crossing the Persian Gulf, proceeded eastward as far as Shirâs, and thence to Persepolis and Jezd. From this farthest eastward point, he returned by way of Ispahân, Hamadân, Kermanschâh, Kerind, to Bagdad, where he remained five months. From Bagdad he went again to Mosul, by way of Taûk, Kerkûk, Erbil (Arbêla), reaching the site of Nineveh at the end of March, 1855.

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[1] Reisen im Orient von H. Petermann, Leipzig. Verlag von Veit und Comp. 1861. Two volumes; pp. 408 and 470.

From Mosul he varied his return route to Hâleb, so as to include Orfa, and other localities of special interest, and he once more found himself in Beirut early in May. A trip to Egypt, including nothing more than a hasty visit to Cairo, terminated this protracted and most interesting tour.

Petermann devotes much space to the religious sects of the East, whose tenets and customs he had opportunity to study during his long residence at various centres of religious life. The fourth chapter of Vol. i. upon Damascus, is largely occupied with descriptions of the different sects of Mohammedans and Christians in that city. The seventh chapter is devoted entirely to the Samaritans, with whom he spent two full months, at Nablous. His account of their doctrines, their worship, their priesthood, their festivals, and their domestic and social life, is minute and comprehensive. Their doctrine of the spirit-world, of angels and devils, paradise and hell, appears to be a curious mixture of Persian myths with the teachings of Moses. The names of the four highest angels are Fanuêl, the first, under whom are Anusa, Kabbala, and Nasi. Answering to these are evil angels, or devils, of which the chief is Azazêl, and under him are Balial (Belial?) and Jasara, and a fourth whose name is unknown. Dr. Wilson states that the Samaritans render Deut. xv. 9, "Beware that there be not a thought in thy heart of *Belial*;" and that they regard Belial as a proper name of Satan (Bible Lands, Vol. ii. p. 49). According to Petermann, they hold that in the day of judgment men will be spirits without bodies; that, consequently, they will not marry, nor have any remembrance of their former life, but the good will become angels, and the bad, devils. From hatred of the Jews, they locate hell at Jerusalem,—because it lies near the Dead Sea and its water has an odor of brimstone!—but Paradise will be on Mount Gerizim. Petermann's personal inspection of the Samaritans was much more full than that of any recent traveller.

Appended to his first volume, there is also an elaborate essay on the Druzes, drawn from original sources. This is worthy of being put into English dress. A valuable historical sketch of this singular people was published in the New Englander for 1851, by W. H. Thomson, M. D., of New York, himself a native of Syria, and familiar with the tribes of Lebanon. Wortabet also gives an outline of the history and tenets of the Druzes, in his "Religions of the East." But the Appendix of Petermann is more complete and reliable than anything which has appeared on this subject, since De Sacy published his standard treatise, "*Exposé sur la Religion des Druzes.*" In addition to his own researches, Petermann procured from a Christian Arab in Damascus, well versed in the Druze religion, a minute written account of the faith and worship of this mysterious sect.

In his second volume, our author gives a minute account of the Mandaeans, whom he found at Sûk esch Schiuch, and again at Bassora, near the junction of the Euphrates and the Tigris. Petermann rejects the common orthography *Men*-daeans and writes *Man*daeans, as a patronymic from Manda de hajje — "Mandâje." They are known also as "the disciples of John," "Christians of John," "Sabians," and sometimes "Nazoreans," — which last should be carefully distinguished from the Nasaireans, a sect of Mohammedans. John the Baptist is their Messiah, and the prominence which they give to baptism, a rite which is repeated at stated times upon the same subject, has caused them to be known in church history as *Hemero-baptists.* They are commonly regarded as descendants of a Jewish sect, which, having received John the Baptist as the promised manifestation of God in the flesh, embraced Gnosticism in its earlier stages, particularly its doctrines of the emanation of Aeons, and of the conflicting kingdoms of light and darkness. John is their Aeon, the manifestation of the divinity.

Norberg, a Swede who visited them in 1780, Gesenius (in Un. Encyc. Art. *Zabier*), Burckhardt, and others, have given some account of the Mandaeans and their doctrines. But nowhere can be found so complete a statement of their legends, their faith, and their worship, as Petermann now gives in the seventh chapter of his second volume, and in Appendix 46.

Our author pays a merited tribute to the character and services of the American missionaries whom he saw at Beirut, Damascus, Hâleb, and Mosul. He characterizes them as remarkably amiable and courteous in their intercourse, and men of scholarly culture. "This enables them to be active in behalf of science; and we owe to them much important information upon the languages, history, geography, and antiquities of the countries in which they have their stations. They have also enriched the libraries and museums of their native land with literary and antiquarian treasures. But their peculiar calling, their missionary work, is with them before everything else."

Petermann happened to arrive at Mosul on his return route, just as the sad intelligence of Dr. Lobdell's death was received. He makes a touching allusion to that event, and gratefully records the kindness he received from Messrs. Marsh and Williams.

Our author was not intent on geographical exploration, and except in the way of incidental allusion, his volumes make little addition to our general knowledge of the countries through which he travelled. But for the special characteristics above indicated, Petermann's Travels in the East will long be a standard book of reference with oriental scholars; though its price, about eight dollars, may restrict it mostly to public libraries. It contains a fine map by Kiepert.

Der Zug der Israeliten aus Aegypten nach Canaan, von Gustav Unruh: Langensalza. The chief point of interest in this *brochure* is the theory that Goshen lay along the Mediterranean, near the easternmost mouth of the Nile, between Tanis and Avaris, which last the author makes the Rameses of the Bible. He supposes, also, that an arm of the Mediterranean extended inland at this point, which with the Bitter Lakes — according to Unruh the "Sea of Weeds,"— formed an almost continuous water connection between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea; and he locates the crossing at a point about ten geographical miles north of Suez, where he thinks the Israelites, favored by an ebb-tide and a strong east wind, found a dry ford, while the Egyptians, in the darkness and the confusion caused by the returning tide, missed the ford, got into deep water and were drowned. The author seems to adopt the narrative of Moses without accepting its miraculous features.

The same author has just published *Das alte Jerusalem und seine Bauwerke.* Ein Beitrag zur biblischen Alterthumskunde. Unruh divides the topographical and architectural history of Jerusalem into four periods. (1.) Jerusalem until its destruction by the Chaldaeans. This embraces an account of Zion, the Lower City, Solomon's Temple, and other buildings of his reign, Bezetha — which he thinks was incorporated with the city in the time of Hezekiah, — and a general sketch of Jerusalem under the successors of Solomon. (2.) This period embraces the history of the city until the time of the Idumean dominion. Beginning with the temple of Zerubbabel, it treats of the rebuilding of the city, its condition under foreign rule (Persian, Macedonian, Egyptian, Syrian), its restoration by the Maccabees, and the public buildings of the Asmonean kings. (3.) This is the period of the Idumean dynasty. It describes the temple of Herod and his other public edifices, and the various improvements made by his successors. The fourth period is that of the destruction of the city by the Romans. The work is illustrated with numerous maps and plans. It is so unique in its method, and so important in some of its views and results, that we propose to make it hereafter the basis of a distinct Article upon Jerusalem and the Temple; associating with it the admirable work of Neumann upon the Tabernacle in the Wilderness, just published by Perthes of Gotha. (*Die Stiftshütte:* von Wilhelm Neumann, pp. 175.) This is an artistic and literary illustration of the Mosaic period of Jewish history. It treats of the encampment of Israel in the Wilderness; the sanctuary of Jehovah; and the divine service of the Tabernacle. The work is printed upon thick paper, large octavo, in the best style of typography, and contains nearly eighty pictorial illustrations of the details of the Tabernacle and its service. These studied in connection with Egypt and Assyria, present some important links in the history of religious art. But this we must reserve for a future Article. The price of the work in this country is $6.

Etudes Critiques sur la Bible, — ancien Testament. par Michel Nicolas. Paris. Michel Lévy Fréres. 1862. pp. 442. The author of this volume is not to be confounded with Auguste Nicolas of Bordeaux, formerly justice of the peace, and a legal advocate of distinction, author of *Etudes Philosophiques sur le Christianisme.* That work, in four duodecimo volumes, has already passed through fourteen editions, and was regarded by Lacordaire as in many respects a timely and able defense of Christianity against modern scepticism. Auguste Nicolas first discusses principles of Natural Theology, the existence of God, and the immortality of the soul. His argument for the soul's immortality, drawn from conscience, from the sense of responsibility, and from the idea of justice, is expressed with remarkable clearness and force. From these preliminary disquisitions he passes to the necessity for a Revelation, and the evidences of a Revelation, both internal and external. Moses is interpreted in the light of science and of monumental remains; the question of miracles is discussed, and various doctrines of the scriptures are stated and defended. Under the head of the doctrines of Christianity, the author, as a devout Catholic, includes Purgatory, Confession, the Sacramental Presence, and other dogmas of the Church of Rome; yet his work is none the less interesting as the contribution of an able and learned Romanist to the defense of Christianity against the more recent forms of infidelity.

Quite different in its spirit and aim is the work of *Michel* Nicolas. The volume consists of four essays: (1.) The sources and the formation of the Pentateuch; (2.) The general principles of Mosaïsm — subdivided into Jehovism and the Theocracy; (3.) Mosaism from the death of Joshua to the close of the monarchy; (4.) Hebrew Prophetism. Two of these essays originally appeared in the *Revue Germanique;* but these have been revised and elaborated for publication in their present form. The general point of view of the author is, that the institutes of Moses never were in full vigor among the Israelites, and that, except with a small portion of the people, Mosaism in its fundamental principles, was not known and adopted until the later times of the monarchy. The author makes a distinction between the age of the Mosaic ideas and institutions, and the period of the composition of the Pentateuch in its present form. The latter he insists cannot be carried back beyond the return from the Babylonian captivity. His argument is, that the Elohistic and the Jehovistic documents represent the two distinct currents of religious thought and feeling; and that these could never have been united as they appear in the Pentateuch, as if derived from a common source, until an age when the ancient opposition between Jehovism and Elohism, as types of religious parties in the nation, had entirely disappeared; when the divisions which had marked the whole history of Israel from the time of Moses to the end of the monarchy, were effaced and forgotten. Regarding Jehovism and the Theocracy as the fundamental principles of Mosaïsm, and the prophets as the adherents and expounders of that system, Nicolas interprets the controversies of the prophets with the idolatrous tendencies of the people, as the strife between the Jehovistic and Elohistic parties in the nation. Thus the men of the North whom Hezekiah summoned to Jerusalem to celebrate the Passover, were Jehovists, and they showed their zeal for their more metaphysical conception of the Deity, by destroying the altars of the Elohists, who worshipped one God, indeed, but through the medium of sensible images and the powers of nature. Under Manasseh, the Elohists returned to power, and slaughtered the prophets and other advocates of Jehovism. Josiah, in turn, declared for Jehovism; but under several of his successors, Elohism was again in the ascendant. Yet from the time of Hezekiah, the monotheistic doctrine which our author attributes to Moses under the name of Jehovism, steadily gained influence in the nation, and in the time of the captivity, it entirely superseded the rival system of Elohism. Then the way was prepared for harmonizing the two in the Pentateuch as we now possess it. We content ourselves with stating, without refuting, this theory of Nicolas, as a phase of recent Biblical criticism. His first essay gives a condensed and comprehensive view of the history of criticism upon the Pentateuch. But while Nicolas assigns to the Pentateuch in its present form no higher antiquity than the time of Ezra, he regards Moses as a real character, and his laws and institutions as a substantive reality. Indeed the dissatisfaction and distrust awakened by his first essay, are in a measure allayed, when he comes to treat of the general principles of Mosaïsm. He shows that the resemblance between the institutions of Moses and those of the Egyptians, is confined to mere outward matters of detail, while there is between them a radical diversity in principle and spirit. The author's discussion of monotheism and the theocracy contains much valuable thought. He traces the conception of God as the self-existent Jehovah, and also as the king of Israel, back to the original settlement of Israel in Canaan.

Nicolas closes his work with a disquisition upon the Messianic element in Hebrew prophecy. Biblical students will find much to interest them in these *Etudes Critiques*, however they may differ from the author in his principles of criticism or in his general conclusions. Nicholas is Professor at Montauban, but sympathizes with the Tübingen school of criticism.

THE EGYPTIAN CHRONICLES, by William Palmer, M. A., late Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford,[1] offers to the student in Egyptology a new scheme for the harmony of sacred and Egyptian chronology, based upon his reading of the "Old Chronicle," as preserved by Syncellus, who probably copied it from the Manetho of Africanus. Lepsius gives it in his *Königsbuch der Alten Ægypten*, in parallel columns with other ancient lists, so that one can see, at a glance, the relation of this table to the various tables based upon Manetho by his Greek critics and commentators. Bunsen speaks contemptuously of the "so-called old Egyptian Chronicle," as a fiction compiled by some Jewish or Christian impostor, even later than the third century. (Egypt's Place, i. 214.)

This Chronicle, which Syncellus describes as the oldest Egyptian document written in the Greek language, is simply a list of dynasties, from the gods and demigods, down through the reigns of human kings, to the thirtieth dynasty. It begins as follows:

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[1] Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts. Two volumes, octavo; pp. 1053.

" *Time* of Phtha there is *none*, as he shines equally by night and by day.

" Ἡλιός, son of Phtha, reigned three myriads of years — 30,000.

" Then Κρόνος, it is said, and all the other twelve gods, reigned years 2984.

" Then eight demi-god kings reigned years 217.

" And after them fifteen generations of the cynic cycle were registered in years 443;" — total, 34,644.

Now begins the first proper historical dynasty of kings, the XVI. of Tanites according to the Chronicle; and the sum total of kings, from dyn. XVI. to dyn. XXX. inclusive, is 1881 years. This is the document which our author proposes to make the key to the chronology of Egypt. The date of the Chronicle itself is assigned to the fourth century B. C.: but Palmer supposes it to have been based upon a Hieratic scheme of chronology which dated from about B. C. 1322. The Chronicle is based upon "the idea of a succession of worlds, and of a certain period of time ending the existing world and introducing a new one." These periods of reconstruction were measured roundly by the Sothic cycle of 1461 Egyptian vague years; or, more strictly, "that particular space of 1461 years which begins from the conjunction of the movable new-year, or Thoth 1, with the heliacal rising of Syrius, fixed to July 20 of our Gregorian calendar for that part of Egypt which is just above Memphis." The last of these Sothic periods falling within the range of the Chronicle, dates from July 20, B. C. 1322, and would have closed in A. D. 139. But the theory of Mr. Palmer is, that with a view to make the conquest of Ochus in the fourth century before Christ mark a new reconstruction, the author of the Chronicle antedates this Sothic period, by throwing back its unfulfilled years into a fictitious period of the cynic cycle. He next resorts to various hypothetical processes to reduce the nominal and mixed years of the Chronicle to a true standard of time: he treats the immense periods of Sothic cycles as nominal years, to be reduced to months, by the following equation: 33,603 nominal years equal to 1 month and $\frac{1}{23}$ of a month each = 2922 full Egyptian years [+ 341 fictitious] + 40 of the current cycle thrown up + 217 + 443 more of the cycle thrown up + 1881 of kings to B. C. 345. This reduces the XXV Sothic cycles of 36,525 nominal to IV of 5844 full Egyptian years, coming down to A. D. 139. Then, after wandering through a perfect labyrinth of formulas — reminding one of the pages of the Calculus, or of a millenarian computation of the prophetic numbers of Daniel and the Apocalypse — the author comes at length, on p. 892, to the conclusion that the Egyptian priests placed their epoch of the creation no further back than B. C. 5362. From this *datum* he constructs, in parallel columns, a harmony of Sacred History and the Egyptian Chronicles, down to A. D. 139; to which is added an Appendix on Babylonian and Assyrian antiquities. The work is a prodigious monument of industry, perseverance, and enthusiasm in the pursuit of a specialty; and though some of its interpretations are but clever guesses, it cannot be overlooked by the student of chronology. It is printed in elegant style, at a cost of about $10.

A supplementary edition of Petermann's *Mittheilungen* (published at Gotha by Justus Perthes) contains the first part of a geographical description of Inner Africa, compiled from the best sources, by A. Petermann and B. Hassenstein. This supplement will be completed in about five numbers; each number to contain, besides the letter-press, two sections of a map of Inner Africa, drawn on a large scale, and exhibiting the routes of all travellers who are quoted as authority. The map, when completed, will extend from 30° N. to 8° south of the equator, and from 12° to 35° E. from Greenwich. The first number, which has just come to hand, contains the Nubian desert, Darfur, Kordofan, etc. The text embraces Moritz v. Beurmann's travels through the Nubian desert in 1860, Theodore Kotschy's travels from Khartum to Kordofan in 1839, and Brun Rollet's travels in the marshy regions of the upper Nile in 1856. The whole work will be an accurate and complete compendium of geographical exploration in central Africa down to 1861. The sections of the map can be joined upon canvass as a wall-map for convenient reference.

Several of the regular numbers of the Mittheilungen for 1861 contained sections of *Th. v. Heuglin's* expedition to Inner Africa, with accompanying essays upon the fauna of the Red Sea, etc.

CRATO VON CRAFFTHEIM UND SEINE FREUNDE. Ein Beitrag zur Kirchengeschichte. Nach handschriftlichen Quellen. Von Dr. J. F. A. Gillett, Prediger an der Hofkirche zu Breslau. Frankfort am Main. H. L. Brönner, 2 Bände. St. 502, 556.

The author of the above work is fully justified in terming it a "Contribution to Church History." Whoever has attempted to explore the history of crypto-Calvinism with such aids as our standard historians proffer, will know the value of a book which lays before him the correspondence, relations, and labors of nearly the whole circle of divines known as crypto-Calvinists. The author was fortunate enough to discover, not long since, in the archives and libraries of Breslau, a perfect mine of unused material, embracing the original correspondence of the party. In the elaboration of his work he has not only guaranteed his historic truthfulness by continual reference to the sources, but has reproduced, in an appendix to the second volume, no less than eighty-two of the original Latin epistles, covering the period extending from Sept. 1, 1550 to June 16, 1603. Among these may be found epistles from Beza, Ursinus, C. Peucer, Camerarius, Musäus, Crato, Victor Strigel, etc. etc. As will be seen, the *documentary* value of the work is by no means inconsiderable. The letters alone occupy a hundred octavo pages, closely printed.

One object of the writer, though by no means an unduly prominent one, is the vindication of the historic and abstract right of the German Reformed Confession against the assumptions of ultra and exclusive Lutheranism. This is referred to in the opening paragraph of the Preface as follows: "Ill-will toward 'the Union,' and the confessional strife thereby engendered, have by natural consequence conducted back to history. The more confidently it is taught and maintained that the reformed church is only an apostasy from the reformation of Luther, and that the Lutheran church on that account does not *make* union, but herself *is* the Union, the more urgently have the Reformed found themselves summoned to seek the answer thereto at the hand of history. In history they have also had to investigate the reason why, with them, inherited love for their Confession proves compatible with the most sincere love to the Union."

The work is thoroughly elaborated, and will take its place as a standard reference-book in its department. Few books of its size have cost greater labor.

PERMANENT DOCUMENTS ON THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION.[1]

THOUGH bearing a local name, and originated for a temporary purpose, the Western College Society has brought into existence a literature novel, unique, and of enduring value, illustrative chiefly of the connection between the higher departments of education and the progress of Christianity. These "Permanent Documents" have already reached the dimensions of three large octavo volumes, and may be divided into three distinct classes. First, there are the sixteen Annual Reports of the indefatigable Secretary, Rev. Theron Baldwin, in each of which, after disposing of local and occasional matters, he discusses some one important point in the history of classical and theological education, as related to the history of the church, and which, taken together, constitute a thesaurus of facts and principles touching Christian education, such as can scarcely be found anywhere else. In the second place, the Discourses and Addresses at the anniversary meetings of the Society are not mere popular harangues designed to excite emotion and raise money, for the occasion, but the carefully considered and elaborately written views of some forty or fifty of the most learned and judicious clergymen, presidents, professors, scholars, and teachers, of the whole country, on the profoundest educational problems of the age. The first of the Discourses is by Mr. Barnes, the second by Dr. Beman, the third by Dr. Bacon, the fourth by Dr. Condit, and the fifth by Dr. E. Beecher. These are contained in the first volume. The Addresses in the second volume are by Doctors Bacon, Stowe, Beman, Cox, Linslay, Hall, E. Beecher, Peters, Hon. R. Wilkinson, Professors Haddock and Park, and Presidents White, Sturtevant, and Sprecher. The table of contents is not less rich in the other two volumes.

In the third place, these "Permanent Documents" include also certain publications of the Society, issued originally in the form of pamphlets or small volumes, and intended particularly to enlighten the minds of common Christians concerning the claims of Colleges to the sympathies, prayers, and contributions of the entire Christian church; such as Dr. Todd's Plain Letters to a Parishioner, entitled "Colleges essential to the Church of God"; Prof. Porter's Plea for Libraries; the same writer's Premium Essay comparing the Educational Systems of the Jesuits and the Puritans; and Prof. Tyler's Prize Essay on Prayer for Colleges.

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[1] Permanent Documents of the Society for the Promotion of Collegiate and Theological Education at the West. Vols I., II, III. New York: John F. Trow.

Amid streaming banners and the uproar of war, the voices of wisdom and eloquence that plead for the hallowed union of learning and piety, and warn against every unholy attempt to separate what God has joined together, are very likely to go unheeded. It is well, therefore, to preserve in a permanent form, such documents as these against the time when the minds of patriots and Christians can more tranquilly consider them. It is devoutly to be hoped that it will not then be too late to profit by the lesson which they teach. They should find a place on the shelves of all our public libraries. They deserve universal notice by the periodical press. And it is a sacred duty which educated Christian men, especially clergymen, owe to their churches on the one hand, and to the colleges at which they received their education on the other, to possess themselves of these facts and principles, and to become the medium of their communication to the uneducated masses. We hope at some future time to recur to this subject — so kindred to the design of the Bibliotheca Sacra — in an Article more worthy of its transcendent importance.

We have received from the house of Charles Scribner, 124 Grand Street New York, the following works:

The Uprising of a Great People: The United States in 1861. To which is added, A Word of Peace on the Difference between England and the United States. From the French of Count Agenor De Gasparin. By Mary L. Booth. New American Edition, from the Author's Revised Edition. pp. 298, 12mo.—The present edition of this deservedly popular volume is much more accurate than the preceding. Few foreign treatises on the United States contain so much truth with so little error.

Lectures on the English Language. By George P. Marsh. First Series. Fourth Edition. Revised and enlarged. 1862. pp. 715. 8vo. — This volume has already attracted the attention of English and of Continental philologists, and deserves a place in every clergyman's library.

Lessons in Life; a Series of Familiar Essays. By Timothy Titcomb. Author of "Letters to the Young," "Gold Foil," etc. Tenth Edition. pp. 345. 12mo. — The author of the present Series has attained a high reputation for his sprightly style, and his keen criticisms on life and manners.

Ethical and Physiological Inquiries; chiefly relative to Subjects of Popular Interest. By A. H. Dana. pp. 308. 12mo.—We have examined some of Mr. Dana's Essays, with pleasure and profit. They are fragmentary, but suggestive. They were not designed to be exhaustive discussions, but are well adapted to stimulate the mind. They are collections of germs, which the reader will easily transform into fruits.

Commentary on the Epistles to the Seven Churches in Asia. Revelation ii., iii. By Richard Chenevix Trench, D.D., Dean of Westminster. pp. 312. 12mo.—Dean Trench exhibits here, as elsewhere, a profound reverence for the word of God, an extensive acquaintance with classical and patristic literature, a genuine tact in explaining the difficult phrases of the ancient writers. The present volume will be noticed more fully hereafter.

We are indebted to Robert Carter and Brothers, No. 530 Broadway, New York, for the fourteen volumes named below:

An Exposition of the Epistle of the Apostle Paul to the Hebrews. By the late John Brown, D.D. Edited by David Smith, D.D. Biggar. Vol. I. pp. 451; Vol. II. pp. 440. 8vo.—The author of this exposition was distinguished for a rare union of qualities highly important to an interpreter of the scriptures. He was a man of profound judgment, and of deep piety. He had read extensively, and was particularly conversant with the worthiest books. He was an independent thinker. Perhaps no Scottish theologian has excelled him in a genuine love of freedom. To Americans Dr. Brown is justly dear. They were ever welcome at his fireside. He was intimately acquainted with their favorite writings. He loved the institutions of the United States, and heartily sympathized with the distinctive spirit of American theology. The present work of Dr. Brown was prepared for the press by himself. It is not a posthumous work, in the ordinary sense of that term. It is one of his most elaborate commentaries. Nine of his Discourses on select portions of the Epistle to the Hebrews are appended to the second volume of the commentary, and they augment the value the work for clergymen and intelligent Christian laymen.

Louise Juliane, Electress Palatine, and her Times. By Fanny Elizabeth Bunnett. pp. 263. 12mo.—This volume is the result of original investigation. Its materials were gathered from the national collections of ancient and curious manuscripts in Great Britain and Germany, and from numerous publications inaccessible to the American reader. The moral and religious impression of the volume is excellent.

The Way to Life. Sermons by Thomas Guthrie, D.D., author of "Gospel in Ezekiel," "Saints' Inheritance," etc., pp. 336. 12mo.—Dr. Guthrie exhibits, in the present volume, his usual power of illustration. Few writers excel him in presenting vivid portraitures of truth. Many of them are natural as well as graphic. Sometimes Dr. Guthrie *strains* an illustration, and sometimes he *strains after* one, but in the general he interests and charms, while he instructs the devout reader.

Thoughts on Holy Scripture. By Francis Bacon, Lord Chancellor of England. Compiled by John G. Hall, Pastor of the Reformed Dutch

Church, Fort Plain, N. Y. pp. 408. 12mo.— These Thoughts, many of them immortal, are happily arranged by the Editor, and form a volume of uncommon interest and power.

Health: Five Lay Sermons to Working People. By John Brown, M.D., author of "Rab and his Friends," etc. pp. 90. 18mo—Dr. Brown is a writer whom we love to read; and his Lay Sermons form an admirable model for clerical sermons, in respect of a racy English style, and a direct way "of putting things." The present tract deserves an extensive circulation.

The five volumes whose titles immediately follow are well adapted to the popular taste, and they make a healthful religious impression:

The Near and the Heavenly Horizons. By Madam De Gasparin. pp. 311. 12mo.

Life Work; or the Link and the Rivet. By L. N. R., author of "The Book and its Story," and "The Missing Link."

The Pathway of Promise; or, Words of Comfort to the Christian Pilgrim. pp. 196. 18mo.

The "I wills" of Christ: being Thoughts upon some of the Passages in which the words "I will" are used by the Lord Jesus Christ. By Rev. Phillip Bennett Power, M.A., Incumbent of Christ Church, Worthing. pp. 395. 12mo.

The Life of Arthur Vandeleur, Major, Royal Artillery. By the Author of "Memorials of Captain Hedley Vicars," etc. pp. 303. 12mo.

The three volumes whose titles are next given, are from the pen of Rev. Horatius Bonar, D.D., of Kelso, Scotland; author of the "Night of Weeping," the "Morning of Joy," the "Desert of Sinai," the "Land of Promise," etc., etc.

Hymns of Faith and Hope. First Series. pp. 269. 18mo.

Hymns of Faith and Hope. Second Series. pp. 308. 18mo. — The First Series of these Hymns has been previously republished by the Messrs. Carter. The Second Series appears now in its first American edition. It is not perhaps equal to the first, but contains many sweet stanzas.

God's Way of Peace: a Book for the Anxious. pp. 200. 18mo. This unpretending volume abounds with solemn counsel to the unrenewed, and exhibits many specimens of theological acumen.

From Carlton and Porter, 200 Mulberry Street, New York, we have received the following works:

The History of the Religious Movement of the Eighteenth Century, called Methodism considered in its different Denominational Forms, and its Relations to British and American Protestantism. By Abel Stevens, LL.D. Volume III. From the death of Wesley to the centenary jubilee of Methodism. pp, 524. 8vo.—This is an admirable volume. It has all the interest of a novel. Dr. Stevens writes in a graphic style, and clothes the ample materials of his history in an attractive garb.

The Elements of Logic: adapted to the capacity of younger students, and designed for academies and the higher classes of common schools. By Charles K. True, D.D. Third Edition, revised. pp. 176. 18mo. — We are happy to perceive that this excellent treatise has had a large circulation.

Rudiments of Public Speaking and Debate; or, Hints on the Application of Logic. By G. J. Holyoake, author of "Mathematics no Mystery," "Logic of Facts," etc. With an Essay on Sacred Eloquence, by Henry Rogers. Revised by Rev. L. D. Barrows. pp. 230. 12mo. — The study of this volume cannot fail to exert a beneficial influence on our public speakers.

The Missionary in Many Lands. A Series of interesting Sketches of Missionary Life. By Erwin House, A.M. Ten Illustrations. pp. 388. 18mo.

A Missionary Among Cannibals: or, the Life of John Hunt, who was eminently successful in converting the people of Fiji from Cannibalism to Christianity. By George Stringer Rowe. pp. 280. 18mo.

Life among the Chinese; with characteristic Sketches and Incidents of Missionary Operations and Prospects in China. By Rev. R. S. Maclay, M.A. Thirteen years Missionary to China from the Methodist Episcopal Church. pp. 400. 12mo. — The three volumes last named contain many thrilling narratives of missionary life.

A Commonplace Book; designed to assist students, professional men, and general readers in treasuring up knowledge for future use. Arranged by Rev. James Porter, D.D. With an Introduction by Rev. William Rice, A.M.—We are pleased with this volume. The plan of it is simple, and so much the more valuable.

Moral and Religious Quotations from the Poets. Topically arranged: comprising choice selections from six hundred authors. Compiled by Rev. William Rice, A.M. Third edition. pp. 338. 8vo.—The mechanical execution of this volume will commend it at once to the reader. The selection is made tastefully and judiciously.

Mr. Warren F. Draper, of Andover, has recently published a Commentary on Ecclesiastes. By Moses Stuart, late Professor, etc., at Andover. Edited and revised by R. D. C. Robbins, Professor in Middlebury College. pp. 346. 12mo.—Prof. Robbins is performing a work of great value, in editing and revising the exegetical volumes of Professor Stuart. The present edition of the Commentary on Ecclesiastes deserves, and will doubtless receive the favorable judgment of scholars belonging to different sects and schools. Prof. Stuart was admirably fitted to explain the Coheleth, and many parts of his explanation are racy in style, as well as rich in thought. We hope that all of his exegetical writings will be given to the public in a uniform edition. A good commencement has been made already.

From the house of Gould & Lincoln, No. 59 Washington Street, Boston, we have received the "Annual of Scientific Discovery; or, Year-Book of Facts in Science and Art for 1862: exhibiting the most important Discoveries and Improvements in Mechanics, Useful Arts, Natural Philosophy, Chemistry, Astronomy, Geology, Zoölogy, Botany, Mineralogy, Meteorology, Geography, Antiquities, etc.; together with Notes on the Progress of Science during the year 1861; a List of Recent Scientific Publications; Obituaries of eminent scientific men, etc. Edited by David A. Wells, A.M., author of Principles of Natural Philosophy, Principles of Chemistry, Science of Common Things, etc. pp. 415, 12mo." — This Annual is too well known to need commendation. We greet, with peculiar pleasure, every new volume of it.

The Testimony of Christ to Christianity. By Peter Bayne, A.M., author of Essays on Biography and Criticism, etc. pp. 200, 18mo. — Mr. Bayne commands a sprightly and vigorous English style. The tone of the present volume, like that of the preceding works from his pen, is healthful and inspiriting.

We had prepared a full Notice of White and Riddle's Latin-English Dictionary, published by Longman and Company, London, but have room to express our estimate of it only in general terms. Though based on Freund's Latin Dictionary (Andrews's translation), it "has been so thoroughly re-written and enlarged as to entitle it to the character of a new work." It embodies the results of the most mature and critical scholarship, and the best fruits of the recent studies in Comparative Philology, so far as they relate to the Latin. In its etymology, its philosophic arrangement, the natural deduction of the secondary from the primary meanings of words, in its illustrations of their various constructions, and in the fulness and clearness of its definitions, it is fully up to the present advanced stage of Latin scholarship; and, as ought to be expected from the advantages under which it has appeared, is much superior to any previous work of the kind. It is a royal octavo volume of 2103 pages.

The Article on Hopkinsianism, in our present number, is the *third* of a series of Articles designed to exhibit the peculiar views of each theological school or sect, in a style which the friends of that school or sect will not deem unfair. It is not the aim of these Articles to state the *reasons* for the peculiar views which are described, but merely to state the views. Still, it is sometimes necessary to give a synopsis of the arguments in support of a particular creed, because the arguments themselves have been often misrepresented, and the distinctive nature of the creed cannot be fully portrayed without a reference to some of the proofs adduced in its favor.

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ARTICLE I.

THE ATONEMENT, IN ITS RELATIONS TO GOD AND MAN.[1]

BY REV. ENOCH POND, D.D., PROFESSOR IN BANGOR THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

This little book has been for a long time before the public. The substance of it was published, in four sermons, almost forty years ago. In 1844 it was re-written; the form of sermons was dropped, a new chapter added, and it was given to the public in its present state. Since that period, it has been extensively circulated, not only in our own country, but in foreign lands. It has been translated into several languages, as the French, the Welsh, and the Low Dutch. In the preface to the last edition of his Controversy with the Unitarians, the late Dr. Wardlaw speaks of it with high commendation.

But in the midst of so much approbation, it has not entirely escaped censure. As might have been expected, the Unitarians early laid their hands upon it; and almost immediately after its publication in its present form, it was subjected to an elaborate and merciless criticism in the Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review, vol. xvii. p. 84. "This book," say the reviewers, "is in itself of little consequence; but from its gross and confident misrepresentation of the truth, it has more of the power due to falsehood, than any book of the kind we know" (p. 138). In the following remarks, we shall have more frequent occasion than we could have desired, to refer to this Review.

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[1] Christ the only Sacrifice; or, the Atonement in its Relations to God and Man. By Nathan S. S. Beman, D.D. With an Introductory Chapter by Samuel Hanson Cox, D.D. Second Edition; Revised, re-written, enlarged, and improved. New York: Mark H. Newman. 1844.

The view of the atonement presented by Dr. Beman is that commonly known as the *governmental theory;* the same that was advocated by Doctors Edwards, Griffin, Emmons, Mr. Burge, and many others. According to this view, the atonement is an expedient of infinite love and mercy, adopted with a view to satisfy the justice of God and sustain his law and government, in extending pardon and salvation to guilty men.

The work before us is divided into five chapters. The first is on the *necessity* of an atonement. An atonement was necessary, not to make God merciful, but to open a way in which his mercy could consistently flow out to our guilty race. It was necessary, to manifest God's supreme regard for his law, his holy hatred of sin, and his determination to punish it as it deserves. It was necessary, also, on account of "its practical influence on moral and immortal beings," in this world, and in all worlds. It is sometimes asked: Why could not God pardon repenting sinners without an atonement? To this it is pertinently replied: None ever would have repented without an atonement. The mere influence of a broken law never brought sinners to repentance, and never will.

Dr. Beman's second chapter is on the *fact* of an atonement; which he argues, first, from the bloody sacrifices of the Patriarchal and Mosaic dispensations — a form of worship which was extended all over the ancient world. There is no accounting for this peculiar mode of propitiating the Deity, but on the ground of an original divine institution. Nor "would God have appointed such a propitiation, but on the supposition of its symbolical, typical character, pointing forward, as the scriptures assure us that it does, to the expiation of the cross. The fact of the atonement is also proved by numerous and positive declarations of God's word.

The next two chapters are on the *nature* of the atonement; in the first of which the author examines and refutes the supposition that Christ perfectly obeyed the law for us, and bore its literal penalty in our room and stead, thus paying our debt to justice, and cancelling all demands of the law against us.

> "This system would destroy all mercy in God the Father, in the salvation of sinners, because it represents God as totally disinclined to the exercise of compassion till every jot and tittle of the legal curse was inflicted. On the same principle grace or pardon, in the release of the sinner from future punishment, would be out of the question; for what grace or pardon or favor can there be in the discharge of a debtor whose demand has been cancelled to the uttermost farthing? And as to the benevolence of the gospel, it is impossible to discover how such a feature can consist with that idea of the atonement which represents Christ as having suffered the same amount of penal evil which would have been embraced in the future condemnation of all those who will be redeemed by his sacrifice. What wisdom or benevolence can there be in a plan or expedient which shall inflict a certain degree of suffering upon the innocent, who could never deserve it, in order to spare the guilty from precisely the same degree of suffering, and to which, too, their sins had justly exposed them." p. 122.

In the following chapter (the fourth) Dr. Beman sets forth, more fully than he had before done, what he conceives to be the true nature of the atonement. He regards Christ as having suffered, "not the literal penalty of the law, but that which will fully vindicate the divine character, and support the divine government; while God, at the same time, offers pardon and eternal life to the sinner, and actually secures these blessings to every one who complies with the terms or conditions on which they are offered." This view of the atonement leaves the sinner still exposed to the penalty of the law, and in need of pardon; and represents pardon and salvation as being entirely of grace — as much so as though no expiation had been made.

In the fifth and last chapter, Dr. B. considers the *extent* of the atonement; showing conclusively, from its very nature, and from a great variety of scripture representations, that it is not limited to the elect, but is sufficient for the whole human race. The offers of the gospel are freely made to all men, and those who fail of heaven will finally perish, not because no atonement had ever been made for them, but because they rejected the provided Saviour, and would not come to him that they might have life.

Dr. B. might have added another argument for the universality of the atonement, from the fact that all men are greatly benefited by it in the present life. The probation of grace on which we are all placed, and every favor we receive in connection with this probation — the air we breathe, the varied blessings of Providence which we enjoy, the means of grace, the strivings of the Spirit, the forbearance of God, long waiting on us to be gracious; in short, everything of this nature, common to the elect and non-elect in the present life, — all is based upon the atonement of Christ; flows to us through this broad channel of mercy; and shows conclusively that, whether embraced or rejected, the *provisions* of the atonement are for all.

Such, then, is the plan of the work before us — a plan ably and faithfully carried out, rendering the book one of the best in our language on the important subject of which it treats; worthy of the high reputation of its author, and of the wide circulation to which it has attained. His reviewers may indeed say, as in fact they do, that the view here taken presents no proper atonement for sin; that it is little better than the Socinian view, and in some respects even worse; but intelligent Christians will judge differently. They will say, that this is the atonement which Paul and the other apostles preached, and in which they trusted; that here is the corner-stone of Zion, on which the whole church of God rests, and will rest forever.

Having thus expressed our honest appreciation of this work, — a judgment in which, we doubt not, we shall be sustained by the generality of Christian readers, — we proceed to point out some slight defects or infelicities of statement which have given rise to misrepresentations as to the author's meaning.

In urging the necessity of an atonement, Dr. B. lays an undue stress, in some passages, upon its influence in deterring from sin, promoting obedience, and thus advancing the good of the universe. "The penalty of the law," he says, — and of course the death of Christ, the appointed substitute for the penalty, — "was intended to operate as a powerful motive to obedience; and the execution of this penalty, whenever it takes place, becomes an awful warning to deter others from transgression" (p. 127). Again: "the moral law could never be set aside without the adoption of those precautionary measures which would secure the order and prosperity of the universe as effectually, to say the least, as the infliction of the penal curse would do" (p. 128). Passages such as these have led his reviewers to insist that Dr. B. "denies that sin deserves any punishment for its own sake," but only as a means of deterring others from transgression, and that the great object aimed at in the atonement is to promote the good, the order, the prosperity of the universe, rather than to sustain the law, and vindicate the character and the justice of God. Nor does the influence of these defects of statement, if they be such, end here. By the good of the universe, the reviewers understand the mere *happiness* of the universe; and they remark, at length, on the great error of setting the happiness of the universe above its holiness, above the justice and glory of God, above everything.[1] Now that the real meaning of Dr. Beman is perverted and misrepresented in these passages, no candid reader of his work can entertain a doubt. He as fully believes that sin is an evil in itself, that it deserves punishment for its own sake, and that in providing an expiation, God had respect, not merely to the good of the universe, but to his own honor, and the maintenance of his law and government, as these reviewers themselves. Nor is there a passage in his book which implies that he regards happiness as preferable to holiness, and that by the highest good of the universe he only means its highest happiness.

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[1] There is a difference of opinion among writers on moral and theological subjects as to the meaning of the word *benevolence*. Some — and among them the Princeton Reviewers — insist that benevolence regards only the *happiness* of its object, and that such men as Doctors Edwards, Hopkins, Emmons, and others, who resolve all holiness into benevolence, make happiness the chief end of creation. Whereas, a greater mistake could not possibly be made. Benevolence, with these men, looks at the *good* of its object — its highest good; involving, of course, and chiefly, its highest attainments in knowledge and holiness, and not merely its highest happiness. The holy character of God, the scriptures assure us, is all comprised in love, which love can be no other than benevolence. Still, this does not imply that God regards above all things the happiness of the universe, but rather its *supreme good,* involving its highest spiritual good, and his own highest glory.

Dr. B. follows the younger Edwards in setting forth three kinds of justice, viz. commutative or commercial justice, distributive justice, and general or public justice. The last of these, he says, "has no direct reference to law, but embraces those principles of virtue or benevolence by which we are bound to govern our conduct, and by which God himself governs the universe" (p. 132). We doubt whether this is an accurate description of what is commonly called general or public justice, so much of it, at least, as relates to God. If it be so, then every act of God is an act of justice, and his justice is no more satisfied in the atonement of Christ, than it is in every other dispensation of his hand. Public justice, we have supposed, had a more restricted meaning. It relates to what God may be said to owe to himself, to his law, to the interests of his kingdom, to the universe over which he reigns. Were any of these great interests to be sacrificed, public justice would be violated; but when they are all secured and promoted, as they are in the atonement of Christ, then public justice may be said to be satisfied.

We are not sure that Dr. B. has expressed himself with sufficient accuracy always, in setting forth the relations of the atonement to distributive justice. He says, more than once, that "distributive justice is not satisfied in the atonement;" that "it has received no satisfaction at all" (p. 133). That this statement is true, in the sense intended by the author, we do not doubt; but there is another sense in which it is not true. Distributive justice may be said to be satisfied when *all its important ends are answered.* They would be answered by the merited punishment of transgressors. They are equally answered in the atonement of Christ. This Dr. B. believes, and has repeatedly affirmed. "The ends or objects of distributive justice must be secured; and the substitute by which these objects are secured is found in that atonement which is revealed in the gospel" (p. 131). In another place he represents the atonement as "answering *every purpose* which could be effected by the literal and proper execution of the penalty of the law" (p. 39). We submit therefore, whether, in a most important sense, distributive as well as public justice is not satisfied in the atonement. If "*every purpose* which could be effected by the literal and proper execution of the penalty," is met and answered in the death of Christ, what has justice to claim more, and why may it not be truly said to be satisfied? The mistake here, if it be one, is one purely of phraseology; but it is a phraseology which leads the reviewers of Dr. B. to affirm that he sets aside justice, in the proper sense of the term, altogether; and that the atonement which he proposes is really no satisfaction at all.

If the misrepresentations of the reviewers have sometimes an excuse in the language of Dr. B., they more frequently pervert his meaning when they have no excuse. They continually charge him with teaching that the whole design of Christ's mission into the world was simply to make salvation possible. "Dr. Beman denies that the design of Christ's mission was salvation; it was merely to make salvation possible." Again: "was the Son of God sent into the world, as Dr. B. says, merely to make the salvation of all men possible, or actually to save all whom God had given him?" "If Christ only makes pardon possible, if the possibility of forgiveness is all we owe to him, to whom or what do we owe heaven? Is it to ourselves, as some of the advocates of this doctrine teach? This is the natural answer: Christ having made pardon possible, then God deals with men according to their works."[1]

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[1] Bib. Repertory, Vol. XVII. pp. 121, 128, 129.

That the atonement, of itself, does not actually save men, but merely opens a way of salvation, is the belief not only of Dr. Beman, but of evangelical Christians generally. It is the belief of these reviewers themselves. "Penal satisfaction," they say, "does not *ipso facto* liberate. The acceptance is a matter of arrangement or covenant; and the terms of that covenant must depend on the will of the parties" (p. 120). But simply to make an atonement for sin was not the whole object for which Christ came into the world. His work of atonement was but one among several others. He came "to bear witness to the truth." He came "to fulfil all righteousness," and to "save his people from their sins." In the language of the reviewers, which Dr. B. can adopt as sincerely as themselves, "we owe the blessed Redeemer, not the possibility of pardon merely, but justification, adoption, sanctification, the resurrection of the body, and life everlasting." And to charge a Christian minister with denying all this, and holding that the sole object of Christ's mission upon earth was simply to make salvation possible, is sadly, inexcusably, to pervert his meaning.

The reviewers charge Dr. B. with holding that "the atonement was nothing more than the symbolical expression of a truth"—"a mere symbolical method of instruction" (pp. 126, 138). That the cross of Christ was a most instructive symbol, we trust these reviewers will thankfully acknowledge. From it beamed forth a glorious light to dispel the darkness of a guilty world. But where did they learn that Dr. B. regards the atonement as "nothing more than the symbolical expression of a truth." Certainly not from the book before us, nor from anything else that its author has ever said or written. To be sure, the atonement "declared God's righteousness for the remission of sins that are past." This Paul says, and Dr. B. believes it. But he also believes that the atonement of Christ opened the only door of hope for a ruined world; that it laid a foundation for our probation of grace, and for all the blessings, temporal and spiritual, resulting to us from this probation; that it honored the broken law, sustains the divine government in the free exercise of pardon, and, in short, "answers every purpose which could be effected by the literal and proper execution of the penalty originally threatened" (p. 39). And yet these reviewers affirm and repeat, once and again, that Dr. B. represents the atonement as no more than "the symbolical expression of a truth."

They also charge Dr. B. with teaching that "so far as the *purpose* of God and his own *intention* are concerned, Christ had no special reference to his own people and to their salvation in his death. His whole work had no reference to one class of men more than to another, to the saved more than to the lost" (p. 130). Dr. B. does indeed hold (and these reviewers hold the same), that the atonement of Christ is sufficient for all men; that the offers of the gospel are made alike to all; and that all who will may come and take the waters of life freely. But he does not hold that the blessings of the atonement are conferred alike upon all, or that it entered into God's eternal purpose that they should be. God purposed the salvation of his people, his elect, "the seed" given to Christ in the eternal covenant of redemption, — a covenant of which Dr. B. has made frequent and honorable mention, and which Jesus suffered to fulfil.

But the misrepresentation in the above passages does not end here. According to these reviewers, Dr. B. teaches that "the *whole work* of Christ had no reference to one class of men more than to another, to the saved more than to the lost." The *whole work* of Christ, it must be borne in mind, includes vastly more than his atonement. It includes the entire work of human redemption, from its inception in the eternal purpose of God, to its completion in the final glorification of his people in heaven. And does Dr. B. believe that in this whole work, "Christ had no reference to one class of men more than to another, to the saved more than to the lost?" Do these reviewers *think* that he believes it? Have they not full proof to the contrary? What, then, can they mean by such unfounded, unguarded misrepresentations as these?

But if the reviewers have misrepresented Dr. Beman, they charge him also with misrepresenting them. They charge him with *wilful* misrepresentation; with imputing to them, "and to hundreds and thousands of his brethren, a shocking blasphemy" (p. 117). What, then, is the amount of Dr. Beman's misrepresentation? He says that "some have pushed the theory of substitution so far," as to suppose that all the sins of Christ's people are put over to him, and laid upon him; "that he became, in the eye of the law, the sinner, and was legally punished to the full amount of all that demerit which was attached to the sins of those who will be finally saved by his blood" (p. 98). Observe, Dr. B. does not say that this absurd and blasphemous idea of substitution is held by the Princeton reviewers, or by any number of old-school Calvinists at the present day; but *some* have so held it. "*Some* have pushed the idea of substitution" to this dangerous extreme. And is not this true? Do not the reviewers know it to be true? Have they never heard of the Neonomian controversy which raged in England near the close of the seventeenth century, in which those on one side so viewed the union between Christ and his people, as "to make a Saviour of the sinner, and a sinner of the Saviour. All Christ's righteousness is put over to the believer, and all the believer's sins belong to Christ. God considers the believer as actually doing and suffering all that Christ did and suffered; and, on the other hand, considers Christ as being actually guilty of all the sins of all the elect."[1] The old-school Calvinists of that day (or, at least, some of them) held the doctrine of substitution or imputation with a logical consistency from which their followers of this age shrink back with horror. They said: "If Christ was literally punished for the sins of his people, to the full amount of their deserts, then he must have been guilty of their sins, and they were strictly laid upon him: the Lord hath laid upon him the iniquity of us all." Thus Dr. Gill discourses upon the subject of Christ's bearing our sins.

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[1] History of Dissenters, Vol. I. p. 408.

"His bearing sin supposes that it was upon him, — not *in* him inherently, in his nature and life, — but *upon* him. Sin was put upon him by his divine Father; not a single iniquity, but a whole mass and lump of sins collected together. Sin being found upon him by imputation, a demand of satisfaction for sin was made, and he answered it to the full. Christ bore all sorts of sins, original and actual; sins of every kind, open and secret, of heart, lip, and life; all acts of sin committed by his people: for he has redeemed them from all their iniquities; his blood cleanseth from all sin."[1]

So much for the first alleged misrepresentation. Let us listen to another. The apostle Paul represents pardon and justification as wholly of *grace.* "Being justified freely by *his grace*, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus" (Rom. iii. 24). But Dr. B. insists that, if Christ has suffered the full penalty of the law for his people, so that the law has no further demands against them, their justification cannot be of grace. It is more properly of justice. He does not charge this doctrine upon any class of existing theologians, but urges it as a logical conclusion from the premises assumed: a conclusion which has, in some instances, been allowed. And to us it does seem to be a logical conclusion. If the whole debt has been paid, what more remains due? If the whole penalty of the law has been endured by an appointed and accepted substitute, what further can the law demand? What is there to be forgiven? Or if forgiveness and justification were on this ground possible, what grace would there be in the act of bestowing them? And although our Princeton brethren, we are glad to know, do not draw the same inferences as ourselves, but disclaim them with abhorrence, yet others have drawn them, and may do the same again.

To show what has actually been done in this direction, we cite the following from Scottish history. After the earl of Morton had been condemned to death, he was greatly distressed on account of his sins, and desired an interview with certain preachers whom he named. The comfort they administered was on this wise: "Be of good courage, my lord, and be not afraid of the justice of God. Your sins shall not be laid to your charge, and that for the very reason that God is just. The justice of God will not allow him to take payment twice for the same thing. Seeing, therefore, that your sins have all been put over to Christ, and he has suffered for them to the uttermost farthing, will God demand any further suffering from you? Will his justice allow him to take it? Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?"[1]

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[1] Gill's Body of Divinity, Vol. II. p. 203.

After all that has been said about misrepresentations, on both sides, it is pleasant to know that the parties in this controversy are not very far from each other. The reviewers insist that sin is an evil in itself, and is deserving of punishment for its own sake; and Dr. B. believes the same. The reviewers think it a gross error to set the happiness of the universe above its holiness, and above the justice and the glory of God; and Dr. B. is of the same opinion. The reviewers reject the thought that the atonement of Christ was the mere symbolical expression of a truth, and that the whole object of his mission was simply to make salvation possible; and both these assumptions Dr. B. would reject as sincerely as themselves. The reviewers believe that "so far as the purpose of God and his own intention are concerned, Christ had a special reference to his own people and to their salvation, in his death;" and Dr. B. believes the same. The purpose of God in regard to the atonement, as well as everything else, may be best learned from its results; and certainly the atonement results in final salvation to God's people only.

On the other hand, Dr. B. rejects with abhorrence the opinion of some, that our sins were so put over to Christ as to become his, and make him guilty on account of them; and the reviewers, with equal abhorrence, reject the same. They denounce such an opinion as "a shocking blasphemy."

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[1] See Cook's View of Christianity, Vol. I. p. 265.

Dr. B. insists that, although the atonement of Christ is full and complete, salvation on the ground of it is wholly of grace; and the reviewers teach the same doctrine. They even insist that their view of the atonement has some peculiar advantages, in setting forth the grace of the gospel. Dr. B. holds that the atonement of Christ is universal as to its sufficiency, while its saving efficacy, and its intended saving efficacy, reach only to the elect; and the same view, precisely, is set forth by the reviewers. There is no difference between them, on this point, unless it be in terms.

One of the most important apparent differences between the two theories of the atonement, relates to the nature of Christ's sufferings and death; the one party affirming that he endured the proper penalty of the law for us; while the other holds that he suffered, not the exact penalty, but a *full equivalent;* one that meets all the ends of justice, and the demands of the divine law and government, as well. Now here would seem to be a wide and important difference; one from which most of the other differences flow; but when we come to sift and scrutinize it, we find that it is little more than a difference in terms. What is the penalty of God's holy law? The scriptures call it death, "the second death," and by necessary implication, *eternal* death — the opposite of eternal life. "The wages of sin is death, but the gift of God is *eternal life*, through Jesus Christ our Lord." It is the same, for substance, which was inflicted on the rebel angels when they sinned. They were "cast down to hell," being "reserved in everlasting chains, under darkness, unto the judgment of the great day." It is the same which will be inflicted on the wicked in the day of judgment, when they will "depart accursed into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels." It is a positive and definite punishment, which God has sufficiently described in his word, and which he has inflicted in the case of the rebel angels, thus showing conclusively what it is. It involves, in respect to those of our race who die in sin, the eternal destruction of both body and soul in hell. Such, then, is the penalty of the divine law, as God has explained it, and as we understand it. Now did Christ suffer all this, when he died upon the cross? Did he suffer it millions of times over, — as many times as there are individuals to be saved by his blood? Did he suffer it, in his own person, even once? Dr. B. says, no; and we say the same; and, strange as it may seem, the Princeton reviewers say the same. "The sufferings of Christ were unutterably great; still . . . . . the transient sufferings of one man would not be equivalent to the sufferings due to the sins of men" (p. 107).

And yet these reviewers insist that Christ did suffer the penalty of the broken law. What, then, do *they* understand by the penalty of the law? "Not any specific kind or degree of suffering." "Not remorse, or despair, or eternal banishment from God." "These things enter not essentially into the penalty of the law." "All that our standards say on this point, they say wisely, viz. that our Saviour endured the miseries of this life, the wrath of God, the accursed death of the cross, and continued under the power of death for a time. This was the penalty of the law" (p. 107). Very well; according to this description of the penalty, *we* say that Christ endured it. And Dr. B. would say the same. As *we* describe the penalty of the law, and as we think the scriptures describe it, the reviewers agree with us in saying that Christ did not suffer it. He could not have suffered it. Considering the dignity of his person, it was not necessary. And as *they* describe the penalty of the law, we agree with them in saying that Christ may have suffered it. We suppose he did suffer it. Our difference on this point, therefore, is merely verbal, and vanishes just so soon as the terms are explained.[1] And so the subject is regarded by most theologians, who say in terms that Christ suffered, for us, the penalty of the law. They do not mean the full and precise penalty, as we understand it, and as God has explained it in his word, but rather a *full equivalent* — one which, considering the dignity and glory of Christ's person and his ineffable nearness to the Father, answers all the purposes of law, and justice, and government, as well. Thus a writer in the late Dr. Green's Christian Advocate says: "The Redeemer did not endure eternal death," but "the infinite dignity of his person imparted to his temporary sufferings a value that made them *a fair and full equivalent* for the everlasting sufferings of all who shall be finally saved."[1] Dr. Bellamy, too, after having said repeatedly that Christ endured the penalty of the law for sinners, sums up his meaning in the following terms: "Considering the infinite dignity of his person, his sufferings were *equivalent* to the eternal damnation of such worms as we." And again: "The infinite dignity of his Son causes those sufferings which he bore in our room and stead, to be as bright a display of the divine holiness and justice, as if all the human race had, for their sin, been cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, and the smoke of their torment had ascended up forever and ever."[2] The late Dr. Dana says: "Inasmuch as the scriptures expressly declare that, in redeeming us from the curse of the law, Christ was made a curse for us, we are constrained to conclude that his sufferings were a *substantial* execution of the law; a real endurance of the penalty, *so far as the nature of the case admitted or required.*"[3] So Dr. Woods, speaking of the penalty of the law, says: "Christ suffered it *virtually.* He suffered that which had a *like effect*, or which had a *like value*, in God's moral government. As to the ends of government, it was as though the curse of the law had been endured literally."[4]

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[1] We might insist here on the extreme danger of frittering down the penalty of the law, as these reviewers seem to do, in order to make it appear that Christ endured it; but we forbear. In one of their expressions, they fall quite below where evangelical Christians of any denomination will be likely to follow them: "The wrath of God, however expressed, constitutes the penalty of the law, in *the strictest and highest sense*," p. 108. On this ground, the incorrigibly wicked

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suffer, in the present life, "the penalty of the law, in *the strictest and highest sense.*" Thus said the late Hosea Ballou; and here he built his theory of universal salvation, — a theory which, with greater propriety, may be called *universal damnation.*

[1] Vol. for 1826, pp. 388, 389.

[2] Works, Vol. I. p. 285.

[3] In Beman on Atonement, p. 114.

[4] Works, Vol. II. p. 473.

But it is urged that justice demands the full penalty of the law, and will be satisfied with nothing less. Hence, if justice *is* satisfied in the atonement of Christ, he must have suffered the whole penalty of the law. This objection has been obviated already. We have seen that the demands of justice are answered, when its ends are answered; and these are all met and answered as fully in the atonement of Christ, as they could be in the execution of the law upon our entire guilty race. Here, a firm foundation is laid for the exercise of mercy. The divine government will be as strong in dispensing pardon as, under other circumstances, it would be in inflicting punishment. The penalty of the law may be remitted to penitent transgressors, and no interest will suffer in consequence; on the contrary, the glory of the Sovereign and the highest interests of the universe will, in this way, be greatly promoted.

It has been further objected to the views which have been expressed, that in every case of transgression God's *veracity* is pledged to inflict the penalty of the law. And if it is not inflicted upon the sinner, it must be upon Christ. But does the penalty which God has affixed to his law, bind his veracity, in every case of transgression, to inflict it? If it be so, then certainly it must be inflicted upon the transgressor, and upon no one else. The law knows nothing of a substitute. Its language is explicit: "The soul that sinneth, *it* shall die." If the divine veracity is pledged here, a substitute is out of the question. The transgressor must bear the penalty, and no one else.

But does a simple threatening, in all cases, bind the veracity of the sovereign? We think not. A threatening may be so connected with a promise, or so involved in a covenant, as to pledge veracity; but a simple threatening, setting forth the penalty of law, does not pledge it. The subject is not so understood among men; neither can it be so understood in respect to God. In dispensing pardon, a human government does not necessarily violate its truth; neither does the divine government. Just legislation, like justice itself, implies no necessity for punishment, except as *the ends* of punishment may require it. Let these ends be answered, and truth would lose the character of a virtue, if it should now prove a barrier to the free exercise of mercy. The penalty of a law, says John Howe, is "not to be taken for a *prediction* of what shall be, but a *commination*, expressing what is deserved, or most justly may be." They who think otherwise, says Calvin, "labor under a delusion as to the meaning of threatenings; which, though they affirm simply, contain in them a tacit condition, depending on the result."

The reviewers have various objections to Dr. B.'s doctrine of the atonement, some of which we shall briefly notice. The view he takes, it is said, is not in accordance with the devotional language of the church, and more especially with its psalms and hymns. But this certainly is new to us. We can sing the psalms of David, from beginning to end, and find our thoughts and hearts going up, without embarrassment, in his expressions of love and penitence, of joy and gratitude, of trust and praise. We can sing the hymns of "the early Christians, of the devout Lutherans, of the Reformed, of the Moravians, of British and American Christians," as arranged, by the thousand, in some of our late collections, and find them but the echo of our sentiments and hearts. We can sing the new song, which John heard sung in the opened heavens: "Thou art worthy to take the book and to open the seals thereof; for thou wast slain, and hast redeemed us to God, by thy blood, out of every kindred, and tongue, and people, and nation." And what need we sing more or better than this?

It is further insisted, that our doctrine is not in accordance with scripture; and numerous passages are cited in proof of this allegation. We have examined these passages anew, and considered the remarks which are made upon them, and they seem to us an often figurative but exact expression of our own views. We believe assuredly that Christ "bore our sins;" that "he made his soul an offering for sin;" that he gave "his life a ransom for sinners;" that he "redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us,"—not by going into hell for us, but, as Paul expresses it, by "hanging on a tree." We believe that Christ is the great high-priest of our profession, and that "he executeth the office of a priest, in once offering up himself a sacrifice to satisfy divine justice and reconcile us to God, and in his ever living to make intercession for us." If our brethren can accept heartily the above representations of scripture and of their own standards, we can do the same; and this shows, again, that our views, whether we know it or not, cannot be very wide asunder.

It is further said, that our view of the atonement presents a different method of justification from that held by the apostle Paul, and advocated by our old-school brethren. But wherein a different method of justification? We believe that men "are justified by faith, without the deeds of the law;" and that "being justified by faith, they have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ." We believe that the atonement of Christ is the sole ground of the sinner's justification, and that faith in Christ is the cardinal condition of it. In what respects do our brethren differ from this?

It is alleged that we confound justification and pardon; "whereas in scripture, and in all languages, the ideas of pardon and justification are distinct, and in a measure opposite." But the difference here, as in cases before noticed, is entirely one of terms. Pardon, in the largest, widest sense of the term, is the same as justification; in a more restricted sense, it is not the same. The penalty of the law which pardon remits, is, in its fullest sense, both *privative* and *positive*. It involves the loss of God's favor, and the incurring of his displeasure; the loss of the rest and happiness of heaven, and the endurance of eternal miseries in hell. Such is the full penalty of the law of God, for the removal of which the atonement of Christ furnishes the sufficient and only foundation. In procuring the salvation of those who embrace it, it removes the *positive* part of the penalty, so that they are no longer liable to suffer the pains of eternal death. It removes also the *privative* part, and thus restores them to the forfeited favor of God, and to the happiness of heaven. All this is implied in freeing the returning sinner from the full penalty of the law; or, which is the same, in forgiveness; using the term forgiveness in the widest sense. But forgiveness, in this sense, is the same, precisely, as justification; the one *restoring* the subject as fully as the other. And so the case was regarded by the apostle Paul. He repeatedly speaks of forgiveness and justification as the same. "Through this man is preached unto you the *forgiveness of sins;* and by him all that believe are *justified* from all things from which ye could not be justified by the law of Moses" (Acts xiii. 38). "Being *justified* freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation, through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for *the remission of sins*" (Rom. iii. 24). "David also describeth the blessedness of the man unto whom God imputeth righteousness without works," [or whom he *justifieth*], saying, blessed are they whose *iniquities are forgiven,* and whose sin is covered" (Rom. iv. 6, 7). The apostle here quotes from the thirty-second psalm, in which David sets forth the blessedness of him who had humbly confessed his sins, and been forgiven, representing such an one as *justified;* which shows that, in Paul's theology, justification and full forgiveness are the same.

Calvin and other eminent theologians have taken the same view of the subject. "The righteousness of faith," says Calvin, "is a reconciliation with God, which consists *solely* in the forgiveness of sins." "The Lord cannot receive into favor or fellowship with himself, without making him, from a sinner, to be a righteous person; and this is accomplished by *the remission of sins.*" "It appears, then, that those whom God receiveth are made righteous no otherwise than as they are purified, by being cleansed from all their defilements by *the remission of their sins;* so that such a righteousness may be denominated a *remission of sins.*"[1]

It is further alleged, that our views of the atonement make faith in Christ of very little importance, and that the direction to believe in him has in great measure, disappeared from our sermons. This announcement will be news, as false as it is startling, to the great body of our orthodox preachers and congregations. We do indeed, as the apostles did, direct the sinner to "submit to God," to "lay aside his rebellion," and "begin to love and serve his Maker;" but our *prominent* direction — that most frequently given and most earnestly insisted on — is precisely that of Paul to the jailer: "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved." So persistent have we been in giving this simple direction, as to incur the reproach of theologians of another school, who, regarding the sinner as physically impotent, and wholly unable to believe, have urged him to use means, and do what he can, with the heart that he has, hoping that God may at some time interpose, and give him a better heart. The controversy in respect to what was called "the doings of the unregenerate," which raged among us near the close of the last century, is not yet forgotten by our older ministers and Christians.

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[1] Institutes, Book III. chap. xi. sect. 21.

We are told, finally, that Dr. B.'s view of the atonement has "done more to corrupt religion and promote Socinianism, than any other of the vaunted improvements in American theology" (p. 116). This is the old and oft-reiterated objection: "It is your New England theology which has wrought so much mischief in your churches, — which has led so many of them to renounce the faith of their fathers, and relapse into Unitarianism." But a little inquiry will satisfy any one, that the very opposite of what is here stated is the truth. It is historically certain, and is susceptible of the fullest proof, that what of Unitarianism there is in New England came in upon us, not from *our particular explanations of the established faith*, but *from a perverted view and application of old-school Calvinism.* As men could not make to themselves new hearts and new spirits, they were taught to do what they could with such hearts as they had. They must read and pray, and attend public worship, and join the church, and go to the sacrament, in hope that through these pipes of God's own providing, they might receive an infusion of living water; in hope that in a diligent use of means, God would meet them, and bestow upon them converting grace. In consequence of instructions such as these, the churches came to consist very considerably, in many places, of unconverted members, — of those who *regarded* themselves as unconverted, and who came to the Lord's table as a means of regeneration. And when the door was once opened for persons without piety to enter the church, there was no let or hindrance to their entering the ministry. And unconverted ministers (whatever creed they may profess for a time) are prepared, in the spirit and temper of their minds, for just such errors as ere long began to show themselves in New England.

There was no marked division among our ministers till near the close of the Whitefieldian revival, somewhat more than a hundred years ago. The revivalists of that day were those who imbibed the views and adopted the explanations of President Edwards. And their pupils and successors constitute at this day, and have ever constituted, the great body of the orthodox Congregational clergy of New England. While those in general who opposed the revival, — old Calvinists at the time by profession, but holding a lifeless and perverted Calvinism, and giving little evidence of true spirituality, — ere long came to be known, first as Arminians, then Arians, and then Socinians or Unitarians of the lowest stamp.[1]

Such, in brief, is the manner in which Unitarianism gained footing in New England. Its course can be traced as surely, from step to step, as any historical sequence whatever. We see, then, how unjust it is to ascribe its entrance and prevalence here to what has been called the New England theology. It entered in *spite* of this theology, rather than by its means. The advocates of this theology constituted the chief barrier which opposed it. They are the men, almost without an exception, who have withstood its progress, obstructed its influence, and brought it, under God, into its present disorganized and decaying condition.

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[1] The late Dr. Chauncy, for some sixty years pastor of the first church in Boston, was the great opponent of Whitefield and the revival. At the close of the revival he professed to be a Calvinist; but he lived to become an Arian and a Restorationist. A similar course was pursued by many others.

From the want of a thorough acquaintance with our religious history, the reviewers of Dr. B. may be sincere in what they have said as to the influence of our particular views of the atonement in promoting the spread of Unitarianism in New England. But can they be justified in affirming, as they repeatedly do, that our doctrine "is even below that of Socinus," and that "the Socinian view is, in some respects, much easier reconciled with scripture than that of Dr. Beman" (pp. 95, 113). We hold all the great facts of the atonement as firmly as these reviewers themselves; as firmly as any class of Christians have ever done, since the crucifixion of Christ. Socinians reject the atonement in everything, unless it be the name. We build upon the atonement all our hopes of justification and final salvation. They build their hopes on an entirely different ground. We differ from our brethren at Princeton, as has been proved in the foregoing discussion, in very little except the meaning of words. Socinians differ from us both in everything that is essential to the gospel of Christ. And now in view of these facts, which the reviewers understand as well as ourselves, we ask again whether they can *think* themselves justified in representing the faith of Socinians in this most important article of our religion — which really is no faith at all — as in some respects better and more scriptural than our own? The answer to this inquiry we leave to their own consciences; and conclude with suggesting, whether it may not be better for both of us to unite in defending this fundamental article of our creed against those who deride and oppose it, rather than waste our energies in magnifying differences and widening divisions between those who agree in this life, in everything essential to the doctrine, and who expect to rest upon it the salvation of their souls forever.

ARTICLE II.

THE APOSTOLIC SALUTATIONS AND BENEDICTIONS.

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FROM the earliest days of the Christian church, widely different views have been taken respecting the meaning of the apostolic salutations and benedictions, and their significancy in the position assigned them in public worship. They who invest Christ's ministers with sacerdotal powers and functions, regard these formulas as the actual conferral from priestly lips of spiritual blessings; and by implication, if not by express statute, they argue that the power to pronounce maledictions belongs in like manner to the ministerial office. Others go to the opposite extreme, and consider them mere expressions of earnest desire that blessings may descend upon God's people, and implying no such official power or prerogative, as to render them unsuitable to be uttered by private Christians at the opening and close of religious services. Between these extremes lies a third view, that they are solemn declarations of the permanent possession and enjoyment of the grace of God by all who are embraced in the covenant of redeeming love.

We believe that very few persons in evangelical churches are disposed to attach a priestly significance and potentiality to these sacred formulas, and we dismiss therefore, as irrelevant to the special object of this Article, any refutation of this belief, and confine ourselves to the simple question, whether they are to be regarded as expressive of strong desire, or as declarative of a great truth, applicable to all of Christ's family, and in all time. That they are not prayers, in the proper acceptation of the term, is quite evident from the fact that they are not addressed to God, and have not the usual form of supplication. But as might be expected from such short, elliptical, and independent formulas, it is a matter of doubt whether they are to be interpreted as earnestly expressed wishes or positive declarations.

That a difference of opinion exists on this point, is manifest from the variety of form employed by ministers of the gospel in pronouncing the benediction. It is the practice of some to say : "May the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you all ;" others adopt the same form, but substitute "*us*" for "you." Many drop the potential form, but, nevertheless change the pronoun from the second to the first person plural : "The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with *us* all." Another class adhere precisely to the language of scripture, and say : "The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you all."

It is our present purpose to inquire, whether the last-mentioned form of the benediction does not express its true and only meaning, or, in other words, whether the official act is not nuncupative of that which really exists, rather than the expression of a wish that the blessing of God may be bestowed upon his people. To maintain the former of these views is by no means to deny that a strong and earnest desire, on the part of the person who pronounces the benediction, may accompany this official annunciation of the abiding grace of Christ with believers. But our design is to show that the benediction is an announcement of the possession of a blessing promised *in perpetuum* to the church of Christ, and not a simple wish or desire, as some think it to be. The same sense we would also assign to the salutations when employed according to apostolic usage.

The usual form of salutation in Paul's epistles, is *χάρις ὑμῖν καὶ εἰρήνη ἀπὸ Θεοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν καὶ Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.* This is the form employed in the Epistles to the Romans, Corinthians, Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians, Thessalonians, and Philemon. In the Epistle to the Galatians, *ἡμῶν* is omitted after *πατρὸς*, and supplied with *Κυρίου.* In the First Epistle to Timothy, *ἡμῶν* is found in both clauses, and *ἔλεος* is added to *χάρις καὶ εἰρήνη*, in the order *χάρις, ἔλεος καὶ εἰρήνη.* The form in 2 Timothy is the same, except that *ἡμῶν* is wanting in the first member. In the Epistle to Titus we also find *χάρις, ἔλεος καὶ εἰρήνη*, but *ἡμῶν* is omitted in both members; while to the words *Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, is added epexegetically, *τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν, even our Saviour.*

No form of salutation is found in the Epistle to the Hebrews. In accordance with his brief, pointed, straightforward style, James employs the simple infinitive *χαίρειν.* In his first epistle, Peter uses the form *χάρις ὑμῖν καὶ εἰρήνη πληϑυνείη.* It is noticeable that in this salutation a verb is employed, the writer wishing to express a fulness of blessing, which the verb of existence, understood in the other salutations, would not have denoted. The same form of salutation, except that the verb is omitted, is used by Peter in his second epistle, to which, however, he adds the words *ἐπιγνώσει τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ Ἰησοῦ τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν, in the knowledge of God and of Jesus Christ our Lord.* In John's first epistle there is no form of salutation. Quite an expanded one is, however, found in his second letter, *ἔσται μεϑ' ὑμῶν χάρις, ἔλεος, εἰρήνη παρὰ Θεοῦ πατρός, καὶ παρὰ Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ πατρός, ἐν ἀληϑείᾳ καὶ ἀγάπῃ.* This is the only instance in the salutations, where we find the verb of existence expressed; and it will be noticed that, instead of being in the optative *εἴη, may grace, mercy, and peace be with you*, or the imperative *ἔστω, let grace, mercy, and peace be with you*, it is the indicative future; the realization of the promised blessing being rendered emphatic by the position of the verb at the very commencement of the sentence, "*shall be with grace,*" etc. John's third epistle has no form of salutation. In the epistle of Jude, we find a form similar to that in Peter's first epistle, except that *ἀγάπη* is added. In the salutation of John to the seven churches in Asia, the usual form, *ἀπὸ Θεοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν κ. τ. λ.* is varied to *ἀπὸ τοῦ ὁ ὢν καὶ ὁ ἦν καὶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος· καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἑπτὰ πνευμάτων ἅ ἐστιν ἐνώπιον τοῦ ϑρόνου αὐτοῦ· καὶ ἀπὸ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ὁ μάρτυς ὁ πιστός, ὁ πρωτότοκος ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν καὶ ὁ ἄρχων τῶν βασιλέων τῆς γῆς.*

It will be observed that in all these apostolic salutations, there is the same general form of construction, and, except in the one last cited, a very close resemblance in language. It may seem somewhat remarkable that, while the Father and Son are in every instance referred to, no mention is made of the Holy Spirit, the third person in the adorable Trinity. It may be a reason for this that, as the Spirit of inspiration, the Holy Ghost conveys these salutations, by apostolic agency, from God the Father and his Son Jesus Christ to the churches. Or perhaps prominence is intended to be given to the great economical fact in the plan of redemption, that it is God the Father who sends, and God the Son who is sent to achieve human salvation, while it is the office-work of God the Spirit to apply truth to the hearts of men, and make it effectual to their regeneration and sanctification. "Grace, mercy, and peace" may then be said to come from God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ, and, through the agency of the Holy Spirit, to rest upon all who are embraced in the covenant of redeeming love. But whatever weight may be given to these conjectural reasons for the omission of the name of the Holy Spirit in the apostolic salutations, no valid argument can be drawn from this omission against either the personality of the Spirit or his equality with the Father and the Son.

In the apostolic benedictions, we find greater diversity of form. In Romans, Philippians, 2 Thessalonians, and the Apocalypse, the simple form is *ἡ χάρις τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ μετὰ πάντων ὑμῶν.* In first Corinthians, *ἡμῶν* and *πάντων* are omitted. In 2 Corinthians we find the form which is generally designated *the apostolic benediction: ἡ χάρις τοῦ Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, καὶ ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ ϑεοῦ, καὶ ἡ κοινωνία τοῦ Ἁγίου Πνεύματος μετὰ πάντων ὑμῶν.* The benediction in Galatians is changed from the usual *μετὰ πάντων ὑμῶν* to *μετὰ τοῦ πνεύματος ὑμῶν, ἀδελφοί.* In Ephesians the form suffers a still greater change, *εἰρήνη τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς καὶ ἀγάπη μετὰ πίστεως ἀπὸ Θεοῦ πατρὸς καὶ Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.* The form in Colossians is simply *ἡ χάρις μεϑ᾽ ὑμῶν.* In 2 Timothy, the benediction is addressed first to Timothy and then to the church of which he was bishop:

ὁ Κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς μετὰ τοῦ πνεύματός· σου ἡ χάρις μεθ' ὑμῶν. A similar form of benediction closes the letter to Philemon: *ἡ χάρις τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ μετὰ τοῦ πνεύματος ὑμῶν*, the plural *ὑμῶν* referring not only to Philemon, but also to the persons embraced in the salutation, vs. 1, 2. In Titus and Hebrews, it is *ἡ χάρις μετὰ πάντων ὑμῶν.* The benediction is omitted in the epistle of James. The form in Peter's first epistle is *εἰρήνη ὑμῖν πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ.* In his second letter, a doxology takes the place of the benediction. No benediction is found in the first and second epistles of John. In his third epistle it is briefly *εἰρήνη σου.* Jude's epistle closes with a doxology instead of a benediction.

We see from this inspection that the apostles did not confine themselves to any one form of benediction, and that in some instances they omitted it altogether. The inference is obvious, that, as now employed in the dismission of Christian assemblies, the minister who pronounces the benediction is under no obligation to use one form to the exclusion of the rest, nor to seek variety by introducing forms of his own composing. It would seem preferable, however, to adhere strictly to scripture language, and avoid a monotonous repetition of the same form by a variety of selection, reference being always had to the character of the religious services which the benediction is intended to close. No stress should be laid upon the use of "the" or "our," before the words "Lord Jesus Christ." Some of the benedictions have *ἡμῶν*; in some it is omitted. Even where the pronoun is omitted, we may read "*our* Lord Jesus Christ," inasmuch as the article, according to the Greek usage, often supplies the place of an unemphatic possessive pronoun.

From this survey we also see how marked is the correspondence of form and sentiment between the apostolic salutations and benedictions. Were it not for their difference of position, the one class introducing and the other closing the epistles, so far as their sense and grammatical construction are concerned, they might all be denominated benedictions. But whatever appellation may be given them, to distinguish the one from the other, they ought never to be regarded as independent or isolated, but as possessing such a mutual relationship, that the full sense of the one cannot be reached, except through the medium of the other. The salutations refer to the origin or source of the grace of the gospel, the benedictions, to its perfected fulness in Christ's forgiving love. The prepositional construction, *ἀπὸ Θεοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν καὶ Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, finds in the benedictions its counterpart in the subjective genitive, *ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*. The preposition *ἀπό* in the salutations, by the *constructio pugnans*, imparts to the omitted verb the idea of motion, *away from*. *Χάρις*, *ἔλεος*, *καὶ εἰρήνη* are announced as proceeding from God the Father and his Son Jesus Christ, and resting upon all who are embraced in the covenant of redemption. This notion of origin or source is left out of the benedictions, and the permanent indwelling of grace in the soul of the believer is that which is alone expressed.

In all his epistles recorded in the New Testament, Paul first announces his official relation to the churches, as an apostle of Jesus Christ, by virtue of which office, he proceeds to declare, in the terms of the salutation, that the grace and favor of God rest upon all true believers. This intimate relationship between the announcement of his apostleship and the salutation, imparts to the latter a depth of meaning, which is not reached by regarding it as a wish or prayer for the descent of spiritual blessings upon the churches addressed. Such a sense is also forbidden by the context which follows. Why is the salutation in every instance, and in such express terms, limited to the saints in Christ, the elect of God? Would it not have comported with his abundant labors as a missionary of Jesus Christ, for Paul to have invoked God's forgiving love to descend upon all, both converted and unconverted? Must it not have been the all-absorbing, controlling desire of his heart, that grace, mercy, and peace, with all the sanctifying influences of the Holy Spirit, should descend upon the Gentile world, to which in a special sense he was set apart as an apostle? Did he not aver that his heart's desire and prayer to God for Israel was that they might be saved? Could they not have been embraced in the comprehensive sweep of these salutations, regarded simply as the expression of a strong desire for the descent of spiritual blessings? Why were these apostolic greetings in every instance so carefully limited to those who were true believers?

To this there can be but one answer. It is because they were not mere wishes or prayers, embracing all in their benevolent scope, but declarative of blessings actually conferred upon Christ's followers, to which unbelievers had no claim, and were in no respect whatever the recipients. Let a few citations suffice to show in what express terms all others than true believers are excluded from the blessings conveyed in these salutations. In Romans, the salutation is addressed to the "beloved of God called to be saints;" in Ephesians, "to the saints and faithful in Christ Jesus;" in Philippians, "to all the saints in Christ Jesus with the bishops and deacons;" in Colossians, "to the saints and faithful brethren in Christ," and so throughout the epistles. It was not enough that this limitation was indicated by the words "to the church of Christ at Corinth," or to the church at Ephesus, but it was rendered still more emphatic and explicit by the appended clauses just cited. This shows that these salutations are not to be regarded as mere wishes or prayers. They refer manifestly to the bestowal of a blessing which belongs only to God's people, and in which men in a state of impenitence and unbelief have no share.

From this point of view, let us examine the benedictions with which these same epistles are closed. Upon whom were they pronounced? To what class of persons does *ὑμῶν πάντων* refer? Most unquestionably to the same believers in Christ to whom the salutation had been previously addressed. The form varies somewhat from that of the salutation, but the sense is substantially the same. There was no necessity of repeating *ἀπὸ Θεοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν καὶ Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.* The divine source of the grace of the gospel having been affirmed in the salutation, and proved and illustrated throughout the whole epistle, there was a peculiar appropriateness in closing with the more tender and informal, *ἡ χάρις τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ μετὰ πάντων ὑμῶν.* Are we not justified, then, in attaching to the benediction as weighty a significance as to the salutation? Nay, more, might we not have inferred that the great idea of the salutation would be repeated with more enlarged signification after the manifold grace of God in the work of redemption had been descanted upon in the epistle? These salutations and benedictions, when regarded as a solemn and formal announcement of the grace of God resting upon all his people, very appropriately introduce and close the apostolic letters. But how comparatively frigid and meaningless are they, when considered simply as prayers or desires for the descent of blessings upon the churches.

The argument for this exegesis gathers strength from the grammatical construction of the passages under consideration. In every instance, with a single exception, the verb is omitted. The ellipsis is beyond all doubt to be supplied by some form of *εἰμί*, the verb of existence. Commentators, however, are not agreed as to what this form shall be. If these salutations and benedictions are to be interpreted as wishes or prayers, we must suppose an ellipsis of *εἴη*, the 3 sing. optat. present. We will not go so far as to pronounce such an ellipsis in a sentence, independent of some preceding clause containing the optatative, a grammatical absurdity, but it is so improbable that we would not venture to build an exegesis on so slight a foundation.

Winer cites several passages in the New Testament, where he would supply the optative *εἴη*. But a reference to some of these passages will show that the ellipsis of this mood is quite doubtful. One of them is John xx. 21, *εἰρήνη ὑμῖν, peace to you.* But when we take into consideration the personage who employed this salutation, and the time and circumstances in which it was uttered, we cannot but attach to it a higher significancy than that of a simple wish that peace might rest in the troubled minds of the disciples. Another passage which Winer cites as containing the ellipsis εἴη, is Luke i. 28, when the angel addresses Mary with *ὁ Κύριος μετὰ σοῦ, εὐλογομένη σὺ ἐν γυναιξίν, the Lord with you, blessed thou among women.* If the ellipsis here is to be supplied with εἴη, the translation would be, *may the Lord be with you, may you be blessed among women.* Can this be the sense of this angelic salutation? Is it not rather to be interpreted as a solemn annunciation that the Lord was with Mary, and that she was, in the highest sense of the term, blessed among women? But this, which is the obvious sense, would require an ellipsis of the indicative. The other citations of Winer to prove an ellipsis of the optative are made from the apostolic salutations and benedictions which are the subject of our present consideration. We hope to show that such an ellipsis is not only grammatically improbable, but subversive of the sense of the passages in themselves considered.

Professor Stuart and many other excellent commentators supply the imperative *ἔστω.* This is certainly admissible, especially in such passages as *ἡ ἀγάπη ἀνυπόκριτος* (let) *love* (be) *without dissimulation* (Rom. xii. 9); and in *ὁ λόγος ὑμῶν πάντοτε ἐν χάριτι,* (let) *your speech* (be) *always with grace* (Colossians iv. 6); where the context obviously places these elliptical phrases in the category of commands. Such an ellipsis of *ἔστω* may be supplied in the doxologies, Rom. xvi. 26; Philip. iv. 20; 1 Pet. v. 11. But it is questionable whether we are justified in supplying the imperative in the salutations and benedictions, inasmuch as they are neither ascriptions of praise to God nor the injunction of duties upon man. But, when grammatically considered, there is nevertheless far less objection to an ellipsis of the imperative than of the optative, and its adoption at once raises these salutations and benedictions far higher than mere wishes or desires for the bestowal upon God's people of the blessings referred to. We do not think, however, that the imperative gives the precise sense, or is wholly free from grammatical objections.

The usual forms of the verb which in sentences of this sort suffer ellipsis, are *ἐστί* and *εἰσί.* In questions or commands, where the sense cannot well be misunderstood, many other verbs in common use may be omitted, but in simple annunciations, the third person of *εἰμί* or *γίγνομαι*, or a similar verb, is the only form which in general suffers ellipsis. There is no obscurity from the omission of *ἐστί* in the proposition, *ἀγαϑὸς ὁ ἀνήρ*, *the man* (is) *good*, or in *ϑεῶν δύναμις μεγίστη*, *the power of the gods* (is) *greatest*, or in *τῷ Κύρῳ μεγάλη βασίλεια*, *a large palace* (was) *to Cyrus*, i. e. Cyrus had a large palace. But suppose we would express our wish that the man might be good, the form would be *ἀγαϑὸς ὁ ἀνὴρ εἴη*, *may the man be good*, i. e. would that he might be good. So *τῷ Κύρῳ μεγάλη βασίλεια εἴη O that Cyrus possessed a large palace.* Sometimes the particles, *εἰ, εἰ γάρ, εἴϑε, ὡς*, are placed before this optative to make it more definite or emphatic. The grammatical canon is that the optative is employed in the expression of a wish, and in such a use the verb in an independent sentence seldom suffers ellipsis, inasmuch as there would then be no way to distinguish the wish of the optative from the positive assertion of the indicative. One may say *σοὶ μυρίαν ἔχω χάριν*, *I give you ten thousand thanks;* or *σοὶ μυρία χάρις* (sc. *ἐστὶ*), *ten thousand thanks* (are) *to you*, the elliptical form being as readily understood as the one in which the verb is expressed. But if the optative as freely suffered ellipsis as the indicative, there would be no means of determining whether *σοὶ μυρία χάρις* denoted the actual bestowal of thanks, or a wish that thanks might be bestowed.

Let us now examine more particularly the grammatical construction of these salutations and benedictions. The omitted verb in all the salutations is followed by what is called the dative of the possessor, and in all the benedictions, except in Peter's first epistle, by the preposition *μετά* with the genitive. There is no essential difference between these two forms of expression, the dative simply giving prominence to the idea of *coming to* or *into* possession of, the genitive with the preposition, the notion of participation or full possession of the blessings referred to. In this construction, the thing possessed is put as the subject of the sentence, and the verb may be, and often is, omitted, especially when no obscurity would arise therefrom, and no special emphasis is required to be given to the verb. But in such cases the ellipsis is to be supplied with the same forms of the verb which are found expressed, and these forms are in the indicative. Thus, we may say with equal perspicuity ἀγαϑὰ ἡμῖν ἐστι, *good things are to us*, *we have good things*, or ἀγαϑὰ ἡμῖν, *good things* (are) *to us*. The idea of *belonging to*, as one's own possession, is equally clear in both forms of expression.

In view, therefore, of the well-established grammatical law, that the present indicative is the form which commonly suffers ellipsis in such constructions, we are of the opinion that ἐστί is the omitted verb in these apostolic salutations and benedictions. We dismiss, as irrelevant to this special point, all references to the early liturgies of the church. The simple question before us is, what sense the Greek construction demands; and this is to be determined by the application of well-established grammatical laws. If we were composing a treatise on liturgical forms, it would then be incumbent on us to trace the changes and various usages of the church at different periods of her history.

We have alluded to the fact that the salutation in John's second epistle has the verb expressed in the indicative future. This seems to us proof positive that the same mood is to be assigned to the omitted verbs in the other salutations and benedictions. The employment of the future tense does not in the least degree weaken our argument. Concinnity with ἔσται in the preceding verse seems to have been the reason why the verb was put in the future, and had its emphatic position at the very commencement of the salutation. But the question before us has reference, not to the tense of the omitted verb, but to the mood, or, in other words, whether the optative of request or desire is to be preferred to the indicative declarative of an actual fact. We would not then argue from the passage cited that the future of εἰμί is to be supplied in the other forms of salutation and benediction, but that the mood used by John proves beyond all question, that his salutation is something more than a simple wish or prayer.

The ellipsis of *ἐστί* which we have assumed, is justified by the context of some of the benedictions. In Romans, a doxology immediately follows the benediction. If the verb of the benediction be the optative of a wish or prayer, the same form of the verb is naturally to be supplied in the doxology, *μόνῳ σοφῷ ϑεῷ ᾧ ἡ δόξα εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας*, or, in other words, the doxology must be regarded as nothing more than a prayer that glory may be rendered to God. In like manner the benediction in 1 Corinthians is followed by *ἡ ἀγάπη μου μετὰ πάντων ὑμῶν ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*; in precisely the same grammatical form of construction. If the benediction is to be interpreted as a prayer or desire that the grace of Christ may be with the Corinthian church, the verse which follows is nothing more than a wish or prayer that the apostle's love may also be with them. Colloquially expressed, it is simply: "I desire that my love may be with you all;" "I pray that I may love you all." How preferable is the construction by which we read: "my love is with you all." It is worthy of note that in the verse preceding this benediction in 1 Corinthians, where the imperative mood is obviously required, the verb is expressed, *ἤτω ἀνάϑεμα*, *let him be anathema.* This confirms our position, that when the mood is other than the indicative, the verb in an independent sentence seldom suffers ellipsis.

In the context which precedes the benediction in 1 Thessalonians, the apostle declares it to be his prayer that the whole spirit, soul, and body of the Thessalonian Christians may be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. Here, as might be expected, the verb in the optative is expressed. So in Hebrews, the benediction is preceded by the imploration, "now the God of peace that brought again from the dead our Lord Jesus, that great shepherd of the sheep, through the blood of the everlasting covenant, make you perfect," etc. Here, also, the verb is found in the optative. If the benediction which follows in immediate proximity to these texts were also a prayer or strong desire for grace to be imparted to the churches, may we not suppose that in like manner the verb would have been expressed in the optative?

If, then, ἐστί is the omitted verb, the sense of these salutations and benedictions is very clear. They serve as official announcements of the permanent indwelling of the grace of God in the hearts of his people. They are emphatic declarations of a great and comforting truth, and fitly stand at the beginning and close of the apostolic epistles, penned for the guidance, comfort, and edification of the churches to which they were addressed.

This result, however, may be reached by another line of argument. If the official privilege of pronouncing the blessing of God upon his people was accorded to the patriarchs, kings, and prophets of the Old Testament, may we not argue, *a fortiori*, that the authority to do this would be granted to those who held the relation of divinely authorized teachers to the churches of the New Testament dispensation? Turn we, then, to the pages of the Old Testament. We pass by, as of no account in this discussion, those forms of salutation and leave-taking common in social intercourse to the Hebrews, as well as to other oriental nations. We refer now to those benedictions pronounced by the patriarchs and prophets, which conveyed a real blessing to the recipients, or at least were solemn prophetic declarations of the purpose of God to bless them. Such was the blessing which Noah pronounced upon his sons, Shem and Japheth (Gen. ix. 26, 27). With a blessing of this sort Melchizedek met Abraham when returning from the slaughter of the kings at the valley of Shaveh (Gen. xiv. 18 – 20). That this was not an invocation for blessings to descend upon the patriarch, is evident from the use made of it by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, in proof of the official superiority of Melchizedek to Abraham. "Without all contradiction the less is blessed of the greater," or, as Professor Stuart renders it, "the inferior is blessed of the superior" (Heb. vii. 7). An inferior may pray for his superior, and bestow upon him his best wishes. Paul (1 Thess. v. 25) desired the prayers of those who were far inferior to him in piety and official station. But a blessing like that which Melchizedek pronounced upon Abraham, could be given only by a superior to an inferior. This shows that it was not a prayer or invocation or common salutation, but a solemn blessing, pronounced by one who, as priest of the Most High God, and king of Salem, was Abraham's official superior.

Another blessing of the class we are now referring to, is that which Isaac pronounced upon Jacob (Gen. xxvii. 27–29), for the revocation of which Esau pleaded in vain, even though it was fraudulently obtained by the younger brother. This was not a prayer or desire for Jacob's temporal or spiritual prosperity. It was something which carried with it the possession of a real blessing, and as such was beyond the power of Isaac himself to revoke, when once it had been pronounced. Cf. Gen. xxvii. 37. We find a similar blessing given by Jacob to Ephraim and Manasseh (Gen. xlviii. 8–20). This was deemed of such moment, and required so full and firm a belief in the divine promise on the part of Jacob, strangers and sojourners in the land of Egypt as he and his children were at the time, that it is referred to in the Epistle to the Hebrews (xi. 20) as one of the examples of remarkable faith exercised by the Old Testament worthies. The patriarchal blessing which Jacob (Gen. xlix), when about to die, pronounced upon his twelve sons, is another example of the blessings to which we are now referring. So also are those pronounced by Moses (Deut. xxxii. 1–29) upon the children of Israel before his death. Throughout the historical books of the Old Testament, we not unfrequently meet with prophetical benedictions from the lips of the authorized teachers of God's chosen people.

But not the more eminent saints only of the Old Testament dispensation were invested with this authority to bless the people of God. As an official act, it formed a part of the priestly service of the Mosaic economy. We read in Lev. ix. 22, that "Aaron lifted up his hand toward the people, and blessed them," after having waved the breasts and the right shoulder of the bullock and the ram for a "wave offering before the Lord," after which both "Moses and Aaron went into the tabernacle of the congregation, and came out and blessed the people, and the glory of the Lord appeared unto all the people." In Numb. vi. 23–26, a form of benediction is prescribed for Aaron and his sons. "On this wise ye shall bless the children of Israel, saying unto them, the Lord bless thee and keep thee; the Lord make his face shine upon thee and be gracious unto thee; the Lord lift up his countenance upon thee, and give thee peace. And they shall put my name upon the children of Israel, and I will bless them."

Our argument from this is simple and obvious. If the patriarchal and Mosaic dispensations, serving as mere types and shadows of the good things to come, and not being the very image of those things, were yet so fraught with blessings, that patriarchs, priests, and kings were invested with official authority to bless those who waited for the word of the Lord, might we not, with reason, expect that this prerogative, or something like it, would constitute a prominent feature of the new dispensation? Was it the privilege of Moses to bless the people of God before he ascended Mount Nebo to die, and of David and Solomon to pronounce a benediction upon the great congregations convened on such occasions as the bringing of the ark to Jerusalem and the dedication of the temple; and was Paul, the servant and apostle of Jesus Christ, the High Priest of good things to come, and the mediator of a better covenant established upon better promises, to be restricted to the simple utterance of his wish or prayer that the grace of his Divine Master might rest upon the churches which he had planted? We are slow to believe this. The same line of argument which proves that the ordinance of infant baptism, resting, as it does, upon the Abrahamic covenant, and abrogated by no enactment expressed or implied, is the right and privilege, *a fortiori*, of those who live under a dispensation so much more ample in its covenanted blessings and mercies, demonstrates beyond a doubt, that no official prerogative, like that we are considering, belonged to the patriarchs, prophets, and kings of the

Old Testament, which did not, in increased degree, belong to the apostles and evangelists of the new dispensation.

We pass, then, from the Old to the New Testament. In the very foreground is the Sermon on the Mount, the beatitudes of which cast far into the background the benedictions of the Old Testament, whether regard be had to the dignity of the one who pronounced them, or the richness and amplitude of the blessings themselves. Similar beatitudes or benedictions meet the eye throughout the gospels. "My peace I leave with you, my peace I give unto you; not as the world giveth give I unto you." In the spirit of this great utterance, which secures the possession of true and lasting peace to the soul of every believer, Paul, with no misgivings that he is doing something extra-official or presumptuous, announces in his salutations and benedictions, that the peace of God, through Jesus Christ, does, and ever will, abide with all true believers.

Was this an official prerogative too great to be granted to him and his fellow apostles? Did our Lord not say (Matt. xvi. 19), that he 'would give unto them the keys of Heaven, that whatsoever they should bind on earth should be bound in Heaven, and whatsoever they should loose on earth should be loosed in heaven;' and did he not, when he had imparted unto them by his divine breath the Holy Ghost, also say, on another occasion (John xx. 22, 23): "whosesoever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whosesoever sins ye retain, they are retained?" Is it an unwarrantable stretch of authority for men clothed with such extraordinary powers to declare, in the name of their divine Master, that his grace is, and always will be, with all who believe in his name? Interpreted as solemn averments of this great truth, the apostolic salutations and benedictions very appropriately introduce and close the epistles. But if, through a mistaken apprehension that words of such gracious import cannot be uttered by human lips, we interpret them as mere prayers or earnest desires, their prominent position at the beginning and end of the epistles, we cannot but regard, is comparatively meaningless and incongruous. We have only to ask, which of these interpretations comports best with the sublime promises, hopes, and consolations of the epistles, which serves as the most fitting introduction to so triumphant a consummation of grace as is brought to view in the eighth chapter of Romans, the fifteenth chapter of 1 Corinthians, or the first chapter of Ephesians, and there can be but one reply, namely, that interpretation which regards these salutations and benedictions as declarations of God's accredited ambassadors that the grace of Christ is the portion of every believer. Thus explained, the epistles serve to expand and illustrate the great idea of the salutation, which is again repeated with increased emphasis in the closing benediction.

The only question which remains, and which may be disposed of very briefly, is, whether the ministers of Christ are authorized to pronounce these salutations and benedictions, in the sense in which they were employed by the apostles. We believe that they are thus authorized. "When he ascended up on high, he led captivity captive, and gave gifts unto men. And he gave some apostles, and some prophets, and some evangelists, and some pastors and teachers; for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ" (Ephes. iv. 8, 11, 12). Were these ascension gifts designed only or chiefly for the apostolic age of the church? Were there no saints to be perfected, and no body of Christ to be edified, after Paul and his fellow laborers had ceased from their work on earth? May not the Christian minister now come before his people in the fulness of the gospel of Christ, as Paul was sure he should come to the church at Rome? Has he no official authority to pronounce words of peace and joy to those who are the Israel of God, and to whom in a special sense pertain the promises? Most assuredly he has. When he pronounces the salutation or benediction in the forms given by the Spirit of inspiration, it carries with it all that wealth of spiritual grace and peace which it was designed to convey when expressed by Paul, Peter, or John. It was not in their own name or by their own authority, but as ambassadors of Jesus Christ, that they uttered words of such blessed and comprehensive import. Every minister of Jesus Christ, however obscure his position or humble his sphere, is commissioned to preach the same gospel which the apostles preached, and to feed the church with the same hopes and promises. There is no official prerogative, apart from their extraordinary apostolic powers as inspired teachers of truth, which he does not possess.

But while the power to pronounce these salutations and benedictions in their full original sense, is to be conceded to every ordained minister of Jesus Christ, the people should be carefully instructed in regard to the nature of this service, and its position in the ordinances and worship of God's house. They should be cautioned against attaching to it any mysterious virtue or efficacy, as though the minister who pronounces it has power to forgive sin, or bestow blessings. It should be well understood that no new or special spiritual gift is communicated by this ministerial act, but that it is the reiterated declaration of a truth as old as the Christian religion itself; that the grace of Jesus Christ is with his people, in accordance with the express provisions of his everlasting love, ratified by his death on the cross, and that it will ever abide with them in this world and in that which is to come. The congregation should be explicitly taught that, although the language of these formulas embraces all who are within sound of the minister's voice, inasmuch as it is not his prerogative to withhold the riches of the gospel of grace from any who wait upon his ministration, yet the blessing contained therein belongs to and rests upon those only who are true believers, and even upon such has little vitality and force, unless they are in the lively exercise of faith to discern its full and gracious import.

It is to be feared that there is in all our congregations much misapprehension in regard to the nature and import of the benediction. The people stand in reverential attitude during the pronouncement of this simple and sublime formula. There is danger, however, of their coming to regard themselves as the passive recipients of a blessing, in reference to which their only duty is to assume a befitting posture. This may not be true of all. Some, doubtless, have such enlightened views, as to attach to this part of divine service no vital saving power, only as it rests upon those who by faith in Jesus Christ appropriate it to themselves, as a pledge and earnest of God's unchanging love. But such is the natural tendency to rely upon forms and observances, and to substitute them for the living faith of the gospel, that no doubt with many the benediction is regarded as the actual conferral of a blessing, irrespective of that spirituality of mind in the recipient necessary to make it such.

It has always seemed to us eminently befitting the relation which subsists between the minister and people, the one as God's ambassador, the other as a congregation gathered together to listen to the divine message, that public worship should be commenced with a salutation, not necessarily in a form composed in Old Testament language, but sometimes in that employed by Paul, "grace be unto you and peace from God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ." This solemn and affectionate announcement that the favor of God rests ever upon the congregation of his saints, would constitute a fitting introduction to the services of the sanctuary, and confirm the faith and animate the hopes of those who "wait upon the Lord," and seek in the ordinances of his house to renew their spiritual strength. A beautiful correspondence also would then be maintained between the commencement and close of public worship, and due prominence would be given to the great and comforting truth of the superabounding grace of God bestowed upon his people.

But whatever position may be assigned them in public worship, let not these salutations and benedictions be regarded, on the one hand, as possessing some mysterious, indefinable power, when pronounced by priestly lips, so that a blessing is communicated to the whole congregation irrespective of personal faith in Christ, nor, on the other hand, as merely expressive of a wish or prayerful desire for the bestowal of the divine favor upon those in whose hearing they are pronounced. Let them rather be regarded as declarative of the great and fundamental fact of the gospel, that the grace of Christ abides with all his saints according to his promise, when about to lay down his life to bring in eternal redemption from sin and death.

ARTICLE III.

WEDGWOOD ON ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY.[1]

BY EUGENE SCHUYLER, PH D., NEW HAVEN, CONN.

Philology, or the science of language, is almost wholly the growth of the last fifty years; and in that time it has made rapid progress. Nearly all the known languages have been to some extent explored, and their sources and mutual relations pointed out. But philosophical research into the English language, by English scholars, has not kept pace with the advance in other directions. There has been produced no good and reliable work on English etymology, — not from lack of a rich field to work in, but from the incompetency of the laborers. Skinner and Junius lived before language was scientifically studied, and their works have been long out of date. Richardson and Webster, though still in use, are too inaccurate and incomplete to be of much service. They not only lacked the results worked out by investigators in other languages to aid their own researches, but they were both deficient in the genius and the capacities suitable for such studies. While Germany has become a nation of scholars, the age of English scholarship, even in the classics, seems to be past. The student of English has therefore been forced to have recourse to the labors of foreign scholars in foreign languages, and draw what assistance he could from those sources. With regard to the Latin side of the language, Diez has covered most of the ground in his "Etymological Dictionary of the Romanic Languages;"[1] while Grimm[2] and Diefenbach[3] are authorities for the Teutonic and Celtic elements.

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[1] A Dictionary of English Etymology. By Hensleigh Wedgwood, M. A., late Fellow of Chr. Coll. Cam. Vol. I. (A – D.) 8vo. pp. xiv. 507. London: Trübner & Co. 1859.

The same; with Notes and Additions by George P. Marsh. 4to. pp. 247. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1862.

When, therefore, a new attempt in this line was announced by Mr. Wedgwood, under the auspices of the Philological Society of London, it was thought that the great want was about to be supplied. But on a careful examination of the work, we are obliged to say that the want is as great as ever, and that we must still wait, until some English scholar arises fully competent to perform the work.

A good etymological dictionary should be complete, scientific, and accurate. It should be complete in two respects. Not only should it contain all the words in the language, but all that is known about each word should be set forth. When a derivation is not certainly known, there should be a digest of the leading opinions on the word. All the cognate words, too, should be given, so that we may have before us all the steps necessary in ascending to its source.

A scientific treatment demands method; and a method based on true critical principles. No play should be allowed to mere fancy; but there should be a strict adherence to a fixed system in every part. About the word in question all the related words should be grouped, and arranged historically; going "upward through the ages," that we may clearly see its development, and know just when and how it came into our language. Thus, in treating a word of Latin origin, the forms in all the Romanic languages should be given, showing through which it came to us: that parent word should then be deduced from the Latin, and that compared with its cognates, perhaps in the Greek or Sanskrit, or its root compared with others in different classes of the same family. An unhistorical method is not really scientific; and, although it may sometimes be of advantage to compare resemblances of words in languages widely separated, yet, at the same time, the investigator is apt to be led away by mere similarities of external form, and to reach conclusions which the history of the word would at once overthrow. Every change which a word undergoes, in its growth from the root to the present form, may have an effect upon the meaning; and it is by presenting all these in their proper order that the exact signification is to be made out.

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[1] Friedrich Diez, Etymologisches Wörterbuch der Romanischen Sprachen. Bonn. 1853. 2d ed. 1861–62.

[2] Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob Grimm und Wilhelm Grimm. Leipzig. 1852, ff. Deutsche Grammatik von Jacob Grimm. Göttingen, 1822–40.

[3] Lorenz Diefenbach, Vergleichendes Wörterbuch der Gothischen Sprache. Frankfurt am Main. 1851.

Celtica. Stuttgart. 1839.

It is of course necessary to a scientific method that there be accuracy and exactness. Known facts and mere surmises must be kept distinct. The facts in the history and development of a word should be stated just as they are, and with no attempt either to draw inferences from them, or to make them square with any preconceived theory.

The science of language is now beyond the empirical stage to which ingenious hypotheses are appropriate. Facts are no longer to be explained by any arbitrary principle obtained independently of them. The object is now to obtain all the facts; when we have these, we may endeavor to see in what manner they can be explained. The theory must grow up from the facts. But it will not do to found a theory on insufficient data; for the temptation is great, of moulding, to suit our previous notions, what is subsequently discovered. Nor is a dictionary the place for theorizing. If a lexicon is of any use at all, it is solely for the facts which it contains, unburdened by extrinsic matter. Another work should contain the conclusions which might be drawn from the data there given. What would be said of the botanist who should interweave with the description of a genus, arguments about the "origin of species" or the beginning of vegetable life? Dr. Webster may be taken as a striking example of an author working in this way. Starting with the idea that all languages came ultimately from the Hebrew, he endeavored to apply that theory to all words. Hence his work is full of the most absurd blunders, though mingled with occasional happy conjectures. Hence we see a word of Latin origin finding its source in the Welsh, or one of Greek in the Ethiopic.

Let us now examine more particularly the work of Mr. Wedgwood, and see how far it conforms to these requisitions. There has been issued only the first volume, from A to D inclusive, which ought to comprise about one fourth of the words in the language. But few words of Latin origin are given, the principal strength of the author being expended on those from the Teutonic and Celtic stocks. The author says: "I have as a rule omitted words of classical derivation, whether immediate or through the French, unless sufficiently disguised in form to require explanation, or in cases when the meaning of the word has been greatly modified during its residence in a foreign soil, or where it seemed desirable to point out relations not commonly recognized by our classical scholars." We do not perceive the expediency of such a rule; nor do we see that it has been well carried out and applied. Thus, many words have been omitted, the derivations of which are not at all obvious; and as many more find place, where the slightest familiarity with Latin would show us their origin. Even among the words from other sources there are singular omissions, some of them words in common use. Such are, among others, *amice*, *amma*, *among*, *anele*, *archil*, *arise*, *aroynt*, *arrack*, *bier*, *braid*, *bring*, *caboose*, *caddis*, *caltrop*, *capsize*, *caraway*, *crab*, *sour*, *derrick*, *die*, *donkey*, *drift*, *etc.* Again, of the words given, while many are treated at an unreasonable length, others are very incompletely noticed; as *arm*, *away*, *article*, *ass*;[1] while of some the etymologies are not attempted, as *dudgeon*, *art*, and *ape*. This last word is quite interesting in its origin. It may be traced through all the northern languages to the Greek κῆπος, κεῖπος, Sanskrit *kapi*, the root of which is *kamp*, to tremble, to move quickly. The *ape*, therefore, means the agile, quickly-moving animal.

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[1] In many cases, Mr. Wedgwood by a little more research would have brought out etymologies of great interest. He would have shown that *ask* was from the Skr. *ish*, to desire; that *bittern* was from the Lat. *taurus* or *bos taurus*, a bull, on account of its bellowing noise (cf. Pliny, 10, 42, 57); that *candy* was from the Skr. *khand*, *khad*, to break; and that *caper*-sauce comes from the Skr. *kaphári*, which there meant dried ginger, derived, on account of its dietetic qualities, from *kapha*, phlegm, and *ari*, an enemy.

Diez, in the preface to his "Etymological Dictionary," speaks as follows: "The problem of etymology is to trace back a given word to its source. The practical method for the solution of this problem is not always the same; we easily perceive two methods, a critical and an uncritical. The uncritical hits on its explanations, as a mere matter of luck, from some external resemblance of form, or extorts them, in cases of very slight similarity, or even complete difference, by a series of arbitrarily formed middle terms. A method of proceeding so faulty in principle, though through wit and genius it has made many lucky hits, has brought with many the whole science of etymology into discredit; while it has recommended itself to others through the ease of its application; for any one can practise it without call or preparation. The former err in their aversion, the latter in their inclination. In opposition to the uncritical method, the critical subjects itself to the well-settled principles and rules of phonology, without deviating a foot-breadth from them, except where clear actual exceptions compel. It strives to follow the very genius of the language, and to win from it its secrets. It weighs each letter, and seeks to ascertain its appropriate value in every position."

The critical method is finely illustrated in the work from which we have just quoted; Mr. Wedgwood's book is a most excellent example of the opposite. Instead of carefully following up each word, its author often seems merely to have turned over the leaves of various dictionaries, to have selected all the words of similar form, and to have placed them one after another without the slightest attempt at order. The arrangement is in some cases so defective, that we have been totally unable to perceive what he actually intended.[1] Frequently the same word is derived in

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[1] See Mr. Wedgwood's treatment of the word *carat*.

Under the word *Artichoke*, Wedgwood cites Diez, but conveys a wrong im-different ways in different places. The author often groups together words which, on a closer investigation, may be seen to come from different roots; while at the same time he overlooks most important relations, and separates words which are obviously connected. He is especially at fault in words of Latin derivation, where he sometimes ignores the Latin and endeavors to come to an origin this side of it. Besides all the confusion, mistakes, and oversights, with which he is fairly chargeable, we sometimes feel as if Mr. Wedgwood were misleading us for the purposes of his argument, so carefully does he often avoid real relations and bring out the onomatopoetic side of the word.

Under the word *class*, he says: "Lat. *classis*, a distribution of things into groups, originally *clasis*. Identical with Icel. *klasi*, Sw. Dan. *klase*, a bunch, assembly, cluster, Du. *klos*, *klot*, globus, sphaera." The Du. *klos*, *klot*, is also brought in under *clot*, *clod*, as formed from the sound of a heavy mass falling to the ground. It has always been supposed that the Lat *classis* was the Gr. κλᾶσις = κλῆσις, from καλεῖν, to call; the people as called together, a division of the people, a class. *Case*, *cash*, *cask*, *chest*, and *quash*, he compares with the It. *cassa*, Fr. *caisse*, Sp. *casco*, as well as with Icel. *kassi*, Du. *kasse*, Ger. *kiste*, and thus concludes: "The primary meaning seems something hollow or empty, from an imitation of the sound of a blow on an empty vessel by the syllable *kass! quash!* sometimes strengthened by a final *k* or *t*." The It. *cassa*, whence Eng. *case*, is plainly enough from the Lat. *capsa*, a box, from *capere*, to hold. So *cistern*, Lat. *cisterna*, formed from *cista*, Gr. κίστη, chest, he deduces from Bohem. *ciste*, clean, (= Lat. *castus*,) whence *cistiti*, to cleanse, and *cisterna*, a cleansing place.

Our author, besides his failings in comparative philology, has made great mistakes as an historian of words. Not unfrequently he reverses the order, and derives the earlier

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pression of his meaning. He says, "Ven. *articioco;* Sp. *alcachofa;* Ar. *alcarschufa;* It. *carciofa.*" Diez, however. deduces *artichoke*, Ger. *artischoke*, It. *articiocco*, Fr. *artichaut*, directly from the Ar. *ar'dî schaukî*, i.e. earth-thorn, and only cites the other words by way of comparison.

word from the later. Oftentimes a little more attention to the history of a word would have brought out the very opposite of what he has given. The word *appall*, he asserts, is wholly unconnected with *pale*. He takes it from *pall*, to deaden, to lose or destroy the vital powers. He adduces some quotations from Richardson, but omits two which make against him, and which clearly show the origin of the word in *pale*, Fr. *pâle*, *pâlir*. To *deaden* is a secondary meaning easily arising from that of to be *pale*, *pallid*, like a corpse.

> "The answere that ye made to me, my dere,
> When I did sue for my poor hartes redresse,
> Hath so *appall'd* my countnance and my cheere,
> That in this case, I am all comfortlesse."
> *Wyatt, to his love on her refusal.*

The other passage is from *Shakespeare* : 1 *Part Hen. VI. Act i, sc.* 2.

> "Methinks your looks are sad, your cheere *appall'd*."

Cheere is used here, as above, in the sense of face, cheek.

But Mr. Wedgwood's greatest fault is that he is carried away by his theory. This theory is that of Onomatopoeia, or the imitative character of language. According to this, man, in his primitive state, had at first no means of expressing his emotions except by gestures and inarticulate cries. He saw various animals; and though he could perceive their difference by his eye, he was unable to represent them, in their absence, either to himself or others. There was nothing to fix the conception. But at last he heard a voice, say the lowing of a cow. That cry was then the distinguishing feature of the object, and to bring before himself the idea of cow, all he had to do was to imitate its lowing. So with other animals, and so with the various objects above, around, or beneath him. He would be attracted by the perfume of a flower, would sniff up its fragrance, and after that would recall to himself the flower by a sound resembling *sniffing*. In process of time, derivatives would be formed, enough to express the different wants of his nature.

One of the objections to this view of the subject is that it lowers too much the powers of man, in supposing that he was incapable himself of originating symbols of his ideas, and that he must learn his whole language, now so complex and various, from the cries of lower animals and the noises of nature; the whistling of the wind and the purling of the brook.

Thought and language are coincident. The child begins to talk as soon as it thinks. As soon as it perceives the separate existence of a mother, it calls her *mum*, *mum*, the first words which a child ever speaks. When man, then, commenced to think, and to think in reference to others, he began to speak. It is this in which man differs from beasts. They are incapable of expressing their thoughts by language, and use mere interjections of pain, joy, hunger, etc.: he thinks and speaks. Call it instinct if you will, it is a power peculiar to him; and it was as natural for him to speak as to move his arms. Dr. Steinthal well expresses the three principles which governed the production of language.[1] "I. At the origin of humanity the soul and the body were in such mutual dependence that all the emotions of the soul had their echo in the body, principally in the organs of respiration and the voice. This sympathy of soul and body, still found in the infant and the savage, was intimate and fruitful in the primitive man; each intuition awoke in him an accent or a sound. II. Another law, which played a no less essential part in the creation of language, was *the association of ideas.* In virtue of this law, the sound which accompanied an intuition associated itself in the soul with the intuition itself, so closely that the sound and intuition presented themselves to the consciousness as *inseparable*, and were equally inseparable in the recollection. III. Finally the sound became *a word* by forming a bond between the image obtained by perception, and the image present in the memory; in other words, *it acquired significance and became an element of language.* The image of the resemblance and the image of the perception are not wholly identical; e.g. I see a horse; *no* other horse that I have ever seen resembles it absolutely in color, size, etc.; the general conception recalled by the word "horse" involves only the abstracted attributes common to all animals of the same genus. It is the collection of common attributes that constitutes the significance of the sound." It may be said that this does not exclude the theory that words were formed by imitation of sound. No; but it shows that it is not *necessary* for words to be so formed, and we think that the history of language and the facts of philology will show that few words have been actually formed in this manner.

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[1] H. Steinthal, Der Ursprung der Sprache; quoted from Farrar's Origin of Language, p. 45.

Most etymologists are agreed in tracing language ultimately to a certain number of roots. As to what a root is, there are some differences of opinion, Mr. Wedgwood says, that "a root is merely a fiction of the grammarians to indicate the core of a group of related words having similar significations," having never had any independent existence. The root in this sense seems to be the consonantal sounds of a word; as *clb*, the root of *club*, modified to *clmp*, in *clump*. Max Müller,[1] however, says: we call *root* or *radical*, whatever, in the words of any language or family of languages, cannot be reduced to a simpler or more original form. Roots are either predicative or demonstrative. They are monosyllabic, and always contain a vowel. In this view the roots as such had a determinate meaning; and a word of new signification would be formed by the addition of one or more letters to the root, by a modification of one of the letters, or by a union of two or more roots. Inflections would be produced by the addition of a demonstrative to a predicative root. Now the Chinese vocabulary of from forty to fifty thousand words may be reduced to four hundred and fifty roots; the Hebrew to five hundred; and the Sanskrit does not require more.[2] It is also stated that two hundred and fifty roots are sufficient to supply the German with eighty thousand words. The demonstrative roots are very few in number; and from their nature, being those which represent this, that, here, etc., cannot be imitative. The predicative roots, also, we would regard for the most part as original instinctive utterances. There was probably some reason, which, as yet, we have not reached, why one sound was better to express one idea than another. The explanation is probably to be gained, if gained at all, by a careful study of the modes of utterance, and by observation of the earliest attempts at speech in children. But there is this trouble, that we cannot ourselves remember our own experience, and it is very difficult to obtain anything with accuracy from watching others. This problem will, perhaps, always remain unsolved. It is these predicative roots which Mr. Wedgwood desires to prove are produced by imitation of sound. We will briefly state the different classes of words which he considers have their origin in this way.

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[1] Science of Language, Am. ed., p. 252.

[2] Müller, p. 265.

1. Animal cries and sounds; as *cluck*, *croak*, *roar*, *neigh*, *low*, *purr*, etc. Hence come the names of animals.

2. Inarticulate human utterances, as *sob*, *sigh*, *moan*, *laugh*, *cough*, etc.

3. The collision and fracture of bodies of various degrees of hardness and resonance. Of hard bodies, represented by *p*, *t*, *k*, as *clap*, *tap*, *crack:* of softer bodies, by *b*, *d g*, as *dab*, *thud*, *dag:* of resonance, by the liquids; as *clang*, *din*, *boom*, *knell*; sounds arising from the motion of the liquids and air, by sibilants; as *whirr*, *whizz*, *splash*, *dash*. "Modifications in the volume or pitch of the sound, depending on the size of the bodies in collision or vibration, are represented by a change of vowel; a sound of considerable volume being imitated by the vowels *a* or *o*, with a more open mouth and fuller voice, while notes of a high pitch are sounded with the thinner vowel *i*, into which the highest notes of the voice are necessarily moulded; e. g. *clank* and *clink*." Continuance is expressed either by reduplication of syllables, as in *murmur*, or by the addition of *r* or *l*, as in *grab*, *grapple*, *crack*, *crackle*, *clap*, *clatter*.

4. Words expressive of bodily and mental affections, as

of pain, terror, disgust; from various sounds used while experiencing those affections. Thus *ache*, from *ah*, the sound of pain. Words expressing silence are formed in a similar way, with the ellipsis of a negative, from the sounds *st*, *hush*, *mum*, etc.

Even if we allow all these words to be truly onomatopes, they are only words of occasional use, and not at all those which make up the strength and substance of the language. There are of course some words in all languages formed on this principle. But such words stand alone. They produce no derivatives, and are surrounded by no such numerous progeny as other roots are. To be sure, there are exceptions, but those only set the general fact in higher relief.[1] These are mostly words which mark nothing further than the mere sound imitated, its reality, or the means of producing it.[2] But the riches of a fully developed language are not seen in words of this sort. They are mere surface words. Such words are indeed desired in the vocabulary of poetry; but, as Heyse says,[3] "in this only so far as it has to do with a sensuous imitation of nature, which may be a concurring element in poetic representation, but in no wise its real object. For this is not imitation of nature, but representation of ideas. The original language may have been richer in them, just as the speech of children is; but as soon as the spirit looks deeper into the nature of things, it despises more and more this rough imitation of nature, and begins to name objects by deeper-lying, more significant marks.

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[1] The word *mystery* is, perhaps, one of these exceptions. Gr. *μυστήριον*, a mystery, from *μύστης*, one initiated, from *μυεῖν*, to initiate, from *μύειν*, to shut the eyes or mouth. The root is *μύ*, *μῦ*, naturally pronounced by closing the lips.

[2] We do not believe that a person of ordinary intelligence, on hearing for the first time one of these words, could have any idea of the sound it was intended to express. With Mr. Wedgwood the case is different. He has been blessed with an exceedingly delicate ear, and is able to distinguish with the most seeming accuracy between the sound made by a sharp-pointed instrument on a soft body, and that made by a dull instrument on a hard body; between the sound made by the flat of the hand on a partition wall, and by the clenched hand against a yielding body; of a round, heavy body falling into the water, and of the fall of a mass of irregular shape.

[3] System der Sprachwissenschaft, p. 92.

Words of this sort bear a very small proportion to the number of words in a language. Mr. Wedgwood, however, could carry his principle of formation still further. He tries to prove that some of our commonest ideas are gained in this way. He says: "after thus tracing the expression of ideas like endurance or continuance, and even of silence itself, to an imitative root, we need not doubt the possibility of expressing any other idea on the same principle."

The word on which he relies, as showing the origin of continuance, is *abide*. "The effect of complete absorption in an object, whether from sudden astonishment or intent observation, is marked by involuntary opening of the mouth, arising from the relaxation of all the muscles of the face not exerted in a steady gaze. The interjection of wonder, then, is formed from a repetition of the syllable *bæ! ba!* mechanically uttered through the parting lips; Gr. *βαβαί*! Lat. *babae! papae!* The original force of this syllable is seen in the O. Fr, *baer*, *baier*, modern *béer*, to open the mouth, to gape, then to be intent upon anything. Hence the O. Eng. *abeyance*, expectation, *aby*, to expect, endure, remain. The insertion of a *d* to avoid the hiatus ('the *d* being in ancient Latin the regular stop-gap of the hiatus'),[1] gives us the Pr. *badar*, to gape, to open; It. *badare*, to be intent upon, to desire, wait. From It. *badare*, we are led through Goth. *beidan*, to expect, look out for, endure; O. Ger. *bîtan*, *arbîtan;* A. S. *bidan*, *abidan*, to Eng. *bide*, *abide*." The etymology proposed for the Romanic words is indeed possible; but it is scarcely credible that the Northern words came from them. We have the Goth. *beidan*, to wait; *baidjan*, to compel; O. H. Ger. *bîtan*, to expect, endure, *beitôn*, to endure; *peitten*, to delay, force, urge; M. H. Ger. *bîten*, to tarry; Icel. *bîdha*, Sw. *bida*, Dan, *bie*, to wait, Eng. *bide*, *abide*. There is no idea of astonishment conveyed in any of these words; on the contrary, one of compulsion, so that, as Diefenbach suggests, they may be connected with Skr. *bâdh*, to vex. It is noticeable, as Mr. Marsh remarks in a note, that the vowel in all of these words is not the *a* of involuntary utterance, but the closer *i*. The *d*, also, seems part of the root, and not a subsequent addition, for Dan. *bie* is plainly a later form. It is impossible to prove an historical development of the Italian into the Gothic,[1] while the Romanic words might have been formed from these, with the meaning, first, to wait, then to gape while waiting, etc., like *amuse*. Whether then our author has proved that the idea of continuance is from an imitative root, let the reader judge.

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[1] A labial would seem more likely to be a stop-gap than a lingual.

Many words are imitative only in appearance. Many seem to convey to imaginative minds a shadow of their sense, but only because we have got sound and sense so thoroughly identified, that any sound nearly like that of the word will call before our minds the idea represented. One acquainted with the poetry of Tennyson can easily see how words can be made to represent a sound with which they have not the slightest connection. From many words which seem to be onomatopoetic this appearance will wear off on a deeper inquiry into their origin. *Thunder* is often cited as an imitative word. But *thunder*, Ger. *donner*, O. H. Ger. *donar*, which seems to show a rolling, rumbling noise, is the Lat. *tonitru*, Skr. *tanyatu*, and derived from the root *tan*, Gr. *τείνειν*, to stretch, whence come *τόνος*, *tone*, and also such words as Lat. *tenuis*, Eng. *thin* and *tender*.[2] Mr. Wedgwood says that the word *cat*, Ger. *katze*, is probably derived from the sound a cat makes in spitting. Yet in the Ger. *kater*, Eng. *cat* and *kitten*, there is no such sound, and in not a single language, from the Arabic to the Icelandic, except the Ger. *katze* (with perhaps the Finn. *kassi*, given by Mr. Wedgwood), does the sibilant occur.

The sum of the whole matter is happily expressed by Müller:[3] "Most of these onomatopoeias vanish as soon as we trace our own names back to Anglo-Saxon and Gothic, or compare them with their cognates in Greek, Latin, or Sanskrit. The number of names which are really formed by an imitation of sound, dwindle down to a very small quotum, if cross-examined by the comparative philologist; and we are left, in the end, with the conviction, that though *a* language might have been made out of the roaring, fizzing, hissing, gobbling, twittering, cracking, banging, slamming, and rattling sounds of nature, the tongues with which *we* are acquainted point to a different origin."

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[1] We are a little surprised that Mr. Wedgwood did not try to derive the verb *drink* from the tinkling sound seen in Fr. *trinquer*, It. *trincare*, to touch glasses, to tipple, to drink. The analogy is just as obvious as in *bide*.

[2] Heyse, Sprachwissenschaft, p. 93. Müller, Science of Language, p. 364.

[3] Science of Language, p. 365.

But, whatever may be the merits of this theory, it has been carried much too far in the volume before us. We will give here a few examples of evident errors into which Mr. Wedgwood has fallen while following the devious path of this ignis fatuus.

Blind, Mr. Wedgwood connects with *blink*. From *blink*, Ger. *blicken*, we have Ger. *blitz*, a flash, lightning; then by insertion of a nasal, *blinzen*, to twinkle, and by dropping the final syllable we get Scot. *blent*, a glance; Dan. *blende*, to dazzle; Du. *blindselen*, to be blind; Eng. *blind*. "The origin of *blind* would thus be the figure of blinking under a strong light." "Nor ought it," says he, "to startle us to find the simple form of a word derived from a frequentative. . . . Words aiming at the direct representation of natural sounds are apt to appear in the first instance in the frequentative form." Strange reasoning this. As if it did not remain to be proved that the word does aim at the representation of a natural sound. He cites as another example of this the word *blend*. "This word represents," he says, "the sound made by the agitation of liquids. Swab. *blotzen*, to churn; *plotzen*, *plonsen*, to plunge; *blonssen*, to dabble in water; Eng. *bluther*, *bludder*, to make a noise with the mouth in taking any liquid; *blunder*, to stir up water. Hence Eng. *blend*, A. S. *blendian*, to mix." Now Grimm and Diefenbach show that both *blind* and *blend* come from a stronger form, Icel. Sw. *blanda*, Icel. Dan. *blande*, to mix; hence *blind*, mixed, muddy, dark, blind, which therefore has no connection with the Ger. *blicken*, to look. From the same come also *blunder*, and *blunt*, which latter Mr. Wedgwood would have represent another sound, viz. that of a round heavy body falling into the water, connected with Eng. *plump*, Du. *plotzen*, *plonsen*, *plompen*.

Brilliant is classed by our author with *bright*, both of which he derives from one of his favorite roots *br*. This root, in which *b* interchanges with *g*, and *r* with *l*, represents a sudden noise; and then, by transfer from the ear to the eye, a flash of light. Now we have in French the verbs *grisser*, to creak, crackle, *gresiller*, *grisler*, *griller*, to crackle as meat in broiling; also *brasiller*, *brusler*, *bruler*, It. *brasciare*, Eng. *broil*. "In the Fr. *breziller*, *briller*, the meaning is transferred from the domain of the ear to that of the eye, from the analogous effect produced on the sensitive frame by a crackling noise and a sparkling light." Let us see if we can find assistance elsewhere. Diez gives an It. *brillare*, Sp. Pr. *brillar*, Fr. *briller*, to shine, sparkle, which he deduces from the Lat. *beryllus*, beryl, It. *berillo* (in the dialect of Parma, *brill*). Compare also the Ger. *brill*, beryl, and *brille*, beryl, crystal, spectacles. *Beryllus*, Gr. *βήρυλλος*, is a stone of a sea-green color, used also as a general name for crystal. *Brilliant*, then, is shining, sparkling like a crystal, and we almost revert to the original signification when we speak of a diamond ring as a ring set with brilliants.

Caprice is another word falsely derived from an idea of signification in the sound. *Caprice*, Fr. *caprice*, It. *capriccio*, is usually and most probably derived from It. *capra*, Lat. *caper*, a goat; and like Eng. *caper* it meant originally a jump, leap, fantastic action, as of a goat. The former is generally used of mental, the latter of bodily action. Mr. Wedgwood looks for the origin of the word in an entirely different direction. He says: "The connection between the sound and the movement of the sonorous medium is so apparent, that the terms expressing modifications of the one are frequently transferred to the other subject. Thus we speak of sound *vibrating* in the ears; of a *tremulous* sound, for one in which there is a quick succession of varying impressions on the ear. The words by which we represent a sound of such a nature are then applied to signify trembling or shivering action." Various examples are adduced to prove this, — Gr. *φρίσσειν*, Fr. *frisser*, It. *brisciare*, Fr. *grisser*, etc. "We then find symptoms of shivering, chattering of the teeth, etc., employed to express a passionate longing for a thing, as in Sophocles' *ἔφριξ' ἔρωτι*, I have shivered with love." The whole argument is here built on the termination, as in *blind* on the so-called frequentative ending. The first syllable is entirely disregarded. He makes the same mistake in one of the examples which he cites in confirmation, viz. Lat. *ericius*, a hedgehog, It. *riccio*, hedgehog, prickly husk of a chestnut. *Ericius* is a diminutive of *er*, Gr. *χήρ*, related perhaps, to *χοῖρος*, a pig (though Curtius doubts it), and contains no idea of shivering.

The same is again exemplified in our author's treatment of *catch*. This he rightly identifies with *chase*, Fr. *chasser*, It. *cacciare*, but goes on thus: "The origin of this word is the imitation of the sound of a smart blow by the syllable *clatch!* passing on the one hand into *catch*, and on the other into *latch*, by the loss of the *l* and *c* respectively. Ger. *klatsch!* thwick-thwack! a word to imitate the sound made by striking with the hand against a partition wall; *klatsch*, such a sound or the stroke which produces it, a clap, flap; *klatsche*, a whip or lash. . . . . . In the sense of seizing an object, the term *catch* is to be explained as clapping one's hand upon it, snatching it with a smack, in the same way that we speak of *catching* one a box on the ear." But how easily is this word traced to the Latin, where we lose sight of all similarity of sound. N. Fr. *chasser*, O. Fr. *cachier*, *cacher*, *chacher*, Pr. *cassar*, Sp. Pg. *cazar*, Lat. *captiare* for *captare*, to catch, chase, an intensive form of *capere*, to take. . . . . .

We will give yet one more example to show how, led by his theory, Mr. Wedgwood has overlooked what was plain in sight, and wandered off into absurdities. Under the word *drill* he cites as an equivalent the Du. *drillen*, *trillen*, to tremble, move quickly, whirl, turn about, bore. "The primary signification is to shake, to move to and fro; then, as vibration and revolution are characterized by the same rapid changes of direction, to move round and round, and thence to bore a hole. The Du. *drillen* was especially applied to the brandishing of weapons, ... hence *drillen*, as a factitive verb, to *drill* soldiers, to make them go through their exercise." But is not *drill* in this sense a tropical use, much as we say, to *bore* one, to put a thing *through*. For the source of the word, Mr. Wedgwood falls back on his old root, *br*, *gr*, this time modified into *dr* or *tr*. "The origin is seen in Fr. *dredré*, the chattering of the teeth; *dridriller*, *dridiller*, to jingle, as hawks' or mules' bells; Gael. *driethlich*, Fr. *driller*, to twinkle, glitter; the notion of chattering, quavering, trembling, shaking, glittering, being commonly expressed by modifications of the same root. . . . . . The senses of shivering, turning round, piercing, are also found united in *thrill*, *thirl*, which must be classed with *drill* as mere differences of spelling. A *thrill* of *emotion* is a shiver or shudder of nervous excitement. Icel. *thirla*, circumagere; Eng. *thirlpool*, for whirlpool; A. S. *thirlian*, to pierce; *thyrel*, O. Du. *drille*, a hole; Icel. *thirl*, a whirl for milling milk; Ger. *zwirl*, a tool for drilling holes; Du. *dwarlen*, to whirl; Eng. *twirl*." Now by reversing a part of the above process, we will come nearer the truth. Connected with *drill* we have the Du. Ger. *drillen*, Dan. *drille*, Sw. *drilla;* also A. S. *thyrlian*. This is plainly derived from *thyrl*, *thyril*, bored or pierced through, a hole; O. H. Ger. *durhil*, *durihil*, bored through, from *durh*, *durah*, *durih*, N. H. Ger. *durch*, A. S. *thurh*, through. The original signification is then to pierce, bore; and, as in the act of boring, a rotary motion is usually given to the instrument, the various meanings of the Du. *drillen* have their rise. *Thrill* is the same as *drill*, to bore, to pierce, as with something sharp; hence to cause a tingling sensation, and to experience such a sensation.

We will now adduce some miscellaneous examples, taken almost at random, as specimens of the manner in which the work is written.

Accoutre. "From the Fr. *accoutrer*, formerly *accoustrer*, to equip with the habiliments of some special office or occupation, — an act, of which in catholic countries the frequent change of vestments at appointed periods of the church service, would afford a striking and familiar example. Now the person who had charge of the vestments in a catholic church, was the sacristan; in Lat. *custos sacrarii*, or *ecclesiae* (barbarously rendered *custrix*, when the office was filled by a woman), in O. Fr. *cousteur* or *coustre*, *coutre;* Ger. *küster*, the sacristan or vestry-keeper. The original meaning of *accoutrer* would thus be to perform the office of sacristan to a priest, to invest him with the habiliments of his office; afterwards to invest with the proper habiliments of any other occupation." The Fr. *accoutrer*, O. Fr. *accoustrer*, comes much more easily and naturally from *ac* for Lat. *ad* and Fr. *cousture*, *couture*, It. *costura*, a seam, sewing. This is from Fr. *coudre*, part. *cousu*, Pr. *cóser*, *cusir*, Sp. *cosér*, *cusir*, It. *cucire*, to sew, Lat. *consuere; con*, together, and *suere*, to sew. *Accoutre* then, is to array a person by putting on him *sewed* things, or garments, — the real, primitive sense.

Amerce. Mr. Wedgwood follows Bailey in calling an *amercement* a pecuniary penalty imposed upon offenders at the *mercy* of the court, and cites in illustration the Law Latin *poni in misericordia. Amerce*, Fr. *amercier*, L. Lat. *amerciare*, is to impose a fine, require amends, from Lat. *merces*, *mercedis*, hire, wages, reward, penalty. Indeed, this is the source of *mercy* also, as seen in O. Fr. *mercit*, Sp. *merced*, It. *mercè.* The Lat. *merces* came, in the Middle Ages, to be equivalent to *misericordia*, pity, our *mercy*[1]; and the phrase to be amerced or be in mercy, was translated into the Latin of the courts as *poni in misericordia.*

Arrant. "Connected," says Wedgwood, "with Ger. *arg*, bad of its kind, great, exaggerated; *ein arger Schelm*, an arch rogue. A. S. *earg*, timid, evil, wretched; O. Eng. *arwe*, arrant. The termination *ant* is probably from the Low Ger. inflection *en*." The common derivation of this word, from Lat. *errare*, to err, to wander, is undoubtedly the true one. The word was first applied to vagabonds, and then to rascals of any description. Accordingly we find the spelling in Old English to be *erraunt*, *errant*, *errand*.

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[1] See Blackstone's Comm., Book III. App. p. xxv.

> "An outlawe, or else a thefe *erraunt*."
>
> *Chaucer*, *The Manciples Tale*, *v.* 17173.

"That *errand* traitor, Dudley, Duke of Northumberland, upon the scaffolde." — *Bp. Gardner*, *True Obedience. Translator to the reader.*

"And made Edward, from an *errant* rake, become a fine gentleman." — *Tatler*, *No.* 9.

Bastard, according to this work, is "apparently of Celtic origin, from Gael. *baos*, lust, fornication. O. Fr. *fils de bast*, *fils de bas*." We have also Fr. *bâtard*, Pr. *bastart*, It. Sp. Pg. *bastardo*. The best explanation of the word is that furnished by Mahn,[1] and approved by Diez. He derives it from O. Fr. and Pr. *bast*. N. Fr. *bât*, Sp. It. *basto*, a pack-saddle, with the termination *ard* or *art*. The muleteers of Provence and Spain used their saddles for beds in the inns; and hence the O. Fr. *fils de bast*, son of a pack-saddle, and the O. Eng. *born in bast*, were used in distinction from legitimate children born in the marriage bed. See an example in Don Quixote, c. 16. The etymology is similar to that of *bantling*, Ger. *bänkling*, *bankert*, from *bank*, bench.

Bilboes, an instrument of punishment among sailors, is from *Bilboa* in Spain, where they were largely made. Great quantities of them are said to have been found on board the Spanish Armada. It is not, as the author states, from Du. *boeye*, Lat. *boja*, a fetter, shackle.

Black, — *Bleak*. "The original meaning of the word *black* seems to be pale. Then as a pale complexion takes a bluish tint, the designation has passed on to mark the darker colors of the spectrum, and finally, in Eng. *black*, a total absence of color." These two words do indeed come from the same root, but not at all in the way supposed by Mr. Wedgwood. Under the same letters, the A. S. *blac* contains two words, which should be accented in different ways; *bläc*, black, ink, and *blâc*, pale. *Bleak*, A. S. *blâc*, is the O. Sax. *blêc*, Icel. *bleikr*, Sw. *blek*, Dan. *bleg*, Du. *bleck*, O. H. Ger. *pleih*, N. H. Ger. *bleich*, pale. The O. H. Ger. *pleih* is formed directly from *plîchan*, to shine, Icel. *blika;* whence N. H. Ger. *blicken*, to shine, *bleichen*, to be pale, A. S. *blican*, to shine, *blaecan*, *blaecean*, to whiten, *bleach*. From Ger. *blicken*, by the insertion of a nasal, we have *blinken*, to twinkle, to blink, and *blank*, Eng. *blank:* also, from the same root *blech*, tin, and *blitz*, lightning. The O. H. Ger. *plîchan* is further connected with the Lat. *fulgere*, to shine, *flagrare* to burn, Gr. *φλέγειν*, *φέγγειν*, Skr. *bhrâdsch* (*bhrâg`*). *Black*, on the other hand, comes from A. S. *bläc*, Icel. *blakkr*, Dan. *blak*, Sw. *black;* also, A. S. *black*, ink, Icel. *blek*, Dan. *bläk*, Sw. *bläck*, O. H. Ger. *plah*, L. Ger. *black*. With these words is connected the L. Ger. and Dan. *blaken*, to burn with a black smoke, which also, in its turn, is connected with the Gr. *φλέγειν*. *Black*, then, would signify the blackening, charring effect of a blaze on the thing burned; *black*, *bleak*, and *blink*, the dazzling, shining appearance of the blaze itself.

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[1] Dr. C. A. F. Mahn, Etymologische Untersuchungen auf dem Gebiete der Romanischen Sprachen, p. 17.

Our author connects, singularly enough, the words *cable*, *calibre*, *caliver*, *capstan*, and *carbine*. He deduces them all from It. Sp. *cabre*, *capra*, Lat. *caper*, a goat. The name *goat* was applied, he says, to battering rams, and thence to other warlike machines, especially those for throwing heavy stones. From this we have the O. Fr. *calabre*, a military engine. This name, on the invention of fire-arms, was transferred to a kind of cannon; hence come *carbine*, and *caliver*, from which last *calibre*, the bore or diameter of a piece, is derived. From the sense of a projectile engine, the designation was early transferred to the strong rope by which the strain of such an engine was exerted. Hence we have *cable*, Fr. *câble*. So also the name of the projectile engine was applied to a machine for raising heavy weights or exerting a heavy pull. This is seen in Sp. *cabestrante*, Eng. *capstan*. The only fault in these etymologies is that they are all historically incorrect. *Carbine* comes, it is true, from the O. Fr. *calabre*, but that, as seen in the contracted form *caable*, is for *cadable*, Lat. *cadabulum*, evidently from Gr. *καταβολή*, a throwing down. *Calibre* is either from *qua libra*, referring to the size of the bullet, or from the Ar. *qalib*, mould or model. *Caliver*, as Marsh shows in his note, was taken from *calibre*, and not the reverse. *Cable*, Fr. *câble*, Sp. Pg. *cable*, It. *cappio*, is from the Low Lat. *capulum*, a rope, seen in Isidore, from *capere*, to take, hold, and finally, *capstan* comes from the same verb, through the Sp. *cabestrante*, capstan, *cabestrare*, to bind, especially with a halter, *cabestro*, a halter, chain, Lat. *capistrum*, a halter, band.

Cinder. A. S. *sinder*, is not connected with Fr. *cendre*, Lat. *cinis*, ashes, although its spelling was influenced by it. The A. S. *sinder* is dross, scoria, from *sinder*, *synder*, separate, asunder; referring especially to the scales struck off from red-hot iron by the blacksmith.

Crab Mr. Wedgwood connects with *grab*, as the pinching animal. He considers it one of a series of words — such as *cramp*, *grab*, *clamp*, *club*, etc. — of which the radical idea was a lump or thick mass, from whence the notion of sticking together, contracting, compressing, was derived. Now *Crab*, A. S. *crabbe*, Ger. *krebs*, L. Ger. Dan. *krabbe*, is the same as the Lat. *carabus*, Gr. *κάραβος*, a crab, and a beetle, Lat. *scarabaeus*, Skr. *çarabha*, a locust. This is from the root *çar*, *char*, *kal*, to go; and *crab* is simply a walking animal.

Cress, A. S. *cerse*, *cärse*, Du. *kers*, Ger. *kresse*, is not from "the crunching sound of eating the crisp green herb," but from O. H. Ger. *kresan*, to creep.

The word *divan*, Mr. Wedgwood has evidently not examined. He merely says: "The raised bench or cushion at the upper end of a Turkish room on which the principal persons sit; hence, as a council or court of justice." The signification of a seat is the last one in the historical development of the word. The origin is the Persian *dîwân*, a book containing many leaves, a collection of writings, especially poems (compare Goethe's "West-östlicher Divan"), an account-book, a register; then, a council, senate, board of accounts, custom-house (in Fr. *douane*, It. *dogana*); next, a council-chamber; and finally, the seats round the wall of such a room — any raised seat.

Dock, a basin for ships, he explains "through the notion of stopping up, hemming in, confining. The Ger. *docke*, signifying primarily a bunch, is applied to the tap by which the water of a fish-pond is kept in or let off. Hence the name seems to have been transferred to a naval dock, the essential provision of which is, the power of keeping in or shutting out the water by an analogous contrivance, though on a greatly magnified scale." It can hardly be doubted that the Northern words corresponding to *dock* (Du. *dok*, Dan. *docke*, Sw. *docka*, Ger. *dock*, *docke*) are of comparatively modern origin, for they are not found in the older languages, not even the Middle High German; and they are probably identical with L. Lat. *doga*, *doha*, *dova*, a ditch, It. Pr. *doga*, O. Fr. *douhe*, N. Fr. *douve*. All these come from the Lat. *doga*, a sort of vessel, Gr. δοχή, δοχεῖον, a receptacle, from δέχεσθαι, to receive.

In looking through this volume, we have found history distorted, and all rules of sound criticism violated; and in closing it, we must express our regret that the Philological Society, in whose Journal much of it was originally published, should have so far committed itself as to entrust to Mr. Wedgwood the supervision of the etymological part of their New Dictionary; for, to judge from the present specimen, it will neither be a credit to English scholarship,[1] nor an aid to English students.

The American edition is enlarged by Notes by Mr. George P. Marsh; which, in our opinion, do not add materially to the value of the work. It is probable that the republishers merely wished for the name of this distinguished scholar to assist the sale. Mr. Marsh must have seen that to comment adequately upon the work would be, in fact, to rewrite it. A few of his notes are interesting and valuable, and to some of these we have previously referred. We wish that we had space left us to insert his able refutation of the author's ridiculous derivation of the words *better*, *boot*, *bait*, and *abet*, from *bet! bet!* a huntsman's cry to the dogs. But often the notes are too long and too wandering; as those on *amber* and *anneal*, and that on *maim*, under the word *cablish*, which should have waited for the second volume. The disquisition on *at* would be much more in place in an English grammar, or in Mr. Marsh's own "Lectures." Although the annotator does not thoroughly espouse Mr. Wedgwood's theory, he is occasionally led into similar mistakes. He does not hold to the derivation of *brick*, from the Lat. *imbrex*, a gutter tile, which he propounded in his "Lectures"; but we see that he still thinks that *commodore* comes from the Pg. *capitão môr*, chief captain. Now it is possible that *commodore* might be corrupted from Fr. *commandeur*, Pg. *commendadôr*, It. *commendatore;* but in *capitão môr* the similarity consists only in the first and the last letters. We are almost tempted to exclaim with Cotta: "In enodandis autem nominibus quod miserandum sit laboratis? .... quamquam, quoniam Neptunum a nando appellatum putas, nullum erit nomen, quod non possis una littera explicare unde dictum sit."

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[1] The Greek throughout is printed without accents.

Sometimes, too, Mr. Marsh forgets his own rule about historical derivations, and tells us that *admiral* came into the language of Europe through the Byzantine Greek *ἀμηραῖος*, which occurs in Theophanes Isaurus, who lived from 758 A. D. to 815 A. D. Du Cange asserts that it came directly from the Moors, through the Sicilians and Genoese; and he cites *amiratus*, from the Vita Carol. Mag. A. D. 801.

With regard to *apricot*, Mr. Marsh says: "The apricot, as we know from Pliny, N. H. l. xv. c. 12, was introduced into Italy in the time of that writer, and there is no doubt that it came to Rome from Armenia. It is now called *barkuk* in Persian, and the same name is given to a species of plum by the Arabs. These nations would not have borrowed the name of a native fruit from the Romans, and *apricot*, supposed to be from the Latin *praecox*, because the fruit ripened earlier than the common peach, with which it was confounded, is probably a case of accommodation from the Oriental *barkuk*." Now it is true that our *apricot*, O. Eng. and Fr. *abricot*, comes from the Arabic *al-birqûq*, through the Sp. *albaricoque*, Pg. *albricoque*, It. *albercocco*. But the Arabic, in its turn, is derived from the Lat. *praecox*, *praecocia*, through the Greek of Dioscorides, who says, 1. 165, τὰ μῆλα ἀρμηνιακά, Ῥωμαϊστὶ δὲ πραικόκκια. Dioscorides's treatise on Materia Medica was, as is well known, translated into Arabic, and was the chief authority in their schools. Through this the Arabians gained many words, and among them this.

ARTICLE IV.

THE STATE AND SLAVERY.

BY PROF. E. P. BARROWS, ANDOVER, MASS.

The treatment received by the man who went down from Jerusalem to Jericho and fell among robbers, too truly represents the fate that has overtaken the question of American slavery. It has fallen into the hands of partisan politicians, and been made by them a powerful engine for the advancement of sectional interests, while the true welfare of the nation as a whole, and of the slaveholding states in particular, has been forgotten. This was not always so. It is well known that the patriots of the revolution, both North and South, regarded slavery as a great evil, and earnestly desired its extinction.

> "Slavery has been opposed by eminent men in America from the beginning. Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Franklin, Jay, Hamilton, and many more of those who took a conspicuous part in laying the foundations of the government, regarded slavery as a great evil, inconsistent with the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the spirit of Christianity. They confidently expected that it would gradually pass away before the advancing power of civilization and freedom; and, shrinking

from what they regarded as insurmountable obstacles to emancipation in their own time, they consented, in the formation of the constitution, to give the system certain advantages, which they hoped would be temporary, and therefore not dangerous to the stability of the government."[1]

This statement admits of abundant corroboration from the documents that have come down to us from the early history of our government. Mr. Jefferson attempted to incorporate into the Declaration of Independence a clause reproaching Great Britain in the most severe terms for the introduction into the colonies of slavery and the slave-trade, which he calls "a war against human nature itself," and a "piratical warfare, the opprobrium of infidel powers." But the clause, being objected to, was struck out.[2] Again, in 1787, when the ordinance was passed excluding slavery from the territory north-west of the Ohio river, all the Southern States then represented in Congress voted in its favor; and, according to Mr. Benton, it was "pre-eminently the work of the South. The ordinance, as it now stands, was reported by a committee of five members, of whom three were from slaveholding states, and two (and one of them the chairman) were from Virginia alone."[3] This ordinance was coeval with the formation of our present federal constitution, and the Southern States insisted upon the insertion into it, as into the constitution, of a clause for the rendition of fugitives held to service. If the noble patriots and statesmen of that day could only have had foresight enough of the coming future, and enough of moral strength and union, now was the golden opportunity for prohibiting forever the extension of slavery into any territory then possessed, or that should afterwards be acquired. This would have saved us the terrible scenes of the present day. But the ordinance of 1787 extended only to the territory north-west of the Ohio river, and a great change soon came over the views and feelings of the South. The introduction of the cotton-gin, and of machinery for the manufacture of the article, multiplied immensely the facilities as well for throwing the raw material into the market, as for working it up into fabrics; while the enormous expansion of commerce increased to an equal extent the demand for cotton goods. Thus cotton, from being an inconsiderable article of commerce, rose rapidly to be a staple production, of primary importance not only to the United States but to Europe. And, since it was assumed everywhere in the Southern States as an indisputable axiom that the culture of cotton must be by slave labor alone, an immense pecuniary interest was created in favor of the institution of slavery, which operated among the southern slaveholders as it would have operated anywhere else, cementing them together most firmly in the maintenance and defense of that system which they had now learned to regard as the corner stone of their prosperity and sectional strength. Visions of unbounded wealth and power rose before their imagination, of which the cotton states were to have the monopoly, and thus, in connection with the principles of free-trade (a necessary concomitant of slavery, as will be shown hereafter), to control the policy of the civilized world. The consequent action of the southern slaveholders — and this is equivalent to saying the action of the Southern States themselves; for, wherever slavery has taken firm root in any state, the slaveholders have a monopoly of wealth and power in that state — this action of the Southern States necessarily took a *political* form; for wherever slavery exists by the side of free institutions it creates separate and antagonistic interests, both material and moral, as we shall have occasion to show at some length in the course of the present Article. The maintenance of the supremacy of the Southern States, in all three of the departments of the national government, for the interests of slavery; the territorial aggrandizement of the slaveholding states for the interests of slavery; the administration of the national affairs generally in the same interest; the extinction in the Southern States of the spirit of loyalty towards the national government by the assiduous inculcation of the doctrine of state rights in its most extreme form, and thus the preparation of these states for secession, in view of the very probable contingency of a loss of the controlling power in the national counsels—this is the line of policy that was long ago fixed upon by southern leaders, and which has been pursued with a steadiness, earnestness, and sagacity worthy of a better cause. On the part of the free states this stupendous scheme for making, first of all, the United States, and through them the civilized world, subservient to the cause of slavery, was, at the beginning, acquiesced in, with the indifference of incredulity, and an overweening confidence in their own superior strength. But as the plot began more and more to reveal itself, they aroused themselves, as it became freemen, to meet it with stern resistance. The heat and acrimony generated by this controversy, protracted through so many years, and the many political intrigues that have very naturally clustered about it, have made it extremely difficult to discuss the question of slavery in its relations to the state with that calmness and comprehensiveness of view which belong to the true statesman, who seeks not the agrandizement of a political party, but the general welfare of the nation. We propose to consider the institution of slavery in its bearings on the interests of the state, material, intellectual, and moral. and to show that, by an internal law, inexorable in its operation, it must ever be an incubus on the prosperity of the states that cherish it, and a fearful element of discord in the nation at large. To some it may seem that such a discussion is superfluous; but we are persuaded that now is the time for going deep down to the first principles of society. It is of the highest importance that the people understand not only the fact that the free states have always exceeded the slave states in prosperity, but the grounds of this superiority; and, further, that the present terrible struggle has not come about by any accidental combination of circumstances foreign to the element of slavery, but is the necessary result of the growth of the institution in the United States. Our argument in a previous Article was from Scripture. Our present argument will be from the public good — not simply the material good of the public, but its good, material and spiritual, in the widest sense of the term.

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[1] New Am. Cyclopaedia, Article, Slavery.

[2] The whole clause reads thus: "He has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating its most sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people who never offended him, captivating and carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur miserable death in their transportation thither. This piratical warfare, the opprobrium of *infidel* powers, is the warfare of the *Christian* King of Great Britain. Determined to keep open a market where MEN should be bought and sold, he has prostituted his negative for suppressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or to restrain this execrable commerce: and that this assemblage of horrors might want no fact of distinguished die, he is now exciting these very people to rise in arms among us, and to purchase that liberty of which *he* has deprived them by murdering the people upon whom *he* also obtruded them; thus paying off former crimes committed against the *liberties* of one people, with crimes which he urges them to commit against the *lives* of another."

[3] Thirty Years in the U. S. Senate, Vol. I, pp. 133, 134.

We begin with the operation of slavery on the slave states themselves. Mr. Bledsoe introduces his examination of the *Argument from the public good* with these remarkable words:

> "Here, at the outset, we may throw aside a mass of useless verbiage, with which our inquiry is usually encumbered. We are eternally told that Kentucky has fallen behind Ohio, and Virginia behind Pennsylvania, because their energies have been crippled and their prosperity overclouded by the institution of slavery. Now, it is of no importance to our argument that we should either deny the fact, or the explanation which is given of it by abolitionists. If the question were, whether slavery should be introduced among us, or into any non-slaveholding state, then such facts and explanations would be worthy of our notice; then such an appeal to experience would be relevant to the point in dispute. But such is not the question. We are not called upon to decide whether slavery shall be established in our midst or not. This question has been decided for us. Slavery, as everybody knows, was forced upon the Colonies by the arbitrary and despotic rule of Great Britain, and that, too, against the earnest remonstrances of our ancestors. The thing has been done. The past is beyond our control. It is fixed and unalterable. The only inquiry which remains for us now is, whether the slavery which was thus forced upon our ancestors shall be continued, or whether it shall be abolished? The question is not what Virginia, or Kentucky, or any other slave state, *might* have been, but what they would be in case slavery were abolished. If abolitionists would speak to the point, then let them show us some country in which slavery has been abolished, and we will abide the experiment."[1]

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[1] Liberty and Slavery, pp. 227, 228.

He then attempts to show, from the example of emancipation in the British colonies, that emancipation here must be disastrous in its results. Respecting this statement of "the question," we remark :

First, that it is very partial and inadequate. One of the most important points involved in the question is, as every one knows, that of the *extension* of slavery. In truth, from the day of the Missouri compromise to the present hour, the main struggle has been here. To this the annexation of Texas as a slave state, in 1845, looked ; to this, the acquisition of an immense territory from Mexico, by treaty, in 1848 ; to this, the repeal of the Missouri compromise, in 1854 ; to this, the late decision of the supreme court of the United States, in the Dred Scot case, which purported to extend slavery, by the operation of the constitution alone, into the territories of the United States ; to this, the present civil war, at least on the part of its originators and leaders.

Secondly, his demand to have some country pointed out, in which slavery has been abolished without disastrous results, is unguarded. It is within his knowledge that slavery was long ago abolished, with entire success, in New England and the Middle States He must mean, then, some country where slavery has taken deep root, and become a controling element in society. This will leave some, at least, of the present border slave states — we should say, all of them — out of the account. No one can seriously pretend that Missouri and Delaware and Maryland could not abolish slavery without the alleged disastrous results that followed in the British colonies. It is quite certain that if the people of these states would do so, their prosperity, spiritual as well as material, would be greatly increased. This would be an immense gain to the cause of freedom.

Thirdly, his appeal to the example of the British colonies is utterly fallacious. The whole force of his argument is contained in the following syllogism :

> If emancipation fails in one case, it must in every case :
> Emancipation has failed in the case of the British colonies ; therefore
> Emancipation must fail in the case of the United States.

If this were indeed so, it would furnish us with a potent argument against the extension of slavery. We should then have a full right to say: In the name of patriotism and humanity, let not another inch of American soil be given to this ineradicable curse. Then each Southern State, awaked alike to the consciousness of its misery and its helplessness, might well occupy itself, like Theseus amid the torments of Tartarus, in warning all new states against the unspeakable folly of allowing themselves to fall under a curse that could never be removed.[1] But the whole argument is a fallacy. We shall not stop, at present, to inquire respecting the truth or falsehood of his minor premise, that emancipation in the British colonies has been a failure, though we are strongly inclined to believe that a candid investigation of the facts would show that, in what constitutes the true welfare of a people, these colonies have gained by the operation; while they have before them brighter prospects for the future than they could ever have had under the reign of slavery. We content ourselves with affirming that his major premise — that if emancipation fails in one case, it must in every case — is an unfounded assumption. It does not follow that, because emancipation, in one particular instance, in one particular way, and in one particular class of circumstances, has been followed by disastrous results, it must be disastrous in all instances, under all methods, and in all circumstances. No man, in the sober exercise of his judgment, can suppose that the mere outward act of setting free an immense body of slaves, the children of slaves, brought up in ignorance, never taught or even suffered to provide for themselves, having their character formed, from infancy, under the idea that whatever they could do or earn belonged to another, and consequently without the strong motives to industry and thrift which animate freemen; no sober-minded man, we say, can suppose that the mere outward act of emancipation could convert this mass of ignorant slaves into intelligent and industrious freemen, able and willing to plan and provide for themselves under the high motives which liberty offers; especially where the act of emancipation was compulsory, coming from without, and where, consequently, the masters, as a body, had no sympathy with it, and no wish that it should succeed, but rather threw obstacles in its way, and took towards the liberated slaves a cold, repulsive attitude, as much as to say: "Now you are free; take care of yourselves." Yet this is the solitary example to which the appeal is made! Very different, indeed, we think, would be the result, if the movement should be inaugurated by the state itself where the institution existed, and should thus be its own hearty act; and if, also, especial care should be taken to prepare the slaves, by a suitable education, for the transition from servitude to full freedom, and to help them, by sympathy and friendly counsel, in passing through it. As we are not writing an article on emancipation, we shall not pursue this subject any further. We only say that when the example of the British colonies is urged against the policy of emancipation in any form, the argument is unfair and inconclusive. Our present object is to show the ruinous influence of the institution of slavery upon the states that cherish it, and upon the nation at large. If this can be fully understood by the people of the United States, we shall have not only a safeguard against the further extension of slavery, but also the best possible preparation for its abolition, at least in the border states — its abolition by their own free action; for whatever may be the difficulties encompassing the subject in the cotton states, it is manifest that, if the border states were once fully awake to the magnitude of the evil that oppresses them, they could soon find some way for its removal.

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[1] "Sedet, aeternumque sedebit,
Infelix Theseus: Phlegyasque miserrimus omnes
Admonet, et magna testatur voce per umbras:
'*Discite justitiam moniti, et non temnere divos.*'" — Aeneid, vi. 617–620.

Our plan of discussion is to consider, first, the influence of slavery on the states that cherish it. This we shall follow out in a two-fold line: that of the slaves themselves, and that of the free white population. We shall then proceed to examine the corrupting and disturbing influence of the system on the nation at large.

Our first work, then, is to consider the influence of slavery on the slave states *in the line of the slaves themselves.* We begin by regarding the slaves simply as a *producing* power; that is, in their relation to the *material* interests of the state. This we should call the lowest view of its prosperity, were it not for the fact that every system which has the effect of depressing the material prosperity of a community will be found, upon careful examination, to contain in itself the element of injustice. So true is the divine maxim here also, as well as in all other respects, that "righteousness exalteth a nation; but sin is a reproach to any people." The two great antagonistic principles of free and slave labor may be thus stated: on the side of freedom, *hope and reward;* on the side of slavery, *fear* and *penalty.* These are the opposite factors of the two systems, and the common factor with which they enter into combination is human nature, — the same in every race, and age, and clime. The two opposite products are thriftiness and unthriftiness; not thriftiness or unthriftiness in the case of every individual under the two systems (for here many modifying and counteracting influences come in), but thriftiness or unthriftiness in the state at large. Let us consider each of these two great principles separately.

The animating principle, then, of free labor is *hope and reward.* It is to be understood, as a matter of course, that the free states, owing to the common infirmity of human nature, are not wholly exempt from vicious arrangements and combinations, formed and sustained in the spirit of slavery, and having in a measure the depressing effect of slavery. But the predominating principle of free labor is that which we have stated; and it yields, in the free states, its appropriate harvest of material prosperity. Every child is trained up from infancy under the formative influence of the idea that, when he has attained to manhood, he will be, under God, his own master, and himself possess and dispose of the avails of his own industry and skill, be they much or little. He is not driven forward unwillingly, under the lash of fear; but his energies are drawn out, invigorated, and expanded under the impulse of hope. Hope is, in truth, the element which he breathes. He has every inducement set before him to make the most of himself, in soul and body; for, whatever powers, mental or corporeal, he may be able to accumulate, will be at his own disposal, and the avails of them will be his own. But it is not in respect to the *quantity* of activity alone, that the system of free labor has power. It calls into vigorous exercise, also, every *variety* of talent; since in a free state there is scope for the endless diversity of endowments which the Creator has distributed among the individuals of the human family. Each man is at liberty to consult the natural bent of his own mind. If he has not the faculties requisite for success in one line, another is open to him. Hence, the mechanical arts flourish in a free state, as well as agriculture, trade, and commerce; while they cannot flourish under the influence of slavery. It has been quite fashionable with slaveholders to speak of the "greasy mechanics" of the North, as if mechanical employments were illiberal and degrading, and it were more dignified and honorable to depend on the free states for the very tools which the slaves must use, than to produce them among themselves. The truth is, on the contrary, that the prosperity of the mechanical and manufacturing arts in the free states, in all their endless varieties, and their languishing and depressed condition in slaveholding communities, unite in marking the system of free labor as one in accordance with nature, and that of slave labor as against nature. For this prosperity, let it be remembered, is not secured by any sacrifice of agricultural interests. Wherever the nature of the soil permits, agriculture flourishes in the free states, side by side with the arts and manufactures. It is only in the comparatively rugged and sterile regions that it holds a subordinate place.

The antagonistic principle of slave labor is *fear and penalty.* We freely admit that this bad principle does not prevail exclusively in the management of slaves. The good principle of *hope and reward* is able to find its way even into the servile relation. Masters may, and many of them do, encourage their slaves by giving them a liberal share in the avails of their own industry, to be used, for example, in the purchase of their own freedom and that of their families. Between many masters and their slaves the kindliest relations exist. Here the principle of hope and reward comes in under the shape of approbation and confidence, with the numberless advantages and privileges which these always bring in their train. Above all, the living power of Christianity is capable of purifying and ennobling the mutual relation of master and slave, preparing the former to render to his servant "that which is just and equal, remembering that he also has a master in heaven"; and the latter to be obedient to his master according to the flesh, "in singleness of heart, as unto Christ," "doing the will of God from the heart; with good will doing service, as to the Lord, and not to man"; being subject "with all fear, not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward." But these are cases in which the better side of human nature counteracts and overcomes the appropriate principle of the system. So far as the provisions of the slave-code are consistently carried out, this is, and must be, fear and penalty. For the slave-code begins with divesting the slave of the ownership of himself and all the avails of his industry. His intellect, his knowledge, his skill, and the labor of his hands, are not his, but his master's; for "the master may sell him, dispose of his person, his industry, his labor; he can do nothing, possess nothing, nor acquire anything but which must belong to his master." How could the slave be more effectually cut off from all hope of earthly reward? Suppose that he has superior knowledge, skill, and physical power. How shall these be drawn forth to their utmost extent for his master's benefit, since the product of them goes not to himself, but to another? It can only be by introducing some plan of reward outside of the system itself; that is, by substituting, so far forth, the principle of free labor. And this can be done only to a limited extent, and in a very imperfect manner. For the masses of slaves, the underlying principle of the system can alone be made available, which, as we have shown, is fear and penalty. They are not working for themselves, but for their master. The grand motive power, therefore, must be, not the hope of possessing and enjoying the fruits of their toil, but the dread of the lash. In entire harmony with this bad principle of fear, we find among the permanent arrangements of every plantation, the driver with his whip. The writer once had occasion to visit a plantation on the Mississippi, some ninety miles above New Orleans. The master was among the very best specimens of southern slaveholders, humane and liberal in his treatment of his slaves. They were all plump and hearty, giving unmistakable signs of their good keeping. We went, together, into the cotton field, and there, in the midst of a gang of some forty slaves, male and female, stood the driver, himself a slave, whip in hand. The master was manifestly ashamed of the arrangement, for he volunteered to say: " You see the man with his whip; it is the custom in these parts; he is mainly for show." On that particular plantation, doubtless, he was mainly for show, but not on the plantations generally, as the master himself, upon being questioned, candidly admitted. The driver with his whip is the true exponent of the system. He represents the truth that it is a system of fear, where men must be driven by penalty, because they cannot be drawn by reward. " He is mainly for show," said the kind-hearted planter; that is, to show the only way in which indolent slaves can be stimulated to industry. Think, now, how it would look to see a man stationed, whip in hand, among a body of free laborers; say in Winans's machine-shop in Baltimore, or in the Pacific mills at Lawrence, or among a gang of laborers on a new rail-road, or on one of our magnificent western farms in harvest time — " mainly for show!" Such an instrument is never seen under the system of free labor, because pay-day is coming, when the faithful laborer will receive his appropriate reward, and the unfaithful laborer be discharged.

To show that, in respect to *quantity of service*, the system of free labor has immensely the advantage, would be a superfluous undertaking. Owing to peculiarities of character or circumstances, some slaves may be better laborers than some freemen. But of the mass of them, this never was and never will be true. To individual slaveholders the system may be a source of wealth. But on the state it must always exert a depressing influence; for it deprives it of an immense amount of labor, which would be drawn forth by the stimulus of freedom. No legislation, and no skill on the part of slaveholders, can make the principle of fear and penalty as efficient as that of hope and reward. But if the system of freedom has the advantage over that of slavery in respect to the quantity of labor, how much more in respect to the *quality* and *variety!* The freeman labors for himself and his family. He has, then, a high motive to do his work in the best manner. We are aware that even this motive cannot prevail with all. Some men are, by nature or education, indolent and slack; and they will remain such under any system. There are slaves, on the contrary, who show towards their masters "all good fidelity." In this course they ought to receive every encouragement. When they thus obey their masters, "not with eye-service, as men-pleasers; but as the servants of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart; with good will doing service, as to the Lord, and not to men," great will be their reward in heaven. But we are now looking at the two systems on the broad scale. In individual cases, the labor of the slave may excel that of the freeman, in quality as well as in quantity; but, as a general rule, the reverse will be true; for God will not work miracles that he may give a vicious and unrighteous arrangement the advantage over one that is just and salutary. If one would find the farms best cultivated, the roads in the best condition, and the mass of the people best provided for in respect to houses, dress, and furniture, he must go to the free states. In these respects, slavery has a depressing influence on the non-slaveholding white population also, as will be shown hereafter.

And then, under the fostering spirit of freedom, what an endless variety of forms does labor assume! It is like a full stream which finds its way into every bordering creek and channel, and flows wherever there is a place for it to flow. The products of free labor in the Northern states are so numerous, and take so many shapes, that it is almost impossible to enumerate them. Wherever anything is wanted for comfort or convenience, some one is found able and ready to produce it. The farms are supplied with the best implements of agriculture; the shops with the best tools; the houses with the best furniture. It is notorious, on the other hand, that slave labor is restricted mainly to agriculture and domestic services. The mechanical arts have never flourished, and cannot flourish, among them. They might be employed in some processes of manufacture; but it is quite certain that manufacturing establishments dependent on slave labor, could not successfully compete with those that employ free labor. The production of the raw material — tobacco, cotton, rice, sugar, maize, and the other products of agriculture — this must ever be the main reliance of those states in which slave labor prevails over that of freemen. If we take any two states, equal in territory and natural advantages, the one a free, the other a slave state, and compare them in respect to the products of manufacture and the mechanical arts, we shall be struck at once by the immense disparity in favor of freedom; and all this, while in agriculture and commerce, also, the free state surpasses the slave state. But this is a matter which we propose to consider more in detail, when we have examined the influence of slavery on the white population also of the slaveholding states.

The attempt has often been made to neutralize the power of the preceding arguments and facts by an appeal to the condition of the *free blacks.* It is affirmed that this is worse than that of the slaves, and that they are more indolent and vicious. Without pausing to inquire how far this allegation can be sustained by facts, it is a sufficient reply to say that, with the exception of some border states of the South, the free negro is regarded in the slaveholding states as a nuisance: his services on the plantations are repelled; his very presence there is regarded with suspicion; the laws are hard in their operation upon him; in a word, he is everywhere shut out from kindly aid and sympathy.[1] What wonder, then, that he should succumb to such unpropitious influences operating on him from childhood. The fault is not in the principle of free labor, nor in the nature of the African race, but in the treatment which he receives at the hand of those who dread nothing so much as the successful competition of free with slave labor, and are determined that the free blacks shall have neither patronage nor encouragement. In the Northern states we all know what an incubus of prejudice and proscription rests upon the colored race. In some of them, we are ashamed to say, these unkindly feelings find their most intense manifestation. Yet it cannot be denied that, even here, the root of the evil is slavery, which has put the white and black races into opposite castes. The true question is, not what is the comparative condition and character of the free blacks in states where slave labor is the law, and where, as a natural consequence, they are frowned upon and discouraged in every way, but what would be their condition where free labor was the law, and where, moreover, they were kindly treated, furnished with ready employment, and their religious and intellectual wants carefully provided for. Among the incidental benefits of colonization is the demonstration to the whole world, that freedom is as congenial to the African as to the Saxon race; and that the system of free labor has the same high prerogatives in Africa as in the Northern states. We need not, however, go to Africa for the proof of this. Wherever in our own land the free colored people are placed in comparatively propitious circumstances, the happy results abundantly manifest themselves. Take for example, their condition in the city of Baltimore, where the principle of free labor prevails almost exclusively. The magnitude of the city naturally opens to them abundant avenues of honest industry. Their religious culture, too, has received an unusual share of attention, particularly on the part of our Methodist brethren. It is true, indeed, that much remains to be accomplished. Yet the result of what has been already done shows that upon no class of the community can true Christian kindness and sympathy be expended with the hope of a richer harvest of good.[1]

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[1] These remarks apply especially to the plantations. In the large cities, where there is scope for a great diversity of services, the condition of the free blacks is more comfortable; and in some of the northern cities of the slave states, as, for example, Baltimore, it is better, we apprehend, than in the free states generally.

Thus far we have considered the slaves mainly as a producing power in the state. But every slave is an immortal being, made in God's image; placed in this world, like his master, on probation for eternity; equally dear to God with his master; and capable of everlasting progress in knowledge, holiness, and happiness. He is not, then, to be estimated simply as so much bone and muscle. His higher spiritual nature is to be taken into the account. We proceed, then, to consider the proper tendency and result of slavery, so far as *the mind* of the slave is concerned. Here the contrast between the two systems of free and slave labor is as great as that between light and darkness. The affinity of free institutions with knowledge is like that of light and heat with vegetation. In a free state every parent understands, every teacher inculcates, every child is taught, that the more of true education there is in the community, the better will it be, as well for the individuals who possess it, as for the commonwealth. The people grow up under the influence of the idea that they are to govern themselves, and that the indispensable requisites for self-government are mental and moral culture. It is with us an axiom, handed down from our fathers, that ignorance and wickedness are incompatible with true liberty. Hence the intense interest of the free states in education,— not the education of a select few, but of the masses. Hence the multiplication everywhere, not only of colleges and seminaries designed to furnish a higher education for those whose means are ample, or who enjoy the patronage of the wealthy, but also of common schools and free academies, open alike to the children of the poor and the rich. Hence the multiplication of reading-rooms, lyceums, and libraries, as well as of newspapers, books, and periodicals. The universal feeling is, that every ignorant person is a detriment to the whole community.

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[1] On the question whether in a free state, where the white is the dominant race, a large colored population can co-exist harmoniously and prosperously, the community is unfortunately divided. Many have made up their minds, prematurely we think, that emancipation and colonization must go hand in hand. We have no doubt that for the fullest development of the African race, they need, as in Liberia, a country to themselves. At the same time we believe that, if they could be kindly treated, provided with avenues of labor, their children educated, and their moral and religious culture carefully attended to, they would constitute a peaceable and useful element of our own population. But here again the bitter influence of slavery manifests itself. It has created a prejudice of color which, in some parts of the country at least, seems unconquerable. As we are not writing an Article on emancipation, we will not enlarge on this point, but will simply add that, to the border states at least, both plans are open. Perhaps if among them both are adopted, the question will be solved in a practical way. Perhaps, also, if they sit still in this solemn and awful crisis, refusing to do anything, the question of emancipation will take care of itself, without their legislation.

We are well aware of the danger that this all-pervading interest in education should take a merely secular turn, and thus defeat its own end. The experience of the world has abundantly shown that no system of education which looks chiefly to men's material and worldly interests, and therefore neglects, or throws into the shade, the moral and religious element, can preserve a community from corruption and profligacy, much less prepare it for the successful maintenance of its free institutions. Nor is it enough that the education of a community have a show of godliness. The system of ancient Pharisaism was eminently religious in its outward form; but it wanted the soul and substance of piety. It was the religion of worldly and wicked men, and under its influence pride, ostentation, hypocrisy, and daring impiety attained to a rank and luxuriant growth. That we may have a true education, it must be an education based on the Bible, pervaded and moulded by the living power of Christianity. It must make men humble and heavenly-minded, not merely wise in the affairs of this world. We do not affirm that free institutions can of themselves secure such an education, but we say that they are eminently congenial to it, and that, where freedom is the law — freedom, not in name but in reality — there the gospel of Christ has full scope, and it will be the fault of its friends if it do not become a leavening and controlling power in the community.

But under the system of slavery it is not so. There the law for the colored race always has been, and must continue to be, not education, but the suppression of education. The slave is held as a personal chattel, soul and body, for his master's interest. In respect to the education of slaves, the first question raised among a body of slaveholders is not: How will it affect their personal welfare? but: How will it affect our interests? They judge (rightly, we suppose) that to educate them will be to endanger the quiet and peaceable possession of them. It would be uncharitable and unreasonable to suppose that the masters have any objection, in itself considered, that their slaves should know and understand the word of God. But, as remarked in a previous Article, the ability to read the Bible implies the ability to read other things also. And consider how rich is our English literature in discussions on the cardinal principles of human rights! how resonant throughout with the clarion call of freedom! The slaveholders know that its whole drift is against slavery, and in favor of freedom; that outside of their own circle the institution of slavery is regarded with abhorrence and reprobation. They understand well enough that to allow the slaves to become a reading community would be to pour this mighty current of anti-slavery feeling over all the plantations of the South. Hence, it is with them an axiom, that the slaves must be kept in ignorance. This is the reason why penal enactments for the suppression of education among the slaves hold so conspicuous a place in the slave-codes;[1] and why, over and above these direct legal hindrances, the whole spirit of the institution is opposed to the education of the slaves. In a previous Article we have considered the unchristian character of such enactments.[1] It remains to consider their effect on the welfare of the state. That uneducated slaves can perform well, under the superintendence of their masters, the simple labors of agriculture and domestic service is admitted. But that a great mass of slaves systematically kept in ignorance, and never trained to provide for themselves, cannot be of as much value to the state as the same number of educated freemen, is a truth too plain to need demonstration. They cannot, as we have shown, be of the same value as a producing power; and when we look to the *strength and stability* of the state, we find them an element of weakness and danger. In a free state, where the law of equal rights and privileges prevails, all parts of the community contribute to its strength, for they are all parts of the state, and have an equal interest in its prosperity. In the present tremendous struggle of the United States against treason and rebellion, we see how readily and cordially our citizens of foreign origin espouse the common cause, notwithstanding the disadvantage of an early education widely different from our own. In minor matters they may not be able immediately to comprehend the genius and spirit of our institutions; but when their very existence is assailed, they stand shoulder to shoulder with us, as well they may; for it is their country as well as ours, and they have as deep a stake as we in its welfare.

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[1] This reason is avowed in some of the enactments. In an act of the state of North Carolina "to prevent all persons from teaching slaves to read or write; the use of figures excepted," it recites that such teaching has a tendency to excite dissatisfaction in their minds and produce insurrection, etc.; forbids teaching or giving books. See Hurd, Law of Freedom and Bondage, Vol. II. pp. 86, 87.

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[1] We would not detract a particle from the merit of those conscientious masters and mistresses who carefully instruct their slaves, by oral communication, in the truths of Christianity. If they do what they can under the slave-laws, they will have their reward. But the system itself, which shuts up the masters to oral instruction, is radically vicious. It is for substance the system of Romanism, and rests on the same foundation. The church of Rome discourages the reading of the Bible by the people at large, on the plea that they are in danger of misinterpreting it. The universal study of it would endanger her authority over the masses. They must have, through her authorized priesthood, her authorized interpretation of so much of it as it is profitable for them to know. The slave-codes proceed, in like manner, upon the principle, that to entrust the reading of the Bible to the masses of slaves would endanger their property in them. They must be instructed in its truths in a discreet way, through the medium of their owners; that is, so far as their owners may choose to attend to the work.

But the slaves, though they are in the state, are not of the state, so far as its privileges and immunities are concerned. This their masters avow, and this the slaves themselves well understand. They have no rights as citizens; they have no right to the possession and use of their own persons, nor of their wives and children; for all these the master may dispose of as he sees good. They have no home in their own power, for their owners may sell them, as they do horses and mules, from one plantation or state to another. Why, then, should they be expected to identify their interests with those of their masters? The religion of Christ may enable individuals among them to perform this difficult work; but from the slaves as a body all worldly motives for so doing are systematically withheld. Thus the masters sow to the wind, and, sooner or later, they must reap the whirlwind. They think, by withholding from their slaves the means of knowledge, to keep them in quietude. But they cannot, with all their precautions, keep from them the fact that American slavery is regarded with abhorrence by the civilized world. The ignorance of the slaves may be a security against intelligent and well-concerted plans of insurrection, but it can furnish no safeguard against the fierce and bloody outbreaks of fanaticism, the very aliment of which is ignorance and oppression. The extreme sensitiveness of the southern people on the point of servile insurrection is an unanswerable evidence of the danger they apprehend from it. The very rumor of it fills their hearts with anxiety, and sets them upon the adoption of the most severe precautions. How ominous to them the prospect for the future!

And then there is the contingency of war — a contingency which, by the action of the slaveholders themselves, has now been changed into a dread reality. In war the sympathies of the mass of the slaves will be, not with their masters, but with their enemies. Wherever our armies have penetrated, the blacks have welcomed them with joyful countenances. Even when excluded from our lines, they have hung around them in the vain hope of admission. How rapidly they escape from bondage where the proximity of the federal troops affords the opportunity, is well known to all. It is true, that so long as their masters can retain the control of them, they can employ them on their fortifications. But an equal number of freemen, heartily devoted to their cause, could not only fortify but fight for them. The employment upon fortifications of a mass of disaffected slaves, who are watching their chance to escape, is like putting a mutinous regiment into the trenches, because it cannot be trusted before the enemy's line. Such a regiment, though it may be compelled to use the spade, is still an element of positive weakness in an army. In like manner the presence of an immense body of slaves, whose sympathies are, with only individual exceptions, on the side of the United States, is to the rebellious Southern states a source not of strength but of weakness. And the trouble from this quarter will rapidly accumulate as the war is protracted. The policy of repelling the slaves of armed rebels, which had for its end the conciliation of their masters, has proved suicidal, and cannot be continued. As sure as the war lasts, they must and will be received, and employed, as opportunity offers, in the service of the United States. The sooner this policy is carried into thorough operation the better, for it is striking at the life of the rebellion. The men who have risen up in arms against the United States have no claim to have their property in slaves respected. Let the good work of liberating them go on; and let it be a precedent for all future wars waged upon freemen by slaveholders.

Thus far we have considered the influence of slavery upon the slave states in the line of the slaves themselves. Let us now examine it *in the line of the free white population.* Here we shall soon find that our sympathy need not be all expended on the slaves; that the poor, non-slaveholding whites deserve at least a moiety of it, since the effect of the institution on them is as deplorable as on the slaves themselves.

If we look at the states where slavery has taken deep root, and exerts a controlling influence, one of the most prominent peculiarities that strikes us is *the amassing of* *wealth, education, and power in the hands of the slaveholders,* who always constitute a small minority of the population, while the mass of the white people remain poor, uneducated, and weak. This law of slavery has its fullest manifestation in the agricultural districts of the slave states, though its influence is felt more or less everywhere. It has its origin in the very nature of the institution. To be the proprietor of a plantation of slaves requires an amount of capital beyond the reach of all but the wealthy few. Under the system of free labor a man, with the help of his sons, or two or three hired men, can conveniently and economically cultivate a farm of moderate size. With such farms the free states are dotted all over. The number of freeholders is very numerous, and thus wealth and influence are widely distributed. But a small plantation with two or three slaves is neither economical, nor worthy of the dignity and ambition of an aristocratic planter. He wants from forty or fifty to several hundred slaves, with a proportional extent of territory. Hence the inevitable tendency of slavery to increase the size and diminish the number of the plantations. Thus the wealthy slaveholders become a landed aristocracy, monopolizing, to a great extent, the possession of the good and fertile soil. It follows that the poor non-slaveholding whites must either be tenants at the will of their wealthy neighbors, the slaveholders, or must be forced to occupy the barren and worn-out regions rejected by the planters. This of itself exerts a depressing influence on the mass of the free white population. But the evil does not stop with the mere fact of a landed aristocracy created by the institution of slavery. Landed aristocracies may exist under free institutions also, as in England. But in England the landlord is dependent upon the labor of tenants. His estate, however immense, must be throughout cultivated by freemen under the protection of British law, and sustained by British law in all their rights as men. If they need his patronage, he needs their services also. Though he has the many advantages which wealth confers, there is still an interdependence between him and them. It is a mutual bargain, in which the landlord seeks to secure the best tenant, and the tenant to find the best landlord. An analogous principle prevails in the large manufacturing establishments of the northern United States, where there is an interdependence between the proprietors and the free operatives.[1] But on the southern plantations there is no room for the labor of free whites. The masters are alike the proprietors of the soil and of its cultivators, and therefore independent of the poor whites. They do not desire their services along side of their slaves; and the free whites, on their part, would scorn to render such services; for with them the pride of caste is as strong as with the masters themselves. It only remains that they provide for themselves in some small way, as best they can. The whole influence of the institution of slavery is to discourage industry on their part, for it makes labor the business of the servile class. When they think of rising in the world, their ambition is to become the owners of slaves; for they have been accustomed from infancy to see wealth, luxury, education, refinement, social position, and power, in the hands of the slaveholders, who, instead of honoring labor as a divine appointment, regard it as undignified and degrading, especially all forms of mechanical toil.

Here it is in place to consider the acknowledged fact that the manufacturing and mechanical arts have never flourished in the slave states in any degree corresponding with their progress in the free states. The disparity is too great to be accounted for from physical causes. If there are in the Northern states comparatively sterile regions, abounding in water privileges, and better adapted to manufactures than to agriculture, so are there also in the Southern states. Yet the same conditions do not produce, in the latter case, the same results. The difference must be explained mainly from the different institutions of the North and the South. Free institutions give full scope to the diversity of human talents. In the free states capitalists are ready to invest their money in any business that will remunerate them. But in the slave states capital is, to a great extent, absorbed in the single line of the plantations, with the immense outlays required to furnish them and carry them on. In the free states every branch of honest industry is honored. But in the slave states — we mean those states where the institution of slavery has the controlling influence — the rich and influential planters set the example of despising and dishonoring mechanical trades, as something beneath the dignity of southern chivalry. They speak contemptuously of the "greasy mechanics" and "mud-sills" of the North. How can it be expected, then, that the poor whites should willingly take up these employments? Poverty is not incompatible with pride. They are too proud to devote themselves to pursuits which their superiors regard with contempt, and too poor to be the owners of fertile soil. Hence they settle down in indolent and spiritless poverty. Their sluggishness and thriftlessness, present a sharp contrast to the enterprise, versatile industry, and comfort of the laboring classes in the Northern states. The New Englander may be born on a sterile soil, but he will manage to obtain in some way a comfortable livelihood, and to maintain withal the spirit and bearing of a freeman; but the poor white man of the South, who has been forced by his wealthy neighbors to take up his residence among barren sands, always remains poor and spiritless.[1] The above remarks do not, we freely admit, apply to all parts of the slave states. There are among them regions where labor is honored, and manufactures and mechanical arts flourish. But of the slave states taken as a whole, in contrast with the free states, they certainly hold good.

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[1] We do not mean that the tendency on the part of the strong to oppress the weak is not as great in the Northern as in the Southern states. This is everywhere the vice of fallen humanity. But we are now looking at the organic arrangements of society, and following them out to their legitimate results. Among the examples of oppression at the North, that of compelling needlewomen to work for inadequate wages has often been mentioned. But this is not the fault of free institutions; it exists in spite of them. Of the free states of the North it may be boldly affirmed that nowhere else in the world are the masses of the people so well provided for, and so free from pinching penury. The stories of "bread riots" that have figured in the Southern papers are all the figments of Southern editors.

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[1] Marion hit the nail on the head when he said, as reported by Weems (The Life of General Francis Marion): "The people of South Carolina form two classes, the rich and the poor. The poor are generally very poor, because, not being necessary to the rich, who have slaves to do all their work, they get no employment of them. Being thus unsupported by the rich, they continue poor and low-spirited. They seldom get money; and, indeed, what little they

Let us next consider the influence of slavery as it respects the *education* of these poor whites. That the mass of them fall far behind the people of the free states in education, is a fact revealed by the statistics of the different states. Of the *native* population of the free states, only a very small percentage is unable to read or write, the uneducated belonging mainly to the class of foreigners. Thus, according to the census of 1850, of the 28,345 adults, in the state of Massachusetts, over twenty years of age, who could not read and write, 26,484 were foreigners, leaving only, 1,861 natives, and that out of a population or 994,514. According to the same statistics, there were in the same state 222,220 children attending school, of whom 11,927 were the offspring of foreigners.[1] If we look now to Virginia, the oldest of the slave states, with a *white* population of 894,800, we find (to say nothing of the slaves and free blacks) 77,005 unable to read and write, of whom only 1,137 are foreigners. The number of white and free colored children attending school in the same state, in 1850, was only 109,775.

A comparison of Maine, with a total population, in 1850, of 583,169, with North Carolina containing, at the same date, a *white* population of 553,028, gives the following results : adults in Maine (white and colored), unable to read and write, 6,282, of whom 2,134 were natives, and 4,148 were foreigners ; in North Carolina, *white* adults unable to read and write, 73,566, of whom only 340 were foreigners : children attending school in Maine (white and colored), 186,222 ; do. in North Carolina, 100,808.[2]

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do get, is laid out in brandy, to raise their spirits, and not on books and newspapers, to get information."

[1] In the above statistics of Massachusetts the colored population is included, which amounted in 1850 to 9,064. In the statistics of Virginia only the white population is reckoned. The same rule is followed with regard to Maine and North Carolina.

[2] The literary statistics of the *free colored* population in the Southern States

Olmstead, in his "*Seaboard Slave States*," gives the following table to show the *native white* population, and the number of *native white adults* ignorant of letters, in a few states. It is compiled from the census of 1850, the states being grouped together in pairs, one free and one slave state.

States.	White Population.	Ignorant Adults.
Maine,	549,674	1,999
North Carolina,	550,267	73,226
Massachusetts,	819,044	1,055
Tennessee,	749,661	77,017
Ohio,	1,732,698	51,968
Virginia,	871,393	75,868
Connecticut,	324,095	726
Maryland,	366,650	17,364
Rhode Island,	119,975	981
Louisiana,	187,558	14,950
New York,	2,388,830	23,241
Missouri,	514,527	34,448

We add a table of the *total white population*, and *white children* attending school, in the same states, copied also from the census of 1850.

States.	Population.	Attending school.
Maine,	581,813	185,941
North Carolina,	553,028	100,591
Massachusetts,	985,450	220,781
Tennessee,	756,836	146,130
Ohio,	1,955,050	512,278
Virginia,	894,800	109,711
Connecticut,	363,099	82,433
Maryland,	417,943	60,447
Rhode Island,	143,875	28,359
Louisiana,	255,491	32,838
New York,	3,048,325	687,874
Missouri,	592,004	95,245

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exhibit a great disparity between the number that can read and write and that in attendance upon schools. Thus of the 54,333 belonging to Virginia, only 11,515 are unable to read; of the 27,463 belonging to North Carolina, only 6,857 — in both cases about one fifth. Yet the number put down as attending school in the former state is but 64; in the latter, 217. We infer that they have obtained their education by other means.

The average result would not be materially different if the other free and slave states were compared. The depressed condition of education in the slave, as compared with the free states, can be due to nothing else but slavery. How this institution operates to check the general diffusion of knowledge, can be easily shown. The education of the masses must always depend mainly on the general tone of public sentiment in the community. But public sentiment will be always moulded, to a great extent, by the attitude of those who occupy the highest place in respect to wealth, education, and social position generally. If they are, in word and deed, the warm promoters and patrons of *general* education, schools for the instruction of the masses will spring up everywhere. But if they take towards the education of the people at large the attitude of coldness and indifference, it will certainly languish. Positive hostility is not needed to kill the system of common schools. A negative position in regard to it will do the work. Now one of the most remarkable characteristics of the early settlers of New England, and of the free states generally, was their interest in the education of the people at large. The men who colonized New England were themselves thoroughly educated, and it was a part of their system to give education to all, as well as religion. They were republicans, not in name only, but in reality, — republicans of the most earnest character. They possessed, in the best sense of the term, the democratic spirit. They believed that civil government is ordained of God for the good of the people; that the people, acting through their representatives, are the rightful depositaries of its high functions; and that, for the proper exercise of their prerogatives as freemen, they need both religion and education. Every virtuous and intelligent citizen they regarded as adding so much strength to the state; every vicious and ignorant man, as an incumbrance upon it. Their great solicitude was that *every one in every station of life* should be an educated Christian. Hence, wherever they penetrated into the wilderness, the log sanctuary and the log school-house sprang up, side by side. It was this enlightened policy that made New

England what she was in the war of the Revolution, and what, with some sad drawbacks, she continues to be now. We have mentioned New England, because she is emphatically the hive of the free states. But wherever free institutions are the law, there we see the same tendency towards the diffusion of education among the masses. They, not a few aristocrats, are the constitutional depositaries of power; and in their intelligence and virtue the state has the deepest possible stake.

But where slavery is the law, a different spirit prevails. We do not mean to represent slaveholders as any worse by nature than other men. We simply affirm that their system makes it extremely difficult for them to feel, as a body, any warm sympathy with the education and consequent elevation of the masses. Of course, while they are, by law, excluding one large class of the community — their own slaves — from all education, they cannot take the ground that education is good for men *as men*. They do not hold any such doctrine in theory, much less in practice. Their theory and practice too is, that education is good for a certain part of the community, especially and principally themselves; because, in conjunction with their large plantations, it enables them to keep the power and patronage of the state in their own hands. They are the aristocracy of the land; and while we cheerfully concede to them the good qualities of a cultivated aristocracy, we cannot exempt them from the radical fault of isolation from the masses of the people, so far as a warm and active interest in their education and elevation is concerned. We do not say that they set themselves in direct hostility to the general diffusion of education through the community, or that they are even conscious of such hostility. But we affirm that they cannot but feel, instinctively, that the maintenance of their supremacy depends on the depression of the masses. They know that the existence in the community of a large body of educated, independent, and thriving yeomanry, such as may be found in any one of our Northern states, would be the end of their present despotic power. In such circumstances they must be more than human, they must be angelic, to feel and manifest the same warm interest in the education and elevation of the people at large that prevails in the free states. Such an interest they do not feel, as a body. The effect of their apathy is seen in the ignorance of the masses; and the root of the evil is the institution of slavery.

From this tendency of slavery to accumulate the wealth and education of a state in the hands of a small minority,[1] — a tendency most fully manifested where the institution of slavery has taken the deepest root — it follows that the *power* of the state must be in the same hands also. The mass of the people are accustomed from childhood to look up to the rich and educated slaveholders as the sources of public opinion. Hence deference to their opinions and submission to their dictates becomes with them a second nature. Without property, and without mental culture, they cannot stand up and face the lordly owners of the plantations. How can they contradict their maxims and statements when they have not the means of investigating for themselves? How can they, without money or land, successfully withstand those who have both in abundance? "It is hard," says the true proverb, "for an empty bag to stand upright." Intelligent piety, fed and sustained by scriptural truth, can indeed make a poor man firm and unyielding in the presence of great men. But no merely natural courage and independence can accomplish the work. It is impossible for one who has not resided in the midst of slavery to understand the weakness of the non-slaveholding masses as opposed to the will of the slaveholders. The masses of the people in the Northern states have breathed from childhood the air of freedom. They have always been accustomed to maintain their own opinions, and to follow their own judgment in political and social, not less than in religious, matters. To them the idea of prohibiting, under pains and penalties, the free discussion of any public measure, or any social institution, justly seems absurd and tyrannical. They cannot conceive that a man should be liable to suffer personal violence for expressing his determination to vote for this or that candidate for the presidential chair. But with the rule of slavery, such freedom is incompatible. The slaveholders know well enough that to allow it would be a dangerous precedent. Their indignation falls, not merely upon Northern men, whom they suspect of seeking to aid their slaves in escaping, but upon their own citizens also, who dare to maintain, in an open and manly way, that slavery is a system founded in injustice, and ruinous to the state that cherishes it. If there are exceptions to this rule, it is not in the case of the poor whites, but of men whose social position and standing places them above the power of the slaveholders. True freedom did not exist in the South before the commencement of the present civil war, any more than it does now. Of course certain topics might be discussed there freely, as in all states where despotism prevails. Men might investigate, to their heart's content, the merits of different systems of geology, or the claims of different religious sects. But if they were going to write or speak on the vital topics of free institutions and slavery, they must take care to be on one side only of the question. The government of the United States has, as it seems to us, failed to apprehend the terrible despotism of the slave oligarchy over the masses of the people. They did not believe that they could force several hundred thousands into the ranks at the point of the bayonet to fight their cause with the free states, and therefore they did not promptly meet the Southern conscription with corresponding Northern levies. To the thoughtful observer of the current of events in the Southern states, it must be manifest that, should they succeed in establishing their so-called Confederacy, it will be a republic only in name. To a true republic it is essential that the power be vested in the masses of the people, and that there be real liberty of thought and speech. But where the institution of slavery has taken deep root and become the controlling element of the state, neither of these is possible.[1]

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[1] We say a small minority. The number of the slaveholders is commonly stated to be between three and four hundred thousand. It is certainly under half a million, while the number of large slaveholders is but a fragment of this.

From the influence of slavery, as it has now been described, as well in the line of the slaves themselves as of the free white population, it follows that, so far as the general interests of the state are concerned, slavery must ever be a heavy incubus upon it. To the slaveholders themselves, it is a source of wealth and power, but it impoverishes and weakens the community at large. On this point, any one who compares together the statistics of the free and the slave states, may soon satisfy himself.

Let us look at the item of population. Between the territory of the free and the slave states — leaving out of account, on both sides, the vast sterile tracts that border on the Rocky Mountains — there is no essential disparity ; yet, as every one knows, the former have immensely outstripped the latter. If it be said that the tide of western emigration has been towards the Northern states, we answer: Why towards the Northern states, except because they were free, and because the souls of freemen instinctively shrink from the dominion of a slave oligarchy? The Southern slaveholders may lord it over their own poor whites; but they cannot induce the body of emigrants to forego their manhood by putting themselves under their control. The most effectual way to fence out of any state educated and intelligent immigrants, is to set up there the odious rule of slavery.

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[1] In South Carolina the oligarchical spirit manifests itself most prominently. To illustrate this we copy from Olmsted's "Seaboard Slave States" the following: "Even now, no man can be admitted to a seat in the legislature of the state, unless he is the owner of real estate to the value of, at least, one hundred and fifty pounds sterling; and, to be eligible to the upper house, he must possess a freehold estate of at least three hundred pounds value. The number of representatives, from any particular part of the state, is proportionate, not to the number of citizens residing in it, but to the value of the property owned in it.

Five sixths of the whole white population of the state, residing in those counties where there are the fewest slaves, have but seventy-eight out of one hundred and twenty-two representatives. The Pendleton district, with over 26,000 white inhabitants, is represented by seven members; the two parishes of St. Philip and St. Michael, with less than 19,000 white inhabitants, send eighteen." — pp. 497, 498.

But slavery operates also internally to check the growth of the population; otherwise the Southern states would have had as large a surplus of native citizens (to say nothing of foreigners) to send into the southwest, as the Northern states into the northwest. But we all know that this has never been the case. If we compare particular states, the disparity appears in a still more striking light. Thus Virginia, with a territory of about sixty-one thousand square miles, and having the advantage, also, over every other state in the Union as it regards the time of its settlement, had, in 1850, a total population of 1,421,661. Pennsylvania, with but forty-six thousand square miles, had, at the same date, 2,311,786 souls. To what shall we ascribe the difference? It cannot be the sterile regions of the Alleghanies which occupy so much of Virginia, for they run through Pennsylvania also. It cannot be, to any large extent, the mineral wealth of Pennsylvania; for, although she has the precedence here, yet Virginia also is rich in mineral treasures. Besides, other free states, without this advantage, go ahead rapidly in population. It cannot be the mighty city of Philadelphia; for the existence of such a city in Pennsylvania, without any preëminent natural advantages, such as belong to the city of New York, — the existence, we say, of such a city in Pennsylvania rather than in Virginia, is itself due mainly to the stimulus of free institutions. Then we have, lying side by side, Kentucky with 37,680 square miles, and Ohio with 39,964. Kentucky had many years the advantage of Ohio as respects the time of settlement. Her soil is unsurpassed in excellence. Yet in 1850, Ohio outnumbered her, two to one. What is the explanation? Slavery; nothing else but slavery. Once more: there is the fertile state of Missouri, with an area of 67,380 square miles. By her side lies Illinois, with 54,405 square miles. Her settlement was begun later than that of Missouri; yet in 1850, the population of Illinois exceeded that of Missouri by about 150,000. Here, again, the explanation is slavery.

For the *agricultural interest* of a state, we may take the value of the farms as a fair exponent. Let us compare the same couplets of states in this respect, taking the statistics, as heretofore, from the census of 1850.

States.	Sq Miles.	Value of Farms.
Pennsylvania,	46,000	$407,876,099
Virginia,	61,352	216,401,543
Ohio,	39,964	358,758,603
Kentucky,	37,680	155,021,262
Illinois,	54,405	96,133,290
Missouri,	67,380	63,225,543

We add a comparison of Georgia, one of the best of the slave states, with Massachusetts.

States.	Sq. Miles.	Value of Farms.
Massachusetts,	7,800	$109,076,347
Georgia,	58,000	95,753,445

Yet Massachusetts is preëminently not an agricultural but a manufacturing state, while the reverse is true of Georgia, as of the Southern states generally. Thus in 1850, the capital invested in manufactures, in the two states, the value of raw material consumed, and the value of the products was as follows:

States.	Capital invested.	Raw Material.	Value of Products.
Massachusetts,	$83,357,642	$85,856,771	$151,137,145
Georgia,	5,460,483	3,404,917	7,086,525

We do not deem it necessary to carry out these statistics in the line of manufactures or commerce, since the immense superiority of the free states, in these respects, is universally acknowledged. Of education and the general diffusion of knowledge, we have already spoken. The general conclusion at which we arrive is, that slavery is a vampire, nourished and made strong at the expense of the vital blood of the commonwealth.

It may be thought that *in war* the advantage is on the side of a powerful and consolidated aristocracy, like that of the southern slaveholders. It cannot be denied that their despotic power over the masses of the people has, thus far, given them an advantage which our government has been slow to understand and estimate at its true value. But the material sinews of war are men and money. Here, as well as in the moral strength and vigor which the consciousness of a righteous cause inspires, the advantage is altogether on the side of the free states. They are stronger in wealth and numbers than the slave states, because freedom has made them so. It is certain that, without foreign aid, the Southern Confederacy must succumb to the arms of the Union, because slavery has made them weak in the essential requisites for protracting a war.

It remains to consider the disturbing influence of slavery on the nation at large.

We have seen that the necessary tendency of the institution is to accumulate the wealth, education, and influence of the community in the hands of an aristocracy of slaveholders; and that in exact proportion to the extent to which the institution has taken root and become a controlling element of society. Thus the slaveholders of each particular state become a *caste*, having on their side the most powerful elements of influence — wealth, culture, and social position, and naturally drawing into sympathy with themselves a large circle of the rich and fashionable outside of their own proper body. Their heavy monied interest, with the power, patronage, and social position which it gives, cements them together into one unbroken phalanx. They have everything at stake in the institution, and will be sure always to present to their opponents an unbroken front. The same principle, moreover, which binds together the slaveholding communities of the separate states, unites the whole into one grand league for the maintenance and advancement of the institution. However their adversaries may be divided and weakened by the contentions of opposing factions, they are sure always to act unitedly, and to have the strength and persistency which union gives. Here, then, we have a vast and compact combination, resting on the basis of slavery, and absorbing into itself most of the wealth, patronage, and power of the Southern states.

We proceed to show that between this natural confederacy of slaveholders and the free states there must be *an antagonism material and moral.* For reasons that have been already sufficiently considered, the slaveholding states can never compete with the free in the production of manufactured articles. Their interests must ever be mainly in the line of agriculture; and their commerce must consist, to a very large extent, in the exchange of these products for manufactured goods of all kinds, domestic and foreign. Hence their policy has ever been strongly in the line of free trade; and in their opposition to a tariff they have been united and determined. The North, on the other hand, has desired a tariff for the protection of its vast manufacturing interests. Here is a ground of material antagonism. We all know what an apple of discord this question of a tariff has been to our general government, and how the first attempt of open resistance to the federal government, in 1832, in the shape of South Carolina nullification, had opposition to the tariff for its foundation.[1]

The moral antagonism between the free and the slave states — that is, between the free states and the slave oligarchy of the South, cannot but be deep and intense. The people of the free states believe, with all their hearts, that among the "inalienable rights" of men as men (so far as they are not forfeited by crime) are "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." The slaveholders scout at this doctrine as an idle reverie. They hold that the normal condition of the colored race is that of slaves in the hands of masters. The people of the free states reject, with abhorrence, the idea of property in human beings — of converting their fellow men into personal chattels, to be set up in the market at auction, and bought and sold like horses and mules.

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[1] To discuss the merits of a *protective* tariff, is no part of our present design. We simply remark that here, if anywhere, there is just ground for the principle of compromise; since the general government is bound to regard impartially all the various producing interests of the nation. Now, however, we mention the question of a tariff simply as a ground of material antagonism between the free and the slaveholding states.

But with the Southern slaveholders this principle is the corner-stone of their system; since by it they have their wealth, power, and social standing. The people of the free states believe in educating and elevating *the masses* of the people, not because they belong to this or that class of the community, but because they are men. The slaveholders exclude, under heavy penalties, one large class of the community from the privileges of education; and for the education and elevation of the mass of the non-slaveholding whites they have no warm sympathy and effort. The people of the free states believe in the distribution of political power among the masses of the people; the slaveholders, in its accumulation within their own circle. The people of the free states believe in the dignity of labor — the free labor of their own hands; the slaveholders, in the dignity of being able to compel their fellow men to do the labor for them without wages. In a word, the people of the free states hate and reject slavery, as a great political, social, and moral evil; the slaveholders love and cherish it as a very Pactolus, whose golden streams shall be to them a perennial source of wealth and power.

In respect to the item of slave property, the material and moral antagonism between the free states and the oligarchy of slaveholders both meet and flow together. The "personal chattels" of the latter, in the shape of men and women, constitute an immense moneyed interest which they naturally guard with jealous watchfulness. At the time of the formation of the Constitution they secured the insertion of a clause for the rendition of persons held to service or labor escaping from one state into another, which has been from the first interpreted to include fugitives from slavery. Upon this have been based the fugitive slave laws, that have occasioned so much mutual irritation and crimination. The slaveholders seem to be incapable of appreciating the feelings of the northern people on this point. They regard their slaves simply as so much property, and they cannot understand why the people of the free states should not take the same view of them, and return them to their owners with the same indifference that they would stray horses. But the people of the North look upon them as men entitled to the rights of men. All their feelings as freemen revolt at the idea of being compelled to help in the work of reducing them again to the condition of chattels in the hands of their masters or owners. They are, with only individual exceptions, loyal to the Constitution, and desire to see all its provisions faithfully executed. Yet they cannot but keenly feel the false position in which they are placed by being compelled to aid in the maintenance of a system which they thoroughly abhor; while, at the same time, they are excluded by the Constitution from having any voice in the matter of the treatment of these slaves. For the right of *making* the slave-laws belongs wholly to the Southern states. To the people of the free states is left only the poor privilege of being subservient to the slaveholders in *enforcing* them, however atrocious they may choose to make them. If the people of the free states say to the slaveholders: "You ought not to convert your fellow men into merchandise, and buy and sell them like cattle;" the answer is: "That is none of your business; we choose to do so; do you fulfil your duty of returning them to us when they escape from service." If they further say: "You ought not to forbid their education under penal statutes;" they reply: "That is none of your business; we choose to do so; it is your part to restore them when they escape from us." If they add once more: "But your laws allow the master to sell the husband from the wife, and the child from the parents;" the answer is: "That is none of your business; do you return our fugitive slaves." Finally, if the people of the Northern states ask: "Do you mean that, treat your slaves as you may, it is our duty to help you in maintaining your dominion over them?" they reply: "Yes, that is precisely what we mean; do you be still, and restore our fugitive slaves." Such is the practical operation of the requisition now under consideration. Need we wonder then that it has ever been to the nation a source of mutual irritation? The people of the free states are displeased because they are required to aid in upholding an odious system placed by the Constitution entirely beyond their control. The slaveholders are displeased because the people of the North perform the service so reluctantly, and with so many open manifestations of disgust.

Let it be further remembered, that the antagonism of the slaveholding aristocracy towards the free states is not one of mere theory and sentiment, but of most vigorous, persistent, and systematic action. Hence "the inevitable conflict" between the two parties is nothing artificial or imaginary, but a terrible necessity. The disturbance of harmonious relations between the North and the South has, we know, been often charged to the agitation of the question of slavery by Northern men. That there has been in the Northern states a party of extreme anti-slavery men characterized by their violent and indiscriminate abuse not only of the South, but of the North also, so far as it could not be persuaded to indorse their measures, cannot be denied. That their course has advanced the cause of freedom either North or South, we cannot believe; for it has not been, as we judge, in harmony with the principles of God's word, which are the principles of truth and righteousness. But if any one thinks that the conflict could have been avoided without an abandonment, on the part of the free states, of the interests of freedom, he is greatly mistaken. Abusive and uncharitable words and special pleading in respect to either the provisions of the Constitution or the declarations of scripture, are always wrong, and always injurious.[1] But it is, after all, the *effectiveness* of Northern resistance to the aggressions of slavery, that most stirs up the wrath of the slaveholders. If the writings and speeches of the so-called "radical abolitionists" could have had only the effect of dividing and distracting northern sentiment, they would have looked on with composure. What they feared was the revelation to the Northern masses of their policy for ruling the country in the interest of slavery; the credit of exposing which certainly belongs largely to these extreme men. It is folly to suppose that *kind and conciliatory words* would have reconciled the oligarchy of slaveholders to *vigorous measures* for checking their usurpations. It was not the noise of the thunder that they dreaded, but the power of the lightning. At the roar of the thunder they could laugh; but wherever they saw that the lightning was about to strike, there they carefully set up the lightning-rods of their diplomacy, that they might divert the flaming bolt without damage to their party.

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[1] As examples of special pleading we may mention the attempt of some to set aside all fugitive slave laws on the ground that the clause of the Constitution respecting the rendition of "persons held to labor or service" does not include slaves; also a great amount of exegesis designed to show that, because the Hebrew and Greek words for *servant* are often used in a *generic* sense, therefore they never refer in any of the scriptural laws or precepts to servants in the *special* and proper sense of slaves, although it is notorious that they are the customary words for designating that class of persons. The tendency of all such special pleading is to corrupt that candor and integrity which is the first attribute of a true freeman. Another evil is that, when the sophistry is discovered, it prejudices men against valid arguments on the side of liberty.

In proof of this we have only to look at the first attempt at disunion made by the nullifiers of South Carolina, with which anti-slavery agitations had nothing to do. As a slaveholding state they were, for reasons which we have already considered, bitterly opposed to the then existing tariff. They determined to overthrow it, and the method which they adopted was *resistance to the general government;* then, as now, under color of reserved state rights. The President, though himself opposed to a high tariff, was an honest, as well as an energetic man. He decided at once that, while the tariff laws existed, they should be alike enforced in South Carolina and in the Northern states. He issued his proclamation against the nullifiers; Congress supported him by the force-bill; the nullifiers receded from their position, and then, by Mr. Clay's compromise, they obtained substantially what they had demanded. The intrinsic merits of the tariff question we do not propose to discuss. We simply call attention to the fact that in 1832, before the inauguration of our modern anti-slavery agitations, the spirit of resistance to the Federal Government was rampant in South Carolina. Then, as now, the motto of their slaveholders was: *Rule or resist.* Just so it has been ever since. And from that state as a centre, the contagion has spread through the whole confederacy of slaveholders. For the last third of a century, they have had a settled policy to keep the federal government on the side of the Southern states, and to use it for the interest of their peculiar institution. For accomplishing this end in the face of a large majority on the part of the free states, their plan has been *to array a united South against a divided North.* On every question affecting the interests of slavery, they have always presented an unbroken front, while they have managed to keep a large body of Northern allies on their side, whom they have been careful to reward with a liberal share in the immense patronage of the general government. That there have been in this party of Southern sympathizers many good and upright men we do not doubt. But their policy has been controlled by crafty demagogues, and it has been ruinous to the cause of freedom. But for their subserviency to the oligarchy of slaveholders, through many dreary years of corruption and mercenary intrigue, we should not have been to-day contending in arms for the priceless heritage bequeathed to us by our fathers.

The special lines of Southern policy, under the general plan that has been indicated, may be thus briefly stated:

1. The cherished aim of the Southern leaders has ever been *to increase, by all means in their power, the number of the slave states.* If they could but once plant the institution of slavery in a new state, they considered it as secured forever to their side. It was not the true prosperity of the state that they regarded, but its subserviency to their cause. Under the depressing power of slavery it might fall behind the neighboring free states in population, wealth, and education — in a word, in all that constitutes true prosperity; but no matter; it would be under their control, and they could use it for the accomplishment of their ends. The shrewdness of this policy has been abundantly shown since the commencement of the present civil war. Wherever slavery exists, there the spirit of secession has been rampant. Look at the state of Maryland, especially at the city of Baltimore, where the

principle of free labor prevails almost exclusively. What interest in the Southern Confederacy has that state with her noble metropolis? Her true affinities — if she is to have sectional affinities — are with the North. True, Baltimore has a large Southern trade, but so also have Philadelphia and New York. How came it to pass, upon the breaking out of the rebellion, that there was so powerful an interest in Maryland on the side of secession, and not in the adjoining state of Pennsylvania? Why was it that no stone was left unturned to win over the noble and patriotic governor Hicks to the side of treason, while no such pressure was brought to bear on governor Curtin? Why did Philadelphia need neither forts nor forces to protect her from domestic traitors, while Baltimore must be environed with forts and garrisoned with regiments of Union troops? Why, in a word, were our troops fed in Philadelphia and fired upon in Baltimore? The answer is one and simple. Pennsylvania was a free, Maryland, a slave, state. Maryland has many devoted and self-sacrificing patriots, true as steel to the American Union. But the cause of loyalty there is compelled everywhere to encounter the spirit of slavery, and that is a spirit of disloyalty and bitter hatred toward the armies of the Union. Whoever has walked through the streets of Baltimore, and seen the faces of disunion men and women in high social position radiant with joy at the report of some Federal disaster, although they admitted that the only hope of their city lay in the continued preponderance of the Federal arms, has felt the malignant power of slavery in a manner that he will not be likely ever to forget. Look, once more, at the great and rich state of Missouri, where slavery seemed before the war to be struggling for existence. What has made the difference between this and the adjacent state of Illinois? The answer is: Slavery. Slavery is the parent of the raids upon Kansas in former years, and of the present distractions and desolations of civil war. Look, finally, at the state of Kentucky. Why did Ohio promptly respond to the call of the United States, while Kentucky attempted to assume the attitude of neutrality? The answer is again: Ohio was a free, Kentucky, a slave, state. The southern slaveholders understand well the power of their peculiar institution in attaching states to their interest. From generation to generation they have been at the top of society, as it respects wealth and social position, and have naturally drawn into alliance with themselves a large circle of the rich and fashionable outside of their own body. Throughout all the slave states they are leagued together in bitter and determined opposition to the ascendancy of the North, even though it be gained fairly and in a constitutional way. In every state where they can plant the institution of slavery, they are sure to have an organized and resolute body of men devoted to their interest, men who think only of the triumph of the Southern party, and are ready to sacrifice on its altar the very life-blood of their own state. No wonder, then, that they have been so intensely solicitous to increase the number of the slave states. They know that slavery is a bloody cement of terrible efficacy.

The first move of the slaveholders for securing this end was in the case of Missouri. To the United States this was a momentous crisis. The great question of the extension of slavery came up for decision in a practical way, and, by means of the celebrated Missouri Compromise in 1820, it was decided in the interest of the slaveholders. They gained a powerful slave state; while the friends of freedom gained only a pledge for the exclusion of slavery from all the territory north of a certain parallel of lattitude, only to be meanly repudiated thirty-four years afterwards, when the Southern party had derived from it all the advantages it was capable of yielding, and they wished, contrary to its provisions, to bring Kansas into the Union as a slave state.

But it was not enough to carve new slave states out of existing territory. The unparalleled growth of the North threatened to overthrow the slave interest, unless new territory should also be secured for the same end. Hence the series of movements by which, first Texas was annexed to the Union, and afterwards a large portion of Mexico.

On these we do not propose to dwell in detail, for they are familiar to the people of the United States. When Texas (which had been ceded to Spain in 1819 during the crisis of the Missouri controversy as a measure for disarming the opposition of the North)[1] had established in 1836 her independence by the battle of San Jacinto, Mr. Calhoun advocated not only her immediate recognition, but her admission into the American Union, even at the expense of a war with Mexico. This plan failing, the next attempt was to bring in Texas, in 1844, by a treaty, which Mr. Benton characterizes as "covertly conceived, and carried on with all the features of an intrigue, and in flagrant violation of the principles and usages of the government;" in which the previous consent and authorization of Congress "had been eschewed and ignored by the secrecy with which the negotiation had been conducted; and was intended to be kept secret until the treaty was concluded, and then to force its adoption for the purpose of increasing the area of slave territory, and to make its rejection a cause for the secession of the Southern states."[2] The treaty was, nevertheless rejected, and Texas finally came in by legislative act in 1845, with a proviso that four more new states might be formed out of it; and, since all south of the parallel of 36° 30′ (that is, the main part of the region) was left free to admit slavery, it was virtually a provision for ultimately creating four or five new slave states.

In the train of the admission of Texas into the American Union followed the war with Mexico. It was preëminently a Southern measure. It might, and doubtless would, have been avoided, but for the tempting prospect of another large territory to be made into slave states. It is well known that, when the territory ceded by Mexico had come into the possession of the United States, Mr. Calhoun proposed to extend the Constitution of the United States to the territories, "with a view," in Mr. Benton's words, "to make it carry slavery into California, Utah, and New Mexico." The measure did not succeed — that is, not at this time and in this form; but its failure was not due to any want of zeal on the part of its abettors.

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[1] "In 1819, as one of Mr. Monroe's cabinet, he [Mr. Calhoun] had concurred in giving it [Texas] away, in order to conciliate the anti-slavery interest of the Northeast by curtailing slave territory in the Southwest." — Benton's Thirty Years in the U. S. Senate, Vol. II. p. 587.

"Their justification [that of Mr. Monroe's cabinet] for this cession of a great province was that the loss was temporary — 'that it could be got back again whenever it was wanted.'" "It was these reasons [Northern conciliation, and getting it back whenever we pleased] that reconciled General Jackson to the cession at the time it was made." — Ib., Vol. I. p. 667.

[2] Thirty Years in the U. S. Senate, Vol II. p. 600.

Lastly, in the series of congressional acts, came the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. The very men who in 1845 had recognized the validity of this compromise and applied it to the territory of Texas, and in 1850 had extended it to the Pacific Ocean, now discovered that Congress had no power to legislate on the subject of slavery in the territories; a thing which it had been doing all along from the beginning of the Constitution! So the Missouri Compromise was repealed, that the way might be clear to bring in Kansas also, if possible, as a slave state. The base act failed of its end, and Kansas came in free. But at the same time these corrupt politicians, who had not the public weal, but their own private ends, in view, opened the box of Pandora, which none of them had any power to close, and its curses flew abroad all over this fair and once peaceful republic. Some of them — not all — live to see the awful calamities inflicted on the people by their folly and wickedness.

> "Quidquid delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi."
>
> "The rulers play the fool; the people pay the penalty."

This is the law of divine Providence. Would that the citizens of the United States might understand it, and send to their national legislature, not corrupt and intriguing polititians, who "all look to their own way, every one for his gain from his quarter"; but "able men, such as fear God; men of truth, hating covetousness."

2. Another point of vital importance to the slaveholders has been *to secure on the bench of the Supreme Court a majority of judges who sympathized with them in their policy*

concerning slavery. It is with reluctance that we advert to this point. The Supreme Court of the United States is venerable, alike from its position and its early history, and its decisions ought to be invested with sanctity in the eyes of all the people. But it is a matter of history that, for many years previous to the commencement of the present civil war, the Federal Government has for most of the time been Southern in its policy, and that a majority of the judges nominated by the Executive and confirmed by the Senate have been men of Southern proclivities. That the decisions of the Supreme Court have tended more and more to strengthen the interests of the slaveholders, all feel and acknowledge. They claim that it is because their cause has justice and the Constitution on its side. We believe that the Supreme Court has encroached in an unconstitutional and unjust way upon the interests of freedom. The clause in the Constitution on which the rendition of fugitives from slavery is claimed, is the following:

> "No person held to service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due."

The most obvious and natural construction of this clause is, that he is to be delivered up by the state into which he has escaped; just as the previous clause, respecting fugitives from justice, has always been construed. Such was Mr. Webster's opinion. In his speech in the Senate on the fugitive slave law of 1850, he said:

> "I have always thought that the Constitution addressed itself to the legislatures of the states or to the states themselves. It says that those persons escaping from other states 'shall be delivered up,' and I confess I have always been of opinion that it was an injunction upon the states themselves. When it is said that a person escaping into another state, and coming, therefore, within the jurisdiction of that state, shall be delivered up, it seems to me the import of the clause is, that the state itself, in obedience to the Constitution, shall cause him to be delivered up. This is my judgment. I have always entertained that opinion, and I entertain

it now. But when the subject, some years ago, was before the Supreme Court of the United States, the majority of the judges held that the power to cause fugitives from service to be delivered up was a power to be exercised under the authority of this government. I do not know, on the whole, that it may not have been a fortunate decision."

The decision of the Supreme Court to which Mr. Webster refers was that made in 1836, in the celebrated case of Prigg *vs.* the commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The earliest fugitive slave law, that of 1793, had contemplated the concurrent action of the states in the rendition of fugitives from labor or service, and the states had accordingly passed laws in accordance with its provisions.[1] But by the decision in Prigg's case, the business of seeing these fugitives delivered up was taken entirely out of the hands of the states and state magistrates, on the ground that it is a power vested exclusively in Congress and the national judicature. Mr. Webster's remark upon it is worthy of special notice: "I do not know, on the whole, that it may not have been a fortunate decision." He has never thought, and does not think, that it is in accordance with "the import of the clause" in the Constitution; but he does not know, on the whole, that it may not have been "a fortunate decision," — fortunate, we presume, because it exempted the states from the unwilling performance of an odious work, which was creating more and more friction and disturbance between them and the general government. So many warm anti-slavery men reasoned and felt at the time. They openly expressed their joy at the decision, because it relieved the states from all obligation in respect to the rendition of fugitive slaves, except that of passive acquiescence in the action of the general government, through its marshals and courts. But if they had carefully studied the opinions rendered by some of the judges in that case, they might have seen in them the foreshadowings of future assumptions very dangerous to the cause of freedom.[1]

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[1] The fugitive was to be brought by his alleged owner, or his agent or attorney, before any judge of the circuit or district courts of the United States, residing or being within the state, or before any magistrate of a county, city, or town corporate, wherein such seizure or arrest should be made. The rendition of the fugitive was, therefore, regarded, as the *joint duty* of the state and the Federal Government.

Of the decision in Prigg's case, it would be presumptuous for us to speak in a purely judicial point of view. We venture, however, to offer two remarks upon it: First, we are persuaded that this remarkable change of front in the Supreme Court was not the result of any new insight into the true construction of the clause of the Constitution touching the rendition of fugitives from labor; but that it rather grew out of the conviction that in this way alone could the masters recover their slaves by a summary process; since the progress of anti-slavery sentiments was continually making the free states more reluctant to co-operate in the work, to which, nevertheless, they were bound by the old construction: Secondly, as a matter of fact, this new position of the Supreme Court prepared the way for its aggressions on the cause of freedom in the Dred Scott case. We do not affirm that such was the intention, but that the one decision naturally prepared the way for the other. By the former, all legislation of the states, on the subject of the rendition of fugitives, was pronounced null and void. They had nothing to do but to acquiesce in the doings of the Federal courts. The opinion had been already maintained, in Prigg's case, that the Constitution puts the master's "right to the service or labor upon the same ground, and to the same extent, in every other state as in the state from which the slave escaped, and in which he was held to the service or labor;"[2] also, that the legislation of Congress is unnecessary, because the clause of the Constitution executes itself.[3] It was quite natural that, at a later day, the majority of the judges on the bench of the Supreme Court should decide, as they did in the

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[1] Such, for example, as the opinion held by the majority of the court, that the owner of the fugitive slave could seize and remove him by virtue of the clause of the Constitution alone; and of Judge Baldwin, that legislation on the part of Congress also, as well as of the states, is unconstitutional, since the clause of the Constitution executes itself.

[2] By Judge Story.

[3] By Judge Baldwin. Afterwards admitted by other judges of the Supreme Court.

Dred Scott case, that the Constitution extends itself, without legislation, over the territories; giving the master the same right to carry his slaves thither, and hold and use them there, that he has to hold and use them in his own state; and thus making slavery no longer local, but national. But one further step only was wanted, that the Supreme Court should decide that a master may take his slaves into any one of the *free states*, as well as territories, and hold and use them there, at least so long as he does not become a citizen of such free state. But for the events that have suspended the action of the Supreme Court in the matter, such a decision might very probably have been, before now, established as the supreme law of the land.[1]

3. Since it was uncertain whether the slaveholders, with

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[1] On this point we subjoin the following, from the pen of Judge Joel Parker. We take it from the columns of the Boston Journal:

"But let us pursue the principles of the six judges in the case of Dred Scott to their legitimate consequences in another direction. Whether or not the Constitution of the United States extends over the territories while under a territorial government, there is no question that it extends over all the states of the Union. Now, if it be true that the Constitution recognizes slaves as property, and therefore authorizes the owner to take them with him as property into a territory, and hold them there as slaves, against the prohibition of Congress, by the same reason he may take them to a free state, and hold them there as slaves, temporarily at least. It is not necessary to inquire what his rights may be, if he voluntarily becomes a citizen of a free state. Entering the free state as a citizen of another state, with his slaves, for a temporary purpose, the six judges cannot hold, consistently with their principles, that the slaves become free; for if the Constitution recognizes a right of property, which is paramount to the laws of Congress, it must, also, thus far, be a right paramount to the laws, and even the constitution, of a state. 'The citizens of each state shall be entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.' This right of coming within the free states with slaves for a temporary purpose, and of passing through such states is strenuously maintained by many Southern politicians; and perhaps while I am writing, the Supreme Court are making up this very decision in the 'Lemmon case,' which occurred in the city of New York."

In "Cobb on Slavery" we have a labored argument, to show that "the mere transit of the master with his slaves, either from necessity or convenience, through the territory of a non-slaveholding state, does not change the *status* of the slave"; and "that, as a general rule, where there is a *bona fide* temporary residence of a master with his slave in a non-slaveholding state, the *animus revertendi* will protect the master's right in his slave to the extent of his personal service, and the right to return with him to his domicile." See Chapters vii. – ix.

all their efforts, would be able to maintain their ascendancy in the National Government, it was necessary that the Southern leaders *should prepare the minds of the people for secession*, when the proper crisis should arrive. They could not stand on the general right of revolution, because, by concession of all, that applies only to the extreme case of long-continued oppression. Such a case the complainants could not possibly make out; for they had been themselves in possession of the Federal Government during most of the preceding thirty years, and had managed matters in their own way. They chose rather to stand on the doctrine of "state rights," pushed to its extreme extent, by which the Federal Government is converted into a rope of sand, and every state is left at liberty to withdraw from the Union whenever it suits her convenience, though the United States as a nation may have paid millions for her territory, and millions more for her defence.

Here, then, we have the singular phenomenon of a great and powerful party in the nation vigorously pressing forward, at one and the same time, two opposite doctrines — contending, through the Supreme Court, for a theory but little short of absolute centralization, which makes the Federal Government everything and the states almost nothing; while, at the same time, they maintain and assiduously teach an extreme theory of state rights, which makes the states everything, and the General Government nothing. Under such a system of training it is no wonder that true loyalty to the United States as a nation has almost died out from the regions where slavery is in the ascendency. The Southern leaders have regarded the General Government too much as an instrument for the advancement of their interests, and they have been for a long time preparing the people for secession upon the contingency of their being unable to retain any longer the management of it. Not so the people of the Northern states. They are attached to the Union from principle. Whatever may be true of some particular factions among them, never embracing more than a very small fragment of the people, and of some particular acts of state legislation which, although unwarrantable, were never intended to array the states adopting them against the General Government; whatever may be true, we say, in these exceptionable cases, the great Northern heart has ever remained loyal to the Union. The masses of the people in the free states have ever sought to correct what was wrong in the way provided by the Constitution. So they endeavored to do in the Autumn of 1856, through the legitimate channel of the ballot-box. They were unsuccessful, and loyally submitted to the rule of their opponents. Again they made a second attempt in 1860, and were successful. What did their antagonists, the slaveholding aristocracy of the South? Did they loyally acquiesce in the result of the ballot-box, as their brethren in the North had done four years before? Not they; for they had no loyalty to the Union. Their motto was: *Rule or resist.* They called conventions; they passed ordinances of secession; under an imbecile administration, with the Federal offices — even the highest of them — filled to a great extent with traitors, who had been for years using their high position to destroy the government which fed and enriched them, and which they were under solemn oath to defend; under this imbecile administration, palsied throughout with swarming multitudes of official traitors, they seized the forts and arsenals of the United States; and, last of all, when the new President, duly chosen by the people, had been duly inaugurated, they opened upon the United States, at Sumpter, with the roar of the cannon. "*This is war*, CIVIL WAR," inaugurated by the party of the Southern slaveholders, because they could no longer keep in their own hands the reins of the General Government.

Before God we have nothing to say; for our iniquities testify against us. We have been a nation of practical athesists. Now God is compelling us to see and feel that he holds our national existence, with all in it that we hold dear, in the hollow of his omnipotent hand. Many a time, since the commencement of this bloody struggle, has he so shaped the course of events as to teach all concerned that wisdom to forecast the future, as well as power to execute present plans, must come from him. We have been an avaricious nation, putting money above righteousness and the fear of the Lord. Now God is forcing us to give hundreds of millions piled on hundreds of millions for the maintenance of our national institutions. As a nation, we have been for years plunging deeper and deeper into luxury and extravagance. By this civil war God is teaching us that our treasures should be given to some higher end than personal vanity. Our national councils have been controlled by the spirit of faction — a thoroughly corrupt and venal spirit, that sets up truth and justice for sale, and measures everything in heaven, earth, and hell by party interest. The events of the present conflict are fast teaching us, that not the cunning and corrupt combinations of partizan leaders, but comprehensive and patriotic statesmanship must, by God's help, save the nation. Of the profanation of God's name and God's Sabbath, the neglect of God's sanctuary, the virulent, abusive, and slanderous spirit of party presses, North and South, and all our other national sins, we forbear to speak. Before God we can only say, with the holy prophet: "O Lord, righteousness belongeth unto thee; but unto us confusion of faces, as at this day."

But before the civilized world our nation stands up to-day with bold and undismayed front, amidst the surging sea of treason, rebellion, and blood that surrounds her, and calls aloud to all the kindreds of the earth: "Be ye my witnesses, as God in heaven is witness, that this bloody war was forced upon me. Does any one ask: For what are you contending? I am contending that I may be a nation; for the principle of this rebellion strikes at the heart of my nationality. Of all the nations Britain ought best to understand this; for she has made immense expenditures of blood and treasure over Ireland and America in past ages, and over India during the present century, that she might maintain her national integrity. Why then should I consent to die ingloriously at the hand of a rebellion born in the den of slavery,

> ''Mongst horrid shapes, and shrieks, and sights unholy,'

and having, as all the world knows, the exaltation of slavery for its chief end? Why should I sit still and see this fair republic, made one alike by the hand of nature and the wisdom of its founders, divided into two hostile nations, with some thousands of miles of border territory; each side striving to surpass the other in fleets and armies; the people groaning under taxes for their maintenance without hope of relief; and, what is worse than all, the great nations of Europe complacently looking on and saying: 'Aha! so would we have it; for now we can use one republic to keep the other under.' I am contending for national existence, and for this reason I deserve the respect of the world. I am contending, too, for free institutions against a rebellion whose corner-stone is the institution of slavery. For this reason I have a right to claim the sympathy, at least, of England, for she has filled the world with her denunciations of slavery. O England, the land of free institutions, whose voice has been lifted so high against American slavery, shalt thou now falsify all thy teachings for the past century by giving thy sympathies to the side of American slavery, against both the Constitution of the United States, and the cause of freedom in the United States? If thou do, God judge between me and thee."

In bringing to a close our previous article on "*the Bible and Slavery*," we remarked that the consideration of the manifold evils which grow out of the system naturally and necessarily, would come up more appropriately under the head of the Relations of Slavery to the State; and that the institution, like every other, must be judged by its results — its results not in certain select cases and in limited periods of time, but its results as they manifest themselves on the broad scale. The evil results of slavery to the state we have now endeavored to point out, though in a very summary and imperfect manner. We have shown that it is of necessity an incubus on the prosperity, material and moral, of the states that cherish it; and that in the line of both the slaves themselves and of the free population. We have further shown that it has been from the beginning the great disturbing power in the American Union, and has finally plunged the nation into a bloody civil war. Such are the fruits of slavery. "Their vine," then, "is of the vine of Sodom, and of the fields of Gomorrah; their grapes are grapes of gall, their clusters are bitter; their wine is the poison of dragons, and the cruel venom of asps." Let him that has understanding judge whether such a plant of gall and wormwood can be of heavenly origin; and whether, also, with its poisonous shoots overrunning the nation, it can ever have true peace and prosperity. May God, in his infinite goodness, show us a way in which it can be extirpated, root and branch, from this fair Republic!

ARTICLE V.

ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY, AS ADAPTED TO POPULAR USE: ITS LEADING FACTS AND PRINCIPLES.

WITH A BRIEF SYNOPSIS OF ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES.

BY BENJAMIN W. DWIGHT, LL.D., CLINTON, N. Y.

(*Continued from page* 309.)

Many have begun to hear with admiration of the wonders of the new philology, and perhaps themselves "see men, as trees, walking" within its sphere of grand and ever-enlarging discovery. Fain would they see more facts as facts, and these both more definitely and widely than they now do. Words they want in large numbers; and if they can have them in a thorough, reliable form, will greet so welcome a contribution with gladness. It has been a great gratification to the author, in the midst of other abounding labors, to undertake to meet, in even the partial manner here employed, so natural and urgent a desire on the part of those scholarly minds that highly appreciate the vast inward wealth of words themselves, and yet have not the time or materials for any satisfactory explorations of their own among their riches. The list here furnished is designed only to be a specimen list, which might be almost indefinitely multiplied.[1] The purpose has been, to give to the reader as wide and full and varied a view of the lingual riches of our noble mother tongue as could be compassed within the contracted bounds of a single brief Article. In the more than fifteen hundred words here explained, there will be found, by any inquisitive student, to be much material for both investigation and speculation. Curious, indeed, will the affiliations of words be often found to be, and odd their multiform combinations, alike of form and sense. Nothing but the most rigid logic of facts, and the force of manifest verities, could satisfy one who loves truth indescribably more than any novelties however imposing, that the existing relations and correlations of words in each single language, as well as in many combined, are really, in ever-changing forms and aspects, what they actually are. Behold, then, a few words gathered together, among many others, in hours of studious research, for the purpose of finding and enjoying the light that words bear in themselves, and of comprehending them in the inwardly constituted harmony of their mutual relations.

A.

1. Absurdus, Eng. *absurd*, commonly guessed to represent ab, from, and surdus, a deaf person (whose voice, being unregulated by the ear, is abnormal in its action), is probably from the same root as Sk. svri and svar, to sound, and svaras, sound (cf. Lith. surme, a flute), and, like absonus, means dissonant. From the same root is Gr. *σῦριγξ*, a pipe, a musical reed, Eng. *syringe*. Cf. for similar variation of sense, L. pipire, to pipe or peep, and a pipe (as for smoking, etc.).

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[1] The following abbreviations occur in this Article: Cf. for Lat. confere, meaning compare; Eng. for English; Fr. for French; Germ. for German; Goth. for Gothic; Gr. for Greek; Ital. for Italian; L. for Latin; M. L for Middle Latin; Lith. for Lithuanian; Span. for Spanish; Sk. for Sanskrit.

2. Acies, a point or barb (Sk. açri-s, the edge of a sword, Gr. *ἀκίς* and *ἀκή*, Germ. ecke), Eng. *edge*. Of similar origin is *acme* (Gr. *ἀκμή*, a point); as are also the following words, immediately derived from L. acere (obs.), to be sour (as being sharp or biting; as Eng. word *bitter* comes from bite), *acid*, *acetic* : as also from L. acer, sharp, of same ultimate source (cf. Sk. akra-s, brisk, lively, and açu-s, swift, and Gr. *ὠκύς*, as also *ὀξύς*, from which Gr. *παροξυσμός*, lit. sharp irritation, Eng. *paroxysm*, and L. acus. a needle), come *acerbity* and *exacerbate*, and *vinegar* (Fr. vinaigre = vinum acre, sharp or sour wine), and *eager* (L. acer, Fr. aigre, like Eng. *meagre*, from L. macer, Fr. maigre) and *alacrity* (L. alacer = ala + acer), and *allegro* and *allegretto* (Ital.); while from acuere, to sharpen, come *acute*, *acumen*, and *acuminate* (M. L. acuminare).

3. Aequus (pron. as if ēkus), level, equal (Sk. êka-s, one, Gr. *εἶκος*, lit. one with itself), *equal*, *equable*, *equation*, *equator*, *equity*, and *iniquity* (L. iniquus), *adequate* (ad + aequus), *inadequate*, *equanimity* (+ animus), *equivalent* (+ valere), *equivocate* (+ vox).

4. Aevum, time, life, age (Sk. êva-s, a course, a way, etc. cf. ayu-s, long life, perhaps for orig. aivas, and Gr. *αἰές* and *αἰεί*, always, and *αἰών*, a life-time, etc.), *ever* (Germ. ewig); *never* (not ever), *age* (Lat. aetas for aevitas, Fr. âge), *eternal* (L. aeternus for aeviternus).

5. Ager, a field (Sk. ajra-s, a plain or field, Gr. *ἀγρός*, Germ. acker), *acre* (M. L. acra), *agrarian*, *agriculture* (+ colere, to cultivate); *peregrinate* (per + ager); *pilgrim* (L. peregrinus, Fr. pelerin, Germ. pilger).

6. Agere, actum, to lead or drive (Sk. aj, to go, to drive, Gr. *ἄγω* and *ἀγινέω*), *agent*, *agile*, *act*, *actual* (M. L. actualis), *actuate*, *actuary* (M. L. actuarius); *ambiguous* (amb, round about); *cogent* (L. cogere = con + agere); *exigency* (exigere), and also *exigesis*, *exact*, and *exaction; react; transact; agitate* (L. agitare, intensive form of agere); *cogitate* (L. cogitare = con + agitare); *cash* (Fr. cacher, to hide, from L. coactare); *attitude* (Span. actitud, Ital. attitudine); *castigate* (L. castigare = castum + agere); *litigate*, (litem + agere);

mitigate (mitem + agere); *purge* and *purgative* (purum + agere). *Examine* (L. examen, for exagimen, a balance or measure, cf. exigere, to measure carefully, to weigh), also, and *embassy* and *ambassador* (M. L. ambascia, entrusted business, and ambasciator, from ambactus, part. of ambigere, to go about) radicate themselves in the Lat. verb agere.

7. Aio, or ajo, I say (Sk. ah, to speak, Gr. ἠμί; so the Gothic aika is Sk. âha, I have said). This verb, in its present form, represents, as in adagium, also, an *adáge*, an earlier form, agio, like major, in Latin, for an original magior (cf. Gr. μείζων for μεγιων). To this same primitive root ag, belongs, with aio, the word *axamenta* also, or hymns sung by the Salii, derived from a frequentative form axare, lit. to say or repeat much; in aio or ajo (for agio), the common root ag having had the half-vowel i or y added to it. *Indigitare*, to call upon the gods, and *indigitamenta*, religious books, containing the names of the gods, belong also to this same root. From aio come Eng. *aye* (lit. I say it), *nay* (aye, with the negative ne), *negation* (negare = ne-ig-are), *deny* (denegare), *abnegate* (M. L. abnegatio), *adage* (adagium).

8. Alius, another (Gr. ἄλλος; cf. L. ollus, archaic form of ille, and adv. olim, old acc. form of ollus, as partim of pars; and aliquis also = alius + quis. Cf. also ἀλλάσσω and Eng. *parallax*, and ἀλλήλων, Eng. *parallel*), *alien* (L. alienus), *alienate*, *alter* (L. alter, comp. form of alius), *alternate* (M. L. alternare), and *altercate* and *alibi*, a law term (L. alibi, an old dat. of locative signification, from alius, like ibi of is and ubi, for quubi, of quis, as in alicubi, and as also in tibi and sibi from tu and sui, and mihi, for mibhi, of ego). *Other*, also, is but L. alter, Fr. autre, Span. otro. Here, too, belong the following compounds: *solitude* and *solitary* (L. solus = se, without, and alius, another — like socordia, laziness, from secors, lit. without heart, and sobrius, Eng. *sober*, or se + ebrius — and hence the gen. form, solius); *adultery* (= ad alteram, sc. uxorem).

9. Alere, part. altus, to nourish (Gr. ἀλδαίνω, ἄλϑω, and ἀλϑαίνω. Cf. also, L. olescere, to grow; from which come *adolescent*, L. adolescens; *abolish*, L. abolere; *prolific*, L. pro-

les), *aliment*, *alimony*, *alumnus*, *altitude* (L. altus, grown up, high), *old* (Germ. alt, comp. älter, etc.), *elder* (both adj. and noun), *alderman* (M. L. aldermannus), *exalt*, *altar* (altus + ara). *Haughty*, and *hauteur*, and *hautboy*, find their place, also, here, (L. altus, Fr. haut. So in Mid. Lat. " hauta justitia " occurs for alta justitia).

10. Angere, to throttle (Sk. ahu-s, pressed tight ; also, aha-s, pain ; and agha-m, evil ; Gr. ἄγχω, I press or tighten ; cf. also ἄχος, pain, Eng. *ache*, and ἀχεύω, I am sad), *anguish* (L. angor, Fr. angoisse), the physical symbol for the severest mental torment, being that of acute pain in the throat ; *anxious ; anger* (so *passion*, from pati, to suffer, implies that its subject is a sufferer at the time), *angina.*

11. Angulus, an angle, a corner (Sk. ak, to bend, and anka-s, a hook ; Gr. ἄγκων, a bend ; and also ἄγκος and ὄγκος, L. uncus, Germ. haken, Eng. hook), *angle*, to *angle* (Gr. ἀγκύλος, crooked, curved), and *ankle*. With ἄγκος corresponds also ἄγκυρα, L. anchora, Eng. *anchor.*

12. Anima, breath, the vital principle (Sk. ana-s, breath, from an, to breathe ; cf. also anila-s, wind ; Gr. ἄνεμος, wind, and ἄημι, I blow), *animate* and *inanimate* (cf. L. animus, the mind, and Gr. ἄνεμος, wind, for correspondence of sense, with L. spiritus, breath, wind, the soul, Eng. *spirit*, from spirare, to breathe. Air set in motion, in which effects are seen, but not their cause, is the favorite symbol, in all languages, for bodying forth the idea of the soul), *animal*, *animalcule*, *animosity* (L. animosus, lit. full of feeling), *unanimous* (L. unus + animus), *magnanimity* (magnus + etc.).

13. Annus, a year (Gr. ἔνος and ἕνος, a year, and δίενος, L. biennis and τρίενος, L. triennis ; cf. also, Sk. sana-s, old, L. senex, senis, and Lith. senas), *annual*, *annals*, *anniversary* (vertere, to turn, or return), *biennial* (bis, twice), *perennial* (per + annus), *solemn* (L. solennis = solus + annus, stated, and thence ceremonial, and thence pompous), *superannuated.*

14. Ante, before, in space or time (Sk. anti, over against, Gr. ἀντί), *ante-* and *anti-*, *anterior*, *avaunt* (Fr. avant = L. ab + ante, lit. from before), *advantage* (Fr. avantage), *advance* (Fr. avancer), *antique* (L. antiquus), and *antiquated*, *ancient*

(M. L. antianus, Fr. ancien), *ancestors* (M. L. antecessores, see cedere).

15. Arare, to plough (Gr. ἀρόω, ἄροτρον, a plough, and ἄρουρα, a ploughed field; Lith. arti, to plough, and arimas, a ploughed field), *arable*, *oar* (Ang. Sax. âre), viewed as a kind of ploughshare in the water. The root ar, to plough, appears also in L. armentum, cattle for ploughing, and probably in Germ. arbeit, labor, and in Eng. word *errand* (old High Germ. arunti).

16. Ars, art (Sk. ar, to reach or arrive at anything; arya-s, hanging or clinging to; Gr. ἄρω, I fit, and ἀρτύω, I arrange, and ἄρϑμος, a bond; with which cf., as of same source, ἁρμόζω and ἁρμονία, Eng. *harmony*, and also especially ἀρέσκω, I please, and ἀρετή, virtue, or fitness of conduct). Art is, etymologically, the handling of things according to their intellectual fitness, as virtue is, in its Greek terminology (ἀρετή), action according to the fitness of things. Derived from L. ars, are Eng. *art*, *artisan*, and *artist*, and *artifice* (facere); and also *inert* (L. iners) and *inertia*, *artillery* (Fr. artillerie; cf. for sense, *engine* Fr. engine, from L. ingenium), and *arsenal* (Fr. arsenal, lit. a piece of art). From the same root with ars, comes also L. artus, a joint or limb, and from this, Eng. *article* (L. articulus, dim. a little joint) and *articulate*.

17. Ascia, an axe (ἀξίνη, prob. from same root with ξέω, ξύω, and ξύλον, cut wood) *axe*, *hatchet* (Fr. hache) *hack* (Germ. hacken), *hew* (Germ. hauen), *hay* (Germ. hau), lit. *cut* grass, *hedge* and *haw*, as being trimmed (Germ. hag and hecke, Fr. haie), *hatchel* (Germ. hechel).

18. Astrum, a star (Sk. târâ, a star, for orig. stârâ and Vedic pl. staras, stars, from Sk. star and stri, to strew; see L. sternere, Gr. ἀστήρ and ἄστρον), *astral*, *asteroid*, *disaster* (Ital. disastro, Fr. desastre), an astrological word; *star* (Germ. stern). L. stella, for sterla, for sterula, is of same origin, from which come *stellar*, *stellated*, *constellation*.

19. Augere, auctum, to increase (Sk. vaksh, to increase, Gr. αὐξάνω, Gothic, vahsja), *augment*, *auction*, *autumn* (L. auctumnus, lit. increase), *author* (L. auctor, a producer, or cause), *authority* (L. auctoritas), *authorize*, *authentic* (M. L. authen-

ticus), *auxiliary* (L. auxilium); here too belongs, probably, L. augustus, Eng. *august.*

20. Auris, the ear, for orig. ausis, cf. auscultare (Gr. *οὖς*, cont. from *οὖας*, for prob. older form *οὐσατ* and *αὐσατ*, Gothic auso, Lith. ausis, Germ. ohr), *ear*, *auricle*, *auricular*, *auscultation*, *audience*, *audit*, *auditory*, *obedient* (L. obedire = ob + audire), *obey* (Fr. obeir), *hear* (Germ. hören) and *hearken* (Germ. horchen) and *hark.*

21. Aurum, gold (Sk. us, to burn, to shine. Cf. Sk. usar, morning, and usriyâ, light. With the same ultimate root, strengthened by the prefix of an initial a, as in root aus, is connected L. aurora, morning, for ausosa, Eng. *auroral*, cf. Lith. auszra, dawn; and also Lat. prop. name *Aurelius* for *Αὐσέλιος*, lit. descended from the sun, as represented in *ἥλιος* for *ἀέλιος* for *αὐσέλιος*). With aurum are connected *orange* (M. L. aurantium and arangium, sc. pomum, lit. the golden apple), *treasure* (Gr. *θησαυρός* = *τίθημι* + *αὖρον.* L. thesaurus, Fr. trésor), *auriferous*, *oriflamb* (=aurea flamma).

21. Avus, a grandfather, avunculus, dim. (lit. a little grandfather) Germ. onkel, Fr. oncle, Eng. *uncle.*

B.

22. *Βάλλω*, I throw (cf. also *πάλλω*, *παλαίω*, and *παλάσσω*, and L. pellere), a *ball* (M. L. ballum), *balloon* (Fr. ballon, Sp. balon, a large ball), a *ball* or dance, and a *ballet* (*βαλλίζειν*, to dance, lit. to throw one's self about, Ital. ballo, Fr. ballet). *ballot* (Span. balota, a little ball used in voting), *bolus* (Gr. *βόλος*), to *bowl* (Span. bola and bolear; Fr. boule), a *bowlder*, a *bullet* (Fr. boulet, dim. of boule, a ball), *bulletin* (Span. boletin, lit. thrown forth to view, like letters *patent*), *bullion* (gold in the *mass*), *bill* and *billet*, viewed as being packed or rolled up into a ball (Fr. billet, Ital. bulletta and biglietto), *billiards*, lit. little balls (Fr. billard). From *βάλλω* come, also, as compound derivatives, Eng. *devil* (Gr. *διάβολος*, an accuser, Ital. diavolo, Fr. diable, Germ. teufel), *diabolic;* symbol (Gr. *σύμβολον*, lit. brought together with something else, from *συμβάλλω*); *parabola* and *parable* (Gr. *παρα-*

βάλλω, I set side by side, I compare). From παραβάλλειν, M. L. parabolare, to harangue, come *parole* and, through the Fr. parler (for paroler), Eng. *parlance* and *parliament* (lit. a place for speaking) and *parlor* (Fr. parloir), and *palaver* (Span. palabra). The word *emblem* also belongs here (Gr. ἔμβλημα, lit. raised work, embossed on swords and shields, from ἐμβάλλω); the word problem, likewise (Gr. πρόβλημα, from προβάλλω).

23. Bancus (M. L.), a seat, from Sax. benc, Eng. *bank, bench, a Bank,* and *banker* (lit. one standing by a bench; cf. for sense, a *bench* of judges, also word *assize,* from Fr. asseoir, to sit by or near), *banquet,* Span. banqueta, a stool (lit. tables for feasting provided with *benches*); *mountebank* (lit. mount a bank or bench).

24. Batuere, to beat (Gr. πατάσσω and παταγέω, from which roots come *pat, patter,* and *patch,* Germ. patsch and patschen), *beat* (M. L. battere, Fr. battre), *batter, battery, battle* (M. L. batalia, Fr. bataille), *battlement* (an embrasure and its surroundings, originally), *battalion, combat* (Fr. combattre, to fight against), *debate* (Fr. debattre), *abate* (Fr. abattre, to beat from or down).

25. Binden, band, gebunden (Germ.), to bind (Sk. bandh, to bind. Cf. also Sk. bandha-s, a bond, and badhû-s, a wife. In πένϑερος, a son-in-law, and πεῖσμα, a bond or cable, for πένσμα or πένϑμα, we seem to have the same root in Greek. The Lat. vincire, to bind, and Germ. winden, to *wind,* probably belong here also), *bind, band, bandage, bond, bondage, bounds, boundary, bundle* (Germ. bund and bundel). Here belong also (besides perhaps the word *bend*) *husband* (lit. *the band of the house*), *ribbon* or riband, pr. *ribband,* the true spelling (rib, Germ. rippe, referring primarily to narrow forms of things), meaning literally a narrow band; *contraband* (Fr. contrebande, lit. contrary to law), and a *band* (as of music, being bound together by some formal rules of association). To this same root (binden, etc.) belongs Eng. *ban* (M. L. bannum, of Lombard origin, an edict against one; Ital. and Span. bando), and *abandon* (Fr. abandonner = L. ad bannum donare, lit. to give or

expose to the ban), *banish* (Fr. bannir, lit. to put under the ban, M. L. banneiare), *bandit* (Ital. bandito, an exile, an outlaw, Span. bandido), *banditti*. *Banner*, also (M. L, banearium, Span. bandera, Ital. bandiera) is of same source.

26. Blanchus, or blancus (M. L.), white, pale, or that which has lost its color (Gr. βλάξ, thin, wasted; cf. βληχρός), *blank*, *blanch*, *blanket* (named from its undyed or white color, like *candy*, from candere, to be white or glistening), *bleach* (Germ. bleich, very white or pale), and *bleak*. The word *black* also belongs here (denoting literally the fading out of all color).

27. Beugen and biegen, bog, gebogen (Germ.), to bend, bow, etc. Here radicate themselves Eng. *bow*, *bough*, and *book* (Germ. buch), lit. something bent or doubled up. Cf. *volume* (Lat. volumen, from volvere to roll), lit. a scroll.

28. Botte, butte, and bottich (Germ.), a coop, tub, or barrel (Gr. βοῦτις, a flask, M. L. butta, cf. Gr. πυτίνη), *butt* and *boot* (Fr. boute and botte, a cask and a boot), *bottle* (Fr. bouteille), *body* (Ang.-Sax. bodig, its etymological sense being like that of the kindred words trunk and chest for the upper part of the body).

29. Brachium, the arm, the forearm (Sk. bâhu-s, Zend. bazus, Gr. πήχυς), *brace*, a support, and *brace*, a couple (lit. two joined together, arm in arm. So the word *couple* itself has come to mean two), *bracket*, *bracelet* (lit. an armlet), *embrace* (lit. to put arms around each other).

30. Brunus (M. L.), brown, from which come Eng. *brown* (Germ. braun), *brunette* (Ital. brunetta), *bronze* (Ital. bronzo, Span. bronce, Fr. bronze), *burn* (Germ. brennen, Ital. brucciare), *burnish* (Ital. brunire, Fr. brunir), *brand* (Germ. brand, from brennen, to burn), *brandy* (Germ. brauntwein, lit. wine burnt or distilled).

31. Burgus (M. L.), a castle or tower (Gr. πύργος), and also a thickly settled town, viewed as being, without walls, its own adequate defense. Hence come Eng. *borough*, *-burgh*, and *-bury*, *burgher* (M. L. burgarius, Germ. bürger), and from this the vulgar *bugger* (cf. *villain*, from villanus, living in the country), too well justified a scarecrow for those

residing in the outskirts of a great city, *burgess* (M. L. burgesia, Fr. bourgeoisie). *The Boulevards* in Paris are a corruption for Bourgward, or land lying around a city wall. Cf. for sense, L. pomoerium = post murum. So, from L. burgus (Gr. πύργος) come Eng. *harbor* (Germ. herberge = heer + bergen, lit. a place for protecting a number), M. L. albergium, al- (being the Arabic article the) and *harbinger* (lit. one who provides harborage beforehand).

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32. Cadere, casum, to fall (Gr. κατά, from above, down, as in κατιέναι, to go down. Cf. Sk. çad, to fall, and to cause to fall, and also, Sk. pad and pat, to fall, etc.), *case*, *casual*, *casuist* (lit. a putter of cases, i. e. of conscience), *cadence* (part. cadens), *chance* (M. L. cadentia, Ital. cadenza, Germ. schanze, Fr. chance, cf. Fr. cher, deer, and chérir, to *cherish*, from L. carus and Fr. chair, flesh, from L. caro), *accident* (L. accidere = ad + cado), *deciduous* (L. decidere), *decay* and *decadence* (Fr. decaer, from L. decadere), *incident*, *occident* (L. occidens, sc. sol), *occasion* (Suf. occasum of occidere).

33. Caedere, caesum (a causative form of cadere, like L. jacio of jaceo, or, in English, raise of rise and fell of fall), *circumcise* (lit. to cut around), *concise* (lit. certain parts being cut out and the rest put together, like, for sense, syncope, Gr. συν + κοπτω), *decide* (lit. to cut off, i. e. further doubt or delay), and *decisive*, *excise* (lit. cut off, i. e. by way of toll), *incision*, *precise* (lit. cut down in front, or sheer, like an escarpment, is the figure), *fratricide* (+ frater), *parricide* (+ pater or parens), *suicide* (se + caedo), *cement* (L. caementum, for caedimentum, rough pieces or chips of stone, originally).

34. Calare, to call or call to (Sk. çru, Gr. καλέω, cf. κλάγγη, clang and clangor, and κλάζω, I clash. From καλέω, come ἐκκλησία, lit. a calling together, an assembly, a church, Eng. *ecclesiastical*, and κληρικός and Eng. *clerk*, *clergyman*, and *clerical*, the radical idea of the office being etymologically that of one who summons the people together). From

calare and its derivatives come Eng. *call* and *a calling* (cf. sense of word *vocation* and *avocation*, i.e. as from God), *recall*, *challenge* (Fr. do., M. L. callengia), *claim* (L. clamare, lit. to cry out, in which word is involved the idea of vociferation in the assertion of one's rights), *clamor*, *acclaim*, and *acclamation*, *declaim*, *exclaim*, *proclaim*, *reclaim*, *calendar* (L. calendae, calends, or proclamation-days), *intercalary*, *nomenclature* (lit. a calling by name), *celebrated* (L. celeber, lit. called together, and so crowded or spoken much of or to, and so famous).

35. Campus, a flat place or plain (Gr. κῆπος, a garden or plantation. Cf. Sk. kûpa-s, an extended space), *camp* and *encampment* (viewed as being in the open field), *campaign*, *champaign*, (Fr. champ and champagne), *champion* (M. L. campio, Germ. kämpe and kämpfer), *scamper* (Fr. escamper, lit. as ex + campo, to run away from camp and, of course, fast), and *scamp* (one who does ~~so~~ run).

36. Candere (a strengthened form of canere, to be gray), to be very white, to shine (Sk. kan, to shine. Cf. *γανάω* and *γανόω*, I shine, and also *καίω*, I burn, and *κόνις*, ashes, L. cinis, and Germ. scheinen, Eng. *shine* and *sheen*), *candle* (L. candela), *candelabra* (Lat. candelabrum), *chandelier* (Fr. do.), *cannel* (or candle-coal), as burning so freely, *chandler* (Fr. do., lit. a maker or seller of candles, and so of other small wares), *candy* (Ital. candito, Fr. candi. Cf. blanket, from blancus, white) candy being naturally white. From L. candere come also Eng. *candor* (lit. whiteness of character. So, *integrity* is unspottedness), *candid*, *candidate* (originally dressed in white), *kindle* (Ital. accendere, Span. encender), *incendiary* (L. incendere, sup. incensum), *incense*, and *incensed; incandescent* (L. incandescere). Candia, the ancient name of Crete (from which comes Fr. craie, chalk, and Fr. and Eng. crayon) is derived from candere, to be white, referring to the chalk cliffs of the island. Cf. Albion, as the name of England, from the chalk cliffs at Dover.

37. Canere, cantum, to sing (Sk. kan, to sound, is perhaps correlated with it), *cant* (L. cantare, freq. to sing or sound forth much), *cantillate* (L. cantillare, dimin. form), *chant* (Fr.

chanter), *enchant* (Fr. enchanter), *chanticleer* (chant + clear), *incantation* (L. incantare, to say or sing, a magic formula), *concinnity* (L. concinnus, from concinere, to accord, lit. in sound), *incentive* (a martial figure, drawn from a trumpeter's blowing of a horn as a call to battle. Cf. *provocative* for sense, from provocare to call forth or challenge to a trial at arms).

38. Canna, a reed (Sk. kandha-s, a reed, Gr. κάννα), *cane*, *can* (as being cylindrical in form, etc.), *canal* (L. canalis), *channel* (L. canalis, Fr. chenal), *canon* (Gr. κανῶν, a straight rod), *canonize*, *cannon* (Germ. kanone, Ital. cannone), and probably *canoe* (Fr. canot, Germ. kahn). From canna, a reed (M. L. canella, dim.), comes also the Fr. cannelle (Germ. kaneel), for cinamon-bark (on account of its volute form when dried), and also Eng. *kennel* (Fr. chenil).

39. Capere, to take, seize, hold (cf. Gr. κώπη, a handle, and κάπη and καπάνη, a crib, as a receptacle, and also κάπτω, I gulp down. Cf. also Germ. heft, a handle, for whose phonetic accordance, cf. Germ. herz and καρδία) *capture*, *captious*, *captive*, *captivate*, *catiff* (L. captivus, Fr. chetif, wretched, mean), *capacity* (capax), *capacious*, *capstan* (L. capistrum, a holder), *cable* (Ital. cappio, Fr. and Span. cable, M. L. capulum, that which holds), *accept* (L. accipere), *conceive* and *conception* (L. concipere, Fr. concevoir), *deceive* and *deception* (L. decipere, lit. to take from or away), *dupe* (Fr. duper, L. decipere), *except*, *inception*, *intercept*, *occupy* (L. occupare, to seize, — a military figure), *perceive* and *perception; precept* and *preceptor; receive*, *reception*, *receipt*, *recipe*, and *receptacle; recuperate* and *recover* (L. recuperare, and Fr. recouvrir); *prince* (L. princeps = primum, sc. locum capere), *principle* (Fr. do., Lat. principium), *principal* (L. principalis). From capere comes also captare, freq. verb, to catch at eagerly, etc. (with which cf. Gr. κάπτω, I snatch, and Germ. schnappen, to snap up, etc.). With captare is connected, Fr. happer, to snatch at or up, from which come Eng. *hap*, *happen*, *mishap*, *perhaps*, *haphazard, happiness* (the *casual* attainment of which by mankind at large is certified in the word itself). Cf. also, in this connection L. accipiter, Germ. habicht, Eng. *hawk.*

40. Caput, the head. Cf. also, for form, capillus, the hair of the head. (Sk. kapâla-s, the skull, Gr. κεφαλή, the head), *cap* (Ital. cappa, Germ. kappe), lit. a covering for the head; *cap-a-pie* (Fr. = L. ex capite ad pedem), lit. from head to foot, *decapitate*, *chaperon*, and *capote* (French words), *chapel* and *chaplain* (Fr. chapelle and chapelain, from M. L. capella, lit. a little cap, i. e. of St. Martin, which was held sacred by the kings of France, and kept in a building prepared for it within the palace grounds. The name was erelong given to the building itself, which was regarded as holy); *chaplet* (as being worn on the head); *chapter* (Fr. chapitre, L. capitulum, dim., a small head), *capitulate* (to surrender on terms, with formal *heads*) and *recapitulate* (lit. to repeat the principal heads or points of a discourse); *capillary* (L. capillus, for capitulus, the hair of the head. Cf. for form and sense alike, osculum, a kiss, from os, the mouth. We speak in Eng. of a large or fine head of hair); *capuchin* (Fr. capuce, a hood), lit. a hooded monk; *captain* (Fr. capitaine); *chief* (L. caput, Ital. capo, Fr. chef. This French word has been naturalized also in German as chef and in Spanish as jef, besides other words having the same sense in those languages), *achieve* (Fr. achever, Span. acabar), *mischief*, (lit. wrong-headedness); *precipice* and *precipitous* (L. praeceps = prae + caput, head-first). The words *cattle* and *chattel*, also, belong here (L. capitalia, n. pl. neut. of capitalis, lit. principal things, Norman, chattel). The German correspondent of caput, in sense — haupt (Gothic haubith, Ang. Sax. heafud, Eng. *head*, etc.), is doubtless, as claimed by Kuhn, not derived from the same root with it at all, but from the same source with Sk. (Vedic) kakubha, the head.

41. Caro, gen. carnis, flesh, stem, caren (Sk. kravya-m, raw flesh, Gr. κρέας), *carnal*, *carnation* (flesh-color), *carnelian* a stone of *flesh-red* hue), *incarnadine* (flesh-red), *incarnate*, *carnage* (referring not so much to the act or result, as to the sight of horror), *carnival* (L. carni vale, lit. farewell to meat). Here belong, also, L. cruor (Eng. *gore*), which see, and cruentus, bloody, Sk. krûra-s, bloody; Lith. krauja-s. blood.

42. Caulis, a stalk or stem (Gr. καυλός. Cf. as of same probable origin with caulis, the following words in Latin: collis, columna, culmen, celsus, and excellere, with Gr. κολωνός and κολοφών, a summit), *cauliflower* (lit. a stalk-flower), *kale* (Germ. kohl), *brocoli*, lit. brown or purple *cauliflower* (Fr. brocoli, Germ. broccoli = braun kohl).

43. Cavare, to hollow out (cf. σκάπτω, I hollow out, from which Gr. σκάφη, a light boat, L. scapha, Germ. schiff, Eng. *skiff* and *ship;* viewed as being hollowed out, like a *canoe*, from canna, a reed, which see; or, *a vessel* (Fr. vaisseau, L. vas, a vase). With σκάπτω is connected, also, Germ. schaben, Eng. *shave*, and L. scabere, Eng. *scab;* as well as Germ. schieben, schob, geschoben, and Eng. *shove* and *scoop*, and Germ. schief, shelving, etc., Eng. *skew*). From cavare come Eng. *cave*, *cavern*, *excavate*, *cage* (L. cavea, M. L. gabbia, Fr. cage).

44. Cedere, cessum, to go to, on, or away (cf. χάζομαι, I retire), *cede*, *cession*, *cease* (L. cessare, freq. form), *cessation*, *abcess* (L. abs +), *accede*, *access* and *accession*, *concede*, *decease* (L. decedere, to depart), *exceed*, *incessant*, *intercede* (lit. to go between), *precede*, *precedent*, *proceed*, *process*, and *procession*, *recede*, *recess*, *succeed*, *success*, *ancestors* (Fr. ancêtres, for orig. ancestres, M. L. ancessores, for antecessores), *predecessors* (Fr. predecesseurs = prae + decedere).

45. Centum, a hundred (Sk. çatam, Gr. ἕκατον = ἕν κατον, *one* hundred; the Latin being but a nasalized form of this), a *cent*, *century*, *centurion*, *hundred* (cf. for correspondences of form, Sk. çvan, a dog, Gr. κύων, L. canis, and Germ. hund). So, *thousand* seems to come from this same root (Germ. tausend, Old Germ. dûsunt = dus or thus — for Gothic taihun, Sk. daçan, Gr. δέκα, and hund, for hundert).

46. Cernere, crevi, cretum, and originally also certum, to separate one from another, to discern (Sk. krî, to separate, Gr. κρίνω, I separate, distinguish, etc., from which come κρίσις, a decision, Eng. *crisis*, and κριτής, a judge, Eng. *critic* and *critical*, and κριτήριον, Eng. criterion, and ὑπόκρισις, lit. the acting of a part on a stage, under a mask, Eng. *hypocrisy* — like, for sense, L. persona = per, through, and sonare,

to sound, i. e. a mask, Eng. *person*). From certus, orig. part. form, come *certain*, *ascertain*, *certify*, and *certificate* (L. certum + facere), *concert* (L. con, together, and certare, to strive, a freq. form of cernere, sup. certum, lit. to decide by a contest) and *disconcert*. From cernere come, also, *concern* (M. L. concernere), *concrete*, *decree*, *decretal* (L. decernere), *discern* and *discreet*, *discriminate*, *excrete*, *excrement*, *secrete*, *secret*, and *secretary*. From the same root come, also, *crime* (Gr. κρίμα, L. crimen, lit. an accusation) and *criminate*.

47. Circus, a ring, a hoop (Sk. kakra-s, a wheel, Gr. κίρκος and κρίκος, a ring), *circus*, *circle* (L. circulus, dim.) *circulate*, *circuit* (L. circuire), *search* (Fr. chercher, It. cercare, M. L. circare, to go around after) *recherché* (Fr. do.). From circum, prep., an orig. acc. of circus, we have also the prefix circum- as in *circumjacent*.

48. Clarus, clear, whether in sound or sight (Gr. γαλερός and γαληνός, and also ἀγάλλω and ἀγλαός, Germ. glanz, Eng. *glance*), *clear*, *clarify*, *claret* (because so clear), *clarion* and *clarionet*, from their clear sound (Fr. clairon and clarinette), *declare* (L. declarare, lit. to make clear), *clairvoyant* (Fr. do., lit. seeing clearly), *eclaircize* (Fr. eclaircir, M. L. exclarare).

49. Claudere, clausum, to shut (κλείω, I shut, and κληΐς, a key, L. clavis, Fr. cléf, Eng. *clavicle* and *clef*), *clause* (viewed as distinct, by itself), *close*, *closet*, *cloister* (L. claustrum, Germ. kloster, Fr. cloître), *conclude*, *enclose*, *exclude*, *include*, *preclude*, *recluse*, *seclude*.

50. Clinare, obs. to lean on or towards (Gr. κλίνω, from which come Eng. *clinic*, Gr. κλινικός, belonging to a bed; *climax*, Gr. κλῖμαξ, a ladder, and *climacteric;* and *climate* and *clime*, Gr. κλίμα, a slope, a zone). From clinare come *client* (L. cliens, dependent on), *cliff* (L. clivus, Gr. κλιτύς), *acclivity*, *declivity*, *proclivity*, *decline*, *declension*, *incline*, *recline*. To *lean* is probably from same root (Germ. lehnen, L. clinare).

51. Contra, against (an old abl. adj. form of a comp. of con or cum, Sk. sam, Gr. σύν. Cf., for comp. form, inter, praeter, and subter, from in, prae, and sub; and, for both

form and case, extra, intra, etc. for contera, extera, etc. sc. parte), *contrary*, *contradict* (+ dicere), counter (Fr. contre), *counteract* (+ agere), *encounter*, and *rencounter* (Ital. incontrare, Span. encontrar, and Fr. rencontrer), *counterpart*, *control* (Fr. controlle = contre rolle, or counter role, a check-book for keeping accounts straight). *Country* is probably from contrarius (vid. Fr. contrée, M. L. contrata and contreta, probably cont. from contraria terra or contraterra). Cf. Germ. gegend, the country, for sense, from gegen, over against, i. e. the eye.

52. Conus, a cone (Sk. çô, to sharpen to a point, with which cf. L. cautes, a sharp rock, cos, a whetstone, and Sk. çana-s, a whetstone, Eng. *hone*, Gr. κῶνος, a cone), *cone*, *coin* (Fr. coin, a corner and coin, which was at first made in the form of a wedge, L. cuneus), *corner* (L cuneus, Fr. encognure).

53. Coquere, coctum, to cook, bake, etc. (Sk. pach, to cook, Gr. πέσσειν for orig. form πέκτειν, a strengthened form of the simple root πεκ. For the correspondence of the labial (p) in pach and root πεκ with the guttural (c) in coquere, cf. Gr. ἵππος for orig. ἴκFος, with L. equus, and so ἕπομαι and sequor, etc.), *cook*, *cookery*, *cooky* (Germ. kuchen, cake), and *cake*, *kitchen* (Germ. küche, M. L. cocina, Fr. cuisine), *culinary* (L. culina and colina, cont. from orig. form coqulina, formed from coquus, like inquilinus, a sojourner, from incola), *kiln* (L. culina, Sax. cyln), *cockney*, a term of reproach (L. coquinus), *precocious* (L. praecoquus).

54. Cor (stem, cord), the heart (Sk. hard, hrid and hridaya, Gr. καρδία and κῆρ), *heart* (Germ. herz, Gothic, hairto), *hearty*, *dishearten*, *cordial*, *accord* (M. L. accordare), *concord*, *concordance*, *discord*, *recórd* and *récord*, *core* (Ital. cuore), *courage* (Fr. courage, from coeur, the heart), *encourage*, *discourage*, *mercy* (L. misericordia, Fr. merci).

55. Corona, a crown (Gr. κορωνός. Cf. also κορύσσω, and L. corusco, and κέρας, and cornu, and καρνόν, and Sk. çarni-s, a horn), *crown*, *coronet* (dim.), *coronal*, *corollary* (L. corolla for coronola, lit. an inference viewed as *crowning* another truth), *coroner* (orig. devoted to affairs of the crown).

56. Crates, wicker-work (Germ. krätze), *crate*, *grate* (Ital. grata, lattice-work), *crash* (Fr. ecraser, to break or bruise), *craze* (lit. to break to pieces). *Crush*, also, seems to be connected with *crash*, like *rash* and *rush* with each other.

57. Creare, to produce or make (Sk. kri and kar. Cf. also Sk. kartri-s, a maker, and L. creator), *create*, *recreate*. From crescere (incept. of creare) come *crescent*, *decrease*, *increase*, *increment*, *accrue* (Fr. accroître, part. accru), *recruit* (Fr. recroître). With creare cf. also Ceres, the goddess of agriculture and caerimonia (Eng. ceremony), religious rites (in her honor, originally).

58. Cruor, blood. See caro (Sk. root kru lies at the base of this word, as of caro, and possibly of crux—, as found in Sk. kravi-s, and kravya-m, raw or bloody flesh, and Sk. krûra-s, bloody —), *crude* (L. crudus, for cruidus), *cruel* (L. crudelis). *Rude* (L. rudis) is a weakened form of crudus. Cf. also with L. crudus, raw, old Germ. hrâo, Germ. roh, Eng. raw and rough. The Gr. *κρύος*, chilliness, shudder, and *κρυμός* (referring to the natural effects of the sight of blood), perhaps belong here, and with them *κρύσταλλος* (ice, chilliness), Eng. *crystal* (looking like ice).

59. Crux, a cross (cf. *κερκίς*, a beam, from *κέρκω* and *κρέκω*), *crucial*, *crucify*, *excruciate*, *cross* (Ital. croce, Span. cruz), *crusade* (Fr. croisade), *crosier* (Fr. crosse), *cruise* and *cruiser* (Fr. croiser and croiseur, referring to the constant tacking necessary in sailing). Here place, also, Eng. *crook*, *crotch*, and *crutch* (M. L. croca, Ital. croccia, Germ. krücke) and *crotchet* and *crochet* (Fr. crocher).

60. Cura, care (probably from cavere, to take care, for cavira, or cavra, as the earlier form), *care*, *cure*, *curate*, *accurate* (= dare curam ad), *incurable*, *procure* (i. e. curare, to care, pro, for, beforehand), *secure* (se, without, cura, care), *sure* (Fr. sûr), *assure*, *insure*, *reassure*.

61. Currere, cursum, to run, *current*, *curricle*, *concur* (lit. to run together), *concourse*, *course* and *courser*, *discourse*, *discursive*, *excursion*, *incur* and *incursion*, *intercourse* (lit. a running between), *occur*, *precursor*, *recur*, *succour*. *Courier*,

also, belongs here (Fr. courir), and *corsair* (Span. corsario, from verb corsear, L. cursare).

61. Cutis, the skin as a covering (κεύϑω, I cover or hide, from which Eng. *coat.* Cf. Gr. κύτος and σκύτος. Here belongs Germ. hüten, to cover, from which come Germ. hut, Eng. *hat;* hütte, Eng. *hut;* and haut, Eng. *hide.* For correspondence of sense, in Germ. haut, a skin, and Gr. κεύϑειν, to cover, cf. the connection of the verb to hide, in Eng., and a hide), *cuticle.* From σκύτος comes L. scutum, a shield; from the dimin. of which, scutula, comes Germ. schüssel, Eng. scuttle, an oblong, round, shallow vessel, named from its resemblance, in form, to a shield; as is a harp (ἅρπη) from its similitude to a sickle.

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62. Damnum, harm, loss (ζημία, Cretan δαμία. Cf. as from same source, L. domare, Gr. δαμάω, I subdue), *damn* (L. damnare), *condemn* (L. condemnare), *indemnify* and *indemnity* (L. indemnitas), *damage* (Fr. dommage, M. L. dameigium), *danger* (Fr. danger, M. L. domigerium and dangerium).

63. Dare, to give, stem da (Sk. dâ, stem do, Gr. δίδωμι, from which come Eng. *dose*, Gr. δόσις; and *antidote*, Gr. αντίδοτος. Cf. also, Sk. dâtar, a giver, Gr. δοτήρ and L. dator; and Sk. dânam, a gift, and L. donum), *date* (a given day), *dative; abdomen* (hidden from view); *add* (ad + dare); *condition* (condere, lit. to put together), *abscond* and *recondite; mandate* (manus + dare), *command* (Fr. commander = L. con + manus + dare), *demand* (de + manus + dare); *commend* and *recommend* (L. commendare = con + mandare), *edit* (lit. to give forth), *perdition* (L. perdere = dare, to give, per, through, or out), *trade* (L. tradere, lit. to give over, from one to another), and *tradition; vend* (venum + dare, to give to sale), *render* and *rent* (Fr. rendre and rente, L. reddere), *dowry* and *dotal*, and *endow* and *endowment* (L. dos, dotis). From donare, a strengthened form of dare, come *donate* and *abandon* (Fr. abandonner = ad bannum donare). *Surrender* is a corrupted Anglicised form of the French reflexive verb, se rendre; *rendezvous* is the French "report yourselves" (from rendre, etc.).

64. Decem, ten (Sk. daçan, Gr. δέκα), *ten* (Germ. zehen), *decimal, decimate, dime* (Fr. dîme, orig. disme, L. decimus), *dean* (L. decanus, the superior of *ten* prebendaries, Span. dean, pronounced as a dissyllable, Fr. doyen), *thousand* (see L. centum).

65. Dens, stem dent, a tooth (Sk. danta-s, Gr. ὀδούς, stem ὀδοντ, Lith. danti-s, Goth. tunthus, Germ. zahn, Eng. *tooth.* Cf. also, Sk. daç, and danç, to bite, Gr. δάκνω), *dentist, dentifrice* (fricare, to rub), *indent.*

66. Dicere, dictum, to say (Sk. diç, to show, etc., Gr. δείκνυμι), *diction, dictionary, addict, edict, index, indict* and *indite, predict, verdict* (verum + dicere), *interdict* (lit. to say between, or in the way of). From dicare, to say much, or strongly, a freq. form of dicere, come *abdicate, dedicate, indicate, predicate* and *predicament, vindicate* (L. vindicare = venum + dicare, to call or claim as one's own by sale), and *avenge, revenge,* and *vengeance* (Fr. venger, etc., from L. vindicare). The words *judge* (Fr. juger, L. judicare = jus + dicere), and *preach* (Fr. prêcher, Germ. predigen, L. praedicare) belong here.

67. Dies, a day (Sk. div, to shine, and divâ, adv. abl. on a day; cf. for form L. diu. Cf. also, Sk. dyu-s, day and sky. Here belong L. deus, God, Sk. dêva-s, Lith. devas, and also Gr. *Ζεύς*, Boeotian *Δεύς*, gen. *Διός*; Sk. Dyâu-s, gen. Divas; L. Jûpiter, gen. Jovis, Oscan, Djovis; L. Diespiter and Jupiter are double forms of the same compound Sk. original Dyâu-s + pitar, or father of the sky or light. Juno for Jovino, and Diana for Djana, as well as Janus, all refer to the worship of light by the early Indo-European mind), *dial, diary, diurnal* (L. diurnus), *journal* (L. diurnus, Ital. giorno, Fr. jour and journal, belonging to a day, M. L. journale), *journey* (Fr. journée, a day's toil), *journeyman, adjourn* (Fr. ajourner, M. L. adjornare). Here, also, belong *day* (Germ. tag), and *dawn* (Germ. tagen). In Sansk. danh and dagh, mean to shine, as well as div; and in Sk. dava, fire, for orig. daghva, and div, for perhaps, orig. dighv, the two roots, dagh and div may meet in one.

68. Dignus, worthy (Sk. daça-s, glory. Cf. Gr. δόξα and

δοκέω, Eng. *-doxy* and *dogma.* See also δίκαιος, just, Sk. diç, to show; and also L. dicere, and discere, as well as Gr. δάκτυλος and Lat. digitus. L. decere and decus may belong here also), *dignity*, *condign*, *deign* (M. L. dignare, Ital. degnare, Fr. daigner), *disdain* (L. dedignari, Span. desdeñar), *indignity*, *indignant.*

69. Discus, a quoit, a dish (Gr. δίσκος, a round plate), *discus*, *disc*, *dish*, *desk* (Germ. tisch, a table), *daïs* (Fr. dais).

70. Domare, to subdue (Sk. dam, to conquer, Gr. δαμάω, Germ. zähmen, Eng. *tame.* See, also, L. damnum.) From domare comes dominus (Sk. damana-s), lit. a subduer, from which come Eng. *dominion*, *domineer*, *domain* (L. dominium. Fr. domaine), *domination*, *predominate.* Here, too, belong *don* (L. dominus, Span. don), and *donna* (L. domina, Span. dona and duena), *dame* (L. domina, Fr. dame), *damsel* (Fr. demoiselle, dimin.), *madam* (Fr. madame, lit. my lady), *dam.*

71. Domus, a house (Sk. dama-s, a house, Gr. δόμος, δῶμα, and δῶ, a house, and δέμω, I build), *domestic*, *domesticate*, *domicile* (domicilium = prob. domus + cella), *dome* (Fr. dôme, orig. dosme, Germ. dom). The word *timber* (Germ. zimmer, materials for building, a building), is connected prob. with δέμω.

72. Ducere, ductum (perhaps Sk. duh, to draw down, may belong here. Goth. tiuhan, from which Fr. touer and Eng. *tow*), *duct*, *ductile*, *duke* (L. dux), lit. a military leader, *doge* (Ital. do.), *abduct*, *adduce*, *conduce*, *conduct*, *conduit*, *deduce*, *deduct*, *educe*, and *educate* (lit. to lead forth from, i. e. the first rude state), *induce*, *introduce*, *produce*, *product*, *reduce*, *seduce*, *subdue* (L. subducere, to lead under, i. e. the yoke. Cf. for sense, subjugate).

73. Duo (Sk. dvi, masc. nom. dvâu, and neut. dve), *dual*, *duel* (L. duellum), *duet*, *two* (Germ. zwei), *twice*, *twain*, *twin*, *twine*, *twist* (cf. Germ. zwist, from zwei, two), *between* and *betwixt*, *twilight* (i. e. doubtful light. Cf. for sense, Germ. zweifel, doubt = zwei, two, i. e. ways, and fallen, to fall, and also L. dubius = duae viae), *double* (Gr. διπλοῦς, L. duplus, Germ. doppel), *duplicity* (L. duplex = duo + plicare).

duplicate. So the adverbial numeral bis, twice, in Latin, as in Eng. *bisect*, is for orig. dvis (Gr. δίς for δϝίς). The orig. form dvis appears less changed in the insep. Lat. prep. dis, as in Eng. *discuss* (lit. to shake in two). Lat. viginti is also for orig. dviginti, Eng. *twenty* (Germ. zwansig). The archaic form, likewise, of bellum was duellum (lit. a strife between two), from which come *bellicose*, *belligerent* (+ gerere), *rebel.* Lat. bonus was, too, originally duonus, from whence come Eng. *bonny*, *boon*, *bounty* (Fr. bonté), *embonpoint* (Fr. do., lit. in good point), *bonfire* (lit. a good fire. Cf. Fr. feu de joie, and Germ. freudenfeuer), *benefice*, and *benefit* (bene + facere), *benediction* and *benison* (L. benedicere, Fr. bénir and bénison), *benign*, *benignant* (L. benignus), *benevolent.* From bellus, fair, handsome, for benulus, a dimin. form of bonus (cf. for change of vowel, vester, your, from vos, you), come *belle*, *embellish*, *belles lettres* (lit. fine writing), *beau* (Fr. beau), and *beauty.*

74. *Δύπτω*, I dip (a strengthened form of δύω, I go into), *dip*, *dipper*, *dive*, *dove* (Germ. tauben, to dive), lit. the diving bird (its other name, pigeon, L. pipio(n), is given from its *piping* sound). From Germ. tauben come also prob. Eng. *tope* and *toper* (lit. one constantly dipping into liquor), Germ. tauchen, to duck, may also belong here, Eng. *duck.*

E.

75. Ex, prep. forth from, out of (Gr. ἐκ orig. ἐκις), *extra* (L. do. Cf. for form, contra, intra, etc.), *exterior*, *extreme*, *external*, *extraneous*, *estrange* and *strange* (L. extraneus, Span. estrangero), *extraordinary* (+ ordo, order), *extravagant* (+ vagari, to wander), *extrînsic* (L. extrinsecus), *exotic* (ἐξωτικός).

F.

76. Facere, factum, to make (Sk. bhâvayâ, causative form of bhû, to be, i. e. to make to be. Cf. L. fio, fui, and Gr. φύω, as correlates of bhû. Here, perhaps, belongs Gothic bagvan, Germ. bauen, to build, and baum, a tree, Eng. *beam*), *face* (L. facies, lit. that which *makes* the chief impression),

features (Ital. fattura, L. factura), *façade* (Fr. do.), *facile*, *faculty* (power to do), *fact* (a thing done), *faction* (a party engaged in the doing of a given thing), *fashion* (L. factio, Fr. façon, the common way of doing things), *factory*, *manufacture* (+ manus, the hand), *facetious* (lit. *doing* a clever thing), *feat* (L. factum, Fr. fait), something done, i.e. marvellously, *defeat* (Fr. defaite, from defaire, to undo), *affair* (Fr. affaire), *edify* (L. *edificare*, lit. to build, as a house), *satisfy* (L. satisfacere), *counterfeit* (Fr. contrefaire = L. contra facere), *forfeit* (Fr. forfaire = L. foras + facere), *surfeit* (Fr. surfaire = L. super + facere), *traffic* (Fr. trafiquer = L. trans + facere, as L. tradere, Eng. trade = L. trans + dare). Several common derivatives, from L. prepositional compounds, also belong here, as *affect* and *affectation*, *benefaction*, *confectionary*, *deficient*, *effect*, *efficacious*, and *efficient*, *infect*, *perfect*, *prefect*, *proficient*, *refectory*, *suffice*, *superficial*, and also the following, more immediately through the French, *deface*, *efface*, *surface*. *Profit* is L. profectus and Ital. profitto, Fr. profit.

77. Fallere, falsum (Sk. sphal and sphul, to waver, to fall, Gr. σφάλλω. Cf. also σφάλμα, a fall, a fault, σφαλερός, slippery, and ἀσφαλής, safe, *a* priv.), *false*, *fault*, *fall* (Germ. fallen), to *fell* (Germ. fällen), *falter* (Span. faltar), *fallacy*.

78. Fari, to speak (Sk. bhâ and bhâs, to shine, Gr. φαίνω, φαός, etc., and bhash and bhan, to speak, Gr. φημί and φάσκω. In L. declaro, I declare = de + clarus, clear, the style of connection between φημί, I say, and φαίνω, I shine, is well illustrated). From φημί comes Eng. *emphasis* and *prophet*; from fari come *fate*, *fame*, *famous* and *infamous* and *defame*, *fable*, *fabulous*, *affable*, *ineffable*, *infant* (L. infans, one that cannot speak. Cf. Gr. νήπιος), *nefarious* (not to be described), *multifarious*, *preface* and *prefatory* (L. prefatio, etc.). Here, also, belongs *fane* (lit. a dedicated place), and *profane* (lit. before or outside of the temple, i. e. unconsecrated, or unhallowed). From fateri, a strengthened form of fari (like βατέω, of stem βά in βαίνω) comes *confess* (L. confiteri).

79. Fendere, obs. to ward off (cf. Gr. ϑείνω, to strike,

wound, or dash down. Cf. for similarity of correspondence, τείνω and tendo), *fend*, *fender*, *fence*, *defend* and *defense*, *offend* and *offense*, *infest* (L. infestus for infensitus).

80. Feo, obs. I bring forth (Gr. φύω, I produce, from which *physical*, *physics*, *metaphysics*, and *physic*, as being the use of *natural* helps; Sk. bhû, to be. Cf. L. fui and fio), *feminine* and *female* (L. femina, lit. one who brings forth). From foetus come *foetal* and *effete* (lit. having just brought forth), *fecundity* (L. fecundus), *felicity* and *infelicity* (L. felix, lit. producing much).

81. Ferre, tuli, latum, for tlatum, to bear, bring, yield (Sk. bhar, Persian ber, Gr. φέρω, from which Eng. *metaphor;* and Germ. bären, from which Eng. *bear*, *bier*, Germ. bahre), *fertile*, *fortitude* (L. fortis, like, for form, toga from tego), and *forte* (piano forte means, lit. soft — Lat. planus, Ital. piano — and strong forte), *fort*, *fortress*, *fortify*, *comfort* (M. L. confortare, lit. to strengthen thoroughly), *effort*, *force* (Fr. force, Ital. forza), *enforce*, *reinforce*, *perforce*, *fortune*, and *fortuitous*, from fors, chance. From compound Latin forms come *confer*, *defer*, *differ*, *infer*, *offer*, *prefer*, *proffer*, *refer*, *suffer*, *transfer*. From supine latum, for tlatum (of same root with tuli, tolerare, and Gr. τλάω and τλητός), come *collate* and *collation*, *dilate*, *elate*, *illative*, *oblate*, *prelate*, *translate*, and *delay* (L. dilatio, Fr. délai). From same root, also, with L. ferre are L. far, corn and farina, Eng. *farina*.

82. Fides, faith (πείϑω, I persuade, obey, trust, short stem πιϑ), *faith*, *fidelity*, *fiduciary*, *confide*, *diffident*, *infidel*, *perfidy*. *Affidavit* (M. L. affidare, to bind one's self), and *defy* (Fr. defier, M. L. diffidare, lit. to forfeit one's word) belong, also, here. From same root comes L. foedus (cf. perf. πέποιϑα of πείϑω), from which are *federal* and *confederate*.

83. Figere, fixum, to fix (Gr. σφίγγω, I bind together, from which σφιγκτήρ, the *sphincter* muscle, and Σφίγξ, the *sphinx*, lit. the throttler; see riddle. Cf. for correspondence of form, fallere and σφάλλω, and fides and σφίδη), *fix*, *affix*, *infix*, *prefix*, *suffix*, *transfix*. Here belongs Eng. *fit* (noun), L. fixus, Ital. fitto, like atto, from L. actus, lit. pierced or struck down; and perhaps also *hit* (L. fixus, Span. hito, fixed, a mark, etc.;

Span. h is the Lat. f.). From figere comes L. figura, Eng. *figure*, *prefigure*, and *transfigure*. Fingere, fictum, is a strengthened form of figere (as fundere in present tense is of fudi perf. tense), and means, as such, to form or fashion earnestly. While its general sense is much like that of facere, how different is the sense of its derivatives. From fingere come *feign* (Fr. feindre) and *feint*, *fiction*, *fictitious*, *figment*, *effigy* (L. effigies). Finis, the end, is also for fignis, from figere, and from it come *final*, *finish*, *finite* and *infinite*, *affinity*, *confines*, *define*, *definite* and *indefinite*, *refine*, *fine*, *finance*, and *financier* (lit. one skilful in making ends meet).

84. Findere, fidi, fissum (Sk. bhid, Gr. φείδομαι sc. ἐμαυτόν, lit. I separate myself from; Germ. beissen, biss, etc., from which *bite*, *bit*, *bitters*), *fissile*, *fissure*, *fibre* (L. fibris for fidibris), *fillet* (Fr. filet, L. filum for fidilum), *filament*, *file* (the tool, and also a row), lit. something threaded, and *profile* (Ital. profilo, Span. perfil).

85. Flagrare (Sk. bhrâj, to shine; cf. bharga-s, splendor; Gr. φλέγω, I burn, I flame. Of same root are L. fulgere and fulmen for fulgimen, and L. flamen, a priest; Eng. *refulgent* and *fulminate*), *flagrant*, *conflagration*, *deflagrate*, *flame* (L. flamma for flagma; cf. Gr. φλέγμα, a flame, Eng. *phlegm*, lit. an inflammation), *inflammation*, *flambeau*, *flamingo* (named from its redness).

86. Fligere, to strike (πλήσσω, root πλαγ. Cf. L. plangere and, through Fr. complaindre, Eng. *complaint* and *plaint*, and also L. plectere, to beat or punish, and *plectrum*. See, also, plaga), *afflict*, *conflict*, *inflict*, *profligate* (L. profligare, to strike or dash to the ground), *flagellate*, and *flail* (L. flagellum, Germ. flegel), and *flog*.

87. Fluere, fluxum, to flow (Sk. plu, to flow, L. pluere, to rain. Cf. also L. flere, to weep, and Gr. φλύω, φλύζω, and φλέω, and also βλύω, I spout or bubble, and L. bulla, a bubble, and bullare, to boil, Eng. *boil* and *bubble*), *fluent*, *fluid*, *flow*, *flood* (L. fluctus, Germ. fluth), *float* (L. fluitare), *fluctuate*, *fleet* and *flotilla* (M. L. flotta, Fr. flotte), *flux*, *fluxions*, *affluent*, *confluent*, *conflux*, *effluence*, *efflux*, *influence*, *refluent*, *reflux*, *superfluous*.

88. Foris, door (Sk. dvâr and dvâra-m, Gr. ϑύρα, Germ. thür and thüre, Lith. durys, doors), *door*, *foreign* (Ital. foraneo, Fr. forain). *forest* (Ital. foresta, from fore and fuora, out of doors, L. foras), *forum* and *forensic* (L. forum, a large, open field, where elections were held, etc.). *Forage* also (Ital. foraggio) probably belongs here, (as being found without).

87. Frangere, fractum, to break (Sk. bhanj, Gr. ῥήγνυμι for Ϝρήγνυμι; Germ. brechen, brach gebrochen, from which Eng. words break, brake, and breach), *fragment*, *fracture*, *fraction*, *fractious* (disposed to break things), *fragile* and *frail* (L. fragilis, Fr. frêle, orig. fresle), *infraction*, *refrangible*, *refract*, *fringe* (M. L. frangia, Fr. frange).

88. Frigere, to be cold (Gr. φρίσσω for φρικίω. Cf. also ῥιγέω and L. rigere, Eng. rigid), *frigid*, *fresh* (L. frigidus, Ital. fresco, Germ. frisch, Fr. frais), the etymological idea being that of coolness; *freshet*, *freshman*, *refresh*, *fresco* (as being painted on fresh plaster), *refrigerator*, *freeze*, *froze*, and *frost* (Germ. frieren, fror, gefroren); *frisk* (i. e. to act fresh).

89. Frons, stem front, the forehead (Sk. bhru-s, Gr. ὀφρύς, *o* euphonic), *front*, *frontlet*, *frontispiece*, *frontier* (M. L. frontaria), *affront* (Ital. affrontare, Fr. affronter), *confront*, *effrontery*, *frown* (Fr. refrogner), *brow* (Germ. braune, as in augenbraune, eye-brows).

90. Fundere, fusum, to pour forth. (Cf. at least Gr. χέω, χεύσω, stem χυ; Sk. juhomi, perhaps. From χέω, the Gr. correspondent of fundere in sense, if not in identity of origin, comes Eng. *chemistry*, which should be spelled chymistry, Gr. χυμική, sc. τέχνη, lit. the pouring or mixing art; cf. also Gr. χημεία, Fr. chimie, and Germ. chymie, also Eng. alchemy —, al- being the Arabic article the. With χυτός, adj., poured forth, belongs L. gutta, a drop. The Germ. giessen, also, goes with Gr. χέω, χύσω, and its Eng. derivatives *gush*, Germ. gusz; *gust*; *ghost*, Germ. geist, like, for sense, L. spiritus, Eng. *spirit*, from spirare, to blow; *gas*, Germ. gase, with which cf. also gäschen, to foam up, and *yeast*). From fundere come *to found* (lit. to pour forth, i. e. liquid

metal), and *foundery*, *confound* (lit. to pour things together), *confuse* and *confusion*, *diffuse*, *effusion*, *profuse*, *réfuse* (noun), *suffuse*, and also *futile* (L. futilis, lit. poured, or pouring, away).

91. Fundus, the bottom of anything (Sk. budhna-s, the ground, Gr. *πυϑμήν* and *πύνδαξ*, the bottom of a vessel, Germ. boden, Eng. *bottom*), to *found* (i. e. establish), *foundation*, *fundament*, *fundamental*, *profound*, and *profundity* (L. profundus, Fr. profond), *fund* (lit. a sound money basis).

G.

92. Gelu, cold, frost (Sk. jala-s and jalita-s, cold), *gelid*, *glacier* (L. glacies), *glass* (L. glacies, Fr. glace, both ice and glass, Germ. glas. Cf. for sense, Gr. *κρύσταλλος* ice and a crystal), *glaze* and *glazier*, *congeal* (L. congelare), *chill* and *cold* (Germ. kalt). For phonetic connection of *chill* with Germ. kalt, cf. also Eng. child and Germ. kind.

93. Gamba, a leg (cf. Sk. gâ and gam, to go, with which it may be connected, Germ. gehen and Eng. *go*. From Germ. gehen, come also Eng. *gangway*, *gang*, and *gate*, Germ. gasse). From gamba come Eng. *gambol* (Fr. gambiller, lit. to frisk with the legs); *jamb* (Fr. jambe), *ham* (Span. jamon, j being pronounced as h in Spanish; Germ. hamme), *hammer* (Germ. hammer, the leg, a hammer. So, in Gr. *σφῦρα*, a hammer, compared with *σφυρόν*, the lower part of the leg, we have the same idea; and how exact is the resemblance in nature!)

94. Gerere, gestum, to bear; *germ* (L. germen. Cf. Lith. zelmen, a germ, from zelu, to grow), *germinate*, *gem* (L. gemma, an assimilated form of germa, the bud or eye of a plant), *gesture*, *gesticulate*, *congeries*, *congestion*, *digest*, *ingest*, *suggest* (cf. for style of form and sense, *succour*, L. succurrere, lit. to run under; *support*, and also Eng. *under*stand), *vicegerent*. Here belong, also, *exaggerate* (L. exaggerare = ex + agger, which is but ad + gerere), *augury* (L. augurium = avis + gerere, taken from the flight of birds), *inaugurate*.

95. Gignere, genitum, stem, gen, reduplicate, to beget, to bear (Sk. jan, to beget; cf. janitrî, a father; and Gr. *γεννάω*,

I beget, and γίγνομαι, stem γεν, redup. I become. Cf. also, γυνή, a woman, lit. a bearer, Sk. janî ; Lat. cunnus ; and also Eng. *quean* and *queen*), *genius* (lit. inborn talent), *ingenious ingenuous* (the heathen experience of the ancients was, that whatever fine dispositions any possessed, were born in them, and were matters of blood, rather than of personal virtue and effort), *genial* (by nature, the implication is again), *pregnant* (L. praegnans, lit. producing beforehand, cf. Gr. γεννάω), *progeny* and *progenitor* (L. progenies, etc.). From L. ingenium comes, also, *engine* (Fr. engin), referring, like *artillery*, from art to the idea of the mechanical talent displayed. From gen. root of gignere comes genus (Sk. janu-s, Gr. γένος, Germ. kind, and Eng. *kin*, *kindred*, *kind*, both noun and adj., *akin*, man*ikin*, and *child*), and from L. genus come Eng. *genus*, *genuine* (L. genuinus, lit. innate, natural), *generic*, *general*, *generous* (L. generosus, lit. of noble birth, and, by implication, of noble mind), *generate*, *degenerate*, *regenerate*, *gender* (L. genus, Fr. gendre). L. gens is, also, but a contraction of genus (cf. Sk. jâti, a family), from which are Eng. *gentile* (of another nation, to a Jew, than a Jew), *gentle*, and *gentleman*, and *genteel* (L. gentilis, lit. belonging to a family of character). So, in Fr., gentle and genteel are expressed by such words as *bien né*, well born, *de bonne famille*, of good family, *de bon genre*, of a good genus or kind.

96. Granum, grain, seed (Sk. gras, to devour, Gr. γράω and γραίνω, I devour, and γράστις, Eng. *grass*. Cf. L. gramen, grass, and Eng. *graminivorous*), *grain*, *granulated*, *ingrain*, *granary*, *ganite* (as being full of grains), *pomegranate* (L. pomum granatum, an apple full of grains), *garnet* (Span. granate, Ital. granato, Fr. grenat), *grenade* (Fr. do.).

97. Gratus, pleasing, agreeable (Sk. haryâmi, I love or desire, Gr. χαίρω, I rejoice, for χαρίω, stem χαρ, and χαρτός and χαρίεις), *grateful*, *gratify*, *grace* (L. gratia, Fr. grace), *gracious*, *disgrace* (lit. out of favor), *gratis* (L. do., for gratiis, lit. just for mere thanks), *ingrate*, *ingratitude*, *gratuitous* (L. gratuitus, done for mere thanks), *gratulate*, *congratulate*. Here, too, belong *agree* (Ital. aggradare, Span. agradar, Fr. agréer, M. L. aggreare), *agreeable* (Fr. agréable, Span. agradable, Ital. aggradevole).

H.

98. Habere, habitum, to have, hold, or keep (habere is probably allied with capere, to take, seize, hold; cf. Goth. hafjan, to take up, and haban, to have, as their similars, both for sense and origin; cf. Gr. *κάπτω* and *κάπη*, etc.), *have* (Germ. haben), *behave* (i. e. one's self, like Gr. *ἔχειν*, in the sense of to be; lit. to have one's self), *habit* (a cloak, as having it on) and *habit* (a custom, as having it permanently in one's life; cf. *custom* and *costume*, from L. consuetudo, stem consuetudin. So *industry* is from L. induo, I wear), *able* (L. habilis, Fr. habile, M. L. abilis), *inhabit, exhibit, inhibit, prohibit, rehabilitate.* From this same root come *debit* and *debt*, (from debere = dehibere, lit. to have from another, and so to owe to him), *devoirs* (Fr. devoir, to owe, part. dû), and *due* and *duty; debility* (L. debilis for dehabilis), *opprobrium* (L. do. = ob + probrum, for prohibrum), *avoirdupois* (Fr. do., lit. to have, avoir, some weight, du pois).

99. Haerere, haesum, to have, hold, or stick fast to (Sk. hri and har, to seize, to acquire; Gr. *αἱρέω*, I grasp, from which comes *αἵρεσις*, from which Eng. heresy, lit. a separate individual choice or course; cf. *ἀγρέω* and also *χείρ*, and old L. hir, the hand, and L. herus, a master, of same probable origin), *adhere, adhesive, cohere, inherent, hesitate* (lit. to stick much).

100. Heben, hob, gehoben (Germ.) to throw, to lift up on high; *heave, heft, heaven* (as being heaved or lifted above one. The L. coelum, Eng. *celestial*, Gr. *κοῖλος*, refers to the sky as a concave vault), *hoof* (Germ. huf), as being raised in walking, and *hop*,

101. Hora, a limited period of each day (*ὥρα*; cf. *ὅρος*, a limit, and *ὁρίζω*, I separate from, as a boundary, Eng. *horizon;* cf. Sk. vâra, time), *hour* (Fr. heure; cf. Fr. bonheur, happiness, lit. a good hour, and malheur — and also Germ. uhr, a watch[1]), *horologe* (L. horologium) and *horoscope* (+ Gr. *σκοπέω*).

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[1] The word for watch is in French montre, from montrer, to show (L. mons-

102. Hortus, a garden, lit. an enclosure (Sk. garhan, Gr. χόρτος, with which cf. L. cors and cohors, a *court* and a *cohort*, which were numbered originally by being packed within a given enclosure so as to fill it), *court* (Fr. cour), *courtier*, *courtly*, *courteous*, *courtesy*, *courtezan;* and also *garden* (Germ. garten) and *yard* (cf. for correspondence between Germ. garten and *yard*, also Germ. gestern and *yesterday*) and *horticulture* (L. hortus + colo).

I, J.

103. In, into, (orig. endo and indu, Sk. antar, within, Gr. ἔνδον, ἐνί, εἰς, for ἐντς and ἐντός, within), *in*, *into*, *within.* From intra (cf. contra, extra, etc., for form), an abl. form of orig. adj. interus, come *interior* (L. do.) and *intimate* (L. intimus, Sk. antara-s and antama-s), *intestine*, *internal*, *enter* (L. intro, intrare; cf. with the ending -tro, -trare of this verb, Sk. tar and tri, to pass on ~~or~~ to).

104. Ire, itum, to go (Sk. i, to go, Gr. εἶμι,, stem ι reduplicated), *itinerant* (L. iter, a journey), *reiterate*, *ambition* (lit. going around, as a candidate), *circuit* (circum +), *coition*, *exit*, *initial* and *initiate*, *obituary* (L. obitus, a departure), *perish* and *peril* (L. perire, lit. to go through, as in a circle, and L. periculum, dim.), *praetor* (L. do. = prae + itor) *preterite* (L. praeteritus, lit. passed by), *sudden* (Fr. soudain, L. subitaneus), *transit.* From ambire, to go around or about, comes L. ambulare (cf. L. postulare from poscere, and ustulare from urere), and from this come *amble*, *ambulatory* and *perambulate*, and *ambulance* (because the horses that draw it walk). From L. ambulare comes Fr. aller, and from this *alley* (cf. for sense, *gangway*, from Germ. gehen, to go). Several Latin suffixes, with their English correspondents, radicate also in the Latin stem i of ire, to go: as es, itis — as L. comes, a companion (= L. cum + ire), Eng. *count* (= comes belli); -itio(n) — as in editio, Eng.

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trare); in Italian, oriulo and orologio, cont. from L. horologium; in Spanish, loj, from same word. In English, *watch* represents a time-piece, acting as a sentinel of the passing hours.

edition; -iter — as in L. breviter, Eng. *briefly;* and itus — as in divinitus, etc.

105. Jacere, jeci, jactum, to cast or throw (Sk. yâpayâmi, caus. form of ya, to go, I let go, or send; cf. also *ἰάπτω*, I send forth, *ἰάλλω*, I throw, as well as *ἵημι*, I send, stem *ἵ*, Sk. ya, reduplicated). Here belong Eng. *abject* (lit. cast away), *adjective*, *conjecture*, *dejected*, *eject*, *inject*, *interjection*, *óbject* and *objéct*, *próject* and *projéct* and *projectile*, *reject*, *subject*, *ejaculate*, *javelin* (L. jaculum Fr. javeline), *jet* (Fr. jeter, L. jactare, freq. form of jacere).

106. Jocus, a jest, a joke (perhaps for djocus, and so correlate with Sk. div, to play, Lith. jukas, a jest), *joke*, *jocose*, *jocund*, *jocular*, *juggle* (L. joculari, Germ. gaukeln), *jeu d'esprit* (an anglicized French phrase), *jewel* (M. L. jocale, Fr. joyau, Germ. juwel).

107. Jubere, jussum, for jubsum, to ordain (probably a modified form of Sk. yu, to bind, oblige, etc.), *just* (L. justus), *unjust*, *injure* (L. injuria = in jus, contrary to right, which in the word jus is viewed as statutory in its nature; as in their very etymology law, right, fate, are all viewed as matters of formal appointment), *justice*, *justiciary*, *jury*, *juridical*, *jurisdiction*, *jurisconsult*, and also *abjure*, *adjure*, *conjure*, *perjure*, *judge*, (L. judex = jus + dicere), and *judgment* and *ajudicate*, *objurgation* (L. objurgare = ob + jurgo = jus + ago, like purgo = purum + ago).

108. Jungere, junctum, to join (Sk. yuj, yunj, and yunaj, to bind together, Gr. *ζεύγνυμι*, I join, simple stem *ζυγ*, as in *ζύγον* and *ζυγόω*), *juncture*, *join* (Fr. joindre, part. joint), *joiner* and *joint*, *adjoin*, *adjunct*, *conjoin*, *conjunction*, *disjoin*, *enjoin*, *injunction*, *rejoinder*, *subjoin*, *subjunctive*. From jugum, of which jungere is but a strengthened form, come *conjugal*, *conjugate* (L. conjux), *yoke* (Sk. yugam, equal, Gr. *ζύγον*, L. jugum, Germ. joch, Lith. jungas), *yeoman*. Here belongs also L. juxta, near by, and Eng. *just* (adv.), *adjust* (M. L. adjuxtare, Fr. ajuster).

K.

109. *Καίω, καύσω*, I burn, *caustic, encaustic, ink* (L. encaustum, lit. burned in, Fr. encre), *inkling, holocaust* (+ Gr. ὅλος, the whole).

110. Kneifen and kneipen (Germ.), to press, squeeze, or force, *knife* (Germ. kneif, Fr. canif), *nib, nip,* (Germ. nippen), *nibble, sniff.*

111. *Κοῖλος*, hollow (cf. Sk. kal, to be hollow, to resound). From same root with κοῖλος is L. coelum, heaven (lit. the concave overhead), Eng. *celestial*, and L. caelare, to engrave or hollow out with art, Eng. *ceiling*, (Span. cielo). The Germ. hohl, hollow, is of the same radication with Gr. κοῖλος and L. coelum, from which come Eng. *hollow, hole, hell* (Germ. hölle, a pit), or, "the pit." *Holland* is also the hollow land; cf. word Netherlands.

112. *Κώμη*, a village (as being inhabited; probably connected with κεῖμαι, I am quiet or at ease, and κοιμάω, I put to sleep; cf. also κωμοῦμαι, I fall to sleep. For correspondence in analytic sense, cf. L. vicus, a village, with its etymological *homoionym* οἰκία). From κώμη comes probably κῶμος, a village festivity or merrymaking, from which is κωμῳδία, a *comedy* (lit. a village song). Here, too, belongs Germ. heim (Ang. Sax. ham), Eng. *home* and *hamlet* (viewed etymologically as places of repose).

L.

113. Lacere, to draw, entice, or allure (Gr. ἕλκω, For transposition of form, cf. rapere and ἁρπάζω, as well as forma and μορφή), *allective, delicious* (L. deliciae), *delectable* (L. delectare), *delicate, elicit,* and perhaps *solicit* and *solicitous* (so, in such a case, being the insep. prep. se, apart).

114. Latus, broad, for (p)latus (Sk. pratha-s, breadth, Gr. πλατύς and Lith. platus, broad, Germ. platt, from which come Eng. *plate, platitude, plat, platform, flat, blade,* Germ. blatt, a leaf, as being flat, *bladder*; cf. also Gr. πλάξ, anything broad, Fr. planche, Eng. *plank*, and Gr. πλακοῦς, L. placenta, Eng. *placenta*), *latitude, oblate* (not from L. offerre,

sup. oblatum, but ob + latus). For correspondence of latus and πλατύς, cf. L. lavare, to wash, and Sk. plavaya. Of same origin with πλατύς is πλάτανος, the *plane*-tree and *plantain*, and also πλάσσω, I model or form, Eng. *plastic*, and ἔμπλαστρον, a *plaster*, as being daubed or spread over, from ἐμπλάσσω, I daub over.

115. Laxus, wide, loose, open; and laxare, to open, unloose, slacken; Eng. *lax*, *laxity*, *relax*, *lease* (L. laxare, Fr. laisser), *release*, *let* (Germ. lassen), *lash* (Fr. laisse), viewed as hanging loose, *leisure* (Fr. loisir, from laxus; cf. loi and roi, from lex and rex).

116. Legere, lectum (Gr. λέγω). Both words agree in the same fundamental sense, viz. to pick out or up. The Gr. λέγω often means I say, and the L. lego, I read (the figure in each case being that of picking up with the eye or voice the letters and sounds of words), *legend* (lit. something worthy to be read), *legible*, *lecture*, *lesson* (L. lectio, Fr. leçon), *collect*, *elect*, *eligible*, *elite* (Fr. do.), *recollect*, *select*, *diligent* (L. diligere = dis + legere, lit. to choose a thing apart or by itself; cf. for sense *study*, from studium, zeal), and *delight* (L. diligere, as above); *elegant*, (lit. picked out from others. For change of conjugation, cf. *educate*, from educere, to lead out or away from); *intelligent* (= L. intus + legere, lit. to pick up from among, or, to *comprehend*, which also means lit. to hold together in one's hand); *negligent* (= nec + legere, lit. not to pick up, or to be inattentive); *religion* (L. religio, lit. reading over and over again, or pondering, i. e. the things of the gods; cf. for sense superstitio, lit. the standing over a thing inquiringly); *legion* (lit. a selected band), *college* (L. collegium, an assembly). From legere comes, also, legare, as an intensive form of it, meaning to choose, appoint, or send out, i. e. as deputy or ambassador; and from legare come *legation*, *legatee*, *legacy*, *allegation*, and *allege* (Fr. alleguer), *colleague* (collega), *litter* (L. lectica, lit. something for picking up and carrying one, Fr. litiere). From legare, to appoint, come L. lex, law, and its derivatives *legal*, *legitimate*, *legislate*, *law*, and *loyal* (Fr. loi, cf. Fr. roi, a king, Eng. royal, from rex), *disloyalty*, *alloy* (Fr.

aloi, lit. mixed according to law or standard requirement, i. e. ad legem; cf. for sense, *ordnance*, lit. guns made according to governmental requirements). With legere must also be connected L. locus, a place (lit. a spot selected or taken); cf. Gr. λέγω and λόχος, a place for lying in wait, and L. modus with metiri, and socius with sequi. From locus come *locate*, *locality*, *locomotion*, *collocate*, and *dislocate; lodge* (L. locare, i. e. se, one's self, Fr. loger; cf. Fr. juger, Eng. judge, from L. judicare, and Fr. venger from L. vindicare), *dislodge; lieu* (Fr. do., L. locus; cf. Fr. feu, fire, and L. focus and Fr. peu, L. paucus), and *lieutenant* (Fr, lieu + tenant, part. of tenir, to hold); *loan* (L. locare, Fr. louer); *couch* (Fr. coucher, L. collocare, sc. se, one's self. For analytic sense, cf. L. phrase, componere membra, to lie down), *accouchment* (Fr. do.), *lucre, and lucrative* (L. lucrum, gain, from L. locare, to loan, i. e. with usury), *allow* (Fr. allouer). From λέγω, the Gr. correspondent of legere, and λόγος its derivative, come *logic*, *analogue* and *analogy*, *apologue* and *apology*, *dialogue*, *prologue*, *geology*, *syllogism*, *theology*, *teleology*, etc., etc.

117. Levare, to lift up, and levis, light (Sk. laghu-s, light, Lith. lengvas, easy, Gr. ἐλαχύς, ε being euphonic), *lever*, *leaven* (Fr. levain, from lever, to raise), *levee* (Fr. do.), *lift*, *levity*, *alleviate* (M. L. alleviare, from L. levis, light), *relieve* (Fr. relever and relief), *bas-relief*, *elevate* (L. elevare), *aloft*, *aloof*, *loft*, and *lofty* (Germ. luft, luften, etc.). Here, too, belong *sublime* (L. sublimis, contracted from sublevamis), the *Levant* (Fr. se levant, part. of se lever, sc. le soleil; cf. oriens, sc. sol, Eng. *orient*), and the adj. *light* (Germ. leicht, Gr. ἐλαχύς, etc.).

118. Libet and lubet, it is pleasing (Sk. lubh, to desire, and lubdha-s, desirous, Gr. λίπτομαι, I am eager for, Goth. liub), *libidinous* (L. libido), *love* (Germ. lieben), and *lief* (Germ. lieb). Cf. also, Gr. λάω, I wish, and λῷστος (Germ. lust. desire, and Eng. *lust*, base desire). To this same class of roots belongs L. liber, free (for liberus, archaic loebesus, Gr. ἐλεύθερος, ε being euphonic, lit. having one's own way). From liber come *liberty*, *liberate*, *liberal*, *libertine* (lit. freeing

one's self from all restraint; cf. Liber, as a name for Bacchus), *livery* (Fr. livrée, from livrer, to deliver or give freely, because given to servants without charge to them), *deliver* (Fr. delivrer, Span. librar). The L. liberi, children (Gr. ἐλεύϑεροι), means lit. free persons, i. e. neither slaves nor citizens, but free.

119. Ligare, to bind (Sk. lag, to cleave to, and ling, to embrace; cf. also, laj, to clothe or cover. Here belongs Ang. Sax. laecan, to take, to lay hold of, Eng. *leech*; cf. also with Sk. ling and lag, Gr. λύγος, a pliant rod, Lith. lugnas, pliant, and Gr. λυγίζω, I bend, or twist, etc.), *ligature*, *ligament*, *alligation*, *ally* and *alliance* (Fr. lier and allier, from L. ligare and alligare), *lien* (Fr. do., L. ligamentum), *allegiance* (M. L. allegiantia), *oblige* (L. obligare), *rely* (Fr. lier and relier, L. religare, to bind one's self back to or upon), *liege* (Fr. lige). Here belong, also, *league* (Fr. ligue) and *colleague*.

120. Linere, levi, and livi, litum, to daub, anoint, smear (Sk. limpâmi, I anoint, stem, lip; Lith. limpu, I anoint, infin. lipti, to glue, or stick; Gr. ἀλείφω, I daub, cf. λίπας, fat, oil), *liniment*, *letter* (L. litera, for linitera, from being made in wax by the stylus), *literary*, *literature*, *belles lettres* (lit. fine letters or writings), *alliterative*, *obliterate*.

121. Lingere, to lick, to lick up,; cf. L. ligurire (Sk. lih, for ligh, and rih, to lick, Gr. λείχω, I lick, and λιχμάω, I am dainty), *lick* (Ital. leccare, Germ. lecken, Fr. lecher), *relish* (lit. to lick up again), *lingual* (L. lingua, the tongue), *linguist*, *language* (Fr. langue and langage).

122. Linquere, lictum, to leave, stem, lic (Sk. ric; cf. for correspondence of form, L. rumpere, ruptum, with Sk. lup and lump, to break; Gr. λείπω, stem λιπ; Germ. erlauben and glauben, for ge-lauben, to believe), *leave*, *believe* (lit. to leave with or to another), *relinquish*, *relic*, *delinquent*, *derelict*. So *live* (Germ. leben) and *life* (Germ. leib) are probably of the same origin with *leave*. Cf. also, Germ. bleiben, to remain, for beleiben.

123. Linum, flax, linen (Gr. λίνον and λίνεος), *linen*, *linseed*, *lint*, *line* and *outline*, *lineage*, *linear*, *lineal*, *lineament* (L. lineamentum), *lining*, *delineate*

124. Longus, long, for (d)longus (Sk. dîrgha-s, Gr. δολιχός), *long*, *longitude*, *longevity* (+ aevum), *elongate*, *oblong*, *prolong*, *lounge* (Fr. longer, to move idly about), *loin* and *surloin* (Fr. longe and surlonge). *Loiter* is doubtless also from L. longus (Fr. loin), representing such a Latin word as longitare, to make long about anything. Of same root with L. longus, is Gr. λαγγάζω (in Aeschylus, λογγάζω), I slacken, and λαγγών, a loiterer, from which come Eng. *lag*, and perhaps *slack* (Germ. schlackern), and also *lank* (Germ. lang, long), and *languor*, *languid*, and *languish* (L. languere).

125. Luere, to wash, to lave (Sk. plu, Gr. λούω, I wash, λύθρον, a stream, and λουτρόν, a bath ; cf. pluere and fluere, as of same radication), *alluvial* (L. alluvio), *diluvial*, and *deluge* (L. diluvies, Fr. deluge) ; *pollute* (L. pollutus, for prolutus, washed off or away, like polliceri, for proliceri, referring to the filth itself removed), and *lustration* (L. lustrum, a purification, — the idea of purification being in all nations connected with either fire or water).

126. Lux, light (Sk. lauka-s, brightness, Lith. laukas, white, and Gr. λευκός, bright, and λύχνος, a lamp), *lucid*, *pellucid* (L. pellucidus = perlucidus), *translucent*, *lucifer* (+ fero), *lucubrations* (L. lucubrare, lit. to compose by lamplight), *luminary*, *luminous*, and *illuminate* (L. lumen, for lucimen), *sublunary*, *lunatic*, and *loon* (luna, for lucina), *light* (L. lux, Germ. licht ; cf. Gr. νύξ, L. nox, Germ. nacht, and Eng. night, for correspondence of form). Here, too, belong *illustrious* (L. illustris = in luce), *illustrate*, and *lustre* (Fr. lustre). Here radicate, also, Gr. λεύσσω, for orig. λευκιω, Germ. lugen, Eng. *look;* cf. also λάω, I see, and λαμπάς, Eng. *lamp*.

M.

127. Machinari, to make or contrive (Sk. mah, to prepare, and magh, to practise, Gr. μηχανάομαι), *machination*, *machine* (L. machina), *mechanic*, *make* (Germ. machen), *mason* (Fr. maçon).

128. Magnus, great (Sk. mahat, for maghat, great, Gr. μέγας, with sup. of which, μέγιστος, cf. Germ. meist and Eng.

most; and with μεγάλη, fem. form of μέγας, cf. Germ. michel, Eng. *mickle*. Cf. also with magnus and μέγας L. mactus, increased, etc., and maturus, for macturus, Eng. *mature*. The various root forms of the different correlate words here adduced, and of others like them, are, on a rising scale for strength, mak, mag, and magh (for which also, mah), *magnate*, *magnitude*, *magnify*, *magistrate*, *magisterial* (L. magister), *majesty* (L. majestas), *master* and *mister* (L. magister, Span. maestro and maestre, Fr. maître, Germ. meister). From major (comp. for magior) come *major*, *mayor* (Span. mayor, greater), and from sup. maximus, Eng. *maxim* (lit. very great or important truths).

129. Malus, evil (Sk. mala-s, filth; cf. Sk. malina-s, dirty, black, malishta-s, very foul, and malâkâ, a bad woman), *malice*, *malignant* (cf. benignant, from L. bonus), *malady* (Fr. maladie), *malaria*, *malefactor*, *malevolent*, *malcontent*, *malfeasance* (Fr. faire, from L. facere, part. faisant), *malapropos* (Fr. do. = L. male ad propositum).

130. Manus, the hand (prob. connected with Sk. mâ, to measure, referring to the hand, as the mode of man's trying things, and operating his will upon them; cf. Gr. μάρη, the hand, εὐμαρής, easy of hand, and also μανιάκης, an armlet: cf. also L. immanis, huge, i. e. beyond the measure of the hand), *manual*, *manacle* (cf. *fetters* and *feet* for form of connection), *manage* (+ L. agere), *maniple* (L. manipulus, like discipulus, from discere) and *manipulate*, *manifest* (for festus, obs. by itself, see Gr. φάω, I shine, and φαιστός, clear), *emancipate* (= e manu capere), *manumit* (= e manu mittere), *maintain* (Fr. maintenir = L. in manu tenere), *legerdemain* (Fr. do., for legerté de, etc. Leger, adj., is the L. alacer, Ital. allegro), *amanuensis*, *manoeuvre* (Fr. do., = L. manus + opera), *manufacture* (+ L. facere), *manuscript* (+ scribere), to *manure* (Norman mainoverer, to manure = Fr. manoeuvrer, referring to the labor of doing it. The noun manure is derived from the verb), *mandate* (L. mandare = in manu dare), *demand* (= de + mandare), *remand* and *commend* (L. commendare) and *recommend*.

131. Mater, a mother (Sk. mâtâ, for orig. mâtar, lit. a

bringer forth. Gr. μητήρ; cf. also μαῖα, good mother, Lith. moti), *maternal*, *matriculate*, *matron* (cf. patron from pater), *matrimony*, *mother* (Germ. mutter), *matter* (L. materies; cf. Sk. mátrá, a substance), *material*, *matrix*, *mare* (L. mater, Fr. mére; cf. dam, also applied to animals, for style of formation, L. domina, Fr. dame; and with it, in respect to special appropriation, also pup and puppy, from pupus a young child).

132. Matta, a mat made of rushes; *mat*, *mattrass* (Germ. matratse, M. L. almatricium, al- being the Arabic article, as in almanack, algebra, etc., Fr. matelas), *mead* and *meadow* (viewed as a sort of natural matting of grass).

133. Merere, meritum, to deserve, earn, to serve for pay (a military use of it) (cf. Gr. μείρομαι, μέρος, and μερίζω), *merit*, *demerit*, *meretricious* (L. meretrix, lit. a female who puts herself on hire). From merere comes merces, a reward, and mercari, to trade, and Eng. *mercantile*, *mercenary*, *amerce*, *commerce*, *merchant* (Fr. marchand), *market* and, contracted, *mart* (Fr. marché, Germ. markt).

134. Metiri, mensus, to measure (Sk. mâ, to measure; Gr. μετρέω, from which Eng. *metre*, Gr. μέτρον and Sk. mâtrá, measure, and *geometry*, and also *barometer*, *thermometer*, etc.), *mete* and *metes*, *measure*, *mensuration*, *dimension*, *immense*, *menstruum* and *menstruate* (L. mensis, a month, Sk. más and mása-s, Gr. μήν, stem μήνς, as appears by Ionic form μείς, compared with L. mensis and Lith. menesis). The word *moon* is of this same origin, Gr. μήνη, Germ. monat and mond; it is etymologically the *measurer* of the month, which is, itself, the *measure* made; cf. Lith. metas, time. From metiri comes L. modus (like toga from tegere, and vortex from vertere), and from this, Eng. *mode*, *modish*, *modest*, *modify*, *moderate*, *modulate*, *modern* (lit. of the present mode), *model* and *mould* (M. L. modela, Fr. moule), *commode*, *commodious* and *commodity*, *accommodate*, *incommode*. L. mos, a custom, is a contraction of modus (cf. L. praecox for praecoquus), from which are *moral*, *moralize*, *demoralize*, and *immoral*. With L. metiri, mensus, corresponds also Germ. messen, to measure, and masz, Eng. *mass* (as an

indefinite measure, and *mess* (as definite); cf. Fr. mets and Lith. mera, a measure. With Sk. mâ, and Gr. με in μετρέω, are connected also, perhaps, Gr. μιμέομαι, Eng. *mimic* and *pantomime*, and also L. imitari and imago, Eng. *imitate* and *image*.

135. Mirus, wonderful, and mirari, to admire (Sk. smi, to smile, Gr. μειδιάω, I laugh); *admire*, *miracle*, *mirage* (Fr.), *mirror* (Fr. miroir), *marvel* (L. mirabile, Fr. merveille).

136. Miscere, mixtum, to mix (Sk. miçra, to mingle, Gr. μίγνυμι. μίξω, Lith. miszti), *mix* (Germ. mischen), *mingle* (Germ. mengen), *among* and *mongrel*, *commingle* and *intermingle*, *miscellaneous* (L. miscellaneus), *mule* and *mulatto* (as being of mixed stock, L. mulus, for misculus).

136. Mittere, missum, to send (cf. μεϑίημι, and, in Herodotus, μετιέω, I let loose, I throw; with which cf. metus, fear, a possible derivative), *missive*, *missile*, *mission*, *missionary*, *message* (Fr. do.; Span. mensaje), *messenger* (Fr. messager), *mass* and *missal* (Germ. messe; Fr. messe; M. L. missa — from the words of dismission formerly used at its close, viz.: "ite, *missa* est concio"), *admit*, *inadmissible*, *amiss*, *commit*, *committee*, *demit*, *demise*, *dismiss*, *emit*, *emissary*, *intermit*, *omit*, *permit*, *premise*, *premiss*, *pretermit*, *promise* (lit. to send one's word forwards). Polliceri, to promise; for proliceri means to offer beforehand. Versprechen, in German, to promise, means to speak one's word away), *remit*, *remiss*, *submit*, *surmise*, *transmit*.

137. Molere, to grind in a mill (Gr. μύλλω, I crush, and μύλη, a mill, Germ. mahlen, Gothic, malan, Lith. melu), *mill*, *molar*, *meal* (Germ. mahl), *mellow* (Germ. mehlig, mealy, and mellow).

138. Moles, a huge, heavy mass: *mole*, *demolish*, *molest* (L. molestus, troublesome), *emolument* (L. emoliri, to work out or forth. The same idea of *forth* is also in the words *effort* and *exertion*), *amulet* (L. amoliri, to remove from). Here belongs L. multus, orig. moltus and molitus. Cf. stultus, cont. from stolidus. From multus come *multiply* (+ L. plicare), and *multitude*, and *much* (Span. mucho).

139. Mollis, soft (Gr. μάλακος, cf. μῶλυς, dull, and μαλλός,

wool, as being soft, and *μαλάσσω*, I soften, from which Eng. *melt*, Germ. schmelzen and *smelt*, and also *malt*, Germ. malz, which is barley steeped in water), *mollify*, *emolient*, and *mulch*.

140. Monere, to remind, warn, or teach (Sk. man, to think; Germ. mahnen, to remind and meinen, to *mean*; L. memini, reminiscor, memoria. Minerva and mens, stem ment, the *mind*, with which compare Sk. mati, the mind, and also Sk. mana-s, Gr. *μένος*, Lith. menas; and Gr. *μνάομαι* and *μιμνήσκω* and *μανϑάνω*, and also Germ. mensch and mann and man, Eng. *man*), *monition*, *monitory*, *monument*, *admonish*. From monere comes also L. monstrare, to point out, show ect., and from this, *monster* (L. monstrum, lit. an evil omen from the gods), *monstrosity*, *demonstrate*, *remonstrate*.

141. Movere, motum, to move, remove (Sk. mê. to change place, Gr. *ἀμείβω*, Doric *ἀμεῦω*. Cf. L. meare, to go on, by, etc.), *move*, *motion*, *mobile*, *moment*, *momentum* and *momentous* (L. momentum for movimentum), *motive* (Fr. motif), *commotion*, *emotion*, *remove*, *remote*. From movere comes mutare (for movitare), and from this, *mutable*, *commute*, *permutation*, *transmute* and *mutual* (L. mutuus, cf. Gr. *μοῖτος*, Sicil. dialect, borrowed from Latin).

142. Munis, grateful, obliging (Sk. mû, to tie or bind. Cf. for sense, Eng. obliging; Gr. *ἀμείνων*, better. Cf. L. amoenus), *immunity*, *municipal* (= munia + capere), *munificent* (+ facere. to do), *common* (communis), *commonwealth*, *community*, *communion*, *communicate*.

143. Mus, a mouse (Sk. mûsha-s and mushika-s, a mouse, lit. a stealing animal, from mush, to steal; Gr. *μῦς*, Germ, maus), mouse, pl. mice; *muscle* (L. musculus, dimin.; lit. a little mouse, i. e. in motion; Germ. muskel, the flesh of animals).

144. Mutire, to mutter or mumble (Gr. *μύζω*, I mutter, or make a sound with the lips closed), *mute*, *mutter*, *mouth* (Germ. mund), *muzzle* (Fr. museau), *muse* (Fr. muser), referring to the abstract air of one humming to himself, while he thinks), *amuse* (Fr. amuser). To the common root of all this class of words, which are indeed quite onomatopoetic in their nature, belong also *mumble* (Germ. mummeln), *mum* and *mumps* (viewed as shutting up the mouth).

N.

145. Navis, a ship (Sk. nâu-s, Gr. ναῦς), *navy*, *navigate* (+ agere), *nautilus*, *nautical* (L. nauta), *nausea* (L. do.).

146. Nocere, to harm or hurt (Sk. naç, to perish, and causative nâçâyami, I injure, destroy, etc.), *noxious*, *innocent*, *innocuous*, *noise* (L. noxa, Fr. noise), *nuisance* (Fr. nuire and nuisance), *annoy* (Ital. annojare), *ennuie* (Fr. ennuyer, to annoy).

147. Noscere, notum, orig. gnoscere, root gno, to know (Sk. jnâ, jânâmi, I know; Gr. γιγνώσκω, root γνο; and νοέω and νοῦς, the mind; Germ. können, to be able, lit. to know how, Eng. *can* and *cunning*), *know*, *notion*, *noble* (L. nobilis, for noscibilis, lit. worthy to be known), *ignoble* (= in + (g)nobilis), *ignorant* (= in + (g)norans; cf. Gr. γνωρίζω), *cognizant* and *connoisseur* (Fr. connaître, from M. L. cognoscitare), *recognize*. From notare, a freq. form of noscere, come *note*, *notable*, *notorious*, *notice*, *annotation*, *denote*, *notify*. From L. nomen, a name, from same root (Sk. naman, Gr. ὄνομα, from which comes *anonymous*), come *name* (Germ. name), *namely* (Germ. nämlich), *noun* (Fr. nom), *pronoun* (cf. for sense, Germ. fürwort, or for-word), *nominal*, *pronominal*, *nominate*, *denominate*, *nomenclature* (+ L. calare, to call), *renown* (Fr. renommé, lit. mentioned over and over again), *ignominy* (L. ignominia = in + (g)nomen). Of same ultimate root with (g)noscere is L. narrare (Old L. gnarigare) Eng. *narrate*.

148. Novus, new (Sk. nava-s, Gr. νέος for νέFος, Lith. navas and naujas), *new* (Fr. neu), *novel*, *novelette*, *novitiate*, *innovate*, *renovate*; *anew* (cf. for form L. denuo, for de novo), *renew*, *news*. From L. nuncius (for orig. novencius, like nundinus, for novendinus, from novem) come *nuncio*, *announce*, *denounce*, and *pronounce*.

O.

149. *Οἰκία*, house; from which *economy* (Gr. οἰκονομία), *oecumenial* (οἰκουμένη), *diocese* (Gr. διοίκησις), *parish* (Gr. παροικία, Fr. paroisse, Germ. pfarrei), *parochial*, *parson* (Germ. pfarrer, Ital. parroco).

150. Ὅλος, the whole (Oscan sollus, Sk. sarva-s), *whole*, *hail* (lit. be well, Germ heilen), *heal* and *health* (Germ. heil), *holy* (Germ. heilig), *catholic* (καϑολικός, universal), *catholicon.*

151. Oriri, ortus, to rise (Sk. ar and ri, to lift up one's self; Gr. ὄρνυμι, ὀρίνω, and ὀρούω), *orient* and *oriental* (see levare), *origin*, *originate*, *original*, *aborigines*, *abortion* (L. aboriri, lit. to set, as the stars do, to fail), *east* (Germ, ost, L. ortus), *Easter* (Germ. Ostern), the festival of Christ's resurrection. *Austria* (lit. the eastern land, i. e. east of Neustria, the western division of Gaul at that time).

152. Os, oris, the mouth, and orare, to pray, beseech, etc. (Sk. asja, from as, to breathe, Gr. ὄσσα, a voice, report, etc.), *oral*, *oracle*, *oration*, *orison* (L. oratio, Fr. oraison), *adore*, *inexorable*, *peroration*, *omen* and *ominous* (omen being for osmen, the archaic form; cf. for sense, monstrum), *abominate* (L. abominari, lit. to deprecate as an evil omen).

P.

153. Pacisci, pactus, to arrange, settle, fix (Sk. paç, to bind, and paçayâmi, I bind; Gr. πήγνυμι, stem παγ. Pangere, pactum is a nasalized form of same root. With part. pactus of pacisci, cf. πηκτός and Sk. paçita-s and pankta-s, for form. With pangere is connected also Germ. fangen, Eng. fangs and fingers, Goth. fahan). From pacisci comes L. pax, peace (peace anciently being viewed as, in the very mind itself, a covenant), Eng. *peace*, *pacify*, *pacific*, *pay* (L. pacare, to pacify. Span. pagar, Fr. payer). To the same etymological source with pacisci, pax, pangere, and pignus belongs also L. pecu, a flock (Sk. paçu-s, and L. pecus, a sheep). From pecus is Eng. *pecuniary* (flocks and herds were the first generally recognized form of convertible property. The image of a sheep or ox was also stamped on the first specimens of coin). *Peculiar* (L. peculium, lit. property in cattle, and afterwards personal and then private property) and *peculate* (L. peculari, to steal public funds). With pecus is correlate Germ. vieh, cattle, wealth, Goth.

faihu, Ang. Sax. feoh, Old Eng. feh, Eng. *fee;* cf. also. *feoff* and *feud.*

154. Pandere, passum, to spread out (cf. Gr. πετάννυμι, stem πετ, and Sk. pat), *expand, expanse, pass* (Fr. passer), *passage, passenger, passably, passport, compass* (Ital. compasso and compassare), *trespass* (+ Fr. trés, L. trans, over), *surpass* (+ Fr. sur, L. super), *pace* (L. passus, Fr. pas).

155. Par, equal (prob. correlate with Gr. παρά, Epic παρ, alongside of; cf Eng. *par*allel and *para*ble, from Gr. παρά and ἀλλήλων and βάλλω, in each of which παρά expresses the very idea of equality), *par, parity, pair, impair* (L. impar, unequal), *disparage* (M. L. disparagere), *peer* (Fr. pair), *peerless, compeer, nonpareil,* or, none such, (M. L. pariculus, Fr. pareil). From Gr. παρά come, besides *parallel* and *parable,* as above, also *paradox* (παράδοξος, contrary to expectation), *paradigm* (παράδειγμα, a sample or copy), *paragraph* (παραγραφή, a marginal note), *paralysis* (παράλυσις, a loosening apart), *parapet* (παραπέτασμα, a covering or screen), *parasite* (παράσειτος, one who eats at the same table), *paraphrase* (παραφράζω, I speak by the side of another). So the French words, parapluie, paravent, and parasol, Eng. *parasol,* different names for an umbrella (lit. a little shade, dimin. of L. umbra), as used for the different purposes of warding off the rain, the wind, and the sun, are derived from the same source. There is, however, an objectionable mixture here of Greek and Latin elements in the same compound. From παρά, also, and βάλλω come, not only the obvious derivatives *parabola* and *parable* (Gr. παραβολή), but also *palaver* (M. L. parabola, Span. palabra, Portuguese palavra), *parley, parlance,* and *parliament* (M. L. parabolare, Fr. parler), and *parole* (Fr. parole) and *parlor* (Fr. parloir).

156. Parere, partum, to bring forth or about (Sk. bhar, to bear, Germ. bären, Eng. *bear.* Cf. Gr. φέρω and L. fero), *parent, parturition.* From aperire (= L. ab + parere) come *aperient, aperture, April* (L. Aprilis, the month for *opening* or ploughing the ground), *apricot* (L. apricus, sunny: the apricot demands much sun), *open* (L. aperire, Fr. ouvrir), *overt* and *overture* (Fr. ouvert, part. of ouvrir), *cover* and

covert (L. coöperire, Fr. couvrir, part. couvert), *cope*, (L. coöperire, Ital. coprir).

157. Pars, a part, stem part (Sk. prî and par, to press through or out, lit. cut out or off; L. per, through, prep. is correlate with Sk. prî, also, as well as L. porta, a gate, and Gr. *περάω*, I go through. Cf. Sk. param, beyond, and L. perendie = per, beyond or after, unam diem, one day, day after to-morrow), *part*, *partner*, *party*, *partial*, *partition*, *particle* (L. particula, diminutive, a little part), *particular*, *participate* (+ capere); *apart*, *apartment*, *depart* (Fr. partir), *department*, *impart*, *partake* (= part + take), *parcel* (Fr. parcelle, L. particula).

158. Pater, a father (Sk. pitâ, stem pitar, from pâ, to nourish, Gr. *πατήρ*. Cf. for origin, L. pascere, pastum, to feed, Gr. *πατέομαι*, Eng. *pasture* and *pastor*), *paternal*, *patriarch*, *patrician*, *patron*, *patrimony*, *patrial* (L. patria, one's father-land, as in Germ. vaterland), *patriot*, and *father* (Germ. vater).

159. *Πειράομαι*, I try (of same probable origin with *περάω*, I go through), *pirate* (*πειρατής*, lit. an adventurer), *experience* (L. experiri, to make trial of a thing), *experiment*, *expert* (" practice makes perfect"), *empiric* (Gr. *ἐμπείρικος*).

160. Pellere, pulsum, to drive, to drive away (*πάλλω*; cf. *πάλη*, wresting, and *παλματίας*, an earthquake. Here, also, belongs, perhaps, *παλάμη*, the hand, L. palma, Eng. *palm* and *palmate*, shaped like the hand. Cf. L. palpare. See *βάλλω*), *compel*, *expel*, *impel* and *impulse*, *propel*, *repel* and *repulsive*, *pulse* and *pulsation*; *appeal* (L. appellare, freq. form) *appellative*, *repeal*; *push* (Fr. pousser, L. pulsare).

161. Pellis (Gr. *πέλλα*, a hide or leather; cf. *ἄπελος* and *ἐρυσίπελας*, *erysipelas*, redness of skin), *peel* (Germ. pelle and pelzen, to peel), *pelt* and *peltry* (Germ. pelz), *pelisse* (Fr. do.; cf. also, Fr. pelerine), *felt* (Germ. fell and filz), *filter* (Ital. feltrare, to filter, from feltro, felt, first used for the purpose); cf. with pellis, L. pulvinar, Eng. pillow

162. Pendēre, to hang, to hang down (cf. as possibly correlate, Gr. *πέτομαι*, I fly, or hang in the air), *pendulum*, *pendent*, *dependent* and *independent*, *pensive*, *appendage* and *ap-*

pendix, *compendious*, *impend*, *prepense*, *propensity*, *suspend*, *suspense*, and *suspenders*. The L. penis, from which peniculus, diminutive, a little tail, Eng. *pencil*, comes, is not, as might be thought at first, a derivation of pendere, but is of another root (see Vedic pasa-s, membrum virile, Gr. *πέος* and *πόσϑη*). With pendēre, to hang corresponds pendĕre, pensum, to weigh, as a causative form, as jacĕre, to cast down, does with jacēre, to lie. From pendĕre, to weigh, come *pound* (L. pondus), as being *weighed* by rule, or standard; *pence* (L. pensum), as having weight; *compensate* and *recompense*, *dispense*, *dispensation*, and *dispensatory*, *expend*, *expense* and *spend*. Here, also, belong *ponder* (L. ponderare, to weigh), *ponderous*, and *preponderate*.

163. Pes, stem ped, the foot (Sk. pâda-s, from pad, to go; Gr. *πούς*, stem *ποδ*, from which Eng. *tripod* and *antipodes;* Lith. padas, the sole; Germ. fusz, Eng. *foot*, *fetlock*, and *fetter*), *pediment*, *pedal*, *pedestal*, *pedestrian*, *pedigree ; biped*, *quadruped*, *expeditious* (lit. out of the way of the feet), *impede* (lit. in the way of, etc.), *speed* (L. expedire, Ital. spedire).

164. Petere, petitum, to seek, to go after, to, or against (Sk. pat, to fly, Gr. *πέτομαι*, cf. Gr. *πτερόν*, a wing, and Sk. patram), *petition*, *appetite*, *compete*, *competent*, *impetuosity* (L. impetus), *repeat*. From the same orig. root with petere is penna, Old Lat. pesna for petna, Eng. *pen* (orig. a feather, like Germ. feder, a pen) and *pennate*.

165. Pinsere, pinsum, and pistum, to beat, pound, bruise (Sk. pish, to bruise, Gr. *πτίσσω*), *pinch* and *pincers* (Fr. pincer), *piston* and *pistol* (referring to the pushing-out force of the powder. The Fr. word for gun is fusil, L. fundere, fusum, a pourer forth), *pistil*, *pestle* (L. pistrilla, a little pounding mill).

166. Pipire, to pip or chirp (Gr. *πιππίζω*, I chirp, onomatopoetic), *peep* (Fr. piper), *pip*, *pipe*, *fife* (Germ. pfeifen), *pigeon* (L. pipio-n, Ital. piccione, Fr. pigeon).

167. Plicare, to fold or double up (Sk. prich, to join together, Gr. *πλέκω*, I twist; from *πλόκος*, a derivative of which, comes L. floccus, Eng. *flock* and *lock*. Plectere is a strength-

ened form of the same root ; from which comes Eng. *plait* : cf. L. amplecti and also flectere), *ply* (Fr. plier), *pliant*, *pliable*, *apply*[1] and *application* (Fr. appliquer) ; *complex*, *complexion*, *complicate*, *complicity*, *accomplice* and *accomplish* (Fr. accomplir), *duplex*, *duplicate*, and *duplicity* ; *explicate* and *explicit* ; *implicate*, *implicit* and *imply* ; *reply* and *replication* ; *simple* (L. simplex = singulus + plicare), *double*, *triple*, *supple* (lit. doubling under), *suppliant*, *supplicate* ; *play* (referring to the ever-doubling movements of those engaged in sport or in enacting a drama) and *display* (Span. desplugar, Fr. deployer) ; *deploy* (Fr. deployer), *employ* (Fr. employer, Span. emplear, L. implicare), *exploit* (Fr. exploiter, M. L. explectare, from earlier form explicitare).

168. Plere, to fill (Sk. prî and pûr, to fill ; piparmi and prinarmi, I fill up, cf. prâna-s, full ; Lith. pilnas, full, Gr. πίμπλημι, I fill, stem πλε. Cf. πλέως and πλήρης, full, L. plenus, and Gr. πλοῦτος, riches), *plenary*, *plenipotentiary* (+ potentia), *complete*, *complement*, *deplete*, *implement*, *replete*, *supplement*. Lat. plebes (the common people), Eng. *plebeian*, belongs here. Here, too, we must place L. plus, more (Sk. puru-s — Vedic, pulus, much, many, and Sk. pula-s, Gr. πολύς), *plural*, *surplus*. From populus (= plus reduplicated), come *popular*, *populous*, *population*, *people* (Fr. peuple), *public* (L. publicus for populicus), *republic*, *publish*, *publican* (in England, a hotel-keeper ; in the scriptures, a tax-gatherer), *populate* and *depopulate*.

169. Ponere, posui, positum (for posnere, stem pos nasalized ; Sk. pas, to make firm or sure), *position*, *positive*, *post*, *posture*, *post-office* (where the mail is *placed*), *apposite*, *apposition*, *compound*, *compose*, *deponent*, *depose*, *deposit*, *depôt* and *depository*, *expound* and *expose*, *dispose* and *disposition*, *impound* and *impost*, *opponent*, *opposite*, *preposition*, *propose*, *purpose*, *repose*, *repository*, *suppose* and *supposititious*.

170. Potare, to drink (Sk. pâ and pî, to drink ; pibâmi, I drink ; cf. L. bibere, to drink, and Eng. *bib*, *bibber*, and *bibulous*, Gr. πίνω, Aeol. πώνω, fut. πόσω, stem πο and πότης, a

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[1] The figure in this word is that of a rower drawing in his arms as he toils.

drinker. Cf. Lith. pota, tippling), *potation*, *potion*, *pottage*, (M. L. potagium, Fr. potage).

171. Potis, able (Sk. pati-s, a master, lord, or husband. Cf. L. suffix -pte, as in suopte, and also -pse, as in ipse = i(s) + pse. Gr. *πόσις* and also *δέσποινα* and *δεσπότης*, Eng. *despot*, Lith. pati-s, a husband). From potis with esse, to be, comes posse, and from posse, part. potens, come *potent*, *impotent*, *potentate* (M. L. potentatus), *possible*, *power* (Fr. pouvoir). From potis, with sedere, or possidere, lit. to sit by, be master of, come *possess*, *prepossess*, and *dispossess*.

172. Precari, to pray to or for (Sk. prachh, to ask. Cf. *προίσσεσϑαι*), *pray* (Fr. prier), *precarious* (lit. needing to be prayed for), *precatory*, *deprecate*, *imprecate*.

173. Prae, prep. before, for prai; and also pro, orig. prod-, Sk. prati (Sk. pra, before, Lith. pra and pro. The original adjective form pris, of which prior and primus are derivatives, is lost. Traces of it appear in the Gr. *πρίν*, before, and also in L. priscus, ancient, and pristinus, primitive. With the sup. primus, cf. Sk. prathama-s, and Lith. pirmas), *prior*, *prime*, *primary*, *primate*, *primer*, *premier* (Fr. premier, for L. primus), *prince* (L. princeps = primum, sc. locum, capiens) and also *principal* and *principle* (L. principium).

174. Premere, pressum, to press (cf. Gr. *πρίζω* and *πρίω*, I grind between the teeth, and *πρήϑω*, I drive out by blowing), *press*, *compress*, *depress*, *express* (lit. to squeeze out, as the juice of grapes. Cf. for sense, Germ. ausdrücken), *impress*, *oppress*, *repress*, *suppress*; *print* (L. imprimere, Fr. empreinde, part. empreint) and *imprint*, *imprimatur* (lit. let it be printed; like exequatur, let it be executed).

175. Pre*hendere*, prehensum, and sycopated prendere, to seize or lay hold of (Gr. *χανδάνω*, stem *χαδ*; Goth. hinthan, to seize, which agrees closely with the Latin; Eng. and Germ. *hand*; cf. also, Goth. bigitan, Ang. Sax. gitan, which corresponds more with the Gr., Eng. *get*), *prehensile*, *apprehend*, *comprehend*, *comprehensive*, a *prize* (Fr. prendre, part. pris and prise), *prison* (Fr. do.), *apprize* (Fr. apprendre, part. appris), *apprentice* (Fr. apprenti), *comprise*, *surprise*.

176. Prope, near to, nigh (from same root as pro, before; Cf. Sk. prati, Gr. πρός, old form προτί, Aeol. προπί, just by). The comp. and sup. forms, derived from it, are propior, proximus. Proprius, one's own (lit. near by one; cf. for sense, possidere, which see, under potis) is from prope. From these words come Eng. *proprietor*, *propriety*, *property*, *proper* (L. proprius, Fr. propre), *appropriate*, *propitious*, *propitiate*, *propinquity* (L. propinquus), *approach* (L. appropinquare, Fr. approcher), *proximity*, *approximate* (L. proximus), *proxy*, *reproach* (Fr. reprocher, lit. to come back, near to. See Fr. proche, near to).

177. Puer, a boy (Gr. παῖς, from which, or its derivatives, come *pedagogue* = παιδίον + ἄγω, lit. to lead a child; encyclo*paedia* = παιδεία ἐν κύκλῳ; page, a boy, Gr. παιδίον, Fr. page; *pedo*baptism, etc. In the Spartan dialect, παῖς occurs as ποῖρ. In old inscriptions it appears as por, as in Marcipor; like our English way of making surnames, as in Thomason, Jamieson, etc). From puer come *puerile*, *puerperal* (puer + parere), *puberty* (L. puber), *pupa* (L. pupus and pupa cont. from puberus, etc.), *puppet*, *pup*, and *puppy* (as being young), *pupil* (L. pupillus), *bub* and *booby* (Germ. bube), and *babe*, *pusilanimous* (L. do., lit. having the mind of a little boy).

178. Pungere, punctum, to prick or puncture, Gr. πεύκη, the fir, viewed as being sharp-pointed; from which root come *pike* (Fr. pique), *pique* (Fr. piquer), *picket* (Fr. piquet), *peek* and *pick* (Germ. picken), *pickle* (cf. for form, *tickle* from tick, and *tackle* from tack), L. picea, Eng. *pitch*-pine, also, belongs here, and L. picare, to pitch, (and L. picra, bitter medicine, Gr. πικρός, bitter, as *bitter* in Eng. comes from verb bite). From pungere comes *pungent*, *poignant* (Fr. poindre, part. poignant), *poniard* (Fr. poignard), *compunction*, *punctuate*, *punctual*, *punctilious*, *point* (L. punctum, Fr. point), *appoint* (M. L. appunctare and appointare), *disappoint*.

179. Purus, clean, undefiled (Sk. pû, to purify; Gr. πῦρ, fire, Germ. feuer, Eng. fire), *pure*, *purify*, *purge* (L. purgare = purum + agere), *purgatory*, *expurgated*, *impurity*, *spurious* (L. spurius = se, insep. prep. without, and purus, pure. Cf. *serious* = se + ridere, and *sober* = se + ebrius).

180. Putare, to clear up, arrange, reckon, etc. (Sk. budh and bundh, to know, Gr. πυνϑάνομαι, stem πυϑ, I search into, or out), *compute*, *depute*, *dispute*, *impute*, *reputation*, *count* (Fr. compter, L. computare), *account* (formerly written *accompt*).

181. Quaerere (for quaesere), quaesitum, to seek (Sk. chesth, to go about), *query*, *question*, *acquisition*, *conquer* (Fr. conquerir = cum armis quaerere), *exquisite* (lit. sought out from among other things. Cf. for sense, *egregious* = e grege), *inquire*, *inquest*, *inquisitive*, *perquisite*, *require*, *request*, *requisition*, *prerequisite*, *curious* (L. curiosus. Cf. for form, cujus, with its nominative from quis).

182. Quatuor four (Sk. chatur and chatvâra-s; Lith. keturi; Gr. τέσσαρες, Archaic πέσσυρες and πίσυρες, with which cf. Celtic petor. For the interchangeableness of gutturals and labials, as in quatuor and τέσσαρες, for πέσσαρες, now apparently quite unrelated, cf. also Gr. πέντε, five, and L. quinque, and also Gr. πῶς and πότε, Ionic κῶς and κότε, Sk. kati and kadâ. See also Gr. ἵππος, Aeol. ἴκκος (L. equus), *quart* (L. quartus), *quadrant*, *quadrature*, *quadruped* (+ pes, pedis), *quadruple* (+ plicare, to fold), *square* (L. quadrare, Ital. squadrare, Fr. equarrir and carrer), *squadron* (L. quadratus, Ital. squadrone).

ARTICLE VI.

EDITORIAL CORRESPONDENCE.

LETTER FROM REV. B. SCHNEIDER, AINTAB, SYRIA, MARCH 26, 1862.

In passing through Oorfa, supposed to be the ancient Ur of the Chaldees, we examined some excavations in the environs of the city. These were evidently tombs, and apparently family tombs. They are exceedingly numerous; the high rocks, surrounding the city to the west and south, being full of them. They all have the same general form and size, and are always in the side of a hill, and the excavation is made horizontally, so that by stooping a little at the entrance you can walk right into them. On your entrance you find a room some twelve or fifteen feet long and nearly as wide, and perhaps eight feet high; and at the right and left side and at the further end there are niches in the wall, just large enough to receive a full-grown human body. The generality of them have only these three receptacles for the dead, but occasionally there were side rooms, entered from the central one, of the same form and size, in each of which there were again three such niches or sarcophagi. In two or three there were images carved over these niches. In one it was the image of a Roman warrior, in a reclining position, with a female standing at his feet. Both figures were in a tolerably good state of preservation. In a second were two similar images, though not very distinct; and in a third, two angelic figures and one of an eagle. In a fourth there was an inscription over one of the niches, in rather large characters. A copy of it was once sent to Dr. Robinson by the Rev. Mr. White; but it could not be deciphered.

That these excavations were tombs, seems not only probable from their form, but is positively proved by our observations. One of them had been opened quite recently, and we found the remains of human bones still in the niches. We handled parts of the skull and other portions of the human frame, and found also small pieces of glass. These we conjectured to have been pieces of the tear bottles, often deposited with the dead in ancient times. I have seen a perfect one of these bottles, taken from a similar tomb on the banks of the Euphrates; and, again, in the island of Cyprus I once had some beautiful ones shown me, made from translucent marble.

One feature of these tombs interested us particularly. It was a semicircular groove outside of the entrance to the left, and of such a size as to receive a large round stone, which was evidently used to close the entrance. Whenever the tomb was to be opened, this stone was rolled to the left into this groove, especially made for its reception; and when it was closed again, it was rolled back before the entrance or door. At one of them, brought to view by removal of the earth only a few days before our examination, we found the stone actually standing before the entrance, so as to preclude our ingress. It was of the size and thickness of a common mill-stone, large and heavy, standing perpendicularly right in front.

These tombs are all expressly hewn out of solid limestone rock; and those recently opened appear as fresh as though the excavation had been made within quite a recent date.

Was not the tomb in which Christ was laid, in all probability, precisely like those here mentioned? In Matt. xxvii. 60, it is said: "He laid it in his own new tomb, which he had hewn out in the rock; and he *rolled a great stone* to the door of the sepulchre, and departed." In Mark xvi. 3, 4, is is said of the women who were on their way to the sepulchre: "And they said among themselves, 'Who shall *roll* us away the stone from the sepulchre' . . . for it was very great." When we saw the size and weight of the stone above mentioned, we could not at all wonder that these females felt themselves unable to roll it away, being so large and heavy. Rolling seems a much more proper word than moving or raising; for the round stone, standing perpendicularly before the door, must be *rolled* away, and not lifted or moved, to secure an entrance. With tombs like those we saw, before our mind the whole account of the opening of a tomb out of a rock, and closing it by means of a large circular stone, and of the men's entering it (not going down into it), and of a "young man sitting at the right side," is perfectly natural and consistent, and just what the circumstances require.

The only possible objection to the idea that Christ's tomb was like these, arises from the expression in Matt. xxviii. 2, where it is said the angel "rolled back the stone, and sat upon it." But the expression *ἐκάθητο ἐπάνω αὐτοῦ* may not necessarily imply that he sat down upon it, as we usually understand the phrase; but simply that the angel having rolled away the stone, took a position by the side of it, and leaned against it. The word *ἀποκυλίω* is translated rolled *back* in Matthew; but it could not be rolled *back* unless it was a stone precisely of the kind we saw; but, considering it of that nature, no word could have expressed the act more truly, as is readily seen: it was rolled back into this semicircular groove, made expressly for it, and not rolled off from a grave beneath the surface of the ground.

In Birsdgik, on the Euphrates, and in many other parts of Mesopotamia through which we passed, we saw many of these tombs; and in all cases the form was the same. Many poor families of Koords and Arabs now actually occupy these abodes of the dead as habitations for themselves.

Another object of interest in Oorfa is what we supposed must be the site of the famous school of Edessa. The position is one very favorable and suitable for such an institution, and there is an abundant supply of flowing water. Some parts of the ancient wall are still to be seen, and some remains of marble pillars, scattered about, may have adorned some of the doors and entrances of the building. But the most prominent relic of the edifice is a tower, or steeple, which seems to have been the belfrey. It is square in its form, and the upper part is so constructed as to indicate, very plainly, that a bell was once suspended there, and poured forth its clear tones all over the city. It is now used as a minaret, from which the Turkish muezzin daily calls the followers of the false prophet to their prayers. But Mohamedans do not construct their minarets in that form; but finding it ready-made, they use it for this purpose.

ARTICLE VII.

RECENT GERMAN WORKS ON LIBERAL EDUCATION.

So we designate that whole class of books which discuss the subject of education in the *gymnasia*. Within a few years past the press has been unusually prolific in productions of this kind. Some of these attack the entire system of classical education, as no longer suited to our times; others defend it, and maintain that it needs no modification; but most of them take middle ground, contending for the study of the classics and, at the same time, for giving increased attention to the sciences. This last class falls into two subdivisions, the one giving more prominence to the study of antiquity than to modern science; the other combining the two in nearly equal proportions. Some of the writers, especially those who are inimical to the classics, are flippant and superficial; and, while they may influence the minds of the uneducated, produce no other effect upon the learned than to arouse them to the effort of making a more thorough refutation. The greater part of the advocates of reform, however, plead for scientific and practical study without proscribing the classics. A majority of all the writers urge the necessity of a reform, not so much by dropping the study of the classics, as by devoting less time to the study of mere words and the cultivation of style, and more to the study of the subjects and facts embodied in Greek and Roman literature. Of these numerous writers we shall notice none who hold extreme views, and only the best of those who occupy their several positions between the two extremes.

One of the most interesting features of all these works is their thoroughly religious and sober character. They are evidently written, not from motives of professional pride, nor as the result of learned leisure, but from motives of humanity, of patriotism, and of profound religious conviction. Twenty-five years ago the great body of the teachers in the gymnasia were of doubtful religious character. Some were avowedly sceptical. By far the greater portion were rationalists. Few went further than to adopt the moral precepts of the New Testament, with a part of its doctrines, and to teach the formulas of the creed, while they undermined all its peculiar doctrines. All this is changed. The most influential men in the gymnasia are now firm believers in Christianity, with its miraculous history and divinely inspired doctrines, and insist on an education that shall be, first Christian, then classical and historical, and finally, patriotic and, in the true sense of the word, practical.

We begin with the small work of Heiland, entitled *The End and Aim of a Christian Gymnasium.*[1] The first discourse is on the Nature and

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[1] Die Aufgabe des evangelischen Gymnasiums nach ihren wesentlichen Seiten dargestellt in Schulreden von Dr. Karl Gustav Heiland, Weimar, 1860.

Objects of a Liberal Education, of which the following are some of the leading thoughts:

There was a time when there was no doubt as to what constituted the bone and sinew of education in the gymnasia. Resting upon the foundation laid by the venerable founders of our churches and schools, the structure of our German erudition rose to a proud eminence, whose apartments were occupied and adorned by philosophers and poets, scholars and artists. Ravished with the new light of classical antiquity, the German mind, sanctified by a Christian faith, entered upon a new career of intellectual and spiritual freedom, and achieved victory after victory in art and science. If the time has gone by in which a knowledge of the classics and education are supposed to mean the same thing; if no one now excludes all other means of culture; it nevertheless remains true, and it cannot be too often repeated in this utilitarian age, that classical studies form the groundwork of a liberal education. From the soil of antiquity spring all the sources of human culture which in a thousand rivulets flow through all the world. In the classical works of the Greeks and Romans are to be sought the grand outlines of literature and art, law and justice, and even morality. Those persons have very narrow views of things, who suppose that the ancient languages are dead, and that the men who spoke them have passed away. Does not experience teach us how soon the immortality of our great men ends, while the suns and stars of that ancient firmament continue to shine in unfading splendor? If we ask our leaders in science and art to what models they look, what examples they follow, from whom they learn nice discrimination, clearness, and order, transparency and beauty of representation, they will uncover their heads, and point you to Thucydides and Tacitus, Plato and Aristotle, Demosthenes and Cicero. Our great poets are not a little indebted to the ancients for their classical elegance. Think of Goethe, that stately tree in the forest of German poets, which taking its root in its native soil spreads its crown of rich foliage out towards Greece. Into that classic home, a sound education will ever strive to lead the youth of our gymnasia, to prepare them for future greatness in literature and art. While modern authors, by the fulness of their knowledge, and the abstract and scientific arrangement of their materials, are removed from the sphere of thought familiar to juvenile minds, the ancients, by the directness, naturalness, and simplicity of their thoughts, find easy access to such. By the clearness of their ideas, the sincerity of their feelings, the strength of their will, by the symmetry, dignity, and transparency of their language, they have in all ages seized and captivated the hearts of the young.

What the ancients have written on law and justice, on freedom and the love of country, comes not from the speculations of the closet, nor from immature thought, but is the result of varied observation and experience in the forum and in the camp. Hence the clearness of their conceptions, the sobriety of their views, and the soundness of their judgments and feelings. This fresh vitality breathes upon us like the spirit of health, and contrasts strikingly with the sickliness of modern speculations. By the deeds of their more public life, which were inspired by patriotic sentiment and political integrity, they furnish, for all times, models of political wisdom, patriotism, and civic virtues. To this day the young learn from them obedience to the laws, respect for rulers, the love of country, simplicity and temperance in private life, and modesty and propriety in public life.

Little need be said in regard to the other studies complemental to these. No one questions the value of history, in which the young should learn in what way God educates the human race. That the classical productions of our own literature should be studied, is conceded by all. The importance of the study of mathematics and of the sciences is nowhere denied, though most persons value them for their utilitarian character, rather than for the discipline they give to the mind. The object of a gymnasium is not so much to impart useful knowledge, as to form the character and train the mind. The gymnasium is a school for exercising the mental faculties, so that the pupil may acquire the power of mastering all knowledge, and of fitting himself for any profession. Its motto is not *discere*, but *discere disce*. Not varied knowledge, but intellectual vigor, capable of acting in any direction, is its object. In the acquisition of the former the mind may be comparatively passive, or merely receptive, and is in danger of forming habits of superficiality and of coming to hasty conclusions.

The second discourse is on the Formation of the Character, as a chief aim of a liberal education. Antiquity and Christianity are the chief pillars of modern culture. There is no literary culture for us without Greece and Rome; and no education without Christianity, if by education is meant something more than mental development; if it means the subduing of the will, the humbling of human pride, and the regeneration of the soul. On this foundation of "the languages and the gospel," as Luther expresses it, our gymnasia have stood the test of centuries. It is unnatural to put those two in opposition to each other. If an Augustine did not scruple to adorn his "City of God" with ornaments drawn from the ancient poets, historians, and orators; if he found something almost Christian in Plato; if he confesses that by reading Cicero he was led to search for divine truth; if Luther believed that ancient literature was revived for the sake of the gospel, and that the latter could not be maintained in its purity without the former — then the fear sometimes entertained that the study of the classics will prove dangerous to Christianity may safely be dismissed as groundless. The earnest religious character of the German mind, its reverence for the Sacred scriptures, long ago put classical studies in their right place in a system of education. As our fathers drank in the spirit of the apostles more than others, so, by their natural aptitude to imbibe all foreign elements of culture, have their descendants appropriated, with singular success, the spirit of ancient literature. In these two elements, classical antiquity and Christianity, are found the sources, so far as culture goes, of all our intellectual greatness. It is from them that the nourishment of our gymnasia is now mainly derived. From these schools have sprung those distinguished men who, by their profound learning and scientific investigations, have made the German name respected throughout the world. Where is there a people that can boast of such deep thinkers, thorough investigators, and erudite scholars as the German? And is there one among them that did not derive his nurture from Hellas and Latium? These schools, from the beginning seminaries of the church, were by our forefathers made nurseries of Christian morals and good order, in which prayer was united with study, and the Bible was read along with Cicero. But I am speaking as if our schools had ceased to be what they once were. So many think; and I believe they are not wholly in the wrong. I will not dwell upon this. I will not attempt to show how, for a time, knowledge was overvalued and *education* neglected; how a premature criticism in the young undermined the character. Intellectual culture apart from a sound moral feeling often becomes superficial and perverse. The formation of the character by habits of industry, of self-control, of self-denial, of respect for just authority, and by sentiments of modesty, reverence, and piety is the principal object of education, without which all the other ends of education are liable to be sacrificed.

The third discourse, being his inaugural at Weimar, as the first and second were at Oels and Stendal, is of a similar character and tendency, and is still more eloquent and inspiring. The fourth, delivered at the celebration of the founding of the gymnasium at Weimar, is on its original religious character. The fifth, on the Revival of Learning, is one of the most attractive of the series. The sixth, delivered in 1859, when the celebration of the founding of the gymnasium and that of the Reformation happened to fall on the same day, is, by a happy choice of the theme, on the Relation of Classical Antiquity to Christianity. After pointing out the various ways in which the study of the ancient languages has proved useful to society and subservient to the interests of Christianity, and showing how closely they are connected historically, the author closes his address in the following words: "Classical antiquity will always continue to be a means of education, for the human race. Literature and art will never cease to rejuvenate themselves by recurring to that youthful age of the world. Our poets will ever descend anew into the fountain of the Muses in Mount Parnassus. Our philosophers will pluck branches from the tree of wisdom in the garden of Plato. Our artists will find the lines of beauty and of proportion in the plastic productions of Greece. Our public men will find models of political wisdom and self-sacrificing patriotism in the great men of the Grecian and Roman states. Classical culture will preserve our theology from ignorance, scepticism, and fanaticism. It was not an accident that Schleiermacher, the restorer of our theology from low rationalism, was a diligent student of Plato. The classics will ever remain a storehouse of practical wisdom for the old and the young. To our condition of social disintegration the states of antiquity, with their unity of nationality, religion, and manners, will present a healthful antidote. But as high as the heaven is the above the earth, so high above all these glorious things is the gospel, the power of God for the salvation of all who believe."

The next discourse, on Patriotic Education, is, according to our republican ideas, hardly equal to the theme. The following one, on the Choice of a Profession, by the Christian elevation of its sentiments and its noble enthusiasm for the higher interests of society, exceeds the expectations we had formed.

The ninth discourse, on the Relation of Learning to Active Life, deserves a more particular notice. While the cultivated nations of antiquity preserved these two things in a state of happy union — active men pursuing study, and studious men fructifying life with the seeds of wisdom — learning, says the author, in our native land, the home of profound thinkers and investigators, has acquired such an independence that, in its ideal flight, it often leaves real life quite behind, and goes its own upward way. The higher schools are subject to the influence of both tendencies, the ideal and the real; and it is their proper office to harmonize the claims of both. The old saying, that "we learn not for the school, but for life," expresses the general conviction that education should prepare men for life. But here the question arises: What constitutes a preparation for life? If we look at life as it appears in the present age, with its thousand springs of action, we see a wide chasm between it and the subjects which occupy the attention of the learned. The bustling spirit of the age, its eagerness for external things, is unfavorable to that calm and collected state of mind necessary to the search after wisdom. It were a degradation of the schools, to aim merely at ministering to the material interests of society. The latter, forming a constituent part of our public prosperity, and growing out of the condition of the people, deserve, indeed, consideration. The scriptures themselves say: "all things are yours." But, at the same time, it should be the aim of knowledge to let all its light shine; to fill the minds of its disciples with ideas of the beautiful and the true, as they are treasured up in the noblest productions of genius; to cherish an enthusiastic devotion to what is invisible and eternal, and to guard the mind against the selfish pursuit of those material objects which makes it forget its heavenly origin, and sink like lead to the earth and to the gross realities of common life. There may also be a false idealism, converting the living God into a logical idea, or a speculative materialism, converting him into a physical law. But such things can happen only when philosophy and real life are divorced from each other. There was a happy period in our history when they went hand in hand, — the period of the Reformation, when men of learning were the truest guardians both of the church and of the state; and there are now signs of a return to such a condition, by making the schools nurseries of piety and of practical wisdom.

Learning ministers to life by imparting the knowledge necessary to understand life, with all its social, political, and religious institutions, as growing out of the past; by imbuing its disciples with those lofty and pure sentiments which will preserve them from all that is selfish, sensual, and mean; by forming the mind, through the acquisition and the love of truth, for all those callings by which it can serve the church, the state, and civil society at large. While mammon-worshippers contribute little or nothing to the improvement of the national character, the lover of learning, the student of history, and the cultivator of our national literature are scattering those seeds of knowledge which connect the schools with the life of the people. Do we not contribute something to the improvement of life when we introduce the young student to the pure and simple creations of beauty which characterize the works of the ancients, that have served as models for our national culture? Is it of no practical importance to make him familiar with the wisdom of the most eminent nations of antiquity, to kindle in his soul an ardent love of their patriotism and virtues, and to inspire him with their noble sentiments? What an instructress for real life is history which is a fresh life of itself, guarding men against the worship of theories, and teaching them moderation and sobriety in their judgments! Above all, does the history of our own country open to the view of the young the path of honor and glory by which the nation has risen to greatness. Do we not educate our youth for life and its most sacred interests, when we initiate them into the spirit of our poets who have touched all the cords in the depths of the German heart, and whose harps are strung to truth, fidelity, the love of country, and the fear of God? And need I mention the study of the book that most of all connects the learning of the schools with the life of the people? The Bible is the book of books. It is the scholar's best guide in his deepest reflections, and the poor man's stay and staff in affliction and sorrow. The critical knowledge of the scriptures, of the history of the church, of the lives and deeds of its heroes and martyrs, who have produced greater revolutions than kings or warriors, prepare men to act in the great crises of a nation's history.

The remaining five discourses on high aims (mental gymnastics), moral earnestness, a German heart and character, a historical spirit (in opposition to hasty abstract theories), and Herder as a school reformer, are no less interesting and important than the preceding; but, for want of space, we must content ourselves with the specimens of thought [and style already given.

Hoffman's Eight School Addresses on Educational Topics connected with the Gymnasia.[1] — This pamphlet of seventy-two pages, notwithstanding the brevity with which the several topics embraced in it are treated, is decidedly the most sensible, the most comprehensive, the clearest, the soundest, and the best of all that we have seen on the same subjects. The author analyzes and classifies his materials perfectly; omits nothing that is essential; introduces nothing, not even a word, that is superfluous; is brief without being obscure, and advances none but well-considered opinions, the very statement of which carries its own evidence with it. The opening address gives us a fair sample of his manner. It does not admit of material abridgment.

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[1] Acht Schulreden über pädagogischen Zeitfragen für Freunde des Gymnasialwesens, herausgegeben von K. A. J. Hoffmann, Director des Johanneums zu Lüneburg. 1859.

Of all the demands, he says, made upon the higher schools in recent times, none is presented with more urgency than that for nationality in the education of our youth. Go back with me for a moment, and let us see if it was so in the last century. You know that such a demand was hardly possible then; scarcely was such a thought entertained. Then one of the greatest of men sat upon the Prussian throne, the great Frederick, who professed to be a philosopher; but he was more ambitious to be a Frenchman than a German. It was then that the noble Emperor of Austria, Joseph II., inscribed upon the gates of his park, the Augarten, the words: "Dedicated to all men, by their friend." Then men's hearts glowed with the thought of being citizens of the world, and they prided themselves in being cosmopolitans. When, at the close of the century, the revolution broke out which aimed at obliterating all historical recollections, there was in many noble minds a longing that peace might prevail, and that the people of all nations might extend a friendly hand to each other, and unite in efforts for freedom and progress.

But how changed are all things in the space of fifty years! As the great Pericles said, "the thoughts and feelings of men change beyond all calculation." Why, then, is a national education now demanded? A series of afflictive events came over Europe, and especially over our country, such as rarely ever occur. The contempt with which the invading conqueror treated all whose resistance he had overcome, drove men back upon themselves, and awakened in their minds an indignation at their violated nationality, and called forth the determination to throw off the foreign yoke. The national feeling was aroused, and it has not slumbered since. This is sufficient to explain the existence of the demand for a national culture. But what is the precise meaning of the demand? It can mean nothing but these two things: first, that we should educate our pupils to be Germans — should nourish and cherish in their hearts German sympathies and a German character; secondly that, for the accomplishment of this end, we should draw the means and the materials of education from our own national literature and culture.

Let us begin with the second, and inquire what these means are. We have a peculiarly German music, a German architecture, a German school of painting, a German history, a German language, and literature; and in all these branches of culture and art, the German mind has exhibited a greatness and elevation surpassed by no other nation. Our music, our Gothic cathedral architecture, and our old paintings are incomparably rich. But these three arts do not properly belong to the schools. They are not adapted to every person, are not sufficiently general. It is not the office of the schools to train artists. Our history and our language and literature alone remain as a means of general education; and in these we excel. They, of course, cannot be neglected in any system of education. But it is quite another question whether these alone are a sufficient means of education for our times. To this question, so often proposed, I must reply emphatically in the negative.

I hardly need say that the intercourse of nations, which for the last three centuries has extended to all quarters of the world, compels us to learn other languages. As to our literature, we will certainly study it diligently in the schools. But it is not sufficient of itself. The German literature of the Middle Ages has power to attract us; but it does not offer the means of a sufficiently various culture on account of its limited range of thought. And where in our modern literature, excellent as it confessedly is, do we find the gigantic greatness of a Shakspeare, the wonderful power and loveliness of a Homer, the comic genius of an Aristophanes and Molière? How many writers have the smoothness and transparent clearness of the best French prose-writers? How many of our historians have the picturesqueness, ease, and grace of the Greek and Roman historians? What we need is the best means of education, whether national or not. The best are none too good.

Our own history needs no commendation to awaken an interest for it in our youth. But he who has studied only German history, cannot understand our times and our present public and social life. He who would know the good and the evil of an absolute monarchy, must study Spanish and French history. He who would learn the rapid growth and decay of democracies, must study the history of Athens, of Rome, and of Florence; and he who would understand constitutional government, must know the history of England. It is not enough to know one side of national life. We must be able to compare it with another, of a wholly different people. A Humboldt failed to understand many of the phenomena of the forms of our territory till he observed similar ones, in gigantic proportions and in a much more distinct outline, in the Andes. So we often learn the delicate traits of our own national character, only when we have seen them magnified in the character of another people.

We may be told that the other is the main point to be insisted upon in securing a national education; namely, that we should cultivate German sympathies and form a German character in our pupils. If by German sympathies and character are meant good nature, fidelity, industry, perseverance, simplicity, moderation, depth of feeling and thoroughness of knowledge, — if modesty, orderly conduct, composure in danger, and persistent courage in calamity are meant, then it were a disgrace not to inculcate them. This, however, is but one side, and that the bright side, of our national character. All national character — ours no less than others — has its weaknesses; and they are often an essential element of it. Shall we also cherish these? Let it be remembered, too, that all great nations, whether ancient or modern, have possessed, if not all, yet the greater part, of these same qualities; and if some were wanting, others of equal value were found in their place.

In truth, teachers have only one thing to strive for: the good, wherever it is found; and to remove whatever is evil and wrong, however closely it may be interwoven with our national life. This course will not expose us to the undue imitation of what is foreign; for many good traits in the character of other people will be incompatible with those of our own. Does Christianity, which is the highest perfection, recognize nationality as essential to itself? Is not that which is purest and noblest in art universal, except that it must take on some definite form? Let me not be misunderstood. In nationality I recognize the stamp of the coin, not the precious metal itself. Let the stamp be clear and distinct; but also let the gold be pure, so that it may have an independent and universal value apart from its form.

The best way to bring this little work to the notice of our readers, would be to translate it entire. But we must be excused from doing anything further in this line. The second address is on the relation of the gymnasia to the people, in respect to which he lays down two propositions: first, the school rules; second, the school serves. Quaint as these statements may seem to be, they are nevertheless true. Within its own appropriate sphere, the school rules. It does not ask leave to define its own aims and to make its own regulations. Both the parent and the pupil expect that the school will have its laws, to which they must conform. Order is a part of the education which it gives. The school is a little community, where the authority is less parental than in the family, and more parental than in the state. Here the young make their first essay at living in a public way, and feel the influence of a public sentiment, and the force of inflexible rules. In another, and quite a different sense, the school serves. It serves the community, by toiling for the general good. Serving the whole, it cannot sacrifice the whole to any of its parts. It cannot attempt to teach those things in which all do not, in a certain order, participate. It cannot undertake to qualify men specifically for any particular calling. This would be abandoning the common ground of a learned school, — a school for liberal culture, and trenching upon that of professional or practical schools. A gymnasium best serves all, when it so exercises and disciplines the minds of all that they shall be able, in the end, to master whatever they undertake

In another discourse the author discusses the importance of an idea element in education. Deep in the soul of man, unexplained and perhaps inexplicable in their origin, exist the natural or intuitive ideas of the beautiful, the good, and the true. While these are the standards by which he ultimately judges of things, he feels assured that, in its actual form, as it is met in life, there is nothing beautiful or good without some foreign admixture. These ideas, more perfect than any observed reality, present models

— ideals, for approximate imitation in all the individual acts relating to them in life. The ideal element in education is therefore the direction of the mind to something higher, nobler, and better than is to be seen on earth; namely, to ideas of perfect beauty, goodness, and truth. But the ideal should not merely furnish matter for philosophical contemplation; it should be, as far as possible, realized in life. To realize ideas and to idealize life, are substantially the same thing. It is so when the sculptor resorts to marble, the painter to colors, the poet to words, or the musician to tones. It is no less so when the domestic circle strive to manifest nothing but pure and unselfish affections; when a statesman nobly endeavors to lift society into a higher and purer atmosphere; when the philosopher lives to pour the light of truth upon the minds of all; when the patriot finds in the safety and welfare of his country something better and dearer than life; when the martyr testifies to truth in the midst of devouring flames. Thus it is apparent that an ideal tendency is the noblest direction which a teacher can give to the minds of his pupils.

We pass over the address on education in general and the principles on which it is to be conducted, and that on the difference between domestic and school education, and come to the sixth, on the instruction peculiar to the gymnasium. Its object cannot, of course, be at variance with that of education in general. Nor can its aim be to give any special education with reference to a particular occupation. It is concerned with literature, science, and art. To the last belong poetry and oratory. Some maintain that its proper aim is the study of the humanities. This view, though true as far as it goes, is too restricted. If it included science, and religion, and the like, there would be no objection to it. Others say its office is to give a general culture; this is true, only we are left in uncertainty as to how much is to be included under the term general. The lines need to be more sharply drawn. Others still affirm that the culture which it gives is purely subjective; that is, its object is discipline rather than knowledge. It would be more correct to say, discipline and a thorough elementary knowledge of a given class of subjects. It is convenient to call a gymnasium a learned school, though no single epithet adequately describes such a school. Leaving definitions, we may remark that the leading object of a gymnasium is to give depth of knowledge in a limited number of well-chosen subjects. Knowledge is disciplinary only when it has thoroughness and accuracy. Other kinds of knowledge, though unavoidable, are incidental and subordinate rather than essential. The power to investigate subjects is to be created or developed; and habits of investigation formed. The student must learn to trace knowledge to its sources. The mind of the pupil has indeed to perform much mechanical work, like that of the memory, and must take many things on trust; but these are the instruments of education rather than education itself. If a few select subjects are well understood and comprehended, the benefit of this mastery will not be lost because other subjects are less perfectly known. He who has learned two or three things properly, knows how to learn other things in the same way. One of these subjects, and the most important, no doubt, is classical antiquity. It is not necessary here to argue this point, though the author does so to a considerable extent, nor to enumerate the other studies which should be associated with that above named, in order to furnish a liberal education. Experience has settled this question with tolerable accuracy. The practice of the majority of the best schools of learning in different countries cannot be a very unsafe guide, if due regard be had to the circumstances of each case.

The last two discourses will be specially interesting to the teacher of Latin, the former on the Latin as the centre of instruction in the gymnasium, and the latter giving a history of instruction in that language from the sixteenth century to the present. The details of these subjects are so numerous that we must forego the pleasure of presenting them.

L. Döderlein's Public Addresses; with an Appendix.[1] — The volume before us, though published separately, may be considered as a continuation of the Addresses and Essays (Reden und Aussätze) of which the first volume appeared in 1843, and the second in 1847. The three volumes together contain the results of the experience of a great scholar and first-rate teacher and director of a gymnasium, extending over a period of more than forty years. In this country he is known more as a critic, and as the author of a large work on Latin Synonyms, than as a practical teacher. His Addresses, which are in Germany classed among the best, present him to us in a new light, and most favorably. The subjects discussed all relate to education, and yet vary widely from each other. The contents of these three volumes are so various that we cannot attempt to represent them, much less make any selections from them. The last volume, not materially different in its plan from the others, has thirteen addresses on topics similar to those discussed by Hoffman; six on the life and character of eminent deceased teachers, and ten articles relating to classical studies, which are mostly critical, grammatical, or rhetorical (specimens of translations). In the first volume, which was also published separately, the addresses predominate; in the second, critical essays. We regard the first volume as the best; the third, as the next best for teachers generally; the mere philologist would prefer the second.

For the sake of unity we add here the following work published some years ago.

C. L. Roth's Minor Ptoductions relating to Education.[2] — Roth, director in Nuremberg, and Döderlein in Erlangen, have been for nearly half a century the two leaders among classical teachers in the gymnasia of the south of Germany. These two volumes relate more exclusively to education than Döderlein's, and less so than those of Heiland and Hoffmann. We regret that Hoffmann is so brief; we *almost* regret that Döderlein is so voluminous. With the two small volumes of Roth we are satisfied in all respects. More varied and less compact than Hoffmann; as religious as Heiland, though less fiery; as classical as Döderlein, though less powerful; he alone would represent tolerably well the whole class of writers referred to in this and the preceding notices. Besides a clear discussion and sound views of the principles involved in education, we find in these volumes, incidentally, much historical information pertaining to the German gymnasia, especially those in the south, reaching back as far as the Reformation. To the majority of classical teachers, these minor works of Roth would, on the whole, be more useful than the more stately addresses and the more elaborate and critical essays of Döderlein.

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[1] Oeffentliche Reden mit einem Anhange pädagogischer und philologischer Beiträge von Ludwig Döderlein. pp. 446. Frankfurt: 1860.

[2] Kleine Schriften pädagogischen und biographischen Inhalts von Carl Ludwig Roth, Th. Dr. Zwei Bde. Stuttgart: 1857.

ARTICLE VIII.

MISCELLANEOUS GERMAN WORKS.

THOLUCK'S PRELIMINARY HISTORY OF RATIONALISM, Second and last Part: the Religious Life of the Chnrch in the Seventeenth Century to the beginning of the Period of Illumination, First Division. The first half of the Seventeenth Century, extending to the Peace of Westphalia. Berlin: 1861.[1]

THE second half of this last part of the Preliminary History of Rationalism will soon be put to press, and this will complete the author's elaborate introduction to the subject. This history must be considered as the chief work of his life. It was begun early in life, and has been continued to old age. As a compendious account of rationalism was his first publication on the general subject, we may fairly suppose that a new and enlarged edition of it will not cost much additional labor, or require any great length of time. Taken together, the whole work will constitute a complete view of one of the most wonderful moral revolutions in the history of the church. As the causes of the French revolution lay far back in the moral history of the

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[1] Vorgeschichte des Rationalismus, von Dr. A. Tholuck, Zweiter und letzer Theil. Das kirchliche Leben des siebenzehten Jahrhunderts bis in die Anfänge dem Aufklärung. Erste Abtheilung. Die erste Hälfte des siebenzehten Jahrhunderts bis zum Westphälischen Frieden.

French people, and as the rise of Unitarianism in our own country is to be traced back to the period of Orthodoxy that preceded it, so Rationalism was but the harvest which sprang from seeds sown long before.

The history before us, though interesting and instructive, is a sad one. It is the history of evil in the church, working out its legitimate results.

The first point presented is that of the ecclesiastical organization, which the author thinks is good in itself, but was, in the present instance, sadly perverted. The theory is that of bringing both the state and the church under the supervision of the reigning prince. It is asserted that this is well when, as the theory requires, the sovereign rules the church according to the advice of an ecclesiastical council. But what is to be done when the king and council do not agree? And who is to appoint the council? If the secular prince does not domineer over the church, it is in consequence of the moderation of his personal character. The security is not in the system, but in the individual. This is just the difficulty with a monarchial government. A good king will, no doubt, rule well. But how is it with a bad king? Can such a one be kept from the throne? Luther said, in 1527: "We would gladly have restored the episcopal visitation, but because we had no authority to do so, we have limited ourselves to our office, and prayed the Lord that our Elector might, out of love to God, appoint some suitable persons to such an office." A civil, instead of an ecclesiastical pope! And it came to this. If it is said that consistories govern the church, and that the king is only the nominal head, the question still returns how are these consistories constituted? A part of them are generally laymen, nobles, creatures of the prince. In some instances the king's chancellors take the place of consistories. In the free cities a ministry is appointed by the senate. Who does not know how arbitrarily the minister of religion in Prussia has often ruled over pastors and churches! It is said that two distinct things are represented in the person of the king: the political and the episcopal rule,—*jus politicum* and *jus episcopale*. Distinct enough these may be in theory, but who shall keep them apart in practice? Luther, in the end, had good cause to say, "sub papa miscuit (Satan) ecclesiam politiae, nostro tempore vult miscere politiam ecclesiae." We recollect to have heard even Hengstenberg utter the same sentiment. In how many instances have clergymen been dismissed, and even banished, by the civil ruler for not subscribing to doctrinal articles, drawn up, not by the church, but by men appointed by him! How many ministers have been forced upon churches by rulers against the will of the people! How many good Lutherans in the seventeenth century complained of the heavy yoke laid upon the neck of the church by arbitrary princes! A church that trusts in princes is truly to be pitied. Still Tholuck sees a divine order and beauty in the union of church and state.

The very same principle that led to the domination of the princes over the church, led to every form of intolerance. When the Elector Maurice espoused the cause of the Protestants, and protected them against Charles

V., the Catholic party in the treaty of Passau bound themselves to tolerate the Lutherans, not at all on the ground of religious liberty, but from necessity, and only temporarily, till a general council should be held. When the Lutheran party accepted this concession to themselves, they would not allow it to include the Calvinists, unless they would adopt the Lutheran creed. The sovereign of each state, large or small, was to choose between the Catholic and Lutheran faith, and then his subjects were bound to adopt the same, or leave the country. The Catholic and the Lutheran rulers alike acted on this principle. Neither of the two parties would allow a third party to exist at all. Neither the Passau treaty, nor the Augsburg peace founded upon it in 1555, made any provisions for the Calvinists or any other sect. The Catholics thereby weakened the party of Protestants recognized by law, and, of course, divided the Lutherans and Calvinists effectually; the Lutherans could not recognize the Calvinists at all, though the latter did not object to the Augsburg Confession. The Calvinists never had a proper legal existence in the German Empire until the Peace of Westphalia, at the close of the thirty years war. A kind of toleration was informally granted the Calvinists in some states; but the Anabaptists and Socinians did not fare so well. In Saxony neither Catholics nor Calvinists were tolerated. The language of the elector in 1528, in his instructions to the visitors of Saxony, was: "We will have no sect nor separation in our territory."

The aversion of the Lutherans to the Calvinists was so strong that Leyser wrote a treatise under the title: "Why we should prefer to have fellowship and friendly intercourse with the Catholics rather than with the Calvinists." Even when the latter endeavored to effect a reconciliation with their Lutheran brethren, these repelled them with words of ignominy and reproach. "They force themselves upon us," it was said, "on the ground that the differences between us are but trifling. Let them consider whether they do not thereby render their cause suspicious; for in church history we do not find that the orthodox approached heretics, but that Arians and Nestorians made advances to the orthodox." A certain Philip Nicolai went so far, in 1597, as to affirm that the Calvinists worshipped, not God, but the Devil. "Their hearts are inwardly and through and through and all over bedeviled" (eingeteufelte, durchgeteufelte und überteufelte). When the Huguenots perished by thousands on the scaffold, a Hutter could say: "What the Sacramentarians suffer, they suffer on account of a false and unauthorized religion. The laws against these men proceed from duty, not from persecution; from just government, not from tyranny." A Lutheran bishop in Denmark was sentenced to death for recommending to his clergy to make themselves acquainted with the writings of Calvin and Peter Martyr. He was graciously pardoned, and only dismissed from office.

HAGENBACH'S LECTURES ON THE CHURCH HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE AGES.[1]

These volumes complete the series of the author's popular lectures on church history. He began the publication in 1834, with the first of six volumes on the third period, extending from the Reformation to the present time. Of the first, second, fifth, and sixth parts, or volumes, a third edition has appeared; of the third and fourth, a second edition. Next followed his Lectures on Ancient Church History, in two volumes, the last of which was published in 1855. As the author is a critical and careful historian, there is nothing alarming in the word "popular," as applied to his lectures. They were actually delivered to a mixed, popular audience; but are such lectures as few men can give. They may be characterized as furnishing pleasant reading for the theologian, and solid reading for others. The volumes on the Middle Ages represent the spirit, as well as the more striking features, of the times. They give graphic pictures of the institutions and more prominent events of a period whose detailed history is to most readers not a little wearisome. The character of the age is shown rather by choice characteristic specimens than by a running narrative of general history. After all the dull and dry books that have been written on the subject, we ought to be grateful to any author who, without being false to history, or rambling and superficial, furnishes for us such entertaining reading. These lectures of Hagenbach will, for clergymen and theological students, be an excellent supplement to manuals commonly used in courses of theological instruction.

HISTORICAL VIEWS OF THE MANNERS AND MORALS OF ROME, from the Time of Augustus to the last of the Antonines, by L. Friedlander.[2]

The learned author tells us, in his preface, that he has spent many years in collecting materials for his work, and the execution of this first volume shows that he has studied his subject thoroughly. Indeed, we doubt whether much matter is left to be gleaned by others after him. The subject itself is one of great interest, and is rendered particularly attractive by being taken, as far as possible, from the impressions of eye-witnesses, as found scattered in the writings of ancient authors. Where no such pictures from original hands, are furnished, combinations have been made by the author from such data as are left upon record. In foot-notes are references to authorities, with well-chosen passages from works that are rare or not easily accessible. The volume before us treats of the city of Rome in forty-four pages; of the court, in one hundred and twelve pages; of the three orders of the state — senators, knights, and burgesses, in forty-three; of social intercourse, in fifty-four; and of Roman women, in eighty-four. Hardly any book could be more welcome to the scholar. It throws much light on the subject treated of by Schmidt in his Essay on the Civil Society in the Roman world.

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[1] Vorlesungen über die Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters, von K. N. Hagenbach. 2 Theile. Leipzig: 1860, 1861.

[2] Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms in der zeit von August bis zum Ausgang der Antonine von Ludwig Friedlander. Erster Theil. Leipzig: 1862.

CHRESTOMATHIE DES PROSATEURS FRANCAIS du Quatorzième au seiziéme Siècle avec une Grammaire et un Lexique, etc., par Charles Monnard. Genève et Paris. 1862.

The fact that Monnard is Professor at the University of Bonn, is presumptive evidence that his book is a scholarly production. He has evidently been trained in the school of Diez. The work consists of three parts, or three octavo volumes, of 218, 119, and 196 pages respectively. The first part contains a history of the language from its origin, a Grammar of the old French, and a Lexicon. The second part is an elementary reader, beginning with selections from the sixteenth century and going backward to the fourteenth, on the principle of proceeding from the known to the unknown. The third part is a larger reader for the more advanced student, with a series of extracts in a chronological order, beginning with Froissart in 1337, and ending with Montaigne in 1592. An excellent companion to this book may be found in J. L. Ideler's History of the old French National Literature, with Numerous Specimens of the Language (Geschichte der Altfranzösischen Literatur), containing 368 pages of selections from the early poets, with an explanation of the obsolete words. Diez's Grammar of the Romance Language (Grammatik der romanische Sprache), which traces the modern languages of Latin origin to their source, is an excellent aid in the study of the old French, as it gives the laws by which the Latin words pass into the French and other kindred languages. For the sake of completeness of information for the young reader, we will add that G. L. Städler's French Grammar (Wissenschafttiche Grammatik der Französichen Sprache, Berlin, 1843), treats of the language as growing out of the Latin, which is the only method that is adapted to persons of a classical education.

We propose here to call the attention of our readers to some five or six valuable books of an earlier date, not hitherto noticed in this journal. First among these we do not hesitate to place K. Helmrich's History of the Grand Duchy of Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach, for the School and Family; pp. 139, 1852 (Geschichte des Grossherzogthums Sachsen-Weimar-Eisenach für Schule und Haus). One of the chief difficulties to be overcome in the study of German history, is that arising from the great number of states belonging to the confederacy. Only at short intervals has Germany been so united as to admit of being treated as a single state. Whatever political changes have taken place, or new divisions of territory, the people themselves have, in their native *Gaus*, preserved their peculiarities in a remarkable degree. A general history of Germany, which should represent only what is common to the different states, would be as unmeaning as a history of our own country treated as a unity without reference to the separate states. It cannot be expected that foreigners shall, except in rare cases, study minutely the history of all the German states; but it is desirable that they make themselves acquainted with two or three, of the greatest historical interest, as representatives of the whole; Saxony, both the kingdom and the several duchies, belongs to this class. The book before us, being confined to the united duchies of Weimar and Eisenach, presents a somewhat microscopic specimen of German history; but it is all the more distinct on that account. The reader's mind is kept constantly fixed upon the territory and population of old Thuringia, a district which has preserved, as few others have, its characteristic features through all its various fortunes. It was the land of the Thuringian Landgraves; of the Minnesingers; of Luther's ancestors; of Wartburg; of the *Goldene Aue* and the residences of the Saxon emperors; of Boniface the Apostle of Germany; of Lewis the Springer, who saved himself by leaping from the castle of Gièbchenstein into the river Saale, and who built Wartburg; of Elizabeth the Thuringian saint; of the Iron Lewis, whose history is adorned with so many beautiful traditions.

SANCTI AUGUSTINI CONFESSIONES, herausgegeben und erläutert (edited and explained) von Karl von Raumer.

The editor was for many years accustomed to read these Confessions with a small circle of his pupils, meeting with them one evening in the week, and examining and explaining very carefully a very few pages at each exercise. The substance of the explanations of the words and thoughts of the Latin Father, modified by the study of several years, is given in the notes. In no other way could the editor be so well prepared to judge what parts needed explanation, and what proportion the notes should bear to the text. On an average the notes occupy about one third of each page. Those who know the character of von Raumer, both as a scholar and as a Christian, will need no assurance of his preëminent fitness for his task. The paper and type of this edition are both beautiful. These interesting and invaluable Confessions of the great Bishop of Hippo, can now be read by the German scholar in an edition worthy of the subject.

H. OTTE'S OUTLINES OF THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF ECCLESIASTICAL ART IN GERMANY IN THE MIDDLE AGES; with one hundred and eighteen

wood-cuts. 1855. (Grundzüge der kirchlichen Kunst-Archäologie des deutschen Mittelalters).

These outlines are an abridgment of the author's larger work on the same subject. The book is admirably arranged and well written. All the topics are compactly presented in leading paragraphs or sections, to which are subjoined remarks in a smaller type, with sufficient fulness of details to satisfy the general reader. The manual is a model of its kind; and is as elegantly executed as the volume above noticed.

F. VON SODEN'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE HISTORY OF THE REFORMATION AND OF THE MANNERS OF THE TIMES, with special reference to Christopher Scheurl II. Nuremberg: 1855. (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Reformation und der Sitten jener Zeit mit besonderem Hinblick auf Christof Scheurl II)

A more perfect book, in the antiquarian line, cannot easily be found. Scheurl was a distinguished student of law at Bologna, afterwards Professor and Rector at the University of Wittemburg, where he was the intimate friend of Luther and Melancthon, and for the greater and more important part of his life, one of the first men in rank and office in the government of Nuremburg, his native city. The author draws from the unpublished documents and records of that city an amount of new and curious matter relating to all the great men and events, religious and political, of the times, which fills the reader with astonishment. The details of the life and manners of the people, and of the doings of the government of the renowned city of Nuremburg, are poured out in one incessant stream — single paragraphs extending not lest than forty or fifty pages. It is a book of facts, not dissertations; full to overflowing, and yet fresh in interest. No man of antiquarian tastes can lay down the volume until he has finished it. Men of other tastes will do well to abstain from it altogether.

THE SCHOOL SYSTEM OF THE PRUSSIAN STATE, historically developed. By L. von Rönne (das Unterrichts-Wesen des Preussischen Staats in seiner geschichtlichen Entwickelung) in 2 vols. Berlin: 1854, 1855.

These volumes form a part of a large and elaborate legal work on the Constitution and Administration of the Prussian State. Its materials are drawn from the laws of the state, and the instructions issued from its several bureaus, as found in the public archives. This is the only complete work that has been published on the Prussian system of instruction, founded directly on the school-laws. In its character it holds an intermediate place between a codification of the school-laws and a popular representation of the system, like that of Cousin. It is the highest authority on the subject, and gives a complete legal and historical view of all that pertains to it.

The rescripts of the ministers of instruction are not like our general laws, giving no clue to the actual working of the system of education; but they enter minutely into all the details of the methods of instruction in the several branches taught, specifying the authors and even the passages to be read, as well as the manner in which they are to be taught. The principal of a school could not prescribe more exactly the labors of his assistant teachers. The first volume contains the history and general view of education in Prussia, and that part of the special view which relates to the lower schools. The second volume is wholly devoted to the higher schools, including the gymnasia (and other schools of similar rank), the universities, and all professional and technical schools. The work is a vast storehouse of knowledge; but it must be studied, like a text-book of law, in order to be understood. It is not a book to be read in course.

THE second volume of Prantl's History of Logic (Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, 1861), includes the flourishing period of scholasticism. It is a work of immense research, and leaves little to be said on the subject. The author maintains, not without reason, that what is usually called the scholastic philosophy, is not philosophy, but logic merely. This history of logic is, therefore, for the period of the Middle Ages — what has been called a history of philosophy, presented in a new, interesting, and instructive light. In the newly-awakened interest in the study of logic, such a work can hardly fail to attract attention.

Carl Ritter's History of Geography and Geographical Discovery (Geschichte der Erdkunde und der Entdeckungen, 1861), edited according to his direction by his pupil, H. A. Daniel, with a portrait of the author, is cordially welcomed by the numerous pupils of the distinguished geographer It is in one volume, and extends to the age of Columbus.

Friederich von Raumer's Memoirs and Correspondence (Lebenserrinnerungen und Briefwichsel, 1861), in two volumes, will be read in England and America with almost as much interest as in Germany. A fearless and independent writer, a good compiler, though not always sufficiently critical as an investigator, he has received more praise and more blame than falls to the lot of ordinary men. In his reminiscences and letters he appears to be fully aware of his position in the literary world, and, with general good humor, stands up bravely in his own defence. The active part of his life till 1811, is presented in a sort of irregular autobiography; the second volume is almost wholly taken up with his letters from 1811 to 1836. The book furnishes, in about equal proportions, entertainment and historica information.

The History of Greece, by E. Curtius (Greichische Geschichte von Ernst Curtius), second volume, 1861, bringing the narrative down to the end of the Peloponnesian war, not only sustains its high character, but even improves as it advances. The ingenious theories, for which the traditional period offered such temptations, disappear in the period of authentic history. The age of Pericles, so splendid in poetry, literature, and art, is described with great truth and beauty. The political condition of Greece, and the great men of Athens, are represented with the author's well-known artistic power.

E. C. Baur's Christian Church in the Middle Ages (die christliche Kirche des Mittelalters, 1861), in its leading historical developments, published after the author's death, is a continuation of his two former publications, "Christianity and the Church in the first three Centuries" and "The Christian Church from the beginning of the fourth to the end of the sixth Century," and reaches to the Reformation. This is one of the author's best productions; being equally distinguished for the learning it displays, for the keen penetration of the views it presents, and the historical skill with which the materials are wrought up. His peculiar theory is less prominent and less offensive here, than in the first of the above-named works.

Polenz's History of French Calvinism.[1]

The author of the above work will be recognized by many of our readers as the genial Major Polenz of Halle. Not a few of our countrymen who have resorted to the auditoriums of Tholuck and Mueller, have had reason to reckon the society of this truly amiable and Christian gentleman among the highest privileges of their residence abroad. All such will be pleased to learn that the great work upon which he has been so long engaged is steadily approaching its completion.

But the work has an intrinsic value, which will carry it far beyond the circles of personal friendship, beyond the limits of a confession, beyond the boundaries of a nation. When finished, it will be the most *complete* delineation of its subject in any language. The author's point of view, who is neither a theologian nor politician, by profession, neither anxious to write his theme *up* nor to write it *down*, is eminently favorable to historic fidelity, philosophic insight, and Christian catholicity. The work is what it claims to be, — a *history*. This very excellence will prove, if we mistake not, a disadvantage to it at first. The spirit of confession and party prevails so strongly at present in Germany, that an impartial author finds but a small public. For the present the motto of each little clan — be it literary, political, scientific, theological, or churchly — seems to be: "Whoever is not for us is against us." The current literature is "*tendiös*" to an unexampled degree. As Merle d'Aubigné's work has found many times more readers in England and in the United States than in France and Germany, so it would not be at all surprising if the field of Maj. Polenz's success should prove to be outside the boundaries of Germany.

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[1] Geschichte des französischen Calvinismus bis zur Nationalversammlung im Jahre 1789. Zum Theil aus handschriftlichen Quellen: von Gottlob von Polenz. Gotha: F. A. Perthes. 3 volumes, 8vo. pp. 736, 720, 480.

The comprehensiveness of the work will appear from a brief statement of its plan. The first volume contains a delineation of the rise, spread, consolidation, characteristics, and fortunes of the French Reformation till the rising of Amboise, 1560. Thus far the history of French Calvinism is religious history. From this point until the edict of Nismes, A. D. 1629, its history is political history, and is so treated. The second part of the work covers this period, and has the special title: "History of Political French Calvinism." The second volume contains the first part of this special history, and brings the narrative of events down to the accession of Henry III., A. D. 1574. Volume third is entitled "Political French Calvinism in Idea, and its Literature." This is the profoundest treatise on the political relations and influences and literature of Calvinism which has every fallen under the writer's eye. Valuable as are these already published volumes, the American theological public will await with far greater interest the issue of the fourth. In this the author promises to set forth "the influence of French Calvinism on English Puritanism, Scotch Presbyterianism, and North American Puritanism — more important than all."

The attitude of the author towards the peculiar views of Calvin is by no means that of mere indifference. With Neander, he scouts the idea of an opinionless historian; and in view of the influence which a writer's personal views must exert on his apprehension and statement of others' opinions, he deems it proper candidly to state his own point of view, which he modestly does in the following terms:

"Der Verfasser glaubt dem nachstehenden Versuchre über die Praedestionslehre Calvins die Erklärung vorausschicken zu müssen, dass er diese Lehre oder die der absoluten Gnadenwahl, neben und mit der allgemeinen Gnade in der heiligen Schrift klar ausgesprochen und fest begründet findet, dass er die Uebereinstimmung beider Lehren zwar nicht zu fassen vermag, aber von derselben lebendig überzeugt ist, und dass er nicht versteht wie es möglich ist, bei Schwächung jener ersten Lehre, der Annahme eines, wenn auch noch geringen Antheils menchlechen Verdienstes, und dem Vorwurfe des Semipelagianismus und des mit ihem verwandten Synergismus zu entgehen. Mit dieser Erklärung muss er *die* verbinden, mit Calvin an die Unverlierbarkeit der Gnade zu glauben weil er dieselbe für machtiger hält, als die menschliche Sünde und Schwacheit und Hindeutungen auf die Gnadenwahl auch in dem Alltagsleben zu finden. Endlich aber muss er den eigentlichen Abschluss in das demüthige *non liquet* ausgehen lassen, dessen er als Nichttheolge, um so weniger sich zu schämen braucht, als die kühnsten Speculationen Calvins und Beza's doch endlich unwillkürlich in dasselbe auslaufen, und ein grosser deutscher

Gottesgelehrte [Melanchthon] es bestimmt ausspricht." — Vol. I, pp. 524, 525.

As to the political affinities of the French Calvinists, our author finds them revolutionary, but no more so than the doctrines of many contemporary Lutherans, and even Roman Catholics. Despite these affinities, he thinks himself warranted in attributing the salvation of the French monarchy during the wars of Henry III. and the Ligue to the political influence of French Calvinism, and finds himself supported in this view by no less an authority than Ranke. This part of his work the author has evidently done *con amore.* In many places it reminds one of Bancroft. No student of modern history, especially of the *Vorgeschichte* of that " world-historical event, the French Revolution, should overlook this work.

Of course the time for a thorough review of the whole work will not arrive until it shall have been completed, or at least until the author has given us his views of American Calvinism and its relation to the French. We hope a kind and favoring Providence may permit us to see the successful completion of the task so well commenced.

LANGE'S BIBELWERK.[1]

The appearance of the second edition of Parts I, II, III, IV, V, and VI of Dr. J. P. Lange's Bibelwerk, furnishes us a favorable opportunity to call the attention of our readers anew to this truly valuable publication. It is not a mere commentary, in the ordinary acceptation of the word, but a many-sided, encyclopaedic work, embodying the latest and most valuable results of German investigation in every department of biblical, theological, and homiletical study — the whole collected, organized, and elaborated in the interest of genuine historic and living Christianity. The thoroughness of its elaboration may be seen from the demands of its plan, which is as follows: 1. After the preliminary general introductions, comes a special introduction to the book in hand, and an organic analysis, furnishing a clear understanding of the leading ideas of the whole and their connection. 2. Then follow the individual subdivisions, with their appropriate superscriptions and tables of contents. 3. Original translations of the text in paragraphs, with critical foot-notes. 4. After each paragraph, a section containing " the properly *theologische, historisch-exegetische*" notes, with reference to homiletic convenience. 5. A section, giving prominence to the "*dogmatisch-christologische Grundgedanken*" of the paragraph, introducing 6. the final section in which the homiletic themes and truths suggested by the leading ideas of the paragraph are given. This last section is of peculiar value to the preacher. After the writer has given his best thoughts, he presents his reader a choice selection of apothems, topics, illustrative reflections and suggestions carefully gleaned from famous fathers, commentators, preachers, etc., from all periods of church history, often thirty or forty in number. Indeed, the whole work is wrought out in fidelity to the statement of the title-page: "*with especial reference to the necessities of the pastoral office.*" In the prospectus of the publishers, we read that the work "is designed for a definitely limited circle of readers, that of evangelical clergymen, *to the exclusion of all other necessities or points of view.*" To this design the various co-laborers have thus far proved true, and are reaping their reward in the marked appreciation which has everywhere greeted their labors—an appreciation so great as actually to inconvenience and delay both the authors and publishers by rendering a second edition of the first numbers necessary before the work could be completed. To prevent the recurrence of such delay in the further prosecution of the work, the editions of the parts now issuing are so large that no new edition may be expected for many years.

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[1] Theologisch-homiletisches Bibelwerk. Die Heilige Schrift Alten und Neuen Testaments mit Rücksicht auf das theologisch-homiletische Bedürfniss des pastoralen Amtes; in Verbindung mit namhaften evangelischen Theologen bearbeitet und herausgegeben von J. P. Lange. Verlag von Velhagen und Klasing, Bielefeld. 8vo. In parts.

Fourteen parts are already before the public; among them: I. Matthew, with a General Introduction to the whole New Testament, by Dr. Lange; II. Mark, by Dr. Lange; III. Luke, by Dr. J. J. van Oostterzee (pastor in Rotterdam); IV. John, by Dr. Lange; V. Acts of the Apostles, by Drs. G. Lechler and K. Gerok; VII. Epistles to the Corinthians, by Dr. C. F. Kling; VIII. Galations, by Otto Schmoller; XI. The Pastoral Epistles and Philemon, by Dr. van Oosterzee; XII. Hebrews, by Dr. C. B. Moll; XIV. Epistles of Peter and that of Jude, by Dr. G. F. C. Fronmüller. Three new parts are promised this year. The price of the fourteen parts already issued is but ten thalers, two silber-groschen.

SUDHOFF'S HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH.[1]

To those whose acquaintance with German theological literature has been confined to those miracles of learning and profundity for which it is so peculiarly distinguished, this work would seem a curiosity. It is nothing less than a complete history of the Church from the time of its founding down to the present day—the whole originally delivered in the form of lectures, to a mixed popular audience at Frankfort. It was a bold and hazardous project, and surely none but a master could have carried it through with such complete success. During the delivery of the lectures the young pastor retained the unflagging attention of his audience, and on publishing received the most flattering encomiums from the press at large. The work has attained a second edition, and seems to find undiminished appreciation.

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[1] Geschichte der christlichen Kirche; in Vorlesungen dargestellt. Von Lic. Karl Sudhoff. Sauerländer, Frankfort-on-the-Maine. Second edition. 1862. 8vo. 2 parts. pp. 486, 546.

A warm evangelical and catholic spirit pervades the whole portraiture, and it is hoped its pleasing pages may do much to re-awaken a taste in the cultivated circles of Germany for a healthier-toned reading. Mr. Sudhoff is favorably known in Germany by other publications; e. g. his "Kommunion-buch," numerous contributions to Herzog's Cyclopaedia, etc. He is a promising representative of the new liberal evangelical party.

HUPFELD ON THE PSALMS.[1]

We have before us the fourth and concluding volume of the Commentary on the Psalms, edited by the venerable and honored successor of Gesenius at Halle. Before his election to the post which he has now occupied for nearly twenty years, he had acquired a very high reputation for extensive and profound learning in the Hebrew and cognate languages. His "Exercitationes Aethiopicae," published in 1825, and dedicated to his friend and patron Gesenius as "Studiorum Orientalium Primitiae, and Part I of his Hebrew Grammar, published in 1842, had attracted much attention and raised high the public expectation. His constant and pressing labors, and his unwillingness to send forth through the press any work of much pretension so long as he could be laboring to perfect it, have confined his reputation, in a great degree, to his native land. Others have read his contributions to the "Studien und Kritiken," the journal of the German Oriental Society, the "Zeitschrift," known as Müller's, and perhaps some of his monographs in University Programs, and have wished to have more of the results of his labor and learning in the interpretation of the scriptures. In the lecture-room and in private life, he has been known and honored for his high enthusiasm in his calling, and his genial Christian spirit. As a critic, he is thorough, positive, and somewhat combative. With Hengstenberg and Ewald, he is especially at variance, as the preface to his first volume abundantly shows. We hope that the purpose, which we know he has cherished, of publishing a commentary on the historical books of the Old Testament, may now be carried into execution. The present work was called out by an invitation to superintend and revise a new edition of De Wette's Commentary. To do this, and leave the work with anything of its old form, was found impossible. Another editor was found for DeWette; and we have before us the results of Professor Hupfeld's own labor.

The first impression which the work makes upon us, is that of immense labor and learning, and unexampled richness in exegetical material. The fact that the author, a man so learned and so positive in his views, had published so little, makes it impossible to avoid the discussion of many grammatical and lexicographical points at considerable length. Furthermore, he is never content with stating merely his own results with their justification. He traces back each important opinion, each type of interpretation, to the earliest ascertainable authority. He cites, therefore, not merely modern commentators, but the Jewish and the earliest Christian interpreters. Calvin he holds in especial esteem. His work is thus made a storehouse of historical knowledge in its department. An exceedingly compressed and abbreviated typography enables him to bring within moderate limits an unusual amount of material.

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[1] Die Psalmen. Ubersetz und ausgelecht von Dr. Hermann Hupfeld, ordentlichem Professor du Theologie zu Halle. Gotha: Perthus. 1855–62. pp. xxiii, 439; vi. 424; 482; 478.

The author has appended to his last volume the discussions which are more frequently made introductory. In pp. 419–478 he discusses title, subjects and classification, religious and moral character, Messianic relations, poetical character, rhythm, historical relations, history of the collection, superscriptions, liturgical directions, and the history of interpretation.

In relation to the other scriptures of the Old Testament, the author regards the Psalms as of peculiar interest and value, inasmuch as they present "the subjective religion of the Old Testament," while the historical and prophetical books present the objective side, "the ways of God with men." Accordingly he treats the Psalms as, without exception, composed or compiled for the expression of individual religious life, as never written with a didactic purpose, however instructive they may be, never for liturgical use, however naturally appropriated to such use in later times. The elevation of this life, in communion with God and through communications from God, gives us in some Psalms the pressage, "bold for those times," of an eternal life, long before this idea passed over into general conviction and public doctrine.

As will have been inferred from the incidental allusions made in the January number of the Bibliotheca (pp. 188, 206, 209), the author does not fully vindicate the imprecatory Psalms. His language is (IV. 432): "That such utterances, from the Christian point of view, and for us, are no longer allowed nor in the least a model for us; that we may no longer adopt them in speech and song, cannot be doubtful to the unprejudiced and clear-minded Christian."

With reference to the prophetic, and more especially the Messianic Psalms, the author rejects alike the mere grammatico-historical and the allegorical interpretation, and the theory of a double sense — allowing, indeed, a higher spiritual significance with the grammatical, not as distinct from it, but coëxisting with it as "two sides of the same sense with an organic interpenetration." The prophetic or typical is therefore for the most part more or less unconscious, and "always genial, ideal, indefinitely floating over history," so that "it cannot apply to accidental external circumstances in the history of Jesus." As "poetry lives in the present, while the Messiah is an ideal of the future, there is not much that is specifically Messianic to be expected"; i. e. referring to a *personal* Messiah. While the general Messianic anticipations are ardent and confident, the author admits no recognition of a suffering Messiah or of a resurrection.

As would be expected from the author's stringent and consistent critical principles, he does not admit the authority of a single one of the historical superscriptions, either in respect to authorship or the occasion of the composition; nor does he find sufficient internal evidence to decide the question in any case, nor does he regard it as of the least importance to decide.

In regard to the poetic form of the Psalms, the author's very extensive and thorough studies in regard to accent, rhythm, and other related matters, make him of the very highest authority.

We have perhaps sufficiently indicated Prof. Hupfeld's position, and the main characteristics of his work. However much we may be ready to assume beyond him of a New Testament and its Christianity in the Old, his Commentary we regard indispensable to those who would thoroughly study the Psalms, or indeed the Hebrew language and scriptures in general.

MEYER'S GREEK AND LATIN COMPARATIVE GRAMMAR.[1]

In this volume we have another sign and result of the vigor and success with which studies in comparative philology are prosecuted in Germany. The author is one of the younger men at Göttingen. In this work he enters into the most thorough investigation of the Greek and Latin languages, partly for the sake of the better exhibition of the common characteristics and peculiarities of each, but more particularly in order to ascertain the common type, the earliest "sprachzustand" of this Greek-Latin family pair.

Two thirds of the volume before us the author devotes to an inquiry into the vocal elements of the two languages. The remainder is devoted to a discussion of roots and radical verbs. We welcome all such treatises, and believe that every year is developing in this country a taste for them and an appreciation of them. Many classical scholars will rejoice in the possession of such a work as this, who are hardly prepared to venture upon the length and breadth, the certainties and uncertainties, of the science in any more extensive form.

SCHLEICHER'S COMPARATIVE GRAMMAR.[2]

Other works in the same department have made the name of the author (Prof. Schleicher of Jena) familiar to philologists. We need mention only his "Sprachvergleichende Abhandlungen," of 1850, and his "Deutsche Sprache," of 1860. The introduction asks that this work may be received, and judged simply as a compendium for beginners in the studies of this department. Experience in the lecture-room had indicated the want of a manual in the students hands to which the lecturer could refer, especially for the paradigms and full and varied examples. This work designs to supply this want, and is based upon the author's course of lectures, as delivered year by year at Jena. It takes up but two of the departments of grammar. phonology and "morphology" (as the author calls the doctrine of forms).

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[1] Vergleichende Grammatik der Griechischen und Lateinischen Sprache, von Les Meyer. Erster Band. pp. 449. Berlin: 1861.

[2] Compendium der vergleichenden Grammatik der Indogermanischen Sprachen von August Schleicher. Vol. I. pp, iv, 283. Weimar: 1861.

The volume before us contains the phonology : we have first a tabular view of the sounds in the original Indo-Germanic language; i.e. those out of which the sounds of the different Indo-Germanic languages have been developed according to phonetic laws, and to which they point back as their common source. The author then discusses in detail, first the vowels and then the consonants, first of this original language and then of the eight secondary languages or groups which constitute the family. The laws of modification are given in each case, as well as the elementary sounds. The work appears to us well designed and well executed, and we think must attract much more study to this exceedingly interesting and important department of philology.

ARTICLE VIII.

RECENT ENGLISH WORKS.

WESTCOTT'S INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE GOSPELS.[1]

Mr. Westcott has published two works of the deepest interest to the students of the New Testament; to wit, *A History of the New Testament Canon during the first four Centuries*, and *Introduction to the Study of the Gospels.* It is to this latter work, recently published by Gould & Lincoln, under the editorial care of Prof. Hackett, that we would now call the attention of our readers. It is not at all in the track of the usual introductions to the New Testament, but is quite original in its design and unique in its execution. It is *subjective* rather than *objective*, and deals with the *soul* rather than with the *body* of the gospels. It is intended to show the state of mind, the intellectual and moral atmosphere in which the gospels were produced, and to point out the historical circumstances which led to the peculiar religious ideas in which the writings of the New Testament had their origin. He begins with an elaborate and yet very plain and common-sense discussion of the inspiration, the completeness, and the interpretation of Holy scripture. He then comes to the preparation for the gospel as shown in the moral developments of the Oriental, Greek, and Jewish literature in the generations preceding the advent of Christ.

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[1] Introduction to the Study of the Gospels; with historical and explanatory Notes. By Brooks Foss Westcott, A.M., formerly Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, etc., etc. The American edition of this work is published by Gould & Lincoln, Boston; with an Introduction by Horatio B. Hackett, D D., Professor in Newton Theological Institution. 12mo., pp. 476.

Then he has a full development of the Jewish doctrine, both ancient and modern, of the Messiah. This is followed by a very able discussion of the origin of the gospels as we now have them in the New Testament, a discriminating characterizing of the three synoptic gospels, Matthew, Mark, and Luke, and of the relation of the Gospel of John to its three predecessors. He then has a very fair examination of the differences in detail or discrepancies of the synoptic gospels, and a careful solution of the difficulties in the gospels. In the Appendix several important topics are taken up which could not so well come into the body of the work. Among these are a history of the primitive doctrine of inspiration, an account of the traditionary notices of our Lord's words and works, a review of some of the more important apocryphal gospels, and other topics of a like kind.

The reader will see at once the importance and interest of all these subjects, especially at the present time, and in view of recent discussions ; and we can assure him that they are all treated in the spirit of a ripe and genuine scholarship, and the reverential and loving tone of a pure Christianity.

Prof. Hackett has enhanced the value of the American edition by giving to it a well-written Introduction, and adding a few brief notes, such as we might expect from a Christian scholar like him.

At this day, when there is so much of scepticism as to the authority and the authenticity of scripture, when reviews and essays have emanated from the bosom of the English church itself, of a character that we should scarcely have expected from the native land of rationalism, a work like this is greatly needed ; and it ought to be in the hands of every intelligent believer.

PROF. MAURICE ON THE APOCALYPSE.[1]

If we may borrow a phrase from French politics, and designate the Commentary on the Apocalypse by Mr. Eliot as the *extreme right* of interpretation, this one by Prof. Maurice might well be called the *extreme left*, while Dr. Wordsworth and Dean Alford would be respectively on the *right* and *left centre*. There is nothing more encouraging in the whole de partment of sacred interpretation, than the manner in which the ablest minds are taking hold of this mysterious but delightful and most useful book; for most useful it has always been; most wonderfully has it accomplished the purpose for which it was originally written, notwithstanding all the diversities and errors and extravagancies of interpretation which have prevailed in regard to it. It was written for the encouragement of the good in times of depression and persecution, by giving them the most emphatic assurances of the triumph of right over wrong, of Christ over Satan. This it does by a series of graphic and poetic symbols, having *springing and germinant accomplishment throughout many ages, though the height or fulness of them may refer to some one age;* representing the philosophy of history through all time, and not the specific history of any particular periods. The Christians of each historic period have applied these symbols to the particular events most interesting and significant to them; and in this they were not so far wrong, inasmuch as the symbols do include those events; but the error is in supposing that these events are *specifically* and *exclusively* indicated by the symbols. These particular events are indicated only as they belong to the *class* which the symbols represent *generally*, not *specifically*. The seals, for example, are fulfilled, time after time, in all the cycles of history, with springing and germinant accomplishment throughout many ages: the sixth seal is the culmination of each subordinate cycle of judgments, and has its height and fulness of accomplishment in the general judgment of the last great day. The error alluded to, therefore, is not wholly an error; it is an error, not of *inclusion*, but of *exclusion;* and the idea being correct so far as the general intention of the prophecy is concerned — the true is not so far obscured by the false as to vitiate its moral effect. Such schemes of specific historic application as those of Eliot and Barnes must be given up; and some approach must be made toward the methods of Maurice and Duesterdieck, though by them the *generic* view is doubtless carried to an extreme; and it gives altogether less of prophecy than the sacred writer originally intended.

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[1] Lectures on the Apocalypse ; or, Book of Revelation of St. John the Divine. By F. D. Maurice, M.A., Incumbent St. Peters, Vere Street. Cambridge: Macmillan & Co. 1861.

It is not wonderful that there can be such a diversity of historical applications of the symbols of the Apocalypse, and its moral influence still be in accordance with the original intention; for while the specific application is, to an extent of the right class, it is so far correct, and errs only in excluding other events of the same class. This idea begins to be clearly apprehended, and later scholars are converging towards an agreement in regard to the book; and we can now read commentaries on the Apocalypse with a real satisfaction once unknown. The Revelation can be studied with great interest and advantage without any specific historical application of its symbols whatever; and this is what Prof. Maurice undertakes, and quite successfully too, to teach his readers to do.

Among the various English works lying on our table, and demanding a brief notice, are: the second edition of Richard Owen's celebrated treatise entitled, "Palaeontology; or, a Systematic Summary of Extinct Animals and their Geological Relations"; a rich edition of Rev. Dr. R. D. Hampden's volume entitled: "The Fathers of Greek Philosophy"; an equally attractive edition of Sir George Cornewall Lewis's "Historical Survey of the Astronomy of the Ancients"; the fifth edition — still surpassing the above-named volumes in excellence of typography — of Edward William Lane's "Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians." Each of these works, as many of our readers know, is characterized by extensive and varied learning. — We have also before us, the first volume of the "Works of the late Horace Hayman Wilson," which is devoted to "Essays and Lectures chiefly on the Religion of the Hindus: collected and edited by Dr. Reinhold Rost"; also an important volume by Rev. George Rawlinson, author of the Bampton Lectures for 1859, which is entitled: "The Contrasts of Christianity with Heathen and Jewish Systems; or, Nine Sermons preached before the University of Oxford on various occasions."—Another collection of sermons, less affluent in thought than the preceding discourses of Rawlinson, is called "The Dangers and Safeguards of Modern Theology; by Archibald Campbell, Lord Bishop of London." We have read many of these discourses, and we find them chaste and elegant in diction, evangelical in tone, respectable in argument, but not especially profound or eloquent. — Another volume of sermons now before us, is written by Rev. Joseph Jacques, and bears the promising title: "The Gospel the only true foundation of Morality." — A more instructive work is the collection of "Lectures on the Book of Proverbs; by the Rev. Ralph Wardlaw, D.D.; edited by his son, Rev. I. S. Wardlaw, A.M." The present edition of these Lectures is for popular use. — A book of rare interest, abounding with illustrative facts, and well worthy of being republished in this country, is entitled: "Conference on Missions, held in 1860, at Liverpool: including the papers read, the conclusions reached, and a comprehensive Index, showing the various matters brought under review: edited by the Secretaries to the Conference." — We should be happy, if our space allowed, to notice critically the second edition of James Craigie Robertson's "History of the Christian Church, Vol. I (A. D. 64—590), and Prof. Alexander Bain's work "On the Study of Character, including an Estimate of Phrenology"; also the second superb edition of the "Replies" to the celebrated "Essays and Reviews. We regard this volume of "Replies" as superior to the "Aids of Faith," another able collection of treatises called forth by the above-named "Essays and Reviews."

ARTICLE IX.

EGYPTOLOGY, ORIENTAL ARCHAEOLOGY AND TRAVEL.

THE long-promised collection of mural and monumental inscriptions selected by Dr. Henri Brugsch, and published by favor of the Viceroy of Egypt, has begun to be issued in parts, simultaneously, at Leipsig and Paris.[1] Fragments of the work have heretofore appeared in the *Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Geschellschaft* ; but the systematic publication of these materials has been delayed by Dr. Brugsch's visit to Persia, under the direction of the Prussian government.

The volume consists of fifty plates, delicately executed on stone, with about sixty pages of preliminary text, explaining the subject-matter of the plates, and in several instances translating the hieroglyphic and demotic inscriptions in detail. The plates are arranged in the order of the places where the originals are found, beginning at Memphis and advancing up the Nile to the island of Philae. The present volume, which is the first of a a series, contains ten inscriptions from Memphis, one from Lycopolis, two from Abydus, three from Tentyra, and thirty-four from Thebes. Several of the plates are printed upon large double sheets, folded in map style. They are all original transcripts by Dr. Brugsch, either of tablets and inscriptions first discovered by himself, or of monuments imperfectly or erroneously copied by his predecessors in this field of inquiry. They are designed to promote Egyptian archaeology in all its branches, and especially to furnish materials for studies in history, mythology, astronomy, and geography.

The first plate is a fine representation of the colossus of Mitrahenny, the site of Memphis, which in grandeur of dimensions and beauty of execution is unsurpassed by any monument on the soil of Egypt. From the hieroglyphics, Dr. Brugsch identifies this as the statue of Rameses II., whom he assigns to the period 1407 – 1341 B. C. On the second plate are sketched two somewhat uncouth statues now in the Royal Museum of Berlin. They are of black granite, and in a very antique style. Dr. Brugsch regards this plate as of a special historical value, indicating both a political and a religious usurpation on the part of Menephthes I., in the fourteenth century, B. C., which was followed by a general persecution. Such claims as these raise a point-blank issue with the scepticism of Sir G. Cornewall Lewis, as to the value of hieroglyphic interpretations. Dr. Brugsch is confident that

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[1] Recueil des Monuments Egyptiens, dessinés sur lieux et publiés sous les auspices de son Altesse le Vice-Roi D'Egypte, Mohammed-Saïd-Pacha, par Le Docteur Henri Brugsch. Leipzig : J. C. Hinrichs. Paris : A. Franck. 1862.

Menephthes I. appropriated to his own use the monuments, titles, and inscriptions of his predecessors, and that he favored the worship of the god Soutech of Tanis, a divinity of another Nome. Plates IV and V, though containing but a few lines of hieroglyphics, present to the eye perhaps the first authentic copies of inscriptions from the sanctuary of Ptah, in the famous temple of Memphis. These were discovered and identified by Dr. Brugsch himself, while roaming about the Arab villages (of detestable memory!). Mitrahenny and Bedréchein, which now defile the site of the ancient capital of Lower Egypt. One of these inscriptions is of the highest historical significance, as proving the mythological connection between the Phoenicians and the Egyptians. The person to whom it relates is styled "prophet of the god *Aàh* (Lunus), who resides in the city of Pe . . ., prophet [of the temple] of the king *Sàhoura* and prophet of the goddess *'Astert*, mistress of two worlds." The importance of this discovery is thus stated by Brugsch:

"That which gives great value to this inscription, is the mention of the foreign goddess Astoreth. In my *Geographische Inschriften*, Vol. I., p. 236, I have shown — citing a number of hieroglyphic passages — that there was at Memphis, in the quarter called Anch-ta (literally, world or land of life), a temple consecrated to the goddess *Baste*, who is identical with the foreign Aphrodite of Memphis, mentioned by Herodotus. The *Astoreth* of our inscription is none other than *Baste*, the first being the foreign name, the latter the Egyptian. The goddess Astoreth, whose name and worship are better known through the traditions and the mythology of the people of Canaan, appears upon the Egyptian monuments as the female form of the god Baal-Soutech. This god, whose name is so often cited in the times when the Egyptians had hostile or friendly relations with the Chéta, the Heathen of the Bible, was worshipped in Lower Egypt long before the date of our inscription. His temples, even his city Avaris or Tanis, are mentioned in papyrus-rolls and in inscriptions upon stone, in a way that favor the belief that his wife, the heavenly queen Astoreth, shared all the honors rendered to her august husband. Astoreth was, moreover, a particular form of the moon. It is not, then, surprising, that the priest to whom our inscription refers is called a 'priest of the moon.' Her worship was adopted by the Egyptians, as well as that of the god Soutech; and we ought to be thankful for the good fortune which has preserved a monument whose existence proves once more the veracity of the father of history, old Herodotus." . . . .

Plate VII presents some features of interest in inscriptions copied from the necropolis of Memphis, illustrating the religious belief of the old Egyptians. The series opens with an invocation to Hormachou, surnamed "the good god who dwelleth in truth," and who is believed to release souls out of perdition, and to assist them by his sealing-ladder into the presence of the Lord of eternity. Persons interested in Egyptian research will not have forgotten the remarkable discovery of a perfect chamber of Apis, made by Mons. Mariette, in the sérapéum of Memphis, in 1851. "By a chance that I can hardly account for," says this fortunate explorer, "a chamber of the tomb of Apis, walled up in the thirtieth year of Rameses II., had escaped the spoilers, and I had the happiness to find it intact. Three thousand seven hundred years had not changed its original aspect. The fingers of the Egyptian who filled in the last stone of the wall built across the entrance, were still marked upon the cement. Naked feet had left their imprint upon the bed of sand deposited in a corner of the mortuary chamber. Nothing was wanting in this last sanctuary of death, where has rested, for nearly forty centuries, an embalmed bull." Dr. Brugsch has transcribed several of the inscriptions of this chamber. Some valuable hints concerning the Egyptian calendar are supplied by Plate XI, with inscriptions from Lycopolis. Plates XV and XVI are copies of a mural inscription on the temple of Tentyra. They give lists of plants, of precious stones and metals, and of liquids used in offerings to Osiris, and also of stuffs employed by the priests in their ceremonies. These may shed light upon the Jewish service. We find mention of the *hen* — the *hin* of the Hebrews — as a measure.

Travellers who have had the pleasure of meeting the French consul at Thebes, Mons. Maunier, will recal his choice collection of Egyptian antiquities, and his enthusiastic devotion to his select museum. In studying this collection, Dr. Brugsch discovered, in the interior of a coffin of sycamore wood, an astronomical representation of peculiar value. Besides the twelve signs of the zodiac, arranged six on either side, there is a grand-central female figure (Plate XVII), representing the celestial ocean, or the principle of humidity, surrounded by symbolical representations of the four winds. The planets Jupiter, Saturn, Mercury, Mars, Venus, are also indicated, and the procreative divinity, the sun, is pictured by his usual symbol. A prayer for the deceased indicates faith in the immortality of the soul: "May thy soul live and rejuvenate itself to all eternity." The deceased, we are told, was aged thirty-one years, five months, and twenty-five days. Still another astronomical subject is presented in Plate XVIII, — a grotesque figure, and even indelicate but for its symbolical meaning. It is the body of a woman, indefinitely elongated, at right angles to her legs and arms, which touch the same plane in parallel lines, the head being downwards. This figure is the divinity spoken of above as the celestial ocean, over which the god Ra navigates in his bark, which bears a different name for each of the twelve hours of the day. The arms of the goddess are toward the west, her legs toward the east, and her elongated body high in air, represents the upper hemisphere. This peculiar hydrographic projecjection — the celestial ocean — reminds us of the Hebrew conception of the waters above the firmament.

Plate XX affords an illustration of the absurdities and monstrosities of the Egyptians in their worship: a creature compounded of man and bull, and surmounted by a crocodile, being used to denote one of the signs in the heavens. In Plate XXVI, the list of the conquests of Tothmosis III. and of his tributaries, illustrates the warlike relations of his reign toward

Assyria and other nations. One of its inscriptions describes "a beautiful harp, wrought of silver, gold, lapis-lazuli, brass, and all manner of precious stones."

A long poem celebrating a victory of Rameses II. is transcribed upon Plates XXIX – XXXII. The remaining plates of this volume are occupied with lists of victories and their spoils, and with fulsome panegyric upon the royal conquerors.

From this brief outline, it is evident that Dr. Brugsch has presented in this collection materials of great value for the study of Egyptian history, science, and art. We shall not fail to advise the readers of the Bibliotheca of the progress of this work in its future numbers.

But how far are his interpretations reliable? Of how much real value are such readings as materials for history? These questions assume new interest in view of the vigorous assault upon the results of Egyptologers by the Rt. Hon. Sir George Cornewall Lewis, in his "*Historical Survey of the Astronomy of the Ancients.*"[1] This remarkable specimen of historical scepticism opens with a tone of modesty that awakens no suspicion of the author's aim. "It has appeared to the author that an attempt might advantageously be made to treat the history of ancient astronomy, without exclusive reference to physical science, and without any pretension on his part to that profound and comprehensive knowledge of modern mathematical astronomy which some of his predecessors in the treatment of this subject have possessed." Yet the tone of the work, throughout, is that of judicial criticism pronouncing authoritatively against the views of the scientific astronomy and chronology of the ancients, which have been set forth by eminent historical authorities. He rejects the opinion that the nundinal period of the Romans was connected with the determination of the civil year, and regards it as merely a convenient market-day arrangement; thus differing from the week, as observed by several oriental nations, which, as the fourth part of a periodic lunar month, is a proper astronomical division. He assigns the Etruscans to a low grade in science, notwithstanding the admiration of Niebuhr for their proficiency. "The profound astronomical science supposed by Niebuhr to have been possessed by the Etruscans in the eighth century B. C., is opposed both to evidence and probability. The Etruscans never made any advance in physical and mathematical science, or even in history and literature. Their nearest approach to astronomy consisted in their observation of lightning for purposes of divination."[2] Mommsen assigns the same low place to the Etruscans both in science and in art. He attaches but little intellectual value to their cosmogony and philosophy, and asserts that scholars must, with whatever reluctance, make up their minds to transfer the Etruscans from the first to the lowest place in the history of Italian art.[3]

Though he allows to the Greeks a higher knowledge of astronomy than existed among the Romans, our author argues that neither their religion, their mythology, nor their divination had any special reference to astronomy, and that much that is imputed to Thales — especially his visit to Egypt, and his prediction of a solar eclipse — is apocryphal. Sir Cornewall Lewis is quite disposed to undervalue the authority of Herodotus. From the history of the astronomy of the Greeks and Romans, — which under its philosophical and scientific aspects occupies two hundred and fifty pages of his work, — the author proceeds to the astronomy of the Babylonians and Egyptians. Here his tendency to a sceptical demolition of prevalent theories is at once evinced by the following remark: "We cannot, consistently with the capacities and tendencies of the oriental mind, suppose that either of these nations ever rose to the conception of astronomy as a science, that they treated it with geometrical methods, or that they attempted to form a system of the universe founded upon an inductive or even upon a speculative basis. The knowledge of geometry ascribed to the Egyptians seems merely to have grown out of their skill in land-measuring. All the extant evidence goes to prove that the scientific geometry of the Greeks was exclusively their own invention. It may be doubted whether any Chaldean or Egyptian priest had a mind sufficiently trained in abstract reasoning to be able to follow the demonstrations of the properties of the conic sections invented by Appollonius."[1] Sir George argues that if any of the Egyptian or Chaldean priests had really possessed the profound and exact knowledge of astronomy which is attributed to them in a body, he would have gained an individual reputation, and his name would have come down to us through Plato, Aristotle, or some other of the earlier writers. This argument, however has little weight; since these writers could hardly be expected to chronicle in detail the celebrities of remote countries, and since such personal references may have perished in the lost literature of antiquity.

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[1] One volume, 8vo. pp. 527. London: Parker, Son, and Bourn. 1862.

[2] p. 56.

[3] Hist. of Rome, Book I. Chap. XII. and XV.

The most striking portion of the volume under review, is the chapter on the early history and chronology of the Egyptians. The author concedes that up to the date of Psammetichus, 670 B. C., "we may consider the Egyptian chronology as determined, within moderate limits of error, upon trustworthy evidence." Yet he considers the alleged circumnavigation of Africa in the time of Neco, the successor of Psammetichus, as too imperfectly attested, and too improbable in itself to be regarded as a historical fact. Beyond the era of Psammetichus, according to our author, Egyptian history is vague and unreliable: the royal list of Manetho is the result of his own invention; the primitive kings are nothing more than a long procession of regal spectres, like the series of fabulous British kings beginning with Brutus the grandson of Aeneas, who migrated to Britain, and ending with the invasion of Julius Caesar. Much of what is called Egyptian history has evidently been borrowed from the Greek mythology. The extensive conquests of Sesostris and his vast armies, are marvellous figments, unworthy of any credit; and in everything relating to the antiquities of Egypt, Herodotus was imposed upon by the cunning of the priests. This sweeping incredulity Sir Cornewall Lewis justifies by the argument that, since Herodotus, Manetho, Eratosthenes, and Diodorus all alike derived their information respecting Egyptian antiquity from the priests, and the sacred books in the temples, the vast discordance between their several lists of kings, proves that the priests had no authentic written records of their ancient history,— which would have furnished the same facts to all investigators, — but fabricated stories to satisfy these inquisitive and over-credulous chroniclers. Rejecting as fabulous the high claims of Egyptian antiquity, he gives it as his conclusion, that there is no sufficient ground for placing any of the buildings and great works extant in the time of Herodotus, at a date anterior to the building of the temple of Solomon, 1012 B. C.; and regarding the reading of the hieroglyphics as arbitrary and indeterminate, he treats all the results of Egyptology as barren, uncertain, and worthless.

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[1] p. 278.

The author is especially severe upon the late Baron Bunsen, whom he describes as a dexterous manipulator, transmuting legends into history — a "chronocrator," claiming a sort of reflex second-sight, and dividing up monarchs and eras with a discretionary power, in order to frame his own theory. Those who hold to a sedate Biblical chronology, will not object to such an excoriating of Bunsen by a writer whose zeal for the Hebrew scriptures is no greater than his own. But between the extremes of historical scepticism, represented by Bunsen and Lewis, we beg to interpose a rational and moderating faith. There is a mutual confirmation of the Hebrew books of Kings and Chronicles, and of Egyptian records and monuments of the sixth and seventh centuries before Christ; i. e. within the limits which Sir George Lewis assigns as the trustworthy period of Egyptian history. He himself cites this correspondence from the Hebrew scriptures. It cannot be, therefore, that the reading of the hieroglyphics is so unworthy of trust as he would have us believe. The science of their interpretation is yet in its infancy; the key has been found, though the cabalistic words that would open many a ward of this huge combination-lock, are not yet discovered. It becomes Egyptologers to labor with modesty, as well as with patience; and the extravagant scepticism of Sir G. C. Lewis as to their results, may give a salutary check to their own no less extravagant speculations. Time will correct and harmonize what now seems doubtful or contradictory.

Jerusalem und das heilige Land is the title of a pilgrim's manual for Palestine, Syria, and Egypt, prepared by Dr. Sepp, Professor of History in the Munich High School.[1] It is to be completed in four parts, of which the first only has appeared; and will consist of historical, topographical, and archaeological descriptions and discussions, illustrated by numerous woodcuts. Part I. opens with an account of Joppa, Lydda, and Ramleh, to each of which is devoted a chapter, blending graphic pictures of present scenes with an exhaustive narrative of the biblical and political history of the places. The wood-cuts representing the bazar in Jafa, the church of St. George at Lydda, and the cisterns of Helena and the old tower at Ramleh, are executed with a clearness and beauty seldom attained when pictures are worked into the printed page. Sepp makes the castle of Colonia the Emmaus of the New Testament.

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[1] Schaffhausen: Fr. Hurter 'sche Buchhandlung. 1862.

In treating of Jerusalem as the centre of Mosaïsm, of Christianity, and of Islamism, the author diverges into a somewhat striking episode upon these three world-religions: Mosaism is the *vorbildliche*, Mohammedanism the *nachbildliche*, Christianity the *urbildliche*, — the archetypal, universal, complete, and true religion. He also enters into an architectural comparison of Solomon's temple with the religious structures of the Phoenicians and Assyrians, and of the Moslems, illustrating this comparison with numerous plans and sketches in detail.

In his topography of the city, Dr. Sepp adopts the view which is more and more gaining ground with recent writers, that the Tyropoean must be found in the valley running from the Damascus gate, southward through the city. The dorsal ridge north of the Jaffa gate, which Dr. Robinson identifies with Akra, Dr. Sepp regards as a prolongation of Zion, with Golgotha on its eastward terrace; while he makes Akra overhang the Kidron, south of the temple summit, the lower city stretching irregularly downward to Siloa. Thus the point which Dr. Robinson supposed himself to have settled twenty years ago is re-opened by every new explorer, and must probably remain undetermined until a thorough excavation of Jerusalem shall furnish the key to its true topography. We may find occasion to notice Dr. Sepp's work again, as its subsequent parts shall be issued. The reader will find it a somewhat curious medley of the legendary and symbolical with the historical and the practical, making an entertaining and instructive volume, which can hardly aspire to the character of an authority.

A devout and observing traveller in Palestine was Abraham von Noroff, for many years the Russian minister of public instruction, whose Notes on the Holy Land have just been translated from the Russian into German, and published by Weber of Leipsig.[1] This is merely a book of travels, but as Noroff makes the Bible his principal text-book, and at the same time is familiar with the eastern church fathers and the early tourists in Palestine, it has an interest peculiarly its own. Entering Palestine from the South, by way of the isthmus of Suez, he pursued the usual zigzag route of travellers, so as to embrace in his journey northward to Sidon all the principal points of interest in the country. Von Noroff locates Capernaum at Tel-Hum, after a full discussion of the arguments adduced in favor of Khan Minyeh as the site. This point is well argued by Dr. W. M. Thomson, in his Land and Book; but Schulz, in his new map of Galilee, adheres to Minyeh as the true locality. Our traveller seems to have accepted without inquiry the traditional Kana (Kefer Kenna) as the true scene of the miracle.

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[1] Meine Reise nach Palastina. 2 vols. 12mo. pp.

Notwithstanding the relaxation of Mohammedan bigotry at the mosque of Omar, in Jerusalem, this high Russian functionary was unable to gain entrance into the mosque at Hebron, that covers the family tomb of Abraham. The Prince of Wales was more fortunate, having obtained from the Turkish goverment a firman, opening the mosque to himself and his party. Side by side, in a recess, are the alleged tombs of Abraham and Sarah, mere cenotaphs, cased with marble, and hung with green carpets embroidered with gold, the gifts of several sultans. Each tomb is guarded by a silver gate. The royal party were permitted to enter the chamber of Abraham's tomb, and Dr. Rosen constructed a ground-plan of that portion of the mosque in which the sepulchres are placed. Doubtless he and Canon Stanley will publish the results of this interesting exploration. We learn, however, from a correspondent of the London *Times*, who was one of the party, that the guides not only resisted any attempt to explore the cave beneath the chamber, but would not even suffer a lamp to be lowered into it. "One indication alone of the cavern beneath was visible. In the interior of the mosque, at the corner of the shrine of Abraham, was a small circular hole, about eight inches across, of which one foot above the pavement was built of strong masonry, but the lower part was of the living rock. This cavity appeared to open into a dark space beneath, which can hardly be anything else than the ancient cavern of Macphelah."

It is gratifying to know that thus much has been gained; that the fanatical jealousy with which the Moslem has guarded the mosque at Hebron has given way, even to this limited extent; and that what was denied to a minister of Russia was conceded to the crown prince of England.

Mr. Noroff's agreeable volumes well repay perusal. The author presents himself in the frontispiece as a hale and enterprising gentleman of sixty-five, but disfigured by a wooden leg. A tour through Palestine, accomplished with such a physical infirmity, argues much energy and sprightliness of character.

From Noroff's merely passing notes of travel, we turn with avidity to Constantine Tischendorf's latest observations upon the Holy Land;[1] for though geographical and topographical comments were but incidental to his main object — a search for ancient manuscripts in the convents of the East — yet his habits of critical investigation, and the facilities which he had as an explorer, through the favor of the Emperor of Russia, give a special interest and value, even to these notes by the way. The first six chapters of the volume (pp. 1–71) are occupied with the journey from Alexandria to Mt. Sinai. The sixth chapter, covering the route from Ayun Musa to the convent, discusses several disputed questions; e. g. the crossing of the Red Sea, the inscriptions in Wadi Mokatteb, the nature of the manna, etc. Tischendorf had already considered the route of the Israelites in his "Reise in den Orient" (1845–46), and in a special tractate, "de Israëlitarum per mare rubrum transitu" (1847). Revising his conclusions somewhat, in the light of more recent investigations by Lepsius, Brugsch, Gust. Unruh, and others, he still inclines to regard the traditionary "wells of Moses" as the real starting point of the Israelites for their wanderings in the desert of Sinai, after the passage of the Red Sea. With a devout faith in the miracle as related by Moses, Tischendorf finds his religious impressions of the scene deepened by each successive visit. The imperishable memory of this great work of God, consecrates afresh each new journey to Sinai, and the consciousness that, after more than three thousand years, we are going over, step by step, that marvellous and momentous journeying, so visibly guided by the hand of the Lord, is not the least cause for thanksgiving in our personal travels.[1]

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[1] Aus dem Heiligen Lande, von Constantine Tischendorf. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus. 1862.

In the inscriptions in Wadi Mokatteb, Tischendorf recognizes both a heathen and a Christian element: the former he ascribes to the Nabathaeans during their occupation of the peninsula of Sinai, from the fourth century before Christ; the latter he dates from the expulsion of the Nabathaeans by the Romans, towards the close of the second century of our era. Upon the whole, Tischendorf adds little to the elaborate discussion of this subject by Professors Beer, Credner, and Tuch, a good résumé of whose labors is given by Dr. Robinson in Vol. I, 2d ed., note xix. Dr. Robinson states (1856) that no Jewish or Christian name had been found in the inscriptions; but Levy (1860) mentions the discovery of a "Diakonus Hiob." Tischendorf inclines to the opinion that the Nabathaeans were not the indigenous population of Arabia by descent from Ishmael, but were Aramaean or Chaldean emigrants from Mesopotamia, who established their dominion in Arabia Petraea about 400 B. C. Of course, then, there is no ground for the speculations of Forster that these inscriptions were the work of the Israelites, and give traces of the primeval human language. Our author devotes several pages to an interesting discussion of the habits and properties of the manna-tamarisk, found in Wadi Scheich. Berthelot, in a paper submitted to the Academy of Science at Paris, September, 1861, gives the following chemical analysis of this manna of Sinai: Cane-sugar, 55; sugar modified (interverti), 25; dextrine and analogous products, 20 =100. At the same time, he adds his opinion that this manna could not alone suffice for nutriment, since it contains nothing of the azotic principle. Tischendorf gives a particular description of Wadi Sebâyeh, lying to the southeast of Jebel Mousa, the traditionary Sinai. He states that long before reaching the plain, the peak of Sinai rises into view from the approaching Wadi. The plain itself measures about twelve hundred feet in length by from fourteen to eighteen hundred in breadth. Still, the er-Rahah of Robinson better fulfils the conditions of the narrative. With Robinson, Tischendorf locates Rephidim in Wadi Scheich.

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[1] Pages 25, 26.

Chapters IX, X, and XI are devoted to a minute account of the discovery of the famous manuscript of the Holy Scriptures, and the measures taken to secure it for the Christian world. But all this — interesting as the story is from the enthusiastic style of the narrator, as well as from the intrinsic value of the discovery — is too familiar to be here repeated. Returning to Cairo, Tischendorf set out for another tour of inspection among the convents of Palestine. At Jaffa, he had the good fortune to attach himself to the caravan of the Grand-Duke Constantine, of Russia; and during his stay in Jerusalem he attended with that functionary a high mass in the church of the Holy Sepulchre. He devotes a chapter to the question of the holy places, giving a useful résumé of the evidences for the genuineness of the site which tradition has assigned to Golgotha and the sepulchre. His account of the literary remains in the several convents which he visited is, however, of more value than his topographical discussions. On his return to Europe Tischendorf visited the convent of John in the island of Patmos.

As a fitting close of this notice, we announce the publication at Leipsig, in a brochure by Dr. Joh. Ernst Volbeding, of a sketch of the literary life and labors of this eminent biblical critic. It is entitled Constantin Tischendorf in seiner Fünfundzwanzigjährigen Schriftstellerischen Wirksamkeit Upwards of sixty distinct publications of Tischendorf are herein described.

ERRATA.

Page 715, first line; for when, read *where.* Page 722, second line from bottom of page; for is, read *as.*

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